

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONSECTION 29 HEARING"IN CAMERA"

DATE: 05.06.97
NAME: CAPTAIN PAUL LOOCKE
HELD AT: CAPE TOWN

CHAIRPERSON: Good morning! May I welcome you. The focus of our investigation this morning, and I am saying this morning hoping that we will be finished no later than three o'clock, is around the chronology of events around Crossroads, KTC, Nyanga, between the period of 1975 up to 1988 and 1985 and 1986 specifically.



This is not a court of hearing as you know. This is part of the investigation to help us understand the events around the conflict throughout the country and in this case in the Western Cape. The task of the Commission is to investigate and to document the events surrounding the conflict from 1960 to 1994. In order for us to give a thorough documentation and record of what happened we need the support and cooperation of all of the people involved, to not only give us clarity and description of what happened in specific events, but also to give us some ideas about the motives, the events, the patterns that became the focus of the conflict itself.

This morning we are appealing to Mr Paul Loocke to be part of the contingent of people that we have asked to join us this whole week to help us

with that understanding. Clearly without the truth it leaves us to speculate and speculation is very dangerous because we could speculate about something that is incorrect, that might implicate you or suggest something about you that is incorrect, and that is why it is so important for us to be able to get the truth so that whatever findings we make are based on the truth.

May I introduce my panel. I am Dr Ramashala and essentially I will be chairing this session. On my right-hand side is Mr John Lubbe, investigation. On my left-hand side is Mr Lucky Njozela, investigation, and on my immediate left is Miss Madeleine Fullard, research. The three of them will form the core of the panel and will be taking turns, not in interrogating, but in facilitating your testimony and trying to extract some answers to some of the questions that we have that are still yet unclear.

May I welcome your Counsel and ask you if you would like to take the oath or make an affirmation?

Miss Chairperson if I may be allowed, first of all thank you for your introduction. We do...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I would like to ask you first if you would like to take the oath?

ADV VISSER: Myself, I am not going to take the oath, the witness.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh the label is wrong, the label should be - yes, yes.

ADV VISSER: Yes. My name is Visser. I am counsel acting for Captain Loocke...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loocke, let me start first Mr Visser before you say anything I'd like to find out if Mr Loocke would like to take an oath or make an affirmation.

CAPT LOOCKE: I'd like to take the oath.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay would you stand please.

PAUL LOOCKE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Counsel you may continue.

ADV VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. I was saying that we do appreciate the broad view which you sketched in your approach, and we welcome that. Clearly we are here also to be of such assistance as we may be able to.

There are just two matters perhaps of household issues which perhaps we should clear the air with. The first is we are not quite certain how Captain Loocke slots in to your investigations. The first question that comes to mind is whether the investigating unit has any reason at this stage to suspect him of any criminal activity? And whether this investigation or this inquiry today is because of that? We would like to obtain some indication from you and if so what that suspicion would be.

Secondly, we must tell you now that Captain Loocke was an investigator, he was a detective. He was not part of the riot squad who may know and who probably know a lot more about events and the causes of events in the KTC and surrounds, Guguletu, Old Crossroads, during the 1986.

Furthermore, we must ask you to view his evidence against the background that he only arrived in Guguletu in January 1986. He was in fact

injured in a handgrenade attack in November, so his knowledge expands about 11 months so-to-speak.

That's all we wish to say. For the rest we have come here prepared as we were told by letters on two issues. The one is the background to the special investigation unit which he headed for a short period of time and in which he was involved for the rest of the year. He was involved in that unit we can say, roughly, intimately from approximately March 1986 although as chief of the detectives in Guguletu the special investigating unit fell under him from January 1986. I don't want to give his evidence, he will give that evidence himself.

Then of course the issue around a shooting which took place on the 10th of June at the house of - I am sorry I am corrected, on the 29th of April, at or near the home of certain Mr Toysie(?). Just in that regard we don't know whether you are aware that the person who was shot there that day by Captain Loocke was in fact charged in a criminal trial on attempted murder, and we want to tell you that Captain Loocke also gave evidence at that trial. We don't have any information, unfortunately, about that trial. We don't even know what the result was, Captain Loocke doesn't thought it as well to inform you that if you are after more information regarding that incident certainly the record of the trial would probably be of assistance to you.

Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you counsel. We are very much aware of the information you have just presented.

I am going to ask Mr John Lubbe to address some of the issues you've identified, and I would like to appeal to you that we should try in every possible

way not to make this interaction an adversarial one, because if we do then it's going to turn to look like an interrogation. Clearly what we are seeking from Captain Leeks is general information with respect to the context without necessarily making accusations against Captain Leeks. May I ask Mr Lubbe to give a sort-of background of the nature of our discussion and investigation today.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson. Once again I would just like to welcome Advocate Visser and Mr Wagner and Mr Leeks. We appreciate your willingness to be here today and hopefully to assist us in the direction of our investigations.

Just to add on to what the Chairperson has stated I just need to clarify some of your questions.

Firstly, I just want to say that Captain Leeks, according to my evidence before me, has not as such been implicated in any direct human rights violation, and I would like to clearly state that here today.

Secondly, the main motivation for requesting Captain Leeks's presence here today is essentially to get an overview of the situation in KTC for the period January '86 till November 1986 the term in which Captain Leeks was stationed here in KTC. Obviously we've heard evidence from the so-called Leeks side and also the Comrade side and I think in all fairness it would be also right to get the third dimension also involved and that is the side of the security forces and essentially in Captain Leeks's position the investigator involvement surrounding KTC. Obviously he played a vital role in the investigations which took place there and essentially he would have known the situation as it took place in that

period. So essentially it is to also get a background of the special investigative unit, their tasking, their role etc, you know within that dimension we are looking at first of all.

Then to answer the question surrounding the 29th of April, the shooting at the house of Toyise, we also do not have the court record which pertains to that exact prosecution which went through there, but this incident took place within the period of Captain Loocke's being involved in the investigations in KTC and essentially it forms part of the task within that mandated period of his investigation. So it's essentially just one of the elements we would like to touch on, maybe to pose a few questions surrounding that incident which hopefully will still be fresh in the memory of Captain Loocke.

So we trust that we can have an effective interaction here today basically to move forward. Thank you.



ADV VISSER: On that basis, Chairperson, I see no reason why we shouldn't have a fruitful discussion here today.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson. I hope you don't mind me posing most of the questions in English, but I will alternate, you know, for the sake of providing a balance here to Afrikaans as we proceed, if you feel that is necessary.

ADV VISSER: Chairperson, Capt Loocke says he's quite happy to receive the questions in English as long as he can answer, because he can express himself better in his home language, Afrikaans.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Advocate Visser. Captain Loocke I wonder if we can start at the very beginning, which is normally a very good place to start, and for

the record of this Commission if you could possibly supply us with details as to your career in the SAP, when you started, the different units and divisions that you were stationed at, and then before your arrival in Cape Town where exactly were you stationed and what was your job that you were busy with?

CAPT LOOCKE: Chairperson, thank you. On the 17th of January 1966 I joined the South African Police in Pretoria. The whole of 1966 I was at the Police College doing my training. At the end of '66 I was transferred to Acadia Uniform Branch in Pretoria. For a couple of years I was attached to the Uniform Branch at Acadia Police Station. I was then transferred to the Detective Branch in Pretoria Central. If I remember correctly it was in 1972 or '73, in the early seventies I was transferred to the Detective Branch. There I started with theft from motor car unit. I was later transferred to the housebreaking unit and then I was transferred from the theft from motor vehicle unit and I stayed at the Central Detective Branch until 1979 when I became an officer.

When I became an officer in 1979 I stayed at the Police College where I did advanced training and service. I was there for about a year and then I was transferred to Wierda Brug, Detective Branch, that's also in Pretoria, and from Wierda Brug Detective Branch I was transferred to Pretoria Murder and Robbery Unit. I stayed there for a couple of years, I am not sure how long.

From there I was transferred to Bloemfontein, to the detective branch in Bloemfontein. I stayed there for approximately two years, perhaps a little bit less and at the start of '86 I was transferred from Bloemfontein to Guguletu Detective Branch in Cape Town, first Athlone and then Guguletu. For the whole of '86 I was attached to the Guguletu Detective Branch here.

From there I was transferred to John Vorster Square Motor Car Theft Unit in Johannesburg. I stayed at the vehicle theft unit for about, well it was a number of years, I can't remember the exact years. Then I established the Firearm Unit and I was transferred to Eikenhof just outside Johannesburg. That was the firearm investigation unit of the police.

Then I established a special unit to do investigation into the murders of policemen, and I was transferred there. That was in Sandton where our offices were. I was the commanding officer of that unit.

From there I was transferred to Brixton Murder and Robbery and I stayed there for a number of years. I think it was in 1990 when I was transferred and I was a founder member of the anti-corruption unit for the SAP and I stayed there until I retired.

I forgot something. I was transferred to Natal for a brief period, Ntlabane, but that was for about six months or so, that was before I became an officer and then I was re-transferred to Pretoria.

That is basically it in a nutshell.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson, thank you Mr Loocke. Sir, I wonder if it's possible then, also for the record, for you to provide us with what sort of training that you've been exposed to in your police career especially prior to 1986 in terms of specialised training, what can you tell us about specialised training or other training you received?

CAPT LOOCKE: I was properly trained in all facets of the Uniform Branch, managing of a station and whatever, and I also did a proper detective training course as well as a course in the investigation of crime, an advanced course. I

also did an advanced course in the investigation of theft from motor vehicles. I also did training in border control, counter-insurgency training and also I received training in the combatting of riots. I also did various other bits of specialised training, theft from motor vehicles, murder and robbery etc. I also did a shooting course, the ordinary training in shooting, in self-defence and so on.

MR LUBBE: You say special courses in shooting, is that right?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes that's correct.

MR LUBBE: Can you elaborate?

CAPT LOOCKE: That was with the R1 rifle, I received training in that at the Police College, especially when I went to Pretoria Murder and Robbery I received specialised training in the handling of hand arms, the 9mm Beretta. I can't remember the instructor's name, but yes I did a course at the College.

MR LUBBE: What essentially would that training have been marketed for, you are speaking about specialised training in the handling of R1 rifles etc, where would that have taken you?

CAPT LOOCKE: As a result of the type of work that I did at the Pretoria Murder and Robbery we were often in situations in which we were shot at and we were obliged to use our firearms. As a result of that we had proper training, or received proper training.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chair. Just another point.

CHAIRPERSON: May I just ask the question, is that what normally would be called to a layman like me as training in sharp-shooting?

CAPT LOOCKE: No, more combat shooting.

CHAIRPERSON: Combat shooting.

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chair, I think you asked the question I wanted to pose at that point, and thank you Mr Loocke.

I wonder if we can move on then, can you tell us more about the Firearms Investigation Unit? You've obviously had a keen interest in the handling of firearms, can you elaborate on that?

ADV VISSER: I don't know whether he had a keen interest in the handling of firearms, he hasn't given that evidence, perhaps he should be asked that first.

MR LUBBE: Okay sure, I will rephrase that. Do you have a keen interest in firearms Mr Loocke?

CAPT LOOCKE: No definitely not.

MR LUBBE: Fine. I'll move on to another question. How did it come about, Mr Loocke, that you were transferred to Cape Town in the beginning of 1986? You say that you came from Bloemfontein, how did that - was it an actual transfer which took place or was it a "Diensreeling" as they say or was it "Afgedeelde Diens", can you just elaborate on how it came about, you coming to Cape Town?

CAPT LOOCKE: Chairperson, no it was a normal transfer. I was simply transferred by Head Office.

MR LUBBE: So at no stage were you basically called in and tasked to go to Cape Town? You were plainly transferred to Cape Town with no say in the matter?

CAPT LOOCKE: That is correct, yes.

MR LUBBE: Fine.

CHAIRPERSON: Well sometimes people are transferred because they have special skills to bring to the area of transfer, in your case you were never told why you were being specifically transferred?

CAPT LOOCKE: No Chairperson I was simply transferred.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MISS FULLARD: Was there a particular person who arranged that transfer if you can recall that?

