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TRANSCRIPTION

Speaker	Dialogue
MNd	This is an interview with Mtshana Ncube, who has agreed to be interviewed as part of the Zenzo Nkobi Photographic Archive Project. He's being interviewed by Mary Ndlovu on behalf of Mafela Trust and SAHA, and the interview is taking place on November 23 2011 in Kadoma. Mtshana, I think we'll ask you first just to talk a little bit about your background, how you got involved in politics and how you ended up in Lusaka.
MNc	Well, my background really is one of learning from seeing. I up until I left the country really I was a student up to 1959 when I started working at Scanlen and Holderness as a shorthand typist and secretary, and during those days everything around one was an activity of importance in terms of politics, especially nationalist politics, and those were the days when the divide was getting bigger and bigger between the oppressed black population and the colonial regime in this country. As a young person it was an exciting period to be in. We were looking to see what it was that moved our elder statesmen then in the liberation movement or in the movement to free the country. And we listened very carefully to what they were talking about. It seemed to me at that time that the relevance was something that I had had particular interest in because it touched on my family – the removals of people from lands that they had lived in for many years and were forced to



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	leave because the the returning whites who had fought against Germany were to be resettled, I think as a prize they were given the best land and some of the best land were where my people were. And they were moved out of there to go to such places as Gokwe, Sanyati, Kana and many other places. And those removals were very very cruel indeed and the firsthand knowledge of that made understanding the politics of the nationalist movement much much clearer, much easier
MNd	So you experienced that removal as a child.
MNc	Yes, yes. And my part of my family had experiences which were very very very nasty indeed, such as losing animals, losing crops, losing people. One of my great grandparents died in the movement and was lost and never seen again in the process, and this is one of the things that triggered my interest in the nationalist movement and the independence movement as it subsequently became. So I joined the youth movement. In fact I was interested in this as early as 1957 when I was at Tekwani and quietly followed the process and linked up with people that were later to become very active in the movement – 58 and joined the NDP in 1960 when it was formed, and later ZAPU and went through the whole process of the split in 1963 if I'm not mistaken and specifically on August 8 1963. So I I began to have a very strong interest in being personally involved, and that's how I came on board. And in 1964 I left to go to school and it was the years 64 to 70 76, 75 in fact that I worked as a representative of of ZAPU, and later to come back and work at the headquarters in Zambia.
MNd	So you were studying during those ten years
MNc	And carrying out those representative tasks
MNd	And then what brought you what brought you back to Zambia?
MNc	The same spirit that had moved me about the removals. The job had not been completed, and that job was to see the country free. So I decided that even if I hadn't quite completed my studies it was time to return so I returned, first in 1975 for a short while to kind of prepare the way, went back and packed my my books and all and came back in 76 for to remain until independence.
MNd	So what what role did you come back to play. What was your position, your role in ZAPU?.
MNc	I was given various tasks, but most of them had to do with writing — writing documents in the research department the history of the struggle was part of what we were working on, and later I was assigned specific tasks to do with education and then my first concrete activity was to help with the politicization of the people who were in the camps. So I was assigned, and I offered - because I had some idea about that area - to use movies as part of the task, as part of the method to explain what was needed to be done in order to conscientise the people, so I used to to go to different embassies to ask for different types of movies and show these at camps. That was my main major task in the early days from which I then moved into the publicity department, information and publicity, where I became editor of <i>The Voice, The Peoples' Voice,</i> which, parenthetically you may see as an organ of ZANU PF now. It wasn't; its origins are, are ZAPU, and with me as the editor.



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MNd	Oh
MNc	Yes
MNd	OK let's go back then. When you came there in 1975 and then in 76 there was an administration which was working in Lusaka
MNc	Yes
MNd	and it was under the general leadership I believe of this man [3B-52-02]
MNc	JZ, yes
MNd	Yes. Can you describe how it was functioning then. How did the administration function there was already a Revolutionary Council there, and what departments did they have, how did the politicians work, how did the military work?
