

WORK IN PROGRESS 47



South African Youth Congress Launched

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Editorial

South Africa is a complex society, difficult to analyse, sometimes impossible to understand.

Take, for example, the general election planned for 6 May. It appears to be an event no progressive-minded person or opposition organisation would have anything to do with. It is racially exclusive, held under state of emergency regulations which favour the ruling National Party, and has the purpose of voting in candidates for one chamber of the discredited tricameral parliament. In addition, the outcome of voting seems both irrelevant and a foregone conclusion.

But closer scrutiny of the election suggests that its outcome may decide the sort of white power bloc the African National Congress and its allies will ultimately sit down with to discuss the dismantling of apartheid and a transfer of power.

The issue of Bantu Education bears similar scrutiny. Since the early 1980s, the sort of education imposed by this system has been analysed as not only inferior to white education, but actually distorting of African students' development. Some have even argued that Bantu Education conceptually deforms its subjects, and that much has to be unlearnt before a Bantu Education product can start afresh.

In this context support for the massive school boycotts of the past few years seemed not only logical, but politically wise. The slogan 'liberation now, education later' accurately reflected this attitude.

But now clearly progressive forces - the NECC, civic and community leaders, and even parents and students themselves - have pushed for a return to school in that cradle of resistance, the Eastern Cape. A respected leader in the region has argued that 'pupils can only claim their right to speak as students as long as they remain within the walls of the classrooms'. And, in urging pupils to go back to school he said that 'the community was forced to decide whether it was better to be educated, even if by the hated Bantu Education systems, than to be uneducated'.

If opposition political tactics and strategies are always in a state of flux, precisely because the society they seek to alter is also changing, then there is little room for dogma and inflexibility.

The development of new ways of seeing old problems is the mark of a developing and maturing political culture which should be welcomed.

Controversy has followed the recent debate in these columns concerning the relationship between COSATU, Inkatha and UWUSA.

In particular, the editors have been criticised for both the manner in which they published the response by 'COSATU official', and the subsequent attack launched on this official by another contributor.

Having accepted an anonymous contribution from 'COSATU official', the editors were at fault in publishing the subsequent attack on his/her anonymity.

The editors apologise for this, and are currently setting up guidelines to ensure that similar incidents do not occur in the future.

In addition, the editors have been asked to point out that the article on this debate in WIP 46, 'COSATU Strategy in Natal', was written by Geoff Schreiner. Only the brief introductory comment on the anonymity of 'COSATU official' was by Mike Morris.

Finally, the editors did not intend to present any of the articles in this debate as official COSATU policy. It is regretted if any headline gave this impression. All articles reflected the opinions of individual authors.

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Cover drawing by Jonathan Shapiro

SOUTH AFRICAN YOUTH CONGRESS

LAUNCHING CONFERENCE

1987 CAPE TOWN



New National Youth Congress Launched Emergency Forces New Forms of Organisation

The state of emergency severely hampered progressive organisation. But it also challenged activists to find new ways of operating. DAVID NIDDRIE of Agenda Press argues that the recently-launched South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) has adopted a new response to emergency conditions – underground organisation of a mass-based youth movement.

The formation of any political organisation claiming signed-up membership of between 600 000 and 700 000, and a support base of two million, is significant.

But the 28 March launch of the South African Youth Congress is unusually important. For SAYCO is the first national youth grouping set up since the banning of COSAS. And, given the circumstances under which SAYCO organises, it is surprising that the launch took place at all.

SAYCO has done little to avoid immediate and harsh state reaction. The symbols chosen as its public face include the slogan 'Freedom or death - victory is certain'; organisational colours of black, green, gold and red; and a fist holding a red flag as its logo.

In addition, SAYCO's launching congress elected the much-detained ex-Robben Island prisoner, Peter Makoba, as president. Other members of the national executive are: Vice President Mzimasi Mangcotywa; General Secretary Rapu Molekane; Publicity Secretary Simon Ntombela; Education Officer Ephraim Nkoe; and Treasurer Fawcet Mathebe.

To some extent, SAYCO recognises the inevitability that it will become a target of government action. By following in COSAS's footsteps as the cutting edge of popular resistance, it can hardly avoid the wrath of the state.

LAUNCHING SAYCO UNDERGROUND

The decision to step forward as a national organisation is based largely on SAYCO's confidence that it can survive virtually anything the state can throw at it.

The youth congress was born in complete secrecy in Cape Town on 28 March after three rapid, last-minute, changes of venue. This followed an apparently carefully-planned disinformation campaign which identified Durban as the site of the launch.

SAYCO leaders believe the organisation represents a new form of opposition politics in South Africa, combining mass membership with an underground form of organisation.

'We are a legal organisation operating

legally. But the state has forced us to organise underground', said Rapu Molekane.

The 250 delegates and observers to the founding congress were well on their way home before the first murmurs of the launch reached even sympathetic journalists.

In the past six months, ten regional youth congresses have met and been launched in conditions of equal secrecy. Most of these congresses exist in areas where security is far tighter than it is in the Western Cape.

Regional congresses exist in the Southern, Northern and Eastern Transvaal, the Southern, Western and Northern Cape, Border, the Eastern Cape, Natal and the Orange Free State.

When the Southern Transvaal (STYCO) and Northern Transvaal (NTYCO) congresses were set up, it took two weeks before their existence was known by anyone other than those involved in the launches.

But the leadership speaks with confidence of a signed-up membership of more than half a million, and believes this will continue to grow. And they believe that through the numerous youth congresses active in the last year, they command the support of about two million young South Africans.

LESSONS FROM THE EMERGENCY

Equally important is the fact that leadership is able to speak at all after nine months under a state of emergency.

'We learnt some hard lessons in the first emergency', said General Secretary Rapu Molekane some weeks before the national launch. 'Many of us were hit in the first wave of detentions. But by the time 12 June (the second emergency) came, we had adjusted'.

The major thrust of local youth congress activity switched from high-profile, mass recruitment rallies to a system comparable to street committees.

Living permanently underground, organisers established communication channels sufficiently strong, despite the emergency crackdown, to hold regional structures together.

The Northern Transvaal Youth Congress launch in December linked up 150 local

congresses - 40 in Sekhukhuneland alone - over an area stretching from just north of Pretoria to the far northern Transvaal.

SAYCO's militancy cannot be dismissed as passing youthful enthusiasm. Almost 11 years have gone by since the 1976 student revolt. The youth of 1976 has spent much of its time since then in the streets. And experience and economic crisis have combined to give township youth a far clearer idea than before of the limitations of existing political and economic institutions in meeting their needs.

Since 1976, many have persisted in seeing students and youth as part of the same social category. As a result, the more general demands made by youth have been under-emphasised in favour of students' educational struggles. But there has, in those 11 years, been an increasing divergence of interests and demands between youth and students.

STUDENTS LEAD RESISTANCE

The student movement of late 1976 and 1977 made general political demands. Students recognised that an end to Bantu Education required an end to the present South African social system.

An entire generation threw off the legacy of its parents' subservience. But

the basis of the anger and frustration remained Bantu Education, and the perceived restrictions it imposed on entry into the economy.

The black youth of 1976 had only experienced 'gutter education'. But they were better educated than any previous generation, and expected far greater access to benefits the economy had to offer.



First SAYCO President
Peter Makoba

Paul Weinberg

The economic recession which continued through the 1970s, crushed those expectations. The burning rage of 1976 was then directed, not surprisingly, at the education system which had promised so much and delivered so little.

A decade later, the education system remains a major bone of contention - and for many young black South Africans is still one of the major reasons for their disadvantage. But organised student groupings have increasingly handed over political initiative to organisations operating outside the school yards and off the campuses.

The National Education Crisis Committee initiatives of 1985 and 1986

showed the beginning of this trend. Black students are not about to quit the political area - either as part of a student-youth overlap, or in their own right. But the shortcomings of a schoolyard-based, but nationally-targetted, political 'struggle' demanded resolution.

The need to resolve this tension in national resistance politics meant that the organised student movement had to hand over leadership of popular struggle. And paralleling this came a literal revolution in the conditions dictating the forms of popular struggle. The question of which social groups

should lead in the struggle was raised in this context.

YOUTH ORGANISATIONS DEVELOP

The ongoing recession, which influenced the development of a progressive trade union movement and the 1976 generation's militancy, imposed massive economic pressure on students and youth. A political reaction was almost inevitable, and the upheavals of 1985 were not unexpected.

Heightened political consciousness both nurtured and was developed by the political groupings which combined into the United Democratic Front in 1983. They were born and grew to adulthood at breathtaking speed.

But the cutting edge of the UDF remained the youth movements. Organised mainly through COSAS, the youth represented almost half the UDF's affiliated membership at the time of its national launch.

Years before the difference between the 'youth' and 'students' was publicly acknowledged, the organised youth themselves recognised and began addressing the issue.

The economy shrank in real terms, depriving first thousands, and then millions, of the chance to work. Huge sections of the 1976 generation moved into lumpen-proletarian limbo between the schools and the formal economy. Even in Soweto, not an area of high unemployment, the jobless rate for youths under 21 was way above fifty percent.

The ongoing schools crisis and the boycott-closure-boycott cycle pushed thousands more into this limbo. Denied the chance of moving into the factories, these highly politicised veterans of 1976 remained in the townships, grouped loosely around COSAS.

As the major student-youth interface, COSAS initiated the establishment of youth congresses within months of its formation.

By the time COSAS was banned in 1986, the youth congresses had taken on an independent life of their own, with their members hardened from the experiences of 1976 and 1985. But they remained largely locally based

organisations until late last year.



SAYCO replaces COSAS as UDF's largest affiliate

Gili de Vlieg

AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN WORKERS AND YOUTH

This growing group was increasingly suspended between an education system which could offer no solutions, and an economic system which did not even offer the chance of being exploited.

The 'comrades', as these youths became known, began casting about for options and alternatives which could do more than change them from a voteless to an enfranchised lumpen proletariat. They were beginning to challenge the basis of their marginalisation from society and the economy.

It was thus no accident that the keynote address at the SAYCO launch was given by an official of the Congress of South African Trade Unions. Neither was it coincidence that COSATU's statements on an alliance between organised workers and the youth took on an increasing warmth as the launch approached.

In its wide-ranging executive message to members in February, COSATU

leadership referred to the youth as the 'strongest, best and most reliable allies of the working class... The youth exploit no-one. They have nothing to lose and everything to gain by marching together with us to a workers' future'.

A possible alliance with COSATU is a central part of SAYCO's focus. The aims and objectives adopted at the SAYCO launch reflect a growing identification with the organised working class. The congress resolved to:

- * 'channel the militancy and resourcefulness of the youth to the benefit of the whole national and class struggle;
- * 'promote and deepen amongst the youth the outlook of the most progressive class, the working class;
- * 'encourage the working youth to join progressive trade unions which form part and parcel for total political and economic liberation'.

In a message to COSATU, SAYCO made special mention of the federation's 'living wage' and 'jobs for all' campaigns 'with a view to playing a very important role in them'. SAYCO hopes to 'see the working relationship between it and COSATU deepen in the course of

struggle', and will 'actively encourage its young worker membership to join COSATU-affiliated trade unions'.


The mutual warmth between SAYCO and COSATU does not, however, imply any tension between the UDF and SAYCO. Most of the local youth congresses came into the national body as affiliates of the UDF, and SAYCO itself has affiliated. Youth congresses will continue to supply the backbone of UDF membership. In addition, youth congress involvement in the development of street committees has been largely undertaken on behalf of the UDF.

Some months before the national launch, SAYCO executive member Ephraim Nkoe stated that 'we look to the UDF for national leadership'. There is no question of SAYCO challenging the UDF's multi-class united front policies.

But the debate within the UDF on the form of a post-apartheid economy is likely to increase substantially. The formation of SAYCO means that half a million members whose conditions of existence demand an explicit addressing of economic problems have become the most powerful single affiliate in the front.

White Election

The forthcoming parliamentary election is an all-white affair. But those without the vote have deeply influenced the issues and course of white politics. And the racial exclusivity of the election does not mean its outcome is irrelevant. INGRID OBERY and PHILLIP VAN NIEKERK explore the complexities of those party to the election.



The Crucial Issue is Black Politics

The central issue of the 6 May white election is black politics, ironically involving those who cannot vote.

Not that white politicians are deeply concerned about those without the franchise. But, however unwillingly, nearly all recognise that they have to contend with black claims - both moral and physical - for political power.

