

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

AMNESTY HEARING

DATE: 20.01.1997 NAME: SNR SUPT CONRADIE
CASE: JOHANNESBURG
DAY 1

CHAIRPERSON: You are here to talk specifically about the 10
Sebokeng killings. Before we get to that, let me introduce
everybody here. I think you have met Russel and Andre, Mr
Hugh Lewin and of course we have a full interpretation team
here this morning, so you can speak in the language of your
choice.

I would like to make a few points before we start. The
first point of course, is that we have to take an oath and
this all that is being said today, is under oath.

The second point is that we are in terms of the Act
given the responsibility of asking incriminating questions. 20
That will take place.

Also, we have informed the Attorney-General about this
and Andre will tell us more about that.

Sorry, yes, and Mr Wagner is here and it is obvious
that you have a right to legal representation. Could you
please stand to take the oath.

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: (Duly sworn, states).

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

ADV STEENKAMP: I can just maybe say, if you want to speak
to the Commissioners, just push down your microphone, if the 30
red light is on, that specific person will ask the question.

Also, for your convenience, if you want our question to be

translated into Afrikaans, you can just use this. But you are welcome to use the language of your choice, because there is a translation service from English to Afrikaans so you can use this. The same for you, Mr Wagner.

MR WAGNER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, than you for the kind words. Can I speak, say something very briefly? What we have done for your convenience, we have taken the written notification received by Mr Conradie and we have prepared a document for you. I see unfortunately I only have three 10 further copies so I hope it will suffice. You will see this is in the form of a statement with certain annexures. The document is in Afrikaans, but I hope that that won't be a problem. So maybe to expedite matters here today, with your permission, I would suggest that Mr Conradie read this document out in the record and hopefully, he will deal there with some of your, some of the issues that you wanted to ask him about. Then, thereafter, obviously asking whatever questions.

Mr Conradie has indicated to me that he would prefer 20 also answering your questions in Afrikaans, but the questions may be put to him in English. That won't be a problem and maybe that would also make it easier for our gentlemen there in the corner. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you for these documents. I think what we will require is just a short break so that we can not study that in detail, but that we use these documents and then we can come back. If that is okay with you.

MR WAGNER: That is in order.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS

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ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagner, thank you for this document. The panel has considered the document. Of course, given the time factor, we haven't had time to look at it. What we would like to strongly suggest is that we go ahead, that the senior superintendent of course refer to the document as questions are being asked. But also at the same time be given the opportunity to make an opening statement, with regard to the incident that we are talking about, which is the Sebokeng killings in 1990. 10

So if that is acceptable to you, we can proceed. The senior superintendent can refer to the document whenever he pleases, but we would not like him to go and read every sentence out from the document.

MR WAGNER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It is in the record, of course, this document.

MR WAGNER: That is what I would like to ask you. You will note that the document has not been signed by my client. So technically it is not a statement, it is not a statement, it is merely a document. Maybe Mr Steenkamp can assist me here. 20
As long as what he said in the document, if we can say, that is, if we can say it is part of the record, I don't know whether that is the correct expression. But as long as you accept it on that basis we think it may be a good idea. Or else, maybe we can ask my client just to sign the original, if that may assist you, but if we can go ahead, by all means.

CHAIRPERSON: No, we accept that it is part of the record. He will be able to sign the document as well. 30

MR WAGNER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Maybe if I can just

ask one question through Mr Wagner. This document, this document didn't form part of your amnesty application.

MR WAGNER: No, Mr Chairman, the amnesty application I think it is in your possession. That was a document drawn up quite hastily. It was done when we still thought that the 14th of December would be the cut-off date, so the amnesty application as filed, I would have preferred it to be a more complete detailed document, but the answer is no, the application as filed with the Amnesty Committee, there were 10 no annexures and I think you have it in your possession. You will find that this document, to some extent, it is a duplication of the amnesty application. I think it is slightly more detailed and then there are some annexures attached to that.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Mr Wagner. Snr Supt Conradie, maybe as the Chairperson has indicated, we can start by way of asking you, just give us a very broad background of your involvement in the Sebokeng incident, what you know about the Sebokeng incident and again, you are welcome to use the 20 language of your choice. Thank you.

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: If you say a brief reply, do you just mean what happened on the particular day?

ADV STEENKAMP: (Speaker's mike not on) ... what happened at Sebokeng, just broadly, what happened there and what was your involvement as far as you remember, of Sebokeng.

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, on that morning, only after I had arrived in the office, heard about the shooting incidents in the hostels. I was also informed that the district commissioner was on his way there, to visit the 30 scene and to ascertain for myself, I also went to the scene.

I arrived on the scene approximately eight o'clock. There

was already a large number of people in the crowd outside. I also saw corpses lying there. But because of the number of people there I couldn't really see the total number of corpses or judge that.

I followed the district commission to the point at the hostel where the vehicles were parked. Let's say where the entrance of the hostel was blocked off. Once we had arrived inside the hostel, I noticed the group of members of the Inkatha Movement, which we were able to determine later. At that stage the situation was such that we knew that we wouldn't be able to leave the scene again because of the number of people. 10

We negotiated with the people. The people outside the hostel were tremendously aggressive. We discussed the matters with leaders. We wanted the people outside the hostel to move away so that the Inkatha people who were there, could be arrested and taken out of the hostel to the police station. If we did not do that, there would have been big fighting between the Inkatha members and the people outside, because they were really very agitated. 20

Due to the circumstances Col Fourie, the district commissioner entered into discussions with us. There were only a few members of the police inside the hostel. It was quite clear that there was no way that we were going to be able to leave the hostel and avoid a blood-bath if we didn't drive away or get the people outside the hostel to leave.

Therefore, Col Fourie requested per radio that the Defence Force move in in order to help us to get the people out of the hostel. The instruction from Col Fourie was quite clear and I heard it myself, that the Defence Force should not shoot. 30

The Defence Force then moved in. The idea was that in front of the opening of the hostel, they would have to pass in front of the opening. So that they would be able to get the people to move away and give access to the other members of the police so that the Inkatha members could be removed from the hostel.

When the Defence Force arrived there I couldn't see clearly, I didn't have a full view of the scene, because of the vehicles, but I could see the Defence Force members coming in line. And I could see that the front row of people, those people in front sat on the ground. 10

At that stage I felt that as soon as it was possible I myself and the person with me, Warrant-Officer Nienaber should attempt to leave the hostel, because the video camera he had with him, its battery was running down.

At the back of the vehicle, which was parked there, while I moved towards the back of the vehicle, and the next moment tear-gas canister came flying in my direction. When I turned around to run back, I heard a volley of shots being fired. It was automatic firing and there were many shots being fired. I cannot judge exactly how many or how long, but we ran back into the hostel, and the tear-gas overcame us and we hid in one of the rooms. 20

After I had recovered from the tear-gas we went out again. I went outside where I saw quite a number of people lying around, some injured, some not injured. I saw one additional corpse. I could clearly see that he had been shot in the head, lying outside, in addition to those that I had noticed previously. 30

I don't know whether I should set out everything exactly as in my statement, but we launched the normal

police action, and I was more involved on the outside where there were injured people, and where all the arms were lying around, which had been left behind by the people.

I received a report that Mr Mandela was on his way to Vereeniging and that I also would have to conduct an interview with him. Because there were a number of senior officers on the scene, as well as some detectives who would investigate the matter, I withdrew and left for my office, where we met with Mr Mandela later that morning, in the office of the district commissioner of Vereeniging. 10

During the day we also accompanied Mr Mandela to Sebokeng. After we had left him, I went back to the police station at Sebokeng, where I determined that all the persons who had been inside the hostel, including the leader, Themba Khoza, had been arrested, and also that arms had been found in his vehicle.

I had a brief conversation with Themba Khoza. I **inter alia** asked him where the arms had come from. He told me that the vehicle had been parked in the hostel and that the people or somebody had placed the arms in the vehicle. He showed rather an amount of enmity towards me at that stage. I did not have further discussions with him. 20

After he had been kept in custody - well, let me rather put it this way. I returned to my office. Mr Khoza was kept in the Vereeniging police station cells.

That same afternoon, if I remember correctly. It could also have been the next day, but I don't know whether I remain correctly, Eugene de Kock visited my offices. He requested to speak to Themba Khoza. I arranged for him to see Khoza, by making arrangements with my people who had arranged for him to be kept in custody. I did not sit in 30

during the interview.

Mr De Kock's attitude created the impression with me that Themba Khoza worked with him or for the police. I was also summoned to headquarters a few days later. Please excuse me, I can't remember the dates at all. Where Brig Van Rensburg spoke to me.

I determined there that Themba Khoza was indeed an informant of the police and that he had been tasked to collect information regarding Third Force activities in the Vaal Triangle. 10

I was also asked how strong the case against Khoza was. I did not know what the testimony and the evidence against him had been at that stage. I returned and I had discussions with Maj Jacobs who had investigated the dossier at that stage. I also read the statement. From which I realised that Themba Khoza was indeed implicated and linked to the arms in his vehicle. I discussed it with Jacobs and I sort of convinced him that we had to assist Themba Khoza in changing the statement so that it wouldn't implicate him. 20

I then took the statement from Jacobs. I changed it, in the sense that, and I can't remember exactly, but that the one firearm hadn't actually been found in his possession and that his vehicle wasn't locked. That is what I can remember. I can't remember exactly what I did but I don't think there were large deviations.

I then also spoke to Warrant-Officer Van der Gryp who had taken the statement. I called him into my office and explained the situation to him. I tried to explain to him that it would be in the interest of the previous government and Inkatha Freedom Party to change the statement, and that he would have to sign the statement. 30

At a later stage I phoned back to Brig Van Rensburg's office. I couldn't get hold of him, he wasn't in the office. I left a brief message to the effect that the case against Themba Khoza did not really have much content. I can't remember the exact wording, but it boiled down to the fact that he was not very strongly linked to the arms in his vehicle. I haven't since spoken to Brig Van Rensburg or saw him.

That in brief would have been the events, Mr Chair. 10

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you for that statement, Mr Conradie.

Maybe we can start, if we can just ask you about the issues of Mr Khoza. Can you maybe explain to the Committee what was the relationship between the security police and the Inkatha Freedom Party at that stage in the Vaal Triangle? Because as you know there were other massacres as well, not only one, where other Inkatha members were arrested, and some of them were convicted. Do you know what was the official, what was the view, as you were, as I understand, the chief or the head of the security police in the Vaal? What was the relationship between the police, the different arms of the police and the Inkatha Freedom Party at this stage in the Vaal Triangle? 20

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, there was no real relationship between the police and the Inkatha Freedom Party. We treated them similarly to any other party.

ADV STEENKAMP: You also said that you understood at a stage that Themba Khoza was an informer of the police. Can you just explain to us how did you come to know this, was he a paid informer, in other words was he a paid informer of head office or was he an informer of the Vaal Triangle; did you use him previously, Themba Khoza, or did you meet him 30

previously? On what basis did you decide that he was then an official informer of the security police?

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, I met Themba Khoza on one previous occasion, when he and someone else came to my office and asked for a meeting at the Everton Stadium. I had no relationship with Mr Themba Khoza.

Why I thought on that particular day that he was working for Eugene de Kock, was because Eugene de Kock so shortly after the incident, arrived at the office to talk to him. 10

The fact that he had worked for De Kock, I deduced from the conversation with Brig Van Rensburg. I do not have any information whether he was a paid informant or not, or at least at that time I did not know. I think that in the hearings and in the newspapers it has since come out that that was the case, but I did not have such knowledge at that time.

ADV STEENKAMP: As you might be aware of De Kock, and that Themba Khoza was arrested with a vehicle at that stage as far as we could establish, which was registered in the name of the security police. He was also arrested with certain explosives, or home-made explosives, certain weapons and arms, and maybe as you are aware, 42 people died in that incident. Maybe you can just give us some explanation, why do you think at that stage, a man arrested on the scene with explosives where 42 people were killed, that it was in the interest - as you put it - in the interests of Inkatha and the country, that Mr Khoza is not prosecuted properly? And if I read through your statement, in paragraph 30, you specifically said you took this responsibility - the first paragraph there; you took this responsibility of changing 20 30

the statement on your own.

On what basis did you then decide that it was in the interests of justice and the government and the Inkatha Freedom Party, that at a mass murder scene, where a lot of people were killed, that Khoza was not arrested. That is my first question.