MNc	Well I I'm really short of specifics myself in this area because the tendency was that you get assigned to where you are, you stay there, you know what you know and you do what you are supposed to do, and that's what I did most of the time, but from general recollection, general recollection the Revolutionary Council was an active body that seemed to me at the time to take over all of the duties of what might be the duties of a President in an organization and although all of us knew that the head then was JZ it seemed he did not want to put himself too much in the limelight. Whether this was by design or whether this was by structure I couldn't I couldn't say, but I know that he seemed to work very much in concert with a number of other comrades to produce whatever decisions needed to be produced and then he would publish them or read them when necessary.
MNd	OK. So he was sort of a leader he had a sort of collective decision making process
MNc	This was the impression I got.
MNd	And that was the Revolutionary Council.
MNc	Yes
MNd	Not the Executive of the party
MNc	No
MNd	The executive of the party had been overtaken
MNc	Had been overtaken by this and my reading of it was that this was of necessity because there was need to there was need to, to pull things together and be able to see just how quickly decisions could be taken in moments of stress, in moments of pressure. Again, I say this was my reading of the of the picture. I may have been wrong. And I seemed to hear of very little about the executive, although we understood that there was an executive. But we saw little of it and we heard little of it in terms of what it put out, and it met at Zimbabwe House as
MNd	The Revolutionary Council?
MNc	So did the executive, so it was difficult at times to know who was meeting when because



Speaker	Dialogue
	the membership in many respects coincided
MNd	Was almost the same
MNc	The Revolutionary council was much larger.
MNd	It had the military as well
MNc	The military as well. And sometimes it had other nominated members who were neither military nor executive who served on it.
MNd	Those were people like the foreign representatives
MNc	Yes, foreign representatives who would be asked to sit in as long as they were in Lusaka at the time, or when a Revolutionary Council was called specifically to coincide with the presence of foreign representatives in Lusaka
MNd	OK. So but they weren't formally members of the Revolutionary Council?
MNc	No, they were not formally members
MNd	The formal members were the top executive and then the military commanders.
MNc	The military commanders, yes.
MNd	OK and you don't know how often they whether they had a regular meeting time or
MNc	That I couldn't say, but they I know that they met quite regularly and it seems as I said, it seems to me that this is why I created it created the impression in my mind that they had taken over the functions of the executive, because they seemed to be always in session and maybe this of course explains the times also, because these were very busy times at the military front, so that perhaps emphasis would necessarily shift to matters military than than civilian
MNd	than political. So did you get any
MNc	And even, even the civilian, so-called civilian matters, took on a new importance because people had to deal with security matters – how to make sure that people in the camps would be secure, and how to make sure that people in the camps would have food, would have shelter, proper shelter, would have blankets, would have all the necessities that made life a lot easier to live. And in the area of education of course that extended to making certain that children who came in had had classrooms, whether under a tree or in a formal building it didn't really matter but it was important that they had a place to conduct their learning. So all of it seemed to be a matter that required urgent attention, and the Revolutionary Council seemed to me to be the body to attend to this kind of necessity.
MNd	And you needed the military input into everything anyway.
MNc	Precisely.
MNd	Before we go to that later period when there were schools and so on, if we come back to the period when JZ was still alive in your recollection was there tension between the politicians and the military or did they seem to be working very closely together in the same direction?



Speaker	Dialogue
MNc	For my part, I - maybe because I was relatively new at the time - I may not have recognized the tensions, but I seemed to see that there was busy activity everywhere and meeting and coming to hand in the office where JZ would be part of the time, and it would be military all roads led to the office in the centre of Lusaka and you would see people that I knew and I identified as military and people that I identified as coming from administration all coming there for meetings and sometimes for individual briefings and so on. I couldn't at that time say I recognized anything that could by any by any definition be called tension between the military and the civilian side of the leadership in ZAPU.
MNd	OK and then then JZ was killed, of course, early 77
MNc	Yes, and a very sad day indeed and for me just briefly I had just left the office. I could have died in the office on the same day. I don't think it was even 15-20 minutes after I had left the office when the explosion went went off and that brought quite a sad atmosphere throughout the liberation movement and I think for a while I might might not be exaggerating if I say some paralysis because we didn't know what that might mean in terms of our operations the direction, the effectiveness, our ability to collect resources, our ability to connect with the international community to say we are still there we all of that became a big question mark.
