RealTime Transcriptions

TRANSCRIPTION OF THE

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

MARIKANA

BEFORE TRIBUNAL

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FARLAM (RETIRED) - CHAIRPERSON MR TOKOTA SC MS HEMRAJ SC

HELD ON

DAY 285 4 SEPTEMBER 2014 PAGES 36869 TO 37026



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	Page 36869		Page 36871
1	[PROCEEDINGS ON 4SEPTEMBER 2014]	1	I call that a jet, a jet stream.
2	[09:10] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.	2	MR SEMENYA SC: The 10 litre per shot or
3	Before I remind Mr Hendrickx that he's still bound by his	3	the 20 litre per shot, is that what you call jet spray?
4	affirmation I want to know from you, Mr Semenya, whether	4	MR HENDRICKX: Ja. That's what I call a
5	it's necessary to do so. Do you have further questions for	5	jet stream, what you said providing for a few seconds, a
6	him?	6	few litres of water intended to reach or hit a person.
7	MR SEMENYA SC: Two or three questions,	7	MR SEMENYA SC: Can I ask that we, Chair,
8	Chair.	8	have a statement of Tshepiso Isaac Segaole, it's a new
9	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Budlender, I know there	9	exhibit.
10	are time constraints that are pressing. Shall I allow him	10	CHAIRPERSON: Has the witness seen it?
11	to ask the two or three questions now, or shall we stand it	11	MR SEMENYA SC: The witness has not seen
12	over until you're finished –	12	it, but it's a very short statement. It's one paragraph
13	MR BUDLENDER SC: Chair, if you're asking	13	I'm interested in really, Chair.
14	me my personal –	14	CHAIRPERSON: I take it there's no
15	CHAIRPERSON: I'm asking you your	15	objection, Mr Bizos.
16	personal –	16	MR BIZOS SC: No.
17	MR BUDLENDER SC: My personal preference	17	
	would be that I could start now with Mr De Rover.		
18		18 19	you spell the deponent's name? MR SEMENYA SC: Segaole would be S-E-G-A-
19	CHAIRPERSON: Okay, you're happy –		3
20	MR BUDLENDER SC: It's quarter past 9	20	O-L-E.
21	already.	21	CHAIRPERSON: Surname?
22	CHAIRPERSON: You're happy with that, Mr	22	MR SEMENYA SC: That's Segaole. The name
23	Semenya?	23	is Tshepiso, T-S-H-E-P-I-S-O, Isaac.
24	MR SEMENYA SC: Perhaps I could also	24	CHAIRPERSON: Alright, his statement will
25	announce that leading of Mr De Rover won't be 15 minutes,	25	be TTTT4.
	Page 36870		Page 36872
1	Page 36870 it would be like five minutes as well.	1	Page 36872 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes. Thank you, Chair.
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	Page 36873		Page 36875
1	But anyway –	1	after Mr Budlender has had a chance to cross-examine Mr De
2	MR SEMENYA SC: Those are all the	2	Rover. Mr Semenya?
3	questions I have.	3	MR SEMENYA SC: I beg leave to call Mr De
4	CHAIRPERSON: All your questions, thank	4	Rover.
5	you.	5	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Semenya, when the
6	MR HENDRICKX: Can I comment on that,	6	witness seat is vacated, your witness will sit in it. You
7	Sir, or not?	7	call Mr De Rover.
8	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you can comment, of	8	MR SEMENYA SC: I do, Chair.
9	course.	9	CHAIRPERSON: Mr De Rover, would you
10	MR HENDRICKX: The best way to go then	10	please stand? Are you prepared to take the oath or do you
11	ahead if I make, if I may make a recommendation to the	11	wish to affirm?
12	Commission, is to see what a water cannon can do when it's	12	MR DE ROVER: The oath.
13	used properly.	13	CHAIRPERSON: The oath. Do you swear
14	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, perhaps arrangements	14	that the evidence you will give before this Commission will
15	can be made for a water cannon to be taken to Marikana on	15	be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
16	Monday and while we're at the inspection we can see – I	16	Would you please raise your right hand and say, "I swear,
17	don't know whether that's practical, but if it's practical	17	so help me God."
18	it will take a few minutes and we can fire water at a	18	CEES DE ROVER: I swear, so help me God.
19	koppie and see what happens. We can get somebody to stand	19	CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.
20	in the way of a cannon and see, like Mr Mpofu, see whether	20	MR DE ROVER: Thank you.
21	it pushes him back 20 metres.	21	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Semenya.
22	MR BUDLENDER SC: Can we nominate?	22	EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA SC: Thank you,
23	MR SEMENYA SC: We nominate Mr Mpofu.	23	Chair. Mr De Rover, you have been engaged in the
24	CHAIRPERSON: I think what can happen is	24	proceedings around the Marikana Inquiry by the South
25	the legal representatives can draw lots, as was done in the	25	African Police Service. Is that right?
	Daga 24074		Dags 24974
1	Page 36874 Bible when the 12th apostle was chosen and we see on whom	1	Page 36876 MR DE ROVER: That is correct, Mr
1 2	Page 36874 Bible when the 12th apostle was chosen and we see on whom the lot falls.	1 2	MR DE ROVER: That is correct, Mr
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MR DE ROVER: Yes, I do. 1

> MR SEMENYA SC: Might I invite you, Mr De

Rover, to tell us your background, professional background 3

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5 MR DE ROVER: Chairperson, I will not

6 repeat that what is already included in my first statement,

7 to save time, maybe just to add a few elements to it. My

career now spans 35 years, 14 of which in the Dutch police 8

9 and a slight overlap of two years where there's an

10 international career that now runs in excess of 20 years.

11 I have a Masters Degree of Business Administration in

12 addition to my formal policing qualifications, with a

specialisation in Organisational Change. I have a Masters

14 Degree of Public International Law with focus on human 15

rights and humanitarian law.

The last 22 years have seen me in close to 70 different countries around the world on all continents, including South Africa, where I have worked closely with police security forces and armed forces, surely at instances in matters relating to use of force and firearms in public order management which seem to be of particular interest to this Commission, but more generally on issues of task organisation and task implementation.

24 I've worked extensively with the United Nations.

I've been a staff member of the United Nations in 1995 when

Page 36879 policing, as well as restructure and retrain Indonesia's

2 mobile brigades, which are their riot policing variant.

3 The Indonesian police is in personnel strength close to

600 000, so it's about three times as large as SAPS, and

its riot policing component counts 42 000 personnel.

6 CHAIRPERSON: What is the population of 7 Indonesia? How does it compare with ours?

8 MR DE ROVER: I think it's about four

9 times as large.

10 CHAIRPERSON: I see.

11 MR DE ROVER: In excess of 200 million

12 people. I have worked extensively for the International

13 Committee of the Red Cross. I was brought in there

14 initially to produce the book "To Serve and to Protect

Human Rights and Humanitarian Law for Police and Security

Forces." This book, first published in 1998, now knows a

17 second edition that was published in March this year. The

18 original book has been translated into 36 languages and

19 forms for many police forces an important reference work.

20 It's actually to date still one of the best-selling books 21

the organisation has at its disposal.

Once that book was complete I was placed in the position of being ICRC's first coordinator for police and security forces because the organisation realised the need to not just engage the armed bearers that are part of the

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the Department of Peacekeeping Operations placed me in

Burundi as a special advisor to the special representative 2

3 of the secretary-general. I've worked extensively with the

4 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and in

5 fact where professional training series number 5 is

concerned the manual that covers human rights and policing, 6

I'm one of the two authors responsible for that

publication.

I've been part of many expert working groups of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and I routinely assist mandate holders, special rapporteurs on thematic issues. I particularly like to mention Professor Philip Alston who held the mandate that is currently being held by Professor Heyns. In that capacity of working for the UN I've worked for several of the UN specialised agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme for whom I did the needs assessment, validation and programming of the needs of Rwanda to re-establish a national policing capability following the genocide in 1994.

19 20 21 I've worked extensively with the High Commissioner for Refugees, most notably on a project in Indonesia that ran from 2001 till the middle of 2003 and 24 that was aimed at bringing human rights training to the 25 Indonesian national police and introduce community

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armed forces, but that it would also be in interest to engage with the armed bearers that are part of police and security forces. So I established the strategy, the methodology. I recruited the people and I established the practices. Today in that branch of ICRC's activities 36

people have a full-time job and it forms a core part of that organisation's activities.

8 In 1999 I was recruited by the Australian Defence

9 Force and at a request of the Chief of the Army in

10 Australia I deployed with Australian troops to Delhi is 11 East Timor where the Australian-led intervention forces

12 established the first steps on the path to self rule for

13 the East Timorese. I worked as an advisor for General

14 Cosgrove and was particularly tasked to look at issues of

15 public order and to look at issues of treatment of

16 prisoners and condition of detention and conducted the

17 necessary negotiations with the International Committee of

18 the Red Cross who routinely visit prisoners in such

19 circumstances.

> As a consequence of the public order recommendations I conducted extensive training both in Delhi and in Australia at various barracks locations for troops that were scheduled to rotate into East Timor and gave them what essentially are basic law enforcement skills and abilities to counter possible situations on the ground,

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- 1 and I was drawn into the security arrangements for the
- 2 Sydney Olympics, so everything that had to do with the
- 3 military's role in securing the Sydney Olympics, I was one
- 4 of the architects of what actually then happened on the
- 5 ground, including creating and establishing and giving the
- 6 army the capability of having two extraction and recovery
- 7 teams, which essentially are surveillance teams of eight
- 8 that work generally in plainclothes and can mix with the
- 9 crowd and can signal and identify early signs of
- 10 troublemakers and actually physically take troublemakers

11 out.

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Around the Olympics, and this has never seen the light of day, but those teams actually arrested three individuals, managed to identify, follow, isolate and arrest people that carried on them items that would have permitted an Atlanta-type bombing to occur in Sydney, but because of those interventions that never eventuated.

At a later stage I have established in 1998 the organisation Equity International. My, at that time I was working more than six years in policing and human rights and frankly, I experienced a disappointment because many

- 22 times I was asked to go to a country and stand up in front
- 23 of police officials and cite International Law as it
- 24 relates to law enforcement practice, and I would always
- 25 have to stop myself at pointing out what their

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- 1 your testimony. You'll have an opportunity to expand on
- these other points later –
- MR DE ROVER: Okay.

4 CHAIRPERSON: - but we have a particular

concern that Adv Budlender should be able to cross-examine

6 you in the time available.

MR DE ROVER: Okay, fair enough.

MR SEMENYA SC: Did you have access to

the terrain?

MR DE ROVER: Let me set out how I
approached the work that I have done. I've used as a
normative framework International Law, applicable Treaty
Law, like treaties that South Africa is a state party to
and that could give guidance. I've used Soft Law. I've
used all those instruments that talk about what law

16 enforcement responsibility is. I've used Humanitarian Law.
 17 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think it's clear

18 $\,$ from the report, if I may say this, all the things that you

took into account and the authorities and so forth to which you referred. I don't think that's what Mr Semenya wants.

21 He really wants to know I think as far as the evidence is

concerned have you read the transcripts, have you readstatements? Have you looked at video clips? If you can

24 just explain that in a sentence it will be helpful.

MR DE ROVER: I will get to that, Chair,

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- responsibilities are, and at times people would raise their
- 2 hand and say okay, I understand that I can't torture to
- 3 solicit information, but, and you say I need to use ethical
- 4 interviewing techniques; can you teach me ethical
- 5 interviewing techniques, and I would have to say yes, I
- 6 could, but I'm not allowed to.
- 7 [09:30] So my personal experience was that training
- 8 courses of that nature only add to frustration because you
- 9 do not add into the mix the ability to, for people to
- 10 translate the standard into operational practice. There is
- 11 no point in pointing out what a police responsibility is if
- 12 you can't say how it should be operationalised and that -

MR SEMENYA SC: Alright, we'll have an opportunity to amplify. I just want make sure that we

15 cover this aspect before the cross-examination starts.

16 Before compiling the statements you have, what did you do,

o Before complining the statements you have, what did you do,

17 coming into the country after receiving your mandate?
 18 MR DE ROVER: Chairperson, it's probably

19 good to point out that I was outside South Africa when

Marikana happened and of course I saw the news, or at least

21 I saw the news broadcasting that little bit that sells news

22 and that makes news interesting, and I was horrified. I'd

23 never -

24 CHAIRPERSON: The question was asked what

25 did you read and look at in order to prepare yourself for

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neir 1 with your permission, to explain that I can say I did that,

but if I don't add to that the context -

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take your word for it for the time being and when you're being cross-examined you'll get an opportunity.

6 MR DE ROVER: Okay.

7 CHAIRPERSON: We're rather concerned 8 about time for reasons I think have been explained to you.

9 MR DE ROVER: Okay.

10 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya?

11 MR DE ROVER: I had access to all the

12 documents that pertain to the Commission. That includes

13 transcripts, that includes statements, that includes

14 physical evidence, and I had access to SAPS members that

15 were present on the day and I spoke I think to most of

those.

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17 CHAIRPERSON: I take it you went to

18 Marikana -

19 MR DE ROVER: I went to Marikana –

20 CHAIRPERSON: - and saw the scene where -

21 MR DE ROVER: - on several occasions.

22 CHAIRPERSON: - these events happened,

23 yes.

24 MR DE ROVER: Ja, I went to Marikana on

25 several occasions.

	Page 36885		Page 36887
1	MR SEMENYA SC: And were there any	1	read all of that in those eight days?
2	attempts you're involved in, in some reconstruction of how	2	MR DE ROVER: I read all of that in that
3	the events would have unfolded on various days with	3	eight days.
4	members?	4	MR BUDLENDER SC: And the transcript of
5	MR DE ROVER: Particularly with regards	5	the evidence given up to that time, did you read all of
6	to scene 2, yes.	6	that also in those eight days?
7	MR SEMENYA SC: Those are the questions	7	MR DE ROVER: No.
8	we have for the witness.	8	MR BUDLENDER SC: You didn't have a
9	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Semenya. Mr	9	chance to look at the exhibits, I take it, during those
10	Budlender.	10	eight days?
11	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BUDLENDER SC:	11	MR DE ROVER: Not in the detail that you
12	Thank you, Chair. Good morning, Mr De Rover.	12	are looking at here.
13	MR DE ROVER: Good morning, Mr Budlender.	13	MR BUDLENDER SC: No, I appreciate that.
14	MR BUDLENDER SC: You've just – well, let	14	So would it be fair to say that the main source for the
15	me take step back. In exhibit FFF11, your first statement,	15	first statement was statements of SAPS members and meetings
16	you say that you commenced your work on behalf of the SAPS	16	with SAPS members, and I don't know whether you also went
17	on the 28th of February last year. Is that correct?	17	out and had a look at the scene over that period?
18	MR DE ROVER: That is correct.	18	MR DE ROVER: Ja.
19	MR BUDLENDER SC: Before the 28th of	19	MR BUDLENDER SC: So there was a site
20	February, other than seeing television news, did you have	20	inspection, the statements of SAPS members and interviews
21	any opportunity to review any of the evidence relevant to	21	with SAPS members. Would those be your sources at that
22	Marikana?	22	time?
23	MR DE ROVER: No.	23	MR DE ROVER: Well, with of course in
24	MR BUDLENDER SC: Then your statement is	24	the, and I can't pinpoint exactly which parts now of
25	dated the 8th of March, your first statement, the 8th of	25	Commission proceedings, but of course more than that to
	Page 36886		Page 36888
1	Page 36886 March 2013. So you had eight days between the time when	1	Page 36888 contextualise what happened at Marikana.
1 2		1 2	<u> </u>
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                                                                                                                          Page 36891
            MR DE ROVER:
                                                                        unbiased.
1
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                    2
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
2
                                       At this stage I'm
                                                                                                     Yes.
    interested only in the factual information which you
3
                                                                    3
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                          Yes. Now I want to
4
    obtained.
                                                                        look at - you told us the sources from which you obtained
5
            MR DF ROVER:
                                  Ja.
                                                                    5
                                                                        the information on which you rely. Did it occur to you
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                        that there might be some other useful sources from which
                                       Factual information of
                                                                    6
6
    the sources which - the sources of factual information as I
                                                                    7
7
                                                                        you could have obtained, as you put it, contradictory
    understand it -
                                                                    8
                                                                        information?
8
9
                                                                    9
            MR DE ROVER:
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                  la
                                                                                                     Please clarify.
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                       - are those I've
                                                                   10
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                          Well, for example let's
10
    listed; SAPS statements, interviews of members of SAPS,
11
                                                                   11
                                                                        go to FFF11A, paragraph 24. That's your supplementary
12
     transcript of the evidence, or parts of the transcript of
                                                                   12
                                                                        statement. Paragraph 24. You have it? It's on page 13.
13
     the evidence, and visits to see for yourself.
                                                                   13
                                                                        You say, "It is on this basis that I'm uneasy about claims
14
            MR DE ROVER:
                                  Plus of course the exhibits
                                                                   14
                                                                        of the involved unions that the actions of their members
15
    of the Commission that existed then to date -
                                                                        were completely beyond their control. The unions support
                                                                        their members and facilitate the protest for wage increases
16
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                       Yes, indeed.
                                                                   16
17
            MR DE ROVER:
                                  - plus the statements of
                                                                   17
                                                                        of their members. They take their payments in the form of
18
    the other experts, plus the questioning that had happened
                                                                        union dues. They take part in negotiations on behalf of
19
    at that stage of people from SAPS that had appeared before
                                                                   19
                                                                        their members. They regularly address their members. They
20
     the Commission.
                                                                   20
                                                                        cannot simply walk away from any responsibility for what
21
                                                                   21
                                                                        took place on the 16th of August 2012 when negotiations
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                       No, I appreciate that.
                                                                   22
22
    Now I'm sure you'll agree that an expert's opinion is only
                                                                        broke down, stating that there is nothing more that they
23
                                                                   23
                                                                        can do." Now did you seek to interview anybody from AMCU
    as good as the information on which he bases it. If the
                                                                   24
                                                                        or NUM to put this proposition to them?
24
    information is unreliable or incorrect then the opinion may
                                                                   25
25
    be unreliable.
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     Nο
                                                       Page 36890
                                                                                                                          Page 36892
           MR DE ROVER:
                                 I think if you want a
1
                                                                    1
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                         Are you aware that Mr
    precise opinion on a precise incident or occurrence
                                                                        Mathunjwa on two occasions on the 16th of August went to the
2
3
    particular to you then of course you are right. But if you
                                                                        koppie and pleaded with the strikers to lay down their arms
4
    look, and I've, you know like frankly if I see yesterday
                                                                        and leave the koppie?
5
    that Marikana can be made to hinge on the movement of one
                                                                    5
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                    Yes.
                                                                    6
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                         What more do you think
6
    Nyala, then I worry because I don't think that that will
                                                                    7
                                                                        AMCU should have done?
7
    ever provide you the answers that you are looking for. So
                                                                    8
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                    I think still you know
8
    I know that there is concern possibly, or disagreement -
                                                                    9
9
    and I accept that - with findings that I made, but I've
                                                                        that, and it's, if you pinpoint it on that day maybe, maybe
10
    tried to actually offer to the Commission, and of course
                                                                   10
                                                                        there is nothing more to do, but I am quite aware that what
                                                                        produced at Marikana is in part a consequence of a rivalry
11
    not being able to be led in chief undermines that a little
                                                                   11
12
    bit, but what I was seeking to also do is to perhaps offer
                                                                   12
                                                                        between unions and unions vying for majority membership.
13
    what is referred to as contradiction, or to challenge you
                                                                   13
                                                                        Now I think that responsibility for action should be
14
    to look in other ways than just in that micro detail.
                                                                   14
                                                                        exercised when it can make a difference and that you can
15
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                   15
                                                                        point and say well on that day there was nothing more he
                                      I understand that. My
                                                                        could do, I may well agree with it, but I would actually
    question is that if an expert's opinion is based on
                                                                   16
17
    unreliable or incorrect information then the opinion itself
                                                                   17
                                                                        say that that responsibility should be acted upon before
18
    may be unreliable. Do you accept that?
                                                                   18
                                                                        the issue becomes one of no options left.
                                                                   19
19
           MR DE ROVER:
                                 Of course.
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                         Mr De Rover, you're
20
           MR_BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                   20
                                                                        criticising the conduct of AMCU and you're holding them in
                                      Yes, have you
21
    previously given evidence as an expert witness in a trial
                                                                   21
                                                                        part responsible for the deaths. Now I'm asking you what
    or in a commission like this?
                                                                   22
                                                                        you say they should have done that they didn't do.
22
         MR DE ROVER: No.
                                                                   23
23
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                    I've heard various -
         MR BUDLENDER SC: I take it you agree,
                                                                   24
                                                                               MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                                                      Chair, I object. I don't
25 I'm sure you agree that an expert should be objective and
                                                                        see anywhere where Mr De Rover is saying AMCU is
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ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

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    responsible for the deaths.
2
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      No Chair, I think the
3
    context is clear, but the witness can answer for himself.
4
    He's a very experienced man.
5
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                  [Microphone off, inaudible]
    ask him the question. Mr De Rover, do you say that partly
6
7
    responsibility for the deaths rests with AMCU? Is that
8
    your evidence? Is that what you are saying in the
9
    paragraph to which Mr Budlender has referred you, paragraph
10
    24 of your supplementary statement?
11
            MR DE ROVER:
                                 I think what I need to say
12
    at this stage is that Marikana represents an unravelling
13
    system and I've seen in this Commission evidence being
14
    presented and arguments being built, for example that a
    refusal of Lonmin to talk to strikers makes them
    responsible for the deaths, or as you put it now in this
17
    question, and what I see is this drive to look for operator
18
    failure.
19
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                  Yes, I understand that, but
20
    you haven't answered the question. The question is a
21
    simple one. Do you say that part of the responsibility for
22
    the deaths rests with AMCU?
23
            MR DE ROVER:
                                 Yes.
24
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                  Thank you.
25
                                 If you want to link the two
            MR DE ROVER:
                                                        Page 36894
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MR DE ROVER: I think that AMCU as an 1 organisation should have exercised better control over its members. There were deaths at Marikana before the police was involved. There was wanton destruction of property. I 5 have a list of case dockets that between February and the 6 1st of August of 2012 runs in excess of 100 cases opened of 7 destruction of property, grievous bodily harm, murder and 8 attempted murder, and all of those are linked to mine 9 strikes and union rivalry. I just think that if you run an 10 organisation that has a public character, you have a 11 responsibility towards your members, but also towards the 12 general public. 13 MR BUDLENDER SC: Right, that's your 14 answer. Do you also blame the NUM in part for the deaths on the 16th of August? 16 MR DE ROVER: Yes. 17 MR BUDLENDER SC: And what should they 18 have done that they didn't do, or what didn't they do that 19 they should have done that led to the deaths of 34 people 20 on the 16th of August? 21 MR DE ROVER: As a majority union they 22 obviously did not represent or share or wish to represent 23 or share the concerns of those that were demonstrating at 24 the koppie. Now if your system of collective bargaining is such that you only do business with the one that holds the Page 36896 majority you force people into militancy because numbers become important, and if on top of that NUM, who had at 3 that time the majority, do not represent that group, you 4 breed militancy because people will not feel themselves represented, not heard and not listened to, and what 6 alternative but to take a stance and to stand up do you 7 leave open to them? 8 MR BUDLENDER SC: No, I understand that. 9 That's with respect not an answer to my question. We know 10 that the strikers had lost confidence in the NUM, that the 11 NUM president tried to speak to them and they weren't 12 interested in listening to him. Now what do you say they 13 did that they shouldn't have done, or should have done that 14

difference, or a failure to conduct the business of the union in such a way that it doesn't propagate violence, or tolerate that, and that it doesn't breed animosity, I think that there were ample opportunities before because the strikes in the Platinum Belt did not start in August of that year. MR BUDLENDER SC: Mr De Rover, you say that AMCU are partly responsible for the deaths. I'm asking you specifically what do you say they should have done that they didn't do, or what did they do that they shouldn't have done which contributed, which was a causal factor in the deaths? MR DE ROVER: I've just -MR BUDLENDER SC: In the shootings by members of the South African Police Service. MR DE ROVER: I don't know if that additional qualification is required, but -MR BUDLENDER SC: Well, that's my question. What do you say that AMCU did which they shouldn't have done, or didn't do that they should have 24 done, which was a causal factor in the killings of 34 25 people by the police on the 16th of August?