The election is about how to deal with this challenge. The far right is willing to shoot it out; the right - the National Party - has no ideas; and the moderates want to negotiate before it is too late.

A QUESTION OF POWER



Confrontation with the prospect of black rule is represented in the militancy of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB)

which is preparing to meet the threat with guns. The AWB sees itself and the African National Congress as the two ultimate contenders for power. And despite their failure to form an election pact, both the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) and the Conservative Party (CP), in seeking a return to old-style apartheid, fall into this camp.

On the other side the Progressive Federal Party, and to some extent the independents, accept that a black-dominated government is a logical inevitability. To retain some control over how this comes about, and thus pre-empt a social revolution, the moderates propose negotiations with recognised black leaders as soon as possible.

The real Rubicon in white politics is thus acceptance of talks with the gagged African National Congress.

The National Party also claims to be seeking accommodation of black political

aspirations. Government says the election is to obtain a mandate from the white electorate to negotiate with black leaders.

The NP uses the rhetoric of reform. But in refusing to surrender power, it cannot deal with the central question of black political rights.

RESTRUCTURING APARTHEID

Government is committed to a programme which it terms reform. Others call it neo-apartheid, in which apartheid is restructured, but not dismantled. The building blocks of NP policy are black local authorities and the bantustans. Both are politically discredited, and grassroots and international rejection have exposed the bankruptcy of neo-apartheid.

These Nationalist-created structures are part of white rule's crisis of legitimacy. Yet the state wants to use these rejected structures to overcome the crisis. Talks with the ANC, and any real power for blacks at local or national level, is not on the NP agenda.

The question of reform is a confused one. While the government uses terms like 'reform', 'real change' and 'de-segregation', it is unable to give these terms the positive meaning which is generally accepted. Government has introduced substantial and significant changes. But altering an unacceptable system, rather than dismantling it, is not necessarily change for the better.

'Reform' in NP terms ultimately involves a pragmatic programme to restructure apartheid machinery into a more rational and outwardly acceptable form, but without changing the fundamental principle of divided race groups and white domination.

While government's 'reform' programme never intended to abolish minority white power, it did create the space for popular forces to win some real gains. Local officials, carried along in the stream of 'reform talk', became more open to negotiations with popular local black leaders. While PW Botha spurned talks with the ANC, some local authorities were striking deals with organisations which flew the ANC flag at funerals and political rallies.

The state faced a contradiction. Its reform talk set various changes in

motion which were incompatible with its real agenda. This was particularly evident in events around the Eminent Persons Group Mission to South Africa. This venture was made on the basis of Botha's 30 September 1985 speech to the National Party Cape Congress where he stated: 'My party and I are committed to the principle of an undivided South Africa with one citizenship and universal franchise, but within structures chosen by South Africans'. The EPG members tried to facilitate a process of negotiation among all South Africans, and appeared to be making some headway.

But on 19 May, the government launched military raids against alleged ANC bases and civilian activists in Lusaka and Harare, deliberately sabotaging the EPG initiative. Shortly afterwards on 12 June it declared the second state of emergency. This time it was nation wide and gave police and army much wider powers.

Popular pressure from below has created a new dichotomy in white politics. Because the National Party is unable to provide direction or vision for dealing with this pressure, it is losing support to right and left.

While the AWB's concept of 'fighting it out' hardly constitutes a vision, it does have a coherence which attracts right-wing whites alive to the dangers of their position.

The PFP and its allies offer a concrete political alternative of negotiated majority rule and a capitalist economy to those whites actively seeking reform.

BOTHA'S GAMBLE

Botha needed to hold an election to counter the taunts of the right that his mandate ran out in 1986 (five years after the last election), and growing dissatisfaction among the National Party's left.

The election could have been called last November. In August Botha hinted broadly at an imminent election. He delayed, probably expecting the economy to improve - a factor which usually wins the government in office some votes.

Botha's strategy echoes that of then-Prime Minister BJ Vorster in the 1977 election. Vorster called the election

shortly after the crackdown on the 1976-77 school and township upheavals, the banning of black political organisations, the closing of a popular black newspaper, and the death in detention of black consciousness leader Steve Biko.

Vorster successfully whipped up white opinion with an anti-United States harangue after American Vice President Walter Mondale had called for one-man-one-vote and President Jimmy Carter supported mandatory sanctions on military sales to South Africa.

Botha appears to hope for a similar NP landslide by mobilising anti-US feeling, particularly around the sanctions threat, and anti-ANC rhetoric.

A strong 'law and order' ticket is also part of the NP's campaign. One of the most unanimous sentiments among the white electorate - both far right and moderate - centres on security and the need for tough measures. Last year polls showed the state of emergency was very popular among whites. By capitalising on this, the Nationalists hope to outflank the far right's 'law and order' calls and consolidate the white electorate behind the NP.

Botha gambled in calling the election for May. He hoped the economy would improve and allow government to dole out benefits to white farmers and civil servants. Party strategists believed that a long run-up to the election would benefit the NP with its vast organisation and power to manipulate wavering supporters dependent on state licences, permits or tenders for government contracts. Finally, Botha calculated that an election would keep those Nats considering a break to left or right within the party.

The gamble failed on a number of counts. The economy did not pick up significantly. The long drought did not break in important agricultural areas. Civil service payouts had to be delayed until after the election because of lack of funds. Instead, government announced a free long weekend on 1 May, immediately before the election.

The long run-up has probably helped the Nats organise, but strong dissatisfactions within the party had time to reach to the surface, giving disgruntled Nats like Dennis Worrall and Wynand Malan the opportunity to prepare for jumping ship.

National Party support includes a vast apathetic majority, and the shortage of

volunteer organisers remains chronic. Botha's authoritarian style of government, and in particular his decision to take away from the party congresses even nominal power to determine 'policy' as opposed to 'principle', has all but eliminated the once-eager NP activists. But one should never underestimate the power of the National Party machinery, and its ongoing access to and control over SABC media.

The election announcement did limit to one the number of MPs leaving the party. But a powerful independent movement got under way, including many influential non-parliamentarians, much to the surprise of a government gearing up to concentrate its guns on the far right.

THE FAR-RIGHT CHALLENGE

By 1982 the far right had become a threat to the National Party in its traditional strongholds of the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

The HNP obtained one-third of votes cast in the Transvaal platteland in 1981, 25% in the Free State, 18% in Pretoria and 14% in the country as a whole. And after the 1982 NP split, when 17 MPs broke away to form the CP, by-election results consistently showed a massive swing to the far right.

The HNP lost the Carletonville seat to the NP in May 1981 by 1 379 votes. In a by-election two years later, the CP and HNP together polled 500 votes more than the NP. In the Germiston District provincial by-election, where the HNP had not even stood before, the HNP and CP together polled more votes than the NP candidate.

Andries Treurnicht took Waterberg for the CP 1983, Tom Langley won the Soutpansberg parliamentary seat in 1984 while the Potgietersrus provincial seat was captured by the CP in the same year.

The most marked swing was in the blue-collar areas. In 1985 the HNP won its first-ever seat (Sasolburg) when the CP backed its candidate. In the same series of by-elections the CP won 4 539 votes in Springs, coming within 749 of defeating the Nationalist candidate in a seat which had not been contested by the far right before. Other blue-collar seats where the CP performed well included Primrose and Rosettenville.



Sandy Smitt

The AWB's Terre'blanche: Militant populism of the far right


If the far right simply maintains the swings already recorded, some 40 seats in the Transvaal and Free State will be within its grasp. Fifty-two percent of registered voters are located in the Transvaal, the testing ground for gains in far-right support. But poll support will probably be less than expected. The CP - HNP election pact dispute prevented both parties from active electioneering for three crucial months, while National Party machinery has been operating at full steam.

In opposing an election pact with the HNP, the CP has gambled on posing itself as the only party of the far right, and reducing the HNP to little more than an irritation factor. It based this on polls which showed the HNP had less than 3% and the CP more than 15% support countrywide. But this may mean one out of six far-right voters have been neutralised - they may not have a candidate to support. This is a crucial factor given that most of the seats which the right wing hopes to win are marginal.

Even if the far right is unable to make a good showing because of its leaders' suicidal electoral tactics,

there will still be a substantial political grouping to the right of the National Party.

SUPPORT FOR THE FAR RIGHT



In class terms, the far-right represents farmers, blue collar workers and lower to middle order civil servants. And judging by the number of Mercedes Benz's at far-right meetings, it is not just small farmers who feel economically aggrieved and hostile to the NP.

The drought has still not broken in many areas. Together with the debt crisis - made worse by heavy investment in mechanisation - this has created an economic crisis for many farmers in the northern areas. Government handouts at this stage are too small to alleviate this crisis and unlikely to buy farmer support for the NP.

The Botha government's close relationship with big business has alienated the remnants of white working-class support which was once a pillar of the National Party. White workers have felt challenged by black workers who have increasingly acquired skills and whose rapidly-growing trade unions have been legitimised by the system.

The Mineworkers Union, led until recently by the 'knight for the white', Arrie Paulus, represents a significant and militantly organised sector of the white working class which has shifted its support to the far right. Paulus himself is standing for election as Conservative Party candidate in Carletonville. And the black National Union of Mineworkers, which has emerged as a huge factor in the lives of white miners, challenging their traditional rights and privilege, did not exist during the last white election.

Not since the 1930s have whites been as impoverished by economic depression. White unemployment is a growing social problem with, for example, 20 000 white workers laid off in the metal industry.

Sheltered employment in parastatals like the railways has decreased as SA Transport Services, responsive to private sector criticism, streamlines itself in a bid to become profitable.

White bureaucrats - probably the greatest beneficiaries of white privilege - stand to lose under any conditions of deracialisation and the

principles of privatisation. They fear loss of promotion and job opportunities and their income has already declined substantially against the cost of living since 1981.

Support for the far right is concentrated in the north of the country, the economic heartland of the Transvaal, and in regions most prone to drought in the past five years.

Afrikaner Nationalism in the north has a militant populist tradition which has been taken over from the National Party by Eugene Terre 'blanche and the AWB. Botha is a Cape Nat, and while he has a reputation as a party organiser, his autocratic style of government has alienated the grassroots of the party.

The previously existing unity of Afrikanerdom based on loyalty to the Volk is now split. When the CP departed from the NP in 1982, it divided virtually every single Afrikaner nationalist organisation - from the Broederbond to the Voortrekkers. These organisations were the political glue which held Afrikaner nationalism together. The HNP's failure to compete for these organisations when it split in 1969 doomed it to the fringes of far-right politics.

Despite the state's strongarmed crushing of township revolt, many right-wingers believe repression should have been even harsher. The CP's law and order platform is reinforced by candidates like General Hendrik van den Bergh, who built Vorster's brutal security empire; and Brigadier 'Rooi Rus' Swanepoel, the security police chief interrogator in the 1960s and early 1970s, often called 'the beast' for his harsh methods used in quelling the Soweto and Alexandra protests of 1976.

THE MODERATE ALLIANCE



There has been almost as much pre-election activity to the left of the National Party as to the right. The Worrall/Malan/Stellenbosch defections represent a significant crumbling of the National Party establishment, although the impact of this should not be over-emphasised.

More than anything, it reflects the National Party's lack of vision for the future. The independents may have



Anna Ziemiński

The PFP leader Eglin: advocating unbanning of the ANC

intended their actions to force the Nats into adopting real reforms. But the consequences point rather to a new alignment of whites with a model of reform opposed to government's restructuring of apartheid.

The independents are prepared to talk to the ANC, and open channels for a negotiated settlement. But they still have much in common with the government, believing strong law and order is necessary to ensure stability while power sharing is worked out.

Despite the strength of apartheid ideology, the Progressive Federal Party has developed the most comprehensive vision of all opposition groupings in white parliamentary politics. It has dropped support for a qualified franchise, and accepted the inevitability of majority rule. It advocates the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela, and unbanning of the ANC.

The Natal/Kwazulu Indaba, the first real alternative model proposed by white parliamentary opposition, represents a PFP vision for a future South Africa. This involves a multi-party democracy - in which a black majority is inevitable - based on free enterprise and a capitalist economy.



Guy Tillim

Independent Worrall: nearer to the Nats than the PFP

Natal, home of the Indaba, is a crucial area if the PFP is to increase its number of seats. Natal represents a large section of the floating conservative English vote which supported the PFP in 1981 but backed the National Party in the 1983 referendum. The performance of the PFP/NRP alliance in the election will be a key indication of whites' readiness to accept the sort of moderate change suggested by the Natal Indaba.