MNd	JZ was really the focal point for so much.
MNc	JZ was the focal point there, and very very well respected indeed a man of very few words, but a man of great effect. When he spoke he spoke because he had to speak, and when he spoke he spoke what moved the people, and that's how I remember him and I sometimes wonder whether some of the leaders shouldn't learn a great lesson from JZ - that it's not the speaking and it's not being present in the eyes of the people every minute that makes the difference. It is what you bring to their eyes, what you bring in terms of action, what you bring in the few necessary words that makes the difference. And JZ had it.
MNd	That's quite a tribute to him. So After then, after that the administration was reorganized somewhat I presume.
MNc	I my perception was that at this time there might have developed a slight disjunction between the administration and the military and that again perceiving these things from a distance so that even within the military there might have been some disquiet organizationally and I think operationally as well. That moment seemed again to be giving the administration, civilian administration a much greater role, or shall I say, a much more public face than had been up to now. Whether this was because of what was happening on the military side or not I am I am really not sure, but this is an observation I have of the period
MNd	JZ somehow, although he was a civilian, seemed to be able to bridge and represent both
MNc	Absolutely and he is one person I knew of short of, I mean other than Josh himself who could cement the two sides and make them one even though they were carrying out tasks that were were separate and different at the time
MNd	But now you say other than Nkomo after JZ died then there were people coming from
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Speaker	Dialogue
	now, more people coming from within the country to come and join the administration was that to fill the gap left by JZ or was it just because things were expanding and needed more or there was more pressure from inside for them to get out
MNc	I think there were three things, some of which you already mentioned. There was a need to reorganize, a need to take account of capabilities that were home-grown, that were now needing a place to serve these people coming from home, and this had to be taken account of. Two, there was a development also that unless you expanded the administration, purely in terms of numbers you were not going to be able to serve the needs of what was happening in the camps, whether you were talking of military camps or talking of civilian camps. There were more and more people coming into camps that there was need to carry out tasks that were well, to say the least, tasks that were doubling what would have been happening the year before or few months before. So you needed more
MNd	It was just the flow of refugees the flow of recruits and
MNc	Everywhere. And then you needed the political angle. What do you do with the comrades that have just been released from camps inside the country? Prisons and camps like Gonakudzingwa and so on. There had to be an adjustment in that area and so this saw the expansion of administration in those three because of those three reasons. I'm not so sure that this was always a desirable thing to do, but it was seen as a necessity at the time – absorb these people and give them something to do and see if in fact this didn't move the struggle forward. And I believe it did move it forward in many respects although here and there there might have been some drawbacks because of suspicions. Naturally there would be suspicions about the groups of people that haven't worked together for so long and suddenly required to be together all the time. We needed to be sure that everybody coming through hadn't snuck in by by means not permitted, and I left that to the intelligence people to try and see see who was whom, but you had to you had to live with some nasty thoughts, people thinking so-and-so is not quite what he looks, or so-and-so is not quite what she is supposed to be
MNd	Is this applied to new people, not to people released from detention
MNc	No, it applied to just about anybody coming in, across the board.
MNd	But was there were there tensions between the people who'd been in detention who were now coming and joining the process in Lusaka and those who had been there right through.
MNc	Yes, there were, there were. Naturally there would be because you were trying to fit into this the structure, more people than the structures could hold and that raised questions of competence, questions of knowledge, questions of how shall I put it of whether others were being pushed in in order to make balances here and there. So all of those were issues that created tensions.
MNd	Are you talking about ethnic balance when you say balance
MNc	Not necessarily that, individuals and ethnic, ethnic issues as well, but mostly just individuals – who is this
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Speaker	Dialogue
MNd	So you might have somebody who was actually in a fairly high political position fifteen years earlier, went into detention with that position, comes out and really doesn't have any competence in any
MNc	Precisely
MNd	But he wants a position that recognizes him
MNc	Yes, because things had moved on. Fifteen years ago was me facing police with stones in Highfield. Now suddenly it's not a stone that matters, it's something much more serious, much more devastating if released, so these were the issues and these were the bases of the tensions.