The second question is: was it standard practice that informants of the police are not prosecuted properly at this stage? Let me just rephrase the question. Was it standard practice for informers of the police to be covered, not to be prosecuted? Did this happen regularly or was the only incident, as far as your knowledge goes. 10

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, as far as I am aware, this was the only incident. I might mention that it did occur in the past that an informant of the police might have been arrested. One would then attempt to withdraw from that person and he would then have to continue on his own. Particularly with the purpose that it would not become known that he is an informant. 20

ADV STEENKAMP: The next question.

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: With regards to the first question. My apologies. Because of the political circumstances at the time I knew that were it to become known that Khoza was an informant, that it would be a particularly serious embarrassment for the then government, as well as for the Inkatha Freedom Party, and that is why.

ADV STEENKAMP: Sir, before I hand over to my colleagues here for specific detailed questions. Was this the only contact you had with Capt Van der Gryp by questioning him and giving him a false statement? Was this the only incident where you were involved in basically, if I can put 30

it frankly, covering up the arrest of Themba Khoza or did you have any other dealings relating to this issue, over and above your statement to Van der Gryp, with Van der Gryp, obviously. Over and above it, did you ever call him again about this incident after you gave him the statement or was the only incident where you had contact with Van der Gryp on this issue?

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, Van der Gryp was on that particular day or the previous day was transferred to my component. He worked under me for a very long time, although I cannot remember the exact extent of that. Maybe until 1991. Certainly there was continuing contact between him and me, but with regard to this particular incident, this I believe is all. 10

ADV STEENKAMP: Van der Gryp also testified and said you called him in afterwards and you gave him some ammunition. According to him it was AK-47 ammunition, if I am not mistaken. It is also mentioned that in his amnesty application. As far as he was concerned, that ammunition was similar to the ammunition that was found on the scene of the incident, it was also AK-47 ammunition. Do you know anything about such an incident, just shortly after that incident? 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot remember exactly how long after this incident. This particular incident took place on the 4th of September 1990. I was transferred to the regional head office of the security branch on the 2nd of January 1992. At the end of 1991 I did an audit of the safes of the offices in Vereeniging. At that time the safes were completely over-full. There were newspapers in there, I think their old Weekly Mails, pamphlets and all kind of 30

things that we had to confiscate, that there was no longer any room to put anything else in there.

Then also in view of the instruction from head office, that those things which were no longer relevant to our work, since the ANC and other parties had been unbanned, that we had to get rid of this materials. We did this audit and during this audit we found a steel case or trunk which was in the safe. In this trunk there were a number of AK-47 bullets. I cannot remember how many rounds or whether they were all of the same source or where they call came from. It is difficult to explain, but I don't know even know whether AK-47 bullet is similar to another. I don't know what sort of tests one would need to be able to determine that. I determined to whom this trunk had belonged. I could not, however, track this person down, despite several phone calls. I no longer wanted the stuff in my office. I must add here that there was in addition in this trunk, a number of old Swapo uniforms, old water bottles, a whole range of old things that we would have obtained in the past. Say for instance, on the border, the then South West Africa and Southern Rhodesia, where people would have gathered this kind of thing as a souvenir, which you couldn't really use in any way. I threw away the old pieces of clothing or had someone throw it away.

I then phoned the then Capt Du Plessis, who was in charge of the explosives experts. I was not able to get hold of him. I was looking for Warrant-Officer Nolte, I could not get hold of him, and Van der Gryp however, who was available. So I asked Van der Gryp to collect all of these things at my office, which he did. With the idea that he would hand it over to Warrant-Officer Nolte, who was second

in charge of the explosives people at that time, and that they then would have to destroy this.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you. You have said that you asked Warrant-Officer Van der Gryp to destroy these things.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: He had to hand it over to Warrant-Officer Nolte who was supposed to destroy it, because Van der Gryp was not an explosives expert himself.

ADV STEENKAMP: I see, because Mr Van der Gryp said in his statement to us, that you told him to use these arms in their work in the intelligence unit. Would that be true or not? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is entirely untrue. As far as my knowledge goes, we, to be specific, did not have any AK-47s, the weapon, with which to use these bullets or cartridges of bullets.

ADV STEENKAMP: Such bullets would they not have been available for strike projects in the Vaal Triangle?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Stratcom in what sense? I don't know how one could use this for a stratcom project, I am not understanding what you are exactly asking in this regard. 20

ADV STEENKAMP: As I understand it, there are a number of possible uses of these bullets in Stratcom units, you could give the ammunition available to conflicting groups, you could sell it to people to generate money for the security branch, and there is a legion of possible other uses. You could even use it for hard Stratcom projects.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, not in my entire life had I been involved in that kind of action. I would not allow my people to take part in such actions. If I could think of a Stratcom where a person would try a dirty trick, maybe you could plant this on a person, but I would then not 30

to give it to the intelligence unit, I would rather give it to my overhead staff, who were supposed to be searching the houses to find this kind of thing.

I must mention to you that this particular incident took place in 1990. This particular shooting and the bullets were only handed over in 1991 and by that time the situation had already changed considerably.

ADV STEENKAMP: If I understand it correctly, you said to Capt Van der Gryp that he had to hand over the ammunition to Thys Nolte and that Thys Nolte were supposed or was to be given a message that it was your instruction that this ammunition was to be destroyed.

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is correct. I had in fact, in a matter of speaking, forgotten about this. I did speak to Thys Nolte at a later stage and told him to get the stuff from Arthur van der Gryp and that it had to please be destroyed.

ADV STEENKAMP: Arthur van der Gryp did speak to Thys Nolte with regard to this ammunition and Nolte then said to Van der Gryp that it would not be strange for him to have received this ammunition, with the insinuation that he had in fact also had such ammunition in his possession. How would you respond to this?

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I have no knowledge whatsoever of that.

ADV STEENKAMP: There is something, it seems to me that you were a very efficient police officer, a law-abiding citizen, but it is very striking to me that you went to such extents well knowingly that even the courts were deceived by a sworn statement of Van der Gryp. As far as I know Van der Gryp's statement, you not only changed his statement once but numerous times for him. And apparently even, according to

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him, you wrote his statement. Now I think you must agree with me, Sir, that it seems inconceivable that you were never involved in any other atrocities except this one. I find that very strange. Why should Van der Gryp lie about such a detail, an incident like this, about ammunition?

MR WAGNER: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, I don't think the word ... (speaker's mike not on).

ADV STEENKAMP: I will withdraw that word then. Can you just explain to me, Sir, why should he go to such extents, covering a case, even deceiving the courts of South Africa, and the chief security officer of the Vaal Triangle, by even writing to another officer a sworn statement, changing it numerous times. I find it very difficult to understand that why shouldn't you also be involved in other similar kind of actions?

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I changed Van der Gryp's statement, I think we went through it together. There was something which was perhaps not hundred per cent right, which he felt perhaps he couldn't say to me, and then I made a final change. I did not change it numerous times. It was on one occasion.

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ADV STEENKAMP: Was Van der Gryp then part of this process of drafting a false statement, was he part of it or was this done on your own?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I did it on my own, and he then probably said to me that this was not entirely correct, like that. I can't remember exactly. You must remember it was long ago, but I did it on my own. I convinced Mr Van der Gryp to do it.

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MEMBER OF PANEL: Supt Insp Conradie, fine. On the morning of the incident, can you remember which officers exactly

were present?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Mr Chair, you should perhaps just keep in mind that it was a tremendously muddled morning, with hundreds, perhaps thousands of people already on the scene. The hubbub which was prevailing at the stage. The tremendous tension that was there. I can't remember who all the people were present. I remember Col Fourie, the district commissioner, Col Van Niekerk, the district detective officer. With me was Maj Steyn. There was the person who always handled the unrest related issues, he investigated them, Lieut Coetzer. I really can't remember exactly who all the people were that were present. There were quite a number of officers. Then you also have to remember that I was with Col Fourie, actually trapped on the inside, whereas the rest of them were outside. 10

MEMBER OF PANEL: The unit of which Lieut Coetzer was the head, what was that unit's particular task in the Vaal Triangle at this stage?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: They investigated all unrest related matters, incidents. 20

MEMBER OF PANEL: Upon arrival at the scene was Lieut Coetzer the only member of the unit on the scene?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I can't really tell at all. There was quite a number of policemen there, but I can't tell.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagner and Snr Insp Conradie may have a five-minute break. For you to refresh yourself and perhaps also just to consult, if that is okay with him.

MR WAGNER: Very constructive, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. 30

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: We are going to be graced with the presence of Ms Yasmin Sooka, who is also one of our commissioners. If we can just give her a few minutes to come in.

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairman, may I add one thing. During the break Mr Conradie indicated to me that there is one short piece of evidence that he would like to add to his previous evidence, if you will just allow him.

CHAIRPERSON: Fine.

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MR WAGNER: I am not sure exactly what it is all about, but the would like to add something to it.

CHAIRPERSON: Good. Snr Insp Conradie, if you will continue them, starting off with this piece of information that you want to add to what you said earlier on before the break.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, it concerns the trunk which had contained the ammunition. I want to point out how long this trunk had been in the particular safe. This trunk had already towards the end of 1992/1993, beginning 1993 landed in the safe.

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I was not in command at that time. I spoke to the previous commanding officer to determine whether he knew what its origin had been and to whom it might have belonged. It then appeared that a person, a certain Maritz, who started end '82, beginning '83, was transferred from the then South West Africa, now Namibia, to our office. This person had left the trunk there with the request to the previous commanding officer that this was his personal property and whether he could store it in that safe. The then commanding officer was not aware what the real contents of this trunk had been.

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I am trying to point out that the trunk had been

standing in the safe for a number of years, before I opened and found the ammunition in the trunk. I had attempted at that time to track down this particular person. I have not been able to get hold of the person, I am not now able to do it either and I believe that the person has been in America for a number of years.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Senior Superintendent. I just want to take up what you said just now about the date, because you said at the end of 1991. That's when you looked through the safe earlier on, but just now you said 1992. So can we just get the chronology right. 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: My apologies. The trunk was supposed to have been left there at the end of '82, beginning '83, that is when it must have landed up in the safe. At the end of 1991 prior to my transfer to Johannesburg, I opened the trunk.

ADV STEENKAMP: We return then to the morning of the scene. You say you cannot remember whether there were any other members of the riot investigation unit, apart from Lieut Coetzer, that you would have noticed there. Is that correct? 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot remember who was present there. Certainly there must have been some of the members of that investigative unit, probably the entire investigative unit, because that would have been the normal course of events, but I cannot remember who the persons were who worked at the investigative unit at that time. You must remember that I did not have daily contact with these people. 30

ADV STEENKAMP: Capt Van der Gryp mentions in his statement to the Commission that when he arrived at the scene, Lieut

Coetzer was the only other member of the investigative unit present there, but he does mention that a large number of - and he says that he felt as if the entire Vaal Triangle police force was present. He mentioned that a large number of senior officers were present, including yourself, when he arrived on the scene. Could you in this regard say to me the radio message that went out, with regard to the incident, would it be strange that the investigative unit tasked to investigate this kind of event, would have been the very last police officers to arrive on the scene? Don't you find this strange? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: If it is so, I do find it strange. One must not get confused with regard to this however. There were a number of us who were inside the hostel. We don't know who were outside. There was a large number of police officers outside, only a very few who were able to get inside the hostel. If I was inside the hostel, I would not be able to tell you who was outside.

ADV STEENKAMP: Did you see the blue Nissan Sentra on the scene when you arrived there? 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is correct, it was standing there some distance from where we were standing.

ADV STEENKAMP: Did you notice Mr Themba Khoza on the scene?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes, I did. I was also present when the district commissioner was speaking with him. I certainly did notice him, he was present for that entire time.

