

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONSECTION 29 HEARING"IN CAMERA"

DATE: 26-03-1998

NAME: GEN MASONDO

HELD AT: JOHANNESBURG

CHAIRPERSON: Ladies and gentlemen, this is a Section 29 enquiry, in other words it is an enquiry held in terms of Section 29 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. It is a private enquiry and as such only the witness and members of the Commission are permitted to be at this enquiry.

The panel is composed of Ms Yasmin Sooka, Ms Mary Burton and myself and the persons who will be assisting the Committee by putting questions to the witness will be Mr Zenzile Khoisan and Ms Pumla Dwane-Alpman.

Let me extend a word of welcome to you, General Masondo and indicate our greatest appreciation for you having been willing and able to come, at what virtually amounts to a little more than short notice.

I do note that in terms of the Act, you are entitled to legal representation, and I would assume that this was indicated to you.

I would just like to clarify whether you do have legal representation or whether you have chosen not to be represented?

GEN MASONDO: Well, I do not have legal representation, but I don't think it is necessary.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much General. I don't know - there will be - just on the procedural issues we will take a break at about eleven or half past eleven, which will be a tea break, and then we will continue thereafter if needs be.

General, I don't know whether you take the oath or whether you affirm.

GEN MASONDO: Any one of them is - it doesn't matter.

CHAIRPERSON: In which event I will ask Ms Yasmin Sooka to swear you in before you testify.

GENERAL MASONDO: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Khoisan.

MR KHOISAN: Good morning Gen Masondo.

GEN MASONDO: Good morning.

MR KHOISAN: Thank you for joining us here today. General, just in terms of this particular hearing, as is customary with the Section 29's that we have conducted with people, before we get into the body of the matter, we would like to extend to you an opportunity if you so wish, to put whatever issues you have on the record.

If you have a statement that you wish to read, if you have any information that you want to, that you wish this panel to take

cognisance of, then we would like to extend that opportunity to you to do so now.

GEN MASONDO: Okay, I haven't prepared anything in writing, but I will make a few remarks. In the first place I was a National Political Commissar of the African National Congress as a whole, from 1977 to 1985, and at the time there was a time when I also acted as the Army Commissar until Chris Hani came back from Lesotho and we then split the role of National Commissar and Army Commissar.

I have been going through a number of documents just now, glancing through them and it is I think important for me to give certain background. I think the Commission might have the knowledge that I - I left this country after I served 13 years in Robben Island, having been a lecturer at the University of Fort Hare and having started the Department of Applied Mathematics as a separate Department.

In the position that I held, I had no personal reason why I should have gone into Umkonto weSizwe, except the fact that the situation in the country demanded me to do so.

I have gone to Robben Island, spent 13 years. I am among the first MK people there. I have been able, whilst I was there, to battle for the rights of our own people. I suit the government whilst I was in prison, for the way it treated our people. The record is there that I even said there that the reason why I did

that was not money, but to make sure that the conditions were proper.

I left this country in 1976 after I had been banished to Natal and it was a decision of the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, that I leave this country, because he thought I would go back to jail.

I got outside, I went to the Soviet Union to go and train as a military man and came back. In 1977 I became a member of the National Executive Committee and also the National Political Commissar.

I was responsible for drafting the Umkonto We Sizwe code of conduct for the sole reason that I believed that we needed to have a document that would run the military properly, a reference so that we do not have just kangaroo courts.

I also am responsible for the revamping of the structures of the African National Congress outside. When I came back, the President gave me comrade Thabo with whom to work so that we revamp the structures of the African National Congress because I thought those structures needed revamping so that we are able to handle the situation.

As the National Commissar, I was the representative of the cadre and the political organisation in the Army, even in the National Executive itself. I was a member of the Revolutionary Council and as Commissar also I acted as the Deputy Commander.

I think apart from comrade Mzwandile Piliso, practically nobody has spent as time with the ordinary cadre as myself. When, in 1976 whilst I was still in the country, the Soweto uprising took place. I said to the Special Branch who visited me in Umlazi where I was banished, why do you people do such a thing because these kids were only worried about the fact that they were taught in a language they do not understand.

I was also a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and at a Central Committee meeting in 1977 in (indistinct), in the statement I introduced the phrase "Soweto entered the debate of the legitimacy or otherwise of the armed struggle."

I might be wrong, but I believe that we were at war and I told the cadres that we were at war. I also believe that as the Political Commissar, it was my duty to make sure that the cadres of the African National Congress came back home, not in bags, but still walking, and also that I should motivate them that we should fight and win the fight.

I went to, I sat in this Commission that I have never in my life expressed personal feeling towards cadres. I dealt with them as part of the liberation movement. There are a number of things that I think I know more than other people do, about the African National Congress, and that is the situation of the cadre and I paid more attention to what the cadre said.

The only Commission I was called to, was the Stuart Commission, because of some of the allegations that were made there. Some of the allegations were that I did not take into account the problems of the cadres. I don't have to prove that myself. I think the records of the ANC if gone into, will say that the mere fact that even up to the present moment, the ANC cadres still calls me Commissar in spite of the fact that I am a General.

One thing that I developed very early, was that I don't tell my people lies. If I think they are wrong, I say so. To give an illustration, when there was the mutiny in Viana and at that time I wasn't there, and I said to people if I was around, I would probably have been able to avert that mutiny because I would have known what is happening.

Not from the security as people always thought, I got information from the security. I normally got information from the ordinary cadre who came and told me. I think for instance I knew more about the problems even of female cadres and some females in the African National Congress because the cadres had confidence in me.

Now, when we got there, after Chris had had the problem with the mutiny there, we got there with the Commander, Joe Modise and we discussed that matter and told the cadres that irrespective of what problems they had, what they did was counter-revolutionary.

CHAIRPERSON: General, I don't know maybe if I am not going to cut across your trend, but I am - I would possibly request if you could, not to assume anything on the part of the panel, simply because you have that voluminous documentation, because I think what has happened is that we have been loaded with a lot of information, and I think the value of having you here, would possibly to get you say in your own words, what your own perceptions are.

In other words if for instance, now that you are beginning to get in say for instance, the mutiny, if you could possibly say when you left, where did you go when you left South Africa. Get to Angola, set up the structures there, and develop then and build up to the period where the Stuart Commission took place.

GEN MASONDO: Okay, I will do that. I left here, went to Swaziland, from Swaziland I went to Maputo where I met the President because he was waiting for me. Then he instructed me to go to Tanzania. From Tanzania I then went to the Soviet Union to go and do my military training. I was there for the whole year.

I came back at the end of 1977 and went to Angola. I attended my first meeting of the National Executive Committee in 1977, I came back from Angola.

That is when I discussed the question of structures. I then went to Katenga. When I got to Katenga, I then realised that we

had a very serious problem. First and foremost, when our people came there, even if you had money, you couldn't buy things because it was during the time when the Angola itself had a problem within the MPLA. When people like (indistinct) were busy trying to undermine the government.

There was a lot of economic problems. I remember for instance the first group which left with Dr Neeto from Tanzania to Angola. I was involved with General Sidebe to prepare them to go there, before I left for Moscow.

I remember whilst our young people were in Tanzania, one day they went on a hunger strike and I asked them why are you on hunger strike, and they said, no, that time they didn't even know I was the Commissar, they just saw an old man who was among them. I remember them making me guard the whole night.

I was saying to them, no, you must eat, they said no, we are being made fat here, and our people are dying at home. I said to them, no, but eat. When I came from Moscow, they were there and the situation was tough. They were eating condensed milk that is put in water. They were eating powdered egg that was just put in water, there was no fat.

Then they said to me Commissar, no, no, things are bad. (Indistinct) said to them you remember that you can't be fat, because the people at home are dying. That was a way of making them understand that in life, situations changed.

I discussed it with them. One thing that happened when June 16th, people got there, the leadership of the ANC was very, very touched by these kids that had been killed and as a result, we didn't search people. People just said, no, these are our kids, but there was something we didn't know, that the enemy, one had infiltrated.

Two, they themselves you know, when I was discussing with them, sitting and discussing how they got out. They would just start telling one another, tomorrow I am going away and the word spreads around and they go. And those that, some people would know that they were going, but they still remain. That shows how the security of the movement, was still very, very at a low level.

But I came just after the Black September, Black Wednesday, when our people were poisoned. Katenga had more than 500 cadres. They were purging, they - everybody in that camp was just helpless. Have it not been for the Cuban Doctors, we would have lost nearly the whole of that camp. But fortunately the Cuban Doctors were very near, we just went to Bengela and got those Doctors and then they worked on them.

Because also we had Cubans on the camp.

CHAIRPERSON: When did this poisoning take place, what year was it?

GEN MASONDO: It was 1977.

CHAIRPERSON: 1977?

GEN MASONDO: September. Now, that was one aspect that began to say to the leadership there is something here. We need to begin to tighten the security.

One of my tasks as the Commissar, I had access to nearly all the Departments, any Department that had to do with cadres, I could go to them and say there is a problem, what do you do.

When I got there, they had started catching a few of the agents and these people were given to the Angola, they were locked up by the Angolans and as the Commissar, I went to visit them.

In visiting them, I asked how they felt, how we could help them, did they need some material to read and they gave me that type of information. But it is true that the Angolans were beginning to have a problem with our people being there, because at a certain time, some Angolans themselves assisted some of the people to escape.

So it was a problem and I think the laws of the country also couldn't allow them to just detain people who - people who were still going to investigate how far they were involved. I think at that time we had a young lady there, coloured in this. I visited there, ultimately she never went to Quattro.

MR KHOISAN: General, can you just put that name back on the record, I just didn't catch it correctly. The person that ...

GEN MASONDO: I had forgotten her name, but she was coloured and she ultimately, she went to Sweden from Angola, but she was still - she was detained.

I used to visit her there. Because of this problem of the Angolan law and this, the Angolans indicated that it might be better if we had our own place and Pango was built.

I was involved in the building of Quattro. We ...

CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me General, was Pango something different from Quattro?

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So we are talking about Pango now?

GEN MASONDO: No, we are talking about Quattro. That is the lock up area.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see.

GEN MASONDO: You see, in Kibashi were three camps. Camp (indistinct) which is what normally people refer to as Kibashi. Then you had Pango, Camp 101, then we have Quattro which was the place where we kept the people who had problems.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words it was a detention centre?

GEN MASONDO: It was a detention centre.

CHAIRPERSON: So when the Angolans said look, we can't keep your people any more because of all the problems that you know, we have law and others being assisted to escape etc, then

did they then say here is a place and they gave you Pango, or was Pango already there?

GEN MASONDO: No, Pango, yes, Pango is a different - Quattro was like all our camps, you know, you came there and they gave you let's say an old farm, farm house.

And then we began to develop the place. Now, the same with Quattro. They gave us a place, now there was a comrade who was with me in Robben Island, I will remember his name, he had been with me in Robben Island, he was arrested at the beginning for criminal activity. He is one of the people that we organised in prison.

When he got out, out of prison, then he left and joined us. Now, he was a good builder so comrade Mzwandile Piliso and I then said to him, look can you renovate some of these things so that we can keep the people who have problems. So that is what happened.