MNd	Were there ideological differences between people who's been out, who'd been studying in socialist countries, training, and those who'd remained at home.
MNc	There were, yes, as there would always be in any movement, because you are talking here of not only are you talking of different class backgrounds, you are also talking about different orientations in terms of knowledge, people who have been exposed to all sorts of ideas coming together to try and sit with someone who hasn't got a clue where the world starts and where it ends. Naturally there would be those tensions, and the differences were felt, however, I hasten to say in many instances they were handled quite, quite correctly, in discussions.
MNd	OK. So you said some of those tensions were handled very well. What Nkomo now came to
MNc	But maybe before I get to Nkomo it is I think it is helpful to give this as a general background before Nkomo arrives. That peoples' accommodations were themselves a form that helped this discussion I'm talking about. People were housed according to to the possibility for continuing discussions.
MNd	OK so there was a deliberate plan for where people were located.
MNc	Very very deliberate, yes. Whether this was the responsibility of people like Jack Ngwenya or others I I don't know, but it resulted that we we were able to have people who could share ideas, people who could discuss ideas housed conveniently so that that discussion could go on even at night. Lilanda was one place where these sort of things took place and and I I actually thought it was a very very bright idea if it was formally done, formally decided upon by someone in administration it was a very very good idea indeed. And by the time Joshua Nkomo came, we were a settled community, knowing precisely who to go to in order to find what.
MNd	So before he came was there there was no one person in charge, after JZ's death?
MNc	Not not that I could name as somebody formally bestowed with that authority, no
MNd	The thing just went on without a driver
MNc	Yes, well with many drivers
MNd	Many drivers



Speaker	Dialogue
MNc	Yes, let's put it that way, yes, with many drivers, and it was movingstalemated somewhat, but moving. As I said earlier on that when when JZ was killed there was a very traumatic moment for the organization and for the movement, and it's not easy to suddenly pick up and run with a thing when you when you are in a moment like that.
MNd	And then so most of Nkomo's colleagues from Gonakudzingwa already had settled themselves in Lusaka before he came from Zimbabwe.
MNc	Yes, that's right, yes. And they were being given the proper respect, as in according to their status in the in the hierarchy of the organization. I I know that Msika came, came ahead of the president, I'm correct, I think, Chinamanos, Musarurwas, and a number of others
MNd	Madzimbamuto
MNc	Madzimbamuto, yes, Madzimbamuto. He was very very well respected, Madzimbamuto. I this was the first time I came close to knowing something about him, which I hadn't been able to when I was still in Highfields, in Zimbabwe and that he was a very keen he had a very keen mind very very keen mind, and did indeed like to inspect, tear apart, analyse and put together. He was. I mean, I say this because it was a surprise to mesomeone I had known from a distance but somebody that later revealed himself in this particular way I'm describing him. And it was helpful, it was helpful, because many of us could find centres of conversation, centres of reportage. And they were of course people that had always the view that the movement moves forward with or without certain individuals, and it is the movement and not the individuals that matter. And I think that that's what helped the organization to struggle through this very very difficult period, very difficult indeed.
MNd	And then whenwhen Nkomo came this photograph [1C-19-04] shows him together with some of the military leadership, and some of the political leadership, and some of the administrators I guess as well you said he was able to pull them together.
MNc	Yes. And let me say as an introduction to, to that aspect of the discussion he Nkomo for whatever else people may have thought of him he was a man who understood the mind of the people. He understood very very well. Two, he also understood the the need to mold an organization. He understood it very very well. One of the ways he did it, he had to bring himself forward to be leader of the organization, and being leader of the organization didn't mean being President of ZAPU only, in the overall sense, but also being able to be leader of the units of ZAPU. Like the military, hence that uniform
MNd	JZ never wore a uniform, but this was sort of symbolic in a way.