ADV STEENKAMP: You mentioned in your opening statement that the first contact that you had with Themba Khoza was after you accompanied Mr Mandela and then returned to the police station. Was that the very first contact or did you earlier that morning have any conversation with Mr Khoza? 30

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I can't remember whether I personally had a conversation with him, but he was present there on the inside with us for the entire time. I do know specifically that the district commissioner had an extended conversation with him and that the district commissioner then said to me that he was willing to put down arms so that we could accompany them out of the hostel. To say you now, however, that I had a conversation with him then, that would be very difficult. We were standing next to each other with the district commissioner. I might have asked a question but that is very difficult to say. 10

ADV STEENKAMP: I want to quote Capt Van der Gryp. He refers to Mr Khoza and he says that this person moved regularly from the offices to the Zulus and back and that he had conversations with Conradie and the district commissioner.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is true, he did move from the Zulus to us regularly. He even came forward to see what the situation was outside the hostel. Like a person, as I would say, and this was my view at that time, that he was in control of that group and certainly he would have to move in-between so that he could keep this group updated with what was happening. 20

ADV STEENKAMP: In your conversations with Mr Khoza did you at any time ask him whether there were arms with him? I am not asking about assegais and sticks, but I am talking about arms like guns and so on, whether any of his supporters had such arms.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, I did not ask him. 30

ADV STEENKAMP: Do you know whether anyone else asked him this question?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I don't know. May I just say in this regard, that when Col Fourie said to me that Themba Khoza said that he was willing to lay down arms, I did not know what the arms would have been, but one assumes that if so many people have died, certainly firearms would have been included.

MS SOOKA: Had you ever met him before this?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I have met him once. I did meet him on one occasion, Mr Chairperson, when he made an application 10
for a meeting at the Everton Stadium.

MS SOOKA: (Speaker's mike not on), working with the police at that stage.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: At that time I did not know this. I did discover this at a later stage.

MS SOOKA: (Speaker's mike not on).

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: As I said in my statement, received this impression after Eugene de Kock visited him, while he was under custody or in custody. Then later when I spoke with Brig Van Rensburg at head office. 20

MR LEWIN: Sorry, if I could just ask one question. When you were all on the inside there, and after you arrived, was it absolutely clear at that stage that the people who were on the inside had been responsible for the shootings and the killings?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, not at all. I cannot say that at all. That would have been impossible for me to say.

CHAIRPERSON: Supt Conradie, can I just ask then again, people were taken out of the hostels soon after you arrived. Was that for their own safety or were they actually arrested 30
at that stage?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Subsequent to the shooting accident in

which the military were involved, these persons were taken out, although one could not say that they were responsible for the shooting incident, it was probably clear to everyone there that the problem had started with these persons. They were therefore taken away and they were detained under the regulations so that the matter could be investigated.

ADV STEENKAMP: Snr Supt you said recently that subsequent to your meeting with Mr Mandela, once you returned to the Sebokeng police station you heard that arms had been found. 10

You also mentioned Themba Khoza's aggressive attitude. Would it not be true that while you were still on the scene, Warrant Officer Van der Gryp arrived on the scene, he saw the motor vehicle parked there. He had heard that arms had been seen with the Zulus. He had the car unlocked, the arms were indeed found. Piet Nienaber in fact took this on video at that time and after Themba Khoza was arrested, you gave Warrant Officer or asked Warrant Officer Van der Gryp to accompany Mr Themba Khoza to the Sebokeng police station. Would that be the correct version of what had taken place? 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot remember that I had ever asked Van der Gryp to take Themba Khoza to the police station. I was not at the vehicle, I was on the outside where the shooting incident was taking place and where we attempted to determine what had actually happened and where we attempted to prevent people from removing the evidence that was lying around, pieces of evidence lying around outside the hostel. What was taking place inside the hostel at that time, Van der Gryp was taking part in those events.

ADV STEENKAMP: Senior Superintendent, would it not be true 30
that the arms were found in the vehicle prior to the shooting incident outside the hostel?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I am not aware of this.

ADV STEENKAMP: You deny therefore that you had asked any police officer to accompany Mr Themba Khoza to the Sebokeng police station?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: If my memory is correct, I did not ask anyone to take Themba Khoza specifically or to accompany Themba Khoza specifically. At that time there were other officers inside the property. There were then movements possibly from inside and outside and vice versa and I was not involved in the arrest of the people there, where they were standing around with Themba Khoza. 10

ADV STEENKAMP: Warrant Officer Van der Gryp in fact did accompany Mr Themba Khoza after or to the Sebokeng police station and he says that it was your instruction. He found it strange, he said, that you asked him to do so on his own, that he felt unsafe in the presence of Mr Khoza. Would you deny that you ever asked him to do this?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot remember that I requested him to do so, simply because I wasn't on the inside of the hostel. It could have been any other officer with which he might have confused me. You must remember that this was an extremely confusing day. It was a real mess and I don't know whether every person would be able to remember exactly what everyone said and to whom they might have said it. I cannot even imagine that I might have said this to him. 20

ADV STEENKAMP: It may well be that you cannot remember having asked Van der Gryp to transport Themba Khoza to the police station. I do, however, find it strange if you then accompanied the then leader of the ANC, if you at that time knew that Khoza was arrested with these arms, you must surely now remember, that that was the case. It must have 30

been in your thoughts as you accompanied the then leader of the ANC. Did you ever inform Mr Mandela that Themba Khoza was found with these arms?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: The information I gave to Mr Mandela briefly involved the following. Let me begin by saying that I do not believe that Mr Mandela on that day visited Vereeniging because of the shooting incident. At least, that was my impression. As far as I can remember Mr Mandela and his company came to look at the entire problem. This was a situation that was carrying on for a long time already, people were being murdered and getting killed over an extended period of time, and that was the reason for Mr Mandela's visit. The day of the information here I told Mr Mandela what had taken place there, as in my statement to you.

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ADV STEENKAMP: Did you inform Mr Mandela that arms had been found on the scene?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot remember whether I mentioned that in particular. I cannot remember that in particular at all. I do know that when it came to the point where I told them that the SADF had shot, the group was very upset, and I don't know whether we ever arrived at the matter of the arms. I cannot actually remember in detail anything about these particular arms. Whether I was aware of these arms at the time, I never saw the arms.

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MS SOOKA: Did you tell Mr Mandela that Themba Khoza was on the scene?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot remember. I really cannot remember.

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ADV STEENKAMP: Senior Superintendent, how often did it happen to your knowledge and in your police experience, in

the Vaal Triangle, particularly in the light of the amount of violence that was taking place there, that senior politicians were caught on the scene where a number of people had been killed with arms in his possession? How many times did that happen?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot remember any other occasions where this happened.

ADV STEENKAMP: Is it then not strange that in a briefing to a senior political leader you cannot remember mentioning it? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: At that stage I had not really realised how senior a person Themba Khoza really was. I determined this later on, how senior he was. At that stage he was not to me such a really senior person.

ADV STEENKAMP: You previously had a meeting with Themba Khoza?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Positively, yes, he came and applied for a meeting. In the same way that other political leaders came and applied for meetings to be held, where we would refer them to the magistrate then. 20

ADV STEENKAMP: And arms found at ... (END OF TAPE 1 - SIDE B) ... police?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes, I would regard it as such. As in all other incidences where arms had been found, it is important - if one AK-47 was found that we could take out of the community that could no longer be used for violence was of great importance to us.

MS SOOKA: You also mentioned that Mr Khoza was in the office and you had a short conversation with him. Could you tell us a little more about that conversation? 30

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I asked him where the arms came from. That is what I can remember, Mr Chairperson, and he said to

me that he had gone there the morning after he had heard that there had been problems in the hostel and that his people had been involved, that his vehicle had stood there unlocked and that somebody could have placed their arms in there. But Mr Khoza at that stage had an aggressive attitude and I think he was aggrieved because he had been arrested there.

MS SOOKA: Did you take a written statement from him?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, I did not take a statement from him. I spoke to him very briefly. I did not take a statement from him because the investigation would not be carried out by me or my component. 10

ADV STEENKAMP: Okay. Now let us move on a little later in the afternoon. After the incident, after the visit of Mr Mandela's, you said that Mr Eugene de Kock had come and saw Mr Themba Khoza at the police station. Is that correct?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes, that's correct.

ADV STEENKAMP: But that same day according to Capt Van der Gryp, and Maj Jacobs, Capt Van der Gryp was asked for the first time to change his statement. 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, it was not that same afternoon, it was after my visit to Pretoria.

ADV STEENKAMP: Nevertheless, in both Capt Van der Gryp's as well as Maj Jacobs' amnesty applications, it is stated that it was first amended on the day of the 4th. They continue by stating that on the day of the 5th, according to Van der Gryp, he was called in immediately the day afterwards. There was no time that elapsed, except that one day after you had called him in and requested him to make an amended statement. What is your reply to this? 30

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Some time had passed, it was not done

on the same day.

ADV STEENKAMP: Okay, I could perhaps quote to you the relevant portions.

MR WAGNER OBJECTS: Mr Chairperson, in all fairness Mr Jacobs does not say that in his amnesty application.

ADV STEENKAMP: Maybe I can ask you. If I look at (speaker's mike not on) ... the specific document referring to Themba Khoza, marked "secret" and the heading of this document is called "gebeure wat aanleiding gegee het tot die huidge onrus in Sebokeng, distrik Vereeniging". It is just after this page No JFC2, just after that page. You see there is a document which is attached to the documents. As I understand, you are relying on this document to give some sort of indication to the Commission, exactly what the position was in Sebokeng at the time. If you look at paragraph 11, there is a specific reference to Themba Khoza, about a certain incident where in Vereeniging or near Sebokeng then, where there should have been a meeting on the 22nd of July 1990. Now this is about a month and a few days prior the Sebokeng incident, about five weeks prior to this massacre. If you look at this secret memo to head office, it is saying basically that Themba Khoza is a friend of Themba Khoza and about a meeting and also that there is a possibility that Inkatha members can be involved in some sort of violence and that members must be aware of the violence in this specific area. 10

Did you ever know or had any information that such a massacre will happen after this date of 1990 or did you have any kind of information or intelligence that an attack was planned on these hostels, after this document was drafted by one of the security branch members? Did you have any kind 30

of information, any new information that such a thing will happen?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, could I briefly explain this document, otherwise you won't understand where it had its origin.

There was an attorney's enquiry, I think, from the ANC offices. It had been addressed to the then regional commissioner of the Witwatersrand. I received the instruction to prepare a document to explain the whole situation in Sebokeng to the regional commissioner so that he could determine what the origins and progression of the events of violence had been. 10

Now this document was prepared, I think before the attack at Sebokeng Hostel. So it is a document which I had given over a period of time. It is not something which had been prepared by me alone. You will see in paragraph 9, for example, that Col Mazibuko had discussions with Mr Valli. I referred to a conversation with Mr Themba Khoza by telephone, that somebody else had contacted him. It is not I who did it, it is not just my version that you have here. 20

But we expected attacks all the time and there was constant observation. There were patrol vehicles of the unrest unit to prevent incidents from happening. You can see the number of incidents that took place.

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to clarify this taking of statements and changing of statements and the exact timing of that. On the afternoon, we are told, that Eugene de Kock came to visit Mr Themba Khoza. Is that right? On the afternoon of the day that the killings took place. 30

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: As I said in my statement, Mr Chairperson, as far as my memory serves me, it would have

been that afternoon. It may be the next day, but I am quite convinced of it, that it was that very afternoon, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there any conversation between you and Eugene de Kock at that stage?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Very briefly, yes. He introduced himself to me, but it was very briefly and he just said that he was visiting Themba Khoza. No reason was given, it was a very brief conversation.

CHAIRPERSON: Now Mr Van der Gryp says that he made his first statement on the afternoon of the day the killings took place. And on that same day he was approached and he thinks it was by Capt Jacobs, to change the statement. Were you aware of that? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes, this is not really a statement that was changed. What happens is particularly where one has a young detective or for that matter any young police officer, the statement may not be complete. Many elements of the crime might not be contained. Then the commanding officer will take the statement, will sit down with the person and will rewrite the statement so that it contains the whole story and all the elements of the crime. I think that is what had occurred in this case, but this was not a change and it wasn't the change that I had made at a later stage. 20

CHAIRPERSON: Then you go on to say that you met with Brig Van Rensburg in Pretoria. Was that the next day?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, it was a number of days afterwards. I cannot remember the exact date, but it was a couple of days subsequent. 30

CHAIRPERSON: A couple of days after the incident.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS SOOKA: If I hear you correctly, what you are saying is that you think that the changing of Van der Gryp's statement was to ensure that it was brought in line on a more professional basis and that it is not an attempt to commit perjury.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: The first changes which are being referred to, I believe that is the case. But this is not the case with the second change. 10

MS SOOKA: Col De Kock was involved in the matter. What was your own understanding of what this event at the hostels had been?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: It is very difficult for me to just have made a deduction, Mr Chairperson. What I thought may have been the possibility is that De Kock might be handling the person as an informant and that the situation went wrongly in this sense, that Themba did not carry out his instructions and acted on his own. That was my honest opinion, what I thought at that time. 20

MS SOOKA: What Capt De Kock was involved in before that visit?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: All that I knew about De Kock was that he was at the head office and at Vlakplaas, but what the details of his work was and how he operated, I did not know. Nor did I know De Kock at that time except on sight.