CAPT LOOCKE: It would have to have been at Head Office, the transfer came from them. If I may speculate, I am not saying that it is the case but if I may speculate, there were too many of us officers in Bloemfontein and there were some promotions at that stage and I think there were too many of us they decided to transfer me because at that stage I was already a Captain and there were too many captains there. I think that's what might have happened.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chair. Captain if we can proceed to your arrival in Cape Town. Essentially you mentioned that you were transferred to the Guguletu CID branch, is that correct Sir?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes that's correct. I was actually transferred to Athlone Detective Branch, but when I arrived here - my transfer read that I should be the commanding officer of the Athlone Detective Branch, when I arrived here I was notified that I wasn't actually going to Athlone but in fact to Guguletu and that's how I arrived there.

MR LUBBE: So you were transferred then to Guguletu CID. Now just on that point, within the Guguletu CID did they have a team of investigators who specialised in the unrest investigations or how did that operate?

CAPT LOOCKE: Upon my arrival in '86 at Guguletu there was a detective, Engelbrecht, Joop Engelbrecht, I think he was a warrant officer, him and one other person, I think it was a Black Detective, I am not quite sure but I think, I think it was Motlewana, those two dealt with all the investigations into the unrest reigning at the time, that was their primary task.

MR LUBBE: Thank you. So essentially did you come and take command of that group and then move on from there and bring further members into your team or how did you progress from there?

CAPT LOOCKE: I was the detective branch commander of the detectives and that branch was under me.

MR LUBBE: So you were fully aware of the investigations that they were conducting, being in the position of the head of the CID?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

MR LUBBE: Okay.

MISS FULLARD: Captain Loocke I just want to ask, obviously 1985 and 1986 were, one can call them "peak years" of unrest in the Western Cape, I am sure you will recall that the time of your arrival was certainly a volatile period in the Black townships of Guguletu and Nyanga and obviously the appointment of an unrest investigator would have been a very important position. And I am just curious that the career that you've outlined to us so far it doesn't appear that you had specifically worked in the field of unrest management or unrest control. So

in a sense it appears to me, just from your testimony just now, that it was in a sense quite a new sphere for you, and I am just wondering how it was that you were placed at the head of a very important unrest unit whereas - I mean you mentioned that you had had a riot training course but your career outline seems much more crime oriented, and I am just wanting to understand how that occurred.

CAPT LOOCKE: I think that the expertise which I had in the investigation of murder cases must have been relevant. I suppose that led to me taking control of that unit.

MISS FULLARD: But you hadn't dealt with unrest situations prior to ... (intervention)

CAPT LOOCKE: No, years ago I had been in Kwambanambe as a uniform policeman, there were unrests and uprisings in that area of Natal and I did service there. That was ordinary riot control, that we were simply armed with a baton, that was all. Then I was also in Soweto in 1976 but I never did anything more than that.

MISS FULLARD: Thank you.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chair. Mr LOOCKE if we can proceed, I wonder if I can ask you two questions in one now. Who did you report to essentially at the time, who was the commanding officer whom you reported to?

And then secondly the unrest investigative unit when did you become in charge of that group specifically and what cases were they involved in investigating?

CAPT LOOCKE: As the commanding officer of Guguletu I reported to the district commanding officer, I can't remember who he was, but I know I would have reported to him, and in January when the unrest started increasing rapidly in Guguletu I was called by Brigadier Ronnie van der Westhuizen, he was the divisional detective commissioner at the time, and he told me that due to the circumstances in Guguletu at the time - maybe I can just sketch to you what those circumstances were. The area had become unpoliceable. The people's courts had been established and were escalating, necklace murders were escalating, the police were actually chased out of the area. I am talking specifically of Crossroads and KTC and the police simply couldn't enter the areas.

Then Brigadier Ronnie called me in and told me that we had to do something forceful to actually normalise the area and establish normal policing services again and he proposed that I should take control of the riot investigating unit which existed there. We wanted to extend the small unit, place more men there. That was in January '86.

He also requested that we should try to solve more crimes in the area to instil more confidence in members of the public so that they would actually in future come to the Police for their complaints rather than go to the People's Courts, and he also said that we should actually just halt the activities of the People's Court to an extent.

MR LUBBE: So the whole idea was to motivate the community to move away from People's Courts and to encourage them to come to the Police and report cases.

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

MR LUBBE: Essentially your investigations were focused on murder and arson etc, can you maybe elaborate on the cases you investigated?

CAPT LOOCKE: Correct, yes. Most of the cases that we investigated at the time were murders, including necklace murders, stab wounds or panga wounds, that kind of thing, and also many cases of arson. We had public violence, kidnapping and abduction and aiming of firearms, there were many instances of those and also attempted murders.

MR LUBBE: So if we can just move slightly back. You were mentioning about Ronnie van der Westhuizen. Now essentially you said that the area was unpoliceable, ungovernable. Did he give you specific instructions in how you would go about restoring the order in the community other than encouraging people not to make use of peoples' courts. Were you giving specific tasks in how to go about restoring order in the township at the time.

CAPT LOOCKE: No he left that to my own discretion.

MR LUBBE: Your discretion, is that right?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

MR LUBBE: Sorry, if nobody else from the Panel wants to, then I can proceed. So, yes, the discretion which you've just mentioned of how you would have dealt with in KTC was left to your own discretion. What methods did you apply yourself in restoring order or bringing about effective policing and so on in the area. What methods did you make use of?

CAPT LOOCKE: Firstly I tried and succeeded to some extent in establishing a network of informers within Crossroads and KTC and by means of information

which we got from our informers, we would then act and we tried to act on all cases reported to the police. We would try and solve them as soon as possible, because I felt that if we succeeded in doing that, we would regain the confidence of the people.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loocke in trying to, as you say, establish a network of informers, did you choose your informers randomly or did you choose them from a specific group?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I tried to get as many people from as diverse an area and grouping in the whole community.

MISS FULLARD: Could you describe to us how you would go about recruiting, would somebody come to your attention or, how would your attention be directed to a possible recruit as an informer?

CAPT LOOCKE: Firstly I would have talks with our Black detectives, people who were known informers and who had moved away during the unrest and due to the loss of confidence, we would try to contact them again and then in that way extend our network.

MISS FULLARD: And just to describe the geographical areas that you would have had informs in the squatter camps, would that have included KTC?

CAPT LOOCKE: KTC, yes.

MISS FULLARD: Yes, and Crossroads, Old Crossroads itself?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

MISS FULLARD: And the satellite camps on the perimeter on at Nyanga Bush, Nyanga Extension?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes the whole area.

MR NJOZELA: Mr Loocke, you have made mention of the use of Black detectives. Were these Black detectives part of your unit?

CAPT LOOCKE: No not all of them. The Guguletu's detective branch mostly consisted of Black detectives, the majority of them there were Black detectives and I made enquiries from them about their informers to try and contact those informers to extend our network.

MR NJOZELA: If I listened from what you have said correctly, you have said, not all of them. Assuming that there were that were part of your unit, is that correct?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes, yes. Attached to the unit there was one Motlwana, there was Katuka, I think he was a warrant officer Katuka and there were others who came to do unrest and riot duty. They were transferred to my unit to help with the combatting of unrest, they would stay for a month or two or three and then they would go back to where they came from, so I can't remember them.

CHAIRPERSON: Just a clarification Sir, were, to your knowledge, were any of these detectives sympathetic to any particular group in the community, to your knowledge?

May I clarify my question? There is information that there were different groupings in the community, different headman or different captains. What I'm trying to determine is whether any of these detectives were sympathetic to any particular group from whom or from which group, they would have recruited informers?

CAPT LOOCKE: As far as I know the Black detectives in my unit, no, not as far as I can recall. I don't think they were sympathetic towards any group. They just acted generally as we did.

MISS FULLARD: But if I recall, 1985 and '86 was a period which saw a number of attacks for community residents upon particularly Black members of the SAP who were residing in the townships at the time, they faced a tough time. I think that was experienced across the country, and those Black detectives presumably would have experienced that hostility and possible attack, let's call it hostility from the comrades or the radicals, revolutionaries, whatever you want to call them. So they would surely have had a hostile attitude to the group which was directing this hostility towards them?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes it is true, the detectives lived in fear in the time. Personally I know that we investigated many murder cases, murders of policemen in that time, but I must sketch the background to you.

The particular atmosphere which reigned at the time is that they were all too afraid to show their true feelings because you couldn't show that you were in favour of the Comrades, you would be immediately killed. You couldn't show sympathy for the Witdoeke, then the Comrades would kill you. So people kept up a front and didn't indicate really where they stood because they were afraid, they were really afraid. It was difficult.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson. If we could perhaps touch on the issue of the informers which you had in those years. I'm not going to ask you who they were, that's not appropriate, but what I want to know from you is the following. You obtained information from both sides, as you put it, from the

two different factions, there were essentially two different factions, the so-called Witdoeke or the Fathers, and on the other side the so-called Comrades, Makobane, Makobane and Comrades were the same group?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

MISS FULLARD: Some people referred to them as Makobane and some referred to them as Comrades, but it was the same. And then there were the Witdoeke, the other group. Mr Loocke, essentially, did you try to infiltrate the two factions to obtain information about possible attacks?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I did.

MISS FULLARD: Were you successful in infiltrating both sides. Is that correct?

CAPT LOOCKE: Not entirely successful, not as successful as I'd hoped I'd be but to some extent, yes.

MISS FULLARD: Let us take it one step further. The information which you obtained was, as they say, hot information. If you received information of an impending attack, you would have known about it beforehand, is that correct?

CAPT LOOCKE: No my information related to solving of crimes. I tasked an informer with a specific murder docket or murder case or specific incident, not with matters relating to unrest.

MISS FULLARD: So this was information about suspects and so on?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

MISS FULLARD: And peoples' courts, and that was quite a big priority to try to stop the peoples' court activities.

MR LUBBE: In the period, 1986, the Riot Investigation Unit, do you believe that you were successful in the task which you were fulfilling at the time in as far as arrests, I'm speaking specifically about arrests where concerned, were you successful in gaining a headway inasfar as your investigations are concerned in making arrests? And if arrests were made at the end of the day, where did the arrests essentially come out of? Were they basically arrests on the sides of the comrades or were they actually on the side of the Witdoeke?

CAPT LOOCKE: We were very successful with arrests, that is so but we were never successful in solving the cases, finalising them. As soon as an arrest was made and a witness became known, the witness would simply disappear. I don't know what happened to them but they simply disappeared. So very few of the arrests that we made actually ultimately led to court cases. In other words I can't say that we were a hundred percent successful in our task there and as far as the different places of arrest are concerned within the area controlled by the comrades, I made arrests as well as the area controlled by the Witdoeke. I made arrests in both areas. Amongst others, I also arrested the leader Johnson Ngxobongwana and also a Toysi(?). We investigated cases against them as well. So I made no distinction who where the arrests were made.

MISS FULLARD: Can I just clarify. You say Ngxobongwana was arrested in the period that you were - can you remember what the charges were, what was that in connection with?

CAPT LOOCKE: He was arrested for possession of an illegal firearm and also, I'm not quite sure but I think it was an attempted murder, something like that, but I know I arrested him.

MISS FULLARD: And can you recall what happened to those particular cases?

Were they taken to court?

CAPT LOOCKE: I'm not sure because I left during that period.

ADV VISSER: I may add that evidence about this was in fact presented in the Umzamka trial, the so-called KTC case. I might just see if I can find a reference to it although I doubt it, I haven't got the full record, but there was evidence about the arrest of Ngxobongwana.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson, if we can proceed.

In a way, look you were tasked potentially to try and restore order into the community, right? Did you ever on a proactive basis meet with any of the leaders on the other side of the two factions yourself, to try and find a solution to the unrest which was prevailing at the time?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I want to say I had a problem to determine who the leaders of were, the leaders of the Comrades. In the whole year I was there I could never establish who the real leaders were, I know about Toysi who played a prominent role in the Comrades but we could never determine, for example the Witdoeke, who the leaders were, Thomas Kabeka, he was a leader and then a man with the name of Jerry, I can't remember their names clearly, and I did talk to him. And then also Solwana(?), naturally.

MR LUBBE: So you did in fact interact with the Windhoek leaders?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes but only when I investigated cases.

MR LUBBE: And Prince Gobinca and Ndimma, are those names known to you?

CAPT LOOCKE: Prince Gobinca, yes that's a name I've mentioned.

MR LUBBE: And Sam Ndimma, is the name known to you?

CAPT LOOCKE: No it rings a bell somewhere. It sounds familiar but I can't say for certain.

MR LUBBE: And Geoffrey Nongwe.

CAPT LOOCKE: He and Sam Ndima were amongst the chief headmen, directly underneath Ngxobongwana. It is possible that I did talk to them but I can't remember those names.