MNc	Absolutely, and this was the beginning, so you will see him later in other colours of uniforms, but military uniforms.
MNd	This is the only time I've ever seen him white a white uniform. Most of the time it's not white.
MNc	Yes, it but the important point is that it was not just dress. It was symbolic of the unifying factor of a president of a liberation movement that consisted of the the civilian side if you



Speaker	Dialogue
	will, and the military wing, and he would in appropriate occasions, be dressed for that occasion as was here and in many other occasions when he was addressing ZPRA issues. And that went down very well in many quarters. There he is, there is the leader of ZPRA, and but he didn't overdo it, no
MNd	So he didn't upstage the actual military leaders.
MNc	No and, and he gave them their place in terms of reporting. We were not privy to what it is that they told him, although it would seep down the structures of course to where we were, since I was in the Information and Publicity Department I'd eventually get to know of what it was. They had their standing as military leaders, their places to talk to the President and to develop whatever it is that they thought needed developing, particularly strategically, and that then ties into something we were talking about informally earlier on the Turning Point
MNd	Just before we get to that.
MNc	Yes
MNd	When it came to military strategy, who devised it, who was responsible for it was it just the top military leadership or were some of the politicians also consulted. Was Nkomo involved in that?
MNc	My understanding was that the military were de facto the originators because they understood the lay of the ground in the front and they would bring that information to the President and say this is what we have, and these are the options, and he would pick.
MNd	And he did he have any close advisors, was there any sort of inner cabinet sort of, or
MNc	Yes I think his intelligence men, Dumiso definitely comes first and Mafela during the Mangena at his time I mean, Akim and so on although Akim was by that time
MNd	He was out of it
MNc	Not in the forefront, but occasionally he was called in. I know that for a fact because Akim himself would tell me. He was called in as somebody who had a a background view of the struggle and the military side, so indeed yes he did have his inner group to advise on, but I understood that he deferred quite a bit to the military people in terms of certain decisions. There were of course very very strategic decisions that he had to have his his stamp on for them to be carried out.
MNd	But then what about the just before we go into that the role of the Revolutionary Council at this period. What did it still have the role it had under JZ or was it kind of too big and too clumsy to really be making decisions
MNc	It had it had developed I think a lot more biga lot out of size, if I may say so because now membership had grown a bit larger in order to take account of people coming from inside, and to take account of the representatives in foreign countries and to take account of the regions, military regions, and that to me became rather unwieldy. But I don't think it continued to function the same way as it did in the JZ days, when it was a close-knit group and I believe then taking decisions as such. It didn't in my view in the Nkomo days.



Speaker	Dialogue
MNd	It became a consultative body
MNc	A consultative body more than taking firm decisions to do XYZ. That those were reserved to the to the army leadership, to the intelligence leadership and to the Presidency. That's my understanding at the time. Some may have decried that and said "But they are leaving they are leaving us out of it". The answer I got for in that regard was that well in an in an expanded organization you really can't keep expanding that because you won't be able to control what happens with information that
MNd	Yes, especially in that security situation.
MNc	Precisely, yes.
MNd	So you wanted to talk more about the very strategic issues.
MNc	Well, I don't know that, maybe I just wanted to mention them, unless you want to direct me to some specific matters of interest
MNd	Before we go to the issue of the Turning Point, I wanted to ask about issues like the repeated sort of on-again, off-again negotiations with Smith or the British or whatever. Would those decisions be taken together with the military or were they purely political decisions?
MNc	Mostly political, and unfortunately I'd say, mostly political, and I think this may have caused some some tension because the military seemed to be saying "Well we we want to know what it is they are talking about because we occupy the ground and we want to know whether there is something that we are going to be asked to lose or to give up. If so, well why. If we're not in there we're not sure that we can really feel happy about it". And the other point was there was not enough information about what was actually going on in those discussions. Whether this was a fault of our briefing system or it was the it was that there just wasn't the information I don't know. And that, as you may imagine, had even a greater impact on the military because they effectively fell far and far behind in terms of knowledge – what was going on or what was being done in their name. The tension continued, if continued really until Lancaster House, and needless to say that's why there were these differences on how, how you then end up with a single army into Zimbabwe when you actually start off with two disparate bodies fighting on the ground inside the country.
