

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Terreblanche?

MS TERREBLANCHE: Mr Chair, I would wish to call the next witness after tea I think. I think if you needed... [intervention]

DISCUSSION FOLLOWS ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR TEA AND NEXT WITNESS

CHAIRPERSON: Good day Mr Levine and Mr Williamson. This as you know is a section 29 investigative inquiry. It's held in camera in terms of the Act and you have been fairly associated with the processes of the TRC. I need hardly say anything to you that you do not know already, save only to say the members of the panel is myself, I am a Commissioner in the Human Rights Violations Committee and Mr Wilson Magadhla who is head of Special Investigations. Ms Christelle Terreblanche has been conducting investigations into this and the Helderberg issue and Deborah Patta has been contracted to the Commission on a consultancy basis, on account of extensive investigations that she has conducted herself on both these issues and especially the issue that we are now going to look into.

As is customary, we will ask Mr Williamson to be sworn in.

But before we do that, just for the record, if you can care to place yourself on the record Mr Levine?

MR LEVINE: Thank you Mr Commissioner. I appear for Mr Williamson. My telephone number in Johannesburg is 447-6171. I am indebted to you for hearing my client at a fairly early stage

and the extent that you may wish to take some evidence from Mr Recio, I would advise you in advance that I appear for him as well. I have satisfied myself that there's no conflict of interests whatsoever.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Mr Williamson, you have no objection to taking the oath?

CRAIG MICHAEL WILLIAMSON: (duly sworn, states)

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Terreblanche?

MS TERREBLANCHE: Thank you Mr Chair. Welcome Mr Williamson and Mr Levine. I've asked Mr Williamson, invited him to come here, to answer questions relevant to his involvement with Mozambican officials in the three year period between 1984 and October 1986 when the president of that country was killed in a plane crash on South African territory. Also to furnish the Commission with details pertaining to his official travels to and business in both Malawi and Mozambique during this period, as well as in Zimbabwe.

MR LEVINE: Mr Commissioner, may I just add for completeness sake that I met with my client, Ms Terreblanche and Ms Patta last night and handed them a set of documents together with a memorandum from my client. Unfortunately time was not able to permit of more copies being made, but at least Ms Terreblanche has had the opportunity of burning some midnight oil and make available I'm sure the documentation to you and Mr Magadhla.

CHAIRPERSON: All we have is a four page memorandum, but none of the annexures if there are annexures.

MR LEVINE: There are annexures, but I leave that to my Learned Friend to deal with.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Thank you. Yes, I've made available to you the summary. I did not think that you would have time to go through the file. Between Ms Patta and myself we have tried to read through the file and will guide you on that and put before you what we think we need to, at the time that we need to do so.

But in addition Mr Williamson to the summary, can you maybe briefly guide the panel through your involvement during that time please?

MR WILLIAMSON: Is that in addition to the written? Ja, fine.

As I said in the beginning up until 1984 I have to make clear that I was involved in intelligence work which was different perhaps in some way to the normal security branch work which was concentrated on working or gathering information on the ANC and other liberation movements in the neighbouring states. My job was to do something more than that; also to be involved in the political decision-making that was taking place in those neighbouring states.

So for example the annexure A is just a sample of a letter from the Renamo representatives in the United States to the Renamo representative in South Africa. That's just to show you

that this was the type of monitoring that we were carrying out at this time.

I became more particularly involved with Mozambique towards the end of 1983, at the beginning of 1984 when I was appointed to the work group of the State security council which had to investigate the possibility of a peace accord between the Frelimo and the National Party governments.

I have given a copy of the memorandums and the letters involved and our instructions, and I can draw your attention perhaps to one of the points in the memorandum where we on page 2, para C which related to regional and international pressure on Frelimo and to Renamo. And if you look at para C - anyway, the one that's - B towards the bottom third of the page where it says:

"Potential to take over the power in Mozambique."

In other words Renamo's potential 1) with continued South African support; 2) after the suspension of South African support and 3) if "stapeling" which means - ja, the - what is the English word for logistic support which would then be given to them and put into stores before. And I believe that that was basically the decision that was made; that the Nkomathi accord should be signed, that South African support for Renamo should officially stop, but that before the signature of the Nkomathi accord Renamo should be given enough arms, ammunition and other

equipment to allow them to continue their activities. In other words the "stapeling".

And as I said the main player at this time was the defence force, but of course the police were very interested and basically after the signature of the Nkomathi accord that - to put it bluntly, the accord was a piece of paper and had to be put into operation.

And there were a lot of problems. There was a joint security commission established between the two countries in order to try and deal with some of the issues; in other words South Africa claiming that the ANC was still active in Mozambique and Mozambique claiming that Renamo was still active against Mozambique based from South Africa.

And that is where I became involved and met with Mr Alvero Recio. And I think that the record of his involvement and the source reports that I received from him over a number of years and that went through the highest levels of government have been handed in and he will also be available to elucidate more fully on any of those reports that you find necessary.

Basically during 1975 (sic) remained obviously in touch with the process, but I had - sorry, 1985. I remained in touch with the process but I had already decided to resign from the Police and I took extended leave during this time. And then during 1986 obviously I had joined the South African Defence Force, the chief of staff intelligence, the Directorate of Covert

Collection - sorry, not DCI, it should be DCC in para 8 of my memorandum - and I was then in charge of what was called "other countries".

So my job with the Directorate of Covert Collection was intelligence gathering from Kenya north, and the rest of the world. However I of course did retain some contact with Mr Recio and knew what was happening. And was aware that when the plane crash occurred which killed President Machel and also the other people on board, but in particular the contact that Mr Recio had been working with and through whom we'd been working, Col Honwana, I realised that the process of secret contact between the South African government at the time and the Frelimo government had been struck a very serious blow.

