

MR BRAND: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR UYS: Dankie Voorsitter.

WITNESS IS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: I am sure you have been indicated to by Ms Terreblanche that this is an investigative inquiry and that evidence led here is confidential, which means no person other than the members of the Commission and the witness and/or his representatives need and are permitted to be here. We give evidence under oath and without further ado I will ask you if you have any objections to taking the oath.

WILLEM FRANCOIS OOSTHUIZEN: (duly sworn, states)

CHAIRPERSON: You can be seated Mr Oosthuizen.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: You are welcome to speak in any language, and especially any language that you are most comfortable with. So if you would rather speak in Afrikaans, or in Xhosa or in English, do so. And there are listening devices here which are for simultaneous translation.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Thank you Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Terreblanche?

~~MS TERREBLANCHE: Thanks Mr Chair. There is tea now. I~~

don't know if you would quickly like to - or would you like to state your preference?

CHAIRPERSON: If we could continue. Unless there are other people who want to take tea, I could...

MS TERREBLANCHE: We will serve you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Would you like to speak in Afrikaans Mr Oosthuizen?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Actually I would prefer to speak Afrikaans and sometimes I'll use the English translations of technical terms.

ME TERRABLANCHE: Dis doodreg. U het dalk nodig dat u die oorfone moet gebruik, sodat u die vertaling kan terughoor. Of sal u verstaan as dit in Engels vertaal word?

MNR OOSTHUIZEN: Ek sou eintlik graag die oorfone wou gebruik om die vertaling te hoor.

ME TERRABLANCHE: Nou maar goed. Is dit in orde? Thank you very much for joining us and that you came today. We understand that you have information relating to the death of the Mozambican president in an air plane crash in 1986.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That's correct. That was October 1986 as far as I can recall.

MS TERREBLANCHE: You were attached to the Tin Unit, the counter insurgency unit and Koevoet, the task unit of the police

and also the security police at the time of the accident.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: At this specific stage I was in the process of being transferred to military intelligence and I worked in the

area. In the next year, 1987 I worked in the area. And as you would have seen in my statement to you, the run-up to this specific disaster actually started a long time before and with a completely different purpose.

And that aroused my interest. And that is why fate or whatever you want to call it, caused me to bump into these witnesses on several occasions. People that I believe were involved and must have been to carry out the specific operation which was of a highly technical nature and of a very sensitive nature.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Mr Oosthuizen, can we focus on first-hand evidence? A day or so after the accident you were at the security branch in Mbuzini.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: No. It was a couple of weeks after the disaster that I was at the specific base.

MS TERREBLANCHE: What did you find there?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I saw a piece of equipment which, as far as my knowledge went, this piece of equipment was a moveable beacon. And there were also landing lights which was made from the same kind of material and produced and manufactured by the

~~same company as the company that produced the moveable~~
beacon.

Now this particular day I saw a beacon; it's usually mounted on top of a highish installation which contained an

aerial. And it has an instrument panel which is screwed down. It's a stainless steel product and it's screwed shut using screws - this is the instrument panel - after the frequency had been set to serve the specific purpose to indicate direction for a plane.

And at any airport across the world, there would be a radio beacon as we call it. In layman's terms it's a radio beacon. The instrumentation of planes are so adjusted that it could pick up the signal from the beacon, and then you have a direction finder in the plane.

When you approach the beacon, the needle of this instrument in the plane would point directly in the direction of the beacon. When you approach such an area and if you know the area where the airport is, and especially during bad weather conditions where there's mist, et cetera, you can use instruments to land because you know where the runway is even if you can't see the runway or see the lights.

You have a relative position which is indicated on any air map or chart, and that would give you an indication of where the runway would be. As soon as you break through this mist, you would then see the lights.

~~MS FERREBLANCHE: When did you first hear of, or see such a~~
thing so that you would be able to identify it again?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: My very first introduction to the idea of the security forces was in 1979 in Oshakati, in Ovamboland. It was

actually during a social occasion, a braai and there were Koevoet investigators, or Operation K as we called it. And we had a braai at the home of one of these investigators.

They were experiencing a problem at that stage because they'd received certain information from Swapo insurgents. And they knew that there was one specific camp where the top brass and political members of Swapo constantly or frequently visited that camp by plane.