MNd	Oh you mean like with ZANLA and ZPRA.
MNc	ZANLA and ZPRA, yes
MNd	Yes of course, and then part of those negotiations were the political negotiations with ZANU and the frontline states trying to bring them together.
MNc	Exactly, exactly, yes. And it didn't it didn't help that there were just too many too many outside interests in the outcome of our negotiations and our struggle, and I say this quite frankly there were too many people wanting to be king-makers and that's part of what really brought us where we are and I shall be talking about this somewhere else where I am doing some scribbling myself and and it was disastrous for us.



Speaker	Dialogue
MNd	When you say too many other people, there's the British, there's the Frontline States, there's the South Africans, there's the Americans
MNc	There's everybody, except us.
MNd	Including the Soviets I suppose in the background there, and the Cubans
MNc	Yes, yes, and they
MNd	Feeling left out
MNc	Right, and so
MNd	Let's come to the issue of the Turning Point now first of all if you can explain thisthis photograph of Ngwenya [Jack] with Nkomo [2A-47-19]
MNc	For for quite a long time and now, people were feeling – those that were not quite close to the political development, to the military development – were feeling slightly left out, and wondering aloud in some cases what exactly is going on – are we still in this thing or are we not in this thing, and I'm sure comrades who are still alive today will be able to confirm that they often had questions asked of them "what is going on?" And these were genuine questions asked by genuine Zimbabweans wanting to get genuine answers, not because they wanted to go and sell the information to lan Smith of anything like that – there may have been of course such people – but in most cases it was genuine members of the organization, of ZAPU, wanting to know where we were headed to. As the movement grew, and as forces grew on the ground on the ZPRA side and people multiplied in camps, and activities inultiplied in terms of education, in terms of refugees, in terms of feeding the refugees, in terms of just about anything you can think of that normally takes place in a country was happening in the camps, and this had an effect also on theon the movement – was it able to cope? – in some cases it wasn't able to cope because there was just too much, too much to handle. The flow of food – it may sound it may sound, well, contradictory to say that there were times when there was there was more to be handled in terms of moving food out of the airports to the people than there was in the camps to feed the people. So these were strategic questions, organizational questions and so on that had to be addressed, and sometimes dislocations occurred, and these dislocations might be blown out of proportion by the press, international press in particular, and because there were, there were genuine truths in what was being said, those who wanted to to paint a bad image of ZAPU would do so on that ground and give the impression that we were going round in circles and not going anywhere at all. It did cause some some ruptures in



Speaker	Dialogue
MNIA	And you then had to build a strategy around that to contain the need to achieve these things you have elucidated and listed what you want to achieve. There had to be much more forthright explanations about the military activities. There had to be results coming from the military front. There had to be there had to be credibility as seen by the supporters, as seen by organizations that had been working very hard to raise material support, and hence the need for a Turning Point, the need to sit down and say "This is what we are going to do". The military had to come up with their side of it and the political side had to come up with their side as well and so was also the area of support, the area of education, the area all of those areas had to come up and say "this is what we are doing" - what are the children doing in the camps, have they moved forward in this process what are you doing with the aid that you are getting from the support movements. You had to account, you had to show, and here it's where my my friend Edward [Ndlovu] I believe excelled and never tired in coming back again and saying "This is what we have to do, this is what we need, this we have to write this letter to so-and-so to say this is what we have done, this is what we need, this is what we we are focusing on now." And people who shy away from putting down their thoughts in writing, on paper may never fully explain themselves when the need to do so comes, and I don't believe that that is one of Edward's faults, no, it wasn't, because he believed in saying let's write it down, can you just
MNc MNc	And you were there to write.