It was only a year after the plane crash that I really became re-involved in the contacts with Mozambique and I have given some documentation, some reports that I wrote that went to General Malan and to President Botha about re-establishing confidential communication links between the governments of Mozambique and South Africa.

And really, just to sum up, during these years my involvement was on a political level, on attempting to bring about some type of agreement between the two governments. And I at no time became aware of - from South African sources, obviously I heard from Mozambican sources the allegation that South Africa

could have been behind the air crash. But from the South African side I at no time have ever heard anything that would support the assertion that South Africa was involved in fact in the crash of 1986.

And then I just want to place on record and make it very firmly clear, that everything that is in the documentation that I have provided, while it relates to attempts and links between the then apartheid government of South Africa and the then Frelimo government, at no time was this based on some type of a sell-out by Mozambique to South Africa.

The basis of our discussions throughout the years from 1983 until 1991, '92 when I bowed out of the process was always on the basis that the co-operation was on the basis that if Mozambique turned away from the Soviet Union and from communism, South Africa would obviously be able to turn away from apartheid. And if South Africa would move away from apartheid, Mozambique would be able to move away from the Soviets and from communism.

Then finally just to comment briefly on Malawi and Zimbabwe, I haven't put into the memorandum but during this time I was involved in handling some sources in operations in Malawi and Zimbabwe. My Malawi operation was aimed at the ANC headquarters in Lusaka and I have in fact given some details about that previously to an investigation in Johannesburg. My

source there is now deceased; he was a Mr Fraxen Ziambo who was running our operation into Zambia. And in Zimbabwe we had various liaison operations and other sources mainly dealing with the Zimbabwean government.

But I to my recollection had no occasion in those countries to really have any discussion with anything to do with Mozambique. Thank you.

MS TERREBLANCHE: As you have stated, unfortunately the tragic crash also bedevilled intelligence communication on your part. Was it mainly because of the good co-operation from President Machel and Mr Honwana? Or was it a more elaborate operation?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I think it was a more elaborate operation. I think there was a communication through Col Honwana from President Machel but also through to the top structures of Frelimo. And I think first of all key people who were involved in that process died, but second of all there was the immediate suspicion, and you probably know more about it than I and in the recent times have probably heard more about it; there were behaviour by South Africa immediately after the crash which led to a lot of suspicion.

And to be quite frank there were elements in Mozambique that were very opposed to the communication and accord and détente if you like to call it that, between South Africa and



Mozambique. And those people obviously immediately post the crash used the crash to say well, you know, we told you so; you shouldn't have been dealing with the devil, look what the devil's now done.

And for a long period - well, I mean obviously long is a difficult word. But for a year really relations and communications between South Africa and Mozambique were very poor.

To give you an example, the military intelligence representative in our trade mission in Maputo was withdrawn. So there was in fact no official way that the intelligence services at that time could continue operating. I think national intelligence retained a representative there. But I don't think that - and you know, governments even when they are officially not talking to each other and sometimes when even they're officially at war, usually retain a back channel intelligence connection so that they can pass messages to each other.

And in this case, in 19 - from late 1986, maybe for a period not as long as a year, but certainly for six months or so - there was very little proper communication - it was just political accusations being passed one to the other and there was no real communication as far as I was aware.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Was Min Pik Botha party to this channel with President Machel?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes. You know, all through my career in intelligence it fascinated me about how the different departments squabbled between themselves and each tried to protect their own area of operation. And I think in this instance it was one of the worst that I've ever seen in the relations with Mozambique where the military, the police, national intelligence and the foreign affairs were all actually with their fingers deeply in the pie. And even though there was a State security council mechanism that was supposed to be co-ordinating the approach, there were a lot of individuals who were defending territory. And there were some powerful individuals like the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Botha who felt that this was his domain and who objected to other people being involved in his domain.

And he at different times - and I think Mr Recio would be able to give you a better indication - but at some times there was very close liaison with Mr Botha, and at other times Mr Botha became angry and objected to military and police involvement in the process. And the channel was more directly to President Botha and wasn't via Mr RF Botha, Pik Botha.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Do you know whether there was frequent, direct contact between Col Honwana and Mr Pik Botha?

MR WILLIAMSON: I wouldn't say direct and frequent. I believe there was contact; Col Honwana to my knowledge came to Pretoria and did meet with high officials who I believe included

Mr Botha, but I was never personally involved in those meetings or in the setting up of those meetings. I just heard second-hand about such things.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Are you aware that most of the documents...

MR LEVINE CONFERS WITH MR WILLIAMSON

MR WILLIAMSON: Sorry.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Are you aware that most of the documents found at the crash site was found with Col Honwana, and that according to intelligence at the time and counter intelligence in particular, Col Honwana - they concluded - or Col Honwana was about to plant some very sophisticated Russian counter intelligence on the region? Have you had any dealings with this channel that would suggest that something like that could have been forthcoming?

MR WILLIAMSON: Sorry, do I understand you correctly to say that there were documents on his body which were Soviet - disinformation documents of Soviet origin?

MS TERREBLANCHE: It was interpreted as such, although it wasn't clearly marked as such.

MR WILLIAMSON:-- No, it's the first time I've heard that.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Right. I think Deborah Patta would like to ask you a couple of things.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patta?

MS PATTA: Mr Williamson, I wonder if you could just characterise the relations between South Africa - just briefly - and Mozambique in the late '85/'86 period?

MR WILLIAMSON: One of extreme hostility. The Mozambicans felt that they had been let down. The results of the Nkomathi accord I believe - sorry, to change that - I believe that they thought that the result of signing the Nkomathi accord would be almost like switching on a light switch; there would be an immediate change in attitude from South Africa, that Renamo would immediately be curtailed in its operations.