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together and you want to look at the process in that way

that a failure to engage at an earlier stage, or make

yourself available at a stage that it could be making a

they didn't do, that led to the deaths of 34 people on the 16th of August? MR DE ROVER: If I, and you will correct me I'm sure if I'm wrong, but my understanding of what has been presented before the Commission is that on the 10th of August the strikers marched to the NUM offices and I take that march, and I've seen the footage of it, as an attempt to draw attention to their plight and to engage NUM. There wasn't anything hostile in that. There wasn't anything

aggressive. I think it was a genuine question for

attention and that attention wasn't given. On the 11th when

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they went back there is that allegation that shots were

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redress.

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Page 36897
                                                                                                                        Page 36899
    fired from the NUM offices into the group that approached
                                                                             MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                        What criticism did the
                                                                       National Commissioner make of the conduct of the South
2
    and that has triggered subsequent responses, and that is
3
    when matters went violent.
                                                                       African Police Service at Marikana?
4
    [09:50] MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                        And that led to the
                                                                             MR DE ROVER:
5
    police shooting 34 people on the 16th of August?
                                                                   5
                                                                             MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                        Not what you think,
           MR DE ROVER:
                                Look, I'm sure we will get
6
                                                                   6
                                                                       what she told you.
7
                                                                   7
    to that, but you know the problem that I have with those
                                                                             MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                  She asked me to assist SAPS
    reasonings is that you're hinting at what I call that
                                                                       with establishing what went wrong and why and to seek the
8
                                                                   9
9
    unravelling system and I will get an opportunity to clarify
                                                                       remedies to avoid this from happening again.
10
    that. There are relationships at work that when put in
                                                                  10
                                                                             MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                        I'm sure she did, but
                                                                  11
                                                                       I'm asking you what criticism did the National Commissioner
11
    sequence under the conditions as they happened at Marikana
                                                                  12
                                                                       make to you of the conduct of the SAPS at Marikana?
12
    produced that unimaginable result. Now it's far more
                                                                  13
                                                                             MR DE ROVER:
13
    interesting to look at the system that permitted to produce
                                                                                                   I don't think that she
14
    that in first instance before you come to the point where
                                                                  14
                                                                       voiced any particular one that I can give you as a quote
    you judge the responses as they happened at scene 1 and
                                                                       and that you can cross-reference with her, but -
15
                                                                  16
                                                                             MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                        Well, you told the
16
    scene 2, and I'm happy to engage with you on those as well,
                                                                  17
                                                                       Commission that she was critical of the -
17
    but before doing that I would like to also be able to point
18
    out that there are bigger forces at work here because my
                                                                  18
                                                                             MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                   Ja.
                                                                  19
19
    concern is even if you would accept that Marikana was
                                                                             MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                        - from the National
20
    without precedent - and I know that already some people
                                                                  20
                                                                       Commissioner down she was critical of the conduct of the
21
    struggle to accept that - if, the least you need to
                                                                       SAPS. I'm asking you to say how, in what manner was she
                                                                  21
                                                                  22
22
    recognise that it is a precedent and that if you do not
                                                                       critical.
                                                                  23
23
    alter reality that led to Marikana, it will happen again.
                                                                             MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                   In the conversations I have
24
    That's just a matter of time.
                                                                  24
                                                                       had with her I think she has a great concern for the
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
25
                                      Mr De Rover, do you
                                                                       outcome and wants to understand how it can be prevented, or
                                                      Page 36898
                                                                                                                        Page 36900
     consider that the conduct of the South African Police
                                                                       how it can be explained.
 1
                                                                   2
                                                                              MR BUDLENDER SC:
2
     Service is partly to blame for the shootings, for the
                                                                                                        I'm sure that's so. I
3
     killings at scene 1?
                                                                       don't doubt that for a moment.
            MR DE ROVER:
                                                                   4
                                                                             MR DE ROVER:
4
                                   Yes.
                                                                                                   Ja.
5
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                   5
                                                                             MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                        But that's not an
                                        Alright. Now did you
                                                                       answer to the question. The question is in what manner was
    interview South African Police Service members who were
                                                                   6
6
7
     critical of the conduct of the SAPS?
                                                                   7
                                                                       the National Commissioner critical of the conduct of the
8
            MR DE ROVER:
                                  Yes.
                                                                   8
                                                                       SAPS at Marikana?
9
                                                                   9
                                                                              MR DE ROVER:
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                        Who were they and in
                                                                                                   I cannot be more specific
10
    what respects were they critical?
                                                                  10
                                                                       than I have been.
                                                                              MR BUDLENDER SC:
11
            MR DE ROVER:
                                   Do you really want me to
                                                                  11
                                                                                                        Well, it's not a
                                                                       matter, Mr De Rover, of not being specific. You actually
     give you the names of the people that were critical?
                                                                  12
12
13
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                        Yes.
                                                                  13
                                                                       haven't answered the question.
14
            MR DE ROVER:
                                  Okay. They go from the
                                                                  14
                                                                             MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                   Ja.
15
     National Commissioner right down to the operational
                                                                  15
                                                                              MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                        Can you tell us, was
                                                                       the Provincial Commissioner critical of the conduct of the
     commander.
16
17
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                        Well, let's start with
                                                                  17
                                                                       SAPS at Marikana?
                                                                              MR DE ROVER:
18
     the National Commissioner. In what respects was the
                                                                  18
                                                                                                   Yes
                                                                              MR BUDLENDER SC:
19
     National Commissioner critical of the conduct of the SAPS?
                                                                  19
                                                                                                        In what manner, what
20
                                  I think that on the outcome
                                                                       respects was she critical of the conduct of the SAPS at
            MR DE ROVER:
21
     of the operation, the way the operation evolved on the
                                                                  21
                                                                       Marikana?
    ground and could not be controlled, she had serious
                                                                  22
                                                                              MR DE ROVER:
22
                                                                                                   In terms of organisation
     concerns and those concerns have led to her presentation
                                                                  23
                                                                       and communication.
    yesterday before the Portfolio Committee to seek and
                                                                  24
                                                                              MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                        Can you explain that
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further? What did she say the SAPS did wrong? Because

	Daga 24001			Page 24002
1	Page 36901 that's what you were trying to find out –	1	MR BUDLENDER SC:	Page 36903 You mentioned the
2	MR DE ROVER: Ja.	2		let me come back to that in due
3	MR BUDLENDER SC: - did the SAPS do	3	course.	det me come back to that in au
4	something wrong. The Provincial Commissioner gave you an	4	CHAIRPERSON:	Before you move on, did you
5	answer. What was her answer?	5	speak to General Mpembe?	zerere yeur mere em, and yeu
6	MR DE ROVER: The answers of the	6	MR DE ROVER:	Yes, I did.
7	Provincial Commissioner went to the running of the JOC and	7	CHAIRPERSON:	Did he have critical
8	the communication between the different stakeholders. The	8	comments?	2.4
9	concern that with the interactions that happened in the	9	MR DE ROVER:	I think General Mpembe's
10	JOC, the different parties that were represented and	10	frustration is with particular	•
11	present there, plus the lateral connections of people	11	August.	y evenue en me vem e.
12	ringing on mobile phones created a reality that was very	12	CHAIRPERSON:	Yes, I understand that.
13	difficult to manage.	13	MR DE ROVER:	Ja.
14	MR BUDLENDER SC: That's what she told	14	CHAIRPERSON:	That's a valid reply.
15	you?	15	MR DE ROVER:	Yes, Sir.
16	MR DE ROVER: Yes.	16	CHAIRPERSON:	But as far as the events of
17	MR BUDLENDER SC: She didn't tell the	17		he have any critical comments
18	Commission that.	18	that he communicated to yo	
19	MR DE ROVER: I can't help that.	19	MR DE ROVER:	No.
20	MR BUDLENDER SC: In what respect was	20	CHAIRPERSON:	- about what happened on
21	Brigadier Calitz critical of the conduct of the SAPS at	21	the 16th?	100
22	Marikana? Or was he not critical?	22	MR DE ROVER:	No.
23	MR DE ROVER: I think his frustration was	23	CHAIRPERSON:	I see. What were his
24	with communication on the ground, the possibility to relay	24	concerns about the 13th?	
25	information and to get updated as to what was actually	25	MR DE ROVER:	I think, I've had several
	Page 36902			Page 36904
1	Page 36902 happening on the ground.	1	meetings with General Mpem	Page 36904 be and it, I'm not an expert on
1 2		1 2	meetings with General Mpem trauma but I think he still can	be and it, I'm not an expert on
	happening on the ground. MR BUDLENDER SC: In what respects was General, if any, was General Annandale critical of the	_	trauma but I think he still can happened on that day and I	be and it, I'm not an expert on ries a legacy of what think he has a narrative for
2	happening on the ground. MR BUDLENDER SC: In what respects was General, if any, was General Annandale critical of the conduct of the SAPS at Marikana?	2	trauma but I think he still can happened on that day and I	be and it, I'm not an expert on ries a legacy of what
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2 3 4	happening on the ground. MR BUDLENDER SC: In what respects was General, if any, was General Annandale critical of the conduct of the SAPS at Marikana? MR DE ROVER: It's the same thing, the, their inability to at all times be informed of what was	2 3 4	trauma but I think he still can happened on that day and I what happened, what occurr if he had been somewhere el somewhere else rather than	the and it, I'm not an expert on tries a legacy of what think he has a narrative for ed, and he's questioning whether se or positioned himself to be walked behind the group
2 3 4 5	happening on the ground. MR BUDLENDER SC: In what respects was General, if any, was General Annandale critical of the conduct of the SAPS at Marikana? MR DE ROVER: It's the same thing, the, their inability to at all times be informed of what was transpiring on the ground.	2 3 4 5	trauma but I think he still can happened on that day and I what happened, what occurr if he had been somewhere el somewhere else rather than when they diverted from the	the and it, I'm not an expert on tries a legacy of what think he has a narrative for ed, and he's questioning whether se or positioned himself to be walked behind the group railway line, if him being in
2 3 4 5 6	happening on the ground. MR BUDLENDER SC: In what respects was General, if any, was General Annandale critical of the conduct of the SAPS at Marikana? MR DE ROVER: It's the same thing, the, their inability to at all times be informed of what was transpiring on the ground. MR BUDLENDER SC: Well, let's come to	2 3 4 5 6	trauma but I think he still can happened on that day and I what happened, what occurr- if he had been somewhere el- somewhere else rather than when they diverted from the another position than the one	the and it, I'm not an expert on cries a legacy of what think he has a narrative for ed, and he's questioning whether se or positioned himself to be walked behind the group railway line, if him being in the he opted for it would have
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Page 36905
                                                                                                                           Page 36907
    index that says it's 1, but 1 -
                                                                         charge of the JOC knew well before scene 2 happened of the
 2
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                         bad incident and the shootings that had happened at scene
                                      It's flag 1 in your
 3
    bundle.
                                                                         1. Is that correct?
 4
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 What is flag 1 in my bundle
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     If I take that -
 5
                                                                     5
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
    is actually Colonel Scott's statement. I see, yes I've got
                                                                                                           If you take that at
    it. Behind Colonel Scott's statement in my bundle is the
                                                                     6
 6
                                                                         face value.
 7
    interrogatories. Is it an exhibit yet?
                                                                     7
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     Ja, at face value that that
8
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      No, it's not an exhibit
                                                                     8
                                                                         would appear, you know there would have been at least what,
                                                                     9
 9
    yet, Chair. The Human Rights Commission has prepared a
                                                                         is it five minutes or six minutes -
10
    list of exhibits, so could we use their number? Their
                                                                    10
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                           Yes, from 16:03.
                                                                    11
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
11
    numbers, it's UUUU2.4.
                                                                                                     Ja.
                                 UUUU -
                                                                    12
12
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                           At least, yes.
                                                                    13
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
13
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      That will fall into a
                                                                                                     Before scene 2 started.
                                                                    14
14
    sequence which they're going to use.
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                           Yes. Now if you had
15
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 - 2.4, that's evidence
                                                                    15
                                                                         known that when you prepared your report, would that have
    leaders' interrogatories.
                                                                         influenced your opinion on the failure to call a halt to
16
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                    17
                                                                         the operation before scene 2 happened?
17
                                      Yes. Now Mr De Rover,
18
    could you go to page 6 of that document, paragraphs 10 and
                                                                    18
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     No. because I think I said
19
    11. Paragraph 10 you were asked the following question,
                                                                    19
                                                                         already in my first statement that I believe a halt should
20
    "When you prepared FFF11 and FFF11A were you informed that
                                                                    20
                                                                         have been called and the fact that it didn't happen can be
                                                                         led back to part of unravelling systems and issues that in
21
    at 16:03 before scene 2 commenced Brigadier Pretorius in
                                                                    21
    charge of the JOC sent an SMS message to Mr Molatedi at
                                                                    22
22
                                                                         and of themselves might not be fatal, but when you sequence
23
    IPID stating 'Having operation at Wonderkop, bad, bodies.
                                                                    23
                                                                         them produce a result.
                                                                    24
24
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
    Please prepare your members as going to be bad,' or that
                                                                                                           Lunderstand that.
25
                                                                    25
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
    there was any communication between Brigadier Pretorius and
                                                                                                     Yes.
                                                        Page 36906
                                                                                                                           Page 36908
    IPID at the time?" and you said no. You said this was the
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                     1
                                                                                                           You criticise, you say
 2
    first you'd heard of this, and then the next question,
                                                                     2
                                                                         that there should have been a halt before scene 2.
    paragraph 11 was, "When you prepared FFF11 and 11A were you
 3
                                                                     3
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                      Yes.
 4
    informed that from 16:05 before scene 2 commenced Brigadier
                                                                     4
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                           But your understanding
 5
    Pretorius had a series of telephone calls with Captain
                                                                     5
                                                                         at that time was that the JOC didn't know about scene 1.
    Loest who was at scene 1 and informed her what had happened
                                                                     6
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
 6
                                                                                                      No, my understanding at
    there?" and you said no, this was the first time you were
                                                                     7
 7
                                                                         that time was that the JOC could not access the commanders
8
    told about this.
                                                                     8
                                                                         via the radio and I don't know if the fact that Brigadier
 9
           MR DE ROVER:
                                                                     9
                                Yes
                                                                         Pretorius may have known at 16:03 - I don't even know what
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
10
                                     Now we know that
                                                                         it exactly then is that she knew, but if at that stage
                                                                    10
    Brigadier Pretorius was in charge of the JOC. She was the
11
                                                                    11
                                                                         there is a problem with the radios, the fact that the JOC
12
    manager of the JOC.
                                                                    12
                                                                         would know but they are unable to reach people on the
13
           MR DE ROVER:
                                                                         ground at that time, that still leaves that part of the
                                Yes
                                                                    13
14
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                     Could you just speak a
                                                                    14
                                                                         problem -
15
    bit louder?
                                                                    15
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                           Are you aware - sorry,
16
           MR DE ROVER:
                                Yes.
                                                                         Mr De Rover. Are you aware of any evidence that the JOC
17
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                     So we know that the
                                                                    17
                                                                         attempted to call a halt to the operation after scene 1?
                                                                    18
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
18
    person in charge of the JOC knew shortly after 4 o'clock
                                                                                                      No, I'm not.
19
    and well before scene 2 happened that there had been
                                                                    19
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                           Right, can we then in a
    shootings and there was a bad situation at scene 1, but you
                                                                         related matter - did you ask them why they didn't try to
    weren't told that when you prepared your reports. I
21
                                                                    21
                                                                         call a halt to the operation?
    understand that. Is that correct?
22
                                                                    22
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                      Yes.
           MR DE ROVER:
                           That's correct.
                                                                    23
23
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                           And what did they say?
          MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                  What it means is that
                                                                    24
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                      They said they were unable
    however bad the communication system was, the person in
                                                                         to contact people on the ground and -
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Page 36909
                                                                                                                         Page 36911
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                              MR BUDLENDER SC:
1
                                      No, Mr De Rover, you
                                                                                                        Alright, okay. Also
2
    just said you're not aware that they made any attempt to
                                                                       around that issue can you go to paragraph 8 of that
3
    halt the operation, so they can't have - if you aren't
                                                                       interrogatory? That's on page 6. The question is asked,
4
    aware that they made any attempt then how can you -
                                                                       "When you prepared FFF11 and FFF11A were you informed that
5
           MR DE ROVER:
                                 I think there's two
                                                                    5
                                                                       the firing of R5 rifles at scene 1 was audible through the
    different things. You asked me if they made an attempt.
6
                                                                    6
                                                                       police radio to members of the JOC and to other commanders
7
                                                                    7
    1 -
                                                                       on the ground?" and your answer is, "I'm not sure that this
8
                                                                   8
                                                                       assertion represents a statement of fact. I understand
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      Sorry, my first
9
    question was, are you aware of any evidence that they made
                                                                   9
                                                                       that Mr Dirk Botes made a statement to this effect. What I
    an attempt.
                                                                       understand is that as scene 1 happened radio traffic was
10
11
           MR DE ROVER:
                                                                   11
                                                                       between Brigadier Calitz, who was inside a Nyala at the
                                 No.
12
                                                                   12
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      Then how can the
                                                                       time, and Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak, who was in a chopper
13
    communication problems be a cause of the failure to call a
                                                                       in the air. I'm therefore not sure as to the mechanics of
14
    halt if they didn't try?
                                                                   14
                                                                       how this is supposed to have happened as no other person
15
           MR DE ROVER:
                                                                   15
                                                                       made a similar statement to that effect." Now can I take
                                 Well, let's - I would take
                                                                       you to - is this what you were informed by the SAPS that no
16
    the inference of the reference to the radio problem that
                                                                   17
                                                                       other person made a similar statement to this effect?
17
    they would have tried but found that the radios weren't
18
    working.
                                                                   18
                                                                              MR DE ROVER:
19
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                       Did anyone tell you
                                                                   19
                                                                              MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                        Right, now can we go to
20
    that?
                                                                   20
                                                                       exhibit HHH8, the statement Warrant Officer Masinya.
21
           MR DE ROVER:
                                 Yes.
                                                                   21
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                    Behind flag 3 in your
22
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                       They told you that they
                                                                   22
                                                                       bundle.
23
    wanted to try but the radios weren't working?
                                                                   23
                                                                              MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                        Paragraph 12 -
                                                                   24
24
           MR DE ROVER:
                                 Yes.
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                    There are a couple of
25
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                   25
                                      Who told you that?
                                                                       statements [microphone off, inaudible].
                                                       Page 36910
                                                                                                                         Page 36912
           MR DE ROVER:
                                 Annandale and Scott.
1
                                                                    1
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                          Yes, there's several,
2
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      So Annandale and Scott
                                                                        I'm afraid. It's the last one in the bundle of HHH8.
3
    told you they were aware that scene 1 had happened and they
                                                                    3
                                                                        Perhaps we should go to the previous page just so we can
4
    tried to stop scene 2 -
                                                                    4
                                                                        identify what was happening. On the previous page,
5
           MR DE ROVER:
                                                                    5
                                                                        paragraph 11, Warrant Officer Masinya was one of the video
                                No, no, no -
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                    6
                                      - but the
                                                                        operators who left the scene. He says, "Captain Adriao of
6
7
    communications wouldn't happen, wouldn't work?
                                                                    7
                                                                        Communication Services, are you guys from SAPS?" "Yes."
           MR DE ROVER:
                                No, they did not did not
                                                                    8
8
                                                                        Warrant Officer Masinya replied, "You've been identified to
                                                                    9
9
    say that they were aware of scene 1. They did -
                                                                        as police spies. You should withdraw from this place as
10
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                   10
                                                                        the miners said they wanted to kill you." Then he goes on
                                      Did they say that -
           MR DE ROVER:
                                 They did say that they lost
                                                                        in paragraph 12, "We then went back to the JOC. The
11
                                                                   11
12
    for a period of time contact with people on the ground -
                                                                   12
                                                                        shooting started. We heard this because we were listening
13
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      Did they say that -
                                                                   13
                                                                        through the radio at the JOC." So he heard the shooting
14
           MR DE ROVER:
                                - with the operational
                                                                   14
                                                                        over the radio, correct?
                                                                   15
15
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
    commander.
                                                                                                     That's what he says.
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      Did they -
16
                                                                   16
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                          That's what he says.
17
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 Mr Budlender, sorry. You
                                                                   17
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     Yes, that's what he says.
18
    mustn't interrupt the witness.
                                                                   18
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                          You were not informed
19
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      I apologise.
                                                                   19
                                                                       of that?
20
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                   20
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     No, I read this statement
                                 When he's giving an answer
21
    you must let him finish.
                                                                   21
                                                                        yesterday because it was part of the documents that you
22
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      I apologise. Did they
                                                                   22
                                                                       sent across.
    tell you that they wanted to call a halt but they were
                                                                   23
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                          Yes, but you didn't see
24 unable to do so?
                                                                   24
                                                                        that previously?
           MR DE ROVER:
                                No, that was never said.
                                                                   25
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     No.
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Email: realtime@mweb.co.za

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Page 36913 MR BUDLENDER SC: 1 And you've also seen, 2 because that's one of the documents I've sent across, was 3 LLL9, the statement of Colonel Moolman at paragraph 35 -4 CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 35 on page -5 these documents, we haven't got page numbers, we have to go by paragraph numbers. 6 7 MR BUDLENDER SC: Ja, paragraph - do you 8 have that? 9 MR DE ROVER: Sorry, which paragraph? [10:10] MR BUDLENDER SC: Paragraph 35. It's 10 about three pages from the end, and this is what 11 Lieutenant-Colonel Moolman says. She says, "I remained at 12 13 the JOC during the afternoon. I heard over the radio that 14 there was a shooting. To me it sounded like chaos on the 15 radio, but I think I heard Brigadier Calitz's voice. I heard shots being fired and I think I heard Brigadier 16 Calitz's voice saying 'Cease fire.' I recalled Brigadier 17 18 Pretorius starting to despatch emergency services." You 19 didn't see that before you prepared your report either, did 20 you? 21 MR DE ROVER: No. 22 MR BUDLENDER SC: Or before you prepared 23 your interrogatory answers? 24 MR DE ROVER: No. 25 MR BUDLENDER SC: But if what she says is

Page 36915 tell the difference between rubber balls being fired from a 2 shotgun and sharp ammunition being fired from an R5 rifle, 3 can you? It's a different sound, isn't it?" Answer, 4 "That's correct, Mr Chairman." Chairperson, "That's what you heard?" Captain Kidd, "That's correct." Chairperson, "R5 rifles? So anyone listening to the radio would have 7 heard that?" Captain Kidd, "That's correct, Mr Chairman." 8 Now if Captain Kidd's evidence is the truth then everyone 9 who was listening to the radio would have heard the 10 shooting at scene 1. You accept that? That's what he 11 says. 12 MR DE ROVER: If radios work and people 13 are listening to them, yes. 14 MR BUDLENDER SC: Yes, okay. Anyone who 15 was listening, he says - yes, alright. Now did you know that when you answered the interrogatories? 16 17 MR DE ROVER: When I spoke to Captain 18 Kidd, and that's different from what he said here, when I 19 spoke to him he said he could hear the shooting just 20 because of the physical distance. He never, when he, when 21 I talked to him he never said that he heard it on his radio. That qualification is new to me. What I understood 22 23 was that he could hear the gunfire from where he was 24 approaching from the settlement that is on the southwestern side where he was originally.