MR LUBBE: Fine, thank you Sir. If we can just proceed. You know, the area itself, seemed to be at most times extremely volatile, which was obviously one of the factors which hampered your investigations in the area. It was obviously dangerous for policemen to be in the area and from what you mentioned, that there were policemen who were being targeted at the time, and also implications like being able to investigate in the area because of the positioning of the houses, in other words you'd have to stop and then have to walk a distance to go and investigate a crime scene etc, and in the backdrop thereof, do you believe that these investigations could have been conducted more successfully if inasfar as convictions at the end of the day, if you did not have these complicated factors. And also were there any influences from the two factions which hampered your investigations.

What were your - I'm trying to understand the factors which complicated your investigations for you as effectively as possible to find a solution to the cases which you were investigating, convictions essentially, at the end of the day?

CAPT LOOCKE: Definitely yes. It did in normal circumstances. We would have been much more successful. What I mean by that is, if you come to the

scene of a murder, an ordinary murder scene, usually you had your Finger-prints Division, your Photographs, Forensics, all those aids were available, but I want to refer to a specific case of Spanenberg. He was murdered there at Crossroads. That morning he was lying there, he was still burning and we tried to assist him. While we were investigating they were shooting at us. It's difficult to investigate when you're trying to remove the body. They were shooting at us so it was difficult. It was not normal circumstances.

MR LUBBE: You're obviously emotional about this particular incident and, while I apologise if I had sort of encouraged to bring out any emotions from the past and all that and obviously things like this were very traumatic on you as a policeman and not being able to help a person in such a circumstance, so ..

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loocke, I think part of our responsibility is to try and heal. For me it's okay, there is nothing to be ashamed of. It's okay to feel the way you do. It is part of your healing. I suspect that since that period you never have been able to feel the way you do now and I'm saying to you it's okay. It is part of the healing process for you to feel the way you do. It is part of the healing process to get the demons out so to speak. Of course without that healing process I think it would be very difficult for a country to reach reconciliation and so I say don't be embarrassed about the way you feel, it's okay.

MISS FULLARD: Can I also just add, I think it's very helpful.

CAPT LOOCKE: I would just like to say, the other day while we were consulting Mr Wagner, I also became tearful. I wish you could know how it feels to hold a young person who is doing his work who was killed and he was

pleading that he wanted to live. He just tried to keep alive. The people do not realise what was happening there and today. No it's not right what they're doing today.

MISS FULLARD: Mr Loocke I just want to say it's incredibly important for us to hear this and for the Commission to hear about the traumas that police themselves went through in this period, and I really just want to thank you for sharing this with us.

CAPT LOOCKE: Opperman, he was a young man, he was only 19 years of age. I can still see him lying in front of me. They threw a handgrenade into his car, it exploded under his feet and he was completely blown up up to his midriff and he asked, Captain I just want to live, please help me to keep alive. I couldn't do anything. I couldn't do anything, I could see that he was dying. He pleaded that he just wanted to live, he didn't want to die. I couldn't help him at all. Some of the wives, the policemen's wives for example, Lebonga's wife. He climbed from the casspir just when he left the casspir they shot him right in his forehead and he fell down dead, and his family came and they pleaded with me to help them. I couldn't do anything at all.

I saw in the case of Spannenberg, while he was lying there a burned tyre, they were dancing around, they were laughing at him.

There were certain cases when they were shooting at us in the evening. The task team became involved, we couldn't continue with our investigations. Brigadier van der Westhuizen arranged that we should be protected while investigating cases. That evening in my office the first section of the task team were in my office and they thought we were exaggerating and that evening we

took them into that area and I warned them and said you do not know what you were expecting and they thought I was just exaggerating. You couldn't go, you had to go into Crossroads and KTC on foot. We moved in 20 metres into that area and the first shots rang out. The commanding officer of the Task Team in that time told me later on, if a person had to be trained properly in this task force they had to be trained in Crossroads. The people really do not what was happening there, that was not nice.

But even up to today, what happened there had a terrible effect on my life. In the evenings when we came from work, I didn't drink, in the evenings they had to drink a bottle of brandy, they drank a clean bottle of brandy because they were so tensed and they were so frightened because of the work they had to do during the day. I don't know where those people are today, I never kept in contact with them but during that time you could say it was absolutely inhuman to keep a person so long in that area.

All those bodies. I came to the police station one morning, the bodies were lying around and I could not get to my own office, I had to climb over these bodies and you had to climb over these bodies to get to your office. At 7 o'clock in the morning those bodies were there. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon they were still there, the bodies could not be removed because the people were too frightened to come to this area. Sometimes we had to go and pick up bodies which were hacked to death during the night. You went into that area, you took those bodies away and you did not know who those people were, you couldn't inform the families, they were just brutally hacked to death.

I was looking on after a necklacing had just taken place. I want to explain what happens when necklacing takes place. First of all when the tyre starts burning the eyes pop out and they hang in their sockets, and I think at the Esisolweni(?) Centre in Crossroads they took a young Black girl and necklaced her because she allegedly provided information to us.

Those are things which you will for ever remember, you can't get it out of your mind. That was not right. I myself, I thank God that I am still alive. I have three children. I myself at a certain stage thought that I was going to die because they threw a hand grenade at them. I still have shrapnel in parts of my body from that incident. I know what it is to look death in the face and that was the time, that time in Crossroads I do not wish on anybody. I never want to have that again.

CHAIRPERSON: Captain, you say that one of the people you witnessed being necklaced was a young Black girl.

CAPT LOOCKE: I did not see how they put the tyre around her neck but I just arrived right afterwards and they told me there was a girl being necklaced, and I just saw the flames burning, all the people left the scene and I just saw her burning.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this somebody you might have known? You say that she was accused of providing information to the police.

CAPT LOOCKE: That is correct Chairperson but I did not know her. They alleged she provided information to us.

CHAIRPERSON: I think one of the things that we are trying to understand and unravel is that since there were different factions, not just in Crossroads or KTC

or Guguletu, but all over the country, that since there were factions, that information was being transferred from one group to another through different ways including clandestine ways and if information went to another group and that group knew who was responsible, who the informer was, that since it was an area of conflict, our understanding is that this was a particularly sensitive issue, that informers actually made groups sensitive and vulnerable by transferring information from one group to another, let's say that there was going to be a demonstration somewhere and an informer gave that information to the rival group. That then would have made this group vulnerable to attack and all kinds of sabotage. It is in that context I think that we are trying to understand this, that the people became desperate and treated informers the way they actually did, and I'm not condoning necklacing, but in all kinds of forms to try to give people examples that information should not be transferred.

I don't know if that helps you feel better, but that was the context of the atmosphere at time.

CAPT LOOCKE: Thank you Madam Chair.

MR NJOZELA: A follow-up question. As much as I know Captain Loocke, that this question is really touchy to you, namely the death of your colleague. I would like to know, when did this happen as if you can still recall?

CAPT LOOCKE: It was during 1986, I can't remember the specific dates, there were many.

MR NJOZELA: Was it before May or June?

CAPT LOOCKE: Spannenberg, no I can't remember exactly when it happened.

I can't remember specific dates.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson.

I wonder if we can just move back. When we were speaking about the information which you got from informers, now obviously you acknowledge that you had an informer network which was operating in the area. Now the security branch, on the other hand, how were they operating in the area at the time and what sort of information-sharing was taking place if they were operating in the area?

Who were the individuals from the Security Branch involved in KTC?

Did they have an informer network as well or did you share informers?

CAPT LOOCKE: I know very little about the security police, but I know that Captain Liebenberg, he was operating in this area on the side of the Security Police. Who were their informants I do not know.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Sir. And the name Phillipus du Toit, does that ring a bell to you? He was apparently a warrant officer, Phillipus du Toit, they used to call him Flip du Toit and he was supposed to have been from the Security Branch, also pretty involved at the time in negotiating with the different leaders?

CAPT LOOCKE: It's possible but I can't remember his name.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what we'll do is take a tea break to also give Captain Loocke a chance to pour some water on your face and just to get something down at tea and then we'll be back at 25 to 11. Is that alright?

MR LUBBE: Chairperson, while I still remember, the evidence about the arrests of Ngxobongwana was at page 3760 in the KTC case if you want to refer to it. I hope it's correct because that's just before my batteries packed up. The charges if I remember correctly were attempted murder and illegal possession of

a firearm. Yes it's in fact 3769, you've got part of the record, we got this from you, at line 22,

Do you know any of the leader core of Crossroads?

--- Yes I personally arrested him, I can't remember the name, he was locked up.

And on which charge? --- And then he was arrested twice, first possessing firearms, I accused him I charged him. And then the other one was for a Peoples' Court he presided over in Crossroads.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll continue until we can establish that tea is ready.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson, Captain Loocke or Mr Loocke, the two factions, the Comrades and the Witdoeke, what I'm trying to establish is, in the light of you mentioning attacks on policemen as such. Now there seems to be quite a few casualties insofar as members of the SAP are concerned, what sort of weaponry were both sides carrying at the time? I think you made a few arrests in terms of possession of weapons and that, but essentially can you give us an idea of the weaponry these factions were holding?

CAPT LOOCKE: On both sides they used firearms. We even found automatic firearms on both sides. They used knives and spears and any object which they could use. They used handgrenades and many hand weapons.

MR LUBBE: In terms of the automatic rifles, when you tried to trace who those weapons belonged to, did you in your investigations, did you determine if they were subject to a theft in a certain incident or not? How did you follow that up?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes most of those firearms were AK47's, and I could never determine where they came from.

MR LUBBE: Okay AK47's essentially. No other type of automatic rifles?

CAPT LOOCKE: Not that I can think of.

MR LUBBE: You're quite sure of that?

CAPT LOOCKE: I think they also used R4's but I'm not sure about that.

MR LUBBE: So the possibility is that there may have been R4 rifles also used at the time. Both sides.

CAPT LOOCKE: Shotguns they also used.

MR LUBBE: The use of handgrenades?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes they used handgrenades?

MR LUBBE: Were they Russian-made grenades essentially.

CAPT LOOCKE: They threw an F1 handgrenade at me.

MR LUBBE: An F1 handgrenade. Did both factions make use of handgrenades?

CAPT LOOCKE: I can only refer to what I know and that's that Comrades used handgrenades.

MR LUBBE: If we can possibly just touch on the policeman who you were describing to us, how he was killed in the car by way of the handgrenade explosion. Were there any prosecutions followed? Did you identify the faction responsible for that attack?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes it was also Comrades but no I don't believe that anyone was charged with that incident.

MR LUBBE: Nobody charged?

CAPT LOOCKE: Shortly thereafter I was also subjected to a handgrenade attack. No one was charged during my service period.

MR LUBBE: I don't think anyone else has questions.

CHAIRPERSON: We shall just take a break and return at 20 to or quarter to. Thank you. At a later stage we'll try and plug in the video and look at that.

HEARING ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: You can proceed Mr Lubbe.

PAUL LOOCKE: (s.u.o.)

MR LUBBE: It appears that in numerous cases where problems were prevailing in the area or where an attack was going to take place, that the Witdoeke would basically approach the police and sort of tell them, you know we're in a crisis now, there is an attack which is coming off, can you come and help us. From your point of view, look you were involved in the investigation side, are you aware of a sort of a close relationship which prevailed between the security force being the police and the Witdoeke?

CAPT LOOCKE: No Chairperson I do not know.

MR LUBBE: And further to that, are you aware Sir of any meetings, I'm not specifying yourself now, but any meetings which took place between management of the SAP, possibly the district commander of Athlone and maybe even higher up than that and leaders of the Witdoek faction?

CAPT LOOCKE: Chairperson, not that I know about personally, but during the time that I was there I read in the newspaper at some or other stage that those people had a gathering in Cape Town.

MR LUBBE: You do not know what the contents of that meeting was or the discussions?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I remember they came to the Divisional Headquarters in Cape Town to hold discussions.

MR LUBBE: You are then not aware of any documentation or agreements which were agreed by these groups during that time?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I don't know.

MR LUBBE: Can I continue?

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed.

MR LUBBE: Are you aware of any training in whatever form inasfar as any self-defence in as far as weapons-training which was provided in or to the various factions at the time, inasfar as training inasfar as Witdoeke was concerned or comrades?

Or training which was taking place in the area in as far as weapons handling or anything like that. Do you by any chance have any information in regard to that.

CAPT LOOCKE: Training by whom Madam Chairperson?