MR KHOISAN: General, just as a matter of clarification, at the time that the Angolans came to the conclusion that they couldn't handle issues regarding the detention of suspected South Africans, and decided to cede the position to the ANC, to handle your own affairs in that regard, can you give me an idea of what numbers we are talking about.

How many people at that time were in detention in Angola which had caused them to arrive at this conclusion, and also who

was involved in those deliberations to move from that position to the position which would be the establishment of Quattro in effect?

GEN MASONDO: There were about 10 of them detained at various places in Angola there. The negotiations were entered into by the National Executive of the African National Congress. The President was involved in that because they would inform the President that the situation is that way, and now in the actual carrying out of that instruction, comrade Mzwandile Piliso, myself, Joe Modise, the people who are in charge of that area, would then get into discussions as to where, how, because that is how we got most of our camps.

So, then we decided okay, we will have Quattro and we started putting people in Quattro. Now in 1979 comrade Mzwandile Piliso and I, because we were monitoring Radio RSA, heard Vorster say they are going to attack a camp, a Swapo camp, but the mistake he made, he actually called it by name, and said Katenga.

We sat down with comrade Mzwandile and we said, and by the way by that time comrade Mzwandile was not Chief of Intelligence. He was actually the Personnel Chief. The person who was in charge of Intelligence at that time, is a man called Dr Elias Pule Modwa, who ultimately left, he was a Dentist also.

There was also a situation where you had National Intelligence which looked after the security people, then we had camp within the camp. We had what we had recording officers, who were more or less under the Chief of Personnel, just to check what was happening, and they gave information so that later, the two were brought together and they became one.

The recording officer for instance, didn't have powers to arrest anybody for whatever misdemeanour which was connected with security.

MR KHOISAN: General, just while we are on that question of security, and just so that we understand clearly, in terms of the personnel who were actually involved in the security apparatus of the ANC at that time, what was the chain of command. If it was a vertical command, who was the, what was the apex of that command and ...

GEN MASONDO: The apex of the command was the President.

Then from the President, you had the Chief, a member of the National Executive who was in charge of security and at that time, it was Sipho Makhana, and then in Angola you had Dr Poole, together with a chap we called Fapla, who were in charge of that structure.

But that was apart from the others, what we called the recording officers. They were strictly local and under the personnel.

MR KHOISAN: What I am trying to establish here General, is and just to be very clear about the chain, so the chain in terms of the security of the African National Congress, stretches down from the President of the Organisation, reaches into with - this is in consultation with a member of the NEC and you have ...

GEN MASONDO: There is, you see, the President is the supreme Commander of Security. It is one of those Departments which are in the President's office.

MR KHOISAN: What I am trying to establish General, whether there was a vertical chain that reaches from if you can, I understand what you are telling us that the recording officers are the people who were local, they were on the ground, they physically capture the information or deal with the people, whatever.

I am trying to find out what the chain was, so it is from the President ...

GEN MASONDO: The President to the Member of the National Executive Committee, to the man, the regional man in charge of security and the head cadres there, who could go into the camp and do, and check whatever they liked. Those were people who were in the security and intelligence departments.

But the recording officers at the beginning, were not in that, that is why they could for instance not take somebody, interrogate somebody. All they did was just to assist personnel

about information that might be - which would then have to be reported to security.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, I think what we are trying to do here, is to establish procedural issues because if you are telling us that the security apparatus, the final say so of the security apparatus rests with the late President OR Tambo, that is what you are telling us, physically understand that.

GEN MASONDO: Yes, the final responsibility was with the President, but ...

MR KHOISAN: But I don't understand where, because you have informed us about, who you referred to as comrade Siphon Makhana, Dr Poole and a fellow called Fapla, but I don't see where you are located in that intersection.

GEN MASONDO: No, I wasn't in Security, I have never been in Security. I have always been the Commissar.

MR KHOISAN: Now, that is what I am trying to establish. I am trying to establish what is the role of the Commissar relevant to the Security apparatus, if you can explain that to me.

GEN MASONDO: Yes. I told you that I had access to all the Departments of the ANC, all of them. For instance I could go into Security and say to Security, why does it seem that your people don't attend political meetings.

I could go to Security and say to Security why is it that I hear that your people are ill-treating people. I could do that

because if the cadre told me something, then I could go and ask Security, I could go to the revolutionary council where I was, and put it across.

I could go to the National Executive Committee where I was, and put the problem across. So in essence I was the link between the soldier and the leadership of the African National Congress, and that is why I could go to prisons and sit with the people, and find out what ...

I will give examples as we go on. In fact if you want, for instance whilst I went to, I was visiting the Angolan prisons, there was a chap called David Dumela, no David Kotsokwane. Now, David Kotsokwane was a policeman. A policeman who was infiltrated into the African National Congress.

He was taken to the Soviet Union, trained. When he had completed his training, comrade Joe Modise and comrade Joe Slovo went to the Soviet Union to go and check how well trained these people were. As people were involved in the actual combat units inside, they then had an interview with David and David said, the report from the Soviets were very good.

I mean the chap was doing exceptionally well, because after all he was being retrained. And he said to them, and then they said to him where do you come from, and he said no, I come from the Natal area, he told them the area. They said yes man, we

want somebody like you. So we want you to go back and David said to them, no, I am not going back.

They said but why are you not going back, he said no, no, I am not going back. Ultimately when they pressed him, he said no, I am a policeman and I don't want to go back and go and sell my people.

I was indoctrinated about communists and all that type of thing, now I come to the Soviet Union, now I am trained, the people who are called communists, they treat me well, so there is something wrong with what I was told.

Then he was taken, because he had confessed, he was then taken to Angola and locked up. Whilst I was visiting, I met him.

He said to me, Commissar I am very, very much unhappy. At that time the two Commanders had not yet informed me about him.

He said I am very unhappy, and you know, why am I here and he tells me the whole story. So I said to him okay, I will go and see the Commanders to check whether your story is correct. So I go, I check, they say yes. So I asked the two Commanders, why do you lock him up, they say no, we just sent him to Angola, but the Security people decided to lock him up.

So I said, well all right, we must do something. Whilst we were talking, that is the time we transferred people to Quattro.

He went to Quattro and when he was there, I again went to see him.

Ultimately we decided no man, this man doesn't need to be here, so we got him out, then he went to Mazimbo. We sent him to Sweden to go and become a teacher, he came back and taught at Mazimbo.

That is the type of thing that I sometimes did.

MS SOOKA: General, I wonder if I could ask you a question please. When these camps were set up, in a sense what I am hearing you say is that there were two parallel systems running. Was the distinction between who had control, based on whether the misdemeanour was one of a criminal nature or whether it was one essentially of a political nature?

GEN MASONDO: All right, if the misdemeanour was one of a criminal nature or bridge of this, that was the Camp Commander, together with the Camp Commander also who is there, but if it was political, it was Security. It was Security that did that.

Now, for instance, I mean if let's say if somebody did something wrong in a camp, and the camp had a Commissar, the Commander could get the chap, punish the chap. The Commissar might find out that when maybe the sentence was too harsh, you would go to the Commander and say Commander, but are we really achieving what we would like by punishing this chap this way?

GEN MASONDO: I actually started the development of the MK military code whilst I was still - I got there and I said, what supposing somebody did something wrong, how would we know whether we should detain this person, whether we should just make this person do fatigues, whether we should just reprimand this person.

So we, myself and the Commander of Katenga, the late Julius or General Sekeshe, started to draft a code. But I did this having discussed with the Commander, Joe Modise. At that time, even the ANC itself didn't have a code.

So whilst we developed the MK military code which was the one that for instance that was given in the submission of the ANC, was the revised one, not the original one that we had drawn up, and in that one we put quite various things, what was a serious act, what was an ordinary act, what were the punishments, which punishment would you apply to this and that, that is what we did, and then we then presented it.

CHAIRPERSON: Were there any prescribed procedures as to - you see, I am asking because comrade Mac Maharaj indicated to us here that there were people who were executed without even as much as having had a hearing, let alone a legal one.

He indicated that as one of the shortcomings and deficiencies of the, you know, or one of the things that could be

pointed at as having been shortcomings of the whole situation in the camps, without necessarily saying whether it was Pango or ...

GEN MASONDO: No, in a camp, in a camp, like in all military institutions, if you've got - you have done something wrong, you are put before the Commander. Now, the Commissar must be there, because in most cases the Commissar acts on behalf of the cadre to see to it that the cadre is properly represented.

I mean sometimes, somebody can be given a punishment and I could come, maybe the camp Commissar couldn't, I could come and determine and say no, I think this punishment was too much, and I would argue, I could argue on that and they would probably release the chap, or reduce the punishment.

That was the situation. In the politically motivated ones, I also happened to have been in the Review Committee, that was established by the President.

For instance ...

MR KHOISAN: And who were the other people who constituted the Review Committee, just so that we ...

GEN MASONDO: Unfortunately most of them are dead, I am possibly the only one living, Moses Madida, Titi Nkobe, John Motsabi. Yes, I think it was the four of us, and then we always had the Commander of Quattro as part of this, because he would then give us the - and there was a tribunal also that - so if the tribunal for instance had given people a sentence, then it would

be brought to us as a Review Committee, and we could say no, this is not enough.

It is true, that we did not have at the time, a provision for a legal representative. That is a fact.

CHAIRPERSON: But was there any representative by, let's take the situation where somebody, I will take two instances. The one instance is where a cadre is being held for an allegation by a female cadre that he has raped the female cadre.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, what was the process, what was the procedure? You are not there because you are a political Commissar, or were you there? Who would represent that rapist and before what forum would that rapist appear because I got the distinct impression from Maharaj's testimony that there were instances where people were executed where there hadn't been any representation whatsoever?

GEN MASONDO: No, no, I - with due respect I think Mac doesn't, didn't know much of the procedures on the ground, with due respect.

For instance, I know of a specific case where one girl said the chap had raped her. Now, we took that very seriously. You rape a woman, it is keeps. We said because it is a serious matter, I was there myself, we brought in some of the you know, the

whoever was the witnesses, I mean of this thing and we listened to this.

And ultimately we came to the conclusion that in this particular case, it wasn't true. The chap was left. In some cases, because a Commissar must be in that thing to see to it that the cadre is represented.

That is one thing that must always be there. If the Commissar himself is not good, well, then we have a problem, but when the little tribunal is instituted, the Commissar must be there, and he normally has to see to it that the person who is accused, is given a fair trial.

MR KHOISAN: General, just and I know we are about to break for tea in a little while, but you know, in your pre-, in your, when you gave us your views earlier, before we began this discussion, you put some things on the table in terms of your relationship with the cadres on the ground.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: And from my understanding of things, it is usually you know, a good Commissar is one who has touch with people in all echelons of any movement.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: What was your disposition, you know, four years later after the thing blew up, when the Stuart Commission

was formed, what was your position with regard to the Stuart Commission, did you have any position when it was constituted?

GEN MASONDO: Well, I was - when the Stuart Commission was constituted, I was still the National Commissar. When the Stuart Commission was constituted, I was still in the National Executive Committee. The Stuart Commission was constituted because after we took the people from Quattro, I mean from the - I took them to Pango, one group to Pango. The other was taken to Kibashi.

Once we have sort of, you know brought a bit of normality, then we discussed the matter in the National Executive Committee and said there needs to be a Commission of Enquiry. The very Stuart Commission was introduced by me to the cadres.

