

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

SECTION 29 HEARING

"IN CAMERA"

DATE: 06.10.1997

NAME: GEOFFREY RANDALL BRUCE BROWN

HELD AT: CAPE TOWN

HEARING COMMENCES AT 09H25

CHAIRPERSON: Could you state your name for the record and then would you like to take the oath or an affirmation?

MR BROWN: What is the most preferred? I'll take the oath.

CHAIRPERSON: If you don't have any objection to taking the oath?

MR BROWN: No.



CHAIRPERSON: Alright. Could you just stand please and state your name into the record, your full name.

GEOFFREY RANDALL BRUCE BROWN: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated. For the purpose of today Mr Khoisan and I will be running the show, for today. I will be chairing this session and he'll be doing most of the questioning but I will in turn interrupt at some point, and I will do so where there are matters of clarity and if I want you to explain something. You are without a legal representative today, and you feel okay about that?

SECTION 29 INQUIRY .

TRC/WESTERN PROVINCE

MR BROWN: Absolutely.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, alright. Thanks very much for coming.

We will try and be as concise as we can because we are here for the matter of actually trying to establish what had happened, it's part of our investigative process. Thank you very much.

EXAMINATION BY MR KHOISAN: Thank you very much Commissioner. Good morning Mr Brown. I would just like to say at the outset that the terms of this **in camera** hearing, Section 29 Inquiry have of course been stipulated in the document that was sent to you and we are very happy that have been able to join us here.

If there is anything that has occurred which has caused you discomfort in the public terrain I want to put it to you directly that we, as the Investigative Unit, are not responsible for that. You know our investigations essentially are being conducted on a very discreet and confidential basis. If there is notification about subpoenas and stuff like that it doesn't get handled out of our department. We don't deal directly with the press unless in certain circumstances when we have to go and when the Unit has to comment and that is done through the leadership of the Unit. So just to put it on the record that I am not responsible for putting you in the papers.

We have called this inquiry to ascertain what exactly occurred on the 23rd of July 1989 when two members of MK, Coline

Williams and Robert Waterwich died following an explosion opposite Kismet Hardware at the toilets in Athlone.

We have also called this inquiry to establish the circumstances within which weapons and/or other military hardware were removed from a house belonging to one of -where one of the victims was resident.

And also to understand the situations and events in which that particular incident occurred, and as we all know those were very tumultuous times.

So thank you for coming here and giving us your cooperation.

To begin with Mr Brown, it would of course be a very good starting point to find out from you, for the record, what your relationship was to the victims. Did you know Coline Williams and Robbie Waterwich?

MR BROWN: I would like to, before I answer the question, make some comments with regard to the whole thing as requested in the document or letter that you sent me and hopefully that will in fact answer all the questions that you might have.

MR KHOISAN: Yes.

MR BROWN: So if you want to allow me I can proceed with that.

MR KHOISAN: No feel free, go ahead, that's in fact - if you have a statement there that's fine, we can proceed from there.

MR BROWN: Just before I do that, just for the record, I want to express my discomfort and unhappiness about the fact that as I walk

into Cape Town on the third page of the newspaper you know it is - the article alludes to the fact that I could possibly be responsible for this whole situation. Anybody that reads between the lines will have that sort of opinion and the nuances created by, you know, suggesting that I am an arms dealer. So people read strangely and I felt uncomfortable.

And it would be good in the course of these events that the TRC can rectify this by attempting to be as neutral as possible about the reason why I am here to answer these questions.

And number two, a couple of weeks ago it was brought to my attention by some journalists that I have applied for amnesty for the death of these two youngsters. You obviously know that that is not the case, there is no record of that. There is no record of me attempting or making - sending out feelers about an amnesty possibility. I do not believe that there is any need for me to apply for amnesty, but there was this extremely popular talk, in Cape Town especially, that I have applied for amnesty. I was approached by journalists and this was really very problematic.

So even if this could just be clarified it would be good if the TRC could at one point set the record straight that I have not applied for amnesty. I think it's quite important because this talk is still floating around in the corridors of Cape Town.

Anyway I would proceed by talking about my relationship with these two, what I understand of what happened that evening,

and as the letter stated, to comment a little bit about the structure known as the Belgravia Youth Congress.

Robbie Waterwich, in particular, was a very close friend of mine. I have treated him like a younger brother. Robbie learnt a lot from me. We had lengthy political discussions into early hours of the morning. He looked up to me. He was a fast learner, he read a lot, he was a dedicated activist in the Athlone community. He had an exceptional personality. I don't think that there was anybody that disliked Robbie Waterwich, not of my knowledge, but he was also a militant and a staunch supporter of the African National Congress.

I met Robbie Waterwich in his capacity as the leader of the local Belgravia Youth Congress, which was an affiliate of the South African Youth Congress when I was asked to present a paper to members of his organisation explaining the concept, Colonialism of a Special type, which was at that point the dominant theoretical perspective in the African National Congress that explained the nature of South African society. The concept was a hotly disputed theoretical issue in the Western Cape and I was known to be a key advocate and a key mover in winning over many activists to this dominant view of the ANC.

This period was also dominated by concerns among many activists about the activities of some activists that supported the marxist workers tendency of the ANC. I was one of the few in the

Western Cape that understood this tendency's ideological platform, and was subsequently requested by many in the Western Cape, and at a national level, to explain and present lectures on this phenomenon.

On the night, the Sunday of the bomb blast that led to the death of these two youngsters my wife and I had a dinner engagement with some friends in Mitchell's Plain. The following day at work, at the University of Western Cape, many people spoke about this bomb blast and were seemingly unaware of the identity of the two people that were killed in the explosion.

That evening, the Monday, some of Robbie's Youth Congress colleagues came to my house to inform me that Robbie has not turned up at home this Sunday. This made me concerned and worried. I went to see Robbie's mother and other members of his family. They were obviously very concerned at this point. I gave a commitment to them that I will investigate the matter.

The following morning, Tuesday, after dropping my wife at work I went to see a gentleman called Melvyn Bruintjies. He worked at the Churches Urban Planning Commission at the time, in Salt River. I went to him because my earlier observations, as an underground operative anywhere, told me that Robbie and Melvyn had a "special" connection, "special" in inverted commas.

I asked Melvyn whether he had any knowledge of the situation regarding Robbie's disappearance. He, without hesitation

indicated that it was indeed Robbie Waterwich and Coline Williams who died in the explosion, and that he was Robbie and Coline's military commander, and that he was indeed commanding that specific operation.

He then went on to inform me that he was in some sort of security predicament and requested me to assist him in removing some remaining weapons from Robbie's house. I thought that this should not be a problem especially since I was a regular and open visitor to Robbie's house.

From Melvyn I proceeded to meet Robbie's uncle, Basil Snayers at the school where he taught, I can't remember the name of the school, to inform him about the situation and that there were more weapons in the house that might implicate other people.

We then went together to the house where Basil informed the rest of the family about the fact that it was indeed Robbie that died in the explosion.

I in turn informed them that Robbie was a member of Umkhonto weSizwe. This was based on the information that I received from Melvyn and there was in fact no reason why I should have doubted his **bona fides**.

Melvyn also gave me a very detailed idea of where the remaining weapons were. I then removed it. I also cleared the house of all sorts of books and papers that might link Robbie in any way to anything political. These items were not many and as far as

I was concerned not of any relevance. Most of these items have gone missing because of me moving house several times. The only items that I kept were some personal photographs of Robbie and a denim jacket that his mother gave me as a gift.

The weapons included an AK-47, three rounds of ammunition, one limpet mine. These weapons were all stored in the roof of the house and the limpet mine behind the bath.

On the morning of that Tuesday I also went to, out of concern, to see a Mr Neville Naidoo in Belhar to inform him that I have heard that he was in the area that night of the blast. I told him that he should take note of this information. I essentially did this to alert him in case anything goes wrong and he might be implicated.

Melvyn and I then had a further few meetings to broadly discuss the implications of this situation. At one of these meetings I also informed him of my conversation with Neville Naidoo and that I am worried that he might be in trouble. Melvyn did not suggest that this was not so and I assumed that Neville Naidoo was indeed connected to the situation.

He, Melvyn, however informed me that because of his potential security problem that he might have to leave the country, which he never did.

The AK-47 and rounds of ammunition were subsequently handed over to a gentleman called Andre Lincoln initially employed by the ANC's Department of Intelligence and Security and now a

senior a policeman in their Crime Intelligence division in the Western Cape. The limpet mine I gave to a friend, Desmond Abrahams for safe-keeping. He is still in possession of this.

Following all these events I withdrew myself from the situation. I did this because I felt that at this point I might myself be at risk and that I am too exposed and publicly too close to the situation.

About 10 to 14 days after all of this I went to Harare, Zimbabwe, to report to the ANC about the situation. The three people that I reported to, verbally and written, were Miss Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, neé Fraser; Mr Derek Hanekom and Mr Garth Strachan, who were all my ANC underground commanders.

The details of my report to these individuals were similar to the abovementioned notes and issues that I have just raised.

Comments on the Belgravia Youth Congress as requested by your letter.

Robbie Waterwich was a popular figure among the youth, an elderly in his community. The local community saw him as a hero.

Because of the political climate at the time and the popularity of Robbie many young people flocked to the Belgravia Youth Congress of which Robbie was the chairperson. I can recall that after his popular funeral the first meeting of the Belgravia Youth Congress was attended by well over 150 young workers and students.

Many of Robbie's close associates in the Belgravia Youth Congress were, however, concerned that there might be elements that would want to "hijack" this situation and misuse the legacy of Robbie for their narrow political interests. I then assisted and guided some of those that were in the leadership of the organisation to plan ahead.

This planning resulted in the convening of an in-depth strategic planning workshop somewhere in Noordhoek. The workshop was sponsored by the Cape Teachers Professional Association. This planning session resulted in an executive working committee being established. I cannot recall who were all on this committee. Their main brief was to take the process of consolidating the organisation. I was not a member of this committee, but remained very available as an adviser.

I also did not remain a member of this organisation. This was the case for two reasons, one, because it was important that those who were leaders of the Youth Congress to be responsible for the future of the organisation; and two, I moved house from Athlone to live in the northern suburbs of Cape Town.

However, subsequent to me moving out of Athlone I had one more meeting with some leaders of Belgravia Youth Congress. This meeting was mainly seeking my advice on various political issues. This meeting was held at my house in Ravensmead. I cannot recall who attended this meeting, it's way back. I was not a member of

the Belgravia Youth Congress prior to the death of Robbie Waterwich.

Some concluding comments that I want to make on this whole matter.

1. I was never a member of the Umkhonto weSizwe cell that Robbie Waterwich belonged to.
2. Indeed I was never specifically aware of Robbie Waterwich's involvement in Umkhonto weSizwe.
3. I was not familiar with Coline Williams and had absolutely no contact with her at any given point. I did not know where she stayed and what she did. I did not even know what she looked like.
4. I was not aware that there was a bomb blast in Athlone that Sunday evening. I only found this out the Monday morning after many associates spoke about this on campus.
5. Many people in Cape Town associated me, associated Robbie Waterwich with me mainly because of our very close personal relationship. Robbie was like a younger brother to me.
6. Many also believed that I was a major influence behind Robbie. This, however, was not true. Robbie was an intelligent, independent thinker and in many respects a loner.
I was, however, a major source of intellectual inspiration to Robbie Waterwich.

7. I do not understand the relationship between the events and subsequent events of his death and the Belgravia Youth Congress. I don't know what the connection is. I was never a member of the Belgravia Youth other than planning, albeit for a short while, a very critical role after his death.

Subsequent to his death and some period afterwards I came to learn through the grapevine that people were suggesting, and even claiming strongly, that I was responsible for the death of Robbie Waterwich and Coline Williams, responsible for his death, not because of an accident, but rather that this was planned because as some allegations went I actively worked for the apartheid government security service and that this operation was probably an operation of theirs.

This rumour and allegations have cost me many sleepless nights and hardships, both emotionally and professionally. At one point I heard that there was in fact an attempt by some to eliminate me. To this day I do not know how authentic this story was about the elimination and who, if any, was supposed to eliminate me.

I also do not know where the origin of this rumour lies and the allegation that I was responsible for the death of these two youngsters. It, however, caused me tremendous professional grief.

I did what I thought was the right thing to do in terms of this situation -

1. to help Melvyn Bruintjies, whose *bona fides* I did not question, because I believed his opinion that he was in trouble and to subsequently, and
2. to subsequently report the whole matter to the African National Congress in Harare.

I also reported this situation in 1992 to the ANC's Department of Intelligence and Security, and very recently to the ANC Truth and Reconciliation desk.

Subsequently I heard from various people that there is a suggestion, rumour or allegation that I have indeed applied for amnesty for the deaths of Robbie Waterwich and Coline Williams. The TRC itself knows how far this is indeed from the truth.

I believe that besides getting to the truth of this situation, it's my concluding statement, besides getting to the truth of this situation that there should be a public clearing of my name in this regard; that this information is passed to the ANC and that there is a public confirmation from the ANC side and from the TRC side about the correctness of this information.

And that's about what I can say on this matter. I am sure it leads to many questions.

CHAIRPERSON: I just have one or two questions based on your statement and then I will hand over to Mr Khoisan. Could you just tell us what work you were doing at the time of this event, where were you working?

MR BROWN: I worked at the Student Resource Centre at the University of the Western Cape, as the coordinator/manager.

CHAIRPERSON: And then just one more question of clarity, did you say in your statement whether the persons you reported to in Harare whether they - what response there was from their side with regard to your report to them, did you mention that in your statement is that not in there?

MR BROWN: Their response, no. They were - the day when I arrived in Harare they were extremely unhappy because by that - when I got there they already got a report from somewhere about the situation and whoever gave them this report suggested that I was somewhat connected to this operation. And the reason why they were unhappy is because I was not supposed to even be aware of this cell because I was involved in my own underground activities and there was no connection between underground operations and those of Melvyn Brintjies et al. So they were unhappy about that, but subsequent to my report we proceeded and everybody was happy and convinced of the facts, and then we dealt with other matter which were not relevant to that specific situation.

MR KHOISAN: Thank you very much Mr Brown. Just to clear up one point here, at the time of this incident, 1989, you were, would I be correct to say that you were one of the leaders of SYCO?

MR BROWN: No it's incorrect.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, so you were - I am just trying to determine in which structure to place you. You were a leader of SAYCO or you were just in another structure?

MR BROWN: Many would believe that I was probably a leader but officially ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Would you say that you were a member, or shall I put it this way - what I am trying to do is I am trying to place you in a particular structure just for the purpose of clarity to say that you went and you presented these papers on colonialism of a special type, setting straight the record with regard to the MWT and those type of things, obviously you held some standing and some position, and for the record I want to get clarification on which structure you were located in.

MR BROWN: Ja I mean I would say that broadly I was a member of the South African Youth Congress. I will not claim that I was a leader, but I was one of the few in the Western Cape that had significant ideological and theoretical clarity on many political questions and I was subsequently asked by many to assist them in their political perspective and so on. So in that sense I suppose I did have standing, but I don't want to claim that I was a leader. In fact I was never a leader, I never led anything. I was never a member of any executive committee, of any structure, but I was significant, a significant player in shaping the theoretical and

ideological platforms of the broad democratic movement in the Western Cape.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: And in the South African Youth Congress I played a very significant role at a national level. All, most of the NES, National Executive Committee member of SAYCO required me to provide theoretical clarity on many issues.

MR KHOISAN: Just in terms of, you know I want to, of course you yourself say that you have - the person known as Coline Williams was not really known to you and you had no, or very little association, your knowledge of her is minimal or nothing?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Zero. But you paint a very sensitive and poignant picture of Robbie, one that suggests that there is an intimacy, a deep friendship, would I be correct to say that there was some kind of a mentor relationship between you and Robbie?

MR BROWN: Definitely.

MR KHOISAN: He looked up to you. And politically - or shall I - at which point, when exactly did you get to know him? Can you locate it in a period, in a timeframe?

MR BROWN: It's difficult, I cannot ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Late '88 maybe?

MR BROWN: Maybe you know, it's difficult for me to recall that sort of detail but maybe 1988.

MR KHOISAN: Well let me put it to you that in late '88 according to, you know, people that were part of that area and part of the structure, let me put it that in late '88 that he - your relationship became one which was tighter.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: And now so you would have essentially seen him develop politically from an activist engaging in this, shall I say, Youth Congress politics to one which had developed a more calcified attitude, a hardened attitude against the regime, which is essentially probably a prerequisite for taking a harder line, a more serious action against the then existing government, would you have seen that development?

MR BROWN: I think many in the South African Youth Congress were overt, broadly speaking, overt supporters of the African National Congress and of Umkhonto weSizwe. SAYCO was launched with a very militant tone and everybody that joined this organisation joined the organisation with that profile, and that profile was the South African Youth Congress' commitment to the ANC and its support and justification for the armed struggle at that point. So everybody that joined the organisation joined with that sort of consciousness. You didn't come into SAYCO and develop a support for the ANC and a support for Umkhonto weSizwe.

My observation of Robbie's evolution and Robbie's growth was more at an intellectual level. My engagement with Robbie was

intellectual. I introduced him to Lenin, to Marx, to Engels, to the classics, more than introducing him to the more superficial theoretical questions of the liberation movement, and that is where I can say a lot about Robbie's growth.

But as far as I am concerned the moment you become a member of SAYCO there's an automatic affinity and support to the ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe, so I wouldn't say that was as a consequence ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: No, what I am trying to do is that you are his mentor and I am trying to find out how you observed his development. Because obviously shall I say you are his mentor but you are also his confidante, because I have been in a position in my life, and many other people have where they've had mentor, and it is with your mentor that you wrestle with the philosophical questions of the day, you know, in your case you introduced him to the classics, helped him read and understand and of course he needed somebody to spar with, to wrestle, to grasp those deep and timeless concepts.