MR LUBBE: Well it could have been training which was conducted by certain individuals who came into the area possibly on the Comrades side by Comrades and then also the other dimension, the Witdoeke being trained by SAP personnel, or the board of administration which was in charge basically of the administration of the area KTC.

CAPT LOOCKE: No Chairperson I don't know about that.

MR LUBBE: Fine, thank you.

MISS FULLARD: Captain you very graphically have described to us the nature of the task that confronted you in those years and the heavy load that you faced at the time in the combatting of unrest crimes and the horror in a sense of the crimes that were perpetrated at the time. And it just strikes me that you do have a particular group on the scene which has expressed a desire to counter the Comrades. Now surely you as a police person charged with restoring normality, you have in a sense an offered ally in your attempts to normalise the area and to combat unrest crimes, necklacing and people's courts?

There is a group that has publicly stated in newspaper interviews and all kinds of reports at the time, that they were hostile to the Comrades and that they wished to, well essentially they made themselves available. I remember in the newspapers in January or February '86, Prince Gobinca in an interview stated,

"If the police want to come and help us, come and help us".

this was shortly after he had been in a handgrenade attack, and that was widely reported in the newspaper. So here you have a group of people who are also in a sense wanting to normalise the area and eliminate the unrest. Surely these people would have provided a natural ally for police personnel working in the area? Here you have people on the ground who are willing to assist in this task. Wouldn't they have been a natural ally for persons in the position that you were in?

CAPT LOOCKE: Not as far as I can recall.

MISS FULLARD: You couldn't work as separate from the community, I mean you depended on the resources of the community as well for information you've already described.

CAPT LOOCKE: Not that I can recall. It happened mostly between the Comrades and the Witdoeke themselves. It became a power struggle between those two groups. What you're talking about, about the newspaper reports, I can recall that I read that, I vaguely remember that, but allies, no, not with the police.

MISS FULLARD: So even though this group of people had publicly stated that they wished to assist the police in combatting unrest, you didn't take up this offer?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I didn't do riot control, I only did the investigation. I didn't intervene at all in the combatting of the unrest, only the investigations.

MISS FULLARD: Thank you.

MR NJOZELA: Mr Loocke, you have mentioned in your testimony that both factions were armed with AK47's, R4 rifles. From your experience or from your investigations, were there weapons seized or confiscated?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes weapons were confiscated and recovered.

MR NJOZELA: From which sections?

CAPT LOOCKE: Both sides, Witdoeke as well as Comrades.

MR NJOZELA: And what happened to the weapons confiscated?

CAPT LOOCKE: Those I confiscated were handed in at Guguletu Police Station.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Loocke I wonder if we can maybe focus on an individual, Prince Gobinca. How well did you know this individual?

CAPT LOOCKE: I knew him reasonably well. He often came to the police station, he came to the station commander Mr Burger and I don't know whether they had discussions or whatever but he came to the police station quite regularly and there I often spoke to him, I knew who he was.

MR LUBBE: Sir I'm going to be presenting a piece of evidence, if I may call it that. I've come across a statement which I can hand over to the advocate via Prince Gobinca in which he mentions an incident where one evening he actually phoned you at home to inform you, this is according to him now, of an attack which was taking place and I can hand over the statement to the Advocate.

MISS FULLARD: If I can just clarify there that he refers to the night of the 17th of May which is of course the first day of the destruction of the satellite camps at Crossroads, that was the first day of the following three days during which those camps were burned down.

MR LUBBE: Can I proceed and just indicate to you whereabouts this information is contained. If you turn to the statements on page 7 paragraph 10. Now I must also say that this statement is 10 years old and what, if I can just read or quote this paragraph then - and maybe you would like to respond to it or maybe you would like to think about it for a while.

"On the 17th of May 1986 people at night, people from Section 4 came running in panic to Sam and stated that they had been attacked by Comrades and that their houses had been set alight. I was also informed and ran to Landsdowne Road to seek a casspir. I left Sam with instructions to call the people together with a loud hailer so as to defend ourselves. I could not find a casspir. I then ran to Table Top and phoned

Captain Loocke at home and told him what had happened. The Captain promised to come. I then turned to my people and we fought the fires.

Captain Loocke arrived with a squad of policemen and started patrolling in the casspir".

How would you respond to that Captain?

ADV VISSER: Madam Chair, when did this come into your possession, because we were not provided with it beforehand?

MR LUBBE: I understand that and I accept that. When I was going through the evidence last night I came across that specific statement. It wasn't under my attention before. So it's evidence which has become under my attention as such, so if there's a problem maybe we can discuss.

ADV VISSER: We're not complaining but I must tell you that Mr Loocke's recollection of events, perhaps it's a psychological thing, I don't know, it's very vague and we had to consult for very long to remind him of certain incidents, so that he could actually recollect it. I'm not sure whether he's ready to answer this question but let's find out from him whether he is. Perhaps he should just be asked whether he knows anything about this, whether he can recollect it and if so, what he recollects.

CHAIRPERSON: May I make a comment Adv Visser. At the beginning of the session, I stated,

1, that according to Mr Lubbe's investigation, Mr Loocke is not being accused of any gross human rights violations.

2, that we are attempting to get clarity on the sequence of events and that it's important for us to get information.

3, that we're trying not to make this an adversarial session.

As a psychologist, I am concerned that your preceding statement, and I'm speaking as a psychologist now, that will tend to have some implication for either inhibiting or facilitating Mr Loocke's response to this question. I think Sir, I beg you to let him respond in his own way and the way he seeks your assistance with respect to memory loss, that's where you need to intervene. I think by intervening prior to his expressing difficulty, would tend to inhibit his response. We're not putting him on trial here, and I want to emphasise that, we're not putting him on trial. We're trying to take advantage of his memory to the extent possible.

We will also respect where he says I can't remember on his own, where he says I can remember we will try and respect that, and I think from one professional to another, I hope Sir you'll understand what my concern is. Let him respond, where he has difficulty, then he can look to you to speak for him about the nature of his memory. This is not an adversarial session.

ADV VISSER: I was not trying to answer for him and I'm being misunderstood, and may I make myself quite clear. I was trying to be of assistance to you to tell you there are certain things that he experienced which he'd forgotten and it was only after long consultations that it came back to him. So what I was trying to tell you right now is if he says now today, I don't remember, it may very well be a matter in which he might have been involved but which he had forgotten.

So I wasn't trying to answer for him, I was trying to be of assistance to you so that you can understand and read his answers against that background.

He's got a short memory about those things that happened, but please, he can answer and I won't say another word.

CHAIRPERSON: Sir when he says to us, I can't remember, we respect that.

CAPT LOOCKE: Thank you Chair, I have read this statement and I can't remember it.

MR LUBBE: Good I also won't ask you any more questions on that. We can move on. If we can possibly move to another question then.

What was your relationship like as an investigator and possibly trying to break ground in the area inasfar as finding a solution to the conflict there, what was your relationship like with members of the board of administration of Nyanga, did you have close ties with Mr Petersen or an Inspector Theron or a Mr Schelhase, a Timo Bezuidenhout? I don't know if you recollect any of these names.

Did you have meetings with them at all or other individuals who did?

Can you maybe brief us on that.

CAPT LOOCKE: I recall Mr Schelhase. I had quite a lot of contact with him at that period about the situation in the area.

MR LUBBE: Can you possibly elaborate Sir on what Mr Schelhase was all about and the discussions surrounding the conflict at the time. What was the focus of your discussion?

CAPT LOOCKE: Mr Schelhase, if I remember correctly, knew the area very well, he knew the residents very well. He knew both factions very well, so I tried to obtain some information from him to help in investigating the cases.

MR LUBBE: So he had a good knowledge of the area and what was taking place there. The root of the conflict as such. Are you aware Sir of any training, once again I ask this question, which was being conducted by any persons within the administration board, training of Witdoeke, in any form?

CAPT LOOCKE: Not as far as I know.

MISS FULLARD: And just to add to that, were you aware of support provided by the administration board in the form of money, food, logistical assistance, transport provided to the Witdoeke?

CAPT LOOCKE: I think that they once helped some of the people back to the Transkei, some of the refugees who wanted to go back to the Transkei, yes.

MR NJOZELA: Can you elaborate more on what kind of assistance was provided by Mr Schelhase in trying to assist you in investigations, let alone the fact that he the area very well?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I made enquiries with him. We investigated many cases, murder, arson etc, and I often went to him especially if I had a name, I would then go to him with this name and I would ask him whether he knew this person and where this person lived. It was all in line with my investigations that I made enquiries with him to try and help me trace these people.

MR LUBBE: Captain Loocke, can you tell us whether he, as far as your knowledge, was sympathetic towards the Witdoeke?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I can't answer that, no.

MR LUBBE: We can move on to another question then, a more directed question relating to an incident. The shooting incident which took place outside the house of Christopher Toyise on the 29th of April 1986. Can you explain to

us what the purpose was of your investigation in the area at the time? I understand from the court record that you were trying to affect an arrest in the area. Can you maybe elaborate on the ...(intervention)

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes, that night we were being accompanied by an informer and he was supposed to have pointed out a person to us who was suspected of having killed a policeman, and he in fact pointed out a house but we didn't find the person that we were looking for there.

MR LUBBE: Could you explain to us what happened? What the circumstances were?

CAPT LOOCKE: Well we moved into the area accompanied by this informer. He pointed us in the right direction, he pointed out a hut. We went into the hut looking for this person that we were looking for but he wasn't there. Whilst we were in the hut, drums started beating or people started beating on drums and at that stage I knew that it meant danger because that's how people contacted each other to warn each other that there were policemen in the area. So I knew that we had to be cautious, so I withdrew my men. When we moved back to the casspir, we moved back to Mr Toyisi's house. A big Black man came out of Mr Toyisi's house and he aimed at me with a rifle and I immediately shot three shots in his direction, I hit him in the neck. The two other people who were with him ran away, we went into this house, we arrested him and we went back to the police station.

MR LUBBE: Do you know his identity, the person who was shot.

CAPT LOOCKE: It must be in the docket. A case was opened, he was charged. There was a regional court case in Cape Town but I can't remember his name.

MR LUBBE: In respect of the people who were present, who were with you, were these members of your investigating team, were there Security Branch or Task Force people present?

CAPT LOOCKE: No it was my investigating team, members of my investigating team, I can't remember their exact names, but it wasn't the whole team and there were also members of the task team present who protected us whilst we were busy doing the investigation, but no Security Police people.

MISS FULLARD: When you say you were accompanied by an informer, would that informer have been disguised? I mean surely he wouldn't have been walking around in full disclosure of his identity, would he not have had to conceal his identity in some way? To be seen walking around with police, as you yourself have said was something akin to a death sentence.

CAPT LOOCKE: No this was at night. Nobody was in any disguise.

MISS FULLARD: The informer, you say the informer was walking around fully facially visible.

CAPT LOOCKE: No he was, well he was wearing a coat.

CHAIRPERSON: In your recollection, do you know whether the informer belonged to the comrade group or the Witdoeke group?

CAPT LOOCKE: I'm not sure.

MR NJOZELA: Mr Loocke, I take note of the remarks from your counsel that you don't remember everything and I also think he also shed light in this regard

that you didn't even remember the name of the informer during the trial. Can I ask again whether you still remember now who was the informer?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I don't know.

MISS FULLARD: So how did it happen that you got this informer? Who introduced the informer to you?

CAPT LOOCKE: It must be one of the detectives at Guguletu Police Station who introduced me but I really can't remember.

MISS FULLARD: The White detective or the Black detective?

CAPT LOOCKE: It was a Black detective. I doubt whether any of the White detectives had informers in that area. It would have been very difficult.

MISS FULLARD: You mentioned earlier that you used different informers to the Security Branch, which seems to suggest you had your own system of registration and payment of the informers. Would you have paid this out of your own investigation units? How would payment have been affected?

CAPT LOOCKE: Payments were made to informers. What happened was that if I was responsible for an informer and when he was entitled to reward, I filled in a SAP 62 form and I would then bring this form to the Divisional Commissioner, Brigadier Ronnie van der Westhuizen, he checked the docket just to see whether the person was entitled to his reward. He would then approve it. I drew the money at the Divisional Detective Chief, I went back to the area, made arrangements for payment and paid him.

MISS FULLARD: Did he have to sign a receipt?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes. There also had to be a witness present.

MISS FULLARD: Thank you.

