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TRANSCRIPTION OF THE

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

MARIKANA

BEFORE TRIBUNAL

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FARLAM (RETIRED) - CHAIRPERSON MR TOKOTA SC MS HEMRAJ SC

HELD ON

DAY 140 30 OCTOBER 2013 PAGES 15043 TO 15249



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Page 15043 Page 15045 [PROCEEDINGS ON 30 OCTOBER 2013] with the editors and the media houses and there was an undertaking that all footage which was shown or not shown 2 [09:07] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. 3 Colonel, you're still under oath. would be made available to us because we explained that 4 **DUNCAN GEORGE SCOTT:** s.u.o. things that may have no news value that may not be 5 CHAIRPERSON: 5 considered necessary to broadcast, may well assist us in Ms Le Roux, are you going to start cross-examining now? 6 our work and we were given an undertaking that all such 6 7 7 MS LE ROUX: Yes, Chair. footage would be made available to us. That's a matter 8 8 CHAIRPERSON: Please do so. that will have to be taken up with the media houses in due 9 9 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LE ROUX: course. Which is the media house who provided the portions Good 10 to which you are now referring? 10 morning, Colonel Scott. MS LE ROUX: 11 Chair, these were broadcast 11 COLONEL SCOTT: Good morning. 12 12 by Channel 4 in -MS LE ROUX: For the record, the South 13 Where did they get it from? African Human Rights Commission has been allocated the CHAIRPERSON: 13 14 responsibility to cross-examine you on the evidence 14 Who took the footage? submitted by its two experts, Katherine Scott and Gary 15 MS LE ROUX: Chair, I'm not sure. I can 15 White. Have you had the opportunity to review their obtain an instruction on that. I think they had freelance 16 photographer, videographers, cameramen at the scene, but I 17 statements and their annexures? 17 18 COLONEL SCOTT: I've - yes, some of the can, I'll establish - if there's a different media house 19 annexures maybe not. I saw that was more correspondence 19 that was the source of what they used in the documentary I 20 between the police and the Human Rights Commission and so 20 can establish that. 21 on, but specifically the annexure 6 which goes from A to G, 21 CHAIRPERSON: The footage we saw last 22 I had a look at those. 22 time was a copy of the original from which it's not clear, 23 MS LE ROUX: 23 Thank you. in fact it's not there at all, what time the particular 24 COLONEL SCOTT: 24 And of course - sorry, footage was taken, which is the reason why we wanted to see 25 and Katherine White's the original, if we can get it, as we should be able to. Page 15044 Page 15046 MS LE ROUX: Katherine Scott. 1 The footage you're now going to show us, can you tell us at 2 2 COLONEL SCOTT: Katherine Scott's, the what time it was taken? 3 movie footage that she has and so on as well, yes. 3 MS LE ROUX: Yes, Chair, let me just put 4 MS LE ROUX: Yes, thank you. And I plan this in context. This is the only aspect that we've been 5 to begin with the evidence of Katherine Scott and we should able to identify of the footage that is used in this be able to move through that fairly quickly, and then I'll 6 6 Channel 4 documentary that has not previously been provided 7 to the Commission. It lasts about 15 seconds in total. 7 proceed to the statement of Gary White. I should make 8 Five seconds of that is relevant to Gary White's statement 8 clear that we are not going to repeat every aspect of Mr 9 White's statement with you in cross-examination. We've because it formed part of the basis of annexure GW6.A, selected certain topics that we want to cover with you. Of 10 which is the analysis of the route taken by the protesters. 10 11 So -11 course if there are other issues you'd want to address, I 12 12 assume your counsel will invite you to do that in re-CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, but the question 13 examination, and of course your confirmation the last time 13 I asked you was can you tell us - if you don't know, you 14 don't know, but can you tell us at what time that 14 you were here that the annexure 6, GW6.A to F appeared 15 15 particular footage which you're now going to show us was accurate to you has also enabled us to shorten our cross-16 taken? 16 examination. So thank you for that confirmation. 17 Chair, I'd like to start though with a 17 MS LE ROUX: Yes, Chair, it's, the relevant portion that we need for the annexure is eTV time 18 housekeeping matter, which is footage that was broadcast on 18 Channel 4 in the United Kingdom, which we believe had not 19 to 15:52:13. This is when Nyala 4 arrives at the previously been provided to the Commission, formed part kraal, which we put at 15:52:03 eTV time. So it's a few 20 21 of -21 seconds after Nyala 4 has arrived at the kraal, and when 22 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I must say I'm very 22 incident 2 is alleged to have taken place. Now this distressed about that, distressed not only about that 23 CHAIRPERSON: It's going to be an footage, but other footage that was also shown here last 24 exhibit, is it? time. Before we started hearing evidence we had a meeting 25 MS LE ROUX: Yes, Chair, we can -RCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