And then you also watch somebody's social development. You are able to see the little nuances, you know that this person is moving in a particular direction. They may be susceptible to one or another kind of activity. As a mentor, because of that intimacy, that bond, you are capable of ascertaining that.

So in my view I am trying to find out, I am putting that to you in a way of trying to find out if you could sketch for us maybe from that period how you watched his development, how you watch him develop and also if there were concerns about his associations or maybe that he was leaning or going towards a certain particular line of action that you could detect.

MR BROWN: It's difficult to give an absolute comment on this but as I said earlier that Robbie was a militant and a staunch supporter of the ANC. My association with Robbie was indeed that of mentorship but it was - my personal relationship with Robbie was unequal, it wasn't, we weren't on an equal platform. I was older, I was more experienced, I was married, I had my own house, I had my own car, I had my own job, I had money, I had my own activities which were not open to the public and so on. So in a sense at a personal level I was relatively also separate from him. So Robbie came to my house almost every day to have dinner there or to come and have a cold drink or whatever the case may be, but we weren't socialising together. That must be very clear. We didn't go to parties together and to movies together and stuff like that.

He was like a younger brother to me which I helped along, but I had very little control over Robbie. I had very little intention to interfere in his personal life, in his associations and so on, other than shaping or assisting him to understand politics and assisting him to understand the complexities of politics in the Western Cape.

However, one of the reasons why I was able to go to Melvyn Bruintjies, for example, was precisely because of my own training as an underground operative. I was able to pick up that there was indeed a special connection between Robbie and Melvyn Bruintjies which ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Did he ever tell you, did Robbie ever ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Did he ever allude to the fact that he had been approached by people who was in fact busy with one or other kind of activities which were of a more non-romantic nature like a military nature?

MR BROWN: No, no.

MR KHOISAN: Did you maybe observe that he was taking a tone - was there things, certain, I mean if you build up a close relationship with somebody you have a way of knowing just by the time that they come to your house, by the fact that they leave early, or they are concerned about time, or there's a certain preciseness about them, or there's certain things that happen when you join a political military structure, when you actually become part of a military structure, where you become conscious of a lot of different things, like you say you are a very perceptive individual, could you pick that up? That's what we are trying to go through here.

MR BROWN: I think my feeling is that Robbie was a good operative because he concealed it to many, I think everybody. He was a jovial person. He was a happy person. He didn't have overt or evident commitments to engagements other than his meetings you know in the Youth or whatever the case may be. It's difficult for me to think about pointers, you know, that you are suggesting. I can't recall in that sort of detail because it wasn't part of my way of dealing with Robbie. But I had a broad observation of his movements and that's why I felt confident to go to Melvyn because ... (intervention)

MR KHOISAN: What was it that showed you that he was a special or shall I say a different kind of relationship between Robbie and Melvyn, what was it that tipped you to the fact that there might be a sort-of a command relationship, a military relationship or a different kind of relationship?

MR BROWN: I think when you observe people sometimes I mean there's no pointers but you store the thing in your subconscious and it registers when there's an event, and I think it's as simple as that. I saw them together, it looked odd, it looked different ... (intervention)

MR KHOISAN: At meetings or socially?

MR BROWN: No, at the social level, and that's not many. And the day when I set out to investigate this whole situation the first thing that crossed my mind was check this out, just ... (intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Check out Melvyn Brintjies. Now you said that Robbie was like a younger brother to you, right, now I know that the way I would operate with my younger brother is that if I am in touch with him constantly I would know what he is doing, when was the last time you saw Robbie before he died?

MR BROWN: The first thing is, the first comment that I want to make, the manner in which you deal with your family does not determine how I deal with my family.

MR KHOISAN: No, no, I am not.

MR BROWN: Okay.

MR KHOISAN: Ja.

MR BROWN: So how I deal with my younger brother might be different to how you deal with your younger brother, so let's not use family morality to try and work out the nuances. But nevertheless I, it's difficult to recall exactly when, but if I can make a sweeping statement maybe with regard to that question, when last did I see him, it's probably I saw him the Friday, because Robbie came to my office at the University every day, anyway, so I could say it's probable you know that I did see him the Friday. I definitely didn't see him over the weekend, but ja, he probably came me the Friday, because he came to my office every day. On most cases he took a lift with me from work. He would wait for me in my office until I leave and then he would leave with me. But I can't say for sure that that is the case.

MR KHOISAN: So shall I say that, if I put it to you that you were with Robbie at Arap on the Friday before he died?

MR BROWN: I didn't work at Arap.

MR KHOISAN: No but ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: I worked at the Student Resource Centre.

MR KHOISAN: Or shall I say you were at UWC together on the Friday?

MR BROWN: I am saying it's probable, I'm not saying it is the case.

MR KHOISAN: So you are saying that there is a possibility of that?

MR BROWN: Ja, because he came to see me every day.

MR KHOISAN: H'n. And when he saw you did you detect anything special, anything concerning, disconcerting something out of the ordinary?

MR BROWN: I can't answer that, I mean, really. If I did see him it was probably just one of those normal visits of Robbie to my office. I can't even think that I did see him or not or - it's difficult to...

MR KHOISAN: Okay, now let us just go down to - do you remember having a conversation with me?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Do you remember having a telephone conversation with me?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Alright. And then we met in a restaurant.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: And when we met do you remember we talked about the facts as you could remember them about the situation?

MR BROWN: H'n.

MR KHOISAN: And it was your position that you were approached, people came to you and told you that there's been this incident and you said that when people came to you you had to find out what happened and you went to the commander and confirmed that it was indeed - people came to you with the news, that's what you said to me, that somebody had died, people had died, and that you went to the commander and confirmed that this was indeed Robbie and Coline. And you put it to us that you went to Melvyn on the Tuesday at CUPC in Salt River, right?

To discuss this matter.

I had another conversation with you at the time I was trying to get an exact inventory from you and I mentioned the name of a person by - I mentioned a person by the name of Wesley and you put it to me that Wesley came to you and told you, is that your position now?

MR BROWN: As I say, there is a Youth Congress associates came to inform me that Robbie did not turn up on the Sunday.

MR KHOISAN: And were you in at the time of this particular incident, were you in the vicinity of Athlone or in Belgravia or anywhere near there? Where were you ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I have just said ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Where were you when this explosion happened?

MR BROWN: I have just said, and this is now repeating what I have already said ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: We are trying to - we are going to go through, we are going to go through this ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: No I get your point Sir ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: record, because we do need to, we want to be clear. You've told us your statement, we want to be able to have the back and forth here so we can test this, so we can find out, we can get clarity and at the end of the day we can address some of the concerns that you raise right at the very beginning which are very, which we take very seriously. We take your concerns that you raise with us and what you put to us at the beginning we take it very seriously, but we can only get to those concerns once we are able to satisfy ourselves that the information that we are getting here, we can be able to test it. Are you with us there?

MR BROWN: Right.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

MR BROWN: I was not in Belgravia. The Sunday night of the bomb blast my wife and I had dinner with friends in Mitchell's Plain.

MR KHOISAN: In Mitchell's Plain. Okay, so ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: And on return to Athlone where I stayed, where I stayed is in fact way from Belgravia, I stayed in Gatesville, I mean it's quite a distance, it's right at the top end of Klipfontein in a sense and Belgravia is right at the bottom end of Klipfontein.

MR KHOISAN: So you had - you did not know about the explosion?

MR BROWN: Not at all.

MR KHOISAN: Did you at any point visit the house of Adiola Maker?

MR BROWN: When?

MR KHOISAN: In and around the time, in that day.

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: The next day?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: You didn't visit her house?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Now when you spoke with me the last time you told me that there was a situation regarding this woman Adiola Maker in that somebody had arrived at her house.

MR BROWN: Neville Naidoo.

MR KHOISAN: Do you remember you told me that?

MR BROWN: Neville Naidoo.

MR KHOISAN: Now how did you gain that information?

MR BROWN: Well Adiola, as a house friend of ours, and as a close friend of Robbie's as well, as an attempt to put the puzzle together of what could possibly be the situation around Robbie, she mentioned that she heard the blast and shortly after the blast Neville Naidoo arrived at the house, sort of out of breath, and asked for sleeping pills. That's all that she said. She, I don't know whether you can get hold of her to confirm this, but she's in Australia at the moment.

MR KHOISAN: And she said that Neville arrived at her house, what a half-an-hour after the explosion, somewhere around there. Now when did she tell you this exactly, do you know, the next day or?

MR BROWN: The next day.

MR KHOISAN: The next day. - So you went to her house the next day to find out what ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: No she came to us.

MR KHOISAN: Huh?

MR BROWN: She came to us.

MR KHOISAN: She heard the explosion, it's right near her house.

MR BROWN: Adiola was like a - Adiola came to our house also like every day, you know, she came to us.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now just let me clarify one issue here and that is the relationship between you and Neville Naidoo, how do you know this man? In what particular way do you know him?

MR BROWN: Well I lived in Bellville before I got married. Bellville is next to Belhar where Neville stayed, we were all sort of youth activists in what is generally referred to as the northern suburbs, so there was that contact. And then also I was involved with a -I had a girlfriend that stayed right opposite Neville so you know - but we were youth activists.

MR KHOISAN: You were youth activists, you knew each other that way?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

MR BROWN: Not intimately, but we knew each other.

MR KHOISAN: So you met with him to inform him that there was an issue of concern regarding his presence in and around the scene of the explosion?

MR BROWN: I told him that he must take note of the information because I thought if there's going to be any security implications then he should take note of it. Neville was a high-profile character and I told him, you know, take note of this information, watch your back.

MR KHOISAN: Mmm, did you ever meet with him after that again to discuss this matter?

MR BROWN: No, until recently.

MR KHOISAN: And what was the content of your meeting before you got here?

MR BROWN: Before?

MR KHOISAN: Before you got to this hearing. In and around the time that you received a notification from this Commission regarding this hearing did you meet with Neville Naidoo to discuss certain matters with regard to this incident and its aftermath or its antecedents?

MR BROWN: I told him that my feeling is, and this is a feeling that I have had for seven years, but it's a feeling that I have kept to myself, but it's the first time that I went to him directly and told him that my feeling is that he has some connection, whether my assessment is right or wrong, but that's my feeling; and two, that there is a connection between him and Melvyn Bruintjies.

And I told him that in the Western Cape, through various maliciousness there is this rumour or allegation that I am responsible for this situation. And my - based - the essence of my conversation with Neville was to tell him go and sort out your mess.

I am not going to sort out this mess, I have to sort out my own mess here. I have attempted to get hold of Melvyn Bruintjies to tell him the same thing.

But nevertheless that is the essence of my conversation.

MR KHOISAN: Now did you inform Mr Naidoo that you had given us certain articles, weapons or things?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: For forensic testing?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: No. Now just back to the question of forensic testing, do you remember that when we met in the restaurant that we were going to meet at Club Manenberg to make an arrangement and that we are talking about five months ago, to obtain a limpet mine? You've put it to us now that that particular limpet mine is in the hands of Desmond Abrahams and you are putting it to this Commission that we can obtain that now?

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, right. Now to be clear you see the thing is that what we ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I haven't seen him for ages, so let's hope that it's all intact.

MR KHOISAN: Well the thing is that that is something that you have to do. We have asked you, we have requested that particular thing a long time ago. But I want to be clear about this, just straight, did you ever discuss anything militarily with Robbie?

MR BROWN: It's a broad question you know, what do you mean? Can you be a little bit more specific? I don't understand the question.

MR KHOISAN: Did some of your discussions centre on military stuff? Did you talk about action? Did you discuss weapons, did you discuss explosives, did you discuss particular things ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Did you - were ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: What was the - did you ever talk about anything military with him?

MR BROWN: Probably at a theoretical level.

MR KHOISAN: Yes, like?

MR BROWN: Questions of insurrection, questions of - it's, I did this with many people. The classics were full of military theories.

MR KHOISAN: But I am talking here about practical application you see.

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, theoretical level that's one level but ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Did you ever ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN:discuss. You didn't actually, there was no exchange of any information that regarded practical application of these theories?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: No. He didn't show you any weapons at any time?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Did you know that there were weapons in his house?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: In his roof, in his ceiling?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. When you came to me, when we talked in the restaurant you told me that you went into the house - okay you went to the commander, the commander told you that there's stuff in the house and that you got the map and that you went out there and you got out, you got out AK-47, you got out grenades plus one limpet which was badly stashed which you didn't hand back, that's verbatim what you told me. You got out an AK, grenades, plus one limpet which was badly stashed, that's what you told me.

Now when you came and sent me an inventory, your inventory was one AK-47 plus three rounds, and one limpet and when you gave us the inventory this morning you neglected to inform us of the grenades.

MR BROWN: Ja, I, let me just clarify the grenades. I think, not I think, but I did not remove two grenades from Robbie's house. There was no grenades in his house. I do, however, have two grenades that I have received from this colleague of Robbie's,

Wesley, and the reason why Wesley brought two grenades to me is because he told me someone gave it to him, and he was scared to use it. He didn't know whether it was real or not real. I took it and in fact it's still with, it's also with this guy, Desmond Abrahams. But there is not a connection between the grenades and the stuff that I removed from Robbie's house.

MR KHOISAN: So that's two grenades?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: But you told me, I mean you told me when I called you and said that I had spoken to - because when we first met in the restaurant you didn't inform me that you had gone into that house with Basil Snayer, okay. You said that you went to the commander and you went and got this stuff at the house because you knew the house.

But then I went and spoke with Basil and Basil also gave me an inventory because he said that you went there, you came to his school at Garlandale High School and then you made an arrangement and you went there with one car, a red car, a Golf I believe it was, and then you had a map with you and you went into the ceiling and you got this, that and the other thing. And then I asked you, I quizzed you, when I asked you to send me an inventory and I matched up the inventory, and I asked you specifically I put it to you on the phone and I asked you about the grenades and you came back to me, oh, I neglected to put that on.

MR BROWN: Ja. Listen ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: No, no, no, you see I am not trying to entrap you I just want ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: No, no, no ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: ... we need to have, we just want a sense of clarity in that those weapons that were in Robbie Waterwich's house or were somehow connected to that incident or to that particular cell or structure could have a bearing on what happened in this case, and that is what we are trying to establish. Do you understand?

MR BROWN: Umm, Mr Khoisan, I put it to you now that I did not remove two grenades. The discussions that we had prior to this hearing was essentially of a verbal nature. You could have - I am not saying that I did not give you that information, but I don't think one must be hardpressed on our conversation, and not five months ago, we had a conversation in that restaurant more than one year ago. So let's start afresh on a lot of these things. But nevertheless I did tell you about the grenades, I was wrong. Those grenades were not removed from Robbie's house. It's as simple as that. I was wrong when I told you that I did.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I just - just to try and get my ducks in a row. It seems what is at dispute now is what actually came from Robbie's house and are you saying that what came from Robbie Waterwich's house was an AK-47 and three rounds of ammunition, three limpet mines ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: One limpet mine.

CHAIRPERSON: One limpet mine. And what else?

MR BROWN: That's all.

CHAIRPERSON: That's all. Now where does the story about the grenades intersect, what happened then?

MR BROWN: Umm, I don't know, maybe Zenzile can help me out here, but essentially the two grenades in a sense have very little or have nothing to do with what I went to do at Robbie's house and what I went to remove there. But I could have, as he's indicating, suggested that I also took it from there, but it was not the case.

I got those grenades from a guy called, a youngster called Wesley. I can't remember what's his surname. He was a close friend of Robbie's, however. He came to me, he said he got this from someone, he doesn't know the person, the person gave him some rudimentary training on the street. It was a time when things were like really hectic in the country and this happened all over the show were people did make those sorts of overtures on the streets. So he gave it to me because he was nervous ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Right.

MR BROWN: ...about the authenticity of those two grenades. I took it from him and I gave it to a friend of mine for safekeeping and I assume that it's still with him.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. Now did Wesley give you these grenades before or after Robbie's death?

MR BROWN: It was after.

CHAIRPERSON: Gave it to you after Robbie's death.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now, in terms of the exact sequence of events here at which point did you approach Basil Snayer, when, when did you - did you go that same night, the night that he died, around midnight? Would I be correct to say that, or would he be correct if he says that you came to him around midnight?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: The night that Robbie died, that you came to him and he said -

"On the night that Robbie died, that very evening around 12, midnight, a certain Geoff came to see me and I am not sure whether...."

MR BROWN: No that's incorrect.

MR KHOISAN: He's incorrect. So you are saying that you saw him after you went and saw Melvyn?

MR BROWN: I went to - no, no, no. I went to Robbie's house. On the Monday people spoke about this bomb blast, right ... (intervention)

MR KHOISAN: So you went at the night, Monday night?

MR BROWN: When I got home after work some of Robbie's associates came to my house to tell me that Robbie did not turn up the Sunday. I immediately went to his house, the Monday evening,

to go and enquire what the situation was, and by that time everybody had the assumption, the critical assumption that Robbie was probably one of the people that died, but no-one had any proof or evidence whatever of that. I then told them, that Monday evening, that I will investigate the matter.

MR KHOISAN: So you saw Basil Snayer that Monday evening?

MR BROWN: Yes to go and enquire what is happening. Then on the Tuesday, after seeing Melvyn, the first person that I went to was Basil to inform him that there's confirmation from the person that was heading that operation that Robbie was there, and Robbie died.

MR KHOISAN: You see that's the part now we have to understand, because - you got, you went to the family and you confirmed that these people said that there was an explosion, by that time had their names been, of the victims been released?

MR BROWN: No. Let me give you - I will repeat the sequence of events ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: You see - no, -no, I am talking about the fact that you went to Melvyn on the Tuesday.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: The way that particular, we are talking about the Ashley Kriel detachment, that particular cell as you say Melvyn was the overall commander, or part of the command structure, let me put it that way, right, and that particular cell operated in a certain way, but you went to him on the Tuesday. But you just told us that you

went to the family on the Monday. And I am trying to ascertain because what we are trying to find out is at which stage it became known that it was those people who died in that explosion. How did you ascertain that?