MR KHOISAN: Then what was your position, because you see the issue is when the Stuart Commission was formed, to take on review the disturbances at Quattro and the factors which may have predicated those disturbances, they made a series of findings, and one of the primary findings of the Stuart Commission in fact on point 1, it says that the Commission found that amongst the cadres, there is a general criticism of comrade Masondo.

GEN MASONDO: Yes, I was reading that, just now.

MR KHOISAN: They believed that he has failed as National Commissar because ...

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I think I had asked that General Masondo must give us a chronological account. As far as I understand, we are still at 1979.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I would like though quickly, I would like you to be able to get to a point where, then you can introduce that sort of period.

GEN MASONDO: Okay, no problem.

CHAIRPERSON: But I think, let's take that after tea.

GEN MASONDO: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: I think when we come back, I would really - please when I say don't assume that we have read any of these things, because I think the value of this should be that we should now hear from a person who was there, what happened, how the structures were set up, what happened.

Like now, you are able to say no, comrade Maharaj was overstating things. Please give us the benefit of your own knowledge and experience of the structures. Don't assume that we know why there was then a Commission of Enquiry.

GEN MASONDO: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will take tea and we should resume at about twenty past.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

GENERAL MASONDO: (still under oath)

GEN MASONDO: So I am saying that then we got to Katenga itself, that was our first day 1977, when I got there. That was our main base.

I remember one time, at the beginning we had a problem of the June 16 group, who had been fighting the system, when I got to the camp, were continuing to think that authority is you know, is bad per se. I remember some of the chaps who came from university thought they couldn't salute.

They said to salute was an old (indistinct) thing, so I then said to them, no, (indistinct) hangover, I said to them no, before you can say saluting and military courteous is a (indistinct) hangover, I must first teach you what (indistinct) is and also what a hangover is, so that you use it properly.

But we had to explain to them that you know, there is a difference between hostile authority and your own authority. And after a time, I think we were able to begin, whereas we taught them the politics and everything, were able to go on quite well.

1979 came. In 1979 Vorster made that announcement that they were going to attack Katenga, which is a Swapo camp, because they couldn't say an ANC camp. So comrade Mzwandile

Piliso and I sat down and said to the Cubans, we must do something, the South Africans are coming.

The Cubans were not convinced that the South Africans could come, we battled and convinced the leadership no. So we then created underground bunkers and they did come. When they came, they came with six cannon bearers and they bombed that place.

Fortunately by then we only had eleven people within the camp. So we lost one Cuban and one South African. We shot down, we shot one of the planes that came there, but we said it was the Angolans.

But you see, when we started to check what was happening, we found an interesting thing about that raid. We had changed the anti-aircraft positions and when those chaps came, they hit where we had the anti-aircrafts. They also chose a time when we would be on parade or inside the dining hall.

So they had a very good information. I was lucky that at the time I was in Luanda. I just arrived in Luanda, I was in a meeting to go back to Katenga. So the following day I was there, went around checking and trying to keep the moral of the young people, and try to analyze. I think after that raid, then we began to realise that we might not take our people back home. You must also remember that around the same time, they attacked

Luso, the ZAPO camp. They attacked that one just before the Rhodesians'.

Then you had Katenga, and I must say I definitely said we were at war. That is what I told the cadres, we are at war. And we had to tighten security. That is in fact, I think it is after that when the recording officers and the security people, we found that they could work together, so we made them more or less under one command.

I think our hearts became to be a bit hardened, because we were beginning to say when we also got now further information, we found that we should have been - you see in 1977, I think the agents were rather too hasty. They should have poisoned us and then the raid happened.

Now, you can imagine what would have happened if they came to raid us with, they threw about 300 bombs onto that camp.

If we were in the state that we were, it would have been a massacre. We became so serious about our security that we even said to the Angolans, nobody flies above our camp space without telling us.

I remember one day we nearly shot down the Minister of Defence of Angola, because he came, he didn't tell us and we ordered the anti-aircrafts to start controlling that thing by shooting. Then they had to move out, and then they told us it was the Minister of Defence, we said sorry sir. We never knew.

Our friends, must tell us when they are going to fly over us. Even in Kibashi also, our friends the Cubans came, they were doing an exercise. They went, they came into our space and they didn't tell us, we started replying because we were reaching a situation that we were not prepared to say oh, what a pity, the poor children have died.

We thought we owed it to our people to bring those children back. We tightened, obviously I am sure during the course of the tightening, there would have been mistakes that I made, but another aspect, maybe it is even worse, in terms of the tightening, was 1981.

1981 the onslaught on us became very strong. I remember when I was in Dar Es Salaam and at the school there, visiting, we started getting problems in the school. Whilst we are saying we are having problems in the school, there started to be problems in Lusaka.

While we thing there are problems in Lusaka, there start to be problems in the camps. We don't understand what are this, because you know, what was interesting for me, we have had times when things were tough, and the young people took these things and things were beginning to improve in terms of food and things like that, but at this particular time, it was like an onslaught. Now, information was heard that there is a network that is busy organising against us.

I must say the reaction was rather, was rather harsh because then I think we unleashed all, not only the Security, I mean people in Lusaka were collected, checked and then sent to Angola. It was in Angola that we actually started to deal with this matter a little bit more, with a bit of better insight, less agitated.

That is when we did find out that some people in the course of that onslaught, which was called Shisheda, they just said things and implicated people. Whilst we locked them up, then we came back and tried to check whether really some of the statements they had made, were truly you know, the same. They were not trying to implicate themselves simply because they feared that they might have been beaten up and things like that.

In some cases, we were able to take some people out. Maybe it is at this point that I need to indicate something about Kenneth Seremani. Now Seremani was a trusted member of the ANC, as he came in. He used to work, he was made Commander in Kibashi, camp 13.

But I kept on hearing that no, Seremani as a Commander is not playing his part. Now, I never, I know for instance at the Stuart Commission they said I was told by Seremani and I did nothing about it. I watched him, then I said he must be removed in camp 13 and he went to Funda. Funda was the place where we

prepared our chaps for the last, when they were preparing to come home.

One day I go there, I find that Seremani had hung a chap with his arms. A chap called Anderson.

MS DWANE-ALPMAN: Sorry, could I just interrupt there. You just mentioned that he went to Funda. Was that, was he going to do part of the training for the special operations?

GEN MASONDO: Yes, he was actually going to be the Commander.

MS DWANE-ALPMAN: So he was part of that group?

GEN MASONDO: Yes, he was going to be the Commander of that centre, that training centre. Because you see, what we thought, because people were telling us things and we were not sure whether it is a question of maybe he is a tough Commander and therefore you see, camp 13 was a bigger camp, so I wanted to take him to a smaller place, to check whether actually you know, he had any problems with maybe some of the people there, or in fact, there was a problem with him.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the nature of the things for instance?

GEN MASONDO: Well, they used to say that he tended to be cruel to you know, they said. The other thing why I wanted to observe him in a different place, one of the Commissars who kept telling me this thing, was my son.

So I wasn't very happy that you know, I should be listening, although I know me and my son, we normally say things, but it wouldn't have been nice, because the main report would have been from my son, and the Security chaps.

So I said no, let me take him to another place, so he was there.

MR KHOISAN: No, this is Funda.

GEN MASONDO: Funda.

MR KHOISAN: Yes.

GEN MASONDO: So, he said no, this chap Anderson is a sell out, so he had hung him there. Again we checked, and people said but Anderson has got some problems, Anderson, but they were not coming out very clearly. Again, we said all right, let's remove him from this camp, we sent him to Pango.

We started hearing now things. He was destroying motor cars. He is a camp Commander, he would go out with a truck, he would come back, he has capsized the truck, or something is wrong with the truck, but he is all right. And we were being getting information from the Swapo Intelligence that they are having a serious problem with people who are sent by the enemy to come and destroy their transport.

And you know, that is an important way of dealing a serious blow to a guerilla movement, if you can deal with their transport. So one day, he is still Commander, we haven't

removed him, he is Commander there, I take an ambulance, I take a driver, I go to Pango, I say to Seremani, you see this car, you must never drive as a Commander.

Here is the driver for this car. So I go, the next time Seremani has driven that car, and destroyed it. So I decided although the Commissar doesn't lock up people, this one I am going to lock up. So Seremani was actually locked up by me.

But that was before the Shisheda thing. The other thing, just before that, again a chap who was smoking dagga, Makateng.

Again Seremani instructed that he should be beaten up. He knew that we would be, we didn't like people who smoked dagga, because they used to steal our things, go and buy dagga and they created problems.

But he hit that chap and sent that chap to Quattro, and when we found that, that chap died. Now, I then decided I am going to lock him up, then another one, because I am going to talk of these three, because I locked them up the same day, Godfrey Mswewo. That chap was a camp Commissar. He with a chap called Stix, I have forgotten his real name now, he is a Major in the Defence Force.

Stix was the Regional Chief of Intelligence and Security. They go to a camp the two of them, they beat up a cadre, using the bat of a gun and I don't, and after that I find that when all they ask where is the gun, the gun is not there. And this very

Chief of Intelligence we had a Mercedes Benz car there, that we used, he goes and drives that car without oil, and knocks the engine.

So I begin to think, these chaps are doing something wrong.

So I remember this day I went, Mswewo and Stix were in Luanda. I went down, collected the two, got to the camp in Pango, collected Kenneth and the three of them, I said they must lock them up because I wanted them to find out why are they doing these things.

Those two I locked up, and I locked them up ...

CHAIRPERSON: excuse me, can I just ask, is he the same as Seremani?

GEN MASONDO: Yes, he is Seremani.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

GEN MASONDO: You see, the two chaps, I was now beginning to realise the two chaps were actually violating human rights in the camp.

I might say at the time, I didn't lock them up because I suspected that they were enemy agents, no. I just locked them up because one, all three of them now, I have noticed that they beat up people. And particularly a Commissar, I couldn't understand that.

So I then took them, locked them up, but it then turned out that when they said, you see that game and they were now being interrogated, then other things began to be revealed.

Another person who were, I think I should also at this very time, come up Anderson, it is Mswewo's brother, Rodgers.

Now Mswewo's brother was in the front, he was in Zimbabwe with a group of MK chaps who were fighting, side by side with the zebra chaps. In the course of that battle, he vanished and his other colleagues were looking for him. He comes up later, he can't explain his disappearance.

They investigate, they find out that he had had contact with the enemy. Now, that was during battle. So they took him back to Angola. When he got to Angola he was court martialled and sentenced to death.

I was in the Review Committee that reviewed this and once this had happened, we knew that he had a brother. I was instructed and it was my duty as a Commissar, to go and inform him brother, Godfrey. Godfrey got to know that his brother was executed, because I told him in my capacity as the Commissar.

MR KHOISAN: I would just like to put on the record that we have been speaking about Godfrey Mswewo. Just maybe, that is maybe the way you have known him. I think we are discussing the same person who is also known as Gordon Mswewo.

GEN MASONDO: No, there are two chaps there. There is, oh yes, you are right, that is Gordon Mswewo. His brother is Gabriel, that is Rodgers Mjala. He is Godfrey Poole, his surname. Yes, that is Gordon.