MS SOOKA: Had you heard about his hit squad activities at the time?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I was never aware of his hit squad activities until the newspaper stories appeared. That was the first time when I knew about this. 30

MS SOOKA: (Speaker's mike not on) ... of Mr Themba Khoza in

the Vaal?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I had determined this from Brig Van Rensburg.

MR LEWIN: Could I just ask about Vlakplaas. I mean, was it generally known what Vlakplaas was? Did you know of its existence?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: We knew of the existence of Vlakplaas. As far as I was concerned and I think this would be true for the majority of people, Vlakplaas would have been the unit that helped with the tracking down, as we called them then, terrorists. 10

MR LEWIN: Now when you in your first statement this morning, you talked about De Kock arriving and you, the implication that I had from what you said, was that this, it wasn't strange to you. It was almost as though, I mean it was a daily occurrence or something that did take place fairly frequently.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: It was not strange for me in this sense, that he had come from head office. Since in many cases, when people had been arrested, head office people would have visited, not always as quickly, but it was because he came so very quickly. That gave me the idea that he might have been working with Khoza. 20

MR LEWIN: Where there any other incidents like this or like any other sort of incidents where De Kock pitched up surprisingly? Unexpectedly.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: This was the first time that De Kock came to my office. It had happened in the past that when we caught ANC trained cadres, that head office people would have visited them and also questioned them. That is why the visit as such of a head office component was not strange. 30

CHAIRPERSON: Senior Superintendent, I just want to understand process again here. You have a person who may be a key witness in the killings that have taken place. Somebody turns up. You say you met Mr De Kock once before and that you are aware that he worked with head office, but somebody turns up from head office. Is he then just allowed to go and talk to your key witness, without proper notification to you or a proper discussion with you? Is that the way this thing works?

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: In the past it worked in that manner, as I explained to you. If a person was caught or arrested and head office was interested, they sent people and you did not question why that happened and all these things. The person just came to you and said he wanted to see the person and you allowed him to do so.

MS SOOKA: I just want to follow that up. In what sort of situations did that happen? That head office came in and indicated. Was it of a political nature?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes, positive, in all matters which were investigated at that time, were of a political nature. So it was therefore just political crimes which we investigated at this stage.

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MS SOOKA: (Speaker's mike not switched on) ... was in Vlakplaas, and I think we must not get quite so coy about the fact that generally in the police people knew what Vlakplaas was about. You did not find it strange that he was coming to talk to a key witness whom you had in fact found at the scene of a place of killing really.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: At that stage I really did not know and there were very few people who knew of the real activities of Vlakplaas. That is the case and I think the majority of policemen will be able to tell you this. And the fact that

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he came as a head office component to come and see them was not something strange to me really, but I suspected that Themba Khoza worked for him.

MS SOOKA: (Speaker's mike not on) ... in the same room with Mr Khoza at the time when Col De Kock spoke to him?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I don't know at all. It was not on the same floor. I occupied two floors, he saw him on the second floor. I don't even know who was there, I don't know whether there were people present or not, I don't have any idea.

MS SOOKA: He was there. Did you then immediately afterwards then again talk about getting a statement from him? Was any attempt made to get a statement from Themba Khoza? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Because I was not due to investigate the matter I did not attempt to take any statement from him. You also have to realise it was an extremely difficult day. You know, if something like that happened, then there were calls from everywhere, from head office, the Minister's office, everybody wants to know what happened. The commander did not have the time at that stage to go and enter into discussion with the suspects or witnesses. Secondly, the matter would not be investigated by us but by the riot and violence investigative unit, and that's why. 20

CHAIRPERSON: Tell me again, had you communicated with the brigadier, Brig Van Rensburg - is that right? In Pretoria, on the day about the events that took place and also that Mr Themba Khoza had been arrested? Prior to the arrival of Mr De Kock.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, Mr Chairperson, I did not speak to the brigadier myself. Let me briefly sketch to you what happened in that situation. After I had left the hostel after the shooting, I contacted my office on the radio. I 30

gave my brief version of what had happened. They then telephonically contacted the service officer at head office, security head office and then the rest followed with faxes, for example, those which are attached, to inform headquarters. I never really spoke to Brig Van Rensburg myself.

CHAIRPERSON: (Speaker's mike not on) ... Mr Themba Khoza had been arrested at (indistinct).

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Definitely, yes. 10

CHAIRPERSON: That Mr De Kock turned up at your police station.

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: That's right. It definitely would have been passed on that he had been arrested.

ADV STEENKAMP: Supt Conradie, there were also no fingerprints found on the weapons that were confiscated in the car of Themba Khoza. As a senior police officer you will be aware that the moment there are fingerprints on those weapons, it would have been a **prima facie** case against Mr De Kock, but in this instance, not only had he a very good defence that the car was not locked, but also there were no fingerprints on those weapons. Did you know anything about this? 20

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: I heard later that no fingerprints were discovered, but I have no knowledge of why and wherefore and I never saw the arms myself either.

ADV STEENKAMP: Snr Supt, you said yourself that you had changed the statement that Mr Themba Khoza would not be found guilty in court. Is that correct?

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: That's correct. 30

ADV STEENKAMP: The statement was changed in the sense that the vehicle was unlocked and that a firearm had not been

found on his body. Is that correct?

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Yes, that is correct.

ADV STEENKAMP: The purpose was for him not to be found guilty?

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Yes, that is correct.

ADV STEENKAMP: You as a senior police officer, would realise that if matters, if the arms had been sent for ballistic tests and if fingerprints had been found, Capt Van der Gryp's testimony or his false testimony would in that case not have mattered really. Is that correct? 10

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Yes, it is probably to some extent correct, because should fingerprints of the people who had been arrested on the scene been found on the arms, it still wouldn't link Themba Khoza to the crime.

ADV STEENKAMP: It would have linked some of the people to the crime.

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Yes, definitely.

ADV STEENKAMP: There were also no fingerprints found in the car. 20

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: I don't have any knowledge of this.

ADV STEENKAMP: As a senior police officer, does it happen generally that on a number of firearms and on a motorcar no fingerprints are found?

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: There are many cases which I investigated myself where no fingerprints were found - for a variety of reasons this could happen.

ADV STEENKAMP: Would you agree that if there were no positive reports from forensics, whether from ballistics or from fingerprints, or let's put it the other way round, if there had been any ballistical tests which linked the arms to some of the murders and with the fingerprints of some of 30

the people arrested there, Capt Van der Gryp's statement would that in case then have been of less importance.

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: I am not entirely please with you, please repeat the question.

ADV STEENKAMP: If indeed ballistically the arms found on the scene had been tested and found that these arms had been fired and used to kill these people and if fingerprints were also found on these arms, then Capt Van der Gryp's statement would not have been important and it would not have been necessary for his statement to be changed, to let people go free. In other words, his statement would have been of less importance.

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SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Not for himself.

ADV STEENKAMP: Should no fingerprints have been found on the firearms, but they had been ballistically linked, then how would you prove in court who had used the arms? On the other hand, the people who had handled the firearms had their fingerprints been found on the arms, it would link those people and not Themba Khoza. He was not only arrested for the guns inside the vehicle. He was never prosecuted for the weapon he had in his own possession, illegally. He was neve prosecuted for that. What happened to the hand gun we don't know. He was never prosecuted for possession of a stolen vehicle. If you look at your own security document which went to head office, it is saying that the number plate on this vehicle was a false number plate. You inspected this docket numerous times. You looked at this docket yourself. You inspected the docket. Why was this never investigated? Was it part of the cover-up, what was the story here?

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SNR SUPT CONRADIE: I would like to state this very clearly.

I did not inspect the dossier, I saw it once, with that one statement in it. The matter of the accusation regarding the possession of a firearm, I had nothing to do with that.

ADV STEENKAMP: (Speaker's mike not on) ... Brig Van Rensburg, that there was not a real good case against Themba Khoza. But over and above that, in other words you looked through the dockets. Can you explain to me why was he never prosecuted for possession of this car, or for the hand-gun which was in his possession when he was arrested. What happened to the rest of this evidence? Did you also destroy this?

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MS SOOKA: I want to remind you before you answer that you are under oath, and that inasmuch as you have applied for amnesty and you have given us a copy of the document which you are going to complement that application with, we also have an obligation towards the victims in this matter. And that, if, at some stage we discover that you have committed perjury, it will go directly to the validity of your amnesty application as well.

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SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, I realise this fully and I also realise the tremendous seriousness of this matter. I also feel that it appears as if you don't want to believe me in what I am telling you. But the docket regarding that matter in my case just concerned that one statement. The vehicle and then the firearm which had been found in his possession, the ballistic tests, I did not bear any knowledge in this regard. I will not regarding one little matter come and tell you the truth and then lie to you in other matters, because then it would serve no purpose for me to apply for amnesty.

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ADV STEENKAMP: I think that's the thing I don't understand.

Van der Gryp said, told us that he mentioned this in his statement, his original statement in the docket. Not only did he find weapons in the car, but also - and even testified this to the Commission, but also that Khoza was arrested for illegal possession of a hand-gun on his person. That was part and parcel of his original statement which you destroyed.

Now you are saying now you were never involved, you never had any knowledge about this specific weapon. 10

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: No, in my statement I am telling you that we changed it so, to say that the firearm wasn't found in his possession.

ADV STEENKAMP: Yet you tell me at the scene where the weapons were found, that piece of evidence, by supplying Themba Khoza with a perfect defence, but you also destroyed the very important piece of evidence where Van der Gryp said that I found a weapon illegally in the possession of Themba Khoza. You also changed that part of the statement. Do I understand you correctly? 20

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: That is correct. That is the way it is set out in my statement, that is so.

ADV STEENKAMP: Snr Supt, you say that you are opening your heart to us and you ask why you would open your heart in one regard and not do it in regard to others. But I wish to remind you that this whole matter had been brought to your attention by the Commission itself, and that the initiative with regard to the amnesty application indeed did not come from you yourself. But it will, nevertheless, be in your own interest to state everything to the Commission. 30

I wish to return to my previous question. If those arms had been tested ballistically and fingerprints found

on there, Mr Themba Khoza could possibly not have been linked, perhaps other people, but would it then still have been an embarrassment for the IFP?

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: Yes, it would probably be but you know what the politicians usually do, it is just a matter of I don't know what my members do. So it wouldn't have been such a great matter if Themba himself had been found there and worked for the police.

ADV STEENKAMP: You as a senior officer did your work 10
thoroughly, you wanted to prevent the IFP from being implicated in this matter.

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: The IFP by means of Themba Khoza and his link with the government, police, et cetera, not the IFP itself. The IFP and the previous government with Themba Khoza.

ADV STEENKAMP: Okay, I don't understand, should you have decided to change your statement, to save Themba Khoza or the IFP and the government an embarrassment, you wouldn't have done your work as thoroughly if you hadn't made sure 20
that no fingerprints would be found on the firearms, because you knew what the implications would be and also, if the firearms were to be tested positively by forensics, you had to know this.

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: I had nothing to do with the firearms. With the firearms and the fingerprints, I had nothing to do whatsoever and I don't know anything about it. It was also strange for me, not so much the fingerprints as the ballistic tests.

ADV STEENKAMP: I wish to sketch another scenario and I wish 30,
to state you a hypothetical case which I think is the truth. And that is, Eugene de Kock came to you and said he wanted

to see Themba Khoza. We know today that Themba Khoza was an informant of Vlakplaas. We also know that Vlakplaas provided him personally and other members of Inkatha with firearms and we also know that the firearms found in that motorcar and the bomb, came from Vlakplaas.