Page 15047 Page 15049 CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps we can be told by before us as an exhibit, or is it not possible to do that? 1 Ms Pillay or Mr Chaskalson what the appropriate exhibit 2 MR CHASKALSON SC: 2 No, it's not - to the number will be. 3 3 best of our knowledge it's not footage that is part of any MS PILLAY: 4 Chair, it will be JJJ197. 4 of the video footage that we have already seen, although -5 5 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. How do I CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so it's unlikely describe it? Portion of video clip from? 6 therefore that this 15 seconds is all the videographer 6 7 From Channel 4. 7 MS LE ROUX: took, so there must be other material, on the 8 CHAIRPERSON: From Channel 4 broadcast. 8 probabilities, available, which should be before us. 9 9 MS LE ROUX: That's correct, Chair. MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, save for the 10 CHAIRPERSON: 10 possibility that this clip is taken by one of the media Thank you. Are you able to tell us from what you've ascertained who took this and 11 11 houses that used all of its other footage in public 12 12 whether - I take it, it's part of a longer video. You say broadcast material that we have seen. So it could be that 13 a good deal of what was shown on the Channel 4 broadcast 13 this is an off-cut, it's possible that this is the only 14 has already been seen by the Commission. Now this is that 14 off-cut that we haven't seen from that video house, from little extract, but is this an extract from a longer video 15 15 that media house. which we've already seen, and do you know who took it? 16 16 CHAIRPERSON: I see, alright. Thank you 17 17 You'll understand that the context of the extract is very much. Yes, please proceed, Ms Le Roux. 18 sometimes very important and I'm not suggesting that any 18 MS LE ROUX: Chair, just to clarify, we 19 attempt is being made to mislead us, but it's nevertheless 19 intend to show 15 seconds, but there's only about five 20 relevant for us to be able to assess the importance, if 20 seconds of that that has not previously been shown. So 21 any, of this clip, as to know where exactly it fits in and 21 we've made it a 15-second clip to place it in the context 22 what the context is. 22 of the documentary programme, but there's only about the 23 23 five seconds, which is eTV time again 15:52:08 to 13, which MS LE ROUX: Chair, I'm instructed that 24 has not previously been before the Commission, so if we 24 we don't know where they obtained this clip, but this 15 seconds is the only part of - it was a dispatcher's 25 could play that clip now. Page 15048 Page 15050 documentary programme on Channel 4. This is the only 1 CHAIRPERSON: I'm not sure that I 1 understand that, but don't delay over that. Just please 2 aspect of that documentary that has not previously been 3 provided to the Commission, so for completeness sake that's 3 proceed. 4 why we wanted to just start with playing it this morning. 4 [VIDEO SHOWN] 5 CHAIRPERSON: 5 MS LF ROUX: That's it, Chair. If I can Before you proceed, perhaps 6 we can ask Mr Chaskalson, who's gone to a lot of trouble to 6 now -7 CHAIRPERSON: 7 familiarise himself with all the relevant and irrelevant Sorry, I think you'd better 8 videos, if he has any comment to make about this particular go back and start again because it went past so fast I 9 video clip we're now going to see. couldn't see the relevant bit, but please could we see 10 MR CHASKALSON SC: I don't have anything 10 perhaps from the time when the Provincial Commissioner specific to say in relation to this clip, beyond that I 11 stops speaking? 11 12 broadly agree with the Human Rights Commission's analysis 12 [VIDEO SHOWN] 13 13 Thank you, Chair. Colonel of where it fits in, in terms of the chronology. We don't MS LE ROUX: 14 know who the original photographer was. We haven't an 14 Scott, if I could now commence your cross-examination, and 15 original timestamp for the video, but from what it 15 I'd like to do that by looking at how exhibit L, one 16 describes and a number of -16 particular aspect of how exhibit L explains a critical part 17 CHAIRPERSON: But what -17 of scene 1, which is the subject of Katherine Scott's

19 CHAIRPERSON: What it depicts.
20 MR CHASKALSON SC: - we can locate it and
21 we agree with the analysis of the South African Human
22 Rights Commission as to where it is to be located.
23 CHAIRPERSON: It's not possible to fit it
24 into other footage we've already seen? In other words say
25 that this must be an extract from a clip which is already

What it depicts -

MR CHASKALSON SC:

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18

perhaps from the time when the Provincial Commissioner stops speaking?

[VIDEO SHOWN]

MS LE ROUX: Thank you, Chair. Colonel

Scott, if I could now commence your cross-examination, and I'd like to do that by looking at how exhibit L, one particular aspect of how exhibit L explains a critical part of scene 1, which is the subject of Katherine Scott's expert evidence. If we could start in exhibit L at slide 188, and Colonel, slide 188 is a video and photo summary of incidents, and if we could queue it up to just before the eight-minute mark in that slide, it proceeds for just under half an hour, that whole part of exhibit L, but specifically the aspect I want to focus on with you is at the eight-minute mark, if we could go there, please.