MR LUBBE: If we can refer to your statements regarding ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: May I just ask, do you know what happened to those receipts? Where were the receipts kept?

CAPT LOOCKE: It was sent back to the Divisional Head Office.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson. If we can refer to your affidavit, page five, paragraph 10. I just want possibly your comment in this regard and it has to do with the investigations against Toyise. Perhaps just a comment there.

There was an investigation which was conducted against Toyise in regard to a murder. Now it didn't seem as if there was much success in that investigation according to the record that was withdrawn, and then there was also a further charge of attempted murder. Now Toyise from my understanding was probably, I'm assuming now from a security point of view, one of the kingpins in the area who was at the root of a lot of problems which were arising there. In terms of that now, there was a suggestion at the time that the police were fabricating cases against him or basically trying to make his life difficult as far as bringing cases against him which were unfounded. Can you comment on this in any way?

CAPT LOOCKE: Definitely not as far as I can recall. The cases which we investigated were real cases.

MR LUBBE: Captain Loocke, in terms of the murder investigation which was conducted, of which Toyise's case was withdrawn, do you know anything about that particular case, do you know what the grounds were according to which the charges were withdrawn?

CAPT LOOCKE: I think that was one of the cases that were withdrawn because the witness disappeared and could never be traced again. That's all I can recall about that.

MR LUBBE: You say you can't recall anything more?

CAPT LOOCKE: No.

MR LUBBE: If we can proceed then...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to ask another question. Sir did you know what group Toyise, what faction Toyise belonged to?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I think he was a Comrade.

MR LUBBE: Paragraph 11 of this same affidavit. The comments, you were asked to comment in your affidavit and am I correct in interpreting from your comment in paragraph 11 of this document that you were of the opinion that the Comrades were the main instigators of the violence in KTC? You also an event on the 21st of May 1986 where Comrades were killed in the Witdoek area. On the basis of that can you possibly comment in as far as them being the main instigators of the violence, the Comrades as such?

CAPT LOOCKE: What I tried to say here in the statement is that in the period of quiet after a fight, the Comrades would then continue and attack the Witdoeke and that I found out as a result of all the corpses picked up on those evenings. That's what I tried to say there. In other words there was constant retaliation. It wasn't as if matters were just left there. As soon as the one side stopped the other side would start.

MR LUBBE: So it was fighting both ways across those two groups?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

MR LUBBE: Can I proceed.

If we can move on to the events on the 9th, 10th and 11th June 1986 which was described to be the high point of the violence in 1986, I think you will agree with that. Now from our records you seem to have been in charge or on a vehicle, CP 11, a casspir during that period, you were actually on the ground. Can you maybe take us Sir, I know it's difficult for you because of the time period and detail and that, I would like if it's possible, for you to comment on your perceptions, what you observed over that three day period. Where did things start?

Things, according to our records, seem to have started, there was a gathering of thousands, supposedly of Witdoeke on the 9th and from there things escalated. Can you comment step by step? Take us through the days.

CAPT LOOCKE: It is very difficult to do that. I think the attack came from the Witdoeke. There was a definite attack from their side on the Comrades and obviously the Comrades would then defend themselves against the Witdoeke, so it was just chaotic, it was real chaos. There wasn't much we could do.

The only way to try and stop those unrests and riots was to enter the area with enough fire power and just destroy everything because eventually they were just fighting all over the show and it was all mixed up and confused and it was very difficult to control it. But I think the attack came from the Witdoeke side. I think they were also in the majority when they launched the attack. There were many of them.

CHAIRPERSON: And you knew that they were Witdoeke because they were wearing...(intervention)

CAPT LOOCKE: White arm-bands or around the leg a scrap of white fabric.

MISS FULLARD: And this was actually the second bout of fighting, one can say. There had been the earlier bouts on the 18th, 19th, 20th of May in the satellite camp, so when they gathered and they started moving off towards KTC, it must have been pretty clear that this was going to be round two as it were of the conflict?

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't know what round it was, it was clear that they were going to attack.

MR LUBBE: If I can possibly take you to a step just before the attacks started on the 9th, 10th and the 11th. I mean in the backdrop of the informer network possibly, wasn't there information which was being communicated to the security forces that a large scale attack was going to come off, according to your knowledge and information?

CAPT LOOCKE: Not from me. You mustn't misunderstand my informers' network. The Security Branch had their own informers who were also paid regularly, they received monthly payments and they were permanent informers. But I tasked a specific informer with a specific case to try and get information for me about a murder or an arson, whatever. So my informers, I would use them occasionally, so there was a difference between the Security Branch informers and the Detective Branch informers. Ours were used on occasion, so you wouldn't have come across such information coincidentally. If I had I would have immediately conveyed it.

MR LUBBE: Did you at any stage receive communications from the Security Branch about the situation in KTC? I'm specifically referring to the time just before the June incident.

CAPT LOOCKE: No I had very little dealings with the Security Branch.

MISS FULLARD: But you would have participated in the local JMC structures, Die Plaaslike Beseer Sentrum based in Guguletu at which Security Branch representation was likely.

CAPT LOOCKE: I didn't sit in on those meetings, not at all.

MISS FULLARD: You're saying that at no stage you attended any Plaaslike Beseer Sentrum meetings?

CAPT LOOCKE: None at all. Colonel Oosthuizen attended those meetings.

CHAIRPERSON: Sir how confidential was the information of your investigations?

For example, if your investigation showed that the deaths which were recorded were more on the side of the Witdoeke, perpetrated by maybe the Comrades, would that information be then used to feed into the Witdoeke so that the Witdoeke can then do a counter-attack? I'm trying to find out how confidential, who in your unit might give that information to someone else so that the Witdoeke would have advantage of that information.

CAPT LOOCKE: Our investigations were very confidential. The reason why I'm saying that is that as soon as any information became known, then the witnesses would disappear, the investigations we did, we tried to limit the knowledge of that just to ourselves, we tried to keep it as confidential as possible to try and protect the witnesses and also to ensure that we could do our basic task

to bring policing back to the community. So only my unit dealt with the information.

MR NJOZELA: I'm a little puzzled here Mr Loocke, maybe you can be able to assist me. You were the investigating officer working in all Crossroads and KTC. Is that correct?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

MR NJOZELA: So from the facts it clear that the situation was volatile. Can you comment on that?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes very.

MR NJOZELA: So were you aware about the fact that the situation was volatile?

CAPT LOOCKE: Definitely.

MR NJOZELA: So in order to be ineffective in your investigation, don't you think it was proper for you to be informed about the situation?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes we knew of what was going on. It wasn't necessary for further information. I already had knowledge of the area and of the dangers inherent in the area and I knew that despite all the dangers, that we could still complete our investigations. My purpose was to try and solve these cases and to win the confidence and to gain the confidence of the community, we simply had to go on with our investigations, we did our best.

MR NJOZELA: Did you know that from your experience or were you told?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I could observe that. My own observation, I could see these things in the area.

MR NJOZELA: Can I further ask this question. Were you on duty on the 9th and on the 11th?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I was.

MR NJOZELA: Did you see the so-called Witdoeke gathering next to the Western Cape Development Board offices?

CAPT LOOCKE: They gathered everywhere that day. Maybe I saw them, maybe not, I have already forgotten the area to some extent. They gathered everywhere, not only in one particular spot, they had little gatherings or bigger gatherings in various places so it is possible. Also I moved around quite a lot in that area on that day, so it's possible that I saw it, I don't know.

MISS FULLARD: So can we move from the premise that you did witness the gathering wherever it was.

CAPT LOOCKE: I saw many gatherings that day, in many different places.

MISS FULLARD: What did you do as an investigating officer to try to get to know what was it about? You see people gathering, so what did you do?

CAPT LOOCKE: When I moved in the fighting had already started. The riots had already commenced, so the reason for me driving around there, I simply couldn't continue my investigations at that stage, it was impossible. The reason why I went in there was to observe what was going on because I knew that many many cases would arise from what was happening on that day. So from the point of view of an investigating officer it would be very helpful to see what was actually happening, it would help you in your later investigations. That's why I was trying to gather as much information to help me with my investigations which would arise from the events.

In that period we opened a docket of public violence. It was a big key docket in which all these things were documented and dockets were opened against both factions.

MR NJOZELA: Maybe before I didn't follow this thing up. Maybe you haven't answered my question because I'm a little bit puzzled. You are saying to me right now that you decided to observe, you didn't decide to arrest?

CAPT LOOCKE: No observation is part of investigation, an extremely important part of investigation and that's exactly what I was doing there.

MISS FULLARD: So when particular acts of arson and looting were taking place in front of your eyes, you didn't feel it was your task at that stage to make any arrests?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I wasn't equipped to make arrests. I wasn't part of riot control, it wasn't my duty and I only had seven men with me, it would have been suicidal to go in there and try and quell the unrest. I simply wasn't equipped for that. I couldn't do that, I could only observe.

MISS FULLARD: But I mean there were instances when you did in a sense leave the sanctuary of the casspir and move into the communities to affect certain actions, although not arrests.

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes if I remember correctly, I think it was on a day when the press wanted to move into an area and my brief was to protect the press and there was a shooting and one of the press members was shot. We got out of the casspir and tried to find the culprit, so sometimes, yes we did get out and move into the area.

CHAIRPERSON: Captain were there any riot control police at at least one side where you were observing?

CAPT LOOCKE: There were many riot police in that area yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And there was a lot of activity?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes there were casspirs.

CHAIRPERSON: And you mean the police didn't make any arrests at all?

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't think it was possible. I don't know whether they made any arrests. According to me it was impossible. I don't think it was possible for them to attempt to make arrests. Perhaps they did make some arrests, I had nothing to do with their work. I could see casspirs riding around. Where they were going to I don't know, but I don't think any arrests were made.

CHAIRPERSON: But it is known that in many circumstances the police used teargas to try and disperse the crowds and all that. Was there anything like that done to disperse the crowds?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes they used teargas.

CHAIRPERSON: But no arrests were made?

CAPT LOOCKE: Not that I had knowledge of.

MISS FULLARD: At the time there was a joint operational centre, a functional, probably based at Manenberg Police Station at which the relevant members of the Riot Unit and the Railway Police and the Army would have met to, in a sense, strategise around managing the situation.

MISS FULLARD: Were you part at all of any of those discussions?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I think those were the JOC meetings, I was not part of those.

MISS FULLARD: When you say that you had personally made the decision that your tasks over those next three days was to observe, do you know if a similar decision was taken by the GOS? Considering that they didn't make any arrests it appears to suggest that their approach was a similar one?

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't know what their approach was.

MISS FULLARD: So you didn't feel necessary in the midst of this crises which left 60 000 people homeless, to communicate with the other security forces and to ask, what strategy are we using here guys, I mean a lot is going down here and how are we going to handle it. Was there no such communication?

CAPT LOOCKE: No there were competent senior officers in charge of the police and I think they did what they had to do. I just accepted they were doing their jobs. I did not get involved in their jobs.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson. The security forces who were present when the trouble started on the 9th, were they essentially SAP Riot Unit members or were they supported by SADF?

What was the security presence like at the time? I mean we've got thousands of people gathering together, there's a crises which is coming off, how many security force members have we got on the ground sort of thing and from which area were they contained to deal with this crises?

CAPT LOOCKE: I do not know how many were there but according to my observation there were too few, hopelessly too few. Where they came from I do not know. I knew that many people were transferred at the time to assist in special tasks, I saw people from the defence force there.

MR LUBBE: Was Unit 19, you obviously know Unit 19, were they operational in Cape Town at the time?

CAPT LOOCKE: I'm not sure whether Unit 19 was operating.

CAPT LOOCKE: A riot unit which sort of was brought together out of members throughout the country and was sort of deployed into areas throughout the country to assist in problem area where unrest was taking place.

CAPT LOOCKE: No I don't know whether they were involved.

MR LUBBE: In the light of you saying that, look in as far as investigating cases was concerned it was an impossibility for those three days. Your tasking, according to you was "waarneming", observation. Now on that, this observation that you were busy with, did you make records, I mean what was the context of your observation if you weren't investigating? Can you just elaborate? Were you actually making notes on your observations etc? I think it was one of the points raised at the Court Record.

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I made notes on what I saw and the investigative officer, I think he was Coetzee regarding public violence, he made notes.

MR LUBBE: Where did you make these records?

CAPT LOOCKE: I kept notes in my diary.

MR LUBBE: What happened to this diary?