And from my discussions at the time with Mozambican officials I found you know, great frustration about the fact that Renamo did the opposite. Instead of it becoming weaker, it appeared to get stronger. And I had to spend a lot of time explaining to people that Renamo had certain supply - I mean people would ask simple questions like where are they getting the ammunition; where are they getting the fuel. We dealt at every joint security commission with radar tracks that had been picked up of aircraft coming from South African air space into Mozambique and the Mozambicans confronting us with the radar tracks and saying but where did these aircraft come from and where did they go; and who is doing this?

So that was one the one hand. On the other hand we had from the South African side a belief that in particular circles,

maybe if one - it's difficult to term them hard line or hawks or whoever - but people who believe that the Nkomathi accord was a Soviet trick and that - I mean we had intelligence reports which I was presented with saying that ships were arriving at Nakala with ammunition and tanks even, T54's for the ANC. And that we had to spend time and risk agent's lives to disprove stupid reports. You know, I mean nobody was bringing T54's to Mozambique for the ANC.

But there was a lot of this type of intelligence information.

So there were people who were trying to create suspicion on both sides.

But there were other people who believed - and I just want to mention the role of General Coetzee, and General Coetzee I did speak to him and told him that I'd been invited to come here, and he also said that as the former chairman of the joint security commission, if there was any information that the TRC wanted from him on these matters he'd be happy to give it. And he very firmly from the South African side said that he agreed, obviously like all of us knew, that if we put enough support behind Renamo, Renamo could probably overthrow the Frelimo government and could become the government of Mozambique.

And that was the policy of certain people in the South African Government who wanted that to become the official policy of South Africa. But General Coetzee was at that time I

think the most articulate opponent of this policy, because he said that if Mozambique fell to Renamo, what would be the international result? And he argued that the result would be that we would have a Vietnam on our hands and that we would just have another big Bantustan, much bigger than any other Bantustan that existed, which would drain our manpower and our resources and at the end of the day would plunge us into a war which we would probably end up losing.

So there - and you know, I don't have to tell you; other people could tell you much more factual stuff than me, but on the other side obviously in the South African Communist Party and in the ANC and in the left-orientated sections of Frelimo there was a lot of anger about the Nkomathi accord; the Soviets were very angry about it.

And so you know, the 1984/1985 - well, I'd say 1985/1986 period before the crash that you asked about, was one in which all the different factions involved were busy jockeying for position and trying to create the impression -everybody was trying to create the impression that would support their particular type of political policy that they were trying to get implemented at the time.

MS PATTA: Fortunately we know now with the benefit of history that it was the Hawkes policy that won; we have the Gorongosa documents to prove that in 1985, and Roland Hunter's

information about the on-going support for Renamo. South Africa was actively supporting Renamo bases in Malawi, and Malawi was our big ally at the time. And in fact, the president of Malawi, Banda had given Alfonso Dlagama a Malawian passport and allowed him to stay there.

And Samora Machel, the president of Mozambique was furious. Two weeks prior to the crash he had a very, very angry meeting with Banda in which he threatened to expose all this and actually threatened to attack Malawi and took journalists along the border to show them where they would launch an offensive attack.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, I remember that. And you know, that was part of - you see, I just want to say something about South Africa's support for Renamo first, and that is something that I spent a lot of time also explaining to the Mozambicans.

It's undoubted that South Africa continued supporting Renamo. It's a fact. But they did it in a way that it was deniable.

They changed the emphasis. So instead of the project being labelled "support for Renamo" and the budget being labelled "support for Renamo", it became other things. It became intelligence gathering against the Soviets somewhere or other.

And then all of a sudden these guys who we all knew to be Renamo were now being handled and funded on a different basis, on a different budget. So then in terms of official-speak, this was

no longer support for Renamo; this was now an intelligence gathering operation in Mozambique which yes, if you went into the details you would find was all Renamo people who were receiving the support and the money or whatever.

But it was termed that the money was being given to them in return for information or other acts that they were doing on behalf of the South African forces, whichever one was supporting them.

So it became a semantic game. And this is why people like Pik Botha or everybody could come and sit at the joint security commission and say but we're not - Renamo is no longer a project or is not a project of South Africa, we're not supporting it. But in the background the game was still being played.

And so - then just to continue on the Mozambican thing, when President Machel did that the way that I interpreted it and what I was told obviously was that this was an open -and especially I think illustrated by the fact that he took journalists - this was an open political move by him to show no 1 that he knew what was going on, and no 2 to create some type of an incident which would underline the seriousness of the situation.

Because everything that he'd been saying privately was not being listened to. So he now was presented with a situation I think that he then had to make a public issue of it. And make a



threat. Which, when a head of state makes a threat against another state, that has to be taken pretty seriously.

And that's what I believe happened.

MS PATTA: In fact we took it very seriously. Machel was our enemy. Samora Machel was an enemy of South Africa. He could not be controlled by South Africa and South Africa had no intention of ever honouring the Nkomathi accord. And you as head of military intelligence, surely that would have been communicated to you, or you would have understood what the reason was around that.

MR WILLIAMSON: No. You know, again I have to - I don't believe, unless at some level that I didn't have access to; maybe what do you call them? A coven of Broederbonders or something.

I don't actually believe that - and you know, I went through many years of this. I don't actually believe that at the end of the day we had a bottom line policy.

I think that we had some men and obviously at that stage the president who was making decisions. And anybody who was involved in government at that time will know that no decision in government meant anything unless PW Botha made it, or endorsed it.

And I'm now really in the realm of speculation, but my experience was at that time that PW Botha often used to - well, let me put it this way: he either was ignoring and didn't know

what different elements in the government and in the different intelligence organisations and security force organisations were doing; or he did know and he was deliberately letting different parts of the South African intelligence community do different things.

And I believe the second is true. I don't think PW Botha didn't know what was going on. I worked with him, and I think he knew exactly what was going on. And I think that - it was very frustrating to many people who were involved in the process.