So he got to know about his brother's death because I told him. Later, Gordon was released from Quattro. He came to me and we sent him to Sweden to go and study. He studies, he came back, was in Mazimbu for a short time. Then one day, he complained that the Security people were sending back to Angola and he hadn't, he doesn't know why and I said to him, okay, I will check why they are doing that.

If we release you, why are they taking you back again. So I contacted the people, I said but why are you and they said no, we are not doing anything to him, he is just scared, we just wanted to ask him a few questions. I said but no, why do you want to send him to Angola, he is becoming worried about it.

But I then indicated that - now at this point I think I had left being the Commissar, I was now the Chief, the Head of the Manpower Development. But normally people still came to me when they had difficulties.

So that is the question about this chap, Gordon Mswewo. Even now, when he came back, because he also confessed to have been an agent according to the records. You see, there is something very interesting. There was a school in

Bophutatswana, I don't know whether it is Bakahla High School or something like that, but quite a number of these young chaps came from the same school.

And our information at that time, that there was a chap called Shedo who was either an agent of this, or who was a Special Branch, and he used to mobilise this people.

For instance, another one who was here, is it Philip Balile. Balile also was brought to Quattro, apart from when people started talking that he was said to be in the same - but he too, he used to work in Lusaka in Treasury, but he was notorious also for destroying ANC cars, driving them without oil. Destroying cars.

Stix was destroying cars and they seemed to have come from the same handler. But when the ultimate thing was that during that Shisheda, then people started talking about, saying this about the one, that about the other, but that was the questions of the Intelligence people, they gathered that information.

That is the Shisheda time. During that time, an interesting thing came up. Some of these people who we were looking for, made contact with Canadians and they ran away. Some of them made contact with other Intelligence, and they ran away. A chap called Banks, who was the Head of the CIA in East Africa, that is 1981, we are talking about, the Shisheda time, he said after we had been able to sort of control the situation, he said he cannot understand how the ANC survived that onslaught.

MR KHOISAN: Shisheda?

GEN MASONDO: Shisheda.

MR KHOISAN: Just give us a little more background on that General, from your perspective.

GEN MASONDO: Shisheda was a general clean up of enemy agents. It came out of a general situation of disorder from Tanzania, Zambia, in the camps and we got information that it was being orchestrated and that is when the ANC started arresting people in various places and bringing them to Angola for interrogation.

That was Shisheda, and it happened in 1981.

MR KHOISAN: Maybe we can just get some, to put things in perspective here. Because we are spanning a wide period.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: And maybe we can just concentrate it. At the time, we started with the issues which predicated the formation of Quattro.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: All the precurses to Quattro including the poisoning, the bombing, etc.

GEN MASONDO: No, no, Quattro - the bombing didn't precipitate Quattro, but before that, yes, there were bombings, there were this thing, but Quattro as I indicated was because of the Angolans.

MR KHOISAN: The Angolans, yes, but I am just putting it in perspective, certain things which might have affected the situation.

GEN MASONDO: All right. Yes, the tightening of security yes.

MR KHOISAN: Things that were taken into consideration. Now, on the question of the establishment of Quattro, what were the five or three or five or six things that were established, were set down as minimum guidelines for somebody to be brought to Quattro and also can you discuss the issue of the vating of the Security personnel who would be in charge of either the facility physically, or the process that would lead them to that facility. In other words your screening apparatus and stuff like that?

GEN MASONDO: Basically the type of person who went to Quattro was the person who the movement thought he was still acting in the interest of the enemy.

The movement thought he was, he had done grievous things inside the country. Like a chap called Stofileho, we found out that he was a policeman and he had shot children inside the country. But you see, the normal way the ANC vets people, you come, let's say you go out via Swaziland, you reach Maputo.

You write your biography, write your biography and tell us where you come, what made you come in? It is kept, then you go

to Lusaka maybe on your way out, if you don't go straight to Angola. You get to Lusaka, you write your biography again.

A copy of that and the one in Maputo is - follows you. You reach Angola, you write a biography as you come at the transit area like Viana. You write your biography, it is kept. Then you go to let's say Katenga or Pango or Camp 13, Kibashi, you write another biography.

Then, the security people are then given all these biographies. They go through them. If they should find discrepancies, they then call you to come and answer for some of these discrepancies. If there are serious problems, they then call another panel to come now and interrogate you about these things.

And should they find that there is a thing you can't explain, seriously and it leads them to certain suspicions then they would be able to say no, let's do an intensive check. They would possibly try and check with some people inside the country, in some cases where it was easier, they might find out that in fact, you were arrested and you didn't say that you were arrested.

Because for instance, as a person who was in Robben Island myself, I knew that there are people who were arrested and then released. Our people outside here thought that they were still the old people, when it was different people.

Now, those are the type of things that - so now, some people what they - people would say this one, we can't clear him completely, but no problem. Let him go to the camps, we will still observe him.

And some go to the camps, they start doing certain things which begin to tally with the suspicions and they are taken in again, for interrogation. There are quite a number of people for instance who confessed, who never went to Quattro.

They were in the camps, because when they confessed, people checked, they found that they were telling the truth, like Kotsokwane. That is why we said no man, but why did they lock him up?

There is a number who had confessed, but there was that for instance some of the people who went to Quattro, you also found that inside the camps, they were busy creating divisions.

MR KHOISAN: Could it be General, that some of the people who were taken to Quattro, were also people who would have held political views which may have been ideologically divergent from the main position of the African National Congress, and as such they needed to be vatted in terms of that?

CHAIRPERSON: If I could piggyback on that question, and I think the value of your being here, will be assisting us. There was a view and I can tell you that that was a fairly either popular or notorious view even whilst for us, inside here, that some of the

people who were executed, were killed simply because they held a view that was not in keeping with the Congress' view.

For instance, some of them were these young people, and they still upheld Steve Biko as a hero and things like that. It was difficult for us to believe that the African National Congress would then go so far as to kill people simply because they held oppositional political views to that of the ANC.

GEN MASONDO: Let me tell, and that was basically my task. I remember one chap called Motwa, he actually had come from the PAC understand, and he still has that, and one time he was being interrogated and the people were saying, no, no, he is putting the ANC view. I went there and said to them, no, that is not the security's task, it is my task as a Commissar.

There is a chap called Cyrus. Apart from some of the funny things he did, but he held certain views, but I used to sit with him, as long as somebody hasn't got different views, and doesn't go around propagating against the ANC, within the - I don't think that could have ... If we talk about the Black Consciousness, I mean they constituted the majority.

Once we took the chaps who came from university, they were in the majority. I mean the people who were ANC fanatics were these little chaps from SASM, but the rest were Black Consciousness, but we sat with them.

And I mean to - for instance to lock up a person because he was - you know he revered Steve, would be silly because as you know, we were busy when Steve died, we were busy trying to get Steve to Lusaka.

And also, you heard I mean some of us understand the ANC. Some of the varied leaders of the ANC, your Tambo's, your Mandela's, were rabbit nationalists who were sometimes bordering on being anti-white.

But, as they were developed to see, and that is what we did with most of the BCM chaps. Once a person held different views and did things which indicated that he wanted to disrupt, then it is a problem. There is a chap called, we used to call him Faroh. That chap was a political instructor.

That chap was very good in terms of ANC policy, he also had a background of ANC parents. But we locked him up ultimately, for having found out what he was doing.

So that one, it is not ...

MR KHOISAN: But General, I am just trying to put to you, I am trying to put it on the table because to use a case which has been very much in the spotlight, within the series of Commissions which have reviewed these things, the case of Dr Palo Jordan came up and specifically issues with regard to his detention.

Why I put my earlier question relating to the vating of security personnel was whether they could handle the issues with

regard, because when you are detaining somebody, there is, even though you are a liberation movement, you have to exist within your own judicial framework, there has to be some basic standard, there has to be some procedures you follow, and obviously people are going to be influenced by the policy of the organisation.

The issue of Dr Palo Jordan, maybe I should bring that up and see how you respond to that, because there is a view that has been put that some people feared that Quattro was a place when you stepped out of line, politically, you challenged something that you could end up there, and if we had to dispel that particular position, we need to explore it in this hearing, if you get me.

GEN MASONDO: You know, I agree. I mean, look, Palo was at the top, top. So his detention would be a question discussed at the top. So there must have been something else because unfortunately when Palo was actually locked up, I think it was after 1985, if I am not making a mistake. At the time I had ceased to be the Commissar.

But, everybody knew that Palo had a (indistinct) background. It was not a you know, something you hid. And he didn't sort of hide it, you understand. So he would be more in contradiction sometimes not so much with the ANC policy, but with party policies.

And even there, certain areas of party policies. Now, I doubt if it would have been just because he default.

MS SOOKA: General, I wonder if I could step in here and ask a question. It seems to me that during that period, you have a kind of paranoia developing in the camps, about the possibility of agents infiltrating.

Now, could one reasonably assume that where people possibly because you know, the kind of political convictions they held, they were the kind of people who left the country, to join the ANC, and because of their kind of outspokenness, and perhaps a natural opposition, perhaps to an authoritarian position, that that descent was then interpreted as being one which related to developing the aims of the enemy within the camp situation?

Could there have been that room where perhaps your security officers were so over zealous in their duties, that descent would be interpreted as being anti an ANC position, and that led to a lot of people being put in camps later on, being executed?

GEN MASONDO: No. No. Why am I saying so? In the camp, one, we had the Commissariat. You could go to a Commissar, for instance nobody had the right to refuse anybody to come and see me.

Two, we used to discuss politics. In fact, MK was the hot bed of ANC politics. People, I mean one time a cadre said to me as Ponolo says, you Commissar, you are an intellectual, and Lenin said beware of intellectuals.

I would sit with it. I said yes, Lenin was right, but Lenin was an intellectual. How do you square that? It is not the sanction of a political nature, it is particularly if you do things underground. You know sometimes what used to happen, the security chaps would come to me and say, that chap is a problem.

I say, why do you say so? They say he is doing this, and I say is it not possibly just that he is naughty? I go to him, I say look, the security chaps are saying you are doing one, two, three, why do you do it? Don't you think that if you do it this way, it might turn out that they might think you are now doing certain things?

But you see, if he was an agent, what he would do, he would listen to me, but start doing the things in a more underground fashion. The other thing is when we were outside, if I come, the question of people - we discussed this thing in a group so as far as politics is concerned, we couldn't lock up people for politics because we knew that we are dealing with people who were not ANC from the beginning.

We would be left with nobody. They were in the majority. So what would that be, our days? But, it is possible that sometimes a person who might disagree and he's got a position in the security, might bring certain information, but that would have to be checked before the person can go to Quattro and be executed.

MR KHOISAN: But General, just on the point of the politics, I think what, just to further the point that is raised by Commissioner Sooka. There is the position that there particularly in Angola, some of the people at Pango, Kibashi and other places, they and some of the people in Luanda even, were beginning to raise problems with regard to how the struggle is to be prosecuted?

There were issues that were raised about combatting what they interpreted, or what I hear Unita and dealing with the Unita problem, rather than dealing with what they considered the primary problem, and so as such over time, they raised this question, and there was a view that has been presented, that the security apparatus of the ANC, was a bit handled, this issue quite shoddily in terms of dealing with this particular problem and complaint. How do you deal with that particular thing?