The situation on the border was such that the idea was to eliminate these people, or kill them basically. They saw it as a problem. And some of the people present there that night, said that because there were a couple of us interested in aviation and so on - I am also a pilot and I have flown all over the world in the past, and therefore I have an interest in this kind of equipment. Because the beacon mentioned by this person - well, I couldn't say it was mentioned in jest. It was almost as if he wanted to volunteer information.

And in this way I came to hear of this moveable beacon for the first time and that it could be used to simulate a landing strip, or at that stage the Americans used it quite frequently in the war in Vietnam so that they could drop supplies with great accuracy from the air without it being dispersed over a large area. It was also used for planes to be able to land at a homemade or very hastily manufactured landing strip.

Now the possibilities were immediately realised by all present. If we could obtain the correct information and get the frequency of a specific beacon and a specific airport, we would be able to assassinate people in planes and we would be able to get the beacon out in different ways.

We could either destroy it. Secondly we could just render it inoperative for a short period of time and thirdly, if weather allowed, such as in the case of President Machel's plane disaster - that night the weather was very bad, so the pilot in those circumstances would not notice if there was a difference in the route. Under cover of darkness you use your instruments to navigate and to fly, and when the weather is bad you rely on your instruments 100%.

So as different pilots will tell you, we rely on our instruments 110% normally. And you could then guide a plane into a specific area, because there's a much stronger signal emitted than normally. Because across the world beacons give off certain signals of a certain amperage or wattage or whatever. But it could happen that these signals could be overpowered. So the plane will follow the strongest signal.

~~In the case of President Machel and the plane disaster that~~
happened there, they would definitely have done that. And they would have knocked out these international beacons.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Why do you think these things, the lights and so forth, were there, which were the (interpretation lost).

MR OOSTHUIZEN: No such attempt can be made where the equipment has to come from far, so my experience tells me that the equipment was brought from a close location. The whole planning would be that this assassination attempt would have been planned over a long period and that the right occasion had to be waited for, and then for approximately the flying time from Lusaka to Maputo in order to bring everything - to get everything prepared, it can be done.

MS TERREBLANCHE: What I'm trying to determine is if they did something like that, to assassinate him, why would they leave evidence behind?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Such an operation cannot be done in the first place without personnel. You need a very small group of personnel, but you do need them. And the operation could also not be done without the right equipment.

Any such equipment cannot be hidden easily. One cannot hide it in a store afterwards, because the right people or the right experts who see it, or come to hear of it, will go and look for it, if there is an idea that it exists.

Now for years I believed that the right people would start asking questions. Because personally the whole idea upset me later. Initially in the 70's it was a case of the fact that I did not

have the experience or the maturity at that stage to realise what the implications were or would be of such an attack.

With the events of Samora Machel's plane disaster I immediately realised that something had gone wrong. And I am of the opinion that the accident took place on approximately the same distance which Maputo is from Luanda. It would have taken place in the Eastern Transvaal. And if one looks at it on a chart, it would have been within the radius of 100 km. It would have had the same length as what a pilot - a pilot would have said it would have had the same ETA in the flying space of the Maputo airport.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Did you at that stage ask anyone what the equipment was doing there?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I became paralysed with shock when I saw it, and I realised that it was no accident as I had thought; that it was an ordinary plane disaster due to the bad weather conditions. And if you did the work that I did at that stage, then you would realise that one is not immune to the people who are responsible for it.

From previous experience I realised that I would be in ~~danger if I interfered with things that had nothing to do with me.~~

MS TERREBLANCHE: But one of the radio senders was missing.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That's correct, yes. Someone spoke about it and whether it was Lt Schoon - I'm sure you've heard of Col

Schoon, his brother, Marius Schoon who was stationed at Mbuzini security branch - whether it was him or Grant Tracy of military intelligence or Capt Ben Smit, the head of the security branch there; I do not know who made the remark that it had fallen from a vehicle.

But with such an operation, if one should remove the equipment it would have had to be done very quickly. But it would have had to lie there for a period of time, because there would not have been a chance, with the great interest in such a disaster in the vicinity of the Department of Civil Aviation, the police and the defence force who was involved in an international incident.