Page 36914 correct then she too says that it was audible over the radio. MR DE ROVER: Yes. MR BUDLENDER SC: And then can I take you to the evidence of Captain Kidd. Could we have the transcript of day 232, page 29003, line 14. This is line 14, Ms Baloyi is questioning Captain Kidd. She says, "You say you'd reached, before you'd reached your intended position you heard about the attack on the radio that the 10 police were under attack. You hear that. What then happens? What do you do, if anything, after you hear this 11 12 message?" He answers, "Okay, when that happens I start 13 calling on the radio. I start calling on the radio, 14 Brigadier Calitz, the JOC, Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak. I 15 was calling, calling just to get some response but I 16 received nothing." Ms Baloyi says, "And what" and then 17 Commissioner Hemraj says, "Sorry, what did you hear on the 18 radio? Exactly what did you hear as regards the attack?" 19 Captain Kidd says, "Mr Chairman, I heard commotion, the firing of ammunition, people screaming." Commissioner 21 Hemraj asks, "And could you identify any person's voice making the report that the police were under attack?" 22 Captain Kidd, "No, I couldn't identify any members." 24 Chairperson, "You hear on the radio that a volley was being

25 fired, ammunition was being fired, and presumably you can

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Page 36916 1 MR BUDLENDER SC: But you now know that his evidence is that you could hear it over the radio? 3 MR DE ROVER: That's what I see, yes. 4 MR BUDLENDER SC: So the information which you had that no person other than Mr Botes said it 6 was audible over the radio seems not to be correct? 7 MR DE ROVER: That's correct. 8 MR BUDLENDER SC: Right. Does that 9 affect your opinions in any way? 10 MR DE ROVER: Well of course it does. Of 11 course it does. 12 MR BUDLENDER SC: Yes, alright. Let's 13 move on. Can we go to page 3 of the interrogatory? 14 CHAIRPERSON: We haven't got page numbers 15 on ours. Just give us the paragraph number. 16 MR BUDLENDER SC: It's paragraph 1.12. 17 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. 18 MR BUDLENDER SC: Before I go there, Mr 19 De Rover, let me just make clear what I'm asking because I 20 don't want to be unfair to you. I appreciate you were 21 dependent on the information which was given to you. You weren't an eyewitness and so you have no personal knowledge 23 of what happened. You can only rely on what you were told, 24 and so it's not fair to ask you - and I'm not going to ask

you – do you agree that X happened or do you agree that Y

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16

MR DE ROVER:

MR BUDLENDER SC:

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Ja, but logically, yes.

Yes, I accept that.