GEN MASONDO: Okay, Unita. There has always been a desire by MK chaps to get into battle, that has always been there and it was never treated as a threat.

One time I went to the camp in Katenga, they raised this question. I then went to the President and said to the President, the comrades want to join Swapo to go and fight with Swapo.

Then the President said but why are they saying so. I tell him that no, they are saying President, that they are just sitting, they want to get experience.

Then we went to Lushulara, MPLA. We said to him, look, I was with the President that day, we said to Lushulara, Lushu, we would like our people to go down with the Swapo people.

Lushulara said to us, no comrades, we don't want to even to fight Unita, nor to fight with Swapo. If you continue the way you are doing it at home, it is better for us because once you join that, then we might be attacked. I went back and informed them.

We never fought Unita until a certain time. We were in Khakulama, when we started Malandi and Kamalundu, those camps. One thing I can tell you about MK chaps, with all their weaknesses they were prepared to make a lot of sacrifices for the female comrades.

Now, we there was a girl called Caroline, she was in Logistics. They were transporting food and Unita attacked that convoy and Caroline was killed.

I then went to the camps. Firstly I discussed it with Chris, discussed it with Mzwali and I said to them, look, we cannot force people to fight against Unita.

But I went to them, I went to the camps. When I was at the camps, I said to the comrades, Unita has killed Caroline and some of our comrades. Now, Unita wants now to cut our lines of supply.

We want to fight Unita to make sure that it does not do things like this any more. I even told them that (indistinct) if you

swear at my sister and I don't fight, it means I am afraid of you. Unita had done something which we couldn't take, but I said to them nobody is going to go to fight Unita by force.

I said that. Then they said, well, I mean also there was also I think mob psychology was there. Everybody said no we are going, but I said, you must go there and ask people to volunteer.

Many people went, we started fighting Unita. We were fighting Unita because it had started to attack us. And we did deal with Unita thoroughly. But you see, then Unita started the mine warfare. Our chaps had never experienced mine warfare.

Now mine warfare can be intimidating. I mean you don't see any enemy, you just tramp on the mine, and some of our chaps lost their limbs. That was, there started to be a problem about that. Some people started getting afraid of that situation.

But, it was a very small minority. But what is interesting because this leads us to the Viana, the last one (indistinct).

Again the South African radio, that is why we monitored it so much, suddenly we heard a broadcast that said there were very serious divisions within the old people and the young people about how the struggle is run.

We have been discussing the question of how the struggle is run with the chaps. In fact when we started to hit some of the oil refineries and things, some of the young people had discussed it

with us. Why don't we do that, why don't - we would say all right, no, we will see, we will see.

Because you wouldn't say to them we are going to do something, because you don't know - these are underground issues.

MR KHOISAN: So according to you General, I mean is the point taken, it wasn't necessarily the issue of Unita. I was more trying to put a point on the table, that could that have been the necessary end point of political or ideological disagreement, Quattro that is, that for instance comrade, I disagree with the strategy to deal with this, or comrade I disagree with this or with this, could that have been one of the factors which could have landed somebody ...

GEN MASONDO: No.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

GEN MASONDO: No, because look, you know just before that, we were aware of some of the problems that come out naturally. I mean a chap has been for six years in a camp, right, he wants to go and some times we used to make mistakes.

Chaps would choose the wrong people to go home, and they get home, they do the wrong things. The cadres know about this, they bring it up. Just before that mutiny thing, when (indistinct) and Chris went to meet, they were discussing things that were there, things - because every time people, if you are a military

man, if people discuss with you some of the problems that you face, it makes you better.

We were not dogmatic about how we fight that and the Unita thing, there couldn't have been disagreement about it because we, ourselves didn't want to fight Unita. Unita forced us to fight them, because Unita was given - at first they didn't fight us. They were given instructions from here and that is why we started to, after we fought them down there, we then started to fight them even in the north.

So Unita, it is quite certain, could not have said that a person didn't agree with fighting Unita, wouldn't have sent him to Quattro because all he would have had to say is that I don't want to fight Unita, and we say yes, after all it is voluntarily.

MS BURTON: I understand that response, but if I could just follow on that a little bit. Would you say that perhaps there might be some people who had a political difference, would raise it in the discussions that you have spoken about, and that would have been accepted, and therefore not punished?

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MS BURTON: But there might also have been people who started from a point of view of a political difference, but then took that into shall we say fermenting division, and creating groups and that it would that kind of thing?

GEN MASONDO: That kind of thing obviously could get you into trouble.

MS BURTON: Okay, so it might start with a political difference of opinion, but it might lead into trying to generate support for that opposing position, and that would be seen then as disobedience and a certain ...

GEN MASONDO: You see, for a guerilla army, anything that brings about division, even if you didn't have any difference, but if you started a mutiny, that or something that could lead to a mutiny, the MK code says it, the MK code says it.

The other thing for instance, you know, if we were very, very - some people would go around, collect them and shoot them, and it would be in their right to do so because they took an oath, an MK oath.

And in that oath, you actually say that should I contravene these things, I am willing to be punished, even by losing my life. The oath. Now, there are people, after a time, we carried out the oath, I remember even coming to give people oath here in Swaziland at night, the President one day said to me, Andrew, we are administering the oath, do you think that it is accepted in the spirit that it was written?

And I said to him sir, I am not sure. He said, let us stop for a time and examine it, because there is no point administering this oath, that is why you find some people never took the oath.

But the people before 1984, took the oath. Now, you see there are certain things which, for instance, even now in the Defence Force, if we were in war, and you deserted, it is death. If you disobey the command during a battle, it is death.

But if you disobeyed the command, we then sit down and try to find out whether the command was unlawful, you see that point, because the situations are different.

MS BURTON: Now general, when you look back at that time, I would envisage that there would be quite a grey area between what was legitimate political discussion and differences of opinion, and what became subversive or became seen as subversive to the movement.

Would you now, looking back, see that there might have been mistakes made in assessing who was worthy of punishment and who was expressing what might be a legitimate political difference?

GEN MASONDO: No. What I would say is simply this. That if we talk political difference, I cannot reach a conclusion where I can say interpret in political differences to the extent where we had to kill people, we made mistakes there. Where we could have made mistakes, and that is possible, is where for instance in analysing this, then you get some other person, you know the corroborating statements, and find that you were given also disinformation.

That I think, there is a serious possibility of mistakes there.

Secondly, where for instance the people, because some, the people in for instance Quattro, were young, that is why I used to go to them and stress that look, you mustn't use third degree as the first because sometimes a person can tell you what they want.

I mean I have a case of a girl who actually told the security that she was involved in the killing of Joe Xabi, but she is still alive.

She is alive simply because I then said to the security people, please bring that girl to me. I want to check whether in fact what she did, that is - you know what she says, and I started to interrogate her on the things she said and I found out this girl is an inveterate liar.

She can lie to the extent of actually putting herself into trouble. There are some people who confessed that during the Shisheda period, who confessed and when we sat down and we checked, we found that no, but you know if we actually were to call the names of all the people who had confessed and are back here, and were never in Quattro, people would be surprised.

But you see ...

MS DWANE-ALPMAN: Sorry, may I interrupt. Were that done in the case of the three people that you said were locked up like Stix, Godfrey Mswewo and those people?

GEN MASONDO: Yes, you see Stix and Godfrey are still alive. Stix is in the - is a Major in the Defence Force. Kenneth, when

things went deeper and deeper, it was found that he was a serious enemy agent, because we then found out even that he tampered with our guns, he did quite a number of other things, and when we add all these other things, because after I had locked him up, for that, I would have locked him up and released him after a time because all I wanted was the fact that he was doing things that I didn't understand, but then he was again found out to be part of that spy ring.

MR KHOISAN: But General, that is precisely the point. The issue is, and I want to put it on the table, whether the security apparatus actually patrolled the ideological terrain. The fact is that you have a man here, who according to the African National Congress, Kenneth Mahamba, Timothy K. Seremani, according to your view, is an enemy agent, but the position that that man held, in Angola is one where he would be in a position to patrol who, he would be in a position to patrol the loyalties of people.

He would be in a position to report through the channels to you, about whether somebody was clear or not, and that man was within the structure, and I want to put it to you is it your view now, on review, that the security apparatus of the African National Congress might have been seriously defective and deficient and that their actions could have resulted in erroneous actions at the end line?

GEN MASONDO: No, if you say the security apparatus, I say no. Because it is that security apparatus that made us bring these people back.

But if you say that we might have made mistakes in the beginning, adverting people and putting them into positions, I mean Mahamba was, look, some of these people were well prepared, so that when they come there, you find he's got, he is nice, he in the eyes of the leadership, he is doing the correct things. He's got the abilities and you put him there.

But I told you that I locked up Chief of Security, that Chief of Security was in fact later also to be part of, found out to be part of (indistinct) group, so it is not the security only. The ANC itself was infiltrated, so some people managed to get into security, some people managed to get into the National Executive Committee or some people went into Treasury.

That is the normal thing, but you see, to just say that that security was - there are times when obviously as human beings, some of them, will make mistakes, but not because they are security. They would have made mistakes even if they were in other places.

MR KHOISAN: But what control did you have over, I mean what mechanisms did you as Commissar put in place to ensure that the security apparatus of the African National Congress from the lowest to the echelon where you were located, would not

engage in excesses which would result in abuses to the human rights of people?

GEN MASONDO: You know, you are dealing with a national liberation movement, you are not even dealing with the government.

Sometimes people talk in terms of human rights within this, you went there, you talked to the people. Every time, if you go to the young people who were in Quattro, who were anywhere, of the security, I used to talk to them that it is not necessary for them to do things that are going to make them, you know, become sadists.

If they did something wrong, you punish them, like you punished anybody. But let me give you an example where in East Africa, young chaps were interrogating somebody and they killed him, East Africa.

This is a case which then, because we were in East Africa, obviously we had to report that the person was dead, and the chaps were arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: You see General, I hear the answer and I think I even read more to it than is actually said. I think part of the task now, and we are talking 1998, and we are talking the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is that what was then a national liberation movement, has since become government.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the first thing. The second thing is that even as a national liberation movement, there was a level at which it operated in world forums.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Which expels humanitarian principals and views, it became signatories to the United Nations and all the conventions that upheld a humanitarian culture. I think part of our enquiry is not so much to say you shouldn't have done what you did, but to be able to say what were the conditions that made it possible for third degree methods to be used. Were third degree methods for instance the exception rather than the rule or were they the rule, rather than the exception?

Because as you understand, part of what the Commission is charged to do at the end of the day is to make recommendations which would also affect, hopefully, that they will never be in South Africa in any event, a basis for another liberation movement to be about, but that we should be able to say even in very trying circumstances and conditions, some of the things that took place, should never have taken place.

So that is why I think there is a sense for instance, in which on the Seremani issue, when time permits, I will be putting very specific questions, because we have allegations of how he was tortured, that he was tortured in some instances to a position that

he was so disfigured, that those who knew him, could not recognise him.

I say this against the background of what you said about him, having been a torturer.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You know, as a person who in fact indulged in third degree methods, but I think what we are trying to say is to say yes, it was trying times, yes, it was the national liberation movement, rather than the government, but it was a national liberation movement of a special type which even as it embarked on armed struggle, it was against the backdrop of a freedom charter, which by itself could have laid the basis for a humanitarian, if not a human rights culture, document.