MS TERREBLANCHE: I accept that, but just tell me what they said about it. Was it gone, did it fall off, and did you have any idea what it looked like?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, I know what it looked like. I know what the radio sender looked like, or transmitter. It was a cylindrical form. It was approximately 4.6 feet high, had an aerial at the top which we call a "roep" arial, and then also had a light which could be disconnected, screwed out. Because most of ~~the beacons had a warning light which does not flicker, but only~~ dims. So that aeroplanes do not fly into it.

MS TERREBLANCHE: You went to military intelligence thereafter.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Well, I worked there. It was my area. I worked in the area, so that was the vicinity in which I lived as well in that stage. In the following week I noticed strange vehicles on the beach during my patrols, with Transvaal numberplates.

And that night I spoke to a lady who was looking for her fiancée who was a member of the defence force, Lt Lorenzo. This lady worked at Avis in Richard's Bay, so it was purely by coincidence that the two of us looked for the temporary base of ~~Lt Lorenzo and the group who had operated in the area.~~

The nature reserve's part which reaches from Kozi Bay to Sodwana in the south, we moved along the coast with a 4X4 vehicle and close to Island Rock we saw quite a number of vehicles - I did not see specifically in the dark how many there were - but five of the vehicles were parked on the beach and the others had been parked under the trees.

There were a great deal of wooden crates on the beach. I'm mentioning this for interests sake. The people were from C10. That is the group who worked from Pretoria head office; it was their personnel who were there. In the moonlight I saw a fish trailer approximately 400 metres from the coast.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Does this have anything to do with it?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, it does. I found this very strange. And I immediately realised that they were busy with one or other

operation which I was not supposed to know about. They did recognise me immediately.

A number of years later Eugene de Kock addressed me on this matter at Pretoria's police head office and he actually ~~mentioned the fact that my path had crossed with that of his~~ people. And I told him that that was where it had happened.

I do not know whether he had anything to do with this. I know that his personnel was involved, and I also know that a few days later, or approximately 24 hours later I was on the beach ~~again at a place with the name of Black Rock together with the~~ regiment sergeant major of the Gazini 101 battalion when this specific fishing trawler came past us along the coast. And if you know this area, it's an area where there are no trawlers or boats of any kind allowed; it's a marine reserve. And usually defence force personnel are not allowed in the area. It's only the persons ~~from military intelligence, or navy intelligence and military~~ intelligence as well. And also police security is in control of the area, together with KwaZulu Natal nature conservationists.

There we saw, the sergeant major and I, saw them throwing something over the side of the boat. I made a full report in this ~~regard, an intelligence report to my head office in Durban, that~~ this specific trawler with highly sophisticated radio antennas and radar equipment was sailing by within 400 metres of the coast and that they were throwing things overboard, and as I could see that

the cylinder that they had thrown overboard looked specifically like the one I had seen a few days earlier at the security police branch.

There are witnesses that I wrote this report and gave it through to navy intelligence. They promised me that they would follow this up and they would come to see me, and they never did this. So I accepted that this was an own operation; in other words these were the people from the security forces. It was a Mozambican registered trawler, but I also know that this was the way in which they passed on weapons to Renamo.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Can you remember what the specific date of this incident was?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: It was early in 1987. In North Natal it's not actually of academic importance whether it's summer or winter, it's always warm. But it was during that time, yes.

MS TERREBLANCHE: How did it work? You worked at military intelligence and what was your role there specifically?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: My role was the gathering of intelligence or information regarding insurgents from Mozambique and Swaziland. The northern border, that's the border between Northern Natal and Mozambique and the western border is between Swaziland and Northern Natal, and then the southern border of Swaziland is in the area as well.

My agents or members of my unit were infiltrated into Swaziland with the routes used from the insurgents from Komatipoort, Namahash and then also Ponto d'Oro and Tempa Reserve, Ladumo and the section at Nguvuma.

~~MS TERREBLANCHE:~~ At one stage you had access to military intelligence documents.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That's correct yes.

MS TERREBLANCHE: And what did you see there in terms of President Machel?

~~MR OOSTHUIZEN:~~ That is at the same time that I went through the files of my predecessor and I saw a file, a reasonably thick file dealing specifically with President Samora Machel and when I read it, it was a profile report which was in front at the beginning of the file which gave all his personal details. It's like an intelligence is, usually.