MR BROWN: Can I repeat the sequence of events?

MR KHOISAN: Go ahead.

MR BROWN: One, Sunday my wife and I had dinner, a dinner engagement with friends in Mitchell's Plain, and we probably, probably got back late, probably after 12, probably one o'clock, probably two o'clock, I cannot remember. But we had a dinner engagement with close friends and we probably stayed there very late. There was no reason for us to - we didn't have kids or anything.

Two, Monday I went to work oblivious of the fact that there was a bomb blast, went to work, everybody was talking on campus about this bomb blast in Athlone and that two people died in this toilet, seemingly unaware of who could possibly be the victims, or the two, or what their identity is, no-one was aware. No-one could tell me anything of that sort. If there were rumours or suggestions that it might have been two hobos that died you know, or whatever.

I went home like normal and - because over that period there was a number of bomb blasts in Cape Town anyway, so it wasn't of any significance to me really. So it didn't bother me the fact that

there was a bomb blast in Athlone and there were two people killed, died you know. It didn't bother me.

It's when I got home that after having coffee or whatever that these people came to my house to tell me that Robbie hasn't turned up at home yet, the Sunday, and he's still not at home. And it is at that point that I went to his parents to go and enquire when did he leave home and how was he, was he okay, did he say where he was going to. I didn't have any idea of what is going on, but ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Who were these people, sorry, who were these people who came to your house to tell you that Robbie hadn't pitched?

MR BROWN: Wesley.

MR KHOISAN: The same chap who gave you the grenade?

MR BROWN: Ja, I don't know what his surname is.

CHAIRPERSON: So Wesley arrives at your house.

MR BROWN: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: And he tells you that Robbie has not pitched up at home?

MR BROWN: yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. And then you go to his family, immediately?

MR BROWN: Not immediately....

CHAIRPERSON: But I mean as the next, as the next step.

MR BROWN: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: You immediately go to the Waterwich family?

MR BROWN: Exactly, ja.

CHAIRPERSON: And what do you say to the Waterwich family?

MR BROWN: When I get there I want to know what is the situation. When did Robbie leave? Did he say where he was going to and so on? We spoke about all of that. Because no-one was sure at that point, there was no confirmation whether it could have been him that died, we took a precautionary step by removing political literature or whatever from his house so that if he is not the person that died, what if he is maybe just injured then obviously the police will interrogate him and they will come to the - so it was a precautionary measure. But I told them that I will investigate the matter.

And then the following morning, this is the sequence of events, the following morning I went to see Melvyn Brintjies, but I did not inform the family on the Monday or on the Sunday that it was him ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Right, so where did you meet with - did you make an arrangement to meet with Melvyn or what? What did you do?

MR BROWN: No I went straight to his work?

CHAIRPERSON: Where's that?

MR BROWN: It was at a place called Churches Urban Planning Commission in Salt River.

CHAIRPERSON: So you went to CUPC?

MR BROWN: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. And what did you say to Melvyn?

MR BROWN: I told him, you know I asked him to take a walk with me. We took a walk. I told him listen, there's a problem, I cannot recall my exact words, I must be quite honest here, but there's a problem, Robbie has not turned up, can you clarify the matter for me? Which he did.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you not find this interesting, you are not part of the command structure, you are not part of any political organisation, you are not part of any formal structures, you go straight to a commander and you say to the commander, heh, the chap hasn't pitched up and he tells you a story?

MR BROWN: That's how it happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

MR KHOISAN: Now just for the record ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I think one of the reasons why, and this is an assumption, okay, this is not fact, this is - I think one of the reasons why he probably told me is because of the fact that I was extremely confident when I spoke to him. I asked him Melvyn can you clarify the situation for me, almost as if there is no else that ought to clarify it, and he told me listen, it is Robbie that died in the bomb

blast and the other person is Coline Williams. I didn't know her.

He told me this. He told me that he was the commander of that operation and that was it. And then we discussed the removal of weapons and stuff like that. He told me exactly where it was and so on and so on. But I cannot say, yes maybe in hindsight I do find it strange that someone just volunteers that information, but I just assumed now that it's probably because I appeared to be very confident.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, just for the record and you had - earlier we had gone back and forth about the timeframe when we last spoke, the record as part of the file built up around this case says that at 3:45 p.m. on the 22nd May we had a conversation where we discussed the issue of Basil Snayer and you going to Basil Snayer's school; where we discussed the stuff in the ceiling and behind the bath; where you discussed the fact that you gave a - you went to Shell House, you spoke with Mongesi I believe and Cheryl, and where you also informed me and stated once again that Wesley came to your place and said "Robbie has not returned". That's what he told you told, quote, unquote, okay?

MR BROWN: Robbie hasn't pitched up, he hasn't returned you know.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I can't be as absolute as that about the quotes.

MR KHOISAN: Now I am just - now we are there. Melvyn's response to you, or let me put it to you that Melvyn was part of a military command, when you came to him and you told him that there are things in the house, you came to him and that you told - did you tell him that there are things in the house or did he tell you that there were things in the house? He told you that there were things in the house, okay? And so you had basically come and blown his cover. You told him that you, by putting the question to him you are saying to him that you are connected to this particular operation or you are part of a structure, a military structure here. You basically exposed, he's exposed to you, that's right?

MR BROWN: Yes, he did expose himself to me.

MR KHOISAN: What was his response? Did he say that he needed to check with other people in the command before a decision was taken about the removal of the things? Because he wasn't an individual, he was part of a command structure, of a detachment.

MR BROWN: Ja, everybody didn't uphold the discipline and procedures, like in all organisations and institutions so I am not going to say whether he was supposed to ask anybody else or whether he wasn't supposed to ask, the fact of the matter is he didn't.

MR KHOISAN: You are saying for the record he took a decision himself on the spot?

MR BROWN: He told me, as I approached him, he told me, he confirmed that these two were the people that were the victims in this blast.

MR KHOISAN: And also for the record he confirmed that there were things in the house, so he told you that there were things in the house that needed to be taken out ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: And that he took a decision himself on the spot, is that what you are saying?

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: He never approached anybody in the command?

MR BROWN: Not as far as I - my knowledge goes.

MR KHOISAN: You see that ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: After, after I spoke to Melvyn ... (intervention)

MR KHOISAN: You see that's what I find problematic because, because you don't know - you have not been part of that particular detachment, you are not part of the command and control structure.

There has been no interaction with you and there are logistics in this house and he - after you come to him and tell him and basically put it to him that you are part of this thing, he on the spot takes a decision that this stuff has to be removed. Did he give you a specific tasking? Did he say this and this and this or did he just say here's a map, go and get the stuff?

MR BROWN: Sir, I, first of all, I don't know what is problematic about it. It's maybe odd, but I am not sure whether it's problematic, I think there's a difference.

MR KHOISAN: Well let's not spar with words ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: No, no, no ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: I just want to be exact, because we've also spoken to all the people that have been mentioned already here ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Excuse me ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: We've spoken to them and they have given us their version of events ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Excuse me ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Now you are giving us your version of events and we want to be able to say, now - we have to be at the end of the day say, if that person told us this then that person is presenting an incorrect view and we want to be able to be confident to say that we say this version is more believable, more close to the truth, the veracity here has been tested ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Excuse me Sir.

MR KHOISAN: Ja.

MR BROWN: To interrupt you here. If you allow me to explain situations then I think we will get to some clarity on a lot of these things. I do not think I am semantical about a comment that I make about it being odd and it being problematic. The reason why I am

commenting about it, it's not that I want to play with words, but it's important in the line of question that you assume that you are also very - or conscious of the type of words and nuances that you therefore create. But be that as it may I can certainly say it was odd that this man agrees so readily to divulge or to volunteer the information. The fact of the matter, however, is that he did.

And he requested me, it was a request, he asked me for a favour because he believed that he might be in difficulty, he might have a problem, a security problem and because of my easy access to the premise I told him that I would help him. But it was not a command, it wasn't an order, I had no reason why I should take an order from anybody in that situation. It was a request, it was a favour that I did for the man, okay.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. And specifically he gave you a map, he told you exactly where the things were

MR BROWN: He told me where it was.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now, you see now, did he at any time say to you that, based on the fact that they exposed you, that he's exposed to you, that there would be a need to coopt you into the Ashley Kriel detachment as a way of sort-of protecting themselves all round?

MR BROWN: It was his, he did make that sort of point, I told him it's not possible.

MR KHOISAN: Did you say to him that you would want to check with your commanders, or your..."

MR BROWN: I told him it's not possible, I will think about it. But he can feel secure with the knowledge that I know, you know, who was really involved in this whole situation. And I went to - and the reason why I told him that I must first think about it is to play for time, I wanted to get to Harare to go and report the matter.

MR KHOISAN: And that's where you met Geraldine Moleketi-Fraser, Derek Hanekom and Garth Strachan?

MR BROWN: That's right.

MR KHOISAN: And when you came back from Harare you told them, no.

MR BROWN: Nee...



MR KHOISAN: You don't think you can be coopted into the Ashley Kriel military detachment?

MR BROWN: I didn't even know it was called the Ashley Kriel military detachment.

MR KHOISAN: But into their structure?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: You said no I don't think so?

MR BROWN: Mmm, but I told him, listen feel safe with the information. And in fact the only time that I have in fact spoken about Melvyn in regard to this whole matter was when I met you.

MR KHOISAN: Mmmm.

MR BROWN: There is absolutely no-one else that claim that I have ever, you know, spoken about the fact that I had knowledge of Melvyn's connection with that operation, no-one, with the exception of my ex-wife. I mean that's obvious. But you know, no-one. I think subsequent to me talking to you, subsequent to me talking to you I might have spoken to one or two other people but he was in fact safe in the sense that I haven't spoken to anybody about this.

MR KHOISAN: At that time did you also know a fellow by the name of Johan Hattingh?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: And what was Johan Hattingh's - or shall I say how do you know him? How do you know this man Hattingh?

MR BROWN: He was introduced to me by a professor at the University and to the fact that he is busy doing research and I had most of the literature at the Resource Centre to help him with that, and that is how I got to know him. He needed most of the classics to do his research and I had a full collection of all the classics.

MR KHOISAN: So you had a political relationship with him too, Johan Hattingh?

MR BROWN: Well I have had a relationship with him that spans more than, about ten years now.

MR KHOISAN: About 1987 to be exact, that's when it started.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: And how would you describe him? Where on the political spectrum, what is he, who is he?

MR BROWN: Can I approach...

MR KHOISAN: Yes, yes.

MR BROWN: Can I approach you?

MR KHOISAN: Yes surely.

NO RECORDING ON TAPE DURING THIS TIME

HEARING ADJOURNS AT 10H10

ON RESUMPTION AT 11H07

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, Geoff let's resume. Related to your request just before the break I'd like to make a ruling that since this is a Section 29, which is an *in camera* hearing all the information given to us through this process remains strictly confidential.

The line of questioning with regard to the individual in question will be just in relation to this particular matter and it will not involve anything else. So I would like to make the ruling that Mr Khoisan continues to question you about this matter and to reassure you that investigation conducted here is strictly confidential and private.

EXAMINATION BY MR KHOISAN: (cont)

Thank you Commissioner. Ja in respect of this particular individual, John Hattingh, Johan Hattingh, you say you met him in, or your relationship began in 1997, is that correct?

MR BROWN: That's right.

SECTION 29 INQUIRY

TRC/WESTERN PROVINCE

MR KHOISAN: Essentially when we say we are interrogating the incident we are interrogating the incident, its antecedents and its aftermath, okay, so any and all information relevant to that which we believe may have a relationship to impact upon that incident, or situation which led to that incident are relevant to this investigation.

Now in respect of that what is, who is Johan Hattingh and what was his particular relationship to you? How did your relationship begin and what was it?

MR BROWN: Well essentially as I said I was introduced to him by a professor at the University of the Western Cape who told me that Mr Hattingh is busy with a thesis through the University of Stellenbosch. The professor knew that I had all the relevant literature. The University of Western Cape didn't have it. He needed to consult all the classics, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky and so on and so on, and I had a full, the full volumes of all of these classical Marxist theorists, so that is how our relationship started.

Subsequent to that we never broke off our relationship and we continued engaging each other. He came to Cape Town quite regularly and we usually met whenever he was in Cape Town.

Subsequent to that I occasionally, especially when I moved to Johannesburg, I occasionally did strategic analysis for Mr Hattingh, strategic analysis around politico-security issues in South Africa and in Africa and for which he paid me.

Subsequent to that, and very recently I have discovered, or I was informed, officially, that Mr Hattingh has been a member of the National Intelligence Services and with the transformation in 1994 he became a senior operative of the National Intelligence Agency. However, these things aren't confirmed now but I will put it, you know, seeing that this is confidential here.

Subsequent to that the company which Mr Hattingh managed and owned was essentially a National Intelligence front.

MR KHOISAN: And what was the name of that company?

MR BROWN: H & H.

MR KHOISAN: H & H.

MR BROWN: H & H. As I say I don't have official documentation to suggest this but this is indeed the case. Mr Hattingh has recently resigned from the National Intelligence Agency because of many complicated matters. But that is in a nutshell my relationship with Mr Hattingh. At the moment I do not really have a relationship with him.

MR KHOISAN: Now as H & H, what was that? You say it was a NIS front company but what was it essentially?

MR BROWN: It was a company that did various things, socio-politico research, political security research, crime research, development research and so on. And it had a series of smaller subsidiaries, news agency, ja.

MR KHOISAN: What was the name of the news agency?

MR BROWN: Trans-Africa News Agency.

MR KHOISAN: H'n. And at no point did Mr Hattingh inform you that he was in fact a NIS operative?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Were there other persons that were in his orbit or operated in and around him who may also have been on the periphery or directly connected to any political organisation ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: ...who, and who were those people?

MR BROWN: Many.

MR KHOISAN: Can you name some?

MR BROWN: I've introduced almost 50% of people that were or are still associated with Mr Hattingh. Many of these people paid for various services rendered, but it ranges from unfamiliar people to very high profile people. From Maxwell Nemadzivanani, who was the secretary general of the Pan Africanist Congress to Jacob Zuma who is the national chairman of the ANC to Mr Garth Strachan who is a member of the central committee of the South African Communist Party, to many.

MR KHOISAN: And you introduced them all at one point or another to...

MR BROWN: Not all, I introduced a substantial amount of them.

MR KHOISAN: And they all worked or had some connection to...
...(intervention)

MR BROWN: They had a relationship.

MR KHOISAN: They had a relationship.

MR BROWN: The nature of the relationship is not completely clear to me, but I do believe it is a present issue at hand in the Intelligence community.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now let me just pose a direct question. In terms of the conversation that you and I had, when I refer to the conversation I am referring to that conversation in the restaurant.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: I asked you whether you had any suspicions about the Belgravia Youth Congress, whether it could have been infiltrated or stuff like that and you said that there were lots of people around, it's a great possibility that it could have been infiltrated, is that a correct recollection?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Did you suspect anybody in particular of infiltrating this group?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: You couldn't pinpoint anybody as such?

MR BROWN: No. My involvement with the Belgravia Youth Congress was very short. It was intense but it was short.

MR KHOISAN: More in terms of you laying down, or shall I say you presenting the rectification, to keep people on the line, this is the position, colonialism of a special type, this is the MWT, you know, this is how they operate, in the big picture this is how things work, sort-of getting people along the line, getting them ideologically aligned and realigned so that people form part of sort-of one long march, instead of all desperate groups striking out at phantoms?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: And in that respect, in and around that time, was there any discussions around maybe setting up a left-oriented bookstore for which some market research was being done, paid for by Mr Hattingh?

MR BROWN: No, no market research was done as such. No, I attempted to get money from Mr Hattingh, not for market research but to, as an initial capital layout for such a bookstore, he did his own research into the matter and felt that it's not financially viable initiative or venture. And subsequent to that I left Cape Town and the idea died.

There was no research done, it was a proposal and the proposal was taken to a variety of people for endorsement and notably Professor Colin Bundy, Professor Jacques Gerwil, Wally Serote, Neville Alexander, Marko Solomons, and they all, on the basis of the proposal wrote letters of support and recommendation

and I took this proposal and these supporting letters to Hattingh to find out whether he might be interested in raising the capital or initial capital layout which was in the region of R300 000. He came back to me after a few weeks and said it's not going to be possible because as far as he is concerned it's financially not a viable venture.

MR KHOISAN: But you at no point found out, according to you you were unaware that Johan was actually, that Mr Hattingh was actually a senior operative of the NIS?

MR BROWN: No, I was not aware. I was made aware at a very, at a much later stage.

MR KHOISAN: Like when?

MR BROWN: Very recently.

MR KHOISAN: Now that's on the side of Mr Hattingh. In terms of Military Intelligence I remember you and I had a discussion about the possibility that DCC could have been involved, that's one of the first things that I put to you and you said, yes, there is a possibility that DCC, the Directorate of Covert Collection, could have been involved in the events which led to the deaths of Coline and Robbie, do you want to develop that for us? Is there anything that led you to believe that that may be the scenario?

MR BROWN: Well I, I, and this is assumptions, I had the feeling, based on my discussions with my own comrades that commanded my operation about it, and there was a feeling that network to whom

Robbie and Melvyn and a whole range of other people were connected was in fact infiltrated, but I don't have facts at hand to sustain that argument. But I said it was possible.

MR KHOISAN: It's a possibility. And just while we are on the issue of DCC, and I've put it to you before but I put it to you now on the record, at any point, at any time, in any of the scenarios of which you were part or connected did you ever hear the name Ashwell Sampson?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. You never knew about a DCC operative by the name of Ashwell Sampson?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: You never crossed paths with him. Alright. Just in terms of this issue of Mr Johan Hattingh it seems that he was busy with a very sensitive project, one which would involve essentially allowing him to have a clear view of strategy and tactics of a political movement or structures, you know, and on that side maybe part of the forward planning strategy of NIS at that time.