	I was there to write. I was there to write for my superior of course a colleague, a comrade and a respected one for me from whom I learned a wonderful amount of information and I learned an outlook, a life outlook and a and so this strategy developed in all of those sectors and resulted in what then came out as the strategic approach to to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. Whether or not in some areas we we made mistakes or not is a different issue which I leave to others to look at and judge, but certainly there were efforts made on the military front - much more activity there – support coming in in much large quantities than had hitherto been possible and at theon the support for the refugees, the same thing - the movement out of the country into Zambia even bigger to a point that there were even people staying in Botswana for for months before they could be moved to, to Zambia because there were there wasn't enough space to locate them so that they can be cared for, there wasn't enough space in Botswana to keep them safely and so on and so forth. But all of these things came together and boosted the the struggle
MNd	And then this was named the Turning Point. Did you coin this phrase?
MNc	I think I did but I wouldn't want to because I put it in the document that became the document which President Nkomo read at the press conference to announce the the coming together of all of these ideas, yes
MNd	And this was sometime early 79
MNc	Yes, early 79; March-April I'm not sure now, it must be somewhere there.
MNd	But now this this photograph where they are signing – well this is just Ngwenya, but there are other photographs showing all the leadership signing – what were they signing?
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Speaker	Dialogue
MNc	We were all we were all required at that time in anticipation of the announcement, or was it after the announcement now, that we internalize for ourselves as leaders the information that we came to know or have by reason of our service, and had to keep it confidential because it would help save lives and help move the struggle forward if that information was not divulged. So we were signing what was called a secrecy agreement which each individual leader was asked to sign – swear and sign – before the President, affirming their own understanding that they were being held responsible if any information should be leaked which they came to have by reason of service to the struggle, and I think I don't recall anybody being hesitant to sign. People went forward and put their signatures understanding clearly that this was in the name of the struggle and in the name of the country.
MNd	And this took place about the same time as the public announcement.
MNc	Announcement of the Turning Point, yes. It was, I mean it was a momentous time – the language was – I say so because I still feel it to this day – the language was appropriate to the time, maybe some will say grandiose and overclaiming but I feel that it served to it served to motivate as well as show direction, those two things at the same time, and I think that the statement achieved its goal in that respect
MNd	OK let's come back from the Turning Pont then and look at education. You talked earlier about you were quite involved in education. How was that department structured and like there was somebody in charge of education, who did they answer to and then how did that get organized for the schools.
MNc	The education first of all let me say I found the the view of education within ZAPU very very encouraging and very invigorating. I myself having been one of the lucky ones to have gotten a university education I might say - and I hope I'm not claiming too much when I say that - I understood what education meant. I understood also the importance at that juncture of education, not at university level but at the lowest of the lowest levels in the education of any person, that is what we would today call zero grade, from there up through primary to secondary education. I understood the importance and I was heartened by the fact that the people in charge of education understood it even beyond what I understood, that it had a service, it was creating a service base for the society to come, and they wanted to cram it in there as much as possible, now, now, now, so that those who leave the camps will leave with something. And when they get back home they may not have a certificate, they may not have this document or that document, but they will have education, and that was to me absolutely absolutely moving and important.