There are some indications of growing PFP strength. While the Anglo-American connection has always given the PFP the image as the party of English-speaking capital, it has never been a very wealthy party. Now, for the first time, the PFP is financially strong enough to fight an effective national campaign.

The majority of big business remains apathetic, or supports the National Party. But some elements which supported the NP in the 1983 referendum have switched support to the PFP or the independents. South Africa's economic and diplomatic decline has alienated much of the business support which Botha wooed at the 1979 Carlton conference.

But despite these shifts, the PFP can only win a very limited number of seats. It is already close to its ceiling of

support, and lost crucial newspaper support in the Transvaal when the *Rand Daily Mail* closed. The party may even lose seats in that region on 6 May.

The PFP has recognised that it is acceptable to a limited and largely English-speaking section of the electorate. Party leadership hopes that the independents can be the catalyst for the large-scale movement of reform-minded middle-class Afrikaners into a new centrist coalition.

Left-wing groups, which are exclusively extra-parliamentary, have not been vocal around the election. Conflicting messages from different UDF representatives on whether to vote has reduced potential impact of the white left as a voting bloc. But the election has been a catalyst in forming a potentially significant white grouping, the Johannesburg-based alliance calling itself the Five Freedoms Forum.

RALLYING THE PARTY FAITHFUL

The instruments of power may shield the National Party from its own crisis. And while the party establishment and to some extent the caucus crumbles to left and right, white support may still rally behind it.

This has a lot to do with the totalitarian nature of South African politics: historically, white South Africans have tended passively to accept power structures. This tendency is coupled with state control over the most important instruments of information, particularly the SABC.

The majority of whites rely entirely on television for their political knowledge. And state of emergency restrictions on the media have ensured that many will be voting without any real knowledge of events in the country. Not perceiving the depth of crisis, the white electorate may fail to appreciate the need for alternative solutions - to the left or the right of NP policy.

Government still has substantial support from sectors of white capital, while the popular personality of Pik Botha, who has the standing of a matinee idol, will gain the NP some extra votes. In addition, the formidable National Party election machine has been working since the end of last year - a factor particularly damaging to the far right

which has lost valuable organising time squabbling over election pacts.

The government's achilles heel should have been the economy's disastrous performance since 1981. In that election, the state of the economy was an issue for the first time. Inflation stood at 16%, eroding the savings and standard of living of middle-class white suburbia.

A most damaging Nationalist blunder in 1981 was Health Minister Lapa Munnik's statement that pensioners could survive on R20 a month.

This year the economy is in very much worse shape. But Finance Minister Barend du Plessis has appealed to voters not to blame the government, and opposition parties have not yet succeeded in turning economic policy into a main election issue.

In western countries poor economic performance and growing poverty usually result in votes against the government of the day. But in South Africa this process is somewhat distorted because those who suffer the economic crisis most are without votes.

AFTER THE ELECTION 

If the far-right had established party unity at the same time as the moderates made their moves, the 1987 election could have been a disaster for the National Party. A combined right could have won 35 to 40 seats, and the moderates the same number. This would have brought white parliamentary opposition close to the magic figure of 84 required to prevent an overall Nationalist majority.

But far-right disorganisation is no cause for the Nationalists to breathe easier.

After the election, the NP will continue to be a party without a vision. It will still lack any plan beyond the hidden agenda of rule through Joint Management Committees. And township upgrading and resurrected black local authorities will remain the only concessions to black political aspirations.

As long as the central question of political rights is avoided, government strategies will collapse. These repeated failures will underline the lack of vision and lead to further defections to left and right. When this happens

government will be even more vulnerable if it cannot contain the next township rebellion.


All opposition groups are looking towards the scheduled 1989 election - the first concurrent white, coloured and Indian elections under the tricameral constitution. If this takes place the Nationalists will face a better-organised response from the far right; a new centrist group claiming to be the real reformers; and widespread protest in coloured and Indian communities.

The party might be weakened by the succession struggle which promises to throw it further into crisis. Chris Heunis' chances of taking over from PW Botha could be severely dented if his opponent, new independent Dennis Worrall, fares well in Helderberg. This would make FW de Klerk, NP leader in the Transvaal, the most likely successor. But his base will be undermined if the far right makes any gains in the Transvaal.

Pik Botha has also been named as a possible successor to PW Botha. A bitter succession struggle could see him leading a group of dissidents out of the party if he is unsuccessful in the leadership struggle. This becomes even more likely if a new moderate political group - PFP/independents - is consolidating to the left of the Nationalists.

Assuming a 1989 election goes ahead, the Nationalists could emerge without an overall majority in the white parliament. Future scenarios in event of this include

- * a moderate coalition to the left of the party agreeing to negotiations with credible black leadership, including the ANC;
- * a coalition of the far right heralding an even tougher period of repression;
- * a military coup to supplant the shaky facade of civilian politics as black rebellion intensifies the crisis, bringing South Africa to a full-scale civil war.

Whatever the future holds for white parliamentary politics, one thing is already clear: although the NP is sure to win a majority in the May election, the face of white politics is changing in a way never seen before. If only for this reason, the white election is not irrelevant. For its outcome may decide the nature of those groups which eventually negotiate the dismantling of apartheid and the transfer of power. 

Alleged Guerillas and Activists in Court

Another leadership dispute has emerged in the Pan Africanist Congress. But despite this, there is some limited evidence of renewed PAC activity. GLENN MOSS reports.



PAC Chairman Johnson Malambo

P Auf der Heyde

The long-dormant Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) has attempted to infiltrate guerillas into South Africa.

If state allegations are to be believed, the PAC military wing the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (AZAPLA), has gained some recruits from supporters of the Western Cape's radical Islamic tradition.

In a recent terrorism trial, evidence was led about support for the PAC within AZANYU, the National Forum-affiliated Azanian National Youth Unity.

AZANYU recently joined AZAPO in welcoming the meeting between the PAC's

secretary for foreign affairs, Gora Ebrahim, and officials of the British foreign office.

Despite years of disorganisation, there is still some support for PAC positions within South Africa. This ranges from the exclusivist nationalism adopted by the right wing of black consciousness to the religious fundamentalism and ultra-leftism of some groups associated with the National Forum.

But few of those organisations broadly supportive of a PAC position can claim an organised mass base, and it is

doubtful whether the crisis-ridden PAC leadership in exile can provide the dynamism or direction to challenge the well-entrenched African National Congress and its allies.

THE PAC IN CRISIS

Recent reports suggest that there has been yet another leadership crisis within the PAC's central committee.

For years, PAC history has been dotted with leadership splits and rank-and-file rebellions. Credible leaders like Robert Sobukwe and Zephania Mothopeng - the first and second presidents of the PAC respectively, were unable to intervene in these exile manoeuvrings. Sobukwe remained in South Africa until his death in 1978, while Mothopeng involved himself in a plan to revive the PAC internally, for which he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in 1979.

president. He was replaced by a triumvirate of David Sibeko, Vusumuzi Make and Elias Ntloedibe.

Only a month later Sibeko, who had been closely associated with Leballo's actions in detaining dissidents in Swaziland and Botswana, was assassinated by a squad from the PAC's military wing.

The early 1980s saw a greater stability in the PAC, with the low-key and modest John Pokela assuming leadership after a long prison sentence on Robben Island. Pokela was able to bring Ntantla and the military break-away back into the PAC fold.

But with Pokela's unexpected death in June 1985, tensions broke out again, and seemingly could not be contained under the direction of new chairman Johnson Malambo.

Recent reports suggest a new upheaval within the PAC's central committee. The PAC admits that the secretaries for education and manpower, Ike Mafole and Mike Muendane, have been fired from the central committee and suspended from all



Robert Sobukwe, A P Mda and Potlako Leballo

It was left to people of lesser talents to lead the PAC internationally. After Sobukwe's death, PAC chairman Potlako Leballo persuaded Swazi and Botswana authorities to detain those critical of his leadership. In securing his position, Leballo provoked military leader Templeton Ntantla to leave the PAC and set up the Azanian People's Revolutionary Party together with PAC stalwarts like Joe Mkwanazi.

Pressure mounted against Leballo, and in May 1979 he was forced to resign as

PAC secretary for defence, Victor Phama, and publicity secretary Edwin Makoti have resigned, been fired, or remain in their posts is unclear. But the PAC's London representative, Vus Nomodolo, has resigned from the central committee while retaining membership of the PAC.

Equally, whether these disputes are over power, ideological and programmatic differences, or car theft and mandrax smuggling (as alleged in at least one Sunday newspaper) is not obvious to

outside observers.

But whatever the basis of dispute, there is yet another struggle within the PAC's external leadership. Only this time it also involves internal PAC activists, who have declared loyalty to Vusumuzi Make's leadership.

Late last year a group claiming to be the internal wing of the PAC sent a strongly-worded memorandum to exiled PAC leaders. In this communication, the group expressed strong support for Make, who had just lost his seat on the central committee. The memorandum also apparently called on the government's of Zimbabwe and Tanzania to guarantee the safety of Make and his supporters in any factional violence.

TENTATIVE MILITARY STEPS

During the mid-1970s, Zeph Mothopeng and 16 others were convicted under the Terrorism Act. According to the prosecution, they had been involved in a large conspiracy to revive the PAC. To this end, they recruited members, arranged for recruits to undergo military training, and organised some acts of unrest in the Krugersdorp area during 1976. One of those accused in this trial had undergone rudimentary military training in Libya.

There were a few indications of PAC activity after this. David Tharasimbi was found guilty of transporting PAC military recruits to Swaziland during 1978, and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. Isaac Mhlekwa was convicted for his role in training PAC recruits in the Ingwavuma area. And during 1979 three young men who underwent military training in China were sentenced to five years each for their PAC activities.

For the rest, there was little indication of any obvious PAC presence - military or otherwise - within South Africa. And what little activity there was paled into insignificance as the number of ANC guerilla attacks escalated dramatically from 1978 onwards.

Then, in early 1985 six young PAC soldiers, trained in Tanzania, China, Yugoslavia and Guinea, were apprehended by the police.

They met in Zimbabwe, and travelled on to Botswana, from where they crossed into South Africa and split into two

groups. Within hours both parties had been arrested, one at Johannesburg station and the other near Mafikeng.

One of the accused had a revolver and 40 rounds of ammunition in his possession when arrested. Another was carrying a forged Botswanan passport. They were jailed for between four and seven years.

Early this year a young Guguletu man was convicted of terrorism and furthering the aims of the PAC. Andile Gusha joined AZANYU shortly after its formation in 1983. When AZANYU and UDF members clashed in Mbekweni, near Paarl, he joined in the fighting. As a result, his life was threatened on a number of occasions by UDF supporters.

Gusha decided to leave South Africa for his own safety, and approached Stanford Maliwa, a PAC member, for assistance. Maliwa told him of PAC training camps in Lesotho.

Subsequently, according to the accused, Maliwa was burned to death in a clash with UDF supporters. Gusha travelled to the Transkei for the old PAC member's funeral, and there he was told that the PAC had sufficient soldiers. He was arrested on his return to Cape Town.

PAC representatives recently suggested that their forces have been militarily engaged inside the country. Johnson Malambo claimed that PAC guerillas assassinated Brigadier Andrew Molohe, senior Bophuthatswanan police officer responsible for the Winterveld massacre. And publicity secretary Gora Ebrahim hinted that PAC members were responsible for the 'scorpion gang' attacks on security force members in Soweto and Alexandra. But many have dismissed these claims as improbable.

THE QIBLA CONNECTION

In April last year State President PW Botha claimed that 12 Libyan-trained PAC guerillas had been arrested at Athens airport. Subsequently Adriaan Vlok, minister of law and order, announced that five of this group had been arrested by South African police.

According to Vlok, the arrested group had been carrying Scorpion machine pistols, AK47 rifles, TNT explosives, detonators and ammunition.

Vlok further claimed that some of the group were members of a Cape Town

Islamic organisation, Qibla, 'which operates under the banner of the PAC'.

Seven alleged members of the PAC appeared in court in early December, charged with 24 counts of terrorism, membership of a banned organisation, furthering the aims of the PAC, attempted murder, and possession of arms and ammunition. The accused are:

Mabata Enoch Zulu (52)
 Siyabulela Ndoda Gcanga (26)
 Vincent Alson Mathunjwa (29)
 Sestiba Paul Mohlolo (29)
 Daniel Saul Nkopodi (27)
 Achmad Cassiem and
 Yusuf Patel.