Did you ever get introduced to Mike Smuts?

MR BROWN: Who?

MR KHOISAN: Mike Smuts.

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Archie Steyn, none of them?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Was it a concern to you that this man, who was a liberal according to, or shall I say his legend was one of a liberal Afrikaner, did you ever get concern that his research might not be innocent and clinical as such, it might be that it may have an ulterior motive, one which was essentially mischievous in nature?

MR BROWN: Umm, I would say my own feeling about the matter was that, one, I did not question the **bona fides** of the professor that introduced me ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Do you want to put for the record who was the name ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Professor Richard Stevens.

MR KHOISAN: Richard Stevens.

MR BROWN: He's probably now Dr Richard Stevens because he's not teaching at the moment. So that's number one. Number two is my understanding of Hattingh was that he comes from a rich family. His father owns semi-industrialised cattle farms and mealie farms and potato farms in the Free State province, so he's not poor. I never felt uncomfortable about my relationship with him because I never did or gave him anything that could lead to such uncomfortability. And instead what I used to do was to rather introduce him to people, and if he wants to take the matter further, or whatever further with them then it was really up to them. And I was never really part of that process.

So in the sense, for example, I introduced him to Jacob Zuma, and subsequent to that they would have their own meetings or contacts or whatever. What transpired there is really - I am not familiar with that. I think most of the documentation that I saw at hand about the research done was quite substantial and it was not mischievous. The conclusions was on various strategic issues, and local government and development questions and economic questions.

But as far as my knowledge stretches, and I - this is only on the basis of my relationship with him is that there was nothing mischievous.

MR KHOISAN: So you, it is your view that there was a sense of integrity about this research?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: It wasn't something that overtly had a connection to some other sinister objective?

MR BROWN: No, no I didn't have that sort of opinion.

MR KHOISAN: Did he, at any time, receive an introduction through you to any of the people who were main players or players in the political underground or military underground or the youth structures.

MR BROWN: On the Western Cape?

MR KHOISAN: Here, I am talking here, in the Western Cape.

MR BROWN: No, I can't recall, I can't. I introduced him to many people.

MR KHOISAN: Now do you know a fellow by the name of Pedro? Pedro was also operative in the same Belgravia Youth linked to Robbie and these people?

MR BROWN: I have a vague recollection but it doesn't conjure any image, but I have a vague recollection.

MR KHOISAN: Now on the side of Military Intelligence, what has been your relationship to Military Intelligence and when did this relationship begin?

MR BROWN: I am not sure whether I am at liberty to talk about that.

MR KHOISAN: We can ask the Chair to make a ruling on this, but this Section 29 is relevant to a number of issues and I am putting it to you for the record because I also want to ask other questions relevant to that.

MR BROWN: I am a covert actor in the military, in the Military Intelligence. I work for the Directorate of Covert Collection at the moment. And my terms of reference or my tasks include or involve the collection of intelligence on foreign defence matters, on the one hand. On the other hand on foreign defence presence in South Africa. The main job of DCC and my job there is to identify other countries' spies here and to possibly recruit them for the South African Military Intelligence.

MR KHOISAN: Ja I am not so much interested in your current role
...(intervention)

MR BROWN: That is it ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: I am saying, I am just trying to ascertain a period,
a period of that relationship, when did that relationship begin?

MR BROWN: I have never had any other job in Military
Intelligence and certainly it does not stretch beyond 1994.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: Are we to understand that you were employed in
1994?

MR BROWN: No I am saying it does not stretch beyond that point.

CHAIRPERSON: So your first contact with DCC was from 1994?

MR BROWN: It's between '94 and '97.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, so you didn't have any contact with them
before that?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: At any point in your relationship with Mr Hattingh
did he ever approach you - or let me just - was there any period in
your relationship with Hattingh when you were paid something like
R3 000 a month?

MR BROWN: I got payments from Hattingh all the time.

MR KHOISAN: From 1987 onwards?

MR BROWN: Ja, it was on and off, but I got paid all the time,
right up to, whew, R9 000 sometimes.

MR KHOISAN: Depending on the nature of the material you supplied him?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Now let me put it to you ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I shared an office with Hattingh in Johannesburg you know ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Mmm?

MR BROWN: I shared an office with him.

CHAIRPERSON: It's really just a clarification of the salary or the payment here, were you part of his office, were you part of his staff?

MR BROWN: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Or was that just - and was that for the Foundation of Contemporary Research?

MR BROWN: I've had nothing to do with the Foundation for Contemporary Research.

CHAIRPERSON: Whatever material or research work or whatever it is that you did for him came directly from Mr Hattingh, it was not from an organisation?

MR BROWN: No. Can I make a comment. Unless you have a specific objective with this I am, for the record, one, I don't understand the nature of this; and two, I am unhappy about this because this is not what I was asked to come for here. And the line of questions at the moment I do not have any indication that it has

any bearing on the specifics of this matter which is which events led to the death of these people. It doesn't have anything to do with the Belgravia Youth Congress, neither does it have anything to do with where the remaining weapons are, unless through this line of questioning you want to try and work out whether there is any question marks around my personal credibility inasfar as those questions are concerned. If it is that then let's put it on the table.

MR KHOISAN: Were you at any time a source of the National Intelligence Service, registered as a source?

MR BROWN: Today I can say so, but I was not aware.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Shall I put it to you that you were registered as a source on the 1st of June 1989, would that be correct?

MR BROWN: I wouldn't be able to say so because I was never aware that I was a source of the National Intelligence Service. It's only recently that I have seen documentation to that effect.

MR KHOISAN: Now let me put it to you that your source number is 2103441 and that your handler is D0217 without putting your handler's name on the record, is that correct?

MR BROWN: I wouldn't be able to say that.

MR KHOISAN: But you said you saw documentation to that effect, would that be ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I wouldn't be able to say that.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. So I am asking you now, at any time did you, when you were registered as a source ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I was not aware.

MR KHOISAN: You were registered without your knowledge or permission or say so?

MR BROWN: I can happen like that.

MR KHOISAN: And the reason why we are posing these questions is that your date of registration is 01.06.89 which is about one month before the events in question. That is why we are trying to pursue this line of questioning. It is not to question your credibility, it is to deal with information in our possession.

MR BROWN: So why didn't you say that in the first place?

MR KHOISAN: No, but we are not just - we are taking our time here. We have called you to an inquiry and we are trying to enquire.

MR BROWN: I understand some of the reasons, but you know you are not dealing with a stupid here you know.

CHAIRPERSON: Precisely, that's precisely why we feel that we need to conduct this investigation in the manner in which we are doing, because both you and us are aware that we've had a very complex history. We have had a very complex ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I understand.

CHAIRPERSON:interlinking of people and operatives and events and so on.

So we are telling you that our investigation points to a complex web of contacts and people and so on and therefore we are asking you, and it's important, because as Mr Khoisan said in the beginning your concerns that you mentioned right up front, we need to be able to deal with those concerns in a very intelligent and a very intelligible way. So we are trying to unravel all of this. So I don't think that the questions are out of character, nor do I think that the questions are inappropriate, because as far as we are concerned we need to understand this web.

MR BROWN: Sorry Ma'am, I appreciate fully what you have just said. It would - I am absolutely committed to cooperate to the fullest extent. I think it will help me to know what I am cooperating around and so on. I cannot jump on questions without understanding the greater picture here you know. I understand that you have to proceed like this, but in order to speak through these things I have to know. I have come to clarify a specific set of things, and I have prepared myself for that.

If we had any other issues I think it would have been appropriate to put it on the table so that I could have come with those things as well. I could have come with documentation, I could have come with paperwork, I could have come with all sorts of things. At the moment I have got none of those things with me.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. What we have not received any requests from you since you received the subpoena with regard to

documentation or anything the Commission, in our subpoena we have said to you that you are able to prepare yourself and we would be able to allow you to prepare yourself and to have legal representation and also to request whatever documentation you need to prepare yourself, you have not done so. So as far as we are concerned you know we have made it available, I mean we have the possibility for you to prepare yourself adequately but you have not taken advantage of that.

MR BROWN: I did not take advantage of the offer in relation to the specific issues that you raised in that letter, and I have prepared myself for that. I didn't need assistance with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

MR BROWN: So that was okay, I didn't need documentation to prepare myself for the specifics that were raised in the letter. But what I am saying, all these other issues that you are raising now I am fully prepared to cooperate to the fullest but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Alright then let's get on with the business of ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: ...you have not given me any opportunity in terms of dates, events, whatever the case may be to prepare myself for this. You are asking me spontaneously to deal with these things.

CHAIRPERSON: Look I've made myself clear, the subpoena is there, you can read it if you like. In terms of the Section in our Act

we are compelled to ask you these questions if we believe that these questions relate to the matter at hand ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: let's proceed, let's proceed.

CHAIRPERSON: And so let's, ja, I agree, let's get on with it.

MR KHOISAN: Okay so according to the information that we have in our possession you became a registered source of the National Intelligence Service on the 1st of June 1989, and your position in respect of that is that you were, unaware?

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now I am asking you in which way do you know a person by the name of C J Henning?

MR BROWN: I don't know such a person.

MR KHOISAN: Mmm, you don't know such a person.

MR BROWN: C J Henning?

MR KHOISAN: H'n.

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

MR BROWN: Unless you are referring to C J Hattingh.

MR KHOISAN: But you know Mr Hattingh?

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

MR BROWN: His initials are CJ.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. And Mr Hattingh's handler number at NIS, at the NIS, the former NIS was DO217 and you were assigned a

source number, 2103441 on the 1st of June 1989 and for us that is important, because what we are trying to do is to interrogate the role of the security establishment and the security forces in all events which led up to or could have had an impact on the terrible event which led to the deaths of one person that you personally know and another person.

MR BROWN: Fine.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. So I am asking you at any point did Mr Hattingh, CJ Hattingh request any information from you regarding those structures?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: And what were the nature of your reports to the NIS, or shall I say....

MR BROWN: I, for the record, my reports, as far as I am concerned did not go to the NIS, for the record. My reports to Mr Hattingh. Whether he was a registered source or operative of the NIS had nothing to do with me. I was unaware of it. I did not have confirmation about it. I did not even attempt to investigate it or anything like that. So for the record, in terms of your question, whatever I put on paper for Mr Hattingh went to him. Whether it went to the NIS I am not aware of that.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now we've established that, according to you on your side you say that you were an unaware source of the National Intelligence Service ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: If I was registered in 1989 then I was not aware of it.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. When did you become ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: And that's - sorry to interrupt you, that is a normal procedure in Intelligence circles that you can register a source which is unfamiliar with the fact that he is in fact a source.

MR KHOISAN: H'n.

MR BROWN: It's normal.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. So now I am asking you for the record whether you were at any point a source of any other, whether you interfaced with any other structure within the security establishment, because now we've - the file from this says that you were registered over there on that date, now I want to ask you about Military Intelligence, did you interface with them? Are you aware of the fact that you may have interfaced with Military Intelligence people?

MR BROWN: No, no.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. And before you came to this hearing did you approach anybody from the NIS/NIA structure to discuss the matter of your subpoena?

MR BROWN: Not of my subpoena as such but I have discussed with people in National Intelligence.

MR KHOISAN: And part of those discussions were, did they relate to the fact that there needed to be issues that had to be dealt with by Military Intelligence?

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: In respect of work you did for Military Intelligence? I am not saying that we are ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I don't understand.

MR KHOISAN: I am not saying that we are putting you under, that we put you under surveillance, that we've recorded every conversation, but I do say that we are aware of a lot of things because we have conducted a very sensitive and very discreet investigation that goes very deep ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Absolutely ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN:into all kind of sources and places, and we are aware of a whole range of things, but I need to put that to you on the record. I am saying that when you approached them in respect of this matter or matters that may relate to this matter that you come to deal with here today, did they tell you to go to Military Intelligence to sort out some stuff from the past there?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: And you, according to you, you never worked for Military Intelligence in 1989?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: At all?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. And now in terms of Mr Hattingh, did he ever introduce you to a person by the name of John Floris?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Do you know John Floris?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Do you know a person by the name of Shane Oliver?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: And Errol April?

MR BROWN: The name rings a bell but I was - it rings a bell but it definitely doesn't come from Hattingh, but the name rings a bell.

MR KHOISAN: It rings a bell.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Do you know one Aristides Spennalis?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: And did you ever provide any weapons to a person by the name of Zane Samaa?

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: An AK-47?

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: And in what circumstances did you provide him that AK-47 and what was the source of that AK-47?

MR BROWN: I asked him to keep it for safekeeping.

MR KHOISAN: And where did that AK-47 come from?

MR BROWN: That was one of the weapons from Robbie's house.

MR KHOISAN: But you just told us that you gave that AK-47 to Andre Lincoln ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Subsequent, subsequent, that is where the AK-47 is now. He collected that weapon from me in his capacity as a member of the ANC's Department of Intelligence and Security. And Andre Lincoln personally went to collect the AK-47 from Zane Samaa where it was for safekeeping, originally.

MR KHOISAN: You see we are sitting here with a docket and this docket for the record is case no. 188508/95.

MR BROWN: H'n.

MR KHOISAN: And this docket relates to weapons that went missing, and within this docket is a number of statements here, and the view is that you gave the AK-47 that came out of Coline Williams' house, or that came out of Robbie Waterwich's house, out of the ceiling, that you gave that AK-47 to Zane Samaa, which he used as part of an unofficial security detachment when Madiba visited Mitchell's Plain, is that correct?

MR BROWN: That I cannot say.

MR KHOISAN: But you gave him this AK-47?

MR BROWN: For safekeeping.

MR KHOISAN: For safekeeping. When did you give him this AK-47?

MR BROWN: Probably in '89, I can't remember.

MR KHOISAN: But you gave it to him?

MR BROWN: Ja. I left Cape Town in the beginning of 1991 and so it probably happened in 1990.

MR KHOISAN: You see that's the thing that we are trying to clear up here. You got an instruction, you went to a military commander, a commander of a military ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I did not get any instruction ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: No, no, no, no, you went to a military commander, you went to a military commander, a commander of a military detachment, that is Mr Melvyn Bruintjies, you went and spoke with him, you told him, you basically went to him, as you put it to us, at CUPC in Salt River, and you took a walk with him, right, and then you discussed the issue of the things that are in the house. Then you, as you put it, helped him out by going there and going to get the stuff out of the house, am I correct, to there, right?

MR BROWN: Right.

MR KHOISAN: Then when you get that stuff out of the house, that is in July 1989, two days after the explosion, then I want to know when you got it out two days after the explosion, and we will leave the grenade story for now, because we take it that Wesley in a state of panic or something brought you two grenades and we'll square that later, but then you hand the limpet mine to Mr Abrahams, Desmond Abrahams. And then the AK-47 and the three rounds of

ammunition, there were three rounds, right, then you handed that to Zane Samaa, that's according to you. And then you don't know what happened - why didn't you hand that back to Melvyn Bruintjies because he was a military commander who was exposed to you at that time? I mean you went to him, you didn't know that he was a military commander, he went on great faith and took you into his confidence as it were, something that is odd, as you quite put it to us, and then you go and hand that AK-47 to somebody who is unconnected to the same military detachment to which that weapons belong, and I mean why didn't you hand that back to Melvyn to say this is your stuff, we are square? This is your limpet and this is your AK-47 and I've done this job for you and we're square so that there couldn't be any problems with that, why didn't you do that?

MR BROWN: When I got back from Harare I saw Melvyn again and told him that you know that you know I've thought about his thing about coopting me into his structures and that it's not going to be possible. Shortly after that, in 1990, I was posted by SAYCO, the South African Youth Congress to Natal for a long period where I went to re-launch the South African Youth Congress in the entire Natal, so a whole period lapsed in 1990 with me not being around. When I got back I was here for a few months, probably three or four months and then left for Johannesburg.

So one, I broke off my contact with Melvyn and that I suppose logistically created all sorts of difficulties in me getting

the stuff back to him, but there was no decision, you know, consciously that I will not do this, or I will not give the weapons back to him.

I gave it to people for safekeeping which they did. I assume the stuff that is with Desmond Abrahams is still intact. The AK-47 that was with Zane Samaa was personally collected by Mr Andre Lincoln.

MR KHOISAN: That's according to what he told you or what you know?

MR BROWN: No he collected it.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

MR BROWN: I met with Andre Lincoln here in Cape Town, I flew down from Johannesburg to tell him where he can go and get the stuff, he went to get it and I got confirmation from ANC Intelligence that it was indeed the case.

MR KHOISAN: But you see Melvyn told us and I ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: And I met Melvyn by accident at some gathering and he asked me where is the stuff, so I said I handed it over to Andre Lincoln after I was told to do so by the ANC's Department of Intelligence and Security. So I acted officially.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. I just want to clarify. Melvyn has put it to us, and the Ashley Kriel through its commander at that time, Aneez Salie, they actually put together a complaint in respect of missing weapons.

MR BROWN: H'n.

MR KHOISAN: And that particular grouping of weapons is part of that complaint which went to the SANDF and has served to be part of the foundation, the basis for an investigation, but Melvyn says that he made about ten or twelve attempts to get that weapons from you and at one point he even came to your place in Sea Point, met you at the flat to try to find out and he had various meetings at UWC and stuff, you are saying that that's fiction?

MR BROWN: I've never met him in Sea Point at a flat. He did make attempts.

MR KHOISAN: He said several attempts, more than - almost ten attempts to try to get the weapons.

MR BROWN: But it was difficult you know, it was difficult. I mean you are making as if I could concentrate my mind on this. It was difficult. My wife, she felt pregnant in that year, I was in Natal, it was difficult, and then subsequently I - the ANC's Department of Intelligence and Security said hand back the thing and they instructed me to hand it back to Andre Lincoln.

MR KHOISAN: Who in the Intelligence and Security establishment told you to go and hand that back?