Because you would be ordered to do something and then you would find out at a certain stage that other people in another community or another organisation were doing something different. And sometimes it became difficult to understand.

But I always accepted that there must be somebody at the top, the puppet master, somebody with strings who's pulling them all and who knows what he's doing. And my job was to do you know, whatever I felt the string on my back told me to do. Whatever I was ordered to do. And that this was part of a policy of a strategy, of a jigsaw, that somebody knew what he was doing and was putting together.

But I was at no stage ever told that our policy was firmly anti-Mozambique, anti-Machel and now we're going to deal with him. It was never said and - there were individuals and there

were discussions in which this attitude was expressed. But that was never the bottom line policy in the order that was issued.

Because if I think it had been, you know things might have got a bit uglier a bit sooner.

MS PATTA: One could argue a plane crash as ugly, but anyway.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. No, but... [intervention]

MS PATTA: Let's look at that year, just one last question about the year before we move on. There was a concerted disinformation campaign. I mean we've had evidence of a disinformation campaign in the year and a half, or possibly at least a year, in the build-up to the Samora Machel plane crash in which stories were planted on journalists; there was all this descent in Frelimo and yes, as we know with those disinformation campaigns there was always an element of truth; there was some internal differences in Frelimo at the time.

But it was as if the climate was being built for something to happen. And in fact prior to the Machel crash Mozambican journalist Carlos Cordoza wrote an editorial in which he said that Machel was a likely target for assassination from South Africa. Magnus Malan himself was personally threatening Machel by name in the media, and this climate was being prepared.

MR WILLIAMSON: I mean having lived through it, I mean I accept that that's an interpretation that can be given to it. But what at the same time as all this belligerence and difficulty, there

were also - you know, on other channels there were discussions going on.

So yes, you know all I can say is you know, this is the enigma we're trying to deal with. And these things did happen.

MS PATTA: Let's look at Malawi. You raised the name of Fraxon Zgambo, I'm not sure.

MR WILLIAMSON: Zgambo, ja. (Spelt).

MS PATTA: H'm. What exactly was your relationship with Fraxon?

MR WILLIAMSON: He was a source.

MS PATTA: In what sense?

MR WILLIAMSON: He ran - I mean he was a paid operative of the security branch.



MS PATTA: Was he also a pilot?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MS PATTA: He was a pilot for - a Malawian pilot.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. He wasn't a pilot when we employed him. I think he was a qualified pilot; he was the chief of accident investigation or something with the Directorate of Civil Aviation.

MS PATTA: And Fraxon was also - was he not involved in soccer and refereeing?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, he was a FIFA ref.

MS PATTA: So he would travel around and knew the region very well?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. Ja.

MS PATTA: All that kind of thing. And he was involved romantically with a woman by the name of Alvira who worked in the Mozambican Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MR WILLIAMSON: (Laughs). He was involved romantically with - that was the basis of his intelligence gathering. He was involved with women in the ANC headquarters and in various places, ja.

MS PATTA: And that's how he got information?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, he used to - it's a standard procedure. It's called the Honey Pot. And then he would get documentation and information from them.

MS PATTA: And one of the things that he was also asked to do was to monitor President Samora Machel's movements. Being a pilot, being a referee, he knew where he was flying; what he was doing, that kind of thing.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, not from us. And you know, I think monitoring President Machel's movements could be probably done a lot more efficiently than using somebody who is in Malawi.

MS PATTA: H'm. Well, we understand that he was actually -  
~~one of his tasks was to actually monitor the president's~~  
movements. And particularly with his high... [intervention]

MR WILLIAMSON: President Machel's movements?

MS PATTA: Yes.

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, not to my knowledge.

MS PATTA: You didn't know anything about that.

MR WILLIAMSON: No.

MS PATTA: H'm. What was your relationship with Cornelio Vasco Combe or Robert Santos Maquagua?

MR WILLIAMSON: Sorry, put their first names?

MS PATTA: Cornelio Vasco Combe. Mozambican.

MR WILLIAMSON: Combe?

MS PATTA: H'm.

MR WILLIAMSON: You'd have to remind me about him. I'm not sure I know him.

MS PATTA: He was a Mozambican, he was in security, also involved in...



MR WILLIAMSON: With Schnazbo....

MS PATTA: At the airport and all that kind of thing.

MR WILLIAMSON: It's possible, but I don't really recollect.

MS PATTA: You don't recollect.

MR WILLIAMSON: No.

MR MAGADHLA: Mariano Matsinia?

MR WILLIAMSON: Mariano Matsinia is the Minister of Security.

MS PATTA: Ja. What was your relationship with Mariano Matsinia?

MR WILLIAMSON: I used to go and meet with him.

MS PATTA: What kind of meetings?

MR WILLIAMSON: Official liaison meetings.

MS PATTA: When?

MR WILLIAMSON: I would imagine the first time I met him must have been - well, I would imagine - I'm not sure; I suppose I met him during the joint security commission meetings, but that would have been on a formal basis. But I actually travelled - I think the first time to meet him would have been after Machel's death.

MS PATTA: You never met him before Samora Machel's death?

MR WILLIAMSON: I may have met him, but it would have been at a joint security council commission meeting. But I started liaising with him after the president's death.

MS PATTA: And how would you characterise Mariano Matsinia's views towards Samora Machel?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, I think you know he's the current Minister of Security in Mozambique. I think he was - I mean it's not for me to comment. I dealt with him in the position that he's in.

MS PATTA: H'm. H'm.

MR WILLIAMSON: I mean as far as I'm concerned he was a loyal servant of Frelimo and the Mozambican government.

MS PATTA: And did you ever have any dealings with Armando Gubuza?