The state has alleged that some of the accused joined the PAC as early as 1960. Zulu, Gcanga, Mathunjwa and Mohlolo are charged with undergoing military training in several countries, including Egypt, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania.

During 1975, Zulu infiltrated South Africa and gave military training to local Kwazulu inhabitants of the Ingwavuma area.

Together with three of his co-accused, he again entered South Africa during September 1985 and April 1986, carrying weapons and hand grenades.

Nkopodi, a Bophuthatswanan-based priest, is charged with acting as a courier for the PAC, smuggling cash, letters, arms and ammunition from Botswana into South Africa.

The accused are alleged to have possessed three AKM semi-automatic rifles, three AK47s, one Star 9 mm pistol, ammunition, and 38 M69 and M70 hand grenades.

The state claims that when Zulu, Gcanga and Mathunjwa were arrested in Bophuthstswana on 10 April last year, Zulu grabbed a hand grenade and tried to detonate it. But the grenade did not explode.

Some of the accused are charged with contacting Qibla to discuss the supply of weapons to its members. In early 1986, Zulu and Gcanga travelled to Durban and Cape Town, where they spoke to a number of people about reviving the PAC internally. They met Cassiem and Patel, both members of Qibla, and discussed possible links between the two organisations.

Subsequently, Cassiem and Patel met other PAC members in Zimbabwe and Botswana. Qibla agreed that it would assist the PAC within South Africa, while the PAC in turn agreed to train selected Qibla recruits militarily.

In addition, claims the state, Qibla issued a number of pamphlets on behalf on the PAC.

Evidence emerging in trials of alleged PAC activists is too slim to suggest that the organisation is reviving. But despite yet another leadership crisis, the PAC tradition seems to have survived thusfar.

Metal Workers Win National Maternity Benefits

Trade unions in the metal industry have won a major victory for women workers - a maternity agreement allowing for six months paid absence from work, and guaranteed re-employment after confinement. **ADRIENNE BIRD**, Transvaal education secretary of the Metal and Allied Workers Union, looks at the first nation-wide maternity agreement between unions and employers.

Women workers are severely discriminated against in industry. But trade unions have won some major victories in advancing their interests.

At its national launch, COSATU committed itself to a vigorous campaign against sexual inequality at the workplace, in society, and in the federation itself. In line with this, COSATU has put forward maternity benefits as a national demand in the Living Wage Campaign.

The interests of women workers recently received a boost when workers in the metal industry won six months paid maternity absence from work. This is South Africa's first national industry-wide maternity agreement.

The agreement is between SEIFSA, the metal industry employer association, and unions party to the National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry. These unions include the Metal and Allied Workers Union; the Boilermakers Society; the Engineering Industrial Workers Union; and the Electrical and Allied Workers Union.

The agreement guarantees pregnant women both pay and job security for six months when they leave work to have children.

WOMEN IN THE METAL INDUSTRY

The unions and SEIFSA have agreed to send the maternity agreement to the Minister of Manpower for publication in the Government Gazette. Once this has happened, the agreement will be extended to all employers and workers in the metal industry.

Although female workers are a minority in the metal industry, improved maternity benefits were part of Metal and Allied Workers Union demands in its 1986 National Living Wage Campaign.

The industry employs 332 000 workers, most of whom are male. It is largely controlled by South African-based corporations like Anglo American, Barlow Rand and the Dorbyl/Metkor group. However, sectors like electronics and telecommunications are dominated by foreign-based multinationals such as ASEA, Siemens and Philips. This sector is the largest employer of female workers in the metal industry.

About 2 000 of the 10 000 workers employed in this sector are female. They work mainly as machine operators doing assembly work with their traditionally 'nimble fingers'.

Women workers are also found, in a smaller proportion, in the light engineering sector.

During the recent negotiations on maternity benefits, employers tried to exclude employers with fewer than ten women workers from the agreement. But all the unions involved rejected this, and employers were finally forced to agree.

In 1982, amid great controversy, MAWU joined the industrial council for the metal industry. This was part of the union's strategy to win both national and plant-level bargaining. Today MAWU is the largest union in the council, with 62 000 members.

For a number of years, demands from women workers had been growing stronger. In 1986, as a result of this pressure from female members, MAWU included the demand for six months paid maternity leave for all women in the metal industry. This was part of the list of

national demands made to SEIFSA at the annual wage negotiations.

Other metal unions, particularly members of the South African Co-ordinating Council of the International Metalworkers Federation, strongly supported MAWU's demand.

During negotiations the parties agreed to deal with the issues of maternity pay and leave separately.

PAY DURING PREGNANCY

Thirty years ago, in 1955, the industrial council had established a Sick Pay Fund for white, coloured and Indian workers. Employers and workers paid weekly amounts into the fund, which helped only sick employees. It did not cover pregnant workers. The fund is controlled by a board of management with equal trade union and employer representation.

In 1978, following the national surge in worker militancy and organisation, the Sick Pay Fund was extended to cover African workers.

Three months maternity pay was added as a benefit of the fund in March 1984. But many African workers did not even know they could claim for maternity.

At the 1986 wage negotiations, MAWU demanded that women should get pay for six months while on confinement. All the metal unions supported this demand and eventually SEIFSA, representing employers, agreed to this.

QUALIFYING FOR MATERNITY BENEFITS

A female worker has to fulfil a number of conditions to qualify for maternity pay. She must:

- * be employed in a SEIFSA company;
- * have contributed to the Sick Pay Fund for two years;
- * not have claimed for more than one pregnancy in the past (ie there is a maximum of two claims per woman).

Women workers plan to oppose the last condition. They say it is forced 'birth control' to allow only two maternity claims.

Those who qualify will receive

- * payment every week for 26 weeks;
- * an amount calculated as follows:

Wages excluding overtime

Maternity pay per week

Over R287	R144
Over R262-R287	R131
Over R208-R262	R104
Over R182-R208	R 91
Over R153-R182	R 77
Over R133-R153	R 67
Over R114-R133	R 57
R113 and under	R 50

So every women in the metal industry who qualifies gets a minimum of R50 every week for 26 weeks from the Sick Pay Fund. And this does not prevent claims for Unemployment Insurance Fund maternity pay as well.

Most women stop work one month before the birth, and so only qualify for three months UIF pay - one month before and two months after birth. If the UIF benefit is added to the new industry-wide maternity pay, a woman can, for three months at least, get close to her full wages. It is up to plant-level negotiations to make up the difference so that women get full normal pay while on maternity.

Metal unions plan to improve payments and reduce qualifying clauses in future negotiations with employers.

LEAVE AND JOB SECURITY

The principle of job security for pregnant women was established early in the negotiations. But employers insisted that women stopping work to have children should resign and then be re-employed, rather than be on leave.

Employers finally agreed that the period off work would be six months. The unions fought hard for this to be leave rather than resignation, but in the end were forced to accept the idea of resignation with guaranteed 're-employment'. This was only agreed to with important protections:

- * a woman who has been on maternity absence will qualify for leave and leave bonus payments as if she had unbroken service;
- * she will be re-employed in the same or a similar job;
- * she will not only get the same pay when she returns, but will also


automatically qualify for any increases that have been awarded nationally and will 'not suffer any decrease in relative status to other employees as a result of the period of absence';

- * she will not suffer any prejudice in promotion and merit increases because of her absence from work,
- * at the time of leaving a company she must be given a written guarantee of re-employment, which will:
 - give the date on which she agrees to return;
 - clearly state the benefits the worker qualifies for under the Sick Pay Fund;
 - and state the details of the worker's job and rate of pay at the time she left.

An employer must give the woman all relevant claim forms and help her make the claim.

To qualify for this re-employment guarantee a woman must have worked for a company in the metal industry for two years. Someone who has worked for a shorter time will only be given 'preference' at the time of re-applying for her job.

At first SEIFSA suggested that to qualify for this maternity benefit, a woman had to work for the same boss for five years and that she had to return to work after three months. The unions pushed this to six months after a minimum of two years service with the same employer.



MAWU women have won improved maternity benefits

Women workers have commented that these time-limits are a way of forcing family planning on workers, and must be scrapped in the future.

Under the agreement employers can employ substitute temporary workers for the period that a permanent worker is off on maternity absence. MAWU is encouraging its members to negotiate at plant level for women to be able to find their own replacements, or for workers previously retrenched from the company to be given this temporary work.

The unions were forced to accept that a worker on maternity can be retrenched. This can only occur if she would have qualified for retrenchment had she been at work. But SEIFSA agreed that in any retrenchment programme, temporary workers would go before any permanent worker.

DISCRIMINATION IN THE FACTORY

Since the 1960s, when large numbers of black women first became involved in factory work, they have suffered severe discrimination: poorer job opportunities than men; unequal pay for similar work; segregation into poorly-paid 'women's jobs' like cleaning and catering; and widespread sexual harassment at work - the hated 'jobs for sex' practice.

Discrimination includes the myth that women are not 'real workers', that they only work for pocket money and to buy 'fancy dresses'.

But a study of women in the commercial and catering industry exposed this lie. Thirty percent of women in the sample were the only breadwinners in their households. The remainder said they worked because one (male) wage was not enough to support the family. The same study showed 90% of women workers had children to support.

The most visible form of discrimination against women is the practice of dismissing workers when they become pregnant. Most employers will re-employ women dismissed when pregnant, but often at beginner wage rates, and only when there is a suitable vacancy.

And when a woman in this position is re-employed as a new employee, she is vulnerable to retrenchment procedures which usually work on a last-in-first-out basis.

Many women take desperate steps to

avoid the hardships of joblessness. Union members have told of workers who bound their stomachs to hide pregnancies and then took only a few days 'sick-leave' to give birth. Others have resorted to back-street abortions. Many women die from these operations, but even more become sterile for life.

One hundred and forty out of every 1 000 black babies born in South Africa die within in year. This is six times higher than the death rate for white children. Most of these babies die of gastro-enteritis, which can be avoided by breast-feeding for six months. But women workers cannot afford to stay at home so long. The sooner they re-apply for their jobs, the greater the chance of being re-employed.

UNIONS CHALLENGE DISCRIMINATION

The progressive trade union movement has started to challenge these discriminatory practices. In 1984, OK workers, under the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA, made the first big breakthrough. They won the right to 12 months unpaid maternity leave. In 1985 CCAWUSA won another important victory, this time with Metro Cash and Carry. This gave women 12 months maternity leave with seven of the months paid at 33%, and time off to facilitate breast-feeding and to attend ante- and post-natal clinics. It also included important health and safety clauses.

In 1985 and 1986, other progressive unions won maternity agreements from individual employers. During 1986 in the Transvaal alone, the Chemical Workers Industrial Union won 20 maternity agreements, the best of which was with Rolfes: six-and-a-half months leave at full pay.

The National Automobile and Allied Workers Union signed an agreement with Toyota which included the principle of paid leave. Pascelent and the Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union reached agreement for 25% of normal wages over four months maternity leave. And the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union (now Food and Allied Workers Union) won three months leave on full pay at Simba Chips.

These victories were all important precedents. But winning them company by

company has been slow and difficult. So the recent victory by metal workers at a national industry-wide level is clearly an important step forward.

STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MATERNITY PAY

Many individual employers refuse paid leave on the grounds that in other countries maternity 'pay' is granted by the government. Employers say this is fairer, as it spreads the costs evenly across industries. Those employing a large number of female workers have argued they cannot afford to pay women while on maternity leave.

Some unions have argued that since employers contribute to workers' old age through pension schemes, they should also contribute to their early development. Employers responded by pointing out that pension schemes are nationally administered and this should also apply to maternity benefit schemes.

Unions have pointed out that the state-run Unemployment Insurance Fund is inadequate for pregnant workers. It pays only 45% of normal wages for four months before and two months after birth.

Even the Wiehahn Commission recognised this inadequacy and recommended payments of 60% for a six month period. Government turned down this proposal, saying that it had never received reports of undue hardship resulting from the present system. But as one metal worker said: 'UIF is stupid - we need money afterwards, not four months before the child is born'.

Since there is no good national benefit scheme, workers have used their factory organisation to force concessions from employers. Their successes have been concentrated in multi-national corporations, presently highly sensitive to adverse publicity and international pressure.

But the question of state responsibility for maternity pay remains.



Police Admit Torture

Counter-insurgency is again under the spotlight in Namibia, with members of the police admitting that detainees are tortured. JEAN SUTHERLAND reports on the remarkable candour of witnesses in a Windhoek trial, who openly testified that torture of SWAPO suspects is common.