MR BROWN: Mr Billy Masetla who is now the director general of the South African Secret Service and Mr Ricky Mkhonto who is a senior director in the Ministry of Intelligence.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now when you went to Zimbabwe, the two weeks in August you went to Zimbabwe and you went and spoke with Geraldine Moleketi-Fraser and Derek Hanekom and Garth Strachan?

MR BROWN: Yup.

MR KHOISAN: And you gave a report, a verbal report and a written report. And according to those people they did pose certain questions to you, is that correct?

MR BROWN: H'n.

MR KHOISAN: What was the view with respect to this because you indicated to me that you left because there was also this rumour that was floating around and you wanted that rumour sorted out and you went there and there was a decision taken that you should go back and meet these people and sort it out and then there was a counter-decision that you should leave it alone. Now I want to know how that happened.

MR BROWN: As a matter of - the case was put before me after the first or second day after my meeting in Harare that maybe it's a good thing that the people that I operate with in Cape Town should link up with this other network and we discussed a little bit about the modalities of doing that, and an instruction was going to be given to that effect from Harare and Lusaka. That, however, - we then decided against that. We said listen leave this thing alone, it doesn't appear to be an okay thing. It seems that there are problems

with that network and then we took a decision to leave it. And I came back and that is when my process of, you know, breaking my contact with Melvyn started. Which was, you know, the breaking of the contact was enhanced by coincidental other happenings in my life, the fact that I went away for a long period, when I came back my wife was pregnant and all those sort of things, so it became difficult you know. He did make attempts and eventually I told him, listen I handed it back, and he was highly unhappy about it. Why I don't know, because I got an official instruction to do that.

MR KHOISAN: Now you say that your commanders were, or shall I say the people who were running your operation from the Zimbabwe side were Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, Garth Strachan and Derek Hanekom, is that correct?

MR BROWN: H'n.

MR KHOISAN: And they were running what? What was the operation? Was it part of the underground, or had military component, what was it?

MR BROWN: It was essentially an underground structure with specific focus on ideological work; a specific focus on propaganda; a specific focus on rudimentary recruitment, and it was broadly speaking part of the Operation Vula situation. We were connected to a structure called the Doratamana Network, but it was broadly speaking a propaganda and ideological underground thing.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

MR BROWN: And my role in the underground was essentially political.

MR KHOISAN: Propaganda sort-of bringing, tightening up the line. etc?

MR BROWN: Absolutely.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. And in this particular period did you have contact with or associate with or in any way interact with politically or otherwise with Mo Shaik?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: No, you didn't have any contact with that, so you had no - so when you went to KwaZulu Natal to set up the SAYCO structure you went there as a ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I was a special deployment by the president of SAYCO, Peter Mokaba. 

MR KHOISAN: Peter Mokaba deployed you there to ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: And the national executive committee of SAYCO took a decision to deploy me, I was one of the best ideological, ideologically speaking in the Youth Congress.

MR KHOISAN: And did Peter Mokaba also at one point interact with C J Hattingh?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Is there anybody else in the SAYCO executive who may have interacted with this person, CJ Hattingh?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: You never introduced - so you just introduced Jacob Zuma to CJ Hattingh and a few other people?

MR BROWN: Listen I can have a list of people made available to you, I can't think about it you know.

MR KHOISAN: Okay well maybe that's the way we can handle, you provide this Commission - and Commissioner, Mr Brown has indicated that he is going to provide us with a list of the persons that he introduced to CJ Hattingh, okay.

CHAIRPERSON: We need an undertaking by when.

MR KHOISAN: Can we clarify when by -

MR BROWN: Before I leave Cape Town.

MR KHOISAN: Before he leaves Cape Town, which is tomorrow.

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Alright now so that we can - just one other question, now you've known Mr C J Hattingh since 1987, was there a concern about you know the - did you ever get worried about the payments, you said that sometimes you received payments in and around 9 000 and 3 000 and several thousand, was there a concern that that money that you were receiving was pegged to any other thing, that there were strings attached to that money?

MR BROWN: Like I said my position, my opinion of Hattingh was, one, that he comes from a rich family, and that two, he was a

businessman. And in business people pay huge amounts of money for strategic information and that's how I understood it.

Up to this day I do that sort of stuff for big business. I did a paper recently on the situation in the Great Lakes and there are major mining companies that pay significant amount of money for that sort of information. And that's how I understood the payments, that he was a businessman that needed this - that needed a broader understanding of the strategic situation in his area of operation.

MR KHOISAN: And it's not a concern to you that you were registered as a source of the National Intelligence Agency as early as 1989? National Intelligence Service.

MR BROWN: What are you asking?

MR KHOISAN: No I am - what I am trying ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I, I'm ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: No, no, no, no ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I want to know, I didn't hear you properly.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, I am saying in terms of this here we - your yourself have admitted that this man is under investigation, we know that he is under investigation for a range of activities ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: A range of activities which may or may not have resulted in a range of gross abuses of human rights because of the information that he had and because of the context that he had and

because of the people that he was plugged into. This man was plugged into a range of people that were connected to a lot of people, and a lot of people suffered as a result of those connections, this man CJ Hattingh, and you've known him since 1987 and you've been paid by him.

So what I am saying here, what I am trying to ascertain is that did you ever bring to the attention of what you put as your command structure, Hanekom, Fraser and Strachan as a concern about money you are receiving from this individual? Did you raise the issue of this individual with your command structure because you were - if you were part of the underground and running a sensitive operation which was, I would say, which would be a major operation, the propaganda operation in terms of developing and keeping the line tight of an organisation, it's a very sensitive operation, so did you raise with them that there's this liberal Afrikaner who seems to have a lot of money who is paying, did you raise this with them?

MR KHOISAN: In vague detail.

MR KHOISAN: And what was their response?

MR BROWN: We never really went into it. The only thing is that they told me is to be careful.

MR KHOISAN: They told you to be careful of him?

MR BROWN: No not of him, to be careful.

MR KHOISAN: To be careful.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Did you raise this matter with the Intelligence structures because you know this is a, although he was introduced to you by Professor Richard Stevens you still had, you were running - 1989, '87, '88, those were sensitive times here, people died, Ashley Kriel had just been killed, there were lots of other people who died and the place was in a very volatile state...

MR BROWN: H'n.

MR KHOISAN: Did you raise this with anybody in the Intelligence apparatus that there is this man who I am doing some research for, can you check him out to see if he's really on the level?

MR BROWN: I didn't do it and there was no reason for me to do it. I didn't do anything in terms of my relationship with Hattingh, anything - he didn't ask me to do anything which was strange. So it made me not to be nervous because he never asked me to do anything which seemed strange.

MR KHOISAN: In other words you are saying that he was very professional in his way?

MR BROWN: Ja, he never asked me to give him information about the ANC or underground or - he never asked me to do reports, he never even asked me to write a report. He never asked me to write something about specific personalities or - so I never got the impression that there's anything problematic here.

Moreover I would introduce him to someone and if that person feels happy about his relationship with that you know it's okay. If anything happens I am not aware of it. So there was no reason for me to be alarmed or concerned or worried, you know, and therefore I did not feel that there's any need to have him checked out or whatever.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now just in and around this time you did some work with four people, let me just concentrate them on four. Keep Zane Samaa out because that's, I believe, a relative of yours through marriage, right? And the fellow with the AK. But Edwards, Seppie, David and Nazeem, do you know these people?

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: And in what capacity do you know them?

MR BROWN: Well I recruited them into the underground.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. And what was there, what would have been their roles, what would they have been busy with?

MR BROWN: Well it essentially was going to involve ideological and propaganda work.

MR KHOISAN: Would there have been a military component to this?

MR BROWN: There would have been, it was the plan.

MR KHOISAN: Conceived by who?

MR BROWN: Conceived outside.

MR KHOISAN: Conceived by Hanekom, Strachan and Fraser?

MR BROWN: The cells that we set up will have a political officer and a military commissioner.

MR KHOISAN: And what would have been your role?

MR BROWN: I would have been the political officer.

MR KHOISAN: The political officer. And who would have been the military commander?

MR BROWN: Well Zane Samaa would have been that, he went for training and everything.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now did you train anybody, did you provide any military training to anybody at any time?

MR BROWN: Everybody, whoever had military training had to go outside to get it.

MR KHOISAN: But I am saying to you ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: I did not

MR KHOISAN: You did not.

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: And you received your military training?

MR BROWN: I received it outside.

MR KHOISAN: Outside. In Zimbabwe?

MR BROWN: Mmm.

MR KHOISAN: So you say you set up this underground structure ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: Not from, I didn't receive military training from Geraldine and them. Geraldine and them took over from my original commander ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Which were?

MR BROWN: Which is Terence Triyon ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Terence?

MR BROWN: Tryon.

MR KHOISAN: Tryon.

MR BROWN: He had to, he was shifted from Harare to Luanda as a deputy chief rep in Luanda and that is when these three people took over, but Terence Tryon was my actual commander. He is now in the management of the South African Secret Service.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now these ones, Edward, Seppie, David and Nazeem you set up ~~this, this is like one~~ part of the structure, I am not saying this is the whole structure but this is like one part of a broader structure.

MR BROWN: H'n.

MR KHOISAN: And I didn't hear it exactly but you say that these structures were conceived and set up by the command structure outside?

MR BROWN: We discussed the plan, I had to put it in motion.

MR KHOISAN: You discussed the plan, with whom did you discuss this plan?

MR BROWN: With my commanders.

MR KHOISAN: With Fraser?

MR BROWN: Well that was a continuation of a decision that we've taken already between me and Terence Tryon.

MR KHOISAN: But if they had taken over would you have discussed it with them?

MR BROWN: I reported to them the state of affairs.

MR KHOISAN: So besides the limpets that were in Robbie's house did you have any logistics of your own, besides the limpet and the AK, what you found in Robbie's house, did you have any military logistics, military hardware of your own and at your disposal to - because what I see here is one small part of a broader structure to be able to activate a political, military network?

MR BROWN: Well I was, my job was to activate a political military network but my job was not to be responsible for military operations. And thus therefore I did not have the military logistics to do anything. It was not my job.

MR KHOISAN: But you did ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: And I did not have that sort of equipment.

MR KHOISAN: Did you have access to that equipment?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Did you know where that equipment - to be able to launch such a structure you would have known where that equipment was?

MR BROWN: Well it would have come from my command structure.

MR KHOISAN: And they would have sent that down to you.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: But it would be ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: But I would not be the one that would receive it, logistically. I was not responsible for any military decision-making and military commands.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. This man Piet Reyneke, do you know him?

MR BROWN: I don't know, it doesn't sound familiar, I don't know.

MR KHOISAN: I say that the same side Archie Steyn, Ashwell Sampson, Piet Reyneke ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: I don't know them.

MR KHOISAN: Aristides Spennalis, Shane Oliver, Errol April, none of them ring bells to you?

MR BROWN: The Errol April rings a bell but I don't know.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

MR BROWN: I knew an Errol, I am not sure whether his surname is April, but there was an Errol, quite a big guy, in the student movement. I am not sure whether it's the same guy.

MR KHOISAN: In Mitchell's Plain?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: And what was the nature of your relationship to this man?

MR BROWN: Well generally, I mean even the student movement in the Western Cape used me to do theoretical lectures and training and so on, and he was part of that broad student movement. I think he was a leader. I am not sure, is it the same guy, April?

MR KHOISAN: Mmmm....

MR BROWN: And if it is him he is now working for the SANDF, if he is still working for the SANDF, but....

MR KHOISAN: Okay, now in terms of arms caches, did you know anything about arms caches in the Western Cape?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: You had no knowledge of arms caches?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: And your relationship to Shirley Gunn, did you know her?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Johnny Esau?

MR BROWN: Well Johnny, ja, I mean I knew him, who doesn't you know.

MR KHOISAN: But what was your relationship to Johnny, did he know you, did you work together politically, did you have discussions?

MR BROWN: I would say I engaged Johnny you know on a few occasions politically, but I never really had a set relationship with Johnny Esau.

MR KHOISAN: Not that you can speak of outside of the normal Johnny thing?

MR BROWN: Ja, I mean I would engage him you know politically, but I can't attach any significance to my connection with Johnny Esau.

MR KHOISAN: At no time you discussed underground activities with him?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: No.

MR BROWN: I was always one of the people that felt uncomfortable about Johnny's, what's the right word, adventurism.

MR KHOISAN: Johnny was an adventurous, as you put it, he had the Johnny thing?

MR BROWN: Well I am saying I always felt uncomfortable with his adventurism. But I cannot attach any significance to....

MR KHOISAN: And Aneez Salie?

MR BROWN: It doesn't ring ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: And Melvyn.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: You see that brings me to it because here we have Shirley Gunn, you have no relationship to Shirley Gunn to speak of. Here we have Aneez Salie, who is a commander of a detachment as such, right. Here we have Johnny who you regard, as you put it, Johnny and his adventurism, Johnny you know, sort-of Johnny being

the Che Guevera of the Western Cape, or Johnny, whatever you want to, but what you characterise Johnny as somebody who was adventurous. And then here's Melvyn Bruintjies, who is an intricate part of that command structure and the relationship between Melvyn, and from our investigation, and Robbie Waterwich is one which is not that public, so what we are trying to establish is how did you come to the conclusion that this man must be this man's commander? How did you put those two together?

MR BROWN: As I told you, I mean ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Because this command structure is not known, you know Wesley over here, but Wesley is not even close to - maybe let me turn it around, did you know Anton Fransch?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: You didn't know Anton Fransch. You didn't know Anton Fransch, you didn't know Coline, you didn't know any other person in the command structure, that is why I am trying to find out. Maybe did Robbie confide in you that he was in - and he didn't confide in you then how, on what empirical data did you come to that conclusion that this man was his military commander and that he was connected to that particular operation? Because the way it's been put to us is that that operation was in very short circulation, very few people knew about it.

MR BROWN: Well that's your information. My, as I told you earlier, my feeling was on the basis of absolutely human

observation that Melvyn could possibly clarify the matter. I didn't go to him because I - and in my submission or my report here I am not saying that I knew he was the military commander, or I knew that he commanded that operation, the fact of the matter is I went there because I believed there might be a special relationship between Melvyn and Robbie and maybe Melvyn can clarify it. And the reason why I came to that conclusion, as I say, unless you have never experienced this, that on occasions you do notice people's interaction and you register it in your subconscious. And I was trying to put a puzzle together and this is one of the places that I went to. I don't find it odd actually.

MR KHOISAN: Did you know Anthony Diedericks?

MR BROWN: No. I might, I mean I don't know, but the name doesn't ring a bell.

MR KHOISAN: Ja. And Lincoln Solomon, how do you know this man?

MR BROWN: Lincoln Solomon, Andre Lincoln, yes.

MR KHOISAN: No, Lincoln Solomon.

MR BROWN: No, I don't know him.

MR KHOISAN: Did you ever have an interaction with Lincoln Solomon and Zane Samaa?

MR BROWN: Well Zane obviously I know him ... (intervention)

MR KHOISAN: But I am saying this Lincoln Solomon, I want to clarify that. And what we are trying to do is -you see what we are trying to do ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I don't know Lincoln Solomon.

MR KHOISAN: what we are trying to do here is we are trying to put together a picture, the picture is one where there was a detachment ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I am with you.

MR KHOISAN: ...and the detachment, the particular part of the detachment that we are concerned with here is the detachment that was interlinked with Robbie. This was Robbie's real first military operation. You had a mentor relationship with Robbie, as you put it, he was like a younger brother to you. He was somebody, as you also put it, who would confide in you, who looked up to you, and as such you were his guider.

MR BROWN: Mmm.

MR KHOISAN: You provided political guidance to him to keep him on the line. And here's a whole range of people, now according to the way these things are supposed to work there is very little lateral communication, the communication is vertical. In military, you know just to maintain the integrity of operations ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: No, no, no, no, no I must correct you there.

MR KHOISAN: Ja.

MR BROWN: My relationship with Robbie was not of a military nature.

MR KHOISAN: No, no, no I am not talking about your - I am saying that - I am taking it further, I am saying that here is a whole lot of people who are connected. Some of them are connected to Robbie politically in terms of the Belgravia Youth Congress, that's an above ground straight up activism role.

MR BROWN: Okay.

MR KHOISAN: Then there's another side of Robbie which is an unknown side, a side that is not known even to you, and I've put to you a range of people who were in that other orbit, the people connected with that orbit. You put it to us that you don't know any of these people, or have very little knowledge of them and then you arrive at certain conclusions about a commander, and that is what I am trying to find out.

I am trying to find out, I am trying to ascertain on what basis, whether there was at any point whether he, Robbie took you into his confidence and said look here I am about to go on an operation, I am concerned, did that happen? And that is all we are trying to do here now.

MR BROWN: Never. And I can only repeat that the basis for me going to see Melvyn was an absolute personal, human hunch. It's as simple as that.

MR KHOISAN: The family didn't tell you about him, because you are just ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Nothing....

MR KHOISAN: Before you went to Melvyn you went to the family.

MR BROWN: Nothing, they didn't even know Melvyn.

MR KHOISAN: And Melvyn didn't ever, Melvyn didn't ever come to them?

MR BROWN: I don't know, I don't think so.

MR KHOISAN: Ja, he didn't ever come to them. So what we have here, we have the family and did you go to them and say that the family was concerned that things needed to be removed from the house, did you put it to Melvyn that there was stuff in the house, or there could be stuff in the house?

MR BROWN: You know I am not sure whether I must answer the question you know, I mean this is the fifth time that you have asked me the question who told who whether there were weapons in that house.

MR KHOISAN: But that's the problem here, because we have ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: No, no wait Zenzile.

MR KHOISAN: Ja.

MR BROWN: You have asked me, this is the fifth time that you are asking me the question as clear as that, and I have given ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brown will you allow me to be the adjudicator of that.

MR BROWN: But I have given a clear answer on this question.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, I withdraw the question.