We also know today that because of some sworn statements that had been changed and we know that Eugene de Kock probably asked you that he wanted to know about the firearms, because they would contain not probably some of the police officers, but some of the manufacturers of these weapons' fingerprints. 10

I would like to know from you wasn't that perhaps the reason why no fingerprints would be found there, because it would link senior police officers and because you and him were both security officers. He probably explained to you the situation and that was probably the reason why Themba Khoza could not be accused or at least be found guilty, because Themba would then speak up and tell about receiving the firearms from Vlakplaas, from the security police. Is that not the reason why you allowed Themba Khoza to get off free, not just that he was - that you had heard that he was perhaps linked but that you had done so to protect another security officer who had directly provided them with these arms and in this manner the security police, and the existence of Vlakplaas as such? 20

SNR SUPT CONRADIE: No, Mr Chairperson, that is not what happened. I had nothing to do with the firearms. If I remember correctly Eugene asked me on that day where the firearms were. There is something in the back of my mind in this regard. But I myself never had anything to do with the firearms and I discussed nothing with regard to the 30

firearms. It could be correct but not regarding me. I can remember briefly that he had asked this question. You must remember this happened long ago. I cannot remember everything. But I have an idea that he asked me this and that I had said that the firearms were with the detectives. I had nothing to do with the firearms.

ADV STEENKAMP: So to an extent you agree with us, and I can tell you that we have information at our disposal, which we can, so that we can prove that these arms had actually come from Vlakplaas. I find it rather impossible that De Kock wouldn't have said anything to you about these arms actually coming from Vlakplaas and that if Themba Khoza were to be accused, he would in all probability tell where the arms had come from. That is why the statement was changed. Not simply that you, because you might have heard from Brig Van Rensburg that Khoza was an informant, but simply because it would implicate other senior officers and as you know, at that stage, as you state in your statement, Themba, according to you, was an informant for head office. So he could probably have implicated directly with this murder other officers of headquarters and that could mean that the arms would be linked to this mass murder where 42, 43 people were killed. Is that not the reason why Van der Gryp's statement was changed?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, it is not the case. I repeat again, I had nothing to do with the firearms. It was not stated to me like that. Nothing like that exists.

MR WAGNER: Mr Steenkamp, I just want some clarity. You made a very long statement to him, and it is not clear whether you agree or disagree. I am not too sure about this. I hear my client saying that he doesn't agree or he doesn't

understand, but I am not entirely sure. It was a very long statement you made to him.

ADV STEENKAMP: Let me say in principle briefly, what I want to hear from your client, is that the reason he gives for the change to Themba Khoza's statement, is that he understood Themba Khoza to have been a head office informant. The other part would be, according to my view, that should Themba Khoza have been charged and found guilty, he might have implicated and linked the people who made the arms available, who were senior security branch officers, and that is the fear, which, I believe, Eugene de Kock communicated to you. 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Eugene de Kock never said this to me and never mentioned this to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Senior Superintendent, let's just come back to this changing of the statement, Mr Van der Gryp's statement. The decision to change that statement was that your decision, was it a decision of head office and was Brig Van Rensburg involved in that, and can you just again explain to us the rationale for changing that statement. 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Brig Van Rensburg never gave me such an instruction or made such a request. I decided this on my own as I drove back to Virginia or to Vereeniging, apologies. I was thinking about the entire matter and I decided on my own to do so.

CHAIRPERSON: Having decided that senior superintendent, and I - can I just fully say, I fully accept and respect that you were commander of the security police in the Vaal area, that you yourself, and therefore a man of considerable experience, that you yourself earlier on, when we talked about these killings, that this was not the first time it 30

had happened in the Vaal. There were several incidents that had taken place, that had taken place already. The Vaal was, in fact, at that period was rife with killings, subsequent to this, of course, too. That, having actually made that decision, to change the statement and we - you know, the original statement clearly said there were other weapons in the vehicle, surely a man of your experience in the police force, something else had to be done in order to cover this question of the weapons. Perhaps you didn't give instructions, but that instruction could have gone from somewhere else, to change the - to get rid of the fingerprints, to perhaps even fabricate the story. Because, having made that decision, surely it started off a process. You can't just tamper with one side of a statement without dealing with several other aspects. As a senior police officer I am sure you would agree with that.

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, this situation, as far as I was concerned, only involved Themba Khoza. At that time I felt that if you could not link Themba Khoza to the crimes, then the rest would not be that important to me.

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CHAIRPERSON: When we talked about Eugene de Kock just now, you said that you were aware that he was part of Vlakplaas. You also had discussions at the senior level. For you to say today to us that this was only to do with Themba Khoza, I'm sorry, shows a certain naivety then. Because it can't possibly have just been to do with Themba Khoza. If we look again, just what you have told us today, never mind what is coming in the statements what other people have said, but you yourself have talked about Eugene de Kock coming there, your visit to Pretoria. Then the statement being changed.

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So it really didn't have, it wasn't only to do with Mr

Themba Khoza. Can I just ask again: was this the first time in your career that you had to actually, that you were faced with the decision like this, where you would tamper with somebody's statement, where perhaps a conviction would take place? And a clear - and you know, again, may I just remind you, earlier on, you said the political atmosphere was rife at that time, was strong, and did you realise what you were doing when you took on that decision? Or when you made that decision to change the statement, the original statement?

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: With regard to the question whether it was the first time that I had done such a thing, yes, it was the first time. On the other hand, I did not see the matter in such a broad way, perhaps I was naive in this regard, but I only saw this matter as relating to the fact that Themba Khoza should not be charged.

MS SOOKA: In police work, especially in your training, they spent an enormous amount of time advising you on what are the things that you look at at the scene, if you want to gather evidence for a conviction. Am I correct?

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is correct.

MS SOOKA: In this incident, you have the scenario of having arrived at a place where a number of people have been killed. You have a vehicle which belongs to someone you find on the scene, filled with weapons. You then take a decision as a senior commanding officer, to alter the train of events which could result in a conviction. Am I right thus far?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I did not change anything on the scene.

MS SOOKA: You in effect, you take a decision to change the chain of events. You force a policeman to change his statement. The effect of that would be to effect a final

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conviction. Yes or no?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes.

MS SOOKA: But more than, as a senior policeman, you know what the effect of finding weapons is at the scene of the kind that you found that morning.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is correct.

MS SOOKA: A man who comes from head office, someone who in your mind, even at the back of your mind, at the time policemen were aware of what Eugene de Kock was about at Vlakplaas, and you cannot pretend that you could not have known. He comes to you, he wants to talk to someone who is a key figure in this whole event. You agreed to let him see the person. Furthermore, he asks you a question about the weapon. 10

MR WAGNER: Mr Chairperson, can I have clarity on this question. Is it put to my client that he was aware what was going on at Vlakplaas, even by implication? Because if that is the question, if that is the insinuation, I don't think it is fair. For the rest the question is fair. 20

MS SOOKA: Right, you can disregard that. Someone comes from head office, he asks to talk to a key witness, someone who could possibly be convicted in this whole affair. He asks you a second question about the weapon. There are only two scenarios here. One, the one that you put out and the other, the implication that senior police officers are involved. I want to put to you this scenario, that it was your job to take care of the statement which would link these officers and Themba Khoza and that it was Eugene de Kock's job to take care of the weapons. And that's the real reason you had to take care of the statement. 30

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, no one gave me the

instruction to change the statement. With regard to Eugene's involvement with the arms, I am entirely unaware of anything and I cannot comment on it.

ADV STEENKAMP: For clarity's sake. If you inspected the docket, immediately the junior prosecutor can tell you immediately there was a big problem in it. First of all, the weapons that were received on the scene of the incident, their numbers were on the C section of the dockets, their numbers are written down there. Now the numbers of the weapons that were sent to ballistics under Section 2124 were different number. In other words, the weapons that were received on the scene and the weapons that were sent to ballistics, were totally different numbers. You didn't pick it up. That is the first thing.

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Secondly, the car that was seized at the scene was never booked into the SAP13. I will tell you why: because you realised it was not only a stolen weapon, it was a security force car. Not only that, you knew what was the effect of that.

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Here was a man arrested with a security force vehicle. You knew what the ripple effect would have been of this. Now I would like to agree with the Commissioner there. The basic idea was not to cover Themba Khoza, it was to force him to shut up and to stop any further investigation, would definitely would lead to anarchy. And very senior police officers, from Vlakplaas and even from head office being involved and orchestrating not only, as you put it yourself, not only Themba Khoza, but Inkatha Freedom Party into their role in the violence in the Vaal. Isn't this what happened at the scene?

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we speak of a docket which was inspected. What happens is, you go through the docket from A to Z. I did not inspect the docket in that way. I was involved in the single statement in the docket concerning Themba Khoza which linked him to the event. I don't know what else was in the docket. I do not know the differences with regard to the weapon numbers. I think there is some misunderstanding there. I looked only at the single statement which we had to change, that it was right. Because then I felt that we could get Themba Khoza out of this entire event. 10

ADV STEENKAMP: (Speaker's mike not on). ... security branch. He actually got all his weapons from the security police, specifically Vlakplaas. They give him a lot of weapons, right? Now I think what happened here is that you had decided by maybe instructions from Eugene de Kock, to do a favour for Themba Khoza. In that way you will keep his loyalty and you can still use him in the kind of work he was doing for Vlakplaas. For starters, specifically in the Vaal. You were the chief security officer in the Vaal. That is why Eugene de Kock came to you. You were also a very experienced investigator. You knew exactly what was happening. I am talking about the docket. It is not correct that only one statement was in the docket. Because as you might well know, the C section is the back of the docket. All the stuff that were seized on the scene is immediately written down in that part. So there is no way you couldn't have seen that, you must have seen that. 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I did not - how shall I state it ... I was not concerned with anything in that regard. What could I do about firearms' numbers which had been discovered and changed. In other words if I had to deal with all of this, 30

I had to speak to all the policemen concerned, regarding the dossier and tell them to make these changes. So that couldn't happen. It isn't so. But at that stage you must also remember, at that stage I didn't know about Eugene de Kock what I know now, and that is a fact.

ADV STEENKAMP: In other words you were prepared to take the risk not to speak to all the officers concerned in the matter. You were prepared to take the risk that there could be other testimony that would link Themba Khoza with the crime instead of speaking to all the officers involved in the matter, regarding for example, fingerprints, forensics and other matters. Is that what you are telling us? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I was not prepared to speak to everybody in this regard. It is absurd. If somebody comes and it becomes knowledge, public knowledge, I could only speak to Van der Gryp and not to anybody else.

ADV STEENKAMP: I wish to read a statement to you and you must tell me if you agree with it.

"(Speaker's mike not on). 20

... only on my testimony. If there were fingerprints on the firearms, then my testimony in the court case, whatever I presented would have not been the main evidence. Someone would have to explain why his fingerprints were on the firearms."

Is that right or wrong, would you agree with that statement?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Could you please tell us who is speaking there? 30

ADV STEENKAMP: It is Capt Van der Gryp who is making the statement.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Would you please read it to me, perhaps this statement is made by him in the same way that he makes a statement I can make a statement.

ADV STEENKAMP: This is not indicated in paragraphs, but it is at the bottom of page 25 of the transcript of our Section 29 questioning of Capt Van der Gryp, and he states as follows in English:

"If there were fingerprints on the firearms then my testimony in the court case, whatever I presented would not have been the main evidence. Someone would have to explain why his fingerprints were on the firearms."

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Would you agree with this statement, would somebody have had to explain whose fingerprints they were?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: If fingerprints had been discovered, and the fingerprints were not Themba's fingerprints then it wouldn't affect him. So the fingerprints would have had to be Themba's.

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ADV STEENKAMP: Did you know that it could perhaps be Themba Khoza's fingerprints?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, I did not know that.

ADV STEENKAMP: Did you try and establish whether Themba Khoza's fingerprints were on the arms?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, I never did this.

ADV STEENKAMP: Don't you think it was a great neglect from your side because despite all attempts to protect him, this could have caused an embarrassment to you?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: It wouldn't have been a further embarrassment to me, because I did what I could do, which I felt at that stage I could do and to go and fiddle with it

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more would have been an embarrassment.

ADV STEENKAMP: So you were prepared to go that far, but not take another step to ensure that Themba Khoza's fingerprints were not found on the firearms? You were prepared to take that risk? Is that correct?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes, I suppose it is correct.

ADV STEENKAMP: You see the secondary situation is that there was a possibility that some of the Vlakplaas commanders' fingerprints were on the firearms, the moving parts were also changed by Vlakplaas' people in order to ensure that these firearms would not be linked to that event, because that would mean that the Vlakplaas people were directly involved with that mass murder, and that is my hypothesis and my basic statement to you. I believe that you knew about this and it was not just a matter of getting Themba Khoza off free, but that he would keep his mouth and not give evidence to the rest, which would lead to a link with these people, with the murder of 43 people. That's why the fingerprints are so important.