MR WILLIAMSON: Not directly. I obviously - he was of particular intelligence interest to us. We used to gather -you know, he was one of the people that we used to gather information of. Sorry, there was another name you mentioned, a Maquaqua.

MS PATTA: Ja. But it was an alias. He was known as Roberto Santos Maquaqua. I'm not sure how you pronounce it.

MR WILLIAMSON: I know a Fermina Maquaqua, but not a Roberto. Fermina Maquaqua was a Schnazp official.

MS PATTA: What is that?

MR WILLIAMSON: Schnazp, the Mozambique - at that time; they've changed their name now. The Mozambique security service, ja.

MS PATTA: Police. Ja, this guy was a Mozambican security guy.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, this is Fermina Maquaqua.

MS PATTA: Okay. We'll come back to them in a minute. Our information is that - from a double agent, Humberto Fucerolli Casaday who was really kind - was very friendly with Machel, but also did a bit of work with the South Africans, with some military intelligence people. Do you know Maureen Rogers?

MR WILLIAMSON: No.

MS PATTA: You don't know Maureen Rogers.

MR WILLIAMSON: It doesn't ring a bell.



MS PATTA: Okay. That he actually uncovered a plot to assassinate Samora Machel long before it actually happened; a plot that involved General Gubuza and General Mobutu at the time in conspiracy with South Africa.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja, those - again you know I don't have detail, but those sort of rumours were on the intelligence circuit in those times. That there was this - and as you say there was a lot of stories being spread in order to I would imagine - well, they were either stories that were true, or they were stories that were being made up in order to sow disillusion and disarray within Frelimo.

MS PATTA: So you heard stories that Mozambican generals were colluding with South Africa to assassinate Samora Machel.

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, I won't say colluding with South Africa, but I'll say there were stories that there was - that there were problems with Frelimo. And that this - there was even talk of coups and whatever, against Machel.

MS PATTA: H'm. Okay. Now I have a picture here of Maureen Rogers. I don't know if you'd just want to have a look at it. It's not a very good - it's a photostat picture. I don't know, maybe it will refresh - you can remember her. Blond hair, blue eyes, a Honey-pot?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. Was she working for military intelligence?

MS PATTA: H'm.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. No, there's only one woman that I knew working for military intelligence. It's not her.

MS PATTA: Okay. Right. Now you said you did know a guy called Fermina Maquaqua. What was your relationship with him?

MR WILLIAMSON: He was I would say an assistant to the other gentleman I was liaising with called Phillipe Franco.

MS PATTA: And who was Phillipe Franco?

MR WILLIAMSON: Phillipe Franco was the person who took over from Col Honwana and the liaison meeting. And then Maquaqua was like his assistant.

MS PATTA: Now when you paid agents at the time, you know, people like Fraxon; was he paid or was he just a source?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, no, he was a paid agent.

MS PATTA: And how was he paid?

MR WILLIAMSON: He had a handler in Malawi and I think his handler paid him. I would imagine we also would have - it's possible - they used to sometimes - I mean I wouldn't know how each source was paid, but normally what would happen either money was put into their accounts, or they were given cash. And if the source had - each source's specific handler would be responsible for the payment, because he'd have to account for the money. And Nzambo certainly later on in the operation had a

full-time handler in Malawi who was dealing with him. So I would imagine he was getting cash.

MS PATTA: And would the South Africans give them cash? Would it be deposited into a bank account? I mean how would these things work?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, it's one or the other. But you know, if the handler has easy access to the source, then usually it was cash.

MS PATTA: And how would it relate when South Africa was involved? Would it go through like GMR, a front company like that?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. It would normally - either a front company - I mean not - I mean GMR was a company I worked with, but it wasn't really a front company. A front company is a company that was formed specifically to act as a cover for intelligence activities. So then it could go from that company - because if you put money into somebody's account, there must be a reasonable explanation for that money coming into the account. So it could then go through a front company, or it could be done via a bank or via attorneys.

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MS PATTA: Right.

MR WILLIAMSON: There were various methods.

MS PATTA: And if it went via a bank would it be cash? Cheque, what - how would they... [intervention]

MR WILLIAMSON: No, it would be a telegraphic transfer, ja.

MS PATTA: Okay. So we had the capacity to put money into another country quite easily.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. Well....

MS PATTA: In a normal bank way.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes.

MS PATTA: Ja, okay. Okay. According to our information Roberto Santos Maquagua, also known as Cornelio Vasco Combe was actually recruited by yourself as an agent. By Mariano Matsinia.

MR WILLIAMSON: Sorry, via...?

MS PATTA: Well, I think that Mariano Matsinia probably helped introduce you to him.

MR WILLIAMSON: No.

MS PATTA: Do you remember recruiting an agent like that? Do you remember meeting an agent like that?

MR WILLIAMSON: No.

MS PATTA: You never met him in Zimbabwe?

MR WILLIAMSON: Met Mr - this guy in Zimbabwe?

MS PATTA: Combe.

MR WILLIAMSON: No.

MS PATTA: You never met him anywhere?

MR WILLIAMSON: Never.

MS PATTA: You never remember anything to do with meeting him anywhere?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. Certainly not - I mean - you know, I had a lot of agents working for me. But in Mozambique I never recruited any Mozambican official to work for me. And Minister Matsinia never introduced - I mean is the suggestion that there was some deal between the Minister and I as well on this recruitment?

MS PATTA: Well, you were very friendly with the Minister. I mean he organised office space for you and all that kind of thing in Josena Machel Avenue.

MR WILLIAMSON: That was a Schnazp office. It was their office.

MS PATTA: Ja. But were you not there? Did you not meet him there regularly, based there?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. I never met the minister except in his office in the security headquarters.

MS PATTA: And he helped you set up business operations, didn't he, in Mozambique?