Security force members in Namibia have, for the first time, publicly admitted that they torture detainees.

Interrogation of detained prisoners was recently examined in a major Windhoek security trial where police candidly spoke of assaulting suspects.

The trial revealed that interrogation officers dealing with SWAPO suspects believe that 'anything goes'.

These often startling admissions emerged in the trial of eight young Namibians facing a string of charges for alleged participation in 'terroristic' acts. Two of the men are allegedly SWAPO insurgents, the others civilians accused of assisting them.

For years, human rights groups have insisted that torture is a common part of interrogation techniques in Namibia. The difference this time round was that admissions of abuse came from within security force ranks.

Previous allegations of torture or 'irregular pressure' have been officially dismissed as part of 'a concerted effort' to disrupt security force activities and 'to make them ineffective in the revolutionary struggle'. But strict instructions were given to all members of the security police that no assaults 'whatsoever' could be carried out on detainees.

Yet four police officers coolly admitted in the Windhoek Supreme Court that:

- * assaults were justifiable as long as they did not result in deaths;
- * prisoners are deprived of basic human rights;
- * normal rules do not apply when dealing with suspects regarded as 'trained soldiers';
- * one of the accused had an intravenous drip pulled out of his arm before a

lengthy bout of questioning, which included being whipped with a piece of hosepipe;

* a security police captain deliberately hid the flogging of a prisoner from his commanding officer 'because I feared he would have stopped it'.

The men defended their actions by saying they had been 'necessary' to uncover explosives caches.

This evidence emerged during a 'trial-within-a-trial' in which counsel for the defence disputed the admissibility of alleged 'confessions' made by some of the prisoners.

Defence lawyers claimed that the accused had been exposed to questioning, assault, and physical and mental intimidation by security force members from the army, the police special counter insurgency unit, formerly known as 'Koevoet', and the security police.

'BEATEN TO A PULP'

Some observers are baffled over why police officers so openly admitted beating and mishandling prisoners.

The policemen's seemingly unshakeable belief in the righteousness of their 'cause' appears to be the main reason for these admissions.

All four officers seemed to have no qualms in testifying that although they knew the assaults were illegal, they felt they had been justified.

Some insight into their views was offered in a report in the weekly Windhoek Observer, which described the trial as a 'profound embarrassment' to 'these seasoned investigators'.

According to this report, the police officers were 'taken aback', even hurt, that they had been portrayed in the press as 'inhuman, indifferent to the fate of prisoners and, even worse, indifferent to the corporal punishment inflicted'.

As far as they were concerned, 'they had no other choice' but 'to commit an excess' which could have been condemned under 'normal circumstances'.


Another possible reason for their candour is that one of the accused, Andreas Heita, was so badly scarred by his beatings that it was impossible to cover up the assaults.

'THRASH A PRISONER UNTIL HE CRACKS'

Further insight into the minds of security police emerged in the evidence of a security officer who had been with the force for 13 years.

Warrant Officer Nikodemus Nampala blandly described the attitude of his security branch as: 'You thrash a (prisoner) until he cracks - points out what has to be pointed out'.

Nampala's evidence was extraordinary in that it created the impression of a straightforward man who had merely followed normal procedures; so normal,



Andreas Heita's scars: the result of police torture

Presiding judge Harold Levy asked Heita to strip a number of times in court, each time displaying injuries on his chest and across his back. Wound marks on his head and ear were also pointed out. Extensive scarring caused by the beatings includes one patch of abnormal and discoloured skin growth measuring 17 centimeters from top to bottom and 13 centimeters across at the broadest part.

Police officers admitted the injuries were inflicted in detention.

Levy asked one police officer whether he could see that the accused had been 'beaten to a pulp' (pappeslaan) in the vicious assault.

or so it seemed, that he never thought of questioning fellow police officers' actions.

When asked if there was no way he could have protested the beatings of detainees - earlier he had testified he had seen a Koevoet officer 'lay into' Andreas Heita with a hosepipe - Nampala conceded it had never occurred to him.

Questioned if there was no place in police ranks where a case like this could be taken up in order to protect a prisoner, he replied: 'For what purpose, your honour?'.

This policeman said he had never, in his security police experience, encountered an incident where a junior

officer had reported a senior officer for assaulting 'an ordinary criminal or so'.

The court heard that the corrugated iron cells in which the army kept prisoners were described as 'hokke'. When it was pointed out that this was a term used to describe animal cages, Nampala agreed and said it was commonly used in the army.

A CHRISTIAN DUTY

Another security warrant officer, Hermanus van der Hoven, testified that although he disapproved of the thrashing of prisoners, it was his christian duty to explain to one of the accused the connection between punishment and repentance.

This emerged when the officer said he had not kept records of conversations with the prisoner as these had been of a more 'personal' nature.

'I tried to explain to him why it was necessary to use violence (at a particular) stage', he said. 'We then had a discussion about how a person as a christian repents and how they are sometimes subject to punishment, like a child would had he done wrong'.

Asked who had given him the right to 'try and influence' the accused as far as his religion was concerned, the policeman replied: 'My christian duty'.

He denied trying to convince the man not to divulge assaults, and said he only wanted to convey that as a christian the thrashing had been difficult for him - 'but the violence had to be applied to discover the explosives'.

KOEVOET - A POLICE CROWBAR

Trial proceedings lifted the lid a little further on the once top secret special police counter insurgency unit, still known among ordinary people as 'Koevoet'.

Chilling details about this unit, now officially called 'Coin', first emerged in 1983.

Subsequently it has featured, along with the security police, in a number of civilian court actions involving proven

and alleged torture, assault, murder and rape.

During court hearings it emerged that:
 * Koevoet members are trained as 'extermination machines' and taught to show no mercy to SWAPO members;
 * people rounded up are often taken to Koevoet bases where 'specialised interrogation squads' question them;
 * members were paid 'kopgeld' bounty money for each guerilla killed.

Credited with over eighty percent of violent deaths in Namibia's operational area, the special police unit is considered by some to be the most fearsome and successful counter insurgency unit in Southern Africa's recent history of guerilla wars.

'Koevoet is a cold, calculating, efficient and totally ruthless unit as far as the enemy is concerned', an assistant police commissioner told a group of journalists and parliamentarians after a public relations tour of Koevoet bases.

The name of the notorious unit has become so embedded in the Namibian psyche that any incident of violence, abuse or terror is almost automatically attributed to the unit, whether in Northern Namibia where it is based, or in Windhoek, Namibia's capital city.

While some in authority believe the counter insurgency unit is winning the war in Namibia, it does not seem to be succeeding in the South West African Territory Force's stated aim of 'winning the hearts and minds of the local population'.

Some officers deny that the unit's attitude is 'if you get them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow', a maxim commonly associated with Koevoet/Coin.

THE WAR IN THE NORTH

Security forces claim that there has been a drop in intensity of the bush war. But guerilla action continues, and in mid-March security forces reported that SWAPO's special unit, Typhoon, had returned to the Northern Namibian operational area after a two-year absence.

According to security force statistics, 351 SWAPO guerillas have been shot dead this year, and 26 members of the army and police killed in action.

Last year 645 guerillas were reported killed, with 599 guerilla casualties in 1985.

But as in most wars, truth is the first casualty. The South African-led security forces continually claim they are winning the war. But it appears to be far from over. And while the army claims it is getting increased co-operation from civilians, there are mounting allegations of abuse and brutality against civilians.

THE HEITA TRIAL

The trial which has revealed so much about counter insurgency operations involves eight accused, who face almost 200 counts of contravening the Terrorism Act between 1982 and 1985. Charges also include sabotage, illegal possession of explosives, and attempted murder.

In evidence, police officers admitted that although the special counter insurgency unit's name had been changed, 'Koevoet' had become so synonymous with its actions that it remained the name used among the people.

The 'trial-within-a-trial' concerned admissibility of confessions made under interrogation. It ground to a sudden halt after cross-examination of a central figure throughout the proceedings, an officer of the feared unit, Captain Frantz Ballack.

Ballack described the aim of the special 'task force' as being to 'hunt down and eliminate SWAPO guerillas'.

Implicated by his colleagues, the 'Koevoet' man confirmed he had seriously beaten one of the accused, Andreas Heita, assaulted at least two of the other prisoners, and not kept medical or other records of his 'interrogation'.

Ballack described Heita's beating as 'a good hiding', but denied that it had been 'barbarous'. The reason it had been necessary, he told the court, was because 'he (Heita) told lies...but after being assaulted he was completely willing to tell the truth'.

The police officer obviously felt he had not exceeded the limits. In fact, he said, the reason he alone had carried out most of the assaults was to prevent matters from 'going over the top'.

As for records, he admitted that as far as he was concerned, none had been kept by the special counter insurgency unit. He denied however, that this was to 'cover up tracks'. But Ballack could offer no other reason for the lack of records.

He added that he was entitled to question any of his prisoners at any time, but denied he had electrically shocked prisoners, kicked them, and in one incident strung a detainee from a tree, opened his pants and shocked him on the genitals and anus.

Ballack also refuted claims that he had threatened a prisoner in another case that he would be taken to a butchery and chopped into little pieces.

In a touch of irony, Ballack's cross-examination was concluded after he confirmed, under questioning by the judge, that a policeman's duty was to uphold the law and 'be a good example to the community'.

The 'Koevoet' captain agreed that if he had seen 'a man in the street' assault someone as he himself had done to Heita, he would have arrested him.

Both defence and state cases were concluded after the state withdrew the disputed confessions made under interrogation. Defence counsel has called for the total acquittal of three of the accused, and judgement is expected on 21 May.

Duduza's Civil War

When a number of young East Rand activists were maimed in a series of hand grenade explosions, police detained the survivors. A year later they were charged with terrorism. Their trial, and those of other Duduza residents, focused on a civil war which erupted on the far East Rand. GLENN MOSS reports.

Exactly thirty years after the Congress of the People adopted the Freedom Charter at Kliptown, fifteen young Duduza activists were mutilated or killed in hand grenade blasts.

A new generation of black activists - most not born when the Congress Alliance accepted the Charter as policy - were leading in the townships. COSAS - the Congress of South African Students - had also adopted the Charter when it was formed in 1979. By 1985 COSAS branches had sprung up in dozens of black townships as student resistance to Bantu Education hardened into total struggle against apartheid.


Duduza, a small East Rand township near Nigel, had not escaped the rising tide of black anger at poor services, inadequate housing and exclusion from the institutions of power and government.

By 1985 the township boasted a range of UDF-affiliated organisations - a COSAS branch, the Duduza Civic Association, a youth organisation and students-parents committee.

But there was another presence in Duduza and the neighbouring townships of Tsakane and KwaThema: police and community councillors, conservative black businessmen and, almost inevitably, right-wing vigilantes acting against members of opposition organisations.

STRIKING BACK AT VIGILANTES

The ingredients were present for a political clash of tragic proportions. And tragedy struck in the early morning of 26 June 1985 as a group of young



1985: Youths bury a comrade in Duduza

activists set out to attack suspected vigilantes, police and other symbols of apartheid. Their guiding charter - the Freedom Charter - was just thirty years old.

Booby-trapped hand grenades exploded as they pulled the safety pins. Within minutes, eight were dead and seven others badly mutilated. Doctors on the far East Rand amputated a number of hands and fingers later that day.

By late June 1985 Duduza township was characterised by burnings, torture and killings. Right-wing vigilantes, suspected of police, community council and business links, were rampant. Police and angry crowds confronted each other, especially after funerals, when police opened fire and threw teargas. The houses and property of local policemen, past community council members and local businessmen were attacked and destroyed.

Beneath these tensions lay a community bitterly angry about lack of services and facilities, and denied access to the power to change its squalid circumstances.

AGENTS FROM THE ANC?

A number of young activists had been approached by two men on 24 June. They claimed to be from the ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. The alleged Umkhonto agents were disguised, wearing balaclavas and glasses. But it seems they were believed, because that evening they took a group of activists, mainly COSAS members, to an old mine shaft near Tsakane, and demonstrated the art of throwing hand grenades.

After this two-hour 'crash course', the group selected a number of targets for attack the next night. The 'Umkhonto men' agreed to supply the necessary explosive devices.

As midnight approached, the 'crash course' participants split into groups. Their instructors had provided grenades, and the targets were decided on: the houses of local businessmen Steven and David Namane, as well as various black policemen suspected of complicity in vigilante action; the Duduza administration board offices; and the main electricity sub-station in Kwa Thema.