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Page 36917
                                                                                                                          Page 36919
     happened, because you don't know. You rely on other
                                                                        could occur. So I would be surprised if a plan indeed into
     people's accounts. So what I'm really asking you is if
 2
                                                                        completed to phases 3, 4, 5 and 6 was only thought of at
 3
     what so-and-so says is correct that would affect your
                                                                        half past 1 on the 16th. That would be a serious worry.
 4
     conclusions, I'm not asking you to say that what he says is
                                                                    4
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                         Well, the Commission
 5
     correct.
                                                                        will make its own findings as to what was planned when, and
                                                                    6
                                                                        I don't want to debate that with you.
 6
            MR DE ROVER:
                                  Okay.
 7
                                                                    7
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                        Or not correct. You're
                                                                                                    Sure.
     with me, right. Now paragraph 1.12 on page 3 you were
                                                                    8
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
 8
                                                                                                          That's not fair to you
 9
     asked, "When you prepared FFF11 and FFF11A were you
                                                                    9
                                                                        or appropriate.
     informed that there was no POP input into the formulation
                                                                    10
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
10
                                                                                                    Okay.
     of the stage 3 disperse, disarm and arrest plan?" and your
                                                                    11
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                          Then when you -
11
                                                                    12
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     Have you read all of
12
     answer was, "To my knowledge this assertion is not
13
     supported by the evidence led before the Commission,
                                                                    13
                                                                        Colonel Scott's evidence?
                                                                    14
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
14
     notably Brigadier Calitz, Brigadier Tsiloane, Colonel
                                                                                                     Yes.
     Makhubela, Lieutenant-Colonel Merafe, Lieutenant-Colonel
                                                                    15
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     I see. So you know what he
15
                                                                        said about what happened on the Thursday morning and what
16
     Pitsi and Lieutenant-Colonel Mere all had inputs into the
                                                                        happened at the 1:30 meeting.
17
     plan and all have extensive POP experience." Now when do
                                                                   17
18
     you, from what you've been told, when do you understand
                                                                    18
                                                                               MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                                                                                          Now related to that, at
19
     that the stage 3 disperse, disarm and arrest plan was
                                                                    19
                                                                        paragraph 1.11 of the evidence leaders' interrogatories you
20
     formulated?
                                                                    20
                                                                        were asked, "When you prepared FFF11 and FFF11A were you
21
                                                                        informed that when just before 1:30 on 16 August the
            MR DE ROVER:
                                  My understanding was that
                                                                   21
                                                                    22
22
     on the 14th and the 15th the plan for Marikana in its
                                                                        Provincial Commissioner made the decision referred to in
23
                                                                   23
                                                                        1.9," that's to put it into operation, "there was no
     possible outlines that, or in situations that could
                                                                    24
24
     eventuate was prepared.
                                                                        written plan for the stage 3 disperse, disarm and arrest
25
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                        When do you understand
                                                                        operation?" and your answer is, "Yes. I also understand
                                                       Page 36918
                                                                                                                          Page 36920
     that the plan for what would actually be done on the 16th
                                                                        the disperse, disarm and arrest was standard operational
 1
 2
     was prepared?
                                                                        procedures that do not require a written plan. My
 3
           MR DE ROVER:
                                Before the 16th.
                                                                        appreciation is that the plan that existed at Marikana does
 4
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      Before the 16th. Now if
                                                                        provide the breakdown of the different stages. Disperse,
 5
    you assume for the moment that the Commission finds that
                                                                        disarm and arrest are common POP terms referring to common
    there was no stage 3 plan before the 13:30 JOCCOM on the
                                                                        tactical options available to POP, known and understood and
 6
     16th, assume the Commission finds that, then that would mean
                                                                    7
                                                                        regularly practised and applied by POP members. There is
 7
     that there had been no POP input into the plan. Do you
8
                                                                        no need for those terms to be further clarified or detailed
 9
     accept that?
                                                                        in writing beyond their indication as forming part of stage
10
           MR DE ROVER:
                                Well look, ja, if you put
                                                                    10
                                                                        3 of the plan." Now let me, so as I understand your
11
    that time constraint you're presenting a physical
                                                                    11
                                                                        response the disperse, disarm and arrest plan was so
12
     impossibility to consult, so -
                                                                    12
                                                                        familiar to POP members as part of their routine that as a
13
                                                                    13
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                      Yes, and that would
                                                                        practical matter there was no need for a written plan?
14
    affect your opinion as to the planning of the operation?
                                                                    14
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                    If - ja, I take that, if I
```

17 That's fair enough. It's for the Commission to decide 17 expect them on, just on the basis and force of that number whether that is or isn't in fact the case. 18 18 to be very familiar, given that in their approach there is 19 MR DE ROVER: 19 No, but what I want to, a limited number of tactical options available to them. 20 maybe to give a little bit more context, and if that's not MR BUDLENDER SC: Can we go to the pleasing please stop me doing so, but on an operation of 21 statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Scott? It's GGG39, 22 this kind I would expect a police force to do the Alpha and paragraph 6. It's a long paragraph, but I do need to read 23 the Omega, like you don't plan half of it and hope that 23 it. He says, "Finally I want to add that in my 20 years at 24 half of it will suffice and if you need more that you are 24 the South African Police Services, 19 of which in the going to go back and envisage what other eventualities Special Task Force, I'm not aware that the SAPS has never" ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

15

16

think I just take the number of public order incidents that

happen in this country on an annual basis then I would

24

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23

24

25

19

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22

Page 36921 - I think he means has ever - "been confronted with a 2 situation of the kind with which members were confronted on 3 the ground on 16 August 2012. The plan or strategy that I 4 prepared and proposed for adoption by the JOCCOM was the 5 first of its kind. Neither the crowd management strategies 6 for which Standing Order 262 provides, nor the hostage 7 management strategies were appropriate in isolation. I 8 thus had to devise what I considered at the time to be an 9 appropriate plan for an unprecedented situation, being one which had to encompass the principles of Standing Order 10 262, but moving beyond the restrictions of the standing 11 12 order to effectively plan for the disarming of the 13 protesters while considering protection of the police 14 officials and the community in the area when dealing with 15 the belligerent armed group numbering up to 3 000 persons who were choosing to contest the request to disperse and/or 16 disarm, demonstrating a clear defiance towards the law and 17 18 the enforcers of the law with aggressive action should they 19 be approached, as determined on Monday 13th August 2012."

Now Colonel Scott doesn't seem to have regarded

I think that his statement

this as a normal operation which required no special

is probably a reflection of his particular brand of

knowledge. It doesn't take away of the reality that

planning. You note that?

MR DE ROVER:

Page 36923 for a written plan. The thing is I think that you can't plan for the unimaginable. You are trying to find 3 somewhere now in the process a development, a situation or 4 a decision that can be held as the key point on if you hadn't done that this wouldn't have happened, and I think 6 that the plan as it stood, the base idea is obviously born 7 from experience, from doctrine and from the availability of 8 resources on a point, and I see in the sequencing of what 9 happened it's not hard to identify the moments where you 10 can say if you hadn't done this, that wouldn't have 11 happened. But my problem is much more with whether you 12 could actually foresee that development. 13 MR BUDLENDER SC: Mr De Rover, my 14 question was this; for an operation of this kind involving multiple forces and according to Colonel Scott an unprecedented operation, was there a need for a written 17 plan? Of course. 18 MR DE ROVER: 19 MR BUDLENDER SC: Right, and the plan 20 must cater for a variety of contingencies. You plan for 21 the best case and the worst case scenarios. 22 MR DF ROVER: Ves

Yes, and that's what

Page 36924

I needs to provide for

MR BUDLENDER SC:

MR DE ROVER:

the plan needed to provide for, correct?

Page 36922 1 disperse, disarm and arrest are known concepts to POP that 2 when you consider POP do not require that detailed 3 explanation. They might have needed it for Colonel Scott, 4 but definitely not for POP. 5 MR BUDLENDER SC: This was an operation involving multiple forces that was according to Colonel 6 7 Scott an unprecedented operation as far as his experience 8 went. 9 Yes. MR DE ROVER: MR BUDLENDER SC: 10 Surely that required a plan, a proper plan in advance. You couldn't just say just 11 12 go and disperse, disarm and arrest, because it was a 13 multiple plan involving multiple parties in an unprecedented situation. Surely that required a proper 14 15 written plan. 16 MR DE ROVER: The responsibilities of the 17 different units are contained in the plan and I'm only 18 saying that where you ask me the question on where, on

stage 3, disperse, disarm and arrest, whether you need to

Do you think for an

spell that out for the units that are supposed to initially

operation of this kind there was a need for a written plan

MR DE ROVER: Of course there is a need

do that, my answer is no, you don't have to do that.

MR BUDLENDER SC:

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communicated to all of the different units?

these contingencies of best and worst case and that needs 2 to be accompanied with a probability estimate. 3 MR BUDLENDER SC: Yes, indeed. Alright, 4 have you seen such a plan? 5 MR DE ROVER: I have seen the plan that SAPS had available and the contingencies that they planned 6 7 8 MR BUDLENDER SC: And in your opinion did 9 it meet the requirements of a plan which informs the 10 different units of what they're going to do and which deals 11 with the best case scenarios and the worst case scenarios 12 and for contingencies? 13 MR DE ROVER: I've seen better plans and 14 I've seen worse plans. 15 No, that's not the MR BUDLENDER SC: 16 question, Mr De Rover. 17 MR DE ROVER: Ja. 18 MR BUDLENDER SC: The question is was it 19 a plan, was it an adequate plan? 20 MR DE ROVER: For me it was an adequate 21 plan. 22 MR BUDLENDER SC: Alright, well I'm going 23 to have to leave shortly, but can you make available to the Commission the plan which you say met those requirements 24 adequately?

	Page 36925		Page 36927
1	MR DE ROVER: Sorry?	1	I remember being at a place for a meeting and meeting a
2	MR BUDLENDER SC: Can you during the	2	third person just for the first time there and who in
3	course of the day identify which is the plan which you saw	3	conversation over a coffee divulged that information and it
4	which you say met the requirements adequately?	4	was new to me.
5	MR DE ROVER: Okay.	5	CHAIRPERSON: Who was the third person?
6	MR BUDLENDER SC: And make it available,	6	MR DE ROVER: I, that's what I said I
7	identify it for the benefit of the Commission. Right, now	7	can't remember, but I remember that somebody told me that
8	let me move on to a different subject –	8	story and I took that back to General Annandale and General
9	CHAIRPERSON: He can do that overnight if	9	Mbombo and just to ascertain what had actually happened.
10	he likes. He may be busy or-	10	MR BUDLENDER SC: And they told you what
11	MR BUDLENDER SC: Yes, he can do that	11	had happened?
12	overnight because I think we are going to be here –	12	MR DE ROVER: Ja.
13	CHAIRPERSON: He'll be here until	13	MR BUDLENDER SC: Would it surprise you
14	lunchtime tomorrow, so he can do it overnight and give it	14	if I told you that the Commission, you were told that
15	to us tomorrow morning.	15	before the Commission was told that?
16	MR BUDLENDER SC: Thank you, Chair.	16	MR DE ROVER: Sorry?
17	CHAIRPERSON: Together, I don't know	17	MR BUDLENDER SC: Would it surprise you
18	whether the lessons that we were going to get –	18	if I told you that you were told, or given this information
19	MR BUDLENDER SC: I'm coming to that,	19	before the Commission was given the information?
20	Chair. Two other matters I'd like to address with you, Mr	20	MR DE ROVER: I'm not aware of that. If
21	De Rover. Firstly can you go to paragraph 1.3 of the	21	that's true then I agree, I share your surprise, but I
22	evidence leaders' interrogatories. The question was asked,	22	don't know.
23	"When you prepared FFF11 and FFF11A were you informed that	23	MR BUDLENDER SC: Thank you. Finally, Mr
24	the decision was endorsed by an extraordinary session on	24	De Rover, when General Annandale was giving evidence he was
25	the evening of 15 August 2012 of most of the members of the	25	asked about what was wrong, what had gone wrong at Marikana
	Page 36926		Page 36928
1	Page 36926 National Management Forum?" and your answer is, "Yes, I was	1	Page 36928 from an SAPS perspective. I think you'll remember that. I
1 2	9	1 2	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	National Management Forum?" and your answer is, "Yes, I was		from an SAPS perspective. I think you'll remember that. I
2	National Management Forum?" and your answer is, "Yes, I was aware of the recording and the minutes of the extraordinary	2	from an SAPS perspective. I think you'll remember that. I think quite a few of us asked him about that, including Mr
2	National Management Forum?" and your answer is, "Yes, I was aware of the recording and the minutes of the extraordinary session held on 15 August 2012, that the session endorsed	2	from an SAPS perspective. I think you'll remember that. I think quite a few of us asked him about that, including Mr Burger, and he said that the SAPS would produce a statement
2 3 4	National Management Forum?" and your answer is, "Yes, I was aware of the recording and the minutes of the extraordinary session held on 15 August 2012, that the session endorsed the decision that the strikers be disarmed if they do not	2 3 4	from an SAPS perspective. I think you'll remember that. I think quite a few of us asked him about that, including Mr Burger, and he said that the SAPS would produce a statement setting out the lessons learned from Marikana, and then on
2 3 4 5	National Management Forum?" and your answer is, "Yes, I was aware of the recording and the minutes of the extraordinary session held on 15 August 2012, that the session endorsed the decision that the strikers be disarmed if they do not do so voluntarily." Now did you know of that when you	2 3 4 5	from an SAPS perspective. I think you'll remember that. I think quite a few of us asked him about that, including Mr Burger, and he said that the SAPS would produce a statement setting out the lessons learned from Marikana, and then on the 23rd of January – or let's go there. Could we have day
2 3 4 5 6	National Management Forum?" and your answer is, "Yes, I was aware of the recording and the minutes of the extraordinary session held on 15 August 2012, that the session endorsed the decision that the strikers be disarmed if they do not do so voluntarily." Now did you know of that when you produced FFF11? That was on the 8th of March 2013.	2 3 4 5 6	from an SAPS perspective. I think you'll remember that. I think quite a few of us asked him about that, including Mr Burger, and he said that the SAPS would produce a statement setting out the lessons learned from Marikana, and then on the 23rd of January – or let's go there. Could we have day 173? So that first reference was on 15 May 2013. Then if
2 3 4 5 6 7	National Management Forum?" and your answer is, "Yes, I was aware of the recording and the minutes of the extraordinary session held on 15 August 2012, that the session endorsed the decision that the strikers be disarmed if they do not do so voluntarily." Now did you know of that when you produced FFF11? That was on the 8th of March 2013. MR DE ROVER: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7	from an SAPS perspective. I think you'll remember that. I think quite a few of us asked him about that, including Mr Burger, and he said that the SAPS would produce a statement setting out the lessons learned from Marikana, and then on the 23rd of January – or let's go there. Could we have day 173? So that first reference was on 15 May 2013. Then if we go to day 173, page 20442, could we go to line 11?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	National Management Forum?" and your answer is, "Yes, I was aware of the recording and the minutes of the extraordinary session held on 15 August 2012, that the session endorsed the decision that the strikers be disarmed if they do not do so voluntarily." Now did you know of that when you produced FFF11? That was on the 8th of March 2013. MR DE ROVER: Yes. MR BUDLENDER SC: Had you seen the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	from an SAPS perspective. I think you'll remember that. I think quite a few of us asked him about that, including Mr Burger, and he said that the SAPS would produce a statement setting out the lessons learned from Marikana, and then on the 23rd of January – or let's go there. Could we have day 173? So that first reference was on 15 May 2013. Then if we go to day 173, page 20442, could we go to line 11? There the Chairperson says the following, "Before he
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	National Management Forum?" and your answer is, "Yes, I was aware of the recording and the minutes of the extraordinary session held on 15 August 2012, that the session endorsed the decision that the strikers be disarmed if they do not do so voluntarily." Now did you know of that when you produced FFF11? That was on the 8th of March 2013. MR DE ROVER: Yes. MR BUDLENDER SC: Had you seen the minutes by that time?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	from an SAPS perspective. I think you'll remember that. I think quite a few of us asked him about that, including Mr Burger, and he said that the SAPS would produce a statement setting out the lessons learned from Marikana, and then on the 23rd of January – or let's go there. Could we have day 173? So that first reference was on 15 May 2013. Then if we go to day 173, page 20442, could we go to line 11? There the Chairperson says the following, "Before he answers I must say Mr Semenya undertook some time ago in
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Page 36929
                                                                       ones that can produce such a document are the people that
    contact with Mr De Rover to establish the timelines for
     that report to be here." Now is it correct that you were
                                                                       were involved in that operation, and they are the ones that
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3
    requested to prepare such a report?
                                                                   3
4
            MR DE ROVER:
                                 I was never requested to
                                                                   4
5
    prepare a report. I, from when I came I think one of the
    first things that I did was talk to the National
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6
7
                                                                   7
    Commissioner and point out to her that if we just take it
                                                                   8
8
    as a sequential occurrence of circumstances that produced
                                                                   9
9
    this result, the least SAPS should try to do is alter
    enough in its methods of operations to stop a similar
                                                                  10
10
    occurrence from simply happening again, because while we
                                                                  11
11
                                                                  12
12
    are trying to establish what went wrong, how it went wrong
                                                                       question.
13
    and why, it's important to recognise that if outside world
                                                                  13
                                                                  14
14
    stays exactly as it is, such things can simply produce
    again, and that is a big concern. So I've pushed them on
                                                                  15
15
16
    that. My personal -
17
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                       No -
                                                                  17
18
           MR DE ROVER:
                                  Let me maybe complete the
                                                                  18
19
    answer.
                                                                  19
20
           MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                       Please.
                                                                  20
21
                                                                  21
           MR DE ROVER:
                                 I was never asked to
                                                                  22
22
    prepare the report on lessons learned. I approached
23
                                                                  23
    lessons learned. I get, and that is my reading of the
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should be doing it. MR BUDLENDER SC: Well, indeed. I'd respectfully agree. It doesn't help for you to tell them the lessons they learned -MR DE ROVER: No. MR BUDLENDER SC: They must decide what lessons they learned. MR DE ROVER: Ja. MR BUDLENDER SC: That would have been my MR DE ROVER: Yes. MR BUDLENDER SC: But my point is that Mr Semenya was told, I'm sure he was told that you were preparing a report in that regard and that they'd been in contact with you; what he was told was not correct. MR DE ROVER: I think what he was told was incomplete. MR BUDLENDER SC: Not just incomplete, it's not correct. You weren't preparing a report on lessons learned. MR DE ROVER: No, okay, if you want to 24 read it in the strict sense that I was apparently the one who was writing the report, that is wrong. That is not

Page 36930 1 rather than saying I have an experience and I learn from 2 that experience, and whether that was a good experience or 3 a bad experience I seek to further the learning 4 organisation model and I seek to improve my professional 5 practices, and I think there has been a genuine reticence 6 on that perception of lesson learned equals mistake made, 7 for them to be as forthcoming as you would have wanted them to be. 8 9 MR BUDLENDER SC: Could we just go back to the previous page? 20442, down to line 21. Let's just 10 10 read again, or line 20. Let's just read again, line 19 the 11 11 12 Chairperson says, "He said they were aware of that and they 13 were preparing a document. Perhaps before the Brigadier 13 14 answers we can ask Mr Semenya what progress he can report 14 15 in regard to that document," and Mr Semenya says, "Chair, I 15 16 have also made enquiries yesterday with client and I am 16 17 told Mr De Rover is working on it." What your evidence 17 18 means is that what Mr Semenya was told was not correct 18 19 because you were not working on the report because you'd 20 never been asked to produce such a report. 20 21 MR DE ROVER: What I'm saying to you is I 21 was never asked to write the physical report. I engaged at 22 several moments in time, including before and following 23 24 this intervention, because I remember it, with the SAPS 24

members concerned, but you will appreciate that the only

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responses I got in meetings where I tried to push this

point. They equate lessons learned with mistakes made,

Page 36932 correct, yes. COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Mr De Rover, did you suggest that such a report be compiled? MR DE ROVER: I, from the very early days, and that's why I'm saying to you in many of the meetings where I sat, and I've never voiced it back to them to check whether what I sensed was true, but I felt there was that equation of a lesson learned is a mistake made and not a more positive approach that when you conduct any operation of any kind, whether successful or not, you try and draw from that operation the positive and negative points that facilitate the learning organisation experience so that you retain that what was good and that you seek to remedy that what went wrong. COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: If you've already might have been learned, it's still open for such a

suggested or pointed out some of the lessons you think that document to be drawn up without too much trouble, isn't it? MR DE ROVER: I'm aware that a draft document exists and is in circulation for commentary. So I don't know at what stage that will be put forward to you. MR BUDLENDER SC: If I may say, if ever. CHAIRPERSON: Were you contacted in January of this year to establish the timelines for the report in relation to the lessons learned? Were you

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yet.

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Page 36933
                                                                                                                            Page 36935
     contacted – or let me ask the question with more precision.
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                      [Microphone off, inaudible]
                                                                     1
 2
     Were you contacted in January this year by people from the
                                                                     2
                                                                         talk of last night it's being finalised, is that - that was
 3
     SAPS to establish the timelines for the report in relation
                                                                     3
                                                                         something I remember having been told. I don't know who
 4
     to the lessons learned?
                                                                         told me.
                                                                     5
 5
            MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                  Lwas contacted - Lwould
                                                                                                           Not I, Chair.
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
     have to check whether that was in January - and I've pushed
                                                                     6
                                                                                                      Mr Semenya, can you throw
 6
                                                                     7
 7
     the organisation into this introspection exercise that they
                                                                         any light on this point?
                                                                     8
 8
     needed to conduct, and I know that sessions have been held
                                                                                MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                                                         As the witness indicates,
 9
                                                                     9
     in Potchefstroom, that different actors have been brought
                                                                         Chair, we have seen a document that's a draft and in
     together and that in, on the basis of these meetings a
                                                                    10
10
                                                                         looking at the document as a legal team our impression was
                                                                    11
11
     document has been produced.
                                                                         that it is not addressing the issues the Commission is
12
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                  You see, my question was
                                                                    12
                                                                         looking for and the National Commissioner in the meeting
13
     whether you were contacted in order to establish the
                                                                    13
                                                                         that I was part of very recently instructed that that
14
     timelines for such a report.
                                                                    14
                                                                         document be produced by the Friday of last week. I have
15
            MR DE ROVER:
                                  No, because I think SAPS
                                                                    15
                                                                         seen what has come out of that and I still think there are
16
     has throughout also in its dealings with me very much
                                                                         elements of it which require amplification, otherwise it
                                                                    17
17
     stayed master of its own time and calendar.
                                                                         will be a document for document sake.
18
            COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ:
                                             Is it envisaged
                                                                    18
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                      Thank you. Am I correct in
19
     that when that draft document is, that that draft document
                                                                    19
                                                                         thinking there was mention, I think outside the chamber now
20
     will at some stage be discussed with you?
                                                                    20
                                                                         that you've put it the way you have, that mention was made
21
            MR DE ROVER:
                                                                    21
                                                                         of last night, some finalisation of the document last
                                  I've seen the draft
                                                                    22
22
     document and I would hope that they would want to discuss
                                                                         night? That's what I was told by somebody.
23
     it because I've got questions, plenty. So, and I'd hope
                                                                    23
                                                                                MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                                                        I'm hearing it from you,
                                                                    24
     that this document would be also made available to the
24
                                                                         Chair, for the first time. No, I'm not aware.
25
                                                                    25
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
     Commission because I think it would help and at, it would
                                                                                                      Alright. Anyway, I don't
                                                       Page 36934
                                                                                                                            Page 36936
     help the recommendations of this Commission.
 1
                                                                         propose making myself a witness in this matter, otherwise
 2
            COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ:
                                             And do you think
                                                                         Mr Mpofu may wish to cross-examine me and others may wish
 3
     the draft document is almost complete and in a form that
                                                                         to as well. Anyway, let's not go there now. What you're
 4
     can be received by us?
                                                                         telling us, you saw a draft, you weren't entirely happy
                                                                     5
 5
            MR DE ROVER:
                                  Yes, but like I said, I
                                                                         with it. It wasn't adequate. Is that right?
    would still have questions that the range of topics, my
                                                                     6
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     The document isn't dated.
 6
                                                                     7
                                                                         It doesn't identify authors. It doesn't set terms of
 7
     main question at this stage that I haven't had a chance to
                                                                     8
                                                                         reference and it doesn't clarify the methodology. So I can
8
     give back is to terms of reference and methodology.
 9
                                                                     9
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                       I said I'm moving off
                                                                         go on, but it covers some of the issues that interest this
     this point, Chair, unless there's something -
                                                                    10
                                                                         Commission, and if I just take my interest as a
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            CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                    11
                                                                         professional in this field, it doesn't cover many of the
11
                                  I must confess my amazement
12
     at this stage - perhaps that's the wrong word. We've been
                                                                    12
                                                                         issues that would interest me as a policing professional.
                                                                    13
13
     asking for these lessons for a long time. It was reported
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     What I have said in the
     to us, I can't remember whether it was reported to us in
                                                                    14
14
                                                                         past, this was a matter of concern when we asked previously
15
                                                                    15
                                                                         what have you learned, what changes have you made, we were
     the chamber or outside the chamber, that an undertaking had
    been given by the police, the legal representatives, that
                                                                    16
                                                                         told we're waiting for the Commission. Well that was
17
     we were going to get, the lessons document was on the point
                                                                    17
                                                                         perhaps, I'm not sure it was entirely so but it was perhaps
18
     of production. I seem to remember being told it was going
                                                                         an acceptable stance when this Commission was supposed to
19
     to be finalised last night because I expected to see it
                                                                    19
                                                                         finish its work after four months, but the complexity of
     this morning. Is my impression incorrect? Was such an
                                                                    20
                                                                         the issues that arose were such that it is clear we had to
21
     undertaking given to us?
                                                                    21
                                                                         get a number of extensions and so again I raised the matter
22
            MR BUDLENDER SC:
                                       Chair, my colleagues
                                                                         and said you can't wait until our report comes out because
    and I have had various discussions. It's been promised
                                                                    23
                                                                         a lot of things may happen before then.
24 imminently on a number of occasions, but we haven't seen it
                                                                    24
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
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25

And yes, it was agreed

CHAIRPERSON:

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Page 36937 we're working on it, but do I now understand that they 2 still haven't produced the document of lessons, or agreed 3 on it, you know, working on it? So if there's a problem of 4 the Marikana kind somewhere else tomorrow they still won't 5 be ready to implement such lessons as they've learned from 6 what happened at Marikana. That seems to be implicit in 7 what's been said. Am I right? 8 MR DE ROVER: Ja, I would agree that 9 however outlandish some of the facts that appear related in 10 what transpired and produced at Marikana, they managed to get into a sequence and produce that result. Now if you as 11 12 an organisation don't recognise that you can't suffice with 13 setting out the responsibilities of others, you also have 14 to look at your own organisation, so SAPS as an organisation needs to recognise where it fell short of 15 16 expectations that South African society can hold, and you 17 need to act on those, and whether that is because people 18 that are in charge are not subject matter specialist or 19 expert enough to recognise that, I don't know. It's, but 20 the reality remains that some of these discussions that I 21 have had on a personal level, they are difficult. They 22 frustrate because it's, I almost feel there is a 23 miscommunication, a misunderstanding of the purpose that 24 such a document would serve, and that produces a hurdle 25 that I haven't been able to get across.

vou want. 2 MR BUDLENDER SC: No. I understand. I don't want you - I'm not going to scene 2. I just want to understand whether you've attempted to undertake a similar analysis in respect of scene 1. 6 MR DE ROVER: Yes, but I've not, like 7 with some of the other aspects, I'm fully aware that you 8 looking at me, you look at an expert for the SAPS. I want 9 to stress that although SAPS have engaged me, I don't work 10 for SAPS. I'm not a fall guy or somebody who can be plied 11 to organisational need or requirement and it commences with 12 reiterating, I wasn't at Marikana when Marikana happened. 13 I have a reputation and experience that are based on professionalism and integrity. I can't lower my standards to suit anybody's narrative, and that includes SAPS 16 narrative. 17 MR BUDLENDER SC: Let me cut to the chase, Mr De Rover. I just want to ask you a question 19 about scene 1. One of the people who were killed at scene 20 1 was a Mr Thembinkosi Gwelani. Have you ever heard of 21 him? 22 MR DE ROVER: Is he the man who can be 23 seen moving and trying to get up in the -24 MR BUDLENDER SC: No. No, he's not seen in any of the videos -

Page 36938 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I'm sorry, Mr 1 Budlender, for taking up so much of your time. 2 3 MR BUDLENDER SC: There is one brief last 4 matter which I omitted. Mr De Rover, you've done a fairly 5 detailed analysis of the shootings at scene 2 where the different bodies were found and trying to explain how this 6 7 happened. That's in your report. 8 MR DE ROVER: Yes. 9 MR BUDLENDER SC: Have you done a similar 10 exercise in relation to scene 1? 11 MR DE ROVER: I think scene 1 throws up, 12 I think you have plenty sources that allow you to analyse 13 what happened there and I can throw in my five cents worth 14 but I, on the facts of what transpired there I can give you 15 the opinions that I hold, but with scene 2 that is 16 different. You have very little auditable and independent 17 evidence. Now I'm not purporting that what I have set out 18 is then factually correct because the thing is that I wasn't there, and people have rightfully pointed that out and that's correct. SAHRC have pointed that out, LRC have 21 pointed that out. What I've tried to do is on the basis of 22 having spoken to the people that were there, and if you 23 will then looking through their eyes, give you a sequential 24 blow-by-blow account of what happened there, and I've tried

Page 36940 1 MR DE ROVER: Then I don't know. MR BUDLENDER SC: Okay. Well, exhibit B which you have shows where he was when he was shot and 4 killed. Could you just, you've got exhibit B. Could you go to the last -6 MR DE ROVER: Sorry, it's -7 MR BUDLENDER SC: Exhibit B. You've got pages 16 to 18, I hope, in your bundle, and could we go to 9 the last page, page 18, which is an aerial photograph. 10 Right, do you have that? Now you'll see that scene 1 is 11 marked and then there's a marking of P. Do you see that? 12 MR DE ROVER: Yes 13 MR BUDLENDER SC: That's Mr Gwelani and 14 the evidence is that he was killed by a gunshot wound to 15 the head. 16 MR DE ROVER: Ja. 17 MR BUDLENDER SC: And you can take it 18 from me, P, that place where P is, is approximately 250 19 metres -20 MR DE ROVER: From scene 1? 21 MR BUDLENDER SC: From scene 1. Now can you think of any basis on which it might be found that the 23 shooting and killing of Mr Gwelani was justified? 24 MR DE ROVER: No, I – you know, I would hold to you - and I've expressed myself on the use of R5

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25 to do it dispassionately, not to give a value judgment, if

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rifles in crowd control - that that rifle has a horizontal

- carriage that probably exceeds 600 metres easily. So you 2
- 3 fire that round, you aim it at someone who might be five
- 4 metres away from you, you miss and it's on a horizontal
- 5 plain. You have to in your judgment account for another at
- least 595 metres of running distance. 6
- 7 MR BUDLENDER SC: So he's an innocent
- victim? 8
- 9 MR DE ROVER: And you end up hitting an
- innocent victim, yes. 10
- MR BUDLENDER SC: 11 Yes.
- 12 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Budlender, am I correct
- 13 in thinking if one looks at page 16 of your bundle, that's 14 the sketch plan, exhibit B, there is, on the more or less
- extreme right of the plan there's a circle with, is that a 15
- P -16
- 17 MR BUDLENDER SC: That is, that should be
- 18 a P -
- 19 CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't look like a P,
- 20 but it is a P?
- 21 MR BUDLENDER SC: It looks more like a B.
- 22 but it's actually P.
- 23 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and there's an arrow
- 24 going down and then there's a measurement 280 metres.
- 25 That's where Mr Gwelani was.

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- it, to me it looks that a bullet travelled that distance
- 2 and hit an innocent victim. I can entertain other
- 3 possibilities, but generally the one that appears the most
- 4 logical is likely to be true. The problem remains that
- 5 you'd have to go back to the actual person who fired that
- 6 shot and establish whether or not they were justified in
- 7 firing that shot because you factor in that your shot may
- 8 miss. But at that point where the shooter is, can he
- 9 actually see that person and take sufficient note of the
- 10 risk -
- 11 [10:49] CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, I understand.
- 12 MR DE ROVER: - that it poses if you pull
- 13 the trigger.
- 14 CHAIRPERSON: I understood you to imply -15 I don't know whether you said it directly. I understood
- you to imply, and I'd be interested in your views on the 16
- 17 matter if I'm wrongly thinking this was the implication of
- 18 what you said, that you do not regard the use of TR rifles
- 19 with this problem that you've mentioned, or this quality
- 20 that you've mentioned, as suitable for use in Public Order
- 21 Policing. Would that be a fair inference of what you say?
- 22 MR DE ROVER: That was I think one of the
- 23 first, after being here, one of the first recommendations I
- 24 made to the National Commissioner to withdraw R5 rifles 25
 - from POP and to not permit them to be used in crowd