MR WILLIAMSON: I - you know, Schnazp had a company, a front company called TCT and I would imagine that this is what you're referring to. Transport Commodities Trading. TCT. And Mr Juao Latao also before he died had some companies and they used these companies as fronts, as I said before, if you establish a

company. Now I in fact believe that TCT if you looked at the shareholding was between LAM, the Mozambican airline and there was one other Mozambican state company involved. So it was a private company, but owned by two Mozambican state companies.

And the company was run by Schnazp officials. And yes, I liaised and worked closely with that company. But Minister Matsinia, it would be like saying - that he helped and assisted and set up would be like saying that you know, somebody that I was involved with on an operational level had been helped and assisted by General Coetzee, my boss at that time. It's just not so. I worked with officials that worked under him, that reported to him. And when I met Minister... [intervention]

MS PATTA: And those officials helped set you up in business.

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, they didn't really help set us up in business. We worked together.

MS PATTA: H'm, you worked together... [intervention]

MR WILLIAMSON: It was a cover operation. And the meetings with Minister Matsinia were formal meetings held in his office on a formal basis where I came and said that I had X, Y or Z message and he said to me he had X, Y and Z message and I ~~would come back to South Africa and write it up and deliver it.~~

And that was a very formal procedure, and this wasn't because we were personal friends; it was because he was doing his job and I was doing mine.

And any suggestion that he was involved with me in any type of recruiting or involving a South African security plot against the country is ludicrous.

MS PATTA: So... [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just get some clarity? I think I got lost here. Did you say GMR was your company which you had set up?

MR WILLIAMSON: GMR?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WILLIAMSON: No. GMR was a Seychelles based company.

CHAIRPERSON: It had nothing to do with you.

MR WILLIAMSON: Nothing to do with me.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

MR WILLIAMSON: I later, in 19 - ja, during 1986 I became -or the end of '86 or '87 I became the managing director of GMR in South Africa.

CHAIRPERSON: And where were your offices?

MR WILLIAMSON: GMR's offices?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WILLIAMSON: In Seychelles.

CHAIRPERSON: Were there no offices in Mozambique?

MR WILLIAMSON: No.

CHAIRPERSON: I see. This business that you had offices which had offices in Mozambique, where were your offices there?

MR WILLIAMSON: Avenue De Jasino Machel, opposite the - there's a what do you call it? A monument to the Voortrekkers.

CHAIRPERSON: I see.

MR WILLIAMSON: And opposite there was - it's a Schnazp office. It's a Mozambique security service office which was being operated under the name of TCT. And I used to use those offices when I went to Mozambique.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh ja, that's where I wanted to ask you, were the Schnazp offices, you used the Schnazp offices for your own business as well?

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

MS PATTA: And what was in the cover - you said it was for cover operations. What were these operations?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, intelligence operations. And I mean we were involved in also with the whole process - and again you know, I want to make very, very clear that until after the death of Samora Machel I - you know I'd never even been to TCT's offices. I'd never even met them. I only met Fremina Maquagua and Phillippe Franco after the death of Samora Machel.

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~~It was only a long - you know, some time after when I went~~  
back, when I was introduced to them and I then established link with them. So you know, I never had any link with - well, as I said I could have known Mariano Matsinia because of the joint



security commission, but I didn't deal with him. I wasn't his rank. He was a minister and a general and I was a major.

But in 1987, after I was in the President's Council I became very involved with TCT and some of the reports that I've given you were the reports the emanated from these meetings. And we were involved also in trying to get Renamo to - I mean for example some of the delegations, we had contact with Renamo and we sent some Renamo delegations to Rome. We were involved in that whole process. And that was a search for peace.

MS TERREBLANCHE: And how far back does your relationship with Mr Alan Domaya go?

MR WILLIAMSON: You know, I have to tell you I don't think I've ever met the man. I know of him, because he was involved in Angola and then became involved in Mozambique.

MS PATTA: Okay. Let's go back to Cornelio Vasco Combe. I'm surprised you don't remember him, because we have evidence that in fact he was a security person who was at the airport who was recruited to assist South Africa with the crash of Samora Machel. And that you were the person who recruited him; and that he was paid money into two bank accounts on the 6/3/85 and again in 1986.

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, you know all I can say is that either somebody's fantasising or they'd misidentified the person that

recruited this guy. But I certainly never recruited anybody and I also never paid any money into his account.

MS PATTA: You never organised any money to be paid, via Mariano Matsinia maybe?

MR WILLIAMSON: Absolutely not.

MS PATTA: You paid nothing?

MR WILLIAMSON: No.

MS PATTA: You never paid any money into this man's account?

MR WILLIAMSON: Absolutely not.

MS PATTA: And you have no knowledge of anyone else paying money into this man's account.

MR WILLIAMSON: I've got no knowledge of the man whatsoever. I really think that it's - as I said it's either somebody who thinks that I'm somebody else, or it's fantasy.

MS PATTA: Okay. Because what this person says is that payments were made in two parts; the first through Standard Bank and the second one into Nedbank. The dates that I gave you as such; the account does exist - we've checked it out - under the name of Maquaqua. It does exist. There's an exorbitant of money in there, way beyond what a Mozambican person would probably normally have. ~~Certainly not with the average wages in~~ Mozambique. And that over that period he made something like R1.5 M.

MR WILLIAMSON: No well, that's - there's absolutely no way that I would ever have been involved in paying somebody R1.5 M and not remember it, I promise you.

MS PATTA: Well, maybe not all in one go.

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, even an amount that would start to approximate and add up to that sort of an amount.

MS PATTA: Is it not that you don't want to remember it because it's related to the crash of Samora Machel; that this person was a paid agent who was assisting the South Africans in the operation to bring down Machel's plane?

MR WILLIAMSON: You know, whether - you know, it probably doesn't help to say it, but just for the record I'll say it, that if I knew anything about Samora Machel's plane crash, I'd tell you. If the South African had had a plan to bring down his plan and I knew about it or I'd been involved in it, I would say it.