The grenades were prepared. Detonators were gently screwed in. But these were

not ordinary RGD 5 hand grenades. Someone had removed the time delay devices.

As members of the 'hit squads' pulled the grenade safety pins, the devices exploded in their hands. At least eight were instantly killed. Others lost hands or fingers mutilated by shrapnel.

BLAST VICTIMS IN COURT

Exactly nine months later, seven of the survivors appeared in court, charged with terrorism, attempted murder and possession of grenades. Since the ill-fated blasts, they had been detained by security police under section 29 of the Internal Security Act. Held incommunicado, denied access to lawyers, family and friends, they had suffered amputation of limbs and permanent mutilation. Some had been referred for psychiatric counselling.

Hosea Lengosane, 20 years old at the time of the explosions, still has shrapnel embedded in his brain. He wears a hearing aid and speaks in a low murmur. According to evidence in his trial, he has serious brain damage, suffered epileptic seizures while in jail, and will be on medication for the rest of his life.

Joseph Titus Mazibuko (18), John Mlangeni (21), Samuel Lekatsa (19), Humphrey Tshabalala (19), Veli Mazibuko (18), Cedric Dladla (19) and Lengosane faced two counts of terrorism, unlawful possession of 17 hand grenades, and five counts of attempted murder. When they appeared in court, the attorney-general issued a certificate preventing the granting of bail, and the accused remained in custody for the duration of their 11-month trial.

A MODEL TOWNSHIP?

As with all tragedies, there was a context to these events. Perhaps it began in 1963, when Charterston residents were moved to the new township of Duduza. They were promised a 'model township', but more than twenty years later, township residents were still waiting for a water-borne sewerage system and tarred roads. Few could

afford electricity. All these services were extended to Charterston, now a coloured township, within two years of the removal to Duduza.

More recently, government's ill-conceived plan for black local authority structures provoked intense resistance in many African townships, including Duduza. In the trial of the seven who survived the booby-trapped grenade explosions, the state claimed the accused acted with a number of aims:

- * abolition of the third tier government system of black local authorities;
- * expulsion of community councillors and police from Duduza and nearby townships;
- * intimidation of township residents who furthered the aims of the National Party government;
- * a complete change in the system of black education;
- * departure from the present constitutional dispensation, including the dismantling of apartheid, universal suffrage, abolition of bantustans, and a free system of democracy.

The triggering factor in the massive national resistance associated with these demands was government's 1983 implementation of its constitutional proposals, including the tri-cameral parliament and black local authorities.

THE 'BUCKET PROTEST'

The death and destruction of young lives on 26 June can be traced back to the 'bucket protest' of February 1985. After a Duduza Civic Association meeting on 17 February, angry township residents marched to the local administration board offices. They intended protesting against the continued absence of water-borne sewage.

The demonstration took a novel form when residents presented administration board officials with the sewerage buckets which stood outside each house at night, awaiting collection. Officials were asked to 'feel the smell'.

Police reacted to the protest, and a youth was shot in the leg. For some residents, this was the final straw. A legitimate demand for the state to provide a proper sewage system more than twenty years after Duduza was established had been met with police bullets. The spiral of retaliation began, and houses of some local

policemen were attacked and burned.

The next day, 18 February, students stayed away from school. When police opened fire, a 13-year old youth was shot dead. More police houses were burnt down in retaliation.

As township residents prepared for the funeral of the shooting victim, police acted again. An unknown number of Duduza residents were arrested, and 35 charged with public violence. At a meeting called by a committee of parents, residents resolved to stay away from work on the day of the funeral.

Two days before the planned stay away, police detained seven prominent residents under the Internal Security Act: they included Alex Montoedi of the Duduza Youth Congress; John Mlangeni and Veli Mazibuko from COSAS; and the chairman of the parents committee, Joseph Thobela, whose COSAS-linked daughter Sonto was also detained.

Of those then detained, Sonto Thobela is dead, murdered by right-wing vigilantes; John Mlangeni and Veli Mazibuko were seriously injured in the grenade explosions of 26 June, and are serving prison sentences for their involvement in those attacks; and John Thobela and Alex Montoedi face charges of terrorism, murder and subversion in another trial of Duduza residents.

The funeral went ahead as planned, despite the detention of the seven prominent residents. Mourners returning from the graveyard were teargassed as they passed police in hippos at the township entrance.

Matters moved from bad to worse. Activists were warned that their houses would be burnt if meetings of hostel residents were disrupted. This followed a civic association query as to why some hostel dwellers had been granted permission to use the community hall, while permission to hold Duduza Civic Association meetings was withheld.

PETROL BOMB ATTACKS BEGIN

A week later the first petrol bomb attack took place. The house of parents committee member Barnabas Chetty was attacked, and his daughter injured.

Two weeks later, the Thobela house was petrol bombed. Sonto Thobela, the COSAS branch secretary, died in the blaze. Her sister Zanela, also a COSAS branch



Pictures of the unrest two years ago are now being replayed in courtroom dramas

member, subsequently died as a result of burns received in the attack.

Sonto Thobela was buried on 18 May. After police teargassed the funeral procession of over 6 000, angry crowds attacked 14 houses occupied by police and community councillors. Civil war had broken out in Duduza.

CIVIL WAR IN DUDUZA'S STREETS

According to the prosecution in a current terrorism trial, a residents' meeting on 17 May resolved to force police from the township by killing, injuring or intimidating them, and attacking their houses. In addition, it is alleged that the meeting decided to intimidate those with links to community councils, and attack whites from neighbouring Nigel.

As a result, claims the prosecution, Duduza residents began patrolling township streets at night. They

allegedly dug trenches across roads to prevent the movement of police vehicles. One group attacked passing vehicles. Seven houses occupied by black police were attacked, and combined damage of R30 000 caused. As anger intensified, police and private vehicles and municipal buses were stoned, and in some cases drivers attacked. In one of these incidents a white nurse, Gertina de Lange was assaulted, and subsequently died as a result of injuries sustained. On 20 May, almost the whole of Duduza stayed away from work.

The state claims that as a result of these events, all public services in the township collapsed, and those linked to the community council had to flee in fear of their lives.

RIGHT-WING VIGILANTES ATTACK

Some township residents believed the growing right-wing vigilante attacks

were being planned by a group including ex-community councillors, conservative businessmen and some local policemen. A white kombi similar to vehicles driven by local police was seen leaving the scene of a number of attacks. The driver wore a leather coat similar to one owned by a prominent local policeman. And in investigations into at least three of these attacks, local East Rand police were formal suspects.

Attorneys acting for Anglican Bishop Simeon Nkoane contacted senior police officials and the attorney-general about alleged police involvement in vigilante activity. In April 1986, a certain Patrick Mahlangu gave Nkoane's lawyers a statement indicating that a Sergeant Sithole from Kwa Thema police station had been involved in fire bomb attacks on a number of houses. According to lawyers, Mahlangu subsequently fled Kwa Thema when told that Sithole had hired a squad of men to kill him.

The attacks increased. On 11 June, Duduza Youth Congress leader Alex Pailane was kidnapped by a vigilante group. He was taken to a nearby mine dump where he was tortured. Badly beaten and unconscious, Pailane was dumped outside his parents' home later that day. Six days later he died as a result of the torture.

The night of 21 June was particularly dangerous for anti-apartheid activists in the area. At least seven houses, including that of Bishop Nkoane, were petrol bombed.

If investigating police were finding it hard to track down suspects involved in right-wing vigilante attacks, local COSAS members were having more success. According to court records, a Duduza local, Billy Dhlamini, admitted to COSAS leaders that he had been employed by businessman David Namane, his brother and ex-community council member Steven Namane, and a Tsakane businessman, Twebe Maholo.

Under interrogation by his captors, Dhlamini confessed that he and two employees of David Namane had abducted and tortured Alex Pailane, and had been given a list of prominent township activists to eliminate.

The Namane's and Maholo denied that Dhlamini's confession was true. But someone must have believed it, because on 16 June the houses of both Namane brothers were razed to the ground. This was not the first attack on the brothers. After Sonto Thobela's funeral

the Namane houses, as well as David's bottle store, were attacked by an angry crowd of mourners.

A 'TRIAL WITHIN A TRIAL'

The trial of those injured in the grenade blasts opened in Pretoria in August 1986. Evidence indicated that within hours of serious operations, including full amputation of the right hand, police interrogated some of the accused. And a magistrate attempted to take statements from them while they were still under the influence of drugs, and in post-traumatic and post-operative shock.

At least one medical witness said that if given a choice, he would not have allowed police to interrogate Humphrey Tshabalala 17 hours after his fingers had been amputated. Four of the accused had made statements to a magistrate within 18 hours of being operated on, while still in their hospital beds.

After a lengthy trial-within-a-trial, presiding judge Stafford ruled that the statements made by only three of the accused were admissible as evidence. In ruling the others inadmissible, Justice Stafford found that three state witnesses, including magistrate Pieter Marx and police warrant officer van Wyk, had lied to the court in evidence.

In the statements, some of the accused described how they had been approached by two men wearing balaclavas and glasses, who suggested that they attack the houses of people like David and Steven Namane. They were taken to a piece of open ground and shown how to throw grenades. But on the night of the attacks 'the hand grenades went off in our hands'.

During the trial defence counsel alleged that a Springs security policeman, Peter Mphahlele, was seen making petrol bombs in another policeman's garage shortly before three houses were petrol-bombed by men wearing balaclavas. While Mphahlele denied this, he did admit that police had taken three statements from him relating to attacks on the houses of Bishop Simeon Nkoane, Deborah Khabela and Daphne Malinga on the same night as the booby-trapped grenade explosions.

As the state's case drew to a close, the prosecution called a secret witness,

allegedly an accomplice of the accused. 'Mr X' told the court that four of the accused had been part of a 'hit squad' set up in Duduza. A few days after the house of a Duduza civic leader had been fire bombed, the 'hit squad' attacked another house in retaliation.

According to the witness, two men who identified themselves as members of the ANC's military wing trained the 'hit squad' to use hand grenades. Initially the witness told the court that the two instructors could have been policemen or people procured by the police. But he later withdrew this allegation. Subsequently the witness admitted that he had committed perjury in previous court proceedings, and was prepared to lie under oath 'to save his skin'.

Shortly after this admission, the state dropped all charges of terrorism against the accused, and accepted a plea of guilty to possessing hand grenades, attempted murder and malicious damage to property.

In sentencing the accused to 16 months imprisonment, Justice Stafford suspended the imprisonment of Hosea Lengosane, accepting that sending him to jail would serve no purpose.

The judge made no finding on whether police or ANC members had provided the accused with the grenades, or whether police had been involved in township vigilante attacks. Lack of evidence on these 'serious allegations', and the sudden end to the trial left these questions unanswered, said the judge.

TOWNSHIP WAR CONTINUES

The death or arrest of those involved in the grenade attacks did not end the civil war in Duduza. Nor did it stop vigilante attacks. In the month that followed, there were boycotts and work stay aways, mass funerals and mass arrests. By July, at least 36 police houses had been burnt out.

Police set up a makeshift camp at the Duduza town hall, holding the victims of mass arrests prisoner there. Angry residents claimed that police rounded up

youths on the street and sjambokked them. Newspaper reporters witnessed police beating people with sjamboks. According to the one reporter, 'I saw a policeman pointing his firearm at a youth outside a house. Seconds later a shot rang out and the youth collapsed... I drove to the northern part of Duduza where I met armed policemen near a school using quirts to drive a group of youths down a street' (Star, 06.07.85).

Days later, Anglican Bishops Desmond Tutu and Simeon Nkoane had to intervene at the funeral of four of the grenade attack victims when a crowd attempted to burn a man accused of being a 'sell-out'.

When Nkoane's house was petrol bombed for a second time, the Archbishop of Canterbury warned the South African ambassador in London that he expected Pretoria to safeguard Nkoane's life.

And on the same day that PW Botha declared a state of emergency, television viewers saw the killing and burning of Maki Skosana at a funeral of unrest victims. Some mourners believed she was a police informer, some that she was the girl-friend of a local policeman involved in vigilante violence. Others claim she was an innocent victim of Duduza's civil war.

That night, 21 July 1985, State President PW Botha imposed a state of emergency on parts of South Africa. Duduza and its neighbouring East Rand townships were included. Information on what was happening in townships became harder and harder to come by. And after the temporary respite in which emergency regulations were lifted, harsher and harsher restrictions have been imposed with the nation-wide emergency proclaimed in June 1986.