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I understand fully what you are asking, but I was not aware at that stage that the arms came from Vlakplaas and I did not know anything about any involvement of anybody else except Themba Khoza and his people.

ADV STEENKAMP: Were you perhaps aware - let's assume that you are correct in what you say. Were you aware that it could be your responsibility to change the statement and that Vlakplaas, Eugene de Kock or Willie Nortje would see to it that the firearms would not link Themba Khoza or anybody else to be found guilty? Did you understand that the statement alone would be your responsibility and that the arms would be taken care of by them?

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, this is not the case, as I explained before.

MS SOOKA: Wasn't it very strange that a man who is supposed to be a police informer was driving around in a vehicle belonging to the security branch?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I think it is internationally acceptable that for certain police informants the State does provide vehicles.

MS SOOKA: Registered in the name of the security branch? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot remember in whose name it was registered, as our first report stated there, it was a false number plate.

ADV STEENKAMP: Your attorney is also laughing, because if people ...

MS SOOKA: The last thing you want is the link between the police and the informer, and yet you are saying that it is customary all over the world.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: It is customary for the police to provide such a person with a vehicle, but not in the police's name, registered in their name. I mean that is totally wrong. 20

ADV STEENKAMP: But I find it strange that this is the case.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: If that is so, then I also find it very strange and it would be very unprofessional.

ADV STEENKAMP: But you should have known that, because this is the car that was found on the scene. According to this report which we have here, the number plate was false.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is entirely correct.

ADV STEENKAMP: This was - in the name of a person called Balletjies Bellingham, who at that stage was one of the commanders of Vlakplaas. This vehicle was even used after 30

this incident, still by Inkatha members, specific members. It was never booked in the SAP13, never. This is exactly what happened. And even the petrol was supplied by the security branch police, and this is what Themba Khoza was given this kind of treatment, got this kind of treatment. To make sure that he is not going to tell the whole world what was actually the whole story about head office and Eugene de Kock. That is why Eugene de Kock asked you about the arms. If possible, can you tell us what did Eugene de Kock ask you about the weapons? Seeing we are on the subject now. 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I just wish to state clearly that at that stage I did not know anything about the vehicle. The second thing, all that I can remember that Eugene asked was where the firearms were and I told him that it had been confiscated by the detective branch and that the arms were with him.

MS SOOKA: (Speaker's mike not on) ... drive the car off or was that returned by the police? 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I honestly don't know what happened to the vehicle.

MS SOOKA: It is difficult to believe you on this incident, because you find a car filled with weapons. The car has false number plates and in fact, it is discovered later that it is registered in the name of the security branch. In fact, registered to Vlakplaas. It should be taken in and it should be registered and according to a specific method and mechanism. Now you don't know what actually happened to the motor vehicle. 30

MR WAGNER: Sorry, if I may come in here. Maybe you missed out something before you joined us. My client testified

specifically that he was not the investigating officer of this ...

MS SOOKA: He was the commanding officer of this area.

MR WAGNER: Sorry, but he testified to this effect. He said specifically he was not the investigating officer. His unit was not the investigating unit. So if you can just keep that in mind. He testified to this effect before you joined us. So perhaps that just take in mind.

MS SOOKA: Mr Wagner, there are three aspects to this matter 10
which your client would have knowledge of. One, the question of the statement. Two, the question of the weapons. Three, the question of the motor vehicle. At the time he arrives at the scene he is fully apprised of whatever is going on. He takes a conscious decision later on in the day to change a statement which would have the effect of implicating someone and convicting him. The motor vehicle ostensibly which belongs to this gentleman is later found to have false number plates. It also carries weapons which could possibly have been involved in this massacre. I am now 20
asking your client if he knew what finally happened to that, and you say that he could not have known.

MR WAGNER: Sorry, maybe I could have misunderstood. But you implicated that my client was lying when he said that he doesn't know about these things. Only on that point I raised the issue by saying that just will you please keep in mind that he testified earlier that he was not the investigating officer.

MS SOOKA: No, we know, we fully understand that he was not the investigating officer. But he involved himself, the 30
moment he became involved in changing the statement. Now I am asking, here is another piece of evidence, the motor

vehicle. Did he know whether Themba Khoza was allowed to drive off with the motor vehicle. Or was it retained by the police, by the investigating officer in custody.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: As far as I can remember, the vehicle on that particular day was taken to Sebokeng police station. After I had returned from Mr Mandela's visit the first time where we had left him in the area, the vehicle was still at Sebokeng police station. I don't know what happened to it after that, whether it was handed in or not handed in. It was no interest of mine because I did not investigate the matter.

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MS SOOKA: I would like to interrupt you there. You say you were not concerned with this, but nevertheless, you were so interested that you changed the statement.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Could I say that I did not have an interest in the matter because I myself and my people did not investigate. If they were, I would have known what was going on, but you must remember it was a totally different department. The same with the firearms.

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MS STEENKAMP: There are two things concerning the car which bother me. Firstly, you said, as Commissioner Sooka said, you had seen the car. If you looked at the docket you would have seen that the blue vehicle had not been booked into the docket. Secondly, Van der Gryp in his original statement mentioned the registration of this car, which you had taken out. Do you understand what I am saying here? He gave the registration number, Van der Gryp, but he said that you took out that detail regarding the vehicle. You had rewritten his statement, as you yourself had testified. And why would you do this if you hadn't known that the vehicle was a security branch vehicle?

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I am not denying that I took out the vehicle registration number. It could be, but at the stage that the vehicle was discovered I didn't know it, but afterwards I found out that it was a security branch vehicle.

ADV STEENKAMP: You must remember there was a time interval of a few days. But when you had the opportunity to tell us you didn't know, you didn't tell us that the vehicle had been a security branch vehicle. That is the first time you are saying to us now that you knew it was a security branch vehicle. Why are you now, only now telling the Commission about this, why must we tell you what had happened? Why must we tell, why are you not saying to us that you knew that it was a security branch vehicle? Because if it was a regulation 80 vehicle, then you knew it was a head office vehicle and then it would have definitely implied all the officers and Eugene de Kock in this mass murder. 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Could you just give me a brief chance?

CHAIRPERSON: Senior Superintendent, do you want a break? No? 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: (Speaker's mike not on).

CHAIRPERSON: Fine then.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Commissioner, I am sorry, I thought that the facts to the effect that I later found out that it was a security ... (END OF TAPE 2 - SIDE B).

ADV STEENKAMP: ...this, because there are a few other matters which we want to take up with you which are not contained in the statement. Are there any other things? I would like to give you, in all fairness, the opportunity whether there are any other things which you omitted, think about the firearms. If there is anything not contained in 30

this statement, because as it seems to me this statement of yours is also just a cover-up because you are omitting essential matters which could actually hamper this investigation into this mass murder.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Commissioner, I am not trying to cover up anything. If there is anything which you are aware of, which somebody had told you, which I am trying to cover up, please ask me that and I will tell you whether it is so or not. But I am not trying to cover up anything. I really don't have anything more to tell you. But if you have anything else, please ask me regarding this.

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ADV STEENKAMP: Let us then talk about the firearms again. I just wish to make sure that I understand correctly. You say you never knew anything about these arms, nothing. You were not involved with the firearms at all, you never saw them, you never checked the numbers, you never compared the ballistic tests, you never checked the SAP13, you never had anything to do with these firearms. Is that what you are saying?

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes, that is so.

ADV STEENKAMP: Perhaps we should go the same route as the vehicle. You see, the firearm numbers Van der Gryp also gave you in his original statement. You also took those out as was the case with the detail regarding the vehicle.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: As far as the numbers of firearms are concerned in a statement, I never took out anything.

ADV STEENKAMP: You see, if we just have to look outside this, it seems highly improbable. You see, we know today that Vlakplaas, by means of Willie Nortje, removed the moving parts of these firearms to see that they could not be linked. The only scene with which they could be linked

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would be the mass murder at Sebokeng where 43 people were killed and these firearms were found in Themba Khoza's possession.

In other words, we should be able to prove this, the State would be able to prove that these people could be held responsible for this massacre, and it wasn't just an attack, it was a murder. The firearms came from them. Their informant was caught on the scene. There is a senior officer of the police who saw that he got off free. The firearms are changed. So that they would not be ballistically linked and that was therefore all for one reason, not to seek Themba Khoza get off free, but it was to see to it that in that matter be covered-up and not linked to head office. It would see to it that security branch officers would not be accused of 43 murders. That is in essence what it is all about.

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot reply in a simple yes or no to this statement as well as covering up matters regarding police officers, security branch police officers. As far as I am concerned, it was concerning the statement, that I changed statements regarding firearms in the statement. That cannot be the case. It is totally impossible for me. I did not do it.

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I would like then to obtain the statements and let's get the firearms as well. Let Van der Gryp then come and tell me whether I changed the numbers. But on the other hand, I think we should also then get Willie Nortje here, so that he can tell who gave him the instruction to change the firearms, who gave him the firearms. Was I involved? He must tell.

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ADV STEENKAMP: You were involved. You saw to it that

Themba Khoza was not found guilty of possession of the firearms, the motorcar, the firearm in his possession. You saw to it that he was found not guilty of the possession of these firearms. You did that of your own accord. You said that on four occasions. That is what it is all about today. Because the possession, you know, the law says that possession of one AK-47 would lead to five years imprisonment, and it would have deadly consequences for the security police. You didn't cover up anything else. You just saw to it that Themba Khoza was not found guilty of possession of firearms. That's why it was so important, Superintendent Conradie. 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: What is important for me is that I was not involved in tampering with the arms. I feel that if it is true that someone claims that I was involved in tampering with the arms, that it must be said here, because I was not involved in such tampering.

MS SOOKA: (Speaker's mike not on) ... with a lot of inconsistencies, and I think you must appreciate that for us this is an opportunity to try and get to the bottom of the matter. Firstly, you present us today with another, with a document which is very, in fact it adds on a lot to your amnesty application and the explanation of course that you have given, is that of course at that time you were in a hurry to put the amnesty application in timeously. So this is meant to be a more fuller explanation. 20

In the proceedings today you in fact didn't mention anything about the motor vehicle and the fact that you knew it belonged to the security branch. Irrespective of at what stage you discovered that. That is the first thing. 30

The second thing is, it is by accident that you admit

that Eugene de Kock in fact discussed the question of the weapons with you. So given the fact that the items that you alter in the statement relate to dropping the serial numbers of the weapons found at the scene, the question of Themba Khoza, the question of them motor vehicle is left out of the affidavit.

I think you must expect us to find it very hard to believe that you didn't know more than you are actually admitting to here. You were a senior officer in the security branch. You knew, you were part of what was going on in the country at that time. You are dealing with a man, whom to all intents and purposes, you knew was involved in the ongoing violence in that area. You find that you are visited by a man who comes from head office, who is reputed also to be involved. You might well not have known before that that he was involved. But the alarm bells should have been jangling in your head.

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You see, you make it very difficult for us to believe that you are telling the truth and that you are giving us the total picture here. I think we have to in all honesty say, that there are too many inconsistencies that are being placed before us.

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Giving the fact also, that you have lied on a previous occasion at an inquest court. I think we want to help you, but we also need to get to the bottom of what is happening here. I think you should take a moment to reflect on whether there is more you are going to give us than what is sitting here.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagner, perhaps this would be an appropriate time or would you ...

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MR WAGNER: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. Although I would just

like to add one or to ask one question. I mean, if one draws up a statement, it can always be said you could have said more and more. I think that is why my client said well, please ask me what you are aiming at. Because to some extent then, I am also responsible as his legal advisor, because I assisted him in the drafting of these statements. So I would like to repeat what my client asked, and that is, if you have something specific, please put it to us. Because if there is - we approached the issue the way we saw it fit, we approached the amnesty application the way we saw it fit. If there is some, if you have some information somewhere which you think is important, and it is not in our papers, it may be a mistake on my part or not, but I would please repeat what my client asked, is that put it to us then, if you say - because you mention the word "inconsistent". Now I don't understand the word inconsistent to mean what my client has been doing, but if you mean that he omitted certain things, which to you is important, and maybe we weren't aware of that, put it to him and let him respond to that. That's all I would ask, because we did our best.