But you know, we've got to stick to facts and these allegations are - I've heard them before. You know, I heard that I was involved in killing Olaf Pama as well. So you know, they used to surprise me, but they don't anymore.

But it's total - it's absurd, and it's fiction.

~~MS PATTA: Well, let's stick to... [intervention]~~

MR WILLIAMSON: And to go - if this guy is alleging that Minister Matsinia was involved, well then he needs to get a psychiatrist as well.

MS PATTA: Why was there no way Matsinia could be involved?

MR WILLIAMSON: Well, you know I think that it's more than absurd. I mean it's insulting a man that has spent how many years of his life serving his party and his government and fighting the liberation war in Mozambique.

You know, it's completely - it's like saying that Joe Modise was involved in a plot against Nelson Mandela.

MS PATTA: H'm. Interesting one.

MR WILLIAMSON: You know, it's even worse than saying that Michael Jackson is funding Winnie Mandela. You know, I mean it's to go... [intervention]

MS PATTA: It wouldn't be the first time that somebody had worked for a government and been part of an assassination attempt against them. There are many examples. History has proven that time and time again. How is the best way to assassinate someone? Get close to the man.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. I think - ja, I just think it's - we're now in the realm of Frederick Forsythe.

MS TERREBLANCHE: When you joined DCC you say you were in charge of the Northern areas.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Would that have included Portugal?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes.

MS TERREBLANCHE: What was your contact with Renamo people there like?

MR WILLIAMSON: None. Because I never got round to it, but also because the whole Renamo issue was being dealt with by a section called Special Tasks.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Did you ever know a man called Paulo D'Oliviera?

MR WILLIAMSON: Not to my knowledge, but it's possible. But I mean I certainly - was he a Renamo person?

MS TERREBLANCHE: Yes, he was a Renamo spokesperson based in Lisbon at the time.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I didn't know him.

MS PATTA: But surely if you were in charge of Portugal you would have known who the Renamo person was there. He was the person who used to put out all the communiqué's; that Renamo's done this, Renamo's done that; linked with Charles van Niekerk of Phalaborwa.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I wasn't - but you know, once I started the other countries section which began in the beginning of 1986 we concentrated on first of all setting up our base which was in ~~the Seychelles and then we concentrated on countries like Kenya,~~ Uganda and countries where the ANC had - that was our first priority. And I was only there a little over a year, after which I went into politics. So I wasn't really that involved specifically in

Portugal or Renamo and you know, in particular at that time anything to do with Mozambique and Renamo was being dealt with as I said by Special Tasks. So there were people covering it.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patta, I just want to get an indication as to how long you think you are still going to be. Okay, all right.

MS PATTA: (Indistinct) Paulo D'Oliviera has asserted that he was instructed to remain on standby prior to the crash, to watch the media, the news and stuff because something big was going to happen. And then on the morning of the crash he was instructed to claim responsibility. A broadcast did go out on SABC with Renamo claiming responsibility for shooting down Machel's plane, but that was hastily withdrawn.

MR WILLIAMSON: No well, I can't comment because I've got no knowledge of it.

MS PATTA: Okay. Would you like to take a lunch break.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Magadhla, do you have any questions you want to put to Mr Williamson?

MR MAGADHLA: Are we going to continue with him now?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. You are still going to be available after lunch Mr Williamson?

MR WILLIAMSON: I'm in your hands Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. This would then be a convenient stage to take lunch. If you could come back at two? Quarter to two, but I know it will be two.

MR WILLIAMSON: Okay.

COMMISSION ADJOURNS FOR LUNCH

ON RESUMPTION AFTER LUNCH

CHAIRPERSON: I would suggest that you do what you have to do now, because if Mr Magadhla does not come within the next minute we will have to start and we will have to ask you to be away.

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

ON RESUMPTION

MS PATTA: ...comes back.

MR WILLIAMSON: Thank you very much.

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

ON RESUMPTION



CRAIG MICHAEL WILLIAMSON: (s u o)

MS TERREBLANCHE: I'm sure that Mr Magadhla would have liked to ask this question: were you aware while you were with the security police and involved in the initial Nkomathi accord that there were numerous attacks on the palaces of President Machel by security forces from South Africa?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I can't say I was aware of that. You mean physical attacks?

MS TERREBLANCHE: Were you aware of any attempt on his life, or any - apart from what you have shown us in this

document, that there was any conspiracy to look at the possibility of getting rid of him?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. No. No.

MS TERREBLANCHE: Do you have any more questions?

CHAIRPERSON: Just a few questions. In relation to the air crash, were you already in DCC at the time of the crash or was it before or after that?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I was in DCC.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see.

MR WILLIAMSON: And as I said, the reason why I wasn't involved in Mozambique at that time was because my responsibility was for other countries north of - I believe it was north of Zimbabwe, north of Mozambique. So from Tanzania, Kenya, north I was responsible for.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we shall have to stand you down for the moment so that we can take the other evidence from the other gentleman.

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes. Mr Commissioner, if I can just - having had a few moments to think during lunch, I just want to make it very clear if my evidence in chief wasn't clear enough that

~~I do not believe that I ever met Minister Matsinia until after the~~  
death of President Machel. I may well have met him on some occasion on an official occasion, but I do not recollect.



And secondly the question relating to Minister Gobuza, Minister Gobuza was well-known for his antipathy towards South Africa. He was anti-Soviet; he didn't like the Soviets but he disliked apartheid-South Africa even more. And you know, I would have thought that any suggestion of any links between him and South African intelligence community is something that's very difficult to believe.

And I remember certainly as far as Minister Matsinia is concerned, I believe my first meetings with him were in either 1987 or 1988, I think 1988. So that's just to make that very clear.