There was civil war in Duduza. It may still be continuing in this small East Rand township. Or Duduza may be calmer. Government-imposed curbs on reporting unrest and security force activity prevent discussion of this.

But those conflict-ridden days of blood and fire are being replayed in South African courtroom dramas, as the state moves against those who dared to challenge its authority.

Back to School in the Eastern Cape

Students have returned to schools in the Eastern Cape. They still strongly oppose the system of education. But according to MBULKLO LINDA, students, parents and community leaders agree basic education is necessary while organisation continues.

A sigh of relief has gone up in the Eastern Cape, heartland of militant resistance to National Party education policy, because students have gone back to school.

The return to class, long anticipated by anxious parents, clergy, civic bodies and, at the end, student organisations, has taken two-and-a-half bloody, chaotic years to effect. Some put the number of pupils who died in the revolt as high as 150.

The issue peaked in mid-December last year when the Department of Education and Training (DET) presented the townships with an ultimatum: either black parents would send their children back to school, or 40 schools in the Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage area would be permanently closed.

After much debate students decided to return. The DET can once again legitimately claim to be running an education system.

In 1987 children returned to the hated Bantu Education system they had fought at enormous cost since 1976. But it would be a serious mistake for the authorities to believe the issue is now settled. There is still strong resistance to state-administered education, and while community militancy may have lessened it has not disappeared.

The return has signalled a dramatic shift in the politics of different generations. No longer are students the most militant members of the community. Parents have, through the fight over education and schools, become more politicised and increasingly involved.

When the education protests against educational facilities and standards began in June 1984, it was the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) which

was at the helm. But when the boycott ended last month, parents held the reins.

At the start of the boycotts, one of the burning issues raised by the rebellious students was parental apathy. Most student leaders who raised this problem are not around today. Some have died in action against the security forces, others fled the country and many are in state of emergency detention. But their demand for parents to become involved has been achieved.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE DET

During December, meetings were held in Eastern Cape townships to discuss the DET ultimatum. Students met with National Education Crisis Committee representatives, and discussed the issue with parents and community leaders. Township residents decided that the Interdenominational Ministers Association of South Africa (IDAMASA) should negotiate with the DET on their behalf.

The DET agreed to negotiate the return to school. And it soon became obvious that IDAMASA was merely acting as brokers for the parents.

'FLAWED EDUCATION BETTER THAN NOTHING'

Many in the community believe it was the go-ahead from parents which finally lent substance to negotiations between local DET officials and church leaders. But the parents' push for a return to school

also reflected the students' decision.

The Eastern Cape African community was 'forced to decide whether it was better to be educated, even if by the much discredited, much hated Bantu Education system, than to be uneducated', said IDAMASA president, Reverend Soga.

He said the students had not given this matter much thought. But the boycott had deprived pupils of the basic knowlege 'found in any kind of education system without which no person was able to exercise their mental faculties'.

Students had also become so disorganised by 'social factors' that

we feared most was an indefinite boycott which would ultimately spawn a generation of uneducated youths. This would be a disaster for the future society envisaged for the new South Africa'.

OBSTACLES AT THE LAST MINUTE

Students registered for school on 12 January and eventually returned to classes a week later. Among the 58 schools they flocked to were the four frontline anti-Bantu Education



Students have returned to school but the DET has not repaired the classrooms

the student leadership was uncertain of its following, said Soga.

Parents believed, and eventually students agreed, that the return to school was important. It would place pupils in a better position to organise and consider new ways of fighting for a democratic and non-racial education system. And students would at least receive basic education.

Reflecting a new, more assertive attitude among parents, Soga argued that pupils 'can only claim their right to speak as students as long as they remain within the walls of the classrooms. What

strongholds: Kwazakele, Newell, Cowan and Masibambane High Schools.

Students at these schools were at the forefront of the 1976 June uprising. And they were out on boycott again in 1980, 1981, 1984, 1985 and 1986.

It was a clearly delighted Department of Education and Training liaison officer, Peter Mundell, who described the return as a 'reasonable' and praiseworthy development.

Earlier he laid down the rules for continued black education in all Eastern Cape townships. It was to be a process of stage-by-stage negotiation. No school

was to be opened until the parents of the children at that school had formed a parent-school body, had met with the DET circuit inspectors and hammered out some kind of arrangement for future co-operation.

Strangely, it was parents - and not the students - who at one point balked at a crucial stage in the delicate negotiation process.

The objection arose just as post-primary and high schools - containing the rebellious student core - were opening their doors. And the source of contention was the DET's registration forms which had already been handed out to school principals.

It was 19 January - the deadline agreed upon for going back to school. All students returning had to complete and sign the form. It had seven clauses worded in typical DET language. Clauses effectively demanded that parents:

- * allow the authorities to take disciplinary action against their children;
- * pay all costs of damages and losses on school property;
- * pay all amounts owed promptly and regularly;
- * see that their children attend school regularly and immediately notify the principal in writing of any absence from school;
- * agree that the principal or his



Back at school after negotiations between parents and DET

designate 'may act in loco parentis in the event of any injury or accident in which their child/ward may be involved'; * agree that 'in the event of their child being conveyed in a government vehicle, they indemnify the state and state employees against any claims for compensation as a result of loss of life or personal injury to the child or any loss of life or damage to his or her property.

As one parent put it: 'This is too much to bear. So much blood has flowed over this issue. I cannot believe the pettiness of these bureaucrats'. 'The principal never told me a thing about these conditions', said a mother of three school-going children.

TOWNSHIP LEADERS INTERVENE

The anger and confusion which greeted the stipulations was so deep and widespread that township leaders had to intervene.

They argued that even though the conditions for return were unreasonable, students had been away from school for so long at this point that the education and knowledge to be gained from the system had to take precedence over the unjust conditions laid down in the form.

Township leaders suggested that the short-term effect of the boycott had been overtaken by the long-term lowering of education standards among children.

Reluctant parents were asked to swallow hard, ignore the jibe, and continue negotiations which would allow their children to return to school.

The last two schools still shut in East London re-opened in early March as local negotiations drew to a close.

IDAMASA and the DET ended negotiations at the beginning of March. Nothing has been done as yet about restoring schools damaged during the boycott, although the DET has promised to rebuild schools.

There have been alarming reports about conditions: children being taught in burnt-out ruins, victimisation of old enemies and selective hiring and firing of teachers, particularly in Port Elizabeth.

It remains to be seen if the Eastern Cape region, which saw 66 schools destroyed by the end of 1985, will be able to maintain this tenuous accord with the DET during 1987.

Chris Qwazi

Strikes and Disputes: Transvaal

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
AECI Modderfontein	SACWU	5 500	16.02- 06.03.	On 16 February 300 workers went on strike protesting management's refusal to dismiss a supervisor accused of using abusive language. AECI said the charge could not be proved. On 18 February 5 200 workers staged a sympathy strike. The Rand Supreme Court granted AECI a temporary interdict preventing the illegal strike. On 5 March a joint management-union committee was set up to investigate the matter.
African Products Bellville, Meyerton, Empangeni	FAWU	400	17.03-	FAWU declared a national dispute over wage negotiations. Workers demanded R3/hour minimum and management offered R2,75. The Meyerton plant went on strike on 17 March followed by the other plants. Workers slept in at all three factories. Management said 200 workers had staged an illegal strike, but that talks were continuing.
Baragwanath Hospital Soweto	GAWU	1 000	26.02-	Auxiliary workers went on strike demanding the reinstatement of two security guards fired on 13 February. They were fired after refusing transfer to another department. Workers claim they were forced to sign an agreement empowering hospital authorities to transfer workers at will. An ambulance driver has been suspended following his refusal to be transferred. Workers' demands include the scrapping of the agreement forms; a minimum wage of R450 a month; recognition of GAWU and the termination of the services of a private security company.
Bophuthatswana Transport Holdings (BTH)	TAWU	300	16.02- 18.03	Maintenance staff stayed away from work on 16 February, and drivers on 17 and 18 February. They were protesting BTH's refusal to recognise TAWU. Management said TAWU was a 'foreign' trade union. These unions were not allowed in Bophuthatswana and so it could not recognise TAWU. Six worker leaders were detained. TAWU claims management tried to divide workers while management alleges the union intimidated workers. By 25 February, 80 drivers had been dismissed. A BTH employee, Lucas Kekana, detained during the strike, was released from detention in mid March and three days later fired from BTH. BTH also announced a fare increase on 18 March.
Coca Cola	FAWU FBWU SAAWU	2 500	23.03-	Workers went on a go-slow at five plants in Pretoria and the Reef. Grievances included: withdrawal of the Coca-Cola Export Corp from SA; the future of workers in the new company, Amalgamated Beverage Industries; the six-week bonus given only to some workers during the company centenary celebration.
Fedelis	CWIU	700	11-12.02	Workers voted in favour of a legal strike in protest at racial discrimination. The union says black workers fill positions until whites have been trained to take them over. Whites were also paid more for the same jobs.
Henred Fruehauf	MAWU	1 000	10-19.02	Workers downed tools in protest against management refusal to re-instate a fired worker. MAWU said management had ignored disciplinary procedures. Management agreed to an inquiry over the dismissal.
Kohler Corrugated Brakpan	PWAWU	250	25.02-	Workers at the Brakpan plant went on strike demanding an across-the-board R25/week increase. Kohler offered R17. Workers were evicted from the plant. Kohler said union members at other plants had

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
				accepted the R17 offer. Negotiations continued and on 24 March the union rejected a management offer of a R15 a week increase with a R5 transport allowance backdated to January.
Maponya Bazaar Soweto	CCAWUSA		05-23.03	CCAWUSA declared a dispute with Maponya Bazaar following a wage deadlock. Workers demanded a R120 increase. Management offered R45. The present minimum wage is R285. Seven workers were fired on the eve of mediation talks. At the talks management offered an across-the-board increase of R70 for unskilled workers and R80 for supervisors. The union lowered its demand to R110. Following the failure of the talks the union has applied for a conciliation board.
Mathey Refineries Rustenburg	CWIU		12.02-	Workers voted to strike if MRR continued with plans to move its refinery to Bophuthatswana and queried whether management would pay the same wages there as in Wadeville. Workers said management refused to answer this question during negotiations. MRR then declared a dispute with workers and threatened to lock workers out if conciliation fails. When UK parent company UK Johnson Mathey dismantled and shipped the plant to South Africa, hundreds of British workers lost their jobs.
Metal Box	MAWU	2 000	02.02	Workers downed tools after a security guard was dismissed. White workers who stayed at work during the strike were physically removed by 60 black workers. Four whites received minor injuries. They returned to work after treatment. MAWU entered negotiations with management to investigate 'possible reasons for the strike'.
Mining Industrial Rubber	CWIU	700	13.02 11.03	Workers went on strike when management refused to meet pay demands. A conciliation board deadlocked. Workers demanded higher wages, equal pay for women, maternity leave, May Day and 16 June as paid holidays, paid leave and better bonuses. Workers returned to work after mediation. They gained between 37% and 54% wage increases and recognition of May Day and 16 June as paid holidays.
Mondi Board Mills Umgeni, Springs, Piet Retief, Felixton, Bellville	PWAWU	2 000	02-10.02 23.02	Workers went on strike demanding an increase of 70c/hour, 25c more than the 45c offered by management. Agreement was finally reached: 55c/hour minimum increase and 70 cents for highest grade worker. Workers said they would start work when the increase was backdated to January. Workers returned to work on 10 February. On 23 February workers stopped work at the Bellville plant to protest a breakdown in wage negotiations.
OK Bazzaars	CCAWUSA	10 000	18.12- 02.03	On 25 February, after a ten week strike in 120 outlets nationwide, OK workers agreed to return to work on Monday 2 March. CCAWUSA and OK reached a settlement: Of 551 workers dismissed, 364 were reinstated unconditionally; R100 across-the-board increases (R50 in April and R50 in November); a minimum wage of R400/month; increased staff discounts from 10% to 12%; improved maternity benefits including payment of negotiated increases on return to work; privileged leave forfeited because of the strike to be reinstated; loans to assist staff with debts incurred during the strike; detainees ensured of job security; arbitrators to handle dismissal and disciplinary cases from the strike; goods confiscated by OK because of arrears in HP payments to be returned; no victimisation of strikers. On 2 March 72 detained Alrode OK workers were released from Modderbee Prison after an application was lodged with the Supreme Court. But by 14 March 21 OK workers from Port Shepstone who were arrested