CAPT LOOCKE: I do not know. After they attacked me with a handgrenade, all the things I left at the police station, even my diary, I never got them back up to this day.

MR LUBBE: If we can proceed to a further question then, from the records, inasfar as deaths are concerned, obviously in terms of the people who were

killed in faction fighting, you would have had to investigate that at a later stage?

Now according to the records of people who died, I think I gave an indication to the Advocate, I gave a list of names but that's not the thing. There seem to be about 25 people who died in the violence there.

Now what I want to ask you in terms thereof is, obviously you would have investigated those deaths. Now in regard to how those people died, would you say, how would you interpret the injuries?

Did the individuals die as a result of Black on Black violence or was it security force involvement where they acted?

Statistically can you give us an indication of the casualties, in what form the casualties were present?

CAPT LOOCKE: It is very difficult to say who were responsible, there were people with bullet wounds, there were people who were hacked and also some people who were burned. It's impossible to say who caused those deaths, I do not know.

CHAIRPERSON: Captain it's not clear to me. Your note book clearly had crucial information about your investigation.

CAPT LOOCKE: Pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: Your notebook had crucial information about the nature of your investigation. Do you remember what you did with it?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes it was at the police station at Guguletu.

CHAIRPERSON: And then what happened to it?

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't know. When I was injured with the handgrenade attack, I don't know what happened to my - all my belongings in my office was

packed into a little box, when I came out of the hospital it wasn't there. I don't know what happened to...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The notebook had disappeared?

CAPT LOOCKE: Everything had disappeared, not only the notebook, more than the notebook.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay thank you.

MR LUBBE: Chairperson yes, if I can raise another point with you Captain Loocke is, when you left your office on the 9th, when you went into the area after you had left your office, I think it was mentioned in the court record as well, page 3668 is the page number, maybe you'd like to turn to there. Now from the record there was this - about your investigative team, which members they consisted of. You mentioned a few names there, you quoted a few names according to the court record, no earlier on you noted that Motlwana and Katuka were also members of the investigative team. Can you possibly comment on where you were on this particular day and why they weren't with you when you went out into the area, were they on leave or what was the situation in terms of them?

CAPT LOOCKE: I'm not sure but I think they remained behind at the police station to note how many bodies arrived at the police station.

MR LUBBE: What you are saying is that you were expecting a lot of bodies, you knew that things were going to happen and people have to stay at the police station to make note of all those bodies?

CHAIRPERSON: Captain forgive me for (...indistinct) about the notebook. Do you remember which police station you left the notebook?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes at Guguletu Police Station.

CHAIRPERSON: When it was reported that your notebook was missing, what was your response?

CAPT LOOCKE: Madam Chair, you must understand, when I came back from hospital I was transferred to Joburg, that box of belongings in my office was taken to my home, only when I started working in Joburg I realised that some of my things had got lost. Half of the things got lost and I just accepted that they were still at Guguletu Police Station.

CHAIRPERSON: Who took over from you after you were injured? Did you remember a Coetzee who was a member of your team?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I remember Kaas Coetzee.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he the one who took over?

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't know, I was transferred.

CHAIRPERSON: So you don't know who took ...(intervention)?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I don't know.

MISS FULLARD: Warrant Officer Coetzee I believe handled the large public violence dossier. Wouldn't he have required your notes and your notebook for the purposes of his investigation.

CAPT LOOCKE: It could be that it 's in his possession, I don't know one should ask him, I don't know where he is. One could telephone him and determine whether it's in his possession. We jointly kept notes of these affairs, he would be interested in my notebook.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chair. In terms of the 9th, 10th and 11th, when they went into the area, how were you as an individual armed and in this three-day period, did you make use of your firearm in any particular situation?

CAPT LOOCKE: If I remember correctly, I would be using a 9mm pistol and my R1 with a fold-up but with me, whether I fired any shots I can't remember. I fired various shots during that period but I can't remember one specific incident where I fired some specific shots, I can't remember.

MR LUBBE: So you were never called up to give evidence in a specific investigation which was conducted afterwards?

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't know what happened to all the information which was gathered.

MR LUBBE: Captain Locke, in this 3-day period, one of the reporters, George de As, can you give us more information about this incident, could you expand about this?

CAPT LOOCKE: I was the executive officer in the murder. What happened there, I did not see the incident itself, but just after the murder I saw a video of this murder and up to today I still believe Witdoeke killed him. On the video you could see three Witdoeke approaching him, he was standing outside a house. It's at that stage that the incident happened and at that stage I assume they hacked him to death. I investigated that case and I made there photographs of the Witdoeke who until today I believe murdered that man. I made photographs which I distributed and tried to find those people. Up to today I believe that they were the murderers.

MR LUBBE: But up to today you've never identified those three people?

CAPT LOOCKE: I was still busy with that investigation. Now whether they could determine later on I don't know, I was transferred then. Whether they found those people later on I don't know but I have made clear photographs available about those three people. I went to Pretoria especially to have those photographs developed there because we did not have facilities in Cape Town. Those photographs should still be in the docket.

MR LUBBE: Captain Loocke, I'm going to put a question to you and obviously you can respond to it in the way you feel. We've got a situation of conflicts, the Witdoeke and the Comrades, now the security forces are supposed to be understaffed. Is it not possible that when you saw that you had few security officers on the ground to deal with the crises, that couldn't the reinforcements have been called into the area to come and assist?

And could it also not have been, I'm not specifying yourself now, the police saw, why don't we just let them sort one another out, basically a security force attitude of non-intervention? Let the two factions sort themselves out. How would you respond to that? There was speculation of that. How would you respond to it as an individual?

CAPT LOOCKE: As I've already said, my observation was that there were two few policemen there to control those three days, to keep control. Whether they asked for reinforcements, I do not know. Whether those people thought they were enough, I do not know. Perhaps they had a different idea, I was not trained like they were trained because I was an investigative officer. Perhaps they thought they were enough. I do not know but I really think we were too few

policemen, and then suddenly to call for reinforcement at that stage, I don't know how they would have accomplished that.

MR LUBBE: The speculation that the police purposefully or wilfully instigated this conflict or letting it happen?

CAPT LOOCKE: I can't say that's the correct observation because they tried to keep those two factions apart and I don't think they had the attitude just to leave them to it. They did take action against both sides.

CHAIRPERSON: On the 9th of June when you went to KT were there Black members of the team with you then?

CAPT LOOCKE: If I look at my statement it does not seem like it. I'm not 100% sure but if I look at my statement I see that there were not any Black members with me.

CHAIRPERSON: As an afterthought was that unusual, they usually were with you but on this particular day they were not, was that an unusual thing?

CAPT LOOCKE: No they did not accompany me regularly. During those three days at some or other stage they were with me. Katuka for example accompanied me one day. I'm not sure, it's not normal for them just to accompany me every day. Some of the Black members were frightened to enter those areas and sometimes we were forced to go all by ourselves. For humanitarian reasons we left them behind at the police station.

MR LUBBE: Captain Loocke if we can just move a step further. A Colonel Oosthuizen, can you just elaborate on when he was on the scene and not specifically the three days, but what his responsibility was? What was his

position in the time that you were there? And maybe you can just inform us about information regarding Colonel Oosthuizen

CAPT LOOCKE: During the time I was there, when I was commanding officer, he was transferred there. I'm not sure at which stage and then he was a commanding officer of the Riot Squad.

MR LUBBE: Do you know from where he came?

CAPT LOOCKE: He was from Cape Town, he was from one of the stations in Cape Town, perhaps Paarl I think. If not Paarl Gen van der Westhuizen would know and he would know from where he was transferred there.

MR LUBBE: In terms of Colonel Oosthuizen, did you meet with him on a regular basis and specifically prior to these events?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I saw him every day.

MR LUBBE: Were you aware of it that he gave inputs to a Security Council meeting?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes it's possible.

MR LUBBE: You can't remember specifically?

CAPT LOOCKE: No, I never accompanied him. If he went he might have gone there.

MR LUBBE: At any stage during these incidents on the 9th, 10th and 11th of June he probably attended these security meetings. Do you know of any information he brought back from those meetings being communicated to you then in terms of the possible events which would happen during the 9th, 10th and 11th of June?

CAPT LOOCKE: No he never mentioned any of those things. We were busy with investigations, we did not have anything to do with combatting riots. He did not give me any information or any instructions regarding these three days.

MR LUBBE: Just for the record again, Phillipus du Toit, that name doesn't ring a bell yet? As we've progressed today, perhaps you remember. He's a short thick-set man.

CAPT LOOCKE: The name sounds vaguely familiar but I can't place him specifically, but I think I can vaguely remember he's a short thick-set man.

MR LUBBE: Thank you very much.

MISS FULLARD: Do you recall a person from the Western Province Command or the army, one called Louis Rheeder? I think he was a colonel at that stage, Col Louis Rheeder? He was the head of Group 40.

CAPT LOOCKE: I had nothing to do with the army at all.

MR NJOZELA: I wanted to ask the question, I'm sorry to take you back, I take note of the fact that you're not quite sure as to whether in your unit you had the Black officers. Is that correct.

CAPT LOOCKE: Pardon?

MR NJOZELA: Did you have Black officers in your unit during ... (intervention)

CAPT LOOCKE: Officers?

MR NJOZELA: Ja... (intervention)

CAPT LOOCKE: You mean... (intervention)

MR NJOZELA: During the 9th, 10th and 11th? I want just to be sure about it.

CAPT LOOCKE: Well I had the people who were working with me on my unit, it's the only Black police officers that there were.

MR NJOZELA: On those particular days were they with you?

CAPT LOOCKE: I'm not sure.

MR NJOZELA: Okay from your observation Mr Loocke, were other units having Black officers?

CAPT LOOCKE: It is possible that they were in other casspirs perhaps. I can't remember. If you do investigating you don't look at the colour of a person's skin, it might be possible.

MISS FULLARD: During this conflict, particularly the three days, 9th, 10th and 11th of June, there were a number of helicopters deployed by the security forces and were any members of your investigation team deployed to, you've stated that your task as it were was to do observations? Did some members of your team go in the helicopters to do observations?

CAPT LOOCKE: No those helicopters were not under our control. I saw them yes but had nothing to do with them.

MISS FULLARD: And W/O Coetzee, wouldn't in your knowledge have gone into the helicopters?

CAPT LOOCKE: Now while you're mentioning it, it's perhaps that they were there at a certain stage. Kaas Coetzee was the investigative officer of the public violence and it was possible that they could have been there.

MISS FULLARD: If they wanted to go into the helicopter, how would they arrange that, would they do that through the joint operational centre, the GOS,

how would you as the police request, who would organise that helicopter availability?

CAPT LOOCKE: If I wanted to arrange it I would approach the investigative unit at Manenberg and approached a Mr Odendal there and asked them for a helicopter and he would have arranged that. That was the way I would have done it.

MISS FULLARD: ..any video footage made from the helicopters via those investigating officers or any other personnel that could have been useful to your investigations subsequent to the attack? Was any such video material ...(intervention)?

CAPT LOOCKE: No it was never given to me.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson. If we can proceed Captain Loocke, if we can refer to page 3692 of the evidence which was submitted in the interdict, mention is made on that page of an alleged sharp-shooter which you chased. Can you tell us what dates and the circumstances surrounding that specific incident of the sharp-shooter or the alleged sharpshooter?

CAPT LOOCKE: While I was reading this record I can remember this, there was a White person who regularly mingled with the Comrades and who fired shots and on that specific day we also saw that person. I think we saw him driving a white BMW, whether it was on the 9th, 10th or 11th, I don't know, we tried to get hold of him but we were unsuccessful, he got away every time.

MR LUBBE: This sharp-shooter caused a lot of problems for you?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes he shot at the police regularly, yes, he shot at the police etc but there was a lot of information available about this White man, but I could never trace him.

MR LUBBE: You say that he also shot at the police.

Was any policeman injured by the shots?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes there were reports that a White person shot at them but whether they were injured or anything, no not at all.

MR LUBBE: Let us go on to page 3718 of the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: I am not particularly informed about this but if this was a sharpshooter, one would expect this person to be pretty proficient in aiming, that somebody was trained. Isn't it surprising that for each time he attempted to shoot at the police, he was never successful in actually getting somebody down? I mean I'm just asking you to speculate.

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I understand what you're saying, if he was a good sharpshooter, it depends from which position he was shooting but it seem strange yes, it does seem strange.