Among the same files there was a full report on President Joachim Chissano and this all dealt with high profile people in the Mozambique government and the territorial defence force. And I read that it dealt with the plane disaster, and that's what aroused my interest. And I also saw in the report of Mr Chissano that ~~military intelligence was of the opinion that his policy, he would~~ have been the crown prince of - if something were to happen to President Machel he would be the crown prince, and the natural successor of President Machel. That he was a younger person

who was more inclined to co-operate with the Western powers and would have followed a softer policy which would have been to the benefit of the South African government.

This aroused my attention and I wanted to gather more information; ~~I actually wanted to make copies and it will show~~ that at that stage I worked for a foreign intelligence organisation.

Due to the disillusionment that I had with the previous South African government, and earlier I had made contact with a foreign organisation and I gathered intelligence for them in South Africa.

MS TERREBLANCHE: In other words were you a double agent?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, you can call it that. Actually it wasn't just one power, but more than one. I would not like to mention the names, but I will tell you that it was the British intelligence as well as American intelligence known to the special investigative team. I shared this information with them and later as a result of my services, after I had left the country I was used by the American drug enforcement agency and the cocaine intelligence unit of England to do intelligence work for them with specific regard to drugs.

~~So I wanted to make the copies so that questions could be~~ asked from a legitimate power which had nothing to do with South Africa. Because my whole idea or appointment in the

defence force at that stage was, when my application was done, in order to obtain more sensitive information than I had planned.

As a result of my background and my family relations and those of relations with friends, I could not associate with the objectives of the ANC or the PAC.

MS TERREBLANCHE: You worked for these other people. Did you not think it necessary to report these beacons and so on to them at that stage?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is a moral question. My feeling was that this was a blatant international violation of aviation rules, if it was such an operation. And this was also the consideration which prompted me to leave the country, or one of the reasons. Because I could not associate myself, if it was the truth, with the policy of a government which kills people.

MS TERREBLANCHE: In what year did you leave the country?

~~MR OOSTHUIZEN: Before I went back to the army or was~~
permanently appointed in January of 1987, I went to London for 14 days.

MS TERREBLANCHE: When did you leave South Africa?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I left South Africa at the end of 1988.

~~MS TERREBLANCHE: Would you like to tell us very briefly~~
what you know of the purchasing of this kind of beacons?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: When I was flying in the South American area I was working for the Americans.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Which country? Which year?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: 1989. We used the very same beacons. And I built up a first-hand knowledge of - well, I didn't do it myself, but I did obtain first-hand knowledge of the use of such beacons. ~~And I also flew blindly to such a moveable beacon to drop off personnel and also to drop supplies in Venezuela, between the border of Venezuela and Columbia.~~

MS TERREBLANCHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patta?

~~MS PATTA: Just two questions. The beacon that you actually saw, I forgot where you said it was. Where did you see it after...?~~

MR OOSTHUIZEN: The first time I saw it in - was Josini security police base, in Josini in Northern Natal.

MS PATTA: In Northern Natal?

~~MR OOSTHUIZEN: Ja.~~

CHAIRPERSON: You can continue to give your replies in Afrikaans Mr Oosthuizen.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: The next time I saw it from a distance of about 500 metres and it seemed to me to be the same kind of ~~beacon. Whether it actually was, or whether it was a different~~ product, I don't know. I never actually went to that area to dive, to find out whether it was the exact same thing.

But the RSM whose name I have now forgotten - that was the RSM at the military base at Ntunzini was with me in the car on this specific day, because he wanted to see the area. And I showed him the area. And the security police had a hut in the small bay of Black Rock. In this marine reserve.

They had a small base there which consisted of prefabricated buildings, just there in the bushes on the beach. And further down the coast at Island Rock the security police had a big base, a permanent base which consisted of the log cabin type of building and the top brass, the higher echelons of officers went there to rest and to plan things.

So the place that I was on that day was at that small base of the police. I used that base, as did other intelligence officers of the army, when the police are not there. It's open and nobody ever goes there so nothing can actually go missing and nothing can go wrong. And it's a very sheltered little place, a quiet place.

MS PATTA: How big was this beacon?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: About 4 ft 6 inches high. This beacon is the radio system that you use to put on an installation like a tower. And that will be your beacon, with the light fittings on top which you can unscrew and take it away or whatever.