	And we had Edward Ndlovu deeply deeply involved in collecting the resources for this activity, collecting just – he was a collector when it came to that, he simply just collected, it didn't matter what. If he if it was something that can be done with to help someone learn he collected it and he sent it down, he made it come. And he worked with Makoni doing the desk work for the programming but he giving the overall and giving it also the international support base which it required otherwise we we were not in Zimbabwe and we couldn't build anything in Zambia without international support. And so it was a pleasure working with those two and called upon to analyse and called upon to literally say "is this



Speaker	Dialogue
	feasible?" If it is, how do we make it practical. And I want to add another person in an indirect way who also featured in this process, an angle that I took part in - Malandu, Enos Malandu, who was political commissar and tasked with preparing lectures for delivery in camps, and for me it was to deliver those lectures and I said earlier on to deliver them in accompaniment of films that I thought were were helpful in putting the message across, and Malandu was very very effective in a unfortunately I don't think Malandu was given the space that he should have been given, I don't think so, that's my view today. He could have done even better and more effective than he did, but he was very firmly involved in the education of comrades in the camps and his ideas would then be transmitted to the curriculum side of education and Makoni would be involved in, in that kind of work. I slowly moved into the support side because the organization in its wisdom finally decided that I had to go out as a representative and carry out as part of my duties raising funds for projects of the of the party and I did the best I could and I can't say always with success but as best I could at the time, but the moving spirit was Edward and Makoni in that combination, with with Edward doing most of the of the contacts
MNd	Resource mobilization I think they call it now
MNc	Resource mobilization yes and and he did it well, he did it effectively. And I think part of the reason why he did it so effectively was because he was respected, he was trusted, and he accounted for whatever he got. Now that much I know and because I received the end bit of it there and transmittal, I was in the in the belt and saw what came and later saw the letters being shown to me as copies or from the from the donors. And that I think is something that today we need to keep harping on — you have to be trusted as a leader; if you can't be trusted then by god you just have to get the hell out of there and go somewhere else. And this is one of the things that I learned fromfrom Edward. You sit there, you don't try to make the thing look nice if it isn't. You tell it like it is. We had difficulties here colleagues, we have difficulties in getting this and that and the other thing to work, and part of the difficulties come from XYZ and he'd spell it out, and we need to correct this. And eventually of course he would get to the point that the mistakes we make now are our mistakes as leaders but they should not be taken and used against the children in the camps. It's not their fault.
MNd	Who who would have been making decisions on things like curriculum and
MNc	Makoni and Malandu jointly. Malandu from the political angle, Makoni from the technical side of education and he I can't remember now who else came in to help him but I know there were
MNd	Matshalaga was there, I know he had been a teacher and I'm not sure what he was doing
MNc	Yes, Matshalaga helped the curriculum development, yes, and I had it's a mistake on my part, I had forgotten to mention him. He certainly was a very very critical person in Makoni's department
MNd	But Makoni was in charge of that department
MNc	Makoni was in charge of the department



Speaker	Dialogue
MNd	And then whoin a department you've got your education department, there was a health department and so on who did they all answer to then? Who would they be reporting to?
MNc	Sometimes I I was at pains to find out that myself, but it sounded as if there was someone in the in the executive, and I'm not sure whether it wasn't Edward or whether it was somebody else. Quite honestly I never got the picture clearly
MNd	Maybe it was changing as well.
MNc	Yes, yes, because as you know Edward moved back and forth, international relations quite heavily, education, projects
MNd	And then where was John [Nkomo]. John was administrator but what was his role then? He wasn't in charge of other departments?
MNc	John was to John was to administer people like Ngwenya [Jack] and others and Ngwenya was the key person on the ground in terms of day to day administration
MNd	Making sure the money was going in the right place
MNc	the tickets are bought for people who have to travel, and so-and-so has to move from here to there according to instructions and so that was Jack, and so I might say, with no fear of contradiction, effective. I didn't see John that much, and I couldn't tell you that I saw him move this paper from here to there or move this instruction from there to there. I would be lying, but people will say, well because I wasn't near enough to see it happen, true, but the person we saw was Jack Ngwenya.
MNd	And who was managing the money then. After JZ was Treasurer and then with Vuma [Stephen]. After JZ died did Vuma take over?
MNc	Yes, Vuma took over, and Vuma took over and some will say he continued to be effectivehe continued to be effective and of course there were always questions here and there about why this wasn't given enough money to do XY that's always budgetary problems that could be laid at the doorstep of the Revolutionary Council rather than at his doorstep, yes
MNd	Ok, I think we've taken enough of your energy for one day. Hopefully there'll be others. Thanks very much. Unless there's something else you want to say just to to wind up.
MNc	Well if I think of it I'll come back and ask you to put this thing on and say it. I did a very nice piece for your colleague what was her name now
MNd	Oh JocelynJoAnn[McGregor]
MNc	JoAnn, yes, in this section on the support movement - solidarity in fact, solidarity. It's one section that we haven't talked about.
MNd	No, that will be for the next one
MNc	Then I leave it.
MNd	Then we'll go into the whole issue of the foreign relations and international solidarity. So for today thank you very much



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