GEN MASONDO: Yes. The documents of the ANC, the documents of MK, say what the policy was. I myself went and said to people, don't get used to third degree. When you say that, are you saying you were saying to them, look I can understand that you can use third degree, in fact it is a permissible method of interrogation, but don't get addicted to it.

Or are you saying you said to them, look, don't use third degree methods, because they are not in keeping with the ethos and the policy and the outlook of the African National Congress?

GEN MASONDO: You remember I said we were at war. I get to Pango, I find that seven people have been executed summarily.

If I find that, I have to investigate. There might be times that I will use third degree, in spite of the fact that it is not policy.

During the second world war, the Americans went to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and threw an A-bomb onto people. Now, sometimes some of these things, I said to the people, yes, the policy says this, but I knew that under certain circumstances they were going to use, you see, and that is why when I tried to convince them, I said even for investigation sometimes, using third degree won't give you what you want.

But in some cases, it is a question of choosing between what is nice to have, and the life of the people you lead.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, for instance on that General, I am just thinking about what you said about that one woman who because she was such an inveterate liar, maybe she wanted to become a hero in your eyes, she implicates herself in the murder of Joe Xabi.

Quite an irresponsible act, because I mean if she had been taken on her own confession, she could have been executed because of who Xabi was.

GEN MASONDO: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, when you look back, maybe at the time, how were you satisfied that the evidence that became produced,

was evidence of a nature that could be used to determine whether a person should or should not live.

Let me give an example at the present time and I am sure you have taken judicial notice of this. We have an Assistant Commissioner of Police, goes into Mozambique, comes back and says, even before he has reported to his Minister, I have seen evidence of a nature where I think McBride you know, has committed gun running offences.

GEN MASONDO: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I mean, then you say to yourself, in other words, but I am sure before that could be taken into account, there will have to be a lot of investigations and a lot of testing. What Suiker Britz says for instance in the context of this particular example I am giving.

Now, in those times, in those trying times, and given also that you have said yourself there were people who just lied themselves for no apparent reason, how were you able to test the quality of your evidence?

GEN MASONDO: You remember that we had the tribunal, we had the Review Committee. I mean nobody, at least whilst I was still involved with the west, was executed and the Review Committee did not sit and you know the evidence is again the Review Committee looked at it, and they say on this evidence, we think that the person must go.

MS SOOKA: General, I wonder if I could interrupt, because I think the problem that in a sense we are trying to understand is, there is a perception and it comes through the reports of all the different Commissions, that here you have this liberation movement, and it is an extraordinary liberation movement by all accounts, it was really a government in exile, and the perception of the world out there was they were in fact even though they had not signed all the normal conventions, they operated within those conventions in a sense.

The one blot though on their copy book, is what actually happened in the camps. Would you concede that this is the general perception out there?

GEN MASONDO: You see, it is a perception that was created. That we made mistakes, is not a problem, but anybody who can produce for me a truthful statement that the African National Congress went out of its way even in the camps, to make life difficult, then it would be funny.

MS SOOKA: General, sorry, I am not actually saying that. I think that what we want to explore is I think what you said now, that the ANC made mistakes.

You see one thread which runs consistently through all the Commissions' reports, is that things went wrong, one. Two, there was an extraordinary abuse of power by different people and I am not going to say it was Security alone. I will say there was an

extraordinary abuse of power, and that often these executions particularly took place without any legitimate process of fact finding, and I think in a sense from what you said this morning, I am beginning to understand what was happening in the camps.

For one, the one thing I've got from your evidence is that you considered yourself at war. The moment you say that, then you have almost a military kind of atmosphere prevailing in the camp, the you have the psychosis of enemy infiltration at just about every different level.

And once you have that, you in a sense begin to create the climate for things not to be properly done at some stage. I think we asked you this question of would it be descent that could possibly land people up, and I think you came back and you said if somebody created divisions within a particular camp, you would consider in a sense that that person was somebody who needed to be dealt with.

Now, I think that is the kind of area that we want to explore with you.

GEN MASONDO: Yes, let me - look, you see it is one thing to say, in fact let me deal with the thread you are talking about.

For instance, the Commission, the one that I was involved on, the Stuart Commission, what is interesting about it, it was that it wasn't a Commission that went and you know, asked everybody who was in the camp. It was a Commission that was

trying to find out why these people who had actually taken over a region, had actually killed some people.

In other words, it is a Commission of people who had done something wrong. They were also giving a view point. I think if they had, if the Commission had actually written out what I said when they asked me, I said that. They - you get to the Yongwani Commission, again you had the Yongwani's, this thing, they were the people who were giving that information.

The question I am saying is, when you say you are at war, obviously even militaries have rules. That is why we said nobody should rape women. That is why we said nobody should point even an unloaded gun to somebody.

At the base of this thing was to preserve the life of our people. Now, if we started from that premise and then suddenly we went into doing certain things, then we say what was the reason.

The question of infiltrators was not an academic question.

MR KHOISAN: It was very real General.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: But when we deal with the issue that was raised by the Stuart Commission, the Stuart Commission I don't and maybe I am reading it incorrectly, but the Stuart Commission, the way I read their findings, they come and they put some very

serious issues on the table with regard to the Security Department.

On point 13, grievances against the Security Department, there is a lot that is written here, and at one point, they make the point that there is a suggestion that here is the Commissar and he has this people, and this red ants as they put it, in the Security Department.

GEN MASONDO: Yes, I remember that.

MR KHOISAN: And also the Commission made findings, this was not a Commission of enemy agents, it was a Commission of your Organisation, the African National Congress, and in that respect, they made certain findings and one of the findings they made in point 1(a) of their findings, was that you were aware of growing discontent among the comrades, and due to punishment excesses, but you failed to adopt corrective measures, and that you always defended the administration or shall I say the Security apparatus on many issues, and their views without going into proper investigation in this.

In point (e) it found that for instance the person that you have dealt with in this case and put on the table as an enemy agent, they point out here that you received and accepted many of his reports, in respect of other people being enemy agents.

How do you square that?

GEN MASONDO: How do they square, in the first place they say - you see, I am a leader. You come to me and say this person is an enemy agent, so I act.

Another one says this one is this, and I act. I must investigate. I must find out. You see it is interesting that at one point, they will say that I did not care, at another point they said I used the Security, but go to the Security people, how do I then even go and lock up a Security person?

You see, what I want to say, there is yes, if you deal with individuals who made mistakes, I think, that I think is something you will find, but what I cannot accept is a situation that there was a (indistinct) about enemy agent or not, because if that was the case, the number of people we would have executed, would have - for instance, when we were in Angola, right, we transported these people and send them to Uganda.

We could have shot them, so that we don't have the problem of having to carry them in Uganda. We actually took time of young people to guard them, to do that, I mean if you checked with some liberation movements, they just dealt with these people.

Now, you see when I say we did make mistakes, I accept that some times we could have put a person there, not because we knew that there was something wrong with him. The information

that we had said that he was okay, he turns out to be somebody else.

Then you don't go around saying it is the Security. You say yes, there were times when individuals used their position. Like for instance if somebody for some reason didn't agree with somebody, maybe there could be that, but when it comes to questions of executing people, now that one I can say the President made provision.

You know the people he put there, I mean I was the most junior, Moses Mabida, the Treasurer General, Nsabi who was also senior to me, except that I mean maybe in terms of position then, I might have been above him.

Now, if this question has to be accepted, then you can only put the blame on the four of us because here documents came, we looked at them, we took out some people, we endorsed some of these things and even in a state where you have everything, there has been cases where the highest court has actually gone wrong.

MR KHOISAN: But General, we are not talking about an isolated matter, we are talking about a situation that obtained over a period of years, and according to the Stuart Commission, the position that was put on the table was that the Security Department used violence as a rule, rather than as an exception.

And also let me point you to a document in the ANC, and you have it in front of you there, too, the document that deals

specifically with Quattro, it is an appendix to the ANC's policy statement to the TRC, page 44 of that.

GEN MASONDO: Yes?

MR KHOISAN: You see, there were regulations accordingly camp regulations issued by the Regional Command stressed that inmates were to be handled humanely.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: And the view is that and the way I understand it, and that has been put on the table by a Commissioner, by the panel here today, is that the ANC was a government in waiting.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Albeit a liberation movement, it subscribed to international instruments, for instance the Geneva Protocol, the Geneva Conventions, and I believe in some circumstances, it may even be a signatory to some of those documents.

GEN MASONDO: Correct.

MR KHOISAN: In respect of handling people humanely. Now, when this happens on one or two or three occasions, and comes up for review, that is one other thing, but when it happens over a period of time, wasn't there something that you detected which was horribly wrong, and which needed to be addressed before the Stuart Commission?

GEN MASONDO: You know, one of the interesting things about the Stuart Commission, the Stuart Commission came around

when I was no longer for most of the time in the west, that is when Chris had become the Army Commissar, and you see I went there.

The first time for instance, they didn't have - I checked, I found they didn't have uniforms, I made sure that they had them.

That sometimes people did beat people, that one is not something that you can say never happened, but at least when I was still there, you go to people who were in Quattro, you ask them, what was my attitude towards people who do things that are wrong, they will tell you, I don't have to tell you.

The very people who are in Quattro, the people who were members of the Security, they will tell you, but you see, sometimes - the other time, you see, Mzwandile Piliso and myself, spent most of the time there.

Some people hear things by hearsay, but I am not going to say that after I left, I don't know, maybe there might have been violations, but what I am saying, it could never have been the policy of the movement that that should happen.

I can't even imagine that Chris who took over from me, would have gone there. I mean he was even sometimes more sensitive about you know, the Security people. What I - there are people who were in Quattro who we meet daily and I am not talking about those who are now members of the IFP or what,

there are people who were in Quattro who we meet and we discuss.

The other aspect, at one time I saw what people wrote about questions of food. We gave those people food, but you must also understand that our ability to get food, was not at its best. But, we made sure that they were fed.

Now, what I am trying to, I am trying to remove the - you see, one, the idea that people could have been executed without proper you know, thing, because that would come to the review. You don't execute a person, and that doesn't come to review.

That was the rule. The other question is like the Zondi question. You could have a thing like the Zondi problem, which in fact is what happened in Tanzania, where these chaps interrogated and they did go beyond, but when you check, that is why when they were arrested, we gave them to the Tanzanians, and they were sentenced.

But one of them, had just heard that at home, they had destroyed his whole family. Now, a thing like that could happen, you can't condone it, but it could happen.

But you can't say because that type of thing happened, then the system was out of order. That is what I am saying. And you see, what I will not, you know there is a tendency sometimes to want to use a young person as a scapegoat when in fact that young person, at a particular time, even did wrong. In the ANC

we used, there are many people we've punished irrespective of at what (indistinct) they are.

But you see if you come and write something and say this person was doing this, and you check this thing, the person was never called. You know, I for instance at one time there is this allegation that I used to misuse girls. I should have been called just once, and you can go to the whole records of this thing, you won't find that I was called for that.

The only time that these people said I had impregnated a girl, when I was in Mazimbo, they checked, they found that there was no substance whatsoever, but you see, also there is the other aspect of the IFF, you know the IFF. I mean I read about it, the International Freedom Forum.