And then - sorry?

CHAIRPERSON: Well, as you were thinking I was also trying to reflect on you know, the usual phraseology in your world. I think it was you in one of the hearings who said, was it? My friend's enemy is my...

MR WILLIAMSON: My enemy's enemy is my friend.

CHAIRPERSON: My enemy's enemy is my friend. I think there is a theory or a view that for that very reason that he didn't like the Soviets and it appeared that Machel was enamoured with the Soviets, that he might have wanted to secure the guarantee of the South African regime, that if your bottom line is that the Soviets must go away and then there will be no Renamo, I can then you know, get rid of the Soviets if I'm in charge.

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. No, I understand and... [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: And on that basis you know, you will have obtained your objectives; I will have obtained mine.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I understand that Mr Commissioner. I just wanted to say from just thinking back 10 years I can remember the reports that we were doing about General Mabuzo were to the extent that yes, he was anti-Soviet but at the same time he was virulently - in fact except for Marcellino dos Santos probably the most anti-South African member of the Frelimo Polit Bureau and was adamantly against any co-operation with South Africa.

CHAIRPERSON: H'm. Ja, I...

MR WILLIAMSON: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much Mr Williamson. Mr Magadhla is here and he would like - Mr Magadhla, Ms Terreblanche anticipated that you might ask the question about the attack on the presidential palaces and she asked that question. And Mr Williamson replied to it as best as he can. So if it was one of the questions you were going to ask, that has already been asked. But you can put the remainder of your questions.

~~MR MAGADHLA: Maybe just one question. Now of the Frelimo~~  
officials, high-ranking army officials, the likes of the Gubuza's and others, I've heard what you've said about Gubuza and others.

But did you have any one of them working with you as your source?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. I can say categorically that at no time did I have any Mozambican official working for me as a source. And - but obviously other intelligence agencies could have had such people.

MR MAGADHLA: Did you have any of the ANC people working for you?

MR WILLIAMSON: Not for me, but for... [intervention]

MR MAGADHLA: Working as your sources?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, there were ANC - there were sources in ANC....

MR MAGADHLA: In the leadership or whatever.

MR WILLIAMSON: In the ANC community in Mozambique.

MR MAGADHLA: Would there be any reason why then you wouldn't have targeted Frelimo leadership as your sources? Because they were sort of one....

MR WILLIAMSON: Ja. No, I'm saying I didn't. Other people may well have, but my involvement in Mozambique - and unfortunately my career was in three parts - as a police officer my involvement was with the Nkomathi accord and with intelligence gathering.

Once I went to the defence force I had nothing to do with Mozambique because I was involved in - my mandate was

Tanzania, Kenya and north. And then when I became - and what the previous questions were relating to - my involvement with Mr Franco and the Schnazp company in Maputo and so on, that all happened after President Machel's death, and that was when I was already a member of the President's Council in South Africa. So I was acting as a member of the President's Council in a liaison capacity, a confidential channel between President Chissano and President PW Botha.

So you know, except for the period up until during my police time, I would not have been recruiting sources in Mozambique, and during my police time the sources in Mozambique were mainly being handled by the Middelburg and Eastern Transvaal - they were concentrating as I said on the ANC structures in Mozambique. And I then started developing intelligence networks, but very rapidly got involved in the Nkomathi accord and then I was dealing as an official liaison person. So I wasn't recruiting sources.

MR MAGADHLA: During President Machel's air crash, were you then a member of - or were you in charge of DCC in that area?

~~MR WILLIAMSON: No. I was in charge of DCC from Tanzania north.~~

MR MAGADHLA: But...

MR WILLIAMSON: DCC, it was called East Front was the section dealing - East Front and Special Tasks - "Oosfront" and "Spes Take" were dealing with Mozambique. And I was with "ander lande" as they called it.

MR MAGADHLA: You are aware of the capacity that the intelligence people would have where they would be able to monitor a plane flying from Lusaka to Mozambique or to wherever in that region?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes Sir. No, that's why we could have monitored - and also, you know referring to the question about Fraxen Gzambo, as I said you know if we wanted to monitor President Machel's movements it would have been much easier to do it from Maputo or from Hoedspruit or Nelspruit than doing it from Blantyre or Lilongwe.

MR MAGADHLA: But are you saying it was not monitored on that occasion?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, no, I'm not. Of course it would have been monitored, because any flight from Lusaka to Maputo would at a certain time intersect with South African radar. And also with air traffic control.

MR MAGADHLA: Are you aware of Special Forces operations which were on that evening?

MR WILLIAMSON: No. I only read about these in the newspaper recently.

was one of their front companies. And as far as I know, it should still be there. TCT.

MR MAGADHLA: One of the military's front company?

MR WILLIAMSON: No, no, Mozambican security front company.

MR MAGADHLA: They knew who you were in Mozambique at the time?

MR WILLIAMSON: Yes, because I was liaising with them officially as a member of the President's Council.

MR MAGADHLA: No, I mean during the time when you were a member of DCC.

MR WILLIAMSON: No, I never went to Mozambique as a member of DCC.



MR MAGADHLA: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Terreblanche?

MS TERREBLANCHE: I just want to ask you one more question.

The name of this person, does it ring a bell to you: Mrs Matibula?

MR WILLIAMSON: Could you give me any context?

MS TERREBLANCHE: Ja. She runs a shop in Mozambique and

~~she is said to have been military intelligence's main agent during~~

the mid 80's.

MR WILLIAMSON: Forgive me my amusement. No, I've never heard of her.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you through? Thank you very much Craig, or Mr Williamson. I assume you will just take your seat elsewhere. You are otherwise excused, but we are not going to excuse Mr Levine to the extent that he represents the next witness.

MR WILLIAMSON: Thank you very much.

WITNESS IS EXCUSED