MS PATTA: Right. So could it fit on the back of a landrover?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes.

MS PATTA: Could it fit in a helicopter?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes. It can fit in quite a small helicopter, because the weight - it's quite heavy, but the weight is basically about 150 kg. Or a little bit heavier, I'm not sure.

MS PATTA: Okay, thank you.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Then the landing lights are smaller pieces of equipment. It's like these lamps that you use in road accidents. But it's got the three blue lights on top. And you can even unscrew the lights and put an ordinary emergency light on top. And it works on the same principle, with a battery.

MS PATTA: Yes. [intervention]

MR OOSTHUIZEN: I just want to mention one thing. One thing I want to mention is this: if there was such an operation, then the altimeter of the plane would have shown the height above sea level. And if it flew over the beacon which would have taken the place of the Maputo beacon you would have known exactly how high above sea level the airport was, which is just 200 foot above sea level. And this height meter would have indicated that he was about 3 000 feet above the airport.

So, he could have done his before landing checks unhindered, and he would have had his flaps down before landing, especially if a radio station had informed him that the ceiling - in other words the clouds - were about 2 000 feet high. He would then break through that and make visual contact with the airport.

But he would never have been able to achieve that, where the actual beacon was and where the accident was. Because the height above sea level was about 3 000 feet above sea level and between him and the sea there would have been the Lebombo mountains.

So if this attempt failed, he would in any case have flown into the mountain.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Just one last thing. You say that at some point you spoke to a Paul Nash, a controller from Durban. He was a former Rhodesian.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, he'd actually been deported from Rhodesia. Paul Nash was the major who was my controller in Natal, Natal Command. He was stationed in Durban.

He asked me whom I was working for. And in this discussion, as a result of the unexpectedness of the question which took me by surprise, because to all intents and purposes I was working for the South African defence force at that stage and the reason why he asked me this question was because certain people - amongst them South African security police - had complained to the military intelligence headquarters in Durban that they had no control over my movements and that I was interfering with things that were none of my concern. And I think the question was asked to just get more clarity on that point.

Fortunately I had quite a bit of information which, if it had become known, would have caused great embarrassment to Major Nash and perhaps have cost him his job. And I told him that he should not worry about me... [intervention]

~~MS TERREBLANCHE:~~ Did he not give you any information about this air disaster?

MR OOSTHUIZEN: No, he only asked me what I knew in connection with this air disaster and what I knew about certain other things as well. I just laughed at him.

~~CHAIRPERSON:~~ Well, I have only got to thank you Mr Oosthuizen for having been willing and able and ready to come. And I'm sure if you obviously think of anything that you consider as of importance, you will be able to get in touch with Ms Terreblanche.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes. Mr Ntsebeza, I consider it my duty to ~~come forth for the first time. I had an opportunity in my life, and~~ if you know me better, you would know that since I was a young boy in South Africa I came across very sensitive information which would have brought down the previous government in an earlier stage. And my life was always on the line, for more than ~~20 years till today. I was shot by my own people, I was knifed, I~~ was poisoned. And I've got today no country to go to when I leave the jail for a crime which I didn't commit. And I just feel that if the politicians and the people in power at that stage could

be brought to justice for these things, I would feel better and I would feel that maybe there is a chance also for me. Which I don't consider there is at this stage.

I've done nothing in my life accept being a good soldier which I fought hard for a people that knifed me in the back later.

And I had to leave the country and just travel the world dazed and just lonely. I couldn't do anything in South Africa without being in the way of the security police and military intelligence.

My mother and my family suffered greatly because of this information. ~~And they were threatened and even while I was in~~ prison since 1993 my mother had a stroke because of threats that was uttered against her, and she was followed around. She's an old lady.

My family was greatly unsettled. My whole life came to nothing, except what money can buy. And I would gladly give ~~everything that I own to say again, to be able to say again I think~~ there's a future for me in South Africa. Because I don't think I've got a future at all; after this especially.

CHAIRPERSON: Well Mr Oosthuizen, I can only say to you that in spite of everything that has been said about the Truth and ~~Reconciliation Commission, and I can tell you not everything that~~ has been said about it, is complimentary; one of the things that we think we will be able to do is to make recommendations in the

final report that will go to the president. Which hopefully will reflect the concerns and the pain of people like yourselves.