MS SOOKA: I think we have, but I think in all fairness, given the process and the enormous advantage it is to your client, the opportunities being offered him, to come clean with all he knows. I think this is how we must understand the whole question of amnesty, although this process belongs to the Human Rights Violations Committee. We expect your client to tell us everything that he knows, not only what he thinks is important for us to know. I think forget this idea of question and drag it from him, because then it looks like he is not telling the truth completely.

MR WAGNER: Thank you. All that I can add to that,

Mr Chairman, is that once again in fairness, I think you have the benefit of many other statements, of many other people. I assume you have heard the evidence of a lot of other people. You have had access to records and things. So you approach the matter from a certain point of things in mind. My client here is an individual, he approached me. He said to me let's tackle this problem. That is the only point I am making. But I would, I can't take it any further than saying that please ask my client, if there is any further important things that you know or that you have, that you think he is not open with you, just put it to him and hear his response. 10

MS SOOKA: I think I would like your client to reflect on this. There are two scenarios in this matter. The one is as he is alleging that he did, he took whatever action he did in order to prevent an informer from being prosecuted and convicted. That is the version that he is putting before us as to why he asked someone to alter a statement.

We have put a second scenario to him; that he knew that this was a bigger, that that was bigger than Themba Khoza. And that in fact, it was to prevent any discovery of the involvement of Vlakplaas in this. Now whatever he says is going to be on record. I want him to reflect and to give him a final opportunity to indicate which of those scenarios and suppositions he wants to support. 20

MR LEWIN: Maybe I can ask an additional question. Mr Conradie, how would you feel today about this entire situation that happened five years, six years ago. Because you said that at the time, I think the words you used, you said it would be a serious - you felt you needed to act in the way that you did, you felt it would be a serious 30

embarrassment, both for the Government and for the IFP. But how do you feel today, firstly, or let me ask that first.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I am extremely sorry about having done what I did. I feel that I acted unprofessionally, completely unprofessionally. In fact I feel like a sheep. (Ek voel soos 'n skaap).

MR LEWIN: Then from our point of view, what we are involved in, is an attempt on behalf of everybody, the Government, the new Government or everybody to try and put in perspective what had happened. Not only to find out what happened, but actually to put it in perspective. So the assistance that we need now, is, for instance, to say right, clearly there was a Third Force, clearly it was planned, it was organised. What we need actually to find out, is how it was organised. So the fact that Eugene de Kock suddenly arrived at that stage, at that time, it might not have been possible then to explain it or to even need to explain it. But today, we actually, because of what we all know now, we need assistance in being shown where we should look, where further we should look. How we can start tying up all these scattered fragments of information, which are not yet tied up. Maybe you can help us in that. 10 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Commissioner, I am entirely honest when I say that at that time I did not know. It was the first scenario which the Commissioner has sketched with regard to the protection of Themba Khoza. When travelling with the media over the past few years, and what was said in courts, what was said before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, then one sees the entire matter in a totally different perspective than one did at that time. At that time I was not aware of what was going on. If, from today, 30

I look back at what happened, at the changing of the arms, the removals of the mechanism, which we have heard of, then it only can refer back to Vlakplaas. Certainly, that is how I see that today. But I did not personally bear knowledge of this at that time.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagner and Snr Supt, it has been a long morning already. It is probably trying for your client as well. I think we should break for half-an-hour at this stage. There is a place that you can have lunch downstairs, if you want to, of course, and then proceed. I hope we won't go on for much longer after we come back.

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MR WAGNER: Thank you, Sir.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Sir. Sir, we will adjourn until quarter to one?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Sir.

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ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: With the provision of this document to us this morning, there is a possibility that the senior superintendent might be recalled after we have studied this document. So if we can proceed on that note. I think Mr Van Rensburg, are you going to continue?

MR VAN RENSBURG: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairperson. The first question I would like to ask is, we referred to the special investigation team which existed in the Vaal Triangle area, who investigated this kind of case. After my discussions with a variety of policemen there, the distinction between this special investigation team and normal murder and robbery police is that they investigated political cases.

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Now my question is, that already on the 4th Capt Jacobs was appointed as the investigating officer in this case. Capt Van der Gryp stated that he found it strange because they were the investigating team and they expected that somebody from their team would be appointed. Why was Capt Jacobs already on that day appointed as the investigating officer?

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Mr Chairperson, I was not part of that decision. I don't know why that decision was taken. I personally could think that they took Maj Jacobs to exercise overall co-ordination of this case, because he was a senior and experienced officer. That's the only reason I can think of.

MR VAN RENSBURG: There were various such mass murders in the Vaal Triangle area. Why this specific case? Why was he appointed, Capt Jacobs.

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SUPT INSP CONRADIE: If I have to think back briefly, it is not only in this case, there was another case where there

was a mass murder in area 7 in Sebokeng, where a large number of people were shot, and I know that specifically there a large number of detectives were called in there and they investigated under murder and robbery. I don't know who the investigating officer was, but because I know about this, because my component gave information about where the firearms were that had been used.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Who would have given the instruction that Capt Jacobs was the investigating officer, if this was not an automatic decision, who would have given the instruction to this effect? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Col Van Niekerk was the detective, district detective officer at that stage.

MR VAN RENSBURG: So he would have taken the decision.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That's correct.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Would he have taken such a decision against the normal procedure, how would he have gone about this, would he have contacted Lieut Coetzer?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, as far as I am concerned, in a scenario like this, everybody is present there, and there the district detective officer who is in command of everybody, would make that decision that this or that person would do the investigation. 20

MR VAN RENSBURG: Okay, I would like to continue. You say that you only amended Capt Van der Gryp's statement. In his first statement to us, Capt Van der Gryp, his first one that we have in our possession, said that Themba Khoza's statements were also written for him. Do you know who would have done that? 30

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Do you mean that a statement of Themba Khoza had also been written before him?

MR VAN RENSBURG: Yes, in other words, a member of the police force wrote Themba Khoza's statement regarding the incident for him, it wasn't his own statement.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I don't know anything about this.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Capt Van der Gryp says that he suspected you of doing this and he gained information in this regard on the same day that you as I understand, tore up the statement and spoke to him about it.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I never wrote a statement of Themba Khoza's. 10

MR VAN RENSBURG: Do you have knowledge of anybody who would have done this?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: It is normal procedure that somebody would have taken a warning statement from him.

MR VAN RENSBURG: In your opinion who would have done that?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I couldn't tell, it could be anybody who had been instructed to do so.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Okay. I would like to refer you back to day 2 of these events, the 5th of September, in other words. 20
In his section 29 hearing, Capt Van der Gryp said, if I can just find the relevant portion, there is so much documentation ...

MS SOOKA: Before you move away from that. In Mr Jacobs' application he says "I left the statement with Maj Conradie. At a later stage I received back the typed statement."

So who in fact received that statement?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: What happened there was that I kept Van der Gryp's statement. I made changes and had it typed up and then spoke to Van der Gryp about this. He signed it and I handed it back to Jacobs. 30

MR VAN RENSBURG: Okay. Van der Gryp says in his statement, AMNESTY HEARING

TRC/GAUTENG

he refers to the next day after the incident. The rest is in English. You said it was only a few days. Are you dead certain that it was a few days? If he refers to the next day it must have been the 5th. Are you absolutely certain that it wasn't the 5th of September? And if it wasn't, more or less, can you remember whether it was the 5th, the 6th the 7th, whenever?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: In which context did I call him in and what did I discuss with him the next day? 10

MR VAN RENSBURG: I will read to you a passage:

"I went to the security branch offices in Vereeniging. It was only myself and Maj Conradie. Maj Conradie then told me that my statement was wrong. It was retyped. It was then retyped. My original handwritten statement was removed, it was given to me. It was torn in pieces and thrown into a dustbin and I was given a new statement." 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: It couldn't have been the next day, it should have been a few days later.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Is there anything specifically why you state this, any specific reason why you say it couldn't have been the next day?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Because it is only after the event, a day or more, that I had been to head office where I spoke to Brig Van Rensburg, so it couldn't have been that next day, because there should have been a certain lapse of time before I had drafted the statement. It is impossible to have been such a short period. 30

MR VAN RENSBURG: May I just ask you, how did you report to

head office in this regard, the involvement of Themba Khoza. How did you discuss this in your information notes at your GIS or GOS meetings and how did you report in this regard to head office, and do you still have any copies of that document?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I think all the reports that went up are not available. We looked around a lot for statements, but the report in this regard on that particular day, are the reports which aren't contained here. Are there any of the reports of yours attached here which deal with Themba Khoza's involvement on that day, which you could refer me to? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I am not sure, but I don't think there is reference to particular names in these reports. Possibly in paragraph 8 of one of these reports, it would be C something 3, page 3.

MR VAN RENSBURG: It is paragraph 8. I notice in this report of yours to head office, when you refer to paragraph 8 of the JC3 document attached, the entire matter of the prosecution of Themba Khoza and that which was found on the scene is left out of the report, is that correct, or am I mistaken? 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: At this point you must remember that the prosecution wasn't a matter yet, it had to do with the detention in terms of the unrest regulations that was at that moment the matter.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is true, but your reports refers to the events at Sebokeng on the 4th of the 9th, of that particular year, and there is detail with regard to vehicles involved. However, when it comes to Themba Khoza, there is not even mention made of his arrest. That is simply not 30

included in this report. Even though while you are saying that he was a police informant, why do you not report to the police that one of the informants have been arrested?

MR WAGNER: Mr Steenkamp, can I just ask you, don't you want to ask my client if he drafted these reports.

ADV STEENKAMP: I think he said that he did draft this report. Did you draft this report?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, I did not draft this report. This is information that was passed on. Other people then drafted the report. You will notice the handwritten part. When someone brought me the report, I read it and then added something in my own handwriting. What happens with a report like this, you have to check with all the various people who might be able to give you the true story. 10

MR VAN RENSBURG: So what you are saying is, that you did see this report before it was passed on to head office.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes, I did see it.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Were you happy with the contents?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: At that time, yes. 20

MR VAN RENSBURG: At that time, however, Themba Khoza was already arrested.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is correct. I am trying to check. I think we did mention in the report that Themba Khoza and certain other people were arrested. If I could quickly check through it. (PAUSE - SUPT INSP CONRADIE LOOKING THROUGH REPORT).

I write there that all of these people were arrested.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Don't you think it might have been important at that time to say to head office listen folks, in my area Themba Khoza has been arrested, he is a head office informant, he is driving a vehicle that belongs to 30

head office. Did you not think that this information should be passed on to Brig Van Rensburg, or didn't you think it was necessary?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, at that time I did not yet know that he was an informant.

MR VAN RENSBURG: You did however, know that Themba Khoza was arrested, but you don't mention him in particular.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I think one can rather deduce from the report where there is mention made of Themba Khoza and all the others there been arrested. 10

MR VAN RENSBURG: Can I ask you, on the scene as you said in the report, hand-grenades, M26 hand-grenades were found. We don't know that these were black hand-grenades. Can you remember that these were black hand-grenades?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I did not see the hand-grenades. It was brought to my attention that these were black hand-grenades.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Did Capt Van der Gryp not mention anything with regard to these black hand-grenades to you? What did they report to you, who reported to you with regard to these hand-grenades? 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: When I returned to the Sebokeng police station, remember that there is a large number of people involved here. You are talking to people, you ask them what they found, what they did. I cannot remember who exactly I spoke to at the Sebokeng police station. It is impossible to remember, but I was told that black hand-grenades had been found.

MR VAN RENSBURG: You see these hand-grenades found on that same day, were never passed on to forensic labs. There was never any record of their existence, apart from statements by people who were on the scene. Why I am asking you this, 30

is that it refers again to the importance of Eugene de Kock's visit. We know that these hand-grenades were in fact manufactured and made available by Vlakplaas.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I must tell you that the normal procedure when hand-grenades are found, was that the explosives experts would take these and they would then destroy them after they have been photographed. (END OF TAPE 3 - SIDE A) ...