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- 1 MR BUDLENDER SC: That's where Mr Gwelani
- 2 was found dead with a gunshot wound to the head.
- 3 CHAIRPERSON: And does the PM report
- 4 indicate that he died instantaneously?
- 5 MR BUDI ENDER SC: Yes, Chair.
- CHAIRPERSON: 6 I see.
- 7 But Chair, I think also MR SEMENYA SC:
- 8 the witness for fairness must also be told we have evidence 9
- of injured people that were carried.
- 10 MR CHASKALSON SC: Chair, we have
- photographic evidence of Mr Gwelani's body in that position 11
- 12 2 minutes and 33 seconds after the shooting at scene 1. I
- 13 don't think it can seriously be contended that someone shot
- 14 in the vicinity of scene 1 would have been carried to that
- 15 position within 2 minutes and 33 seconds of the first shots
- 16 at scene 1. That evidence I can refer to it. It is
- 17 Colonel Botha's KKK16.5108, you'll see Mr Gwelani's body in
- 18 the position where it was ultimately found.
- 19 CHAIRPERSON: The witness now I think has
- all the facts that he needs and I think you've expressed
- 21 your views on the matter, he's an innocent victim.
- 22 MR DE ROVER: I think that -

- CHAIRPERSON: I say you've expressed your 23
- views. 24
 - MR DE ROVER:
- My view is I concur that

- Page 36944 control, and there is ample literature available on the use
- of military weapons in law enforcement context, and
- particularly there are rules of International Law that talk
- about the use of assault rifles in a law enforcement
- 5 context and generally stating that it should be
- 6 discouraged, like you can't say prohibit it, but at least
- 7 in understanding the risks these weapons pose, and I'll be
- more specific that a 556-round fired at close range is
- virtually and per definition a kill shot. It doesn't even
- 10 matter where on the body you hit because if you strike, the
- problem is with the fact that the bullet on impact 11
- 12 disintegrates because of the high kinetic energy it
- 13 carries. It's designed actually for the battlefield where
- 14 the confrontation per definition happens at a larger
- 15 distance and you want to be able to engage targets from 300
- 16 metres out to 600 metres, and then after 100 metres there
- 17 is a slight deformation and after 200 that bullet stays
- with the shape it has and it produces a minimal wound
- 19 cavity. But at close range that bullet shatters on impact
- and it produces horrific wounds. If you get hit on the arm
- 21 you're likely losing that arm. If you get hit centre body
- mass you get a wound cavity from what I understand to be 20
- 23 centimetres across. So your chances of surviving that are
- 24 minimal.
- 25 CHAIRPERSON: And the ballistic evidence

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                                                                                                                              Page 36947
     of course then doesn't help you to say who fired the shot
                                                                          confronting that group of people and all they have is that
                                                                      2
     because the bullet is not capable of being analysed and -
                                                                          R5.
2
                                                                      3
                                                                                 CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                       Do I understand you can't
3
            MR DE ROVER:
                                   Well, it's very difficult -
4
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                   Isn't that right?
                                                                          criticise them for using the R5 because that's all they
                                                                      5
5
            MR DE ROVER:
                                   - because of the
                                                                          had?
                                                                      6
                                                                                 MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                       That's all they had, and -
     disintegration of the round to do any ballistic comparison
6
                                                                      7
                                                                                 CHAIRPERSON:
7
     to between bullet and rifle. So even if you have the
                                                                                                       There is evidence of course
     cartridge it would still be hard to establish a match
                                                                      8
                                                                          that the POP people, out of every eight POP people one
8
9
                                                                      9
     between that cartridge and a bullet that you have found in
                                                                          apparently according to the evidence has also had an R5.
     a particular location.
                                                                      10
                                                                          So there you even have according to the evidence POP
10
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                      11
                                                                          members, not all of them, one-eighth of them using R5s as
11
                                   Mr Budlender, do I sense
                                                                          well. I take it you'll also feel that should be stopped
12
     that you want to leave? Adv Hemraj wants to ask a question
                                                                      12
                                                                      13
                                                                          immediately?
13
     and so do I, but if you can give us a couple of minutes
                                                                      14
14
     before you go.
                                                                                 MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                       It, I could interpret that
                                                                      15
15
            COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ:
                                                                          at least as having it as a support weapon. I've worked
                                              Mr De Rover, I know
                                                                          SWAT - we would have one member of our group with a heavier
16
     you said that you've recommended that POPS no longer use
                                                                          calibre as a support weapon, not saying that that means
17
     the R5s, but at scene 1 the R5s were fired by the TRT.
18
            MR DE ROVER:
                                   Yes.
                                                                          you're going to use it, but it's a redundancy, if you want,
19
            COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ:
                                              Not the POPS.
                                                                      19
                                                                          that should things go really bad you can answer, but the
20
            MR DE ROVER:
                                   Well, it's my, my claim on
                                                                          problem with bringing TRT into that equation is that, the
21
     the use of the R5 goes to its use and employment in public
                                                                          question for me that it turns on is was it reasonably
                                                                      21
     order management, and to me that's secondary to the unit
                                                                      22
22
                                                                          foreseeable that they would be forced in that position and
23
     that you bring into public order management. I think that
                                                                      23
                                                                          did they contemplate that that could occur, and if you have
24
     if you take your legal requirements to apply potentially
                                                                      24
                                                                          it occurring, the thing is that it then almost follows; you
25
     lethal force, the least I would like to say is that on the
                                                                          put them in that position, all they carry is that R5, so
                                                         Page 36946
                                                                                                                              Page 36948
     array of firearms that you would have available to inflict
                                                                      1
                                                                          then it ends up being used.
1
2
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potential lethal force the R5 is guaranteed deadly. So if 3 you can differentiate again in applying potentially lethal 4 force, you should put the R5 at the end of the spectrum 5 that you would like to employ and maybe start with a 9mil, and I'm not saying that a 9mil can't kill you, but I am 6 7 saying that a 9mil shot with a solid metal jacket fired at 8 centre body mass, I'd prefer my chances that I would 9 survive that as compared to being hit with an R5 because I 10 think that in 99 of 100 cases you are going to die before medical assistance can be given, and even if medical 11 12 assistance is present the catastrophic damage to internal 13 organs are making your chances of survival very slim indeed. 14 15 **COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ:** Does that mean, Mr De Rover, that you criticise putting the TRT with R5s 17 immediately behind the POPS in the operation? 18 MR DE ROVER: Well, you see how - that's 19 why I call it unravelling systems and I hope to get a moment to put that into context, not as an excuse but as an 21 explanation that needs to lead to recommendations on your

part. The TRT were never meant to engage in the way they

did. That much is clear from SAPS' spoken intentions and

24 whatever you think of their written intentions in the plan.

25 What you get is that where they were they end up

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22

2 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand. 3 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: But they do have side arms though. They do have 9millimetres as well. 5 MR DE ROVER: Ja, but the - I think if, especially if they feel threatened, if I'm carrying my 6 7 rifle in both hands, I might have a side arm but it would 8 require me to either drop that on the sling and go for my 9mil, but if you feel an imminent threat to life you bring 10 that rifle to bear because that is what your two hands are 11 on. 12 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr 13 Budlender, I gather you have to leave at 11 o'clock. Is 14 that correct? 15 MR BUDLENDER SC: [Microphone off, 16 inaudible] 17 CHAIRPERSON: Alright, I think we'll take 18 the tea adjournment at this stage. 19 [COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES] [11:20] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. You're still under oath Mr De Rover. Before the next cross-examination begins I'd like to ask you a question. 23 Did you tell the National Commissioner that you thought R5s shouldn't be used in public order policing? 24 25 MR DE ROVER: After the 28th February and

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                                                                        permitted to utilise the videos during the cross-
     before the 8th of March 2013.
 1
2
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                    2
                                  2013 or '14?
3
           MR DE ROVER:
                                 '13. So in the first week
                                                                    3
4
    of me being here.
                                                                    4
5
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                  Yes I see. Thank you. Mr
                                                                    5
                                                                    6
    Semenya is not here, but Ms Baloyi would you, I don't
6
7
                                                                    7
    expect you to give me the answer now, but can you tell me,
                                                                    8
8
    at some stage, whether the police have withdrawn R5s for
9
                                                                    9
    public order policing not only, as the witness said, it's
10
    not a question of which unit used it but the exercise that
                                                                   10
    it should not be used? Will you ascertain and inform the
                                                                   11
11
                                                                   12
12
    Commission whether that advise that the witness gave the
                                                                   13
13
    National Commissioner has been accepted and implemented?
14
    And if so the details of such implementation.
                                                                   14
15
           MS BALOYI:
                              I will do so, Chairperson.
                                                                   15
16
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                  Thank you. Who's going to
                                                                   16
17
    cross-examine next, is it Ms Le Roux?
                                                                   17
18
           MS LE ROUX:
                                The Human Rights Commission,
                                                                   18
19
    Chair, yes.
                                                                   19
20
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                  So you're going to cross-
                                                                   20
21
    examine on behalf of the Human Rights Commission.
                                                                   21
22
           MS LE ROUX:
                                Correct, Chair. Chair, in
                                                                   22
23
    the interests of saving time, my attorney I believe has
                                                                   23
    handed to you an index of the new exhibits that we intend
                                                                   24
24
25
    to use in the cross-examination and we've taken the liberty
                                                       Page 36950
    of pre-marking those in the UUUU series that Mr Budlender
    referred to in his cross-examination.
                                                                    2
2
3
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                  Correct.
                                                                    3
4
           MS LE ROUX:
                               But, Chair, there is further
                                                                    4
5
    housekeeping point that we do need to address at the start
                                                                    5
                                                                    6
6
    of the examination which is as you know there are a series
7
                                                                    7
    of videos that have been prepared by video experts, engaged
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examination with the objection noted and obviously we will then engage through the evidence leaders with the SAPS to resolve any particular objections if they are to the annotations on the videos. The five examples -CHAIRPERSON: How do you do that? I was originally under the impression that the narration was only part of the sound track, so you could simply show the videos without that part of the sound track, but I understand that's not correct. There are actually subtitles or super titles, I don't know what the correct word is, on the screen itself. Is that correct -MS LE ROUX: Yes, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: - to which objection has been taken? MS LE ROUX: We'll we're not sure exactly which annotations are the subject of the objections, there seem to be a handful of - there are five items identified in the affidavit. The majority of those though are not relevant because they address apparent inconsistencies with the GW6 series as well as the Catherine Scott expert evidence. Those are easily disposed of because, Chair, those were prepared when we didn't have the Al Jazeera footage, we didn't have all the SABC footage. So this obviously supersedes that analysis, any revisions to those Page 36952 documents will be made. But the point here, Chair -CHAIRPERSON: Let me not interrupt you, but can I just put this to you? I understand the objection has been taken by the police, so let's hear what Mr Semenya

by the South African Human Rights Commission as well as with CALS in collaboration with SERI for the families. Those videos I intend to use during my cross-examination. I understand that has been referred to as the commentary meaning the annotations that appear in those videos are subject to objection and some dispute by the SAPS -I take it you saw the affidavit that we were presented with this morning -- made by Johan Lubbe -Yes, Chair, we have seen which was prepared MS LE ROUX: Yes. Chair, we've seen that. In the interests of time obviously I'm happy to address you on the details of all of those, but in the interests of time we would like to propose that we be

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has to say. Are you suggesting, however, that I should allow you to show the video with the commentary and the narration and so forth even though it contains things to which the police take objection, if that's what you're suggesting then I think we should hear Mr Semenya. Mr Semenya. Then you can obviously reply to him when he's finished. Mr Semenya. MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, perhaps if I describe the nature of the objection we have, principally we say commentary like ballistic opinions offered by a nonexpert is obviously objectionable. If what he says is something that we all can see he doesn't have to say it. If some of his expertise is to make those visuals better readable then of course we welcome that area of his expertise. But there is commentary there which is - which facts are in contestation and that's the nature of the objection we have to the material. MR CHASKALSON SC: Chair, I wonder if I can give the evidence leaders' position on this because -CHAIRPERSON: Can we finish hearing what Mr Semenya says first before you give us your position?

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CHAIRPERSON:

MS LE ROUX:

MS LE ROUX:

CHAIRPERSON:

CHAIRPERSON:

obviously on behalf of the police.

Yes, Chair.

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23

that.

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Page 36953

Yes, Mr Semenya, are you finished.

MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, I'm finished.

3 CHAIRPERSON: Oh you have. I'm sorry, Mr

4 Chaskalson, please proceed.

5 MR CHASKALSON SC: Lunderstand that

there is a dispute from SAPS as to some aspects of the 6

7 annotations on the videos, our concern is what is best for

8 the Commission and will this video evidence assist the

9 Commission to answer the questions that it has to answer.

That's the question that's posed. Then the answer is a 10

11 resounding yes, we regard this exhibit as one of the most

12 important pieces of real evidence that this Commission is

13 likely to see. What it does is it strings together the

14 video streams from various different sources so that one

15 gets a composite picture of scene 1. There are annotations

which point you to particular things. I would imagine that 16

90% of those annotations are utterly uncontroversial, there 17

18 may be 10% which are. The SAPS are always at liberty to

19 identify that which they dispute and they can table their

20 objections and I would suggest that for today's purposes Ms

21 Le Roux doesn't refer to annotations in cross-examination

22 that are potentially in dispute. If she wants to point

23 something out on the video to a witness she can use a

pointer and point to it. If it happens to coincide with 24

25 what an annotation says well then one can assess what Ms Le

agreed and what is not agreed. That process started on the

2

4th of December last year. On the 6th of January this year

we received a document from SAPS which was expressed

labelled Die Voorlopige Verslag which identified a handful, 5

maybe five or six problems with GW6A, nothing else in GW6.

6 We've been addressing letters to SAPS on a regular basis

7 since January this year saying please tell us what your

8 disputes are so we can try to resolve them. And we've

9 received nothing back from SAPS. Now it raises a real

10 difficulty because what you have is a position and I can

11 see it from Mr Lubbe's affidavit in relation to this video.

12 You identify a very narrow range of disputes, most of which

13 will probably be conceded by CALS and the SAHRC. And then

14 on the basis of that you say well let's eliminate the whole

thing. And in the process the Commission is really

prejudiced of getting to the truth because what is thrown

17 out and what is a whole lot of material which is of

extremely valuable or high probate of value addressing

19 crucial facts for this Commission and not placed in dispute

20 by SAPS. And with respect, Mr Chairperson, if SAPS has a

21 problem with this video it should be asked to identify the

22 particular passages in the annotation with which it takes

23 issue. When it's done so we can have the fight over that.

24 For present purposes the video should be shown, Ms Le Roux

can – the SAPS's right can be reserved in relation to that.

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1 Roux says rather than the annotation. My concern is

twofold, the first is that a very valuable piece of 2

3 evidence the admissibility of which should really not be an

4 issue, it should be a question of weight to be given to

5 annotation.

7

10

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14

15

6 CHAIRPERSON: I don't understand Mr

Semenya's objection to being against the video as such and

I understand it's a useful compilation of various videos 8

9 that we've seen putting things together on the same

timeline and so on. I don't understand the objection being

11 that, the objection is to commentary and in fact even parts

12 of the commentary.

> MR CHASKALSON SC: But, Chair, can I

finish because I do have a very serious concern to raise in

relation to SAPS in this regard which is that the genesis

of these videos as I understand it is they grow out of the 16

17 annexures to Mr White's statement, the GW6 annexures. And

18 they are a video graphic representation of what one sees in

19 GW6. Now when GW6 was first exhibited SAPS complained that

they did not accept it and that it was inappropriate for it

21 to be exhibited through that means. We then started a

process, we said right let's resolve this. Let's get you

to identify the disputes that you have with GW6 and come

24 back to us, we'll try and resolve them. If we can't then

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we will have narrowed those disputes and we know what is

Nobody is prejudiced by showing the video, the Commission

2 is ultimately going to prejudiced dramatically if the video

3 is not shown.

4

8

MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, as you correctly

5 pointed out, there's no objection in us looking at the 6

video. There is commentary in it, even if it is to one 7

person that it is objectionable we're entitled to raise

that objection.

9 CHAIRPERSON: Have you identified all the

10 parts of the commentaries to which you object? Because if

you have you can signal that, I'm not quite sure whether 11

12 it's possible for that commentary to be excised from what

13 we see before we see it. But the first question is have 14

you indicated what precisely the points in the commentary 15 are to which you object? That statement of Mr Lubbe that I

16 read talks about some points, I think he raised half a

17 dozen or so, but this was only some, it didn't purport to

18 be a comprehensive and complete list. Now have you got

19 such a thing?

20 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, I may produce it 21 in due course, but I can indicate even now if I understand what the narrative is to that documentary it now even says

23 what we say was eight seconds of shooting in scene 1, is

24 now 12 seconds. And I don't know whether I'm able to

accept that narrative like that from some cinematographer

4

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and that's one of the illustrations that we have 2 difficulties with.

3 CHAIRPERSON: Is it not possible for you 4 to commence your cross-examination, I take it you've got a 5 lot of other cross-examination material, to have a session with the police perhaps during the lunch hour or whatever 6

7 to identify the bits to which they have specific objection?

8 I don't think we should much time on it further at this

9 stage, rather spend non-sitting time on it outside the

chamber you people have. You know if an affidavit is put 10

up one knock out the whole affidavit simply because one 11

12 paragraph is not appropriate. That paragraph can be struck

13 out. But the way we're doing it at the moment, it's

14 obviously important we should see the actual videos

themselves, even possibly without commentary, the trouble 15

16 is I understand the commentary is not just part of

17 soundtrack, it's on the screen as well. So is there a

18 solution that you can suggest whereby we can deal with the

19 problem, but not waste any further time and you can cross-

20 examine the witness on other matters in the meanwhile? I

21 would imagine there must quite a number of other matter.

22 I'm not wishing to minimise the importance of the video, it

23 sounds a very important thing, but are there not other

24 matters you can deal with in the meanwhile?

25

1

MS LE ROUX: Unfortunately not, Chair. Page 36959

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that we planned to. And then we will certainly engage in 2 that process to try to narrow the questions of dispute.

So to go back to the five examples listed in Mr Lubbe's affidavit two of those refer to inconsistencies with earlier documents that didn't rely on the same

6 universe of information. Those are easily dealt with. One 7 refers to a conclusion reached on the video that seems to

8 be an absolute explanation to that part of the video, it

9 relates to the flight of rubber bullets and rubber balls.

10 We're told by Mr Lubbe that in fact that's the plastic wad,

11 the jacket on the ammunition. That may well be the

12 complete answer to that part of the video, we would then

13 obviously accept that explanation and that would be that

14 revision. The one refers to - the first example refers to

15 the description of the direction in which the strikers are

16 moving. That's an easy revision and the final one relates

17 to the animation that is being done that shows the Nyalas

18 and the movement of the lead group. It notes at one point,

19 at 15 seconds into the video that it claims the lead group 20 position is wrong but by 50 seconds into the video they

21 accept that it's now correct. These are the minor

22 revisions that would be required on what we now understand

23 to be the areas in dispute. I should also then just place

24 on the record that our own review of the videos have

highlighted two points of errata. We've engaged with our

Page 36958

So the proposal I make is that we will certainly engage,

2 through the evidence leaders with the SAPS on the specific

3 annotations that they have objections to. The one Mr

4 Semenya just mentioned has never been raised with us before

5 this. The overwhelming majority of the annotations are

6 simply things like Nyala 4 reaches the kraal or this is the

7 single pylon, so I'm sure the overwhelming majority of the

8 annotations are there to assist the Commission. And Chair,

9 I must pause there because at great expense this exercise

has been undertaken because we've had repeated requests 10

11 from the Commission, Commissioner Hemraj in particular

12 suggesting a chronology that compilates all of the

13 available footage. Mr De Rover talks about the use of

14 independent, auditable, objective evidence. That is what

15 this does. For any handful of guibbles that we may have on

annotations we'll deal with those in due course and not 16

17 take up any more time in the Commission process today. So

18 my proposal remains, we note the objection, we'll undertake

19 a process that may result in concessions or revisions or

something that will provided to the Commission once that

21 process is completed and subject to those qualification the

22 videos can then be used in closing arguments and if the

Commission finds them helpful refer to in the report. But

24 for today's purposes we just note that these are subject to

25 a process, but that we are permitted to use them as a way

colleagues from SERIs who've collaborated with us on this,

perhaps they also need to have an opportunity to address

3 you on this. There are two minor errata points we've

4 picked up already from that which is in exhibit V2 which is

a video which shows the movement of the strikers. 22

6 seconds into that video it refers to the strikers visible

7 walking off the koppie toward Nkaneng, that needs to be

8 revised to say towards the west. At three other

9 annotations 20:21, 21:45 and 22:11 it speaks about the

10 north-western edge of the kraal, that needs to be the

11 northern edge of the kraal. This is the extent of the

12 revisions that need to be made and therefore in light of

13 that and with the undertaking that we'll deal with any

14 specific annotations that cause the SAPS some concern if we

15 could be permitted to use the videos today as we had

16 planned in order to assist the Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Bizos your

18 light's on at the moment. 19 MR BIZOS SC:

Mr Chairman, we want to make a submission in relation to the objection raised by

21 SAPS. They themselves went to a lot of trouble to comment

on the photographs. Could I use in support of the

23 conclusion that I'm going to make, have a look at page 194

24 of exhibit L?

25 CHAIRPERSON: Slide 194?

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                                                                                                                           Page 36963
           MR BIZOS SC:
                                It's one of the examples
                                                                         This is, I wish that I had expressed it as well -
1
                                                                     2
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
2
    where the police chose to comment on the photograph and put
                                                                                                      Flattery will get you
3
    colours in and things, but may I read the printing? "In
                                                                     3
                                                                         nowhere. Mr Bizos.
4
    the following slides three separate, organised attempts
                                                                     4
                                                                                MR BIZOS SC:
                                                                                                     But that is precisely, Mr
5
    will be portrayed where protestors approached the police
                                                                         Chairman, but we are going to argue that an important
                                                                     6
                                                                         matter in relation to this witness's evidence will be was
6
    line." That's comment, I assume, Mr Chairman, that the
7
                                                                     7
    witness will have been shown exhibit L before he was asked
                                                                         he told the whole truth -
                                                                     8
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
8
    to comment in writing as to what the police case is
                                                                                                      Yes, yes, I understand.
9
                                                                     9
    exhibited in exhibit L. We didn't object to that, Mr
                                                                                MR BIZOS SC:
                                                                                                     - or was he influenced by
10
    Chairman. I don't know what influence this comment had on
                                                                    10
                                                                         the material in exhibit L and other matters, and -
11
    the conclusion that was arrived at by the witness in the
                                                                    11
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                      I understand. What you say
    witness box. But we didn't object, but now for them to say
                                                                    12
12
                                                                         is he didn't -
                                                                    13
13
    that any commentary is prejudicial to them should not be
                                                                                MR BIZOS SC:
                                                                                                     We hope to persuade the
14
    upheld. The SAPS can accept that the Commission will be
                                                                    14
                                                                         witness and the Commission that he was not told the whole
15
    able in coming to a conclusion what is evidence and what
                                                                         truth before he made that -
    may be the expression of an opinion. But these opinions in
                                                                    16
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
16
                                                                                                      What you say is though he's
    exhibit L we have now doubt were made available to the
17
                                                                    17
                                                                         endeavouring to be an impartial witness, conscious of his
18
    witness before he made a conclusion exculpating the police.
                                                                         duty to the Commission to be an impartial witness, your
19
    [11:40] It would be manifestly unfair to prevent those
                                                                    19
                                                                         contention is that because he's only heard one side and he
20
    who do not accept the police version if any portion of the
                                                                    20
                                                                         hasn't heard the other side, his evidence is defective for
21
    video was excluded.
                                                                    21
                                                                         that reason and you're trying to remedy that. That's your
22
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                    22
                                                                         point basically. Do I understand you correctly?
                                 In regard to exhibit L who
23
    was responsible for the captions? The comments that you
                                                                    23
                                                                                MR BIZOS SC:
                                                                                                     Mr Chairman, I don't
24
    refer to were contained in captions, were they not? And
                                                                    24
                                                                         understand why my learned friend Mr Semenya and his team
25
    they were contained also I suppose in things like coloured
                                                                        are so concerned that if it's pure comment, not supported
                                                       Page 36962
                                                                                                                           Page 36964
    arrows and so forth superimposed on the photographs. Who
                                                                         by the video, it will be ignored.
1
    was responsible for those things?
                                                                     2
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
2
                                                                                                      It's like Mr Visser's stuff
3
           MR BIZOS SC:
                                 Well, exhibit L was put up
                                                                        in exhibit L.
4
    by SAPS.
                                                                     4
                                                                                MR BIZOS SC:
                                                                                                     Yes.
                                                                     5
5
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                  No, the reason I ask you
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                      Yes, alright. What do you
                                                                        say about that -
    the question is that my understanding was it was
                                                                     6
6
7
                                                                     7
    Lieutenant-Colonel Scott and Colonel Visser - I think he
                                                                                MR BIZOS SC:
                                                                                                     So I urge, Mr Chairman,
8
    was a colonel, I'm not sure what his rank was. Scott did
                                                                     8
9
                                                                     9
    give evidence. Visser didn't. Now I think I'm correct in
10
    saying that most of the captions were the work of Visser.
                                                                    10
                                                                        witness as to whether he was fully briefed by truthful
11
    Am I right?
                                                                    11
                                                                         evidence at a time that he made his two statements
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12 MR CHASKALSON SC: Certainly a 13 substantial number. In the cross-examination of Colonel 14 Scott, Chairperson, there were a substantial number of issues on which he was questioned in relation to exhibit L 15 16 which he identified as not being his responsibility but 17 Colonel Visser's responsible -18 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so what you're 19 effectively saying to me, Mr Bizos, is what's sauce for the 20 goose is sauce for the gander. If the police can put up a 21 presentation which contained captions which are opinion not backed up by a witness who's able to defend them, then the 22

same should apply to the Human Rights Commission. Is that

Mr Chairman, thank you.

your submission?

MR BIZOS SC:

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that these videos should be shown. They are very important for the final decision by the witness, Mr Chairman, by the 12 exculpating the police. 13 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Yes, I 14 think I have that point. Mr Semenya, how do you deal with 15 this sauce for the goose, sauce for the gander point? 16 MR SEMENYA SC: Can I make three points, 17 Chair, very short three points. We are saying the video 18 material must be shown so that that should put that expect 19 to bed. What Mr Bizos is referring to here as exhibit L, 20 we have heard evidence of that. Whether it is accepted 21 later or not, it's a different matter. There is no intention of calling these witnesses to support that 23 narrative which they are making. That's distinctly 24 different. 25 But may we propose a solution, Chair; let them

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    show it with all that narrative that it has if you give us
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                    Good morning.
                                                                    1
     the assurance, aspects of which, which are not supportable
                                                                    2
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
2
                                                                                                   Mr De Rover, I'd like to
3
     because one does not qualify as an expert to make it, we'll
                                                                    3
                                                                        start with, in your statement FFF11, page 2, paragraph 6,
                                                                        you claim public international law of human rights and
4
     ignore them. Aspects to which are references to things
5
     that we also can be able to watch and not agree with we'd
                                                                        humanitarian law, particularly as it relates to armed
    have an opportunity to discuss or argue their weight.
                                                                    6
                                                                        forces, police and security forces, as one of your areas of
6
7
                                                                    7
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                   Alright, we'll give you the
                                                                        expertise. You've also testified this morning about the
    undertaking that you've asked for. It will apply also of
                                                                    8
8
                                                                        academic qualifications you hold relating to international
                                                                    9
9
     course to those parts of exhibit L which was the work of Mr
                                                                        law. When during the engagement with you by CALS we have
    Visser, which may also not be capable of being supported.
                                                                    10
                                                                        asked you a question - Chair, I'm going to try to move
10
     So on the sauce for the goose, sauce for the gander
                                                                    11
                                                                        through the evidence without us having to go to the
11
                                                                    12
                                                                        documents. I'll summarise them and give the references,
12
     principle it can go in, but subject to that very important
                                                                    13
                                                                        but given the time constraints I'll try to do that as soon
13
    caveat which you've expressed and the undertaking that
                                                                    14
14
    we've given you. [Microphone off, inaudible] got to move
                                                                        as we can -
                                                                    15
    from here, you're going to show the video because it will
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     The witness has been given
15
     shown behind our backs and -
                                                                    16
                                                                        notice of the documents you're going to rely on -
16
17
                                                                    17
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   He has indeed.
            MS LE ROUX:
                                 No, Chair, for two reasons;
18
    firstly because all the cabling in the room has now been
                                                                    18
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     - and has had an
19
    replaced to be high definition, so even your screen, if
                                                                    19
                                                                        opportunity to look at them.
20
     you'd like to watch the big screen you can -
                                                                    20
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   Yes.
21
                                                                   21
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     So you can summarise them.
                                   No, the problem is we sit
                                                                    22
22
     here and looking at our screen we've still got this
                                                                        The witness won't be at a disadvantage and if he feels he
23
                                                                   23
                                                                        is I'm sure he'll tell us.
     powerful light in our eyes.
                                                                   24
24
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
            MS LE ROUX:
                                 Yes. Chair, if we can -
                                                                                                   Yes. Mr De Rover, of course
25
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                        if I'm referring to a document you're not familiar with,
                                   Now maybe you can handle
                                                       Page 36966
     that sort of thing, but I'm afraid I can't. So -
1
2
            MS LE ROUX:
                                 But secondly, Chair, I'm not
3
    - the plan of my cross-examination, the videos, I don't
                                                                    3
4
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start with the videos. They came in a bit later, so -5 CHAIRPERSON: Well, when you start with the videos let me know -6 7 MS LE ROUX: Yes. 8 CHAIRPERSON: - so I can prevent myself 9 being blinded by the powerful light of your projector. 10 MS LE ROUX: Yes. And of course, Chair, 11 there's a related issue which is the videos obviously deal with scene 1 and so, and you know, there is a lot of 12 13 footage that may be upsetting, so a warning would also be 14 required -15 CHAIRPERSON: When we get there I would -16 MS LE ROUX: - for all the videos. 17 CHAIRPERSON: When we get there I'll 18 delegate to you the task I normally perform of giving a 19 warning to those who may be caused emotional stress and grieve by looking at the images that's going to be on the 20 21 screen. Will you do that for me when we get there? 22 MS LE ROUX: Yes, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LE ROUX:

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morning, Mr De Rover.

23 24

Page 36968 let me know and we can place it before you. In the May 2014 interrogatories posed to you by the Human Rights Commission you were asked whether you accept that an assessment of the lawfulness of police action that results in numerous deaths requires an assessment of the planning, briefing, deployment and command of the operation as much as a consideration of the actions of individual officers. We then noted that in this respect the South African Human Rights Commission trusts that Mr De Rover is familiar with the European Court of Human Rights case of McCann versus the United Kingdom and other similar authorities. Chair, that is page 2, paragraph 3(a) of the interrogatories. Your response to those in June of this year stated, "Jurisprudence of regional bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights may, in some limited circumstances, indirectly contribute to the emergence of