MR BROWN: He has asked me five times you know who told me and every time I have said it's Melvyn that told me about the weapons.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Khoisan you are trying to establish the link at the moment between how it is possible that Mr Brown knew Mr Bruintjies who was in the command structure of the detachment, the special detachment you are describing and how it was possible that there could have been this revelation about arms caches and so on at the time of that operation, to somebody who in a sense doesn't actually have any military connection with this operation. It is a bizarre situation.

You, Mr Brown, are somebody who is familiar with intelligence and political structures. Given that knowledge even you admit that that is a very bizarre situation, that somebody who is a commander reveals information to you, and actually requests that you cover his back by going and removing weapons from somebody

who has just been blown up. In any military intelligence circles it would be obvious that that house would be under surveillance.

MR BROWN: I agree.

CHAIRPERSON: So you go into a situation where it's highly probable that the entire detachment will be revealed.

MR BROWN: I agree.

CHAIRPERSON: Because having linked Robbie Waterwich with the particular detachment it will be obvious that the rest will be - but he tells somebody who is not part of that thing, and this is our distress and our dilemma at the moment and I am entirely with Mr Khoisan to really go over this so that we actually understand it. So you will have to bear with us with that.

MR BROWN: No I can.

CHAIRPERSON: But he has withdrawn the question and I'd ask him to move on.

MR KHOISAN: Okay let me read into the record what is said by Mr Melvyn Brintjies, and I am going to give you, I am going to put together a package, I am actually going to, when we step out of here I am going to actually make a call asking for permission to - but this is part of an interview, you know, I just want to read it into the record so that you have it on the record what Melvyn Brintjies said, so that we don't have this you know, he said, she said, thing.

Here he's talking about meeting with people.

"I also met with Comrade Anton Fransch the same morning of Monday and we confirmed that those were our comrades who died in that accident. Up to that point we did not know what went wrong. The regional commanding structure was also informed that I was then part of and it, I think, we met later in that week. We met after everything was clear.

Geoffrey Brown came to me in my office, in the office and told me, and that was the first time I made contact with him since the incident happened, and it was also the first time I made contact with him on that level, he came to me and I had to make a decision at that point and time whether I was going to say yes or no, I am going to blow my cover. Then he told me that the family or Robbie's uncle, I did not know the name at that time, I think it was Basil Snayer, I did not know Robbie's family, I only knew him. He told me there were things in the house and asked him to remove it and...."

So basically what he is saying here is you came to him and told him that there were things in the house, you spoke to the family, there were things in the house and that he wants it to be removed. So that's why I am asking, I posed the question to you twenty times or thirty times, it's not because I want to beat this horse dead, it's a

question of you've stated that position, it's fine, now if you stated that Melvyn told you then it's a question that the Commission has to make in our evaluation of this evidence that Geoffrey Brown says that Melvyn told him that there were things in the house and he wants that stuff removed, that's the Ashley Kriel detachment comes to somebody unconnected to any military activity that's never been part of their operation, that's never been in any way connected with them and says you cover us on this question, okay. So we are going to say ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Can I, can I....

MR KHOISAN: Ja.

MR BROWN: When I, earlier I said the Monday when I went to see the family to go and check with them what is going on we, at a precautionary level, removed as many things about Robbie, books, literature, whatever, because we weren't sure whether he actually died or not, and we felt that should he have been in that blast, and what if he's maybe alive still then he's probably going to be interrogated or whatever, on the one hand. So there was a precautionary to remove as much as possible which is political essentially, and that is what we did. Those were the things that were removed.

Subsequent to that my knowledge in terms of where those weapons are, the exact spots where it was, I mean that information I got from Melvyn. Now it's odd that he revealed himself to me, yes,

because I would never have done that, but on the other hand it was not odd for me to go to the house because I was regular and open visitor to that house. It made a lot of sense for me to be there up and down anyway.

MR KHOISAN: That's not our concern here.

MR BROWN: No, no, what I am trying to say is that so it made a lot of sense to Bruintjies also that I help him out because I am an open and regular visitor there.

MR KHOISAN: You are always there, and stuff like that.

MR BROWN: You understand, you know.

MR KHOISAN: Ja.

MR BROWN: I didn't question his bona fides the fact that he revealed me at that point was not of immediate concern but it was odd.

MR KHOISAN: When did you speak to Paul Stober about this incident?

MR BROWN: Now Paul was out of the country at the time so he got to know about this when he got back from overseas.

MR KHOISAN: He wasn't around, you didn't talk to him. But did you discuss this matter with him and your concerns about this matter?

MR BROWN: Umm, I think my concerns about it inasfar as the fact that there is this attempt to link me to, directly, to the operation, I did discuss with him, he's a good friend of mine, but I

have never really discussed the Melvyn and this and that with people like Paul Stober.

MR KHOISAN: Then it's your position, now just to recap before we go, I think we are going to have lunch at some point, but just to recap this thing. During this explosion you were in Mitchell's Plain having dinner with your wife at unknown people.

MR BROWN: Friends.

MR KHOISAN: Friends. And that you returned later and that people came to your house late at night, this Wesley and told you that Robbie has not returned.

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: They came the next - they came to UWC and told you that Robbie has not returned.

MR BROWN: No, they came to my house.

MR KHOISAN: They came to your house.

MR BROWN: But I heard about the conversation this bomb blast at university, that's where I heard about it. I was unaware of it, I heard about the blast in University ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: At UWC.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: And the last time you saw Robbie, according to your evidence was Friday.

MR BROWN: Probably.

MR KHOISAN: Probably Friday at the centre and as he usually used to drop in by you every day. And that you didn't know Coline and that you had no idea that Robbie was political, that he was involved in a military operation. And that you went to the family after Wesley and others came to you and told you look here this one has not returned.

And that from there you proceeded to remove things from the house, incriminating literature etc, etc. Now when you went and removed the incriminating literature or whatever political literature, did you happen to have discussions with the family at that time about the fact that there could be other things? Were there concerns maybe raised by Robbie's mother, heh look here, are there any other stuff in this house we are really concerned? Not that you can recall?

MR BROWN: No, also my approach to the whole thing was not to further increase the tension in the house so I did not make them panic you know. I told them well let's take it out as a precautionary step but you know let's wait, I'll investigate the matter, but my position was not to heighten the emotions and tension and concern of this family about the whereabouts of Robbie. So that is how I approached it. I tried to pull out of there as quickly as possible so that things aren't - I didn't want to make these people emotional or panicky.

MR KHOISAN: At which point did you exactly ascertain that Robbie and Coline were the victims of this bomb blast?

MR BROWN: Tuesday morning when I spoke to Melvyn Bruintjies.

MR KHOISAN: And that's when the issue was ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: And then he told me listen there's still some stuff there which might be incriminating, he doesn't know whether Robbie removed the fingerprints and blah, blah, blah, you know, so you know we made an agreement, okay, I'll help you out. And I went there, he told me exactly where to find the stuff, exactly.

MR KHOISAN: And then you contacted Basil Snayer?

MR BROWN: I drove to his school, straight from Melvyn, and spoke to him. He was extremely unsettled, because it was now confirmation that it was indeed Robbie that was dead and then we went to the house to go and inform the rest of the family.

MR KHOISAN: Did Melvyn ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: And then I removed the stuff and left.

MR KHOISAN: And Melvyn never, at any point, said to you that he needed to get clearance for you to go and remove that stuff?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: That he needed to consult with anybody else in the command structure?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: He just took his own decision?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: That's your evidence. And one other thing now, just on the issue of the inventory because we want to clear this stuff. The inventory of what you found, what was in the ceiling, an AK and three rounds of ammunition, and behind the bathroom, behind the bath in the bathroom one limpet mine badly stashed, no grenades etc, nothing else?

MR BROWN: Huhu (sound to indicate no).

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Okay so we will put that as your evidence for that particular thing.

Now did you have any conversations with Mr - your CJ Hattingh, your NIS handler after this particular incident?

MR BROWN: Can I make an interruption. For the record, because I am going to confirm when you make a statement like your NIS handler ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Or shall I say no you were - you put it to us that you were unaware, but we, we have ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Whether you are aware of it or not, but I am not going to affirm a leading statement like that because it is a leading statement if the records are going to be read.

MR KHOISAN: Okay let me strike that from the record, let me put it in another way. Did you have any discussion with Mr C J Hattingh in respect of this incident at any time after that incident occurred?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Did you ever discuss any matter of this nature?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Was it, I mean Robbie was very close to you, did you ever introduce him to this person?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: And he never requested any report on this matter?

MR BROWN: (No audible reply)

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Now in terms of Mr Hattingh ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: For the record this gentleman, Mr Hattingh, never requested any report about anything.

CHAIRPERSON: You said so.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: He never, he just paid you for strategic research that he did.

MR BROWN: Analyses.

MR KHOISAN: Analysis. You see some people might say now that is a report ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: No, no, no, I'm saying this is what I did.

MR KHOISAN: You did analysis for him ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: Irrespective of what other people may think or interpret, but that is what I did.

MR KHOISAN: You did analysis for him and you got paid certain amounts of money when you brought it to him, the final products?

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Have you kept copies of the analyses that you did or do you know which - do you have hard copy of any of the work that you did for this man?

MR BROWN: I think I still have.

MR KHOISAN: You still have them somewhere.

MR BROWN: No I think, I must scratch around for it but I think, I mean it's....

MR KHOISAN: In and around this time ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: If I come across some of it I can make it available.

MR KHOISAN: Good that's excellent. Did you ever meet a guy by the name of Michael Petersen?

MR BROWN: The name rings a bell but I....

MR KHOISAN: Let me put it to you this way, Michael Petersen, because it's in the record, Michael Petersen was a co-worker for the NIS at UWC, tasked with penetrating about 20 student organisations etc, etc, did you ever meet him? Did you ever know him?

MR BROWN: Like I say the name rings a bell. I know a guy called Edgar Pieterse and I think his brother has a name Michael.

MR KHOISAN: Michael.

MR BROWN: I think so, I might be wrong.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Did you know Robert de Buys, did you ever work with Robert de Buys? Or Robert Langley de Buys, or Reginald Andrews?

MR BROWN: It doesn't sound familiar.

MR KHOISAN: None of them. You worked in Ravensmead also?

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. So in terms of this particular thing what I am trying to write so that we can wind up this particular section and according ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: ...the names that you are raising

MR KHOISAN: Ja.

MR BROWN: ...some of it rings bells but...

MR KHOISAN: You don't know in which way.

MR BROWN: Ja, you know.

MR KHOISAN: We will have to develop it further.

MR BROWN: Ja we'll have to ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Go through it further.

MR BROWN: Or give me a little bit of background to the person, it might help, but you know a lot of the names that you have raised either doesn't completely sound familiar, some of it has some familiar sound, but there's no significance there.

MR KHOISAN: You see some of these people were also part of youth structures that were either aware or unaware sources of the

security establishment let me put it to you that way since we are discussing this matter.

MR BROWN: Okay.

MR KHOISAN: And what we are trying to do here is; you know in terms of unravelling this web of Coline and Robbie, you see Coline particularly is somebody that was a long-term target of the security establishment, so what I am trying to establish is if you say you know Robbie but you never knew Coline you see, and Coline was Robbie's - in fact Coline was, according to information, supposed to be the commander of that particular operation and she was Robbie's immediate commander and you said that you never knew her, you had no idea of who she was.

And so we are trying to establish how these different things - because you see some of these things tie in in strange ways. For instance you find in Hout Bay a whole arms cache being discovered by Municipal workers etc, etc and that has other people attached to that and you know, and that's hooked up to something else. But here in this particular thing I want to find out now if at any time in the strategic analysis requested by Paul Stober you had to in any way give a political military summing up of the situation?

MR BROWN: Rephrase that question, it's....

MR KHOISAN: You see I mean what we are dealing with here is that ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: No, no just rephrase that question.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Were there, I am putting it to you whether in some of these analyses requested by - that you presented to Mr John Hattingh, whether at any time there was a request for sort of a military, a political military assessment of where things were going because the situation was fluid.

MR BROWN: A political military assessment of what?

MR KHOISAN: Of the Western Cape.

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Of the country, did he ask ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. You know ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: The only things that I have been - related in terms of Hattingh are macro stuff, macro strategic analyses of the nature of the economy, the nature of - the balance of forces, but at the macro level, without any reference to individuals or personalities or movements or details, macro ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: The big picture as it were?

MR BROWN: Ja, you know.

MR KHOISAN: The big picture. There was no need to, there was no call to break it down.

MR BROWN: No details, no micro information. It's always been ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: But he could go somewhere else and task somebody else to make those deductions?

MR BROWN: Well if one, now that one knows that he was an NIS operative that probably was the case.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now he ran the front company H & H, right, as you put it was an H & H, H & H had a series of subsidiaries these were all NIS front companies, by the way where was H & H based?

MR BROWN: In Johannesburg.

MR KHOISAN: In Johannesburg. And what was its subsidiary in Cape Town?

MR BROWN: Umm, for the purposes of record what I can do for you I've got disks you know with the entire operation of H & H which I am keeping for my own records and I can make it available.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

MR BROWN: I don't have it with me, however, I've got nothing with me, okay, there was no indication that you wanted any stuff on this. That is why I said you did not indicate what you were going to need.

CHAIRPERSON: Like with the other offer we need to also have a timeframe by when that will be provided.

MR BROWN: I am going back on Wednesday and then I am going to be in Johannesburg for two days and then I am going away for ten days to Angola.

MR KHOISAN: Ja just on that question ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: So I will try by the end of the week to courier it down to you, I will try, but please if I don't get it to you then it can only happen when I get back from Angola.

MR KHOISAN: Is it possible that one of our investigators in Johannesburg can come and pick it up from you?

MR BROWN: Whether it's picking up or not I am saying I will try to have it available ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: At some point.

MR BROWN: At the end of the week.

MR KHOISAN: Okay.

MR BROWN: If it is available then you can have your people pick it up from me, but if it's not then it can only happen ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: After Angola.

MR BROWN: Ja.

MR KHOISAN: Okay now just before we go we would like to obtain that other limpet mine because we want to take that limpet mine for forensic tests and before you leave Cape Town we want to, at least by tomorrow, I think one of - we will get another investigator and we will go together and locate the limpet mine and any other - where did you say the grenades are now?

MR BROWN: Same gentleman.

MR KHOISAN: The grenades, so we'll pick up the grenades and the limpet mine from this gentleman. Because in fact that is part of

what we are doing here. We want to find out which batch they come from etc, etc, etc and do the tracing.

Before I - you know basically I have finished the line of questioning before lunch and I don't know if the Commissioner has a couple more, I want to pick up some other stuff but they are going to take a while to develop, I'd like to come back to that after lunch.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja. I think what we should do is adjourn for lunch now and adjourn for about an hour. We will adjourn for an hour and be back at quarter to two, and then we will have just about an hour after that.

MR BROWN: Can I raise a question or an issue. On some of the additional or some of these new issues that you've raised I think you must raise what it is exactly that you want, right, irrespective of whether you are going to have micro questions, but what is it exactly. Because this matter is being dealt with, not this specific case of Robbie Waterwich and Coline Williams, but these other issues that you are raising is being dealt with at the highest level in the Ministry of Intelligence, there are two specific task forces that are working on these things. It is being dealt with at the highest level, the Chief of Staff, Intelligence in the military, is dealing with this matter, not this thing about Robbie and them. And it's important that if we know what it is I have to speak to these people you know, to raise this with them. Although this is an in camera hearing, but I mean off the record the Truth Commission leaks like

a tap, but I think it's important that I raise these things because I am not sure at a legal level whether I am not transgressing State Intelligence information.

MR KHOISAN: Mr Brown ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: What if the State you know confronts me and says but why did you speak about things that are under investigation on our side. What I am trying to say is that I am sure of the legality of the matter, and it is important that I refer this to Military Intelligence and to the Ministry of Intelligence who is dealing with the very same issue here.

CHAIRPERSON: We've been, we've given our ruling on the matter, you raised it before we broke for tea and I can understand your discomfort with regards to that. We, as I have described to you earlier on, are of the opinion that there's this complex web of links with this particular matter and we would not be raising these questions if we didn't believe that this issue is linked to the death of Coline and Robbie. So the in camera hearing that we are conducting is related to this death and we believe that people that we have mentioned are in fact involved in this issue. That's our assumption and we have to test those assumptions, and that's we are having the hearing.

I think it's a bit problematic for you that you don't have legal representation ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I didn't know it was going to get to this point.

CHAIRPERSON: ...because I think that you are raising issues of certainly how you feel you are being protected or not protected by this hearing, but certainly it's our view that we will not be investigating anything else unrelated to this matter before us.

And the Truth Commission Act provides that kind of protection, that information that is brought to our attention in this particular matter is for the information of the Truth Commission alone and cannot be used in any other matters, it cannot be used in any other hearings.

Do you want to add anything?

MR KHOISAN: And just on the question of the porous nature of the Truth Commission, as you put it to us the Truth Commission leaks like a tap, I think Mr Brown you have to be very, we can actually - the Western Cape Investigative Unit has conducted several Section 29 inquiries and the contents of those inquiries have never seen the light of day, so in terms of our record it's clear we are not too concerned about that..

But in terms of the issues that you raise what you have told us here today is a small amount of what we actually gained in our investigative process in terms of what we know, where we get our information from, we have, as an Investigative Unit, have access to all range of material, secret, top secret, highly classified and restricted, and so well the fact is that you - if you go - you can go and consult with Military Intelligence if you need to, but the nature

of this inquiry is that all the people that are mentioned here, and people that we will still talk about are what serves as the basis for our investigation and as such you know that is, for us, it's very defensible, it's not going to be a problem.