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
				on 22 January had still not been released. An application for their release was lodged with the Durban Supreme Court and the workers were released on 13 March.
Pick 'n Pay	CCAWUSA	17 000	05.03	CCAWUSA signed a R100 across-the-board wage increase agreement. It applies countrywide to Pick 'n Pay workers earning R750 or less. Management recognised 1 May and 16 June as commemorative paid holidays.
Plessey	EAWTU	300	Feb	The union and management reached agreement that workers on a project to create 300 temporary jobs will be paid at the same rate as permanent employees. They will also get full medical and pension benefits, and will be considered first for permanent jobs. The union will appoint an accountant to monitor financial aspects of the project.
Rand Water Board	OVGWU	1	Jan	A union shop steward dismissed from a RWB farm west of Johannesburg was served with two eviction papers. It was alleged the man assaulted a fellow employee, but he was not charged in court. OVGWU said it had asked for other workers retrenched on 15 January to be reinstated without loss of pay.
SATS	SARHWU	6 000	12.02-	<p>Workers boycotted food provided and protested against appalling living conditions at the Kaserne compound. They also insisted management should repay money deducted for meals during the boycott. Workers recently burned down the kitchen. Workers in the Delmore compound near Germiston raised similar grievances.</p> <p>SATS management said conditions in the kitchens were receiving attention, and more telephones and an extra TV set would be installed - this makes two TV sets for 2 000 workers.</p> <p>In a second strike at SATS in as many months, 500 City Deep container depot workers went on strike on 12 March after a driver was dismissed due to cash irregularities - he failed to hand in cash on a Friday but did so on the Monday. The driver appealed and was reinstated. He was fined R80. Workers were not satisfied with this outcome. Over 5 000 Kaserne workers downed tools in sympathy and said they would not return to work unless the R80 fine was lifted, and they were paid for the days spent on strike.</p> <p>Workers also demanded that disciplinary measures against workers be opened for assessment by workers, that management consult with them in decisions about workers' futures, and that racist practices be abolished.</p> <p>On 18 March, the Supreme Court issued City Deep workers with an order prohibiting obstruction of the premises or those wanting to return to work. Management said it held talks with worker representatives and reached an agreement. But SARHWU said the matter was not resolved. The union with which SATS negotiated the issue was the SATS-recognised Black Trade Union. SARHWU said BLATU was 'aggravating' the situation. SATS spokesman said it did not recognise SARHWU and would only talk to BLATU. SATS appointed an arbitrator to consider the case but SARHWU objected as he was a SATS employee from another area. On 24 March train marshalls at Braamfontein and Langlaagte stations downed tools in sympathy with striking workers.</p> <p>By the end of March the strike had spread nationally and involved 14 000 workers. The SATS general manager was given the right to summarily dismiss workers.</p>
Tembisa Town Council	SABMAWU		11.02	Council workers and municipal police resolved to tell township administrator Solomon More that he was

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
				no longer needed. Workers surrounded the council offices to prevent More getting to his office. SABMAWU said members were dissatisfied with the way he handled wage demands. Workers also said council PRO a Lawrence Pokela should resign. Last year, Tembisa council employees went on strike for three months for higher wages and union recognition. All were reinstated and the union recognised.
Trinton Industries		10	12.03	Five women were dismissed with a promise they would be recalled 'if production increased'. Retrenched coloured workers were hired that same day. The next day five more women workers were fired, a week after industrial council officials visited the company to investigate complaints about low wages. Management denied hiring coloured workers.

Strikes and Disputes: Natal

Beacon Sweets Mobeni	FAWU	2 500	06.02-	<p>Workers went on strike following the dismissal of two shop stewards. The union demanded the reinstatement of the shop stewards while allegations of misconduct were investigated. One shop steward was reinstated but suspended pending the investigation. The other was dismissed. The union claimed the dismissal was unfair. Management claimed that the action against the shop stewards was taken after an inquiry. Both the union and management agreed to arbitration on the matter. The union demanded that the dismissed shop steward should be paid while arbitration was in progress. Management refused this demand. Workers returned to work. Management confirmed its decision to dismiss one shop steward and served a final warning on the other shop steward.</p> <p>On 13 February workers at the Port Elizabeth depot staged a sit down strike in solidarity. Workers claimed they were locked out on Monday 16 February. The next day they were allowed in but were handed slips demanding their resignation which workers refused to sign. Workers at the Cape Town depot soon took solidarity strike action.</p>
Clover Dairies Pietermaritzburg	FAWU	168	June 1986	The bitter dispute between FAWU and Clover continues. In June last year 168 workers were dismissed. Following lengthy negotiations management offered only selective reinstatement. After further negotiation management offered five workers with over 20 years service reinstatement and 48 workers with 10 years service employment in Durban. The remaining workers were offered three months pay. The union rejected the offer and demanded that all workers with over 17 years service be reinstated in Maritzburg, and workers with five years experience be employed in Durban. The remainder should be paid eight months wages and given the option to fill vacancies that arose. Workers have embarked on a campaign for community and worker support and are performing a play to popularise their plight.
Coates Brothers Isipingo	CWIU	1 240	23-31.01	Workers went on strike over wage demands at two factories. Workers demanded an increase of R32 a week. Management offered R26. After negotiations workers accepted an offer of R29-20 and a reduced working week from 45 to 44 hours.
Unilver	CWIU	1 240	29.01	Workers went on strike after rejecting management's offer of a 10% increase. The dispute was settled after negotiations. Workers in the lowest grades got increases of up to 21,8%. Other gains were made: May Day and 16 June as paid holidays, improvements in overtime and shift allowances and the scrapping of a merit pay system in some grades.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Natal Die Castings	MAWU	113	05.03	The Natal Supreme Court upheld an Industrial Court order to reinstate 113 workers dismissed from Natal Die Castings following a strike. The court also maintained that the company's failure to negotiate in good faith constituted an unfair labour practice.

Strikes and Disputes: Cape

Bruply	PWAWU	305	09.20.02	Workers at the two Mondi owned, Bruply sawmills went on strike following management's changing demands in respect of wage negotiations. PWAWU negotiated a wage agreement with the company in 1986 but had no recognition agreement. As annual wage negotiations were due to start management refused to negotiate wages unless a recognition agreement was signed first. Management then changed its position and demanded that a dispute procedure be negotiated before wage negotiations. Following negotiations the union won recognition and wage talks continued. The workers continued their strike demanding an increase of 62 cents an hour, backdating of increases and 1 May as a paid holiday. On 20 February management made a final offer of 40 cents an hour. Workers accepted the offer and returned to work.
Nampak Bellville	PWAWU	100	27.11 23.02 05-09.03	Union dissatisfaction over annual wage talks led to a number of strikes at the plant. Following the 27 November strike, management agreed to the appointment of a conciliation board. However the union demanded further negotiations outside the auspices of the board. Management refused and workers went on strike on 23 February. Workers returned to work the following day. The conciliation board failed to resolve the dispute but workers agreed to a management offer of 55c/hour for the lowest paid grades. Workers went on strike again on 5 March in protest over the implementation date of the wage increases. Management said the increase would be implemented as from the date of agreement, the workers demanded that it be backdated to 1 January. Police were called in on 6 March and more than 80 workers were arrested. Workers returned to work on 9 March following agreement with management over backdating of wage increases.
General Motors Port Elizabeth	NAAWU		27.03	Management applied to the Industrial Court for an order declaring that demands for severance pay and the payout of contributions to the group life and pension schemes made by NAAWU during the strike last November unfair labour practices. Alternatively GM (now Delta Motor Corp) asked for a declaration that the company has no obligation to make such payments to workers who remained in its employ, and no obligation to bargain on severance payments.

Strikes and Disputes: Mines

Chamber of Mines	MWU			The Chamber is taking the white Mineworkers Union to the Industrial Court following union members' refusal to train coloured winding-engine drivers.
New Vaal (Amcoal) Vereeniging	NUM	1 000	16.03	Miners went on strike after Transkei authorities allegedly refused to allow workers to attend a funeral in the territory. They demanded management take a stand on the decision. Miners returned after talks between the union and management.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Johannesburg Consolidated Investments	NUM	4 000	March	Following a JCI decision to mechanise its Western Areas and Randfontein Estates mines, 4 000 miners face retrenchment. NUM has entered into negotiations over possible alternatives but no solution has been found.

COSATU LIVING WAGE CAMPAIGN

The COSATU living wage campaign is more than an economic struggle. 'It is a struggle against apartheid-capitalism which is built on ultra-cheap, ultra-controllable and super-exploitable labour'. The campaign includes demands for: R4,50 minimum wage in the metal industry; an across-the-board 58% increase in the mining industry; shorter working hours; the demand for May Day, 16 June and Sharpeville Day to be observed as paid holidays; scrapping the migrant labour system; scrapping of income tax. COSATU sees the living wage demand as a short-term solution - as long as bosses are allowed to put their interests first, there will not be a lasting solution to workers' problems.

The mass rally planned to launch the campaign in Soweto was banned and an application to the Supreme Court to have this overturned failed. COSATU has also been refused permission to hold launching rallies in a number of other areas.

NUM ANNUAL CONGRESS

The major resolutions passed at the fifth NUM congress included: * a demand for a 55% across the board increase in the 1987 wage negotiations; * support for sanctions and disinvestment; * criticism of the migrant labour system and ethnically divided hostels and a challenge to mine-owners to make a statement of intent to abolish them; * support for 1 May and 16 June as public holidays; * an inquiry into health and safety on the mines; * adoption of the Freedom Charter; * calling for an end to the state of emergency.

METAL WAGE TALKS

These talks affect more than 350 000 workers, the largest number of employees in one industry.

Unions representing the largely white, skilled workers presented demands focused on wages and working conditions. MAWU submitted a number of demands for 1987 to the Industrial Council for the Metal Industry. These are part of its living wage campaign. The unions under the IMF largely supported these demands which include: minimum R4/hour; a guaranteed minimum increase of R1/hour across-the-board; no PAYE to be deducted from wages - MAWU argues that workers should not have to pay taxes which go to military spending; no jobs should be lost as a result of sanctions - 'if necessary, the effects should be absorbed by profits'; a 40-hour working week; that workers should not be dismissed for participating in industrial action after deadlock has been reached and strike ballots conducted; improved maternity benefits; and paid leave on 1 May and 16 June.

THE MAY DAY CAMPAIGN

The demand for 1 May and 16 June as paid holidays has been included in most union wage and condition negotiations during the past year. And many employers have conceded the demand. On 21 March 1987, State President Botha, pushed into taking some action, announced that the first Friday in May would be a holiday called 'Workers Day'. He thus attempted to side-step recognising May Day, but conceded a holiday on his terms. Workers nationally have rejected 'Workers Day' and intend to continue the push for May Day. CUSA said it would also push for 21 March (Sharpeville day) and 19 October (when black consciousness organisations were banned in 1977) to be declared paid public holidays.

HEALTH AND SAFETY

The Construction and Allied Workers Union (CAWU), launched in February, will make health and safety its most important campaign this year. This follows an accident at a Phalaborwa mine where eight workers were injured - three of them were blinded. CAWU said the employer - Clifford Harris - failed to co-operate in the investigation, did not say whether workers were covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act, and would not divulge names of the injured and where they were being treated.

1986 STRIKE TRENDS

Last year: 323 858 workers were involved in strikes; 100 532 were involved in stoppages; there were 643 strikes and 150 stoppages; 1 308 958 working hours - 750 000 'mandays' - were lost through strikes and stoppages; more than 2 000 cases were referred to the industrial court; 174 recognition agreements, and 1 090 other agreements were signed; there were 1 294 applications for conciliation boards - 306 were approved; 36,9% of disputes before conciliation boards were settled; 46 registered trade unions still confined membership to whites, 17 to coloureds and 23 to blacks only; there were 109 racially mixed registered unions and 53 706 union members not classified according to population group; the average increase in black wages for 1985 and 1986 was 11,3%; 32 216 illegal workers were sent from SA to neighbouring states; of these 5 000 were deported to Mozambique in November and December; 300 illegals a month cross from Mozambique to South Africa.

TOMORROW BEGINS AT WITS TODAY

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Conditions of employment

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What is the Health Services Development Unit?

We are part of the Department of Community Health at the University of the Witwatersrand Medical School with a mandate to initiate innovative and experimental primary health care projects.

For further information, contact Cedric de Beer at (011) 647-2269 or 647-2051.

Submit applications with a curriculum vitae and the names and addresses of two referees to Cedric de Beer, Department of Community Health, Medical School, 7 York Road, Parktown, Johannesburg 2192.

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