When I was in Angola, I enjoyed reading what they said about me. I enjoyed it, and in most cases, I never even replied. If you notice, even inside this country, when people write about me, I don't reply.

I will reply when I think there is an element of substance, so that I can put things right.

CHAIRPERSON: Like in the Truth Commission?

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Shall we take lunch now, and when we come back, I would rather we possibly deal with the mutiny and then the Commissions.

GEN MASONDO: Okay.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: It is now a little bit after quarter past two and we will resume.

GENERAL MASONDO: (still under oath)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Khoisan?

MR KHOISAN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Now General, at the recess we were discussing a number of issues.

What I find is that we discussed one of the Commissions.

This Commission, the Stuart Commission, specifically was put into place and it was established to investigate the causes of an uprising of sorts, or shall I say a mutiny?

GEN MASONDO: Correct.

MR KHOISAN: Which took place in Angola?

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: But it also dealt with a number of issues which impacted upon that mutiny and also what occurred subsequent to the mutiny?

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, now from your perspective, can you discuss with us that mutiny and also the issues which in your view, are germane to the Stuart Commission in so far as it dealt with the mutiny, its antecedents and what happened as a result?

GEN MASONDO: You see, at the time I was in Lusaka for most of the time, and Chris was then the Army Commissar.

Now, and it was during the time when we were fighting Unita. As I indicated, they developed a - just before that, the question of the armed struggle was discussed. I remember (indistinct) and Chris went to discuss with the soldiers, the questions of the armed struggle.

But at the same time, because there was a question I for instance, that the cadres were dissatisfied with things like some of the people who went to the front, and came back, in other words, they were asking how is this election done that some people who really were not fit to be in the front, came back, I mean went to the front?

There were also if you remember well, that it was after 1981, if I am not making a mistake in my head, now, the fact that Mozambique, one of our greatest allies that sold us out, was a very, very serious matter because that was a corridor.

So there were genuine things that were being discussed and nobody in the leadership of the ANC, thought that that meeting was a mutiny, but then because of what I said, that Unita began to use mine warfare, that did create a problem for our people.

But not only that, somehow or other during that time, as I also indicated, the enemy also activated its own people. People started now shooting in the air.

Ultimately they came back to Luanda. When they got to Luanda, they literally took over the region. Chris had to resort to asking the Angolans to assist because the whole situation was out of hand.

The Angolans then restored the situation. Now, what was even more serious is that that Committee of ten, we then began to get information that the Committee of ten came as a result of meetings that were being held at the VIP house, where Radio Freedom was.

That for instance, Maliza, the (indistinct) chap was actually the person who was the running point, what they called the wise old man. What was also interesting was that the Regional Commander of, I mean the District Commander of Luanda, Sidwell, also got involved in this.

The Commissar of Amandla, who was in there, also got involved in this. What was, if it had been confined to the chaps who were in the bush, actually fighting, then you know, you could, but now it became actually a mutiny, a takeover of the region.

All right, after the Angolans had put that, then Commander and I were called from Lusaka, to come and assist Chris. We discussed with the people, we said to them, those who are not ANC once side, those who are not ANC one side.

By then, that time some of them were arrested, were locked up. We went and talked to them. Then I left with the other major group. I left Chris and the Commander in Luanda, I took this group to Pango, that was the first group.

No, I went with them, I left one group in Camp 13, Kibashi and then took the others to Pango. I discussed this matter with them. And I told them on the spot, I said gentlemen, this is counter-revolution because even if you had whatever grievances, the methods you used, are not revolutionary methods.

Okay, there was no problem, I left them there. Then Chris came and we went to Kibashi. We got there, Chris was addressing them, and they were saying Chris had sold them out. I said to them no, what did you expect Chris to do when you had taken over.

All right, we thought that the whole thing was, you know, we discussed it, we thought it was okay. By then, when we reached the National Executive, it was felt that let us actually look at the whole situation and let's call for a Commission.

And the Stuart Commission was called. They went, they gave the report which they gave, they asked me, I gave my own reaction to the report.

Then the - after a time we thought everything was okay, people were still going to get things ready, then the second thing happened. In Pango, the (indistinct) chaps executed seven

comrades. Now, again when this was heard, I was in Lusaka, and Chris was in Lusaka.

We were told to go to Angola, both of us. We first went to see MPLA. Now the question was what should be done, should we involve MPLA in this thing?

Chris and I decided to say to the MPLA people, no, we don't want you to get involved in it. In the first place, these people had taken over this region, and you were called in. If we call you in again, then it would mean we do not have the support of the MK chaps.

So we said, we were going to handle this thing with the MK chaps. So Chris and I went to Kibashi. We got to Kibashi, we found that General Ngwenya was already there, (indistinct), mobilising the loyal forces.

And the loyal forces were mobilised, and that was the most painful thing for me because a battle ensued. The other interesting thing was that these people had already, they had contact with people outside, they also had contact with the Commissar of Kibashi who was contacting them and we ultimately got to know that he was sympathetic to Unita, so we battled.

And because they were in the minority, they lost. They started running away. Some of them, we brought them back. Then I left for Lusaka, I left Chris. Then Chris and I think Sis Gerty, went to go and look at the whole situation again.

And some of them were tried and executed. The others were brought in and they managed to survive, others ran away.

MS DWANE-ALPMAN: Sorry, who was part of the panel when these people were being tried?

MR KHOISAN: Who was part of the tribunal, maybe - is that your ...

GEN MASONDO: What I know is that it was Chaired by Chris and I think Sis Gerty Shoppe was part of it.

MS DWANE-ALPMAN: And were there any people representing the accused?

GEN MASONDO: Well, I think the accused should have been represented by the Commissar himself.

MR KHOISAN: Which would have been who?

GEN MASONDO: Chris.

MR KHOISAN: Chris?

GEN MASONDO: Yes, that time.

MR KHOISAN: So he was sitting on the tribunal and at the same time he was taking the role of ...

GEN MASONDO: There was a tribunal and he was part of that tribunal.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, and in the tribunal he also had the role of defending the interest of the accused?

GEN MASONDO: Yes, because as a Commissar he had to see to it that the case went on properly.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Before we get into that, I just want to clear one point, and then we can go further.

The Stuart Commission, at the end of the Commission, made a recommendation that you in your position as National Commissar should be redeployed. What was your view on that?

GEN MASONDO: Actually, the interesting thing is that I didn't actually know that they made that recommendation.

I didn't know that. Because when in 1985, when I was - when I ceased to be National Commissar, when this question was being discussed of the Commissar, and it was said that the National Commissariat should be terminated, I sat in that meeting and Thabo was Chairing that meeting, I said in that meeting I don't agree with the idea that the National Commissariat should be done away with because that is a very, very important structure in terms of looking after the cadre.

I said to them if you want, if you are dissatisfied with the National Commissar in Rumasondo, remove him, but don't destroy the structure.

What I was told in that meeting was that it was not in Rumasondo, that was not being removed. That the structure of National Commissar was too militaristic, so we are going to only keep the Army Commissar.

MR KHOISAN: When we look at the Stuart Commission report, it is a very candid report.

GEN MASONDO: It is an opinion.

MR KHOISAN: Well, at least it seems to deal, maybe it is a reflection of the ability of the liberation movement to be introspective to take its actions under review.

And as such, you know, it forms part of a record, a historical record which to a large degree, reflects some form of honesty, intellectual honesty, and it is also a painful process to take anything under review, and there are not many liberation movements who are willing to do that, to look at themselves.

We have seen situations in Cambodia, places where things just go haywire and nobody wants to review it, and when they want to look at it, we have a Cameroon situation developing.

But now in the situation of this, the section that deals with administration, those are very stark terms to describe relations between the administration and the rank and file cadres in the camp where they say "relations between the administration and the rank and file is described as being of 'master and servant'. They say firmly elitism has developed. The administration's housing, cooking, eating and other facilities are practically cut off and this has increased the separation."

I want to put it to you and I want to see if you could respond. How much of the administrative component in the camps, what was the percentage if you can give me a sense, which was composed of people who were either in the line of

accountability to the Security Department or directly vatted members of the Security Department?

GEN MASONDO: In the structure of the ANC and MK, the Commander is the supreme.

Then you have the Commissar, who is his Deputy. Then you have the team of staff, then you have the Security people in the camp. The Chief of Security, that was the hierarchy.

MR KHOISAN: And the structure in Camp 32 and maybe I am wrong, that a Camp Commander, a Camp Commissar who is second in command, a Chief of Staff, a Chief of Ordinance, Chief of Logistics, recording officer and guards, that was the structure, correct?

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Now, if that situation obtained, the Camp Commander as I understand it, who would he be accountable to directly?

GEN MASONDO: The - you see Camp 32 was a different camp. It was not an ordinary ANC camp.

MR KHOISAN: It was the detention facility?

GEN MASONDO: Yes, it was the detention facility, so the situation was the administration there was Security.

MR KHOISAN: Now, in Pango and in Camp 13 ...

GEN MASONDO: 13, Kibashi.

MR KHOISAN: Kibashi, did you have basically the same command structure in those camps?

GEN MASONDO: I am saying the command structure ...

MR KHOISAN: What I am trying to get at General, I am trying to ...

GEN MASONDO: The Commanders were not under Security, they were under the Regional Commander so there is a difference between the line of command. So the Commander was responsible to the next high Commander.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, then that is what I am trying to do. I am trying to establish here how a liberation movement whose founding principles are predicated on prosecuting a struggle, which exists within a certain framework, an ideological framework, would allow or can allow, a skew power relation because what the Stuart Commission leans heavily on, is saying that most of the problems that they detect, or which they assume are in the camps, are assigned to the Security Department, and I am trying to establish how the Security Department or members of the Security Department, or shall I say the Intelligence and Security structure, if you put it together, but the Security structure, how they were able to develop to such a degree or could it be that they developed to a degree where they became unaccountable to the ordinary military command and the political command, within the liberation movement?

GEN MASONDO: No. I wouldn't have been able to lock up a Regional Security Chief - you see, I said the Stuart Commission interrogate, I mean asked questions of people who most of them, people who got in, became (indistinct), had some problems with - Security problems, so obviously they tended to concentrate more on the Security, but in a camp the Camp Commander is - but if Security could come, if there are things, Security people collected information, and even when they were going to interrogate people, they told the Commander, then they got the people interrogated because that was their task.

But that doesn't mean that in some cases you never found that some Security chaps may have been more influential than the Commanders, it does happen.

MR KHOISAN: General, then how do you account for the fact that not only in Angola, but also in at the Cowboy Conference, and also in Mazimbo and various other places, where the ANC had a significant presence, there was this terminology of (indistinct), which was being tossed around and it was sort of an element of a chilling effect within the liberation movement, because I mean we've heard not only testimony and the Commissions didn't only hear testimony from people who were perceived to be people who had an axe to grind, they also spoke to other people, other people who will in fact be testifying before this Commission.

And I am putting it to you that for this, I mean for a liberation movement for a terminology like a grinding stone, to start becoming a part of the popular lexicon, wouldn't that indicate a problem?

GEN MASONDO: You know, when people give themselves nicknames, the word (indistinct) was in fact a nickname of the Security. It did not, it was there even when the Security didn't have problems.