I think these hearings, certainly the hearings in the TRC over the last 2½ years, have been characterised by operatives, foot soldiers who have been betrayed by politicians.

You know, as you are talking I could be listening to Eugene de Kock speaking. He speaks in exactly the same sort of bitterness with which you speak. Only yesterday he was saying - and I'm sure you have read and heard about it - that it seems as if ~~the politicians were quite prepared to eat the lamb, but they were~~ not prepared for the blood and guts.

And he has been very consistent. There are those of course who want to say he speaks in that way because he has nothing to lose because he's in jail. But I think of all the evidence - I'm not saying all of it is true; I do not know - but of all the evidence ~~that has come across in the TRC, none has been as consistent as~~ that of Eugene de Kock.

And I think objectively, if you don't know directly, we now know that those are people who have been kicked in the teeth by their own leaders, who when it was convenient to them, called them a few bad apples, mavericks, people who did things that the politicians were not aware of.

I'm not in a position to make a finding, because I don't want again this Commission to be taken to court. But if I am

being asked as a person, I don't believe that nonsense that people didn't know what they were doing. But then I'm not making a finding; that will be done by the Commission as and when the time comes.

So what you have said here, and though it was said in the context of the matter in which you were testifying in order to assist us to unravel an aspect of this tragedy, I am sure it will be taken into account. Because you are not the first person of that group of operatives, soldiers, who saw service in this country in the name of patriotism who now are kicked in the teeth and are left to find their own way through this morass of confusion and betrayal.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: You see, I thank you for that very kind words Mr Ntsebeza. I also feel a little bit bitter against the current government because I've given them information years ago. A lawyer of mine sent Mr Jacob Zuma a statement of about 70 pages which the Goldstone Commission came across. And they sent Mr Torie Pretorius to me to investigate these.

I know Eugene de Kock well since 1987. I fought with him and I worked with him for years in the bush afterwards. I never personally liked Eugene de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: Nobody did.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: And it's not because of anything else, it's that he was a little bit jealous because my work in operational

area was a little bit more successful than his. And he was a very dominant person.

I just said it this morning to somebody in your office that there's very many intelligent people in the world. There's very few clever people. Eugene de Kock is one of those clever people.

And give him his due; I am glad that he opened himself up. I've even written a letter to him while in prison, about a year ago.

And I've said to him in the letter, I've told him in 1979 that I'll be his conscious awareness that something some day, somewhere

~~we'll come across each other and I'll put him in jail. And I helped~~
put him in jail.

Because I came forward, even when the previous government were still in authority I came forward with statements against the atrocities that him and the operatives did, which I could never reconcile myself with. I could never take a life

~~without compunction. I felt every time that I - when we were in a~~
fighting situation and there were deaths on both sides - and we worked with Black soldiers and we fought against Swapo, I felt dead inside. I felt sad.

I had an experience one day when we, the so-called chosen ~~people walked around there in the bush and came across the~~
Swapo operatives and we shot a little boy - I shot that little boy - and when he died, he died with his head on the Bible.

I was supposed to be a soldier of light and they were supposed to be the soldiers of darkness. But I came across a searching soul who died because he was not alert enough because he read his Bible, which I never carried in the bush.

And that one incident in 1979 had a profound effect on me and my soul. I felt totally confused. And when I asked a question to the representatives of the church I was made to look silly. And I left the church afterwards because I couldn't reconcile myself with a people that pray to God against the forces of darkness which I know, and I knew then I was one of.

But I was in a catch 22 situation. That was all I knew. That was everything that I was trained for. I did a job; I didn't know who to turn to. I couldn't go to the freedom organisations because I couldn't reconcile myself at that stage with what they stood for.

So I went in a later stage to the Americans and I walked into the embassy in Grosvenor Square and I asked to see somebody in authority and well, they accepted me.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Oosthuizen, I'm afraid we have to take another witness after you. But your story is a very sad one. But it's not a solitary story. There are many people like you out there. And I'm sure on both sides of the political divide. And I think this country needs to do something about people like you, if

it has a hope to be a country that will be based on peace and reconciliation.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Thank you Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: You are excused.

MR OOSTHUIZEN: Thank you.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Thank you Mr Oosthuizen.

WITNESS IS EXCUSED