MR BROWN: I think, what I was saying, is that you have - I don't question the nature of your information and the extent of that information, I don't question that. You are a legal entity to obtain that information. What I am saying is that for me as an individual speaking and confirming certain what is presently an amount of State secrets, whether I am at liberty to do that without clearing those things. And it is on the basis of that concern of mine that I am saying it's important that we know what we are talking about here so that I can raise this thing. I don't want to sit with a problem where I get subpoenaed by the military and you know where they are asking me but why did you do this, despite the fact that it's going to the TRC, that's not a problem, I don't have a problem with that, but I don't want to have a situation where tomorrow I have to go and appear you know before the military. So do you understand what I am saying. It's important that I know what it is that we have to talk about so that I can clear it, because these are now State secrets that I am confirming ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think you are going to have to use your discretion because you don't, you haven't consulted but we have the right to pose those questions to you and then you ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I don't know what it is that you want to talk about
...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...and then you need to use your discretion.

HEARING ADJOURNS AT 12H49

ON RESUMPTION AT 13H45

CHAIRPERSON: Okay let's start again. Thanks for coming back.
Have you had lunch? Right. Perhaps we need to just reiterate that
we will continue with the Section 29 Inquiry in the matter of Coline
Williams and Robbie Waterwich and that you are still under oath,
and that we will be pursuing a line of questioning related only to, in
our opinion, to this matter, to the matter of Coline Williams and
Robbie Waterwich. Mr Khoisan you want to continue.

GEOFFREY RANDALL BRUCE BROWN: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR KHOISAN: (cont)

Okay. Good afternoon Mr Brown and thank you for joining
us again. Earlier in the day I had asked you about an individual by
the name of Anthony Diedericks, the nickname that the man went by
that time, and probably goes by now is also "Toon", do you know a
person by the name of "Toon" who was ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Oh yes I know him.

MR KHOISAN: So for the record you do know Anthony
Diedericks?

MR BROWN: Yes, okay.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Did you have any discussion with Mr Diedericks, did you speak with him, did you know him and in which circumstances did you know him?

MR BROWN: I did not have any intimate political or personal relationship with this gentleman and on occasions where I did have conversation with him it was probably very broad political questions, but generally I did not have any significant connection with him, ja. I knew him, but ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: But you didn't actually have any deep, it wasn't the kind of relationship that you had with him like the one you had with Robbie?

MR BROWN: Oh no.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. During the entire period that you were functioning you say that your command essentially was being handled by Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, Derek Hanekom and Garth Strachan. And before that you mentioned another individual who had been your commander who had been shifted to Angola, Terence?

MR BROWN: Tryon, T-R-Y-O-N.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, Terence Tryon. And in your report to any of these people did you discuss or make any attempt to give a political military report on the situation in the Western Cape? And the contents of those reports did they ever refer broadly or in

specifics to the activities of what later became known as the Ashley Kriel detachment?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: So for all intents and purposes this structure was unknown to you?

MR BROWN: Absolutely.

MR KHOISAN: And the person known as Anton Fransch, you never had any contact with him?

MR BROWN: Correct.

MR KHOISAN: At all, period. You see given the circumstances in which Coline and Robbie died it's our view that this particular explosion occurred in circumstances that are at best questionable, and of particular concern to us is the rest of the weapons, particularly the limpet, because we have a medical report and we want to look at the other limpet. Now in your entire investiga... - did you engage in any kind of rudimentary investigation of this incident seeing that you knew Robbie that well?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: You didn't ask anybody about it besides Melvyn? And to be clear the other limpet, what was the condition of the limpet that you found it in when you found it behind the bath, badly stashed?

MR BROWN: It's difficult to say it's how many years ago, seven odd years ago, so it's difficult to recall exactly the condition that it was in.

MR KHOISAN: What kind of a limpet was it, a mini-limpet or ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: Mini.

MR KHOISAN: It was a mini-limpet. And before you went into the house did you get an inventory from Mr melvyn Bruintjies?

MR BROWN: Well as I told you this gentleman told me that this is where the stuff is and this is what it is and I collected it.

MR KHOISAN: And you removed it. Okay now at any point in your meetings with the members of the Belgravia Youth Congress was there any time at which you had any discussions which bordered on military operations?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Did you ever happen to be in the presence of people, not yourself, who happened to be talking about military operations?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: There is nothing that you know about. So as far as you are concerned the command structure of which - the command structure of the military cell to which Robbie Waterwich belonged was unknown to you?

MR BROWN: I concur with that.

MR KHOISAN: And it's just a basis of simple deduction based on a series of events or coincidences that led you to believe that Melvyn Bruintjies will be the commander of this cell?

MR BROWN: That he could have clarity on the matter.

MR KHOISAN: And ... (intervention) ...

MR BROWN: I want to repeat, I haven't stated that I went to see Mr Bruintjies with the knowledge or understanding that he was indeed the commander of that cell or operation, but I had the hunch that he could shed light on the matter.

MR KHOISAN: And according to you he exposed himself to you?

MR BROWN: He did shed light on it, on the matter.

MR KHOISAN: But he told you that he was the commander of that operation?

MR BROWN: Yes he did.

MR KHOISAN: And then he tasked you to remove the stuff? He asked you if you could help him out?

MR BROWN: He asked me, ja.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. Okay now in terms of this particular structure how would you describe the above ground political orientation of Robbie, what was it about, how, is there anything of special significance related to like the Belgravia Youth Congress or anything else that could have been a pointer for you in a direction that this man was oriented along military lines or headed that way?

MR BROWN: As I said earlier, besides the fact that as a member of the South African Youth Congress, which makes you almost automatically a supporter of the African National Congress and its strategies and tactics, which included the armed struggle, it was almost a given that everybody in this organisation has that sort of commitment. There were no pointers that led me to believe that there has been a shift in Robbie's political perspective or opinion.

Everybody that was in SAYCO launched on a very militant platform, the day when it was launched it gave support to the ANC's armed struggle and everybody that joined or that were members of that organisation agreed to that policy and that militant platform. Robbie was one of them as a chairperson of his local Youth Congress, which was an affiliate of SAYCO. So there were no pointers.

As I said and I want to repeat this, my relationship, political relationship with Robbie was of an intellectual nature and it was about introducing him to the classics and guiding him on those things.

MR KHOISAN: And before this particular incident did you have any opportunity or occasion to meet with or be in touch with or to have any kind of interaction with who is now director Andre Lincoln?

MR BROWN: The contact that I had with Andre Lincoln was at the time when I was instructed by the ANC's Department of Intelligence

and Security in Shell House to meet with Andre and to hand him the AK-47 and ammunition as part of the ANC's broad, or general attempt to collect outstanding weaponry. And that was my contact with him. Beyond that never again, before that, never.

MR KHOISAN: And in this whole time did you ever meet Rafael Martin from Mitchell's Plain?

MR BROWN: It sounds familiar, I mean, but - the name sounds familiar but....

MR KHOISAN: So Zane Samaa trained where?

MR BROWN: He went specifically to Zimbabwe.

MR KHOISAN: And that was part of the whole Fraser, Strachan and Hanekom machinery ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: That's correct.

MR KHOISAN: And he was trained through that machinery. And he came back and then under whose command did he fall, under your command?

MR BROWN: Yes. But it was - the way we set up the operation was to have the political commission and the military commission almost existing in parallel and not as before, and this was part of a broader Operation Vula approach to manage the underground, to not have the military and the political so closely commanded either under each other or whatever. So there was a general split between the two offices. That then - as a result of that decision by generally

Operation Vula, made me then therefore not to become involved in military details.

MR KHOISAN: And in terms of your reports in respect of the activities, you were reporting, at which stage did your reporting channel change exactly from Tryon to the Geraldine Fraser, Hanekom and Strachan command?

MR BROWN: In terms of time it's difficult to say ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: '88, '89?

MR BROWN: Probably '88.

MR KHOISAN: Probably '88. So from then on you were ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I can't remember, I mean I must say.

MR KHOISAN: ...but at the time of the Coline and Robbie Waterwich incident you were under the command of ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Yes.

MR KHOISAN: ...of these other people, essentially in an underground structure tasked with propaganda work, essentially ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: That's correct.

MR KHOISAN: Ideological work and stuff like that. And what exactly was your report to Miss Fraser and Hanekom and Strachan?

MR BROWN: Well I went to them and I told them this is what I have discovered and this is what this man has told me. I went to remove weaponry, this is what the situation is with the weaponry

and that's what I said. The issues that I raised with you this morning about that sequence of events, that is basically what I gave them.

MR KHOISAN: And ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: They were very unhappy, obviously ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Who was that?

MR BROWN: They were very unhappy about the fact that there has been this complication and about the fact that in a sense I've been drawn into this complication. They were unhappy that I allowed myself to get into it to that extent for that matter, very unhappy, to the point that they raised the possibility of us combining all these activities and network and take it right back to Harare where they will exercise command and control, but a few days after we have come to that conclusion we reversed the decision and the decision then was taken and I was commanded to not consider that option and to break ties.

MR KHOISAN: Okay, was it ever discussed with you in Harare the subject of the Island machinery ever discussed with you?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Did you know about the Island machinery and its role here in the Western Cape?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: And ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Can I, can I interrupt you ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: You see I - okay go ahead.

MR BROWN: As indicated earlier I understand the importance of probing and detailing the minutest information, but I want to make this point that everybody, to everybody it appears and it's evident obviously, that there's a complexity around this whole situation. I understand that, all of us are part of that complexity, but to me there's a simple fact here, or two simple facts.

The one is that there is confirmation that someone has been responsible for commanding this operation and that's on the table. Someone sent those two people into a mission, and that person has already confirmed that. That's the one fact.

The other fact is that I got into contact with it, whether it is odd, in an odd way, I did get into contact with it, I did remove the weapons. Those weapons have not disappeared. We are going to get it. So that's another set of facts.

But the main, in my opinion the major fact in regard to this whole problem, is the fact that there has been a commander that did send these people into a mission. There was a complication with the mission, people died, but my belief is, in terms of the events leading to the death of these people, and the subsequent problem, the detail of that must come from that man, and not from me, on the one hand.

Then on the other hand there might be a series of issues that might broadly relate to the politics and the complexity of

underground operations and structures and so on in the Western Cape, but in my opinion, in my opinion that is another issue which I will cooperate with to the fullest in terms of my understanding of the complex web of clandestinity in the Western Cape, I will cooperate. I will give my fullest cooperation. But in my view the two things are different.

MR KHOISAN: You are quite correct there Mr Brown.

MR BROWN: So for example I don't understand when, when - I understand that you want to put the bigger picture together here, so let's talk about this and that and the island network and so on and so on, now if I do have information about that we will talk about it, but to me the one thing that must be sorted out is the fact that there was a person responsible for sending these people into a mission, a mission that I didn't have anything to do with, and that I did not have any knowledge of. And that's the simple situation.

MR KHOISAN: Okay let me put it to you this way. We have spoken with several members of the command structure, that's the first point. We've interviewed them and we've spent hours with them, so - and in terms of the fact that those operatives were part of a structure, the persons who are in command of that structure must accept the responsibility of command. That is clear. This Commission has no problem with that.

What we do have a problem with, on the other hand, or shall I say what we do need to clarify, is that this morning we came and

spoke here and we put it to you that whether you were aware or unaware, you say you were unaware, that in 1989, in June, you were registered as a source. You put it to us that you were close to Robbie, very close to Robbie.

Given the way we know, given the level of depth of knowledge of this Commission, especially the Investigative Unit of the National Intelligence Service and the way they operate, you know what I mean, we understand that there's a necessity to probe because on that side the NIS, I mean we've dealt with the CCB, we've had the same situation where people were totally unaware and they were being paid money and then a number of things would have happened, your house could have been bugged for instance, you had a very close relationship with Robbie, your house could have been bugged and as we put it already, Mr Hattingh, who now emerges as a leading figure in spook politics, shall I say, was using you, could have been using you in one way or another and used a lot of other situations and people to further his own objective. And it's not that we are trying to spin conspiracy theories here, what we are trying to do is to understand how sinister, the sinister lengths that some people go to to achieve an objective, to make a point. And so that is what we are trying to find out, if there was at any time when Robbie Waterwich would have come to you in your confidence and said, at any point at any time or any space or maybe in your house and said there is this one thing, because you were that close to him

that I am going on a mission, which could have been dropped, inadvertently it could have been dropped like that and never dealt with again. But something that you might not have picked up on but somebody who may have been surreptitiously listening to that conversation could have picked up on and activated a whole network of people. I am not saying that it's the way it happened but it's one scenario that we have to contend and that's why I am putting it to you.

MR BROWN: No I understand. I just think that on this matter we must deal with the facts and the details. I don't think it's going to, for me, it's going to be very helpful to deal with scenarios. The world of Intelligence then and now is so complicated that there are 110's of scenarios, but that does not mean that I do not want to help, and I do not want to give my bit of the story, on the one hand.

On the other hand some of these matters are being investigated by the National Intelligence Agency, like for example the CJ Hattingh situation. I think it's critical, it's critical. The NIA knows exactly what my relationship is with Hattingh. Get it from them, get the files from them.

MR KHOISAN: I am not saying that we are not sitting with the files Mr Brown.

MR BROWN: But the fact of the matter is I don't understand the relationship, other than it might have been part of a much bigger scheme.

MR KHOISAN: Ja. No that is clear and we don't really want to revisit that. In terms of that particular thing we've told you and now you actually have the liberating position of knowing that somebody had registered you as a source a month before a close friend of yours was killed, and that in itself is something that you will know now for yourself. There will not be a cloud of - you will always know that somebody did this to you, whether you agreed or not, that somebody did this to you, and you can act accordingly, whatever you need to do.

MR BROWN: It's not a problem ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN:to sort out that matter, right. But for us the fact is that somebody that you had a mentor relationship with, somebody you were very close with, visited you every day, one day is wiped off the face of the earth in an explosion that is inexplicable. Something that happens at the toilets where the medical report itself is something that - and the forensic report and the medico-legal post mortem itself is now under discussion because we've reviewed all those facts and a lot of things don't make sense.

And the thing that we are putting to you is that I have to ascertain from you and I hope you can help us with this, is if you can think through any moment when Robbie may have said something about the fact that he might have been connected to a mission of any kind.

MR BROWN: Not at any time.

MR KHOISAN: So you had no knowledge of the fact that he was military?

MR BROWN: Absolutely.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. And while we are on this issue of Military Intelligence or National Intelligence Service, you are saying, for the record, under oath that you are stating that you were never a source of Military Intelligence?

MR BROWN: I am saying that I am not aware that I have been that.

CHAIRPERSON: Could you speak into the microphone please.

MR BROWN: I am saying that I am not aware. If you can bring to me documentation that proves that could have happened, but I am not aware of it.

MR KHOISAN: But you cannot say for the record that you were not a source of Military Intelligence in 1989?

MR BROWN: As far as I am concerned I'm not, I was never, but if someone comes forward and says this man was a source then I was registered without my knowledge and these things happen.

MR KHOISAN: So that's why I am trying to probe, we've probed the NIS side, Johan Hattingh that's clear, he ran a whole NIS network and you happened to be part of that network, but now on the Military Intelligence side, because what we are dealing with here is a situation where a number of things could have happened,

that that device could have been zero timed, people setting the device at the public toilets, boom, it blows up, two people down.

Or you know scenarios where people could have happened upon them, been waiting for them there, tortured them first, beat them, you know, Robbie had blood on his brain and blood in his lungs indicating a different scenario than what we see happened, and then blown up in an explosion.

And the thing is that we have already established that you were, as you put it, an unaware source of the National Intelligence Service, and I want you to think through very clearly whether in any way or another you may have interacted with people from Military Intelligence, or whether when you went to NIS recently, the NIS people, whether they raised the issue of Military Intelligence with you?

MR BROWN: When did I go to the NIS?

MR KHOISAN: No, no, I am saying if you - because this morning we cleared that, you said that before you came here, since receiving the subpoena, you had gone to NIA people to deal with this and other matters that this topic came up, and I am putting it to you that can you think through clearly whether you may have been an unaware source of another part of the security apparatus?

MR BROWN: No.

CHAIRPERSON: We are recording this so don't nod.

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: No. So for the record in 1989 you were not a source of Military Intelligence.

MR BROWN: Can I make this point, first of all no, okay. And secondly I have never discussed with Robbie, on the one hand, anything about Umkhonto weSizwe details, military operations, underground operations, it was not the nature of my relationship, okay. I was an operative which, and it had nothing to do with Robbie, okay, so I kept those sorts of things apart. So even if my house could have been bugged or surveillance or whatever the case may be there was absolutely no covert connection between me and Robert Waterwich, not at any given point.

We never had clandestine meetings, we never had clandestine communications, there was absolutely none of that in terms of our relationship. It was open, it was friendly, it was above board. He was not part of my circle, he was not part of my day-to-day routine, he was a friend of the house, he was a young brother. He came to my house, he had dinner, he had coffee and so on and so on, that's what it was about. I mentored him in classical marxist literature and that was it.

So even if there was surveillance or tapping or electronic devices connected to me there is, under no circumstances, any time that something like that could have emerged. That's on the one hand.

On the other hand, despite the fact that I've had a relationship with Mr CJ Hattingh, who it emerged as being an NIS operative, at no point have I had any conversations with him about any matters that dealt with things like clandestinity and Western Cape operations or whatever the case may be. It's always been a relationship of me providing him with macro-perspectives on broader political security issues. And at no point was there any discussions or reference or details about things like that. So yes on the one hand I did have a connection with someone that appears to now to have been an NIS operative, you giving me the fact, I have received that information from National Intelligence, from NAA that I was registered as a source. The NAA knows, the Ministry of Intelligence knows that I was registered as an unknown source. So that is there for the record, and so, but it is a point that reality, or that fact, there's never been any, at any time, reference by accident or consciously about anything that dealt with military matters between me and Hattingh. Neither at any time was there any such conversation between me and Robbie, so ja it's....

MR KHOISAN: Ja you see did you know that Hattingh was using the Foundation for Contemporary Research as a nurse front?