new international legal norms, although they will never on their own generate such norms. To cite judgments of the court in a way that implies a direct legal relevance to South Africa is disingenuous. As CALS must be aware, those judgments impose no legal obligations on states that are outside the European Human Rights system. The findings of the McCann case may well be of academic interest to the issues at hand, but have absolutely no legal relevance to

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MS LE ROUX:

summary of -

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Page 36969 the Commission and its work." You recall that response? 1 2 MR DE ROVER: 3 MS LE ROUX: Now what I'd like to do is 4 move away from the question of the relevance of the McCann 5 judgment to South African law, because obviously we accept it's not a binding precedent. I'd like to ask you whether 6 7 you are familiar with the principle in international law of prevention or precaution. Are you familiar with that 8 9 principle? 10 MR DE ROVER: In what context? MS LE ROUX: In the context of the use of 11 12 force. 13 MR DE ROVER: Yes. 14 MS LE ROUX: And Chair, if go to what's been marked BBBB8, because it was referred to by the SAPS 15 16 in their cross-examination of Mr White, page 93 of your 17 bundle, that is the UN special rapporteurs report which 18 notes that its intention is to discuss the protection of 19 the right to life during law enforcement, making a case for 20 the need for a concerted effort to bring domestic laws on 21 the use of especially lethal force by the police in line 22 with international standards. 23 CHAIRPERSON: [Microphone off, inaudible]

to trigger an explosion did not violate the right to life, but the lack of control and organisation of the operation as a whole did violate that right." 4 Now you'll agree with of course that what the UN special rapporteur is doing here is setting out principles 6 of international application. They're not parochial or regional. It's an international principle identified. 8 Sorry, a nod of the head can't be captured for the transcript. 10

CHAIRPERSON: Although the proceedings are being televised, or the television cameras are here, those will not be preserved for us. When we go over the evidence we'll read the transcript and the transcript won't have your body language that you nodded your head. So if you want to say yes you must say yes and you must do what I sometimes fail to do and turn your microphone on to make sure that the word "yes" is recorded.

MR DE ROVER: On that point I'm already leaving it on constantly so I don't forget. Yeah, I have no objection to you framing the subject as you've just done.

MS LE ROUX: Thank you, and then Mr De Rover, in that context as an international principle and irrespective of the status of the McCann decision in South African Law, would you agree with me that the principle of

prevention or precaution is an established principle of

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That's the cover page, the

1 CHAIRPERSON: The cover page is 93. What 2 page is the actual report you want us to look at? 3 MS LE ROUX: Chair, if we can then go to 4 page 10 of that report, there it lists the requirements for 5 the use of force and, Chair, in particular it's (a), (b) and (c) there, sufficient legal basis, legitimate 6 7 objectives and necessity. If I could then ask you, Mr De 8 Rover, to direct your attention over the page 11 to 9 paragraph 63. This is the precise paragraph that Mr 10 Semenya put to Mr White where the special rapporteur sets 11 out that "There is the often overlooked requirement of 12 prevention or precaution. It's explained that once the 13 situation arises where the use of force is considered, it is often too late to rescue the situation. Instead, in 14 15 order to save life, all possible measures should be taken 16 upstream to avoid a situation where the decision on whether 17 to pull the trigger arises or to ensure that all the 18 possible steps have been taken to ensure that if that 19 happens the damage is contained as much as is possible." 20 The following paragraph sets out that "The 21 failure to take proper precaution in such a context

international law applicable to the use of force? MR DE ROVER: You know, the, Chair, there's a problem with these principles in international law exactly with the fact that they are principles and I always have to pull the rabbit out of a hat when I teach police, and depending on where I am I even have to refer to regional instruments and try and tie them into the right to life and the obligation for the State to protect that right, to, and not just by enacting law but by actually being more proactive than that, and maybe in that connection because I understand your reference to McCann, and if it's with the caveat that you gave I have no problem that it exists as a reference, and I would actually like to add to that Osman versus the UK because that is a case that may then in its findings have a relevance that you actually seek in that it addresses this issue of duty of care where if you have a particular set of circumstances where it is foreseeable that somebody is going to become a victim of crime, you as a state responsible have a duty of care. So you must then take steps to protect these people. If you want me to link that to Marikana, then for

example you can hold that as the incident develops - and I'm talking 10, 11, 12 - and deaths occur and people are put at risk and it is actually quite clear that people of a

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constitutes a violation of the right to life. In the

24 the use of lethal force by soldiers who erroneously but in

good faith believed that a group of terrorists were about

McCann case the European Court of Human Rights held that

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particular organisation become a target and that it's

- 2 foreseeable that more of them will become a victim, then
- 3 there is a duty on the police to take measures that seek to
- 4 protect. So if you see the increased VISPOL measures that
- 5 SAPS implemented around Marikana, they are an utterance of
- 6 that. I have to stress that the European Court gave quite
- 7 strict criteria for when that duty of care occurs and you'd
- 8 obviously have to measure them to what exists under your
- 9 own national laws in that respect, but it is an addition

10 and it's an operationalisation, if you want.

11 CHAIRPERSON: That was a point I wanted

12 to put to you and that is it seems to me that you - I'm not

being critical - you may be venturing a little bit into a

14 field in which you do not belong, if I may say that. We

are concerned obviously to state as far as we can what we 15

16 think the domestic law of South Africa is in relation to

17 these issues. The decisions of international tribunals are

18 obviously not binding on us, but they might be used in

19 appropriate cases as a source of persuasive material.

20 MR DE ROVER: Ja.

21 CHAIRPERSON: And judges in South Africa

22 do that -

1

23 MR DE ROVER: Ja.

24 CHAIRPERSON: - use comparative material.

25 There are also provisions of the Constitution of course

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which deal with how you use international legal material,

- as it were, and comparative material of other 2
- 3 jurisdictions, and there are problems about what is jus
- cogens and what is not, but we won't go there now. But 4
- 5 just confining ourselves to the domestic situation, South
- 6 African courts would look, if it was appropriate, to
- 7 decisions of a tribunal such as the European Court of Human
- 8 Rights in search of, not binding obviously, but persuasive
- 9 material which would guide us to apply the right principle
- 10 if our law hasn't got clear authority on the point.

11 MR DE ROVER: Ja.

12 CHAIRPERSON: That's the first point. So

you mustn't tell us that McCann's case isn't legally

binding in South Africa. We know that, but you also can't

15 tell us - and I don't think you are trying to tell us -

16 that we can't look there for, look to it for persuasive

17 material on how to decide some of the issues that arise

18 here.

13

14

19 But the second point is we already have domestic authority for the proposition that you've just referred to.

21 We had a case some years ago where, which eventually went

22 up to the Constitutional Court and then came back to the Supreme Court of Appeal - I was in that case - where a

24 woman brought a claim against the State because she was

25 raped by someone who'd been released on bail in ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

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circumstances where it was foreseeable that if this person

were given bail he was likely to go out and commit further

crimes. She was the victim of one of those further crimes.

4 That's already the law of South Africa. That was laid down

5 by the Constitutional Court and so that principle we

6 already have as part of our domestic law.

But in the search for persuasive authority in matters not covered directly by our domestic law we certainly look, and that's one of the - if I may put it this way - one of the glories of the South African legal system is we have tried consistently for many, many years, to approach the matter in that way, look for persuasive authority elsewhere if we haven't got adequate position, or case law on the matter in our own law, and so that I think is important for me to tell you that because that is effectively what underlies this whole debate about whether

Again even if the principles are accepted to some extent or in entirety, we may disagree on the facts, whether there was - you will remember there was dissent in the McCann case - we would be able if we consider it appropriate to pick the dissent rather than the majority if we found the dissent to have more persuasive force. But the inquiry is not limited to domestic materials. We certainly look at international materials and we are

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obviously also encouraged by our Constitution to do our

best to ensure, without getting into jus cogens problems,

3 to make sure that our law is consistent with the

4 international position as well.

McCann applies and so on.

5 [12:00] MR DE ROVER: Chair, let me then

6 apologise if the way I phrased myself led you to believe I

7 was disagreeing with you because the opposite is true. I

was agreeing with that proposition. The next thing, I

9 think that acknowledging this part there is actually

10 existence of - if you take the basic principles on the use

11 of force and firearms they clearly set out those

12 requirements and they are most commonly voiced in terms

13 that you must attempt non-violent means first and if they

14 seem unworkable and your lawful objective is that important

15 that you still want to pursue it you must try less extreme

16 ends first. So I'm totally acknowledging and in agreement

17 with what you say.

18 MS LE ROUX: Thank you, Mr De Rover, then

19 turning to precisely that context -

20 CHAIRPERSON: Sorry can I just put one 21 other point? You know you spoke about the duty of the law to protect innocent people. The law actually goes further

than that. It says even a criminal, even an assailant is 23

24 entitled to his right to life unless it's, to use the

expression used by the Bridge players on the Constitutional

Page 36977 Page 36979 Court, I think it's trumped, trumped by something else. 1 CHAIRPERSON: This is from the second. 2 And that is even if a criminal who is attacking somebody 2 MS LE ROUX: This is from the second edition. 3 else has a right to life which could only be infringed if 4 the circumstances are such that there's no other MR DE ROVER: Can you bear with me for a 5 alternative. And that's something which is, as you may second while I get it on my screen because I have the PDF, 6 know, it was always the law, but it's become more relevant 6 but I can't find it on my folder. 7 7 since we have a constitution with an entrenched right to MS LE ROUX: Chair, it's also on display life. And of course our entrenched right to life is pari 8 8 on the screen next to you. 9 9 materia with the right to life in international instruments CHAIRPERSON: I think he'll find it such as the European convention. 10 easier to have it on his screen. 10 11 MR DE ROVER: MR DE ROVER: Chair, I've spent 22 years Thank you. 11 12 MS LE ROUX: So on page 259 of that 12 of my life now in the field police and human rights and I 13 can only echo that sentiment. There are too many realities 13 document, no page 259 printed page. 14 where it's thought that criminals shouldn't have human 14 CHAIRPERSON: Page 86 of our bundle, 259 15 rights or that to bind police to observing those that is 15 of the document and the document is now an exhibit, UUUU3. un-levelling the playing field because the other side is 16 MS LE ROUX: Yes and if we could go down 16 17 17 not playing by those rules and I totally disagree with below that block that's shaded, Integration And Practise, 18 that. The norms and the standards and expectations are there we see the text, this is in the context of 19 clear and as officials of the state you are bound by them 19 integrating, inter-training and the like this principle it 20 and you are supposed to uphold them. 20 says, the authors write there "Depending on the complexity 21 MS LE ROUX: 21 of the situation responsibility does not merely lie with Mr, De Rover -22 22 CHAIRPERSON: the individual law enforcement official at the location. Sorry, Ms Le Roux, I had a 23 23 The higher command level has overall responsibility for conversation with the witness, but I hope it was of 24 24 assistance to us all. taking all precautionary measures in line with the 25 MS LE ROUX: provisions of the basic principles for the use of firearms I'm sure it will be, Chair.

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Mr De Rover, in the book that you were the author of the

first edition To Serve And Protect, you referred to it this 2

3 morning as a very important reference work, I'm assuming

4 you approve of the second edition, the update that was made

5 to your initial text. You don't disagree with anything

that was revised in the second edition. 6

7

MR DE ROVER: If you did a text comparison there's, I think, close to 90% overlap with the

9 first edition. So it's updated to meet current existing

10 requirements in terms of case law, applicable treaties, new

11 treaties that have come into force. But on the fundaments

12 of the topics as they relate to police task organisation

13 and responsibilities, powers and duties I think it's the

14 same book.

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15 MS LE ROUX: Right. Chair, for the

record this is UUUU3 which is an excerpt from To Serve And

Protect. In particular it's chapter 7, The Use Of Force

18 And Firearms. Now, Mr De Rover, one edition that we have

19 been able to identify from your first edition appears at

page 259 of the typed page in that chapter which has been

21 provided to you. It's page 86 of the bundle.

22 CHAIRPERSON: This is the book that has

gone into second edition? 23

MS LE ROUX: Yes, Chair, this is the

second edition.

Page 36980 in order to respect and protect life." In the box below

2 that we see again the McCann case cited as that principle.

3 So taking the general principle into this context of use of

4 force and firearms in policing operations would you agree

that there is a generally applicable principle in

6 international law requiring those in command of a policing

7 operation in which higher levels of force are anticipated

8 as a possibility to plan and command those operations in

9 such a way as to minimise the risk that lethal force will

10 be used?

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MR DE ROVER: It goes to the heart of accountability and I actually would contend that that does not limit itself to organised police operations. In fact it's about every police contact with the public. There is a possibility to invoke command's responsibility because if

16 a single police officer in a single contact with a citizen

17 does something that is unbecoming or unlawful and if there

18 is reason to believe that a superior officer was aware of

19 that and could have done something about it that

20 responsibility exists. And of course then by consequence

21 your proposition is true and I agree with that.

22 CHAIRPERSON: Ms Le Roux, when you reach 23 a suitable stage I'd like to take the second adjournment,

24 the tea adjournment. But obviously you must tell me when

it's appropriate because I don't want to break into your

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cross-examination unnecessarily.

2 MS LE ROUX: Chair, we may as well take

3 the adjournment now.

4 CHAIRPERSON: 15 minutes.

[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES1

[12:24] can speak to what they did, why they did that and

7 what result it produced and for you then to through

questioning establish whether that was premeditated or 8

9 accidental. If you leave that part out and you only want

10 to rely on what you can independently audit you get a skew

picture, or if you overemphasise the significance of the

12 auditable trail you might lose valuable insight.

Now can I just then in that connection refer to

the Stockwell investigations in the UK, especially the

15 report Stockwell 1. It is included in the three binders that I left with the evidence leaders. I know it's a long

17 time ago because my statements are now one and a half years

18 old, but Stockwell 1 is in there and I put it in there for

19 a reason, because it shows you an investigation conducted

20 by the Independent Police Complaints Commission in the UK

21 into the shooting death of a totally innocent Brazilian

22 student on the subway who was mistaken to be a suicide

23 bomber, and it seeks to establish how this could happen and

24 it's important to stress that everything Mr White has said

25 about gold/silver/bronze command, designated senior

Page 36982

officers, it seemed that all requirements were in place and

2 nevertheless a disastrous decision produced.

consequences in the process, because the IPCC acknowledged

5 that it wanted an auditable trail. Where that failed,

where they could not bring up documents that supported 6

Now I'm not so much interested in the

police statements they lamented that and they came -

CHAIRPERSON: [Microphone off, inaudible] 8

I'm sorry, Mr De Rover. Someone has got some -

SPEAKER: My apologies, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: 11 Is it a cell phone or a

12 tape recorder or a computer, it's making a noise. Please

13 turn it off, otherwise I'll ask the owner to leave the

14 chamber.

15 SPEAKER: I have indeed.

16 CHAIRPERSON: Carry on, Mr De Rover.

17 MR DE ROVER: They lamented the absence

18 of records and it led to recommendations to strengthen

future processes, and I think that the work, some of the

work Mr White has been involved in with "Keeping the Peace"

21 and its evolution in a subsequent document is testimony to

22 the efforts that have been made to remedy auditable trail

deficiencies, but they existed. 23

The commission went to police officers to get the

25 information they needed to fill the blanks that could not

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be explained by officers, or by documents that were

2 available to it, and it treated police officers as

3 witnesses of truth and that sits well with their public

4 role as agents of the State, the oath they swear. So

5 unless you can manifestly prove that someone's lying or

trying to pervert the cause of justice, or they committed a 6

7 criminal act and you need to change their status from

8 witness to suspect you treat them as a witness because they

9 are obliged and bound by their oath to tell you the truth.

Now Stockwell in the end culminated in a reality where someone ended up being shot dead and it has never been clear whether the gold commander actually gave the order, shoot to kill. It's a convolution of misunderstandings, misinterpretations that led to an innocent person's death. What you see as a consequence is that it's not just about the operations that you run, it's about the way you organise and I contend that whilst I agree that you can look at the level of the operation and say for future operations we want better safeguards, but again I'll talk about unravelling systems, but if you only

23 happening. 24 That's just my problem, that if you don't bring

focus yourself on that level I don't think that you are

going to build structures that stop another Marikana from

it up to the level of how the police organises as an

Page 36984

organisation, how it trains its personnel, what it teaches

them, to what standards it holds them, how it is managed

3 and who does the managing, if that's not part of the

4 equation that problem can't be solved. If you don't go one

5 level higher then and say that those that exercise

6 authority over the police in government, there needs to be

7 a structure to how police receive policy direction that

8 goes beyond a phone call to a PC on a mobile, those are not

9 I think the types of auditable trails you'd be looking for

10 if afterwards you need to render account. So that is a

11 long story, but -

12 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Mr De Rover, just 13 as regards the question posed, on a practical level that 14 would be very pertinent to the number of firearms and the 15 kind of firearms being used in an operation. Isn't that 16 so?

17 MR DE ROVER: Look, the basic thing, if 18 you can't, if you don't have it on site you can't use it.

Now sometimes you take the attitude "better sorry with than

sorry without," but there are certain types of weapons -

21 and I consider military assault weapons have no place in

22 law enforcement, full stop, and that I say aware of

23 particular problems of violence South Africa faces, but to

24 me the solution is not in the police arming up, the police

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needs to arm down and smarten up.

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COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Yes, thank you. 1 CHAIRPERSON: 2 While you're raising the 3 question of auditable trails, a small point but it makes a 4 big difference in this case. For some reason I don't 5 understand the police didn't keep a tape recording of all 6 the radio exchanges. There are gaps. There are disputes 7 about what was said at certain times. Surely that's an 8 elementary principle; there should be a tape recording made 9 of all traffic on the radio. That must be elementary. Is 10 that right?

MR DE ROVER: Chair, in Stockwell 1 it was proven by the IPCC that decision logs were not being kept and in cases, for example of the overall commander Cressida Dick, she compiled her log many hours after the events occurred, and still that did not help to explain to the commission what now actually happened and facilitated this wrong identification and the disastrous action that followed where the ones executing it were absolutely and totally convinced that they were dealing with a suicide bomber about to detonate a device.

Now I agree with you, I think the one solid recommendation for the future, and that technology exists, is that you record what transpires because the done reality is that for as long as events concur with what you foresaw them to be it is easy to keep records and to keep your

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- back together what now actually has happened and how did it
- happen, and you have to then take on advance that they do
- that with the best of intentions, not to pervert the course
- of justice or to give a version that that can't stand the
- 5 light of day, but they do that with good intent and it is
- 6 part of a professional responsibility. So there are - a

7 simple base recommendation, videotape everything.

There are countries where any questioning of a suspect in interrogation it's, everything gets videotaped. So if there ever is a dispute, a suspect in front of a judge claims that undue pressure was exerted, those tapes will be commanded and they will be viewed and a decision will be reached, and it's easy because you have your auditable trail.

MS LE ROUX: Mr De Rover, let me bring you back to Marikana -

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Ms Le Roux, just one final point. Apart from anything else it saves millions, in a case of a commission like this that sort of precaution would save a lot of money, probably millions of rands, because the commission could obviously do its work much more quickly because a lot of disputes of fact can't arise because there's the objective evidence which proves what was said over the radio and the video material as to what was happening. The videographers as you know for some

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- decision log or your occurrence book and to just put down
- 2 everything is happening as your foresaw it. If you take
- 3 the policing operations around the elections, they went
- 4 down without a hitch, and I'm sure that SAPS will be able
- 5 to show you model plans, model occurrence books and
- 6 decision logs and all went as planned because everybody had
- 7 an interest to see that this went down the way it was
- 8 foreseen. But once incidents start to develop in a
- 9 direction that you did not foresee or you consider to have
- a low probability of developing, there is a discrepancy 10
- between what you expect and what occurs, and if you have 11
- 12 two people keeping track of what you are saying the
- 13 possibility is that you can't keep up in registering what
- you are doing and the orders you are giving with the speed 14
- 15 that you are issuing them, and subsequent there is an
- 16

issue. 17 Now Stockwell had that same problem. The IPCC 18 acknowledged that police officials conferred to try and 19 establish the chronology of what had transpired. Rather than calling that collusion they said look, it's inevitable 21 if you do not have - because they did not have a recording 22 in the UK on that incident. The incident room that was used did not provide for verbatim recording, video or 24 audio. They said it's inevitable that police officials

25 would compare records and try and help each other to piece

Page 36988 reason left the koppie and didn't go just behind the police

lines, they went to the JOC. They didn't go to scene 2.

So therefore there's room for an enormous amount of debate

as to what happened, which takes time to unravel and of

course costs a lot of money.

MR DE ROVER: Chair, the, it's irony that actually the costs that would, that I would put under the heading of preventing this kind of thing are marginal when compared to the cost of trying to repair it now, because your process is only the first step. It hasn't actually led, and it won't, to repair. It will lead to recommendations and choices that need to be made.

There are countries that routinely have their officers go out even on patrol wearing individual cameras and everything gets recorded. If in Australia you get stopped by traffic police that entire encounter is filmed from the car, but also from the officer that will approach you. So at any point, and you get advised of that fact. You get stopped; they tell you it's a traffic stop and the first thing after that the officer will advise you that the encounter is being videotaped and if need be, that videotape will be used against you in a court of law, and ja, of course it generates copious amounts of information and you don't use them as Big Brother to find fault with

everything the police does, but the problem, what it does

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- give you is a solid tool that when things do go wrong at
- 2 least you are able to piece back together the chronology
- 3 and to understand how things occurred, in what frequency,
- 4 and to identify the actors in it without discussion, where
- 5 now a lot of your time has simply gone into establishing
- what is the chronology, what, who were the actors there, 6
- 7 what were they doing, and you haven't even managed in many
- 8 stages to answer the question how did that happen and why,
- 9 and those are critical questions that the equipment you
- 10 refer to would at least assist in answering, because you'd
- 11 have the rationale behind the decision-making and the
- discussions that lead to it as they happen in real-time. 12

13 MS LE ROUX: Mr De Rover, I need to ask

14 for your cooperation and if you could shorten your answers 15

that would be very much appreciated.

MR DE ROVER: 16

CHAIRPERSON: 17 [Microphone off, inaudible]

18 it's my fault to some extent. I asked him a question about

19 something I was interested in, but he's taken the point and

20 so have I.

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21 MS LE ROUX: Mr De Rover, bringing you

22 back to the particular operation that we're considering in

23 this Commission at Marikana, what has struck me in your two

24 statements is that you don't conduct a review of briefing,

25 planning, command and control, intelligence, deployment of approached by SAPS in the week before the 28th of February

I've made that abundantly clear, and my personal

3 motivation, I, they are in a lot of difficulty with regards

4 to Marikana, I understand that; some of it of their own

5 making, and maybe you will find that they should have

6 foreseen that that is open for discussion and it is 7

constantly being discussed here.

8 My attempt has been to not reduce the issue, as 9

I've seen yesterday, I understand sometimes you can take

10 people to a point of saying if that vehicle hadn't moved

11 there then this wouldn't have transpired, but that is at a

12 micro level. That's a tactic in an operation. So that

13 won't answer your fundamental question. So what I've done,

and please, my statements are one and a half years old - a

lot of the statements I was confronted with this morning,

16 like for example of Ms Moolman, is dated well after that

17 submission. So it's problematic. I had limited access, a

short period of time and a desire at least to try and give

19 a perspective that would also allow to do what the

20 Commission wants is to look at relevant international

21 standards, relevant international practices.

22 MS LE ROUX: Mr De Rover, in your

23 statement you refer to the unfettered access that you had

24 to any of the evidence and information relating to

Marikana.

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- resources, etcetera, in any great level of detail and I'm
- 2 interested to know why that is. Were you briefed to
- 3 conduct a comprehensive review of the operation? Because
- 4 what appears to us is that you appear to have been
- 5 instructed to consider the allegations that the police
- deliberately set out to kill the strikers. That seems to 6
- 7 be the question that you're answering in your statements.
- 8 So first question, were you briefed to conduct a
- 9 comprehensive review of the SAPS operation in all of those
- elements that I've mentioned? 10

11 MR DE ROVER: My answer to you, my terms

12 of reference are written down. I don't feel that it's my

13 place to give them to you, or to the Commission, but you

can request them from SAPS and I don't see a reason why you 14

15 would not get those. Specific -

MS LE ROUX: 16 Thank you, we'll do that.

17 Looking at -

18 MR DE ROVER: Specifically the, nothing

has been – how do you say? – instructed, guided, directed.

I've said at the beginning, and I will reiterate that, my

21 existence in an international field since 1992 and having

22 visited and worked with police forces in more than 70

countries, doesn't come from jeopardising my

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24 professionalism or my integrity. So I'm also not going to

do that here and I've made that, when I was first

MR DE ROVER: 1

> MS LE ROUX: I understand there was a

time constraint from when you were briefed in February to

when your statement was filed on the 8th of March, but you

5 haven't been - when you have sought information you haven't

6 been refused that information by the SAPS, have you?

> MR DE ROVER: No.

8 MS LE ROUX: And when you've been

9 provided with information by the SAPS you've obviously used

10 it when you were doing your statements, correct?

MR DE ROVER: Correct.

12 MS LE ROUX: But there may well be a

13 universe of information and facts that you have not been

briefed with and therefore you can't be blamed for not 14

15 being able to have reference and consideration to that

16 evidence when you were reaching your conclusions, correct?

17 MR DE ROVER: That's correct.

18 MS LE ROUX: To return to my question,

were you asked in your terms of reference - which we will

request from the SAPS – were you specifically asked to look

21 at intelligence, planning, briefing, command and control,

22 and accountability? Were you asked to look at those five

23 themes?

> MR DE ROVER: No.

25 MS LE ROUX: Was it within the scope of

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Page 36993 your brief to look at those five themes? 2 2 MR DE ROVER: I could well have done it 3 and there is probably, and I need to clarify that here, 4 there's probably a misunderstanding at that time on my part of what this Commission was supposed to do. It's only 5 5 6 6 become clear later to me that the parties that are here, 7 7 besides assisting the Commission, also have a personal - if I, and I allow the wording - a personal case that they 8 8 9 9 represent, an argument. So I was aware of the fact that 10 there were two other international experts and I'd read 10 11 early statements of both that already went into that. Now 11 12 I could give you more of the same. I thought I'd try and 12 focus on something different that would actually then 13 13 14 14 assist the Commission, because you have two qualified 15 experts that have looked in detail at that and have made 15 their findings and presented their argument and there has 16 16 been cross-examination of those. So it wasn't on my part a 17 17 18 deliberate attempt to not look at it, other than 18 19 misunderstanding your role here. Had I better understood 19 20 that I may have well decided to say something about it 20 21 myself and to measure that, but the benchmarks that were 21 used by Mr White and Mr Hendrickx are by and large accepted 22 22 23 international benchmarks. I likely would have come with 23 similar findings. 24

we could, given the time constraints -CHAIRPERSON: No, I understand time constraints, but he's entitled to use -MS LE ROUX: - keep the focus on Marikana. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I'm sorry I'm interrupting you. Forgive me. He's entitled to use Stockwell to buttress his argument - not his argument, his evidence in relation to Marikana. As long as he's conscious of the fact, which I think he is, he's talking about Marikana, he's entitled where he's dealing with the applications of the world-best practice to Marikana to refer to Stockwell, which is a famous incident which has been exhaustively written about. So I think he can carry on, but you'll bear in mind Ms Le Roux hasn't got unlimited time and so she's very worried when -MR DE ROVER: Chair, I appreciate. My -CHAIRPERSON: - when you and I talk for too long on these topics. MR DE ROVER: And I apologise, but I do think it's important to say that ideally you'd hold a police force to 100% achievement on those points that Mr White has made. Stockwell shows that it was impossible; 24 what it has done is lead to recommendations of improvement, but it didn't lead to condemnation because none of the

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done the exercise, but would it be fair then to say that

subject to what was identified as disputed or disagreed 2

3 between the Human Rights Commission and the SAPS in the

So I understand you haven't

4 expert process that took place, and of course we've had

5 very little response, if any, from the SAPS in that

MS LE ROUX:

process, and other than to the extent Mr White was cross-6

7 examined, are you broadly in agreement with his analysis of

8 those five themes, planning, briefing, intelligence,

9 command and control, and the accountability question?

10 [12:44] MR DE ROVER: You know, the - and I think

11 it has come out in cross-examination that at a general

12 level I don't have an issue with those, because as I said

13 his analysis is based on internationally accepted

14 standards. The issue is always with can you make it

15 relevant in a local context and Stockwell, Stockwell is

16 from his parent country and police force, or to all intents

17 and purposes. The deficiencies, the apparent deficiencies

18 there, so if you put that 100% the general requirements, in

19 Stockwell if you analyse it for yourself and take issue

20 with my percentage, but they did not manage -

21 MS LE ROUX: Mr De Rover, could I ask you to concentrate on Marikana? Obviously Stockwell will be 22

useful in submissions with -

CHAIRPERSON:

No, no, Ms Le Roux -

25 MS LE ROUX: - to the Commission, but if

Page 36996

officers involved have been held accountable for the death of Mr De Menezes. There has been no finding of

3 illegitimate killing.

4 So what I'm saying here is whilst I acknowledge 5 the pertinence of Mr White's findings, I take issue with

6 the relevance in the local context, and particularly in 7 terms of SAPS' ability as an organisation and police force

8 to comply, because best practice is something that you can

9 afford economically. You can have the cost to bring it

10 into your organisation and you can train your people to the

11 level to produce that result and then you can sustain it.

12 So, and then it can be your best practice.

> So if you impose a standard you have to I think also ask these questions, and that I think is critical. I think that SAPS' ability in absolute terms, and I'm not talking ill will or bad design, or you know, I'm just saying that I don't judge SAPS' ability to conform to the requirements that those standards put on par with the UK police. So their score would never be a perfect 100. Even at the onset with the best of intentions and the best of

20 21 will they would not be able to score 100.

22 MS LE ROUX: Mr De Rover, I want to just

23 clarify something on the record because when I said earlier 24

that there had been this opportunity to set out points of

disagreement and agreement between the experts, the

24 description.

MR DE ROVER:

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                                                                                                                           Page 36999
    response that was received from the SAPS appeared to have
                                                                        Chair, refers to the, at that time conversations I had with
2
    no input from yourself and appeared to have been drafted by
                                                                        General Annandale and Colonel Scott where they showed me
3
    the SAPS legal team. Is that a correct reading of the
                                                                     3
                                                                        the written versions of the plan and talked me through the
4
    documentation we received from the SAPS in that process?
                                                                        intentions, and contingency then for example refers to the
                                                                    5
5
           MR DE ROVER:
                                                                        support role of the TRT in situations of dispersal, disarm
                                Can you -
           MS LE ROUX:
                                                                    6
                               That you never engaged in an
                                                                        and arrest where that may become a necessity.
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    exercise of identifying points of agreement and
                                                                    7
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   And perhaps over the lunch
    disagreement between yourself, Mr White and Mr Hendrickx?
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                                                                        break if I could ask you to identify the exhibit, if we
                                                                    9
9
    Have you done that exercise for them?
                                                                        have it as an exhibit, that is the written plan that you
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           MR DE ROVER:
                                I did.
                                                                    10
                                                                        were shown by Officers Annandale and Scott, if you could -
           MS LE ROUX:
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                               You did that exercise for
                                                                    11
                                                                        we'll do that in the lunch adjournment though. So other
    the SAPS. What document was produced that records those
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                                                                    12
                                                                        than whatever documents they showed you - it was a written
    points of agreement and disagreement? Because we've never
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                                                                    13
                                                                        document, correct? It wasn't just the Google Earth image
14
    seen them.
                                                                    14
                                                                        that existed at the time?
15
           MR DE ROVER:
                                I don't know better than a
                                                                    15
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     If I recall correctly the,
    document was submitted to you last year by the SAPS legal
16
                                                                        because that was in the first week when I was here, they
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    team, but that part of the process is not my
                                                                    17
                                                                        used slides from exhibit L.
18
    responsibility. I know that I was approached and asked to
                                                                    18
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   Okay, so you never saw a
                                                                    19
                                                                        written -
19
    sit, and at the time it was with another counsel of the
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    SAPS legal team and I spent several days going through an
                                                                    20
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     No.
21
    extensive document on points of agreement and disagreement.
                                                                   21
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                    - document that was a plan?
22
           MS LE ROUX:
                               So the document that was
                                                                    22
                                                                               MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                     Not at that stage.
23
    produced to us in June of 2014, you did have input into
                                                                   23
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   Right. Were you told by
24
    that document?
                                                                    24
                                                                        either Officer Annandale or Scott that what you were being
25
           MR DE ROVER:
                                Can you direct me to one
                                                                        shown was in the plan on the 16th of August, was in
                                                       Page 36998
                                                                                                                           Page 37000
    that I can have a quick look?
                                                                         existence on the 16th of August?
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           MS LE ROUX:
                                                                    2
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
                                It's JJJ178.10 and then
                                                                                                      My understanding of what I
3
    JJJ178.11 was a request for clarification that we made to
                                                                    3
                                                                        was being told was that that was part of the plan. I
4
    the SAPS on those points of disagreement, to which no
                                                                    4
                                                                         realise when I look at the level of detail that you attach
                                                                     5
5
    response was received. It's page 178 in your bundle,
                                                                         to that maybe I should have been more critical in
    Chair.
                                                                    6
6
                                                                        examining, but I understood I was given a briefing as to
7
           MR DE ROVER:
                                                                    7
                                  Can you again give me the
                                                                        what had occurred and most, on the most part I listened and
                                                                    8
8
    date reference, please?
                                                                        I had the occasional question or clarification, but they
9
                                                                    9
           MS LE ROUX:
                                                                         did a lot of the talking to talk me through the events.
                                The date reference was the
                                                                    10
    1st of June 2014. Mr De Rover, I won't waste time now.
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
10
                                                                                                    So other than being shown
    We'll give you the documents in the lunch adjournment. You
                                                                         portions of exhibit L and this oral briefing from the two
11
                                                                    11
12
    can advise me if that's the document that you did have some
                                                                   12
                                                                        commanders, you weren't given any written documentation
13
    input into.
                                                                    13
                                                                         that purported to be a contingency plan?
14
            Taking you then to the operation at Marikana and
                                                                    14
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                      Not that I recall now. You
                                                                    15
15
    your brief, and if I can take you in your first statement,
                                                                        know this, you're talking one and a half years ago.
    FFF11, to page 12, paragraph 51 of that statement. There
                                                                    16
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                    Of course.
17
    you recorded that "A full confrontation with a large armed
                                                                    17
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                      I'm not sure.
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
18
    group of around 300 individuals, although considered and
                                                                    18
                                                                                                    Then in the same paragraph
    catered for in contingency plans, was in fact never really
                                                                        of your statement you talk about, you state that "A full
    anticipated until the afternoon of the 16th of August," and
                                                                    20
                                                                        confrontation with a large armed group of around 300
21
    I'd like to unpack those elements of that. The first is
                                                                         individuals was in fact never really anticipated until the
                                                                        afternoon of the 16th of August." Now there are five pieces
    what contingency plans are you referring to? Because we
22
    haven't seen any contingency plans that seem to match this
                                                                    23
                                                                         of evidence that I'd like to ask whether you were aware of
```