So, you must understand the whole context of the Security in this way. There is the time when I talked of the Shisheda. You remember I talked of Shisheda.

MR KHOISAN: Yes.

GEN MASONDO: Now, at that time obviously the Security was the one that went collecting people from all these things. During that time, that is when people began to fear, because of that act.

Because that time, the Security was collecting people.

MR KHOISAN: But its methods, I mean we talk about, I am back on the issue of the methods, when we are talking of the methods that were in fact being used, and this is not something of the Commission, this is actually what we found, and this has been handed to us, this comes as part of the ANC's own submissions to us.

When we look at the kind of discipline that was handed down, in respect of the Security Department, under the Section,

Section 9, on page 44 of the Section entitled Quattro, abuses, lengthy isolation, solitary confinement, regular beatings under the feet, etc, napalm, that is being rubbed with hairy beans, pampa, blowing up one's cheeks, etc, etc, red ants introduced into clothes, slaughter, chopping wood for hours on end, starvation, and what we talked about earlier, which was third degree interrogation.

When we look at a Department that has that kind of capability and it is according to these Commissions of Enquiry where they say it was not an exception, it was not an occurrence that occurred once in a blue moon, but something that occurred routinely, we find that they refer to in grievances against Security Department they say they found practical evidence of floggings, scars on the whole back of one comrade in our training camp, okay, when you find this, and you put it all together, it seems to have an indicting effect on the Security establishment of the liberation movement, and I want to put it to you that do you think that this particular structure developed to a stage where it became a law unto itself, unaccountable to the political and military instruments which gave it life?

GEN MASONDO: When I was still there, it didn't, and it couldn't. Because I wouldn't allow it to.

You see, we talked about it does happen that people will do certain things. I want to challenge anybody who says that was

the rule. I want them, I challenge that. That certain things happened, because if it was, we wouldn't have been able actually to handle the situation.

The infiltration that we had, we couldn't have handled it. But that some people might have used their power, but that the Security had already taken over, the President would not have allowed it either.

MR KHOISAN: Well, in the case of Palo Jordan, the view was that he will, that when Palo Jordan was detained, and that is also a matter of record, that when Palo Jordan was detained, that he will stay over there, I think he was detained for six weeks, and that he will only be released when Security is finished with him.

That to me, I mean you are not talking about some (indistinct) dredged up and tossed into the fold of the liberation movement, you are talking about somebody who impacts the political ideological life of an organisation, who is central to its discharge of its mandate, its functions, to liberate the country.

When he, a person of that rank, is - when they are able to take him, put him in detention for six weeks, and only release him when they are good and done, doesn't that indicate, and that is much later, that is not in - I believe that is in 1985, so doesn't that indicate to you General, that the Security Department had had powers beyond what it was envisaged they would have?

GEN MASONDO: No. You see when people talk of - supposing I was an enemy agent, and they found out that there was things that was not going right, and they said I must come and account, with that because I am the National Commissar, I should not account. I find it problematic.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what is being said here is that there is a difference between asking somebody to go and account and the manner in which you do it.

If we accept for a little while that when you talk Palo, even in the context of that period, you are talking a very bright person, a person with a pedigree, it may well be that both his parents were ex-unity movement people and therefore were of the (indistinct) band of politics, but he was in the ANC and he was committed and let's assume that there was something far more cogent, let's assume in the phraseology of what we are saying, that his you know, view, his male view as a (indistinct), was of a nature that was causing some disturbance in the camps.

Now, to detain a person for six weeks and to call him even if it is in that period, on a day to day basis and say comrade, we need to get to the bottom of who you are, what you are, what is causing us concern, I think what we are trying to say is there seems to us, we may be looking at it now from the wide end of the telescope of time, where we are able to say but why couldn't they have called him, but it is a question that we must put.

Why was this Security, why was the (indistinct) so very keen to detain people at Quattro or wherever else, when it appears that in some instances routine questioning even if it was on a daily basis, without detention was what could have been done?

GEN MASONDO: You see, I am worried about the fact that maybe they might have done that to Palo, it might have been a mistake, but does not mean that people, other people, were just being locked up.

You see for instance, Matiwani who was a very, very top chap, (indistinct), who wrote a 50 page document to the Special Branch about this organisation, I think one of the problems he got away with it, was that he was in a high position.

Now, for me, I - you know, I remember at some point people were worried about the fact that maybe as they go around, the Security people are looking after them, and I told people, what is the problem because if you don't have a problem, part of the Security is to see to it that you don't get hurt.

But I think the extrapolation that because they locked Palo for six weeks, then all the detentions were of that nature. It is something I find difficult, because also what is being said, it is as if you know, (indistinct) used to just take a person and they go and lock him up.

Somebody senior, must have known that this person is being locked up, and if we reach that stage, which I don't think we did, then it is not Security's problem, it is us as a leadership.

CHAIRPERSON: In fact, just to follow on that, part of the allegation is that if they could do that to a senior person like Palo, can you imagine what it was like to people of less importance in terms of the ranking within the ...

GEN MASONDO: That is what I infer.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what is ...

GEN MASONDO: And I am saying it doesn't follow. I am saying it doesn't follow because you see, because Palo was kept, if I remember well, he was kept even not in Quattro, he was kept in Lusaka.

MR KHOISAN: That is correct.

GEN MASONDO: You see. You see, there are people, you see there are people, many of them, who were involved in with Security problems, who were never, who never went into Quattro.

Some of them were kept in the camp in 13, just like all other people.

And this, anybody who knows the west, will tell you that. Now, my question is people take a testimony of a particular group of people, and make that as the testimony. They don't balance it with the fact that there were quite a number of people who had Security problems and were not locked up in Quattro.

MR KHOISAN: With all due respect General, the Commission which was duly constituted and one must concede that the kind of people that were put on that Commission, including comrades Mgalo, Aziz Bahaad, (indistinct) etc, these were people that by and large were not just a faction within the ANC, the way I understand them politically is that they span a broad region?

GEN MASONDO: Yes, correct.

MR KHOISAN: You know, ideologically also, they span a broad region, even today within the movement.

GEN MASONDO: Correct.

MR KHOISAN: And so with all due respect to what you are saying, they didn't just go and interview the people who allegedly were subjected to these excesses and abuses, or their confederates, but they did speak to people like yourself, you indicated that you provided them with information.

They also spoke to people who were actually, physically involved in the Security establishment in those camps.

GEN MASONDO: In the report to you, do you see what I said? In the report itself.

MR KHOISAN: In the Stuart Commission report?

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Is that your statement?

GEN MASONDO: Yes, what I said.

MR KHOISAN: You see, I don't see your statement.

GEN MASONDO: Right, okay, let me not - I don't want to, and the other thing that even if the - I don't doubt the integrity, but I also don't give them a blank cheque that they are incapable of not seeing the thing in its depth because they were a Commission that was established during a time when there was a problem.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, so to put it in the record, maybe just to get some clarity, is it your view that this Commission and given that we now have the hindsight where - you know, hindsight is 20-20 vision, we are ten years behind time now, 15 years, a decade and a half.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Are you saying that they may not have been as fair as they could have been on assessment of the situation?

GEN MASONDO: I don't want to say that they may not have been as fair because then I would impute, you know, a motive. They may not have been as accurate in their (indistinct), because if I say fair, it means they were biased, and I don't want to say that.

MR KHOISAN: And I wouldn't want you to say that either, General, but how do you - you constantly in this hearing have informed us that when you were there, excesses did not occur. But one of the things that I see running as a thread throughout the Commissions, when this period is taken on review, an important point is raised, and I want to see if you could respond

to it, in terms of one of the grievances of the cadres, the soldiers if you were, on the ground, and that is that the leadership was unavailable, they were not there. That the leadership was not around, that the decisions were being taken by people who were there on the spot and that - because they don't exclude you from this, and I would assume that you would constitute part of that leadership component and that they would put you with leadership.

GEN MASONDO: Correct.

MR KHOISAN: And when the Commission makes its assessment of the situation, and they add that into their report, that one of the problems was that the leadership was absent for long periods of time and as such, there is a suggestion that you were out of touch with what was really happening, how do you respond to that?

GEN MASONDO: You know, that one I wouldn't even respond to it myself.

You see, if you met a young chap who was in Angola, and asked him who were the people who were most of the time in that place, he will say to you Mzwai Piliso and Andrew Masondo.

Any person, I have been the most available leader of the African National Congress, together with Mzwai to the chaps in the camps, until the time when I left, I went to Mazimbo.

And even there, if you went to the people there and asked them who is the person you can at any time, when you have a problem, you can go to him, they will tell you Andrew Masondo, as they do it even now.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, so when, now let's go quickly back to go onto Quattro, established in 1979.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: There are rudimentary facilities here. This doesn't really constitute a detention centre, but it is sort of a makeshift centre so that the ANC can accommodate its own people, that it needs to accommodate, so that the Angolan government doesn't have to deal directly with this problem, as they had asked you.

You facilitated them in this way, but now, how often did you visit Quattro, how often did you review the situation to see maybe if things are going wrong? I understand that a very young man, some young guys were in charge of that, at that point, 19 years old or something like that.

GEN MASONDO: You know, unless I wasn't around Africa, a month never passed without me, my being in Quattro. Some times I went to Quattro twice in a month.

MR KHOISAN: So you had occasion to have a first hand view of the excesses that were being allegedly visited upon these people, is that correct?

GEN MASONDO: I had a first view of visiting those people and discussing whatever problems they had.

MR KHOISAN: And did you ascertain the conditions of the prisoners which were under their charge and for whom they had to ...

GEN MASONDO: I told you I said they must give them uniforms to wear. I am the one that used to go there, and some of them, I would say can you please bring me so and so, I want to discuss with him, and they would come and discuss.

They would, if they had a problem, they said it. And I would, in cases where there was a problem, I would discuss it. You see, my difficulty, I don't know what happened after I left. I am talking about the time when I was there, I went to visit that place very often.

MR KHOISAN: Could it be that the chaps in whose charge the prisoners were kept, may have been remiss in informing you of excesses they may have visited upon the people in their charge?

GEN MASONDO: It is possible, but some did talk to me and if they did, I talked to the people.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, now let's look at the issue of this person that you characterised as a South African agent, one Kenneth Mahamba, Seremani, Timothy K. Seremani.

The allegation is that when he was detained, and you have indicated that you were personally involved in his detention.

GEN MASONDO: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: The allegation is that between the time that he was detained, and the time that he had passed through the judicial process and was eliminated, liquidated by the tribunal, that he was severely tortured, and that he was beaten beyond recognition.

There is an allegation that this situation obtained with this particular person. Now, I am asking you this for two reasons. One, the ANC at that time subscribed to certain international protocols regarding treatment of prisoners of war, or whatever. Two, because of the fact that I want to ascertain what your personal involvement was from the time this person was detained, to the time this person was executed. Can you share with us some of your views on that, General?

GEN MASONDO: Remember what I told you that I locked him up, not because I said at the time he was an enemy agent, so that was not the reason why I locked him up.

I locked him up because he had violated human rights. He had broken a number of our vehicles even when I told him not to. So from that point of view, I didn't lock him up because he was an enemy agent.

The enemy agent aspect comes after, when the Shisheda came and people were being interrogated, some of the people he worked with, indicated that he was an enemy agent.