CHAIRPERSON: The reason I'm asking the question is that it is known that from time to time the police themselves, and including the Security Branch, would plant themselves in the factions in order to aggravate situations, and I'm just asking you to speculate, and I'm wondering if this might have been a deliberate attempt on the sharp-shooter to shoot but not to be successful. Just you...(intervention)

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't think it's possible. If it was like that that he was planted in the factions by for example the Security Police and he shoots at me, I

would definitely shoot back at him and try to kill him. I really do not think that he would just shoot at the police just for the sports because they would shoot back at him.

MISS FULLARD: Captain Loocke did you yourself personally see this person? It was mentioned that reports came in. Did you personally lay eyes on this White sharp-shooter?

CAPT LOOCKE: On the day he was driving this white BMW, if I remember correctly, I can remember there were many stories about this sharp-shooter and then I have to say there was never specifically evidence that he was a sharp-shooter, but the name he gave that was linked to that and we just accepted that he was sharp-shooter on the basis of the information, but I think that day he was driving a BMW and I saw him at a distance.

MR LUBBE: What you saw was a BMW and you assumed that possibly the...(intervention)

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes the information that he popped in there and rushed away and we put chase and could not find him.

MR LUBBE: Did you actually identify a White person in that BMW?

CAPT LOOCKE: Not that I can remember.

MR NJOZELA: Mr Loocke you mentioned that there was evidence at your disposal in regard to the fact that this fellow was a sharp-shooter, can you elaborate on that.

CAPT LOOCKE: What I am saying is that there were a lot of rumours in the community about this White man that was associated with the Comrades. Whether he was really a sharp-shooter, but the names they gave to him

represented that as if he was a sharp-shooter, that was the name they gave to him. Whether he was really a sharp-shooter I do not know.

MR LUBBE: Thank you Chairperson, just another question Captain Loocke, I was referring to page 3718 and the aspect of Mr van Heuse(?) who was on the back of a police casspir at the time and was shot. Do you recall this incident?

CAPT LOOCKE: I think that that was the person from the press I previously mentioned, he was wounded in the arm.

MR LUBBE: Just one question what was the press doing in police vehicles there? Was that the usual trend during that time or was that an exception to the rule that the press would accompany the police? They were in a very dangerous situation you know.

CAPT LOOCKE: The instruction by Colonel Oosthuizen was to accompany the press. A lot of pressure was placed on the police by the media to be allowed to enter this area and at that specific day I received instructions to take these people in to that area. I was not happy about this because of the dangerous circumstances but I did what I was asked.

MR LUBBE: Once again coming back to the sharp-shooters, was it your casspir, was it CP 11 in which you were?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I always used CP 11, that was also the casspir in which the press accompanied us.

MR LUBBE: Were there other people from the press in that casspir?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes there were other people from the press.

MR LUBBE: Was it an exception to the rule that the press accompanied you?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes it was.

MR LUBBE: You entered that area and at certain places you stopped. Did the press get out of the vehicle, took photographs or how did they go about it? How did they behave that day? What did they want to do? Did they just want to take photographs? Did they want to get as near as possible to where things are happening? Was it a glamour story that they were trying to get hold of or what was their whole idea to enter this area together with the police?

CAPT LOOCKE: What their idea was, I don't know but they did take photographs, yes and if I remember correctly, the casspir was open on top and they took photographs from there, perhaps they got out of the casspir at some stages, I can't remember, it was possible. What their purpose was, what their intent was, I can't remember but all I can say is that I was not very happy to accompany them there.

MISS FULLARD: Can you recall who was it who instructed you to take the Press into the area because clearly you had a lot on your plate to deal with and now you were being asked to escort the press people around. Who was it who actually instructed you to take...(intervention)

CAPT LOOCKE: I think it was Colonel Oosthuizen who instructed me to take the press in, the instruction came from him if I can remember correctly. It must have come from him.

CHAIRPERSON: Sir didn't you think that was odd that the Press should be getting protection to go and specially take - wasn't that odd? I know you say were uncomfortable about that, but didn't you think it was also odd that this was happening?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes we could not leave them to go there all by themselves, we had to accompany them. On their own they wouldn't have managed. They would have been killed, they needed protection.

CHAIRPERSON: But in the past and in other areas the police insisted on getting rid of the press but in this case it seemed the police were keen to have the press go in there and take pictures.

CAPT LOOCKE: As I said previously, at that stage a lot of pressure was put on the police by the press to be allowed into that area. Somebody at that stage should have told them to go there. The only instruction I received was to accompany them there and I still do not think up today it was a good thing to have given an instruction like that.

MR LUBBE: Just to add to this I'm trying to understand what the role of the media was regarding this specific incident.

According to a lot of the video footage we see many of the international media people, the liberal media people who were on the side of the Comrades, and those people who accompanied you, do you know from where they were, were they international press or what was their background?

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't know, I just met these people, a group of media people at the police station and I accompanied them into the area.

MR LUBBE: Another question that I want to ask. During your investigative unit, besides the Black members, who of the White members were Xhosa-speaking?

CAPT LOOCKE: I think Tommy Thompson. He was Xhosa-speaking.

MR LUBBE: If we can proceed. The handgrenade attack in which you were injured. Can you maybe tell us about the circumstances surrounding that event, when was it, was it later on in the year that this incident took place?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes it happened on the 26th or the 27th of November 1986. It was one of those two days. From Divisional Headquarters instructions were given that there should be a whole police action in the KTC Squatter Camp in connection with the army and the police and all the security forces, it was a big big onslaught. We were divided into various groups and there were uniformed police and there were detectives and it was an organised operation. It was started from the airport and the army cordoned off the area and the police moved in with various investigative teams to look for weapons and any other stolen goods. The purpose was chiefly to get hold of illegal weapons.

MR LUBBE: This attack, what were the circumstances, what happened. I myself and W/O Coetzee were part of one group. we were busy in one little hut. KTC was built on various dunes. We were in one hut and while I was looking out the window I could see one policeman following a person at the bottom of the dune. I thought that he was experiencing trouble, we ran out and tried to assist him, there were no streets there, only narrow passages.

I passed this person and I approached a Black person. I saw he had something in his hand, I suppose it was a knife or a weapon. I passed the policeman trying to catch this man. When I turned the corner W/O Engelbrecht came from the front, he came from another direction and the Black person was between me and W/O Engelbrecht. He approached Engelbrecht directly and then he ran with his shoulder into him and I could see he made a movement with

his hand and I heard the click of the handgrenade, and I heard that click and I was about as far as from me to you and he threw this handgrenade and it landed next to me. I could not move away because there were huts on various sides, I could not go back, I tried to go to the front but it was detonated for two seconds. It immediately exploded and that was chaos then.

MR LUBBE: Was W/O Engelbrecht also injured?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes he bit him. The person bit him in his hand and a piece of shrapnel hit him in his buttocks. He remained in hospital for three weeks, I was in the intensive unit of Wynberg Military Hospital.

MR LUBBE: While you were in hospital you were transferred. Did you ask to be transferred?

CAPT LOOCKE: No it has already been mentioned before that incident. I did not like Cape Town, I was a Transvaaler. I desperately wanted to return back there and I tried to establish whether they couldn't transfer me back home. I've tried through various contacts to be transferred. I've already then made attempts to be transferred but while in hospital I heard about this transfer, that incident was then perhaps the last straw.

MR LUBBE: So you say the reason why you wanted to go away was that you didn't like Cape Town. Was it also possibly due to the violence, was that also a factor?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I think that had a very big effect on me.

MR LUBBE: And you are still being affected by that?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Captain, I know that there are some events that you remember with great detail and those events seem to be the ones that trigger a lot of pain in you and there are events that you don't remember at all. Are you doing anything about helping yourself? You're not, so you are suffering in silence? Do you need some assistance? Are you sure?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I'm fine thank you.

MR NJOZELA: Captain I only have one last question. Did you know W/O Barnard?

CAPT LOOCKE: Oh yes I know him. Everybody knew him.

MR NJOZELA: How was your relationship between yourself and Mr Barnard.

CAPT LOOCKE: I knew him as a member of the Riot Squad and he was a very prominent member. Everybody knew about him, everybody talked about him. I was never a personal friend of his but everybody knew him, so did I. He was a very popular person. He's already dead today.

MISS FULLARD: Had you ever had an opportunity to meet with him before your transfer to Cape Town in training or was there any circumstance or was your arrival in Cape Town the first time that you met him?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I met him here the first time, I never saw him before.

MISS FULLARD: And he clearly seems to have been a person who also had a very intimate knowledge of the environment and the social relationships and the political set-up and the factions of those areas.

CAPT LOOCKE: That is correct.

MISS FULLARD: So he would have also been a person like Mr Schelhase that you could have drawn on as a newcomer to Cape Town for information about the set up that you were confronting?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I did that, I had contact with him in this regard.

MR LUBBE: Capt Loocke, as your investigations were proceeding and that, were you also involved in various inventories which were provided about what was happening?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I had nothing to do with that.

MR LUBBE: If I can just, in terms of my understanding of Guguletu and the rest of it you know, it seems as if the tendency was that the situation at Guguletu, the police situation there, wasn't well maintained. I think most of the policemen who seemed to have had problems were sent to Guguletu and who were actually stationed, sort of thing, and they had to face this conflict which was prevailing at the time and if policemen were sort of, if they'd maybe caused a problem on a station, that was like as it was termed, die strafstasie, and they were sort of transferred there and they were subjected to the situation there. What is your comment on that?

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't agree with you. I did not know Cape Town at all, I don't know whether Guguletu was that kind of, like a penal station. I was involved in the detective branch, I did not have a lot to do with the uniform branch but people who worked with me were very good people, they did not cause problems, they did not experience any problems in their carriers, they were good people and I can't say it was like a penal station. Logistical support, should

you encounter problems regarding the riots and you requested more manpower etc...(intervention)

MR LUBBE: How did they respond, management to supplementing your situation there?

CAPT LOOCKE: They responded very well. For example I came there during riots, we did not have enough vehicles and Brigadier van der Westhuizen was approached and they provided us with four or six 4X4's from Pretoria to assist us in our work. So we had very good cooperation.

MR LUBBE: And just a piece of information still. I asked you earlier on about individuals of the so-called Witdoek faction and I asked you about Sam Ndima. Now I'm not going to present you with a statement or anything but my understanding is I think if I can recollect, there was a statement by Sam Ndima where he mentions that there was supposed to have been two sharp-shooters who were supposed to have been sent to Cape Town to KTC to come and help out with the situation here and there seems to have been an allegation that you may have been one of those sharp-shooters. What is your response to this?

CAPT LOOCKE: No not at all, definitely not.

MR LUBBE: You do not have any knowledge of that?

CAPT LOOCKE: No.

MISS FULLARD: So you were not approached at any stage by any member of the police or local government or central government to be deployed to assist the Witdoeke at any stage?

CAPT LOOCKE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what we will do now is go to the video footage, view that and then we'll come back to some questions of clarification.

MR LUBBE: Excuse me Chair, can I maybe make a suggestion Ma'am. If Madeleine can possibly stand at the video machine and just the two scenes, that she can take us through it and maybe at the same time, Captain Loocke can respond and we pose questions, maybe that will facilitate a process.

MISS FULLARD: If I can just say they are two very short segments, 10 seconds or something, we'd just like to hear your understanding of what is happening in those scenes and you could also possibly help us with some of the individuals who are on the scene.

CHAIRPERSON: The question that it raises which has been part of the speculation is why the Witdoeke and the police seem to be on the same side. And that if they are the aggressive party why were they not being arrested. I'm not posing the question, I'm just saying that these are the issues that have surfaced, that's what we're trying to understand, that were the police and the Witdoeke actually collaborators in a sense.

CAPT LOOCKE: No if I remember correctly, in that case we were stopped by a group. They wanted to point out somebody that we were looking for. They accompanied us and it's normal that they would have followed the police vehicles. It happened quite often. They often followed the casspirs, that's just the way it was. In that case a pointing out was made to us and then they would just follow us as we moved ahead.

CHAIRPERSON: And as you were going up, you were actually going towards the Comrades? Is that so.

CAPT LOOCKE: No in that case I think that was near the Zolani Centre and the White guy, the sharp-shooter, he was in a car and we were running towards him. That's what I was doing there.

MISS FULLARD: The person though who is accompanying you and pointing out something in the distance, is clearly armed however?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

MISS FULLARD: Was that not a concern to you as a police person that there is an active aggression taking place, the person has clearly physically identified himself as a Witdoek and is armed, wouldn't your concern at that stage, in view of the mass destruction and arson that was taking place and had already taken place three weeks previously in Crossroads, was it not a concern for you to arrest such a person?