MR VAN RENSBURG: ... hand-grenades, and surely it must have 10
come from you this instruction. The explosives expert on the scene was in fact under your command. He was also from security.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is correct. There was never a practice that there had to be an instruction for such destruction with regards to hand-grenades. The explosives expert would act on his own on the scene of a crime.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Say for instance there is a scene and the explosives expert took over the scene, if it was, say for instance a bombing scene, and if explosives were found, he 20
would decide whether it has to be destroyed or not. It was not subject to a command from higher up. This very same expert also visited Themba Khoza in the cells. The bomb found in Themba Khoza's vehicle. Now it is strange that the very person who works particularly in your section, an explosives expert, who took apart this particular bomb, that he also visits Themba Khoza. All we know that there seems to have been a problem with the arms. Why would this explosives expert have visited Themba Khoza? He has got nothing to do with Themba Khoza. He is working with the 30
bomb. Didn't you know that he visited Themba Khoza?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot at this stage whether I knew

or not, but it would not have been strange for me, particularly in view of the fact that he was involved with the detonation of the bomb. Were I an explosives expert I would go and talk to him about this bomb. After all, he should have known, particularly if it was a sophisticated thing how it was manufactured, who might have manufactured it, something like that. It would not be strange for me. Remember, however, that at that particular time we are looking at the entire matter from a different perspective 10 from what we did at that time. Many questions may now appear strange to one which at that time seemed perfectly normal.

MR VAN RENSBURG: It just seems strange to me that a security explosives expert under your command, goes and talks to Themba Khoza, while he has got nothing to do with Themba Khoza. Why would this person have gone to speak to Themba Khoza about this bomb, while Themba Khoza was not even charged with regard to the bomb. Even before him being taken to court the bomb had already been dismantled, but I 20 must say to you that it looks, it appears to me that the notion of getting Themba Khoza free, existed already on that scene. The decision was made on the scene that Themba Khoza could not be charged. Rather than several days later.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, I really cannot comment on that, not as far as I am concerned. I doubt whether that explosives expert would have had anything to do with that sort of thing.

MR VAN RENSBURG: There are various aspects regarding the actual scene which there seem to be discrepancies because 30 there was no test done for detonation residue on any of these people. Was that a strange thing for you as a senior

officer?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Col Van Niekerk who is the head of the detective branch, who was my senior at any rate, was in command of this whole scene, and if it wasn't done I cannot report on this and accept responsibility for this. I mean, we are looking at 137, 139 people, people who had to be processed on that same day by - and who had to be kept in custody on the safety regulations. But I can't give you an answer.

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MR VAN RENSBURG: Why did such a junior officer like Pit Lange, why was he made the investigating officer?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot reply to this, but I can tell you that I don't know which Pit you are talking about. There are two of them.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Sydney Pitt.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: But if you look at Judge Strafford's findings regarding the GO as well, you will see that they were very competent people. It is not strange to me that warrant officers would do this kind of investigation. They were very competent.

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MR VAN RENSBURG: That morning early, on the day of the event, you said you were there quite early, some of the people who saw you there, said that they had been there on the scene already at quarter to eight, whereas you say you arrived at eight. Could you explain this?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: As far as I have it, I made my original notes, I was on the scene just before eight, because I was at the office, and there heard about the event and then went out.

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MR VAN RENSBURG: How did you hear about this, the incident and who told you?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I don't know if it was the district commissioner himself, Col Fourie who phoned or whether he sent a message, but I know that, let us say from the side of the district commissioner, I had been informed and he had said that he was on his way there and that he wanted me there. I know that is the way he usually worked, if there was anything serious, he wanted his other officers there as well.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Was it general practice for the district commissioner to go to such scenes? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes, in some of these big cases that was the case. But in this particular case it had also been said, apparently, I hadn't heard it myself, that the people wanted him there to negotiate with them.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Didn't you find it strange at all that he and another senior officer were there before the investigating team?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I have told you before I don't know when the investigating team arrived there. 20

MR VAN RENSBURG: How many men were there?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: All that I know is Coetzer. Perhaps we should mention here, you know, you can say that somebody was there before somebody else. It is a period in the morning when people are on their way to work. It is very easy that somebody might be on his way to work, one person hears about it and another one does so as well, but the one is further away from the scene than the other and this aspect is really not something that could make such a big difference.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Did you ever liaise with Themba Khoza's legal representative? 30

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Themba's legal representatives were

there, but I didn't liaise with them.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Do you know whether Capt Jacobs ever had discussions with them?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, I don't have any idea.

MS SOOKA: In your first amnesty, in your amnesty application you talk about the fact that you spoke, you were summonsed by Brig Van Rensburg to Pretoria. And in terms of that conversation you discovered that Themba Khoza was an informer. But you go on further to say that it was quite clear to you that he was important and that he was bringing information as regards Thirds Force activities and in connection with the IFP. Can you tell us what you learnt exactly from that conversation? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: It is very difficult to go back now and to tell you exactly what the conversation had been. But as the discussion progressed the brigadier asked me what had happened, what the circumstances were, what the circumstances were against Themba Khoza, and that he had mentioned to me that he was an informant of Vlakplaas. He collected information, particularly in the Vaal Triangle. 20

MS SOOKA: What knowledge did you have of Third Force activities in the Vaal before this?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: To be quite honest, I never believed that there was a Third Force. I regarded it as, well, let's say stories. I just never believed it.

MS SOOKA: Is this before you met with Brig Van Rensburg or did this belief persist afterwards as well?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Also afterwards until a lot more regarding this came out in the newspapers and it became much clearer to me, but at that stage I didn't believe it. 30

MS SOOKA: Later on you go on to say that "derhalwe het ek

besluit ..." "... for this reason I decided that it would be in the interests of the previous government and the IFP to change the statement like this so that it would not be to the disadvantage of Themba Khoza".

Where would you have gained the knowledge that this was not in the interests of the present government at the time? What facts led you to believe that?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Because I thought that if it came out in the media everywhere, it would be carried in such a way that the previous government and Inkatha were responsible for the violence. 10

MS SOOKA: What was your understanding of their involvement in that incident?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I have already mentioned earlier that I had thought that Themba, who was an informant, that his situation had got out of control, that he acted on his own and that is what I had thought, that the situation had become uncontrollable.

MS SOOKA: What has that got to do, apart from the fact that he was an informer, why would it be in the interests of the present government, unless you knew at the time you made the decision that it was a bigger operation than simply Themba Khoza? If you look at the language that you use here, it is a little different from what you have said. 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I don't understand the question all that clearly. Could you just please repeat it.

MS SOOKA: I am looking at the language that you are using. You see, I have asked you a series of questions related to your conversation with the brigadier, and you have said to me that you did not believe that there was a Third Force. I asked you whether that view persisted, even after you had 30

the conversation with the brigadier, and you said yes, until very much later on. But in the application your exact wording is "ek het ook bepaal dat hy 'n beriggewer is wat inligting ...". I also determined that he is an informant or was an informant who had to gather information regarding the so-called Third Force activities.

Then later on in the paragraph, in the next paragraph you say "I decided that it was in the interests of the previous government and the IFP to change the statement in this regard." 10

Now all along (indistinct - speaking simultaneously) it is because he was an informer in the paid employ of the State and that was your interest. But your wording is a lot stronger here, that it is in the interests of the State and the IFP. But what I am trying to establish is, was there anything more that the State was involved in, on that particular day. Unless you had knowledge already that it had been a Vlakplaas operation?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: May I put this way, that if I stated that I didn't believe in a Third Force, then I want to say that I didn't believe that there was reason to believe that police were involved in Third Force activities at that stage. When I say it would be an embarrassment to the government and the IFP, it is because there had been so many accusations, I was afraid that the media would take the whole thing out of context, if it was known that Themba worked for the police. And that is what my intention was. 20

MS SOOKA: Thank you.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Just one last question from my side. In paragraph 5 of your original amnesty application, you said that you had believed that all actions had been **bona fide** 30

and authorised. Was that really your understanding? It is on page 5, paragraph 5. This incident included, did you feel that your actions had been **bona fide** and authorised?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: If I state - sorry. If I say this, you have got to remember that this application was prepared in a great hurry, and if I say that I understand and believe that all actions, it would refer to this action, but at this stage when I felt, when I did this, I felt that it was justified. Today I don't think the same about it any more, as I stated as well. 10

MR VAN RENSBURG: May I ask, did you and Capt Van der Gryp, after you had been subpoenaed, discuss this matter? After you had visited me. Because the day when you were here I couldn't think what it was all about.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I didn't go to him first, I went to Maj Jacobs. I didn't even think of Van der Gryp because I had forgotten the situation. Then I went and visited Jacobs and together we went to Van der Gryp and Van der Gryp told me that that is what I had said. 20

MR VAN RENSBURG: Because it is a bit strange to me, if I look at your amnesty application, did you discuss how you were going to submit this matter to the Truth Commission? Definitely, you should have discussed the vehicle, the detail of the matter, because it doesn't appear in his amnesty application, the matters of the car, the firearms, et cetera, did you discuss how to handle the situation?

I said that the application - I saw the application to the Truth Commission to deal with what you regarded as something you had done wrong. I didn't regard it as a broad discussion of the whole situation. It had to deal with the matters which you had done wrongly. Did you discuss the 30

detail of this matter? I take it that you did.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Yes, we discussed the matter, I can't remember in what detail.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Van der Gryp surely told you about the blue car. The point that I wish to make is that I don't understand that today, after a long struggle, tell us about the car, whereas you so recently discussed it. Because you would have discussed it as everything centred around this and now only a few days later you omitted it. You must have 10
discussed it.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I think it was omitted from my statement but in these documents which I gave you, which I made available to you, the blue motorcar is mentioned. It is not as if I want to hide something or want to cover up something.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Yes, but it isn't stated that it was a regulation 80 vehicle which was on the strength of the head office or Vlakplaas commanders.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That's correct, it isn't stated there. 20
But you are also aware of all these facts at this stage.

MR VAN RENSBURG: Thank you.

MS SOOKA: One more question. When the National Party made their submission, Mr De Klerk in fact said that he would only take responsibility for actions that were lawfully carried out. Now if you read your paragraph 5 of your amnesty application, that you believed and understand that all your actions **bona fide**, lawful and authorised, that these actions were authorised. Could you really say that in subverting the ends of justice and actually destroying evidence, that that 30
could have been authorised?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: I cannot say so today.

MS SOOKA: But you did however say so and not so long ago. This is paragraph 5 of your amnesty application, which was signed on the 13th of December 1996.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: That is correct, but at that stage, in those years, I believed that what I was doing was right and good. I cannot say so today.

CHAIRPERSON: Senior Superintendent, just one question. After you had made this decision to change the statement, it was yourself, Mr Van der Gryp and Capt Jacobs who were involved in this. Did you discuss this with anybody else, in terms of your seniority, did you discuss it with head office, for example, with Brig Van Rensburg? 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, I did not do so. I phoned to head office and left a message that the statement is relevant and contains nothing of interest, but I did not discuss it with anyone at head office.

MR LEWIN: Mr Conradie, I want to ask again, how you feel today, more particularly where you are in a position where you would know of activities like this continuing. Are you in a position to say whether you know of anything similar, any similar relationships existing today? 20

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Do you mean this kind of act still occurring in these days?

MR LEWIN: Yes.

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, not at all. Nothing that I am know of.

MR LEWIN: And are there any indications that you can give us as to how we can find out better what happened then?

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: Not really, except by people like Eugene de Kock and the other people who were in these very circumstances, I don't personally know of any such things. 30

MR LEWIN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Senior superintendent, can I just follow that up in a different way. You have said a number of times today that when you look at it from today's perspective you have a different viewpoint altogether. When you didn't believe, for example, at the time that police were involved and in Third Force activities. Earlier on we also talked about the fact that in the Vaal, particularly, there were a number of massacres, pre and post this one. Is there anything you could actually tell us today about other killings that may have actually taken place in the Vaal, with hindsight, where you as a commanding officer may not have believed it at the time, but you may look at it very differently today. 10

SUPT INSP CONRADIE: No, I can really not think of any others which would have been in these circumstances. I can say to you, however, that with regard to the other massacres, where we were involved, we really did everything within our ability to try and solve the cases. As I have already mentioned slightly earlier, we have made the information available with regard to particular incidents, but with reference, for instance, to the man referred to as the Vaal Monster, Keswil Gatisi. If one looks at his involvement, it would on occasion appear as if there were some thing extra behind it. But that I personally draw or had knowledge of or was involved in, nothing exists. 20

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Senior Superintendent Conradie. I think that brings to an end to the questions that we would like to ask today. But as I said, we may have to recall you once we have studied the document that you have provided us with today. Thank you very much to you and 30

Mr Wagner for coming today.

MR WAGNER: Thank you, Sir. I assume that you will either contact myself or Mr Conradie, but you have our numbers and you are more than welcome. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

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