24

What I've written there,

when you wrote this statement for submission to the

Commission. So I'm going to give you the five pieces of

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Page 37001
                                                                                                                           Page 37003
    evidence and you can tell me if you were aware of those at
                                                                         commanders warned the Provincial Commissioner -
                                                                     1
    the time that you drafted that.
                                                                     2
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                       Well, wouldn't it be -
2
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
3
           MR DE ROVER:
                                  If they are dated after the
                                                                     3
                                                                                                    - of the risk in the
4
    8th of March then obviously not.
                                                                     4
                                                                         tactical option?
5
           MS LE ROUX:
                                                                     5
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
                                No, these are facts, not
                                                                                                       I'm sorry to interrupt you.
    documents
                                                                     6
                                                                         Wouldn't it be sensible for us to get the evidence on that
6
7
           MR DE ROVER:
                                                                     7
                                                                         before he's expected to answer the question?
                                  Okay.
8
                                                                     8
           MS LE ROUX:
                                So the first is did you know
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                     Chair, I think it would be
9
    at the time that you drafted the statement that the JOCCOM
                                                                     9
                                                                         appropriate if he just assumes that for now.
    meeting at 6AM on the 16th of August began with a briefing
                                                                    10
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
10
                                                                                                       No, I don't think he should
    that said that day was D-day? Were you told that the 16th
                                                                    11
11
                                                                         be asked to assume something that may be wrong.
                                                                    12
12
    of August was D-day?
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                     Chair, the entire cross-
13
           MR DE ROVER:
                                  Yes.
                                                                    13
                                                                         examination of Mr White and Mr Hendrickx proceed on the
14
           MS LE ROUX:
                                Were you told before you
                                                                    14
                                                                         basis of assume this evidence, assume that evidence. I'm
    wrote your statement that shortly after the 6AM JOCCOM and
                                                                    15
15
                                                                         merely doing goose and gander one more time.
    in response to the discussion of a possible tactical option
16
                                                                    16
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                       No, no, I know. Lunch is
17
    Brigadier Van Zyl requested four mortuary trucks to be
                                                                    17
                                                                         going to come up in a couple of minutes. It isn't as if
18
    placed on standby? Were you told that?
                                                                    18
                                                                         there's much prejudice for that answer to stand over until
19
           MR DE ROVER:
                                  I've - no. I've only heard
                                                                    19
                                                                         we resume, and I think that's better. But can I ask a
20
    that discussion came out here in the Commission. I wasn't
                                                                    20
                                                                         question before we take the lunch adjournment? Exhibit L,
21
    aware of that.
                                                                    21
                                                                         slide 78 gives what purports to be the operational plan for
22
           MS LE ROUX:
                                                                    22
                                Okay. Did you know at the
                                                                         stage 3. It's on a page which has a calendar page for
23
    time that you wrote your statement that after the JOCCOM
                                                                    23
                                                                         August, indicating this was on the Tuesday the 14th and the
    and before 9 o'clock Majors-General Mpembe and Annandale
                                                                    24
                                                                         plan there set out is to disperse the strikers into smaller
24
                                                                         groups, encircle and disarm. That is essentially the plan
25
    warned the Provincial Commissioner that a proposed tactical
                                                       Page 37002
                                                                                                                           Page 37004
    option carried a risk of injury and death to strikers?
                                                                         as it was announced or agreed to at 1:30 on the Thursday.
1
                                                                     1
2
                                                                     2
           MR SEMENYA SC:
                                   Sorry, may I invite my
                                                                                Lieutenant-Colonel Scott conceded in his evidence
3
    learned colleague to repeat that? It was a little too fast
                                                                     3
                                                                         that that was not the plan on Tuesday. When he was asked -
4
    for me to comprehend.
                                                                         and in fact it only became the plan on Thursday at about
5
           MS LE ROUX:
                                                                     5
                                                                         half past 1. When he was asked why this was included in
                               Did you know at the time
    that you wrote your statement that was submitted on the 8th
6
                                                                     6
                                                                         exhibit L he gave the explanation that it wasn't malicious,
    of March 2013 that after the 6AM JOCCOM, before 9AM on the
                                                                     7
7
                                                                         it was simply done to make it easier for the Commission to
                                                                     8
8
    16th of August, Majors-General Mpembe and Annandale warned
                                                                         understand the development of the plan. What I want to
9
    the Provincial Commissioner that a proposed tactical option
                                                                         know from you is this; when you were shown exhibit L were
    carried a risk of injury and death to the strikers?
10
                                                                    10
                                                                         you told that slide 78 which gives what purports to be the
11
           MR DE ROVER:
                                Chair, I would hold that to
                                                                         plan already on Tuesday, was in fact not the plan on
                                                                    11
12
    be -
                                                                    12
                                                                         Tuesday but that was merely inserted there without malice
13
                                                                         to enable the Commission and presumably you to understand
           MR SEMENYA SC:
                                   Chair, again it may -
                                                                    13
14
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 Yes, I'm sorry, I don't
                                                                    14
                                                                         the development of the plan better?
                                                                    15
15
    remember that evidence. I'm not saying it isn't the
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
                                                                                                      Chair, the, I can't recall
    evidence, but can you give us the reference to it, please?
                                                                         seeing this particular slide. I can't recall a particular
16
17
           MS LE ROUX:
                               Chair, I'll get the
                                                                    17
                                                                         reference to when different stages would become
18
    references for you over lunch.
                                                                    18
                                                                         operational. I, but you tell me if you don't want me to; I
19
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 I must confess I don't
                                                                         am, I have no problem with addressing the question that was
    remember that. I don't that was the basis for Mr Semenya's
                                                                    20
                                                                         just put to me as a matter, like as a matter of course,
21
    objection as well, but if there is a reference - I'm not
                                                                    21
                                                                         but -
    saying it doesn't exist, I just don't remember it.
                                                                    22
                                                                                CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                      Yes. No, the question that
22
           MS LE ROUX:
                           Chair, we'll get you the
                                                                    23
                                                                         was just put to you by - you mean by Ms Le Roux?
23
24 references, but for now, Mr De Rover, if you could assume
                                                                    24
                                                                                MR DE ROVER:
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that between the 6AM JOCCOM and before 9 o'clock those two

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Well, my problem is I don't

CHAIRPERSON:

_	Page 37005	1	Page 37007
1	remember that evidence. I don't say it wasn't given and	1	MS LE ROUX: Qualified that they would
2	we've had a lot of evidence, we've got well over 35 000	2	make efforts to mitigate that risk.
3	pages, so I may be forgiven for not remember. But we're	3	MR DE ROVER: Yes, Chair, I was aware of
4	taking lunch in a minute.	4	that. I'd add that I would actually expect such an
5	MR DE ROVER: Ja.	5	assessment to be there. Like yesterday Mr White pointed
6	CHAIRPERSON: So after lunch she'll give	6	out that any decision you make that relates to using force
7	us the reference. If she's correct you can answer it. So	7	you have to contemplate what effects that it will trigger.
8	Ms Le Roux, convenient for us to take the lunch adjournment	8	So it, you'd obviously also want to add probability or
9	now?	9	likelihood in your assessment, but I would have been more
10	MS LE ROUX: No, Chair, I'd like to	10	surprised if there had not been some level of advice to the
11	finish the five pieces of evidence, if I could, then that	11	PC what possible consequences there would be to going
12	point is rounded out.	12	tactical, as it has been referred to here.
13	CHAIRPERSON: Alright, provided you don't	13	MS LE ROUX: Have you seen such a risk
14	put the bit that I can't remember as being correct.	14	assessment in the case of the stage 3 tactical plan for
15	MS LE ROUX: Chair, I have the reference	15	Marikana for the 16th of August?
16	for you. It's day 181, pages 21719 to 21728 and 21661 to	16	MR DE ROVER: Ja, again I hear you and I
17	21662.	17	think you are asking for auditable trail evidence and I
18	CHAIRPERSON: I think put those pages on	18	have not seen a written account of people actively
19	the screen when we resume after lunch.	19	assessing that risk, but if I take it that the conversation
20	MS LE ROUX: Yes. So –	20	between Generals Annandale, Mpembe and General Mbombo did
21	CHAIRPERSON: We'll now adjourn for	21	take place, then I would assume that that is the product of
22	lunch.	22	an assessment, that you don't just go there to make that as
23	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]	23	a statement that you haven't based on a deeper
	[13:47] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. Mr	24	
24 25	De Rover, you're still under oath.	25	consideration before reaching that conclusion. MS LE ROUX: But that's the assumption
25	De Rover, you're still under oath.	25	MS LE ROUX: But that's the assumption
	Dags 2700/		Dogo 27000
1	Page 37006 CEES DE ROVER: [S.u.o.]	1	Page 37008 you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such
1 2	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.]	1 2	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such
2	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we	2	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with
	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred	3	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities.
2 3 4	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to	2 3 4	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what –
2 3 4 5	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke	2 3 4 5	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what – MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other
2 3 4 5 6	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke to General Mbombo and they told her that if the POP	2 3 4 5 6	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what – MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other - you haven't been told, I understand you don't have a
2 3 4 5 6 7	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke to General Mbombo and they told her that if the POP couldn't do what they were supposed to do as far as	2 3 4 5 6 7	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what – MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other - you haven't been told, I understand you don't have a paper trail. Have you been told that such a risk
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke to General Mbombo and they told her that if the POP couldn't do what they were supposed to do as far as dispersal and disarmament was concerned and the TRT had to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what – MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other - you haven't been told, I understand you don't have a paper trail. Have you been told that such a risk assessment exercise took place?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke to General Mbombo and they told her that if the POP couldn't do what they were supposed to do as far as dispersal and disarmament was concerned and the TRT had to take over, there was a risk of injury or death, but that	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what – MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other - you haven't been told, I understand you don't have a paper trail. Have you been told that such a risk assessment exercise took place? MR DE ROVER: No. What I have been told
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke to General Mbombo and they told her that if the POP couldn't do what they were supposed to do as far as dispersal and disarmament was concerned and the TRT had to take over, there was a risk of injury or death, but that they gave her the assurance that they would use their best	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what — MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other - you haven't been told, I understand you don't have a paper trail. Have you been told that such a risk assessment exercise took place? MR DE ROVER: No. What I have been told is a reflection of what you now ask me as a question, that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke to General Mbombo and they told her that if the POP couldn't do what they were supposed to do as far as dispersal and disarmament was concerned and the TRT had to take over, there was a risk of injury or death, but that they gave her the assurance that they would use their best endeavours to see to it that that didn't happen. I think	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what – MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other - you haven't been told, I understand you don't have a paper trail. Have you been told that such a risk assessment exercise took place? MR DE ROVER: No. What I have been told is a reflection of what you now ask me as a question, that they considered the potential, the possible consequences of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke to General Mbombo and they told her that if the POP couldn't do what they were supposed to do as far as dispersal and disarmament was concerned and the TRT had to take over, there was a risk of injury or death, but that they gave her the assurance that they would use their best endeavours to see to it that that didn't happen. I think that's – would you agree, Ms Le Roux, that's an accurate	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what – MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other - you haven't been told, I understand you don't have a paper trail. Have you been told that such a risk assessment exercise took place? MR DE ROVER: No. What I have been told is a reflection of what you now ask me as a question, that they considered the potential, the possible consequences of going tactical, one of them being that it would cause
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke to General Mbombo and they told her that if the POP couldn't do what they were supposed to do as far as dispersal and disarmament was concerned and the TRT had to take over, there was a risk of injury or death, but that they gave her the assurance that they would use their best endeavours to see to it that that didn't happen. I think that's – would you agree, Ms Le Roux, that's an accurate summary of all the pages that you gave us to look at?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what — MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other - you haven't been told, I understand you don't have a paper trail. Have you been told that such a risk assessment exercise took place? MR DE ROVER: No. What I have been told is a reflection of what you now ask me as a question, that they considered the potential, the possible consequences of going tactical, one of them being that it would cause injury or death, but obviously not to the measure that it
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke to General Mbombo and they told her that if the POP couldn't do what they were supposed to do as far as dispersal and disarmament was concerned and the TRT had to take over, there was a risk of injury or death, but that they gave her the assurance that they would use their best endeavours to see to it that that didn't happen. I think that's – would you agree, Ms Le Roux, that's an accurate summary of all the pages that you gave us to look at? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LE ROUX (CONTD.):	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what – MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other - you haven't been told, I understand you don't have a paper trail. Have you been told that such a risk assessment exercise took place? MR DE ROVER: No. What I have been told is a reflection of what you now ask me as a question, that they considered the potential, the possible consequences of going tactical, one of them being that it would cause injury or death, but obviously not to the measure that it ended up producing but as a possibility that you are, you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	CEES DE ROVER: [s.u.o.] CHAIRPERSON: During the adjournment we looked at the pages to which Ms Le Roux and Hardy referred us and at 2, I think it's 21724 to 5 there's a passage to the effect that General Annandale and General Mpembe spoke to General Mbombo and they told her that if the POP couldn't do what they were supposed to do as far as dispersal and disarmament was concerned and the TRT had to take over, there was a risk of injury or death, but that they gave her the assurance that they would use their best endeavours to see to it that that didn't happen. I think that's – would you agree, Ms Le Roux, that's an accurate summary of all the pages that you gave us to look at? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LE ROUX (CONTD.): Yes, Chair. Mr De Rover, did you have an opportunity to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	you're making that there was such a risk assessment, such an exercise that identified risks and engaged with probabilities. MR DE ROVER: Now what — MS LE ROUX: You don't know of any other - you haven't been told, I understand you don't have a paper trail. Have you been told that such a risk assessment exercise took place? MR DE ROVER: No. What I have been told is a reflection of what you now ask me as a question, that they considered the potential, the possible consequences of going tactical, one of them being that it would cause injury or death, but obviously not to the measure that it ended up producing but as a possibility that you are, you deploy a means and nothing occurs and nobody comes to harm,
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now objective and verifiable proof that that indeed