MR BROWN: Well I knew that he was instrumental in the founding of the Foundation for Contemporary Research. He was overtly involved in the setting up of it together with a whole lot of well known personalities in the Cape, Richard Stevens Johnny Esau,

Trevor Manuel, Chris Nissen, many people. He worked with them together in setting up this thing. My understanding of the FCR was never that it was a front because I was not aware that Hattingh was an NIS operative. It only registered when I found out eventually that he was an NIS operative, that all these things must have been fronts. So no I was not aware.

MR KHOISAN: There's something very interesting that you just dropped here that...(intervention)

MR BROWN: So no I was not aware that the FCR was a front.

MR KHOISAN: Did CJ Hattingh, did he have a relationship to Johnny Esau, maybe we can go with it from that angle. Did - because you just said that... (intervention)

MR BROWN: No sorry, sorry, I think that we're stepping out of line here.

MR KHOISAN: No, no you just mentioned that Johnny Esau was one of the people...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Can I interrupt here please...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: No, no-one...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Just allow him to answer questions.

MR BROWN: One second.

MR KHOISAN: You just told me that Johnny Esau was one of the people, Johnny Esau is one of the command structures, one of the commanders of the structure that commanded the operation in which two people fell. We're trying to establish, we know that C J

Hattingh was a member of the security establishment who had mischievous intentions with regard to what was going on on the ground here, that we know already because there is a massive investigation, it's not something that you don't know about, you know about it and he's being investigated for a range of criminal activities.

You know that now the Foundation for Contemporary Research was also a front company that he helped establish. You said that Johnny Esau was one of the people that was involved in this, I just want to know, it's just a simple question, yes or no.

MR BROWN: It's not a simple question.

MR KHOISAN: Do you know if a relationship existed, I can pursue it myself for Johnny.

MR BROWN: Now why don't you do that because it's not a simple question and I am to bring this thing back to the point. If you, if we want to discuss the complex web of clandestinity in the Western Cape then let's say that, then let's talk about that. But I'm not here to shed light on the complexity of clandestinity in the Western Cape, I am here to assist in the specifics of a situation where two people died. The nature of whoever's relationship with whoever is not my responsibility, but more than that, I don't understand what, in terms of the bigger picture it might have something to do with the events or with the death of these two people, but the facts on the table at the moment is that there are people that are responsible for

that and they must be spoken to, they must give the minutest detail, not me.

CHAIRPERSON: And can I ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: No, no, one second Commissioner, you were whether you're aware or whether you were unaware unless ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: (...indistinct) ...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: ...at the time, at the time of their deaths you were a registered source of an intelligence organisation that was a direct opponent of the liberation movement, whether we like it or not.

MR BROWN: No, no listen, what are you saying?

MR KHOISAN: I'm saying that you were, you are recorded as a registered source. I have a legitimate right to ask you that question.

MR BROWN: So what does that mean?

MR KHOISAN: You know I'm - I can show you, I can give you your source number.

MR BROWN: No, no, no, so what does that mean, are you having a conclusion on the basis of that?

MR KHOISAN: I'm not having no conclusion, I'm asking you because the thing is that you were an instrumental person, you were somebody that had a mentor relationship with Robbie and was respected by a whole range of people. On the other hand you had a relationship with a man who had one of the most sinister intentions in the Western Cape.

MR BROWN: Okay.

MR KHOISAN: And that relationship can be put as a business relationship, but fundamentally that relationship is the fact that you were paid..

MR BROWN: What is the connection?

MR KHOISAN: Okay the fact is that you were a source of the NIS, you are a registered source a month before these people die and I want to know what the connections are that this man is making with you.

MR BROWN: What is the connection? I cannot give you any information on that. What is the connection?

MR KHOISAN: Okay I'm asking you now, I'm trying to ascertain from you whether there is any connection that flows off of your connection to Mr C J Hattingh. When I put on the table that the Foundation for Contemporary Research has been and established front company of the NIS of which CJ Hattingh was instrumental in establishing ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: So what is the connection between that and the death of Robert Waterwich and Coline Williams, what is the connection?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brown it's important that you allow Mr Zenzile to ask the questions.

MR BROWN: No I understand be...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Let him ask the questions and then you reply.

MR BROWN: No I understand that he must ask the questions, he's not asking questions he's making statements.

MR KHOISAN: No then let me rephrase it quickly I'll just shorthand this thing. Okay when you came here this morning you told us that you introduced this man to fifty percent of the people that he had, I think we can read back the record to you, that's what you told us, you introduced him to a lot of people.

MR BROWN: I want to ask you and I want to say this very emphatically. Whether I introduced him to 2,000 people, the fact of the matter is, what is the connection?

MR KHOISAN: Well we are trying to establish ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Other than a vague scenario that you're building that could possibly shed light on this matter, but the fact of the matter is, that information I don't have. Go and get it from the National Intelligence Agency.

MR KHOISAN: Mr Brown at no time did you volunteer the fact that you were a source of the National Intelligence Service. The only time that that was confirmed was when I put your source number and your handler on the table. You never volunteered that information to us. That is something that we found out, okay.

MR BROWN: What is the connection?

MR KHOISAN: The connection here is the fact that you, at the same time as being a leading figure in, or shall I say somebody who had a responsible position, you were reporting to senior people in

Harare, you had a relationship to a structure in which a lot of young people, very impressionable young people were connected. On the other hand you were connected to one of the most sinister individuals who is being investigated for a range of criminal activities which resulted in gross human rights abuses. I'm trying to find out whether at any point those wires crossed and that is what is important. Because the National Intelligence Service to us is not something that is being left uninvestigated, that institution, we are engaging in a very serious investigation of it and we want to know what it's role is because you are a registered source of them a month before these people die. I have a legitimate right to ask you...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Well you've got a legitimate right to ask that question...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: Yes, and I'm asking it you, I'm putting it to you ... (intervention)

MR BROWN: But, but you are making an assumption here Mr Khoisan, I'm telling you, and it is wrong, there is absolutely no factual or empirical information that you have at hand that can make any connection. Yes there's a scenario which makes things very complicated, I understand that, but if you want to make a conclusion at the end, you must put on the table what the connections are between these things.

The fact that I, I can know anybody who is extremely sinister, and I can know someone else who has the highest morals in the world, and that doesn't mean that there is a complication or a problem there. The fact that you are using the fact that there was a registration of me as a source of the NIS, I do not understand the connection because even myself found out about this very recently. So it's not as if I was a known and conscious operative of the NIS. So I'm posing this, what is the connection and why is it that you're elevating this issue beyond its proportion I would believe?

CHAIRPERSON: Can we get back to rationality rather than emotionality here.

The question is quite a legitimate one. There are two, I'm chairing this session Mr Brown, there are two sets of connections here, one you have a connection with a person who is registered as your handler, and you have a connection with this person and a whole range of other connections.

And on the other hand you have a very intimate relationship with someone who is blown up. Okay. So we are trying to get rid of perceptions and get rid of doubt and get rid of mysticism in all of those things. Let's get to the facts. The question posed to you is, do you know whether at any point those two sets of connections intersected? Can you answer that please?

MR BROWN: I think that is a more legitimate question. I think as far as my knowledge goes, there's never been any connection

between my relationship with Robert Waterwich and my relationship with C J Hattingh. There's never been a conversation about it, Robert didn't know the man, this man didn't know Robert, there's never been a discussion about my relationship with Robert on the one hand and neither has there ever been a discussion between Robert and myself and the fact that I've got a relationship with this man.

So as far as my knowledge stretch, in terms of my position in this whole equation, I don't see a connection. ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Now we are making progress.

MR BROWN:neither was I actively or consciously a facilitator in the broader and bigger quagmire of this whole problem of being a link or a connection, I don't see it.

CHAIRPERSON: Now we're making progress so can we please remain rational and not get on to some emotional high horse.

MR BROWN: You are referring to all of us I suppose.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I'm referring to ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Thank you.

MR KHOISAN: So Mr Brown so we've established that on the one hand that your relationship with Robert Waterwich and your relationship with C J Hattingh, those paths never crossed?

MR BROWN: As far as my knowledge goes, yes.

MR KHOISAN: As far as your knowledge goes. That's all we want for now on that question. Now ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Mr Khoisan, you know it would have been very helpful if we started like that.

MR KHOISAN: No you know you can, I'm not here to harass you, and literally you know I don't want to be here asking - this is one of the most difficult, in fact this is one of the most difficult cases that we have to deal with in that it involves unravelling one of the murkiest webs and you know we have a problem on our side. You have to realise that we have a family here, who wants to know, we have families who want to know what happened to their children. I'm sure you on your side have your own questions that go back to that time, and that's what I ascertain. I'm not here to try to harass you, but we need to find out whether there's anything that you know which in any way implicates the security apparatus in any dirty tricks. That's the bottom line here. And to get to this we have to ask all of these questions you know that seemingly have no relationship to what you say are the facts on the table. The facts on the table are that Robbie Waterwich and Coline Williams, they had a commander, that commander was part of a command structure, that's the detachment, that detachment has made a statement, we have that statement. They've accepted that those are their people. That scenario is clear for us. We're not going to go and interrogate them, we know that.

On the other hand this thing that we don't know is who could have engaged in an act of mischief which could have led to their untimely deaths.

MR BROWN: Ask the people that planned the operation

...(intervention)

MR KHOISAN: ..you see and the thing is that we've asked them those questions but we are now asking you certain questions about people that were connected to you. That's why the question about Mr Hattingh. That's why, but okay let us first go forward.

I just want to find out now just to clarify because I think we have cleared up a number of things. In terms of your - the last time that you spoke to Wesley, when was that?

MR BROWN: I don't know, I can't remember.

MR KHOISAN: At the funeral or some time after?

MR BROWN: Maybe after, I can't remember. I wasn't at the funeral so I didn't speak to him.

MR KHOISAN: Okay but were you part of that funeral committee?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: No, okay. So you have Wesley over there, Wesley came to you and brought you the news that this guy has not come home. So basically that could have been the last time that you spoke to Wesley.

MR BROWN: No, no, no, no, I spoke to him to him after you know, Robbie's death and everything. He was part of the Belgravia

Youth Congress. He in a panic brought me the handgrenade, you know, all those sorts of things. I did speak to him but I can't recall exactly when the last time was.

MR KHOISAN: But you don't know when exactly he brought you, that's what we're trying to get to, the grenades?

MR BROWN: I can't remember.

MR KHOISAN: Okay and then you took those grenades over and - Okay just er..I just need to study....

MR BROWN: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we just need to take a five minute break.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Alright let's proceed. Mr Khoisan, you've got some questions.

MR KHOISAN: Ja, thank you Commissioner, thank you Mr Brown.

As we were on this issue of you, know your reports, we put it to you earlier whether you in any time or at any point reported on situations of people in the Western Cape, that's on a micro level to the NIS and you informed us, no. Do you want to consider that answer?

MR BROWN: As far as I'm concerned I never had any knowledge or I have never been aware that I am writing any reports to the National Intelligence Service.

MR KHOISAN: Now what if I put it to you that there is information in our possession, a wide range of information, that relates specifically to the fact that you not only reported on just broadly in the Western Cape, but actually zeroed your reports to include specific individuals, would you accept that as fact?

MR BROWN: I wouldn't be able to confirm that.

MR KHOISAN: But when we asked you this morning and we kept putting the question to you, and the issue has to do with, what was the nature of your relationship? You put it to us that you were unaware that you were a source and that you were registered on the first of June 1989, and you put it to us that these 3,000, and 8,000 and 9,000 that you were getting from Mr Hattingh was in respect of sort of the big picture type analysis, and I want to ask you for the record, and under oath, whether you have ever given any reports of a micro nature that includes you know, Western Cape scenarios or actually includes specific zeroed reports on key individuals like Johnny Esau?

MR BROWN: I've never done things like that. The only thing as far as individuals are concerned and as far as my relationship with Hattingh is concerned is where I've introduced him to individuals.

MR KHOISAN: And there's no time at all that you put in a report about Zubaida Esau and Johnny Esau?

MR BROWN: I don't recall that, I don't know that, I have absolute, I cannot confirm that. But I want to make this point again. I don't understand this, I don't understand it.

MR KHOISAN: You see for us then now, we just want to be clear because we are giving you ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I know I know, someone, just hypothetically or let me just put you slightly in the picture. I've had several engagements with someone like Johnny, I've had several engagements with someone like Zubaida, Johnny's ex wife, but I don't know them, you know. I don't know them significantly at a personal level. Neither do I know them significantly at a political level. I've always, I've told you that my relationship with Johnny was of occasional political engagement but I've had a rather aloof relationship with him.

CHAIRPERSON: And in any of the reports or communications, written communications, you've had with other people, you have never mentioned his name, alluded to him, him and his family?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: And you've never discussed like the Bonteheuwel Residences Association etc etc.

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: So you're holding firm to that. Because the ultimate thing is that we have to draw up a report based on our own investigation. We're asking you under oath and you have said to us

that you gave no micro reports, there was nothing that centred on individuals and that is your position, you wrote...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Absolutely.

MR KHOISAN: And that in all of your interaction with the National Intelligence Service, you kept it on that level, that micro, taht macro level ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: Can I interrput. On the point as you put it I cannot make a confirmation because I want us to keep this straight, that as far as I am concerned and as far as I was concerned I was not a source of the National Intelligence Service. So if you ask me a question like so you've never written a report to the NIS and I say, yes or no, it's wrong.

CHAIRPERSON: My question was not whether you wrote a report to the NIS.

MR BROWN: This is what he just asked me Ma'am.

CHAIRPERSON: He's following up on a question which I asked and my question is, in any report writing that you had done to any individual or any other person, did you ever mention individuals or individual organisations in those reports? Your reply to us was, no, because you did not do any micro reports on the Western Cape.

MR BROWN: right.

CHAIRPERSON: You only did reports in relation to macro-economic political other issues to whoever you wrote reports about. Because you obviously were given a task you have to write report

isn't it? I mean that's the basis on which one works when you do research or information-gathering at that kind of level. And you are asserting that you did not do anything of that sort.

MR BROWN: I want to say that some of the reports that I gave to the ANC in Harare were of more detail.

CHAIRPERSON: Would that include persons, individuals within the Western Cape?

MR BROWN: No, but it would include the state of politics and the state of organisation, which would then talk about the strengths and the weaknesses and so on and so on.

CHAIRPERSON: But still at a macro level.

MR BROWN: More or less ja. But I've never been asked or tasked.

CHAIRPERSON: But you did not mention individuals or organisations. Okay so we're clear that that is your answer. No you have not done that.

MR KHOISAN: Okay. And I just want to be very clear now on the other side because you see the thing is that as you put it to us you were unaware but as it is in the record, Mr Hattingh is registered as your handler and you know according to what you've told us, your reports to him or your analysis, whatever you wrote for him had nothing to do with Western Cape per se and had nothing to do with individuals and that is your answer for the record, no. You're saying no?

MR BROWN: That's right.

MR KHOISAN: Okay I think that as far as we are concerned Mr Brown and just for the record too, you had no connection at that time to Military Intelligence?

MR BROWN: As far as I'm concerned.

MR KHOISAN: It could be that you were an unaware source of Military Intelligence?

MR BROWN: It could be. These things are strange you know.

MR KHOISAN: Okay and Hattingh never introduced you to somebody that you later discovered was Military Intelligence?

MR BROWN: No.

MR KHOISAN: Okay I think that you know for the most part we are, we're finished with the business here. Now we need to sort out the issue of going to get that limpet mine and the grenades. Can we go early in the morning? Can we pick you up at your hotel and go and get the grenades?

MR BROWN: I think I must, I haven't spoken to this guy for months, so I must try and first of all track him down, I don't even have a telephone number for him. So I'm going to do that.

MR KHOISAN: No but we have cars ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: No I have a car but that's not the issue. The issue is I must try and get hold of him. But it's not like I walk out here and go and drive to his house, I don't even know where he stays. It's been months.

CHAIRPERSON: That's a logistical issue that you have to sort out.

The question at issue is whether the Investigative Unit at the moment, led by Mr Zenzile Khoisan will accompany you (a), to locate the weaponry and (b) to retrieve it and (c) for us to have it forensically tested.

MR BROWN: I have made that commitment right in the beginning of this ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That's the commitments, so the logistical issues we can discuss without having the records involved in that.

MR BROWN: Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: So we just need to make those logistical arrangements so that the Investigative Unit accompanies you in tracking down Mr Abrahams and in retrieving the weaponry.

MR KHOISAN: Mr Brown I think that for now we are finished. I would ask that Mr Brown make himself available to follow up questions, we may have one or two little loose ends that we want to tie up but we can always make that arrangement of getting - if he can just commit himself to being available to us to follow up any loose ends that we need to sort out.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that in order?

MR BROWN: It's okay.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you be available for follow-up questions if we have them?

MR BROWN: Ja I also ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And also if you feel that you would like us to supply you with any information that you need in order to prepare yourself will you do that to us in writing as well please? Will that be okay?

MR BROWN: Um, can I just make a point here. I just want to register again that I believe, and irrespective of what you are going to tell me now, I do believe that a large part of the discussion here could have been much better if I was informed in a much better way about it. I feel very unhappy about the line or the nature of the discussion. A large part of the stuff that you asked me to prepare myself around I did, but a large section of this, you asked me to respond to certain things, and as far as I'm concerned I still don't understand why you've asked me these questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay we know of course that a Section 29 is not easy for all of us...(intervention)

MR BROWN: No it's not about difficulty.

CHAIRPERSON: It is a quite difficult process. The process of establishing what has happened in the past is no easy matter. It is a difficult and arduous task that confronts all of us in this nation and I think that as far as we're concerned, we have been reasonable and in fact the Act in fact gives us the leeway to be much more rigorous than we have been today. So I think that ...(intervention)

MR BROWN: I don't know what that means.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that we have acted within the confines of the Act and we have acted within our mandate and we would be asking you to please accompany, or for the IU to accompany you in order to retrieve those weapons. Thank you very much.

HEARING ADJOURNS