CAPT LOOCKE: I couldn't arrest him, what for? He didn't have a firearm with him, that particular person and there was no threat there, because as I said, we had been stopped and they told us about this other man they wanted to go and point out to us. So let me put it this way, I felt safer to move amongst the Witdoeke than amongst the Comrades. The Comrades immediately attacked, they asked no questions but with the Witdoeke you could still get out and ask and talk. So if I wanted to stretch my legs I would rather do it amongst the Witdoeke rather than amongst the Comrades because they would immediately attack you upon sight.

MISS FULLARD: What you seem to be indicating there is a kind of a natural samewerking?

CAPT LOOCKE: No there definitely wasn't a cooperation between us, but they didn't attack us in the way that the Comrades did and that was the difference between the two groups. The Comrades didn't allow you into their areas at all, they would immediately attack you. The Witdoeke were different. The Comrades were against the police and the Witdoeke. The Witdoeke's main target was the Comrades. They didn't mind so much about the police and that was the difference.

CHAIRPERSON: But clearly the police and the Witdoeke were fighting the same enemy?

CAPT LOOCKE: No we tried to keep the groups separate, we wanted to protect life and limb, we tried to keep the groups apart to save lives. We certainly didn't want to put them together because if they had fought together they would have destroyed the entire place.

MISS FULLARD: You know it just strikes me that particularly after your testimony this morning about the gruesome scenes which you saw during that year which were perpetrated by the Comrade group upon yourself as you described with the handgrenade attack and many many other police personnel, surely it was logical therefore that the police must have harboured a great deal of anger, hostility and hatred towards the group, the Comrades that were perpetrating these gruesome deeds?

CAPT LOOCKE: The Witdoeke perpetrated horrible deeds as well, not only the Comrades, the Witdoeke also. If they found a Comrade in their area they killed him in just as cruel a way as the other party would have done. So these things happened on both sides.

CHAIRPERSON: May I, before I do anything else, may I express our special thanks and gratitude to the translators and recorders and transcribers. Yours is a very difficult task of having to concentrate and pay attention and try and weave from what we're saying, what others are saying and I know that is a very difficult assignment. Really perhaps we don't say it enough, special thanks, because really without you we would not be able to communicate with one another, particularly those of us who don't speak all of the languages.

The transcription is going to present a special record for us against which we will check our information as we take notes and that is always, invariably a very very arduous but yet very significant task, and I pay special tribute to you partly because the last time I was chairing I was so exhausted, I forgot to say thank you and I really officially say thank you very much. I know you're facing another task in Parliament this afternoon and fortunately we finished early.

Thanks to the staff who helped with the investigation and the background material. A special thanks to my panel who really handled themselves with exceptional professionalism.

Advocate Visser and Mr Wagner, I know that sometimes these proceedings seem adversarial and sometimes it seems like we are at odds with one another but I think that we all try to accomplish the same thing.

I'm going to say a special word to Mr Looke but before I do that I would like us to view the second footage and then I'll come back and sort of speak to Mr Looke.

COMMENTS FOLLOW ON THE VIDEO EXTRACT

You see what sees to be a friendly relationship.

Panel do you have any questions related to this video?

MISS FULLARD: Well I suppose what I would like to ask is your interpretation of the scene where we have a group of armed people, heavily armed people moving past and one of your investigation teams is, you know, he says hoe gaan dit and he says goed goed. There's a friendly exchange with armed, clearly the Witdoeke and it's clearly another incident which seems to indicate a positive relationship and samewerking and what I referred to earlier, so we just wanted to hear your comments on the footage?

CAPT LOOCKE: If I look at that, he greeted them when he walked past. There was a friendly greeting and they continued walking, so I don't actually, I can't conclude a lot from that. There's just too little to go on.

MISS FULLARD: Presumably you would have engaged in your work as an investigation unit because there you all are and oblivious to the chaos going on all around.

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't know what the date was of that video recording. I don't think it was made on the 9th and the 10th.

MISS FULLARD: (speaker's microphone not on)...satellite camps around Crossroads.

CAPT LOOCKE: It's possible.

MISS FULLARD: Is there no other commentary you wish to give on that?

MISS FULLARD: What conclusion should we draw as the Truth Commission looking into this incident in which there are so many wide-spread allegations of police samewerking, if I can repeatedly use that phrase? How are we supposed to interpret these kinds of collective bits of evidence and visual impressions.

CAPT LOOCKE: I think looking at it from your point of view, I think you'd have to look at it globally. You'd also have to look at attacks on the police and what was done to us by the Comrades and by the Witdoeke or by the Comrades themselves and you must look at the Witdoeke themselves. So perhaps one shouldn't look at little fragments, you must look at the whole thing in context. That particular incident, I must repeat, it felt safer to be amongst the Witdoeke than to be amongst the Comrades because there were direct instructions given by the comrades to attack the police, so I think you will have to look at the whole picture and amongst others go and look at the attacks on Witdoeke and the attacks on the police to make sense of the whole thing at the end of the day.

CHAIRPERSON: If the Comrades attack the Witdoeke and the Comrades attack the police, wouldn't it make a natural union between the Witdoeke and the police to work together to eliminate the Comrades? I mean isn't that a natural phenomenon?

CAPT LOOCKE: I believe that if the Witdoeke and the police cooperated and stood together, if we worked with the Witdoeke and agreed to attack the Comrades then there wouldn't have been any riots, we would have stopped the whole thing in its tracks because we would have gained the upper hand. It is clear that they weren't skilled in combat, they were just groups fighting each other, so if there had been cooperation between us and the Witdoeke, the outcome of events would have been very different.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loocke ...(intervention)

MISS FULLARD: You also mentioned earlier that it was not only the Comrades that were committing gruesome deeds. There were also widespread

allegations at the time that in as much as the Comrades were running Peoples' Courts and we can call it systems of community justice, that the Witdoeke themselves were also involved in forms of community justice, to the extent that they even had their own informal prison in their area. What was the attitude of the police and particularly the Investigation Unit regarding this informal prison at which numerous allegations were made regarding severe beatings and even killings?

CAPT LOOCKE: When that information emerged I immediately with my staff swooped on that little prison which was in the Witdoeke area in Crossroads and we charged people for abduction etc and I freed the prisoners and I closed up that little prison, so I acted there against those people.

MISS FULLARD: Could you describe that prison. What sort of building was it in...(intervention)

CAPT LOOCKE: It was a corrugated iron building which they locked and there were guards outside and they detained people inside.

MISS FULLARD: And the time that you released people, how many people would have been within the prison at that time?

CAPT LOOCKE: I can't remember. Not many. I can't recall I would have to go and look in the dockets. I never had another look at the dockets since then.

MISS FULLARD: And the individuals who were charged, would they have been the guards or the political leadership of the area at the time, can you recall?

CAPT LOOCKE: I think we charged some of the leadership, the members of the leadership. I can't remember who they were specifically, I can't remember the names I would have to go and look at the dockets.

MISS FULLARD: And you're not certain what happened to those court cases?

CAPT LOOCKE: I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Which name or what names were associated with this prison?

CAPT LOOCKE: I can't remember the names, I think it's on the tip of my tongue but I can't quite get it. I can almost picture him but he was a member of the leadership group in charge of that prison. He was in charge of the prison and he was also in charge of their court and he was charged.

MR LUBBE: At 3649 was the evidence in the KTC case about that Chair.

MR NJOZELA: Captain Loocke can I mention a few names, maybe you can be able to recall? Ngxobongwana?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes I saw that was Johnson Ngxobongwana. I can see it on the statement here.

MR NJOZELA: San Ndimba?

CAPT LOOCKE: That name constantly comes up, it could possibly be Ndimba was Johnson.

MR NJOZELA: Mr Nongwe? Jeffrey Nongwe.

CAPT LOOCKE: Maybe, I don't know.

MR NJOZELA: The last one, Mr Mlanjeni?

CAPT LOOCKE: No I don't know him at all.

MR LUBBE: Chairperson yes, I think clearly according to the footage which I've seen and this is just a generalised comment now, and that footage was also contained or taken by police Video Unit photographers, we have scenes where arson is taking place by members of the Witdoek faction and clearly there is no

intervention by the SAP in situations like that. Now I'm not implicating you in any particular fashion in that kind of situation, but maybe a comment from your side and then maybe a closing comment from my side is I think clearly in this country's past nobody can say that he was victorious, no matter who was on what side.

I think the only thing which is clear about the past is that on both sides people have suffered and this is from my personal impression of the past and for that I thank you for your presence here from my side. Thank you Ma'am.

MISS FULLARD: I just want to go back, I remember something I meant to ask earlier, I left it, and it's to do with that statement by Prince Gobinca which, you couldn't recall the exact incident although that statement would have been made to one of your investigating officers, possibly Coetzee. I think it's some other case, I'm not sure what the case is about. But what struck us is that when conflict was happening in the area and Prince Gobinca runs for help, he doesn't run to the police station, he runs and he phones you at home, which is surprising that he has your home number on his personal possession and you know it was quite an unusual situation. I mean you are the guys that would normally be coming after an incident has happened for the investigations.

As you yourself said, you're not part of the Unrest Control Unit, you're not there to intervene in particular conflicts, you're the guys who come in afterwards and sort of clean up the mess. But it just struck us that this was a statement made to your own, probably your own investigation team and you would be the first person that he would contact at home as well.

CAPT LOOCKE: I can't remember the incident of him phoning me but if he had done so, it could have been because our task was to get the trust and confidence of the community. Now if it's true what he said in his statement that there had been an attack or an impending attack, it could be that he had gone to the police station and that they wouldn't listen to him and he then resorted to phoning me because they all knew that if they gave information to us we reacted immediately.

So to some extent we did succeed in gaining their trust. I didn't give him my phone number, so he must have got my number either at the charge office at the police station or somewhere else but I didn't give it to him.

So if it is true that he phoned me it was out of a sense of frustration that he wasn't being helped by the police at the station.

MISS FULLARD: And were the police at the police station in the habit of handing out the home numbers of police officers to dissatisfied members of the public?

CAPT LOOCKE: It happened often in the past that if you enquire at a police station that they would give you his number if you wanted the Commanding officer's number, although it was a standing instruction not to give out numbers, it did happen.

CHAIRPERSON: Would that not have put you at risk in case the person enquiring about your phone number is a Comrade?

CAPT LOOCKE: It is possible yes.

MISS FULLARD: If I can just summarise. What you seem to be saying to us today is that you personally did not participate in any support, either moral,

political or logistical, financial, to the Witdoeke during any of the conflicts in the six months of 1986. Do we understand you correctly?

CAPT LOOCKE: Yes.

MISS FULLARD: And that secondly you are unaware of any such support from any other section of the security forces, be they police or defence force or any of the security forces that were deployed on the day including the riot police.

You are unaware of any such support in any of the forms that I have outlined.

CAPT LOOCKE: That's correct.

MISS FULLARD: And you are unaware of any directives that may have come from senior levels of government or local joint management centre structures regarding support to the Witdoeke?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loocke I want to say that I'm aware that through this investigation we're opening up old wounds. I'm also respectful of your response that you don't need help. To me clearly you do and I'm hoping that when things become raw that you do inform your counsel so that they may be of assistance to you other than just legal assistance. It is pretty clear that you talked about officers Opperman and Spannenberg but it is still raw and I think that you should do something about it, not wipe out the memory but wipe out the last horror of the scenes with them.

We can make recommendations of places for assistance. We are as concerned about the victims as we are concerned about the people who perpetrated gross human violations, not that you did, and it is no less manly or less masculine to say look I do need some help to deal with this because it's been

11-12 years ago and it's still raw. I think that you should do something about it and we can make recommendations.

I don't know what kind of new information we have received today, we have to do analysis of the transcription but I do like to thank you for your providing us with assistance and to the extent possible to provide some clarification.

Clearly the way you feel has to also affect your family because the rawness of the emotion can not be kept away from the family and I think in order to heal yourself and to also heal your family it is important to reach out. But may I say thank you very much for being here and say also thank you to Advocate Visser and Mr Wagner for supporting in being here and again thanks.

CAPT LOOCKE: Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: We have lunch, if you'd like to join us for lunch just outside you may do so, I suspect you just want to go home and...(intervention)

ADV VISSER: We can't, we've got to wait until half past six.