- 2 occurred. It probably comes back to what we discussed
- 3 earlier, that had you had mechanical recording devices in
- 4 the JOC you might have stumbled upon that segment or not to
- 5 validate or invalidate what you are saying.

MS LE ROUX: 6 Now Mr De Rover, of course

7 our difficulty is that we don't even have witness evidence

- 8 that such a risk assessment took place, so we rely on what
- 9 you were told. With respect to what you were told, when
- did this risk assessment take place and who participated in 10

it? 11

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12 MR DE ROVER: Again you're asking me now

13 about meetings that are a long time ago. I'm from policing

14 background, I'm also used to investigations where if after

15 a certain time you have new insight you can bring a witness

back and confront them with new questions or information. 16 Here the process has been that you've tried from A through

Z to deal with people as they became available to you and

18

19 I'm sure that today you would probably conduct your

20 examination of General Annandale and Mpembe differently

21 than you did at the time that you conducted them.

22 MS LE ROUX: Unquestionably. Mr De

Rover, did you take note of the conversations in which this

24 risk assessment was discussed? Because of course we've had

25 an exchange with you already in interrogatories relating to

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- your notes around the scene 2 reconstruction. We're told
- 2 they're in Australia. We were hoping you might be able to
- 3 get them to us even from Australia if someone could scan
- them and email them to us. Did you take notes of this 4
- 5 conversation in which this risk assessment process was
- 6 described to you? Because obviously it doesn't appear in
- 7 your statements other than where you say and in response to
- 8 an interrogatory there was a risk assessment.

9 MR DE ROVER: Look, I -

10 MS LE ROUX: Do you have notes of these

interviews? 11

12 MR DE ROVER: I'm in a habit when I

conduct interviews with people to jot things down. I was

never imagining that at some stage someone like you, or you 14

15 would ask me to have I got these notes. So no, they're not

16 here. I'd even have to check whether I kept them at all

17 because I do not do this as my only job. I have many, and

18 if I seek to preserve or archive also let's say my works of

19 deliberation, if you want, or the process of gathering

information and the notes corresponding, I'd have to rent a

21 separate place. Like fortunately nowadays electronically

22 it becomes a little bit easier, but hardcopy notes, at

times once I'd compiled a document on which they are based

24 I tend not to keep them. So I'd have to check.

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MS LE ROUX: We'll engage with the SAPS

legal team and ask you to undertake that exercise. But I

- just want to be absolutely clear that the five pieces of
- evidence I'm asking you about and you said, I just want to
- 4 understand that my understanding was correct that these are
- 5 based on when you met with Officers Annandale and Scott and
- 6 they took you through exhibit L. Those were your sole
- 7 sources of when I asked you did you know it was D-day, did
- 8 you know about the four mortuary trucks, and now did you
- 9 know about the warnings to the Provincial Commissioner
- 10 about risk and the undertaking to mitigate it. So am I
- 11 correct that the source of that information when you're
- 12 answering the questions to me as to when it fed into your
- 13 March 2013 statement, it's those sole sources, exhibit L -

MR DE ROVER: Ja.

> MS LE ROUX: Major-General Annandale,

Lieutenant-Colonel Scott?

17 MR DE ROVER: In the lunch break, because

18 I've been given a wealth of information and obviously I

19 need to try and separate at which date did I get, so I

20 tried to isolate, because I remembered that and I can track

21 it to the day that I created a folder for it, which is

22 Sunday the 3rd of March 2013 at 12:19PM, and the folder I

23 labelled "Marikana Deep D Scott" and I was given by him a

24 collection of electronic files related to Marikana and

there is, ja there is quite a few in there that I, and

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again it's one and a half years ago. I would have looked

- at those. So I don't see a problem with that information
- 3 that is there. I guess some of it is now entered as
- 4 evidence, but there is, you know cordon and search, daily
- 5 operational concepts, daily plans, POP compilation, there's
- a file deceased summary, discharge I don't even know what 6
 - that stands for -

7

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8 MS LF ROUX: Mr De Rover, would you be

9 comfortable with sharing that folder with the evidence

leaders and parties in the Commission?

11 MR DE ROVER: I - ja, personally like I,

12 like I said it's information that I would assume, because I

13 think it comes from the hard drive that the evidence

14 leaders obtained from Colonel Scott, obviously with many

15 more files on there because when they received that drive

it was obviously many months after the 3rd of March. 16

17 MS LE ROUX: Yes.

MR DE ROVER: 18 But ja, it would at least

19 then allow you a comparison if that is -

20 MS LE ROUX: Thank you, and -

21 CHAIRPERSON: May I ask you a question

22 before Ms Le Roux continues. Did Colonel Scott tell you

23 that some of the plans which we have in - they're not in

24 exhibit L, I think they're in a separate exhibit - were

actually reconstructed, as it were, afterwards, that there

Email: realtime@mweb.co.za

Page 37013 Page 37015 weren't actual written plans but that he sat down simultaneous rollout of the wire. 2 MS LE ROUX: 2 afterwards to reverse engineer them in a sense to So Lieutenant-Colonel Scott told you that -3 reconstruct them in written form? Did he tell you that? 3 4 MR DE ROVER: Chair, he did and ja, being 4 MR DE ROVER: Ja. 5 5 MS LF ROUX: - in his plan he wanted a - I'm a policeman by trade, so I can check properties. I 6 can check when documents were produced. You know it's a 6 simultaneous rollout of wire? 7 7 handy feature to have, so in addition to him telling me I MR DE ROVER: Ja. 8 MS LE ROUX: 8 was obviously also able to ascertain that. So before I We'll get to the deployment 9 went into a meeting with him I already knew that and I gave 9 of the barbed wire later on. With respect to the 10 him a chance first before asking, and I didn't need to ask intelligence that was available to the police around the 11 because he explained the process that underpinned that. 11 16th of August were you told about the intelligence, limited 12 MS LE ROUX: And this explanation and the 12 as it was, showing that there was likely to be a 13 provision of those documents from Lieutenant-Colonel Scott 13 confrontation with the strikers because there may be some 14 came to you in February and March of last year? 14 of them that would refuse or be reluctant to disarm and that there may then be conflict if they were engaged by 15 MR DE ROVER: No, I received them on the 15 police? Were you told that the intelligence showed a 16 3rd of March 2013. 16 17 17 MS LE ROUX: Yes, okay. In that folder likelihood of confrontation? 18 were there the minutes that record the 16th of August as D-18 MR DE ROVER: 19 day, if you can recall? 19 MS LE ROUX: And that again came from 20 MR DE ROVER: My guess is not because I'd 20 Officers Annandale and Scott? 21 remember that. 21 MR DE ROVER: Ja, but it, I'd also 22 MS LE ROUX: 22 Okay. contend that just taking into account the events as they 23 CHAIRPERSON: Ms Le Roux, I think you'll 23 produced on the 10th, the 11th, the 12th, the 13th, that find that, just to remind you, I think you'll find that 24 24 likelihood, if you'd need separate intelligence sources to those minutes are actually notes made by Captain, as she 25 confirm it then you're not analysing the events as they Page 37014 Page 37016 then was, Moolman at the meeting in manuscript form. 1 produce on the ground very well, because I think the 2 Subsequently the minutes for the meeting went through a manifestations of violence that were apparent at Marikana 3 number of recensions at Roots and the final version we got, even before the police was there show that there was a 4 which was put up as an exhibit, didn't contain those words 4 predilection at least amongst some to resort to violent 5 at all. In fact there were significant differences between 5 activity. 6 6 the final version and the contemporaneous notes made at the MS LE ROUX: Chair, the team has taken a time, and the contemporaneous notes do not exist in 7 decision over lunch, given the cost of all the high-7 8 8 electronic form, as far as I know. They were given to the definition projection equipment that we have available, 9 9 that rather than staggering the viewing of the videos evidence leaders at some stage on the original pieces of paper. So I doubt very much whether he would have got 10 through my cross-examination we would like to just play 10 11 them. They became available quite late. 11 them all now before -12 MS LE ROUX: Mr De Rover, prior to the 12 CHAIRPERSON: I didn't understand Mr time that you filed your first statement in March of last 13 13 Semenya to object to that. year, you obviously were aware that Lieutenant-Colonel 14 MS LE ROUX: 14 Yes. 15 Scott's plan contemplated using rollout of barbed wire as a 15 CHAIRPERSON: All he said was it could be 16 barrier to protect police resources and media, correct? 16 done provided there was an understanding in effect with the 17 MR DE ROVER: I'm aware of that. 17 Commission, which he spelt out -18 MS LE ROUX: So was the purpose of the 18 MS LE ROUX: Yes, of course. wire explained to you before you filed your statement in 19 CHAIRPERSON: - that, and it would March 2013? effectively be treated as the captions in exhibit L were 20 21 MR DE ROVER: Yes, it was. 21 which emanated from, I can't remember his rank, Colonel 22 MS LE ROUX: And am I correct that it was 22 Visser. described to you to be the barrier to protect police 23 MS LE ROUX: resources and media? 24 CHAIRPERSON: So on that basis you can MR DE ROVER: Yes, and including a 25 continue. On that basis -RCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

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Page 37017 MS LE ROUX: So Chair, if I could -1 2 CHAIRPERSON: So you're now going to show 3 the -4 MS LE ROUX: - if I could then ask Mr 5 Bennett to come and assist us to activate the HD projector. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so we'd better move 6 7 from where we are because otherwise -8 Yes, Chair. MS LE ROUX: 9 CHAIRPERSON: - we will have this bright light shining in our eyes, particularly my eyes, which 10 wouldn't be a good idea. 11 12 MS LE ROUX: Yes, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: 13 So we'll come and sit next 14 to Mr Van Der Bijl. 15 MS LE ROUX: Similarly if we could then just have a blanket warning that probably for the next hour and 20 minutes we're going to be dealing with footage of 17 18 the events. 19 CHAIRPERSON: I asked you to give it on 20 my behalf, but do you want me to do it or - you do it. Have a go at it. I've done it so often. You must have 21 22 heard me saying it hundreds of times. 23 MS LE ROUX: Well, then just to the 24 family members and those watching in the overflow room, the 25 five videos we're going to show - perhaps I should just

it. We're going to see a video which shows amongst other things pictures we've seen before, images of deceased miners who were shot, indicating in some cases their injuries, but the pictures are of such a nature that we think that the relatives and loved ones of those people who 6 are depicted in those images will experience extreme 7 emotional pain and distress when they see them. 8

We had occasions in the past where these pictures were shown and people were very upset and started crying and collapsed. So if you feel, if any of you here feel that seeing those images will cause you to react in that way, cause you emotional distress and pain and great sorrow, I'm going to ask that those pictures not be shown until a minute has elapsed from the time I've finished speaking to give those who wish to leave the chamber the opportunity to do so. The minute will start now.

During this minute we will actually adjourn to give the technicians the opportunity to set the thing up, so we will leave the chamber with any other people who are minded to do so in a minute's time. We will come back when we are told that the chamber is ready for us to see the video. I don't see anybody moving, but please remember some of these pictures are quite horrific and particularly if it's people you knew and loved you're going to find it painful. It's bad enough for people like us who didn't

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briefly explain what's happened. All of the available 1

2 footage before the Commission has been taken by a video

3 expert using various technical terms, because we now know

4 things like CCTV footage only captures one frame a second,

5 other footage is 24 frames a second, etcetera. All of this

footage has now been cross-referenced and synchronised so 6

that it follows eTV time.

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The five videos we're going to watch, the first deals with the movement of strikers around, from the koppie to the kraal, using different video footage. The second video has the first video playing in the corner of the screen so that you can see what's happening at that point in time in the narrative, and then there's an animation

showing the movement of the wire Nyalas and the group. I should note for the record that you'll see there's a red shape that is supposed to be the lead group. As Mr Dagan makes clear in his affidavit, that is a representative shape. The position of the group he is

confident of, matched against landmarks, but the shape of the group shouldn't be taken as anything other than

21 representative -

22 CHAIRPERSON: Forgive me, Ms Le Roux, you're now giving a warning to those who're going to see

24 the video. The idea was you should give a warning to those

who don't want to see the video, so perhaps I'd better do

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know them to see them; it must be terrible for the

relations and loved ones. Alright, I think the minute is

now up. We'll now adjourn.

[COMMISSION ADJOURNS **COMMISSION RESUMES**]

5 [14:12] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.

We're now going to see the video, but it's not necessary to 6

7 remind the witness he's still under oath.

8 MS LF ROUX: Alright, so Chair, for the record we're going to start with annexure V2, which has now 10 been marked as UUUU10.4 and this is -

11 CHAIRPERSON: [Microphone off, inaudible] 12 MS LE ROUX: If we could dim the lights

that would probably assist, and Chair, this video deals 14 with the movement of the strikers from the koppie around 15 the kraal.

[VIDEO IS SHOWN]

Chair, just so that we're oriented, the time clock running at the bottom is eTV time. The source of the footage that is being shown in either of the blocks is recorded in the corner and then where there's a zoom-in or a speeding up of the frame rate or something, that's noted as well.

23 [14:32] [VIDEO IS SHOWN]

24 Chair, if we could then play V2A, which is an animation of the movement of the wire Nyalas and the lead

Page 37021 Page 37023 group, if we could, if Mr Bennett could assist, if we could [VIDEO SHOWN] 1 2 play the first minute of the clip and pause one minute in. Chair, I am conscious that it is 3 o'clock. The 3 [VIDEO IS SHOWN] next video, V3 which deals with water cannon usage, I think 4 Chair, the blue line represents the deployment of it is about 12, 13 minutes. I am not sure if you would like to take tea 5 the barbed wire. [VIDEO IS SHOWN] 6 CHAIRPERSON: [Inaudible, microphone 6 7 7 off]. Then Mr Bennett, if we can then move to 5 minutes [COMMISSION ADJOURNS 8 COMMISSION RESUMES1 8 38 in the clip. Chair, in the interim period I just need 9 to give some milestones. So Nyala 1 commenced its rollout 9 [15:15] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. at 15:42:30, completes its rollout of the wire at 15:43:30. 10 [VIDEO SHOWN] 10 Nyala 2 begins its rollout 15:46:30 and completes its 11 MS LE ROUX: 11 Chair, as will become 12 obvious shortly when something goes in front of the camera 12 rollout 15:47:45. The lead group begins to set off from 13 the koppie 15:48:20 and that should be roughly where we this is a very dirty north-west water canon camera. At the 14 are, yes, and if we could now play from here until 15:55 14 moment it's stationary. Chair, the next clip, V4, looks at and pause at that point. the use of teargas and the stun grenade. And Chair, again 15 [VIDEO IS SHOWN] because we have had an adjournment before the last warning, 16 17 Chair, the yellow lines indicate fields of view both this video and the next probably should carry a 18 of the cameras that are in use in the V2 annexure playing warning if any members of the public or loved ones of those 19 in the corner. 19 in the video would like to leave. Chair, for the CCTV 20 [VIDEO IS SHOWN] 20 footage obviously it only captures one frame a second 21 21 versus 24 frames a second, so that explains the difference Chair, perhaps just to round it out, the shape 22 22 between those sources of footage. that's moving through the field of view is representative 23 23 [15:35] [VIDEO SHOWN] of the lead group. The single red dot is the single pylon. 24 MS LE ROUX: 24 The V-shape red is the other pylon. The blue line at the And then finally, Chair, V5 25 which deals with shooting at scene 1. It has a number of top is the fence. Page 37022 Page 37024 parts. If we could pause after part 1 and skip part 2 1 [VIDEO IS SHOWN] because that is the subject Mr Lubbe's contention this 2 Chair, that's Nyala 3 beginning to deploy its 3 wire. morning that what's observed in that part is in fact the 4 [VIDEO IS SHOWN] plastic wad of the cartridge. So we don't need to look at that part of this annexure, but if we can play part 1 and 5 Chair, the yellow indicates the field of view of this photograph taken at this point in time. then I'll advise Mr Bennett when to skip forward. If we 6 7 [VIDEO IS SHOWN] could then skip this part of the video, if we just fast forward to part 3. No we've gone past part 2. No, no it's 8 Chair, that's Nyala 4 stopping near the single 9 pylon. back. Sorry I'll get the reference in the - if we go to 10 10

[VIDEO IS SHOWN] 11 Chair, you'll note Nyala 5 has started to set off, and then Nyala 4 is on the move again. 12 13 [VIDEO IS SHOWN] 14 Chair, that's Nyala 4 reaching the kraal. 15 [VIDEO IS SHOWN] 16 Chair, if Mr Bennett could now fast forward to 17:47, then we'll skip the section of V2 that had the four sources displaying simultaneously and pick it up from there 19 to the end where they're played one after each other. So 20 to 17:47. 21 [VIDEO IS SHOWN] 22 [14:51] Chair, the splitting of the group is explained in 23 the affidavit of Mr De Gaan. And, Chair, what he sets out 24 there is that the smaller little group is what he counts to

25 be 37 people coming around the kraal.

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3:20 in the video. There we go and if we can play from 11 there to the end. Chair, this does contain detailed 12 zooming in and the like on the shooting. So again if 13 anyone would like to leave they probably should now. 14 Chair, when the number appears it appears above the puff of 15 dust that has been observed. Chair, here the numbers 16 indicate the number of times we can see someone holding 17 their hand in the air in an apparent cease fire call. 18 Thank you, Chair, that concludes the video presentations. 19 Yes, Chair, if I could. 20 [15:54] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. Ms 21 Le Roux, I must confess I was under the impression that we were going to stop at 4:00 today and I told one of the 23 commissioners that that was so and he made arrangements on the strength of it. When you asked me if we could on -

when you told you wanted to go on till quarter past four I

Page 37025 assumed that we could. But perhaps we can try to solve the problem by being very prompt tomorrow starting on the dot 2 3 9:00, quarter of an hour breaks to ensure that you get the full period tomorrow morning. We've got a couple of 5 minutes left, but -MS LE ROUX: 6 Chair, is it at all possible 7 to start before 9:00 or finish a little after 1:00, 1:30 -8 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya, what would you 9 say to us starting at quarter to nine tomorrow? 10 MR SEMENYA SC: Even if you started at 11 7:00 it's fine, but I have intimated -12 CHAIRPERSON: Don't push the envelope too 13 far. 14 MR SEMENYA SC: I want to make a 15 different point that have intimated that Mr De Rover had to leave by 1:00 and -16 17 CHAIRPERSON: By? 18 MR SEMENYA SC: By 1 o'clock, so we can 19 leave the time before the time that that would not 20 inconvenience him. 21 CHAIRPERSON: Is half past eight possible 22 for everybody? All right let's make a vigorous effort, 23 daadwerklike poging to start at half past eight tomorrow 24 and we will also try to cut - well confine the breaks to quarter of an hour, definitely quarter of an hour to give 25 Page 37026 you the maximum time. You heard we have to stop at 1:00. 1 But you have quite a lot of material to think about 2 3 overnight, so it's probably appropriate to stop at this stage anyway. All right we'll adjourn now until half past 5 eight tomorrow morning. Please half past eight. 6 [COMMISSION ADJOURNED] 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 23

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