Chair, we seem to be having some difficulty, if I should

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evidence?

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Page 15054

I'm aware that was raised

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just describe what appears there. 1

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well let's ask those who are assisting us from the technical side whether the

4 difficulty is insoluble, or whether it's likely to be

solved in the next minute or two. Can you tell us whether 5

6 we're likely to see the clip, or the section of the clip

7 which - we won't be able to. I'm afraid you will have to

8 describe it for us.

> MS LE ROUX: That's fine, Chair. As you'll recall, this video and photo summary, it's

photographs and video clips, and it's interspersed with 11

black slides with white writing where the SAPS narrative 12

13 unfolds. At the eight-minute mark is one of those slides

14 which states in part, and this is the only relevant part,

but that slide states, "The shooting lasts eight seconds 15

16 until the cease fire is called by members who can see the

17 threat no longer exists." This is a slide that appears

18 just before the Reuters footage is shown. So again,

19 Colonel Scott, the slide says "The shooting lasts eight

20 seconds until the cease fire is called by members who can

21 see the threat no longer exists," and I'd like to focus

22 on -

25

23 CHAIRPERSON: I see you nod your head.

24 You remember that passage in the slide?

COLONEL SCOTT: I do, Chair.

yes. 8 MS LE ROUX: And Chair, on the basis of 9 both that slide in exhibit L, as well as the uncertainty

COLONEL SCOTT:

10 that had arisen from Mr Magidiwana's evidence, the Human

live ammunition used after the volley of fire at scene 1?

Are you aware that there was that issue that arose in his

with regard to him, yes, specifically who was part of the

group right at the front, so as far as that is concerned,

11 Rights Commission instructed Katherine Scott, who is, to

12 put it colloquially, she's a sound expert, to analyse the

13 Reuters footage -

14 CHAIRPERSON: Expert on sound?

15 MS LE ROUX: Correct, and a sound expert as well, Chair. So we instructed Ms Scott to analyse the

17 Reuters footage to determine whether she could analyse and

distinguish between the different sounds that you hear in

19 that footage to try to identify the different weapons that

20 are being used, and the video which is attached to her

21 statement as KS1 is the one manifestation of that analysis,

22 but I'd like to start with the Reuters footage because our 23 submission will be that, and you've just testified that you

24 came to the conclusion that the shooting lasted only eight

25 seconds having heard the Reuters footage, and the Human

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CHAIRPERSON: Did you write it yourself? 1

2 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.

3 MS LE ROUX: And Colonel Scott, of course

4 there's three pieces of information there. The first is

5 the statement the shooting lasts eight seconds. The second

is that the shooting lasts until cease fire was called, and 6

7 then thirdly that it ceases because members could see the

8 threat no longer existed, and this claim that the shooting

9 only lasted eight seconds has been repeated many times both

10 within the Commission and outside of it, but the only place

11 where we see that statement that the shooting lasts eight

12 seconds is in exhibit L. Who provided that information to

13 you when you were preparing that portion of exhibit L, that

14 the shooting lasted eight seconds?

15 COLONEL SCOTT: That was my own analysis

from watching the video footage from, I think it was 16

Reuters, understanding the speaking about the actual scene 17

18 1, and with regard to the live fire aspect of it, not the

19 rubber rounds that were being shot. So it was aimed to be

at that line of mixture of TRT and POP members that

21 initially engaged for that amount of time. That's what it

22 was talking to.

23

MS LE ROUX: And Colonel Scott, are you

24 aware that when Mr Magidiwana gave evidence, there was some

uncertainty as to whether there was other live fire, other

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Rights Commission's submission and the finding by Ms Scott

is that in fact the shooting lasts much longer than just

the eight-second volley, that beyond that time there was

other sharp-pointed ammunition used, which is evidence from

the Reuters clip.

5

12

6 Now the other thing I should flag for you in the 7 Reuters clip is that obviously there's an edit which

8 appears at about 36 seconds into the clip. So what I'd

9 like to do is if we could watch the Reuters clip, which is

10

exhibit UU3, up until that edit point, and if we could

11 pause then.

[VIDEO SHOWN]

13 MR CHASKALSON SC: Chairperson, it just

14 occurs to me that we are going to be watching very

15 distressing footage on a repeated basis, if I understand

16 the route in which this cross-examination is like to

17 proceed and I think an announcement to that effect should

18 be made.

19 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you for bringing that to my attention. You will have heard what Adv Chaskalson 21 said. From now on we're going to see video footage which

22 will include pictures of the bodies of people who were

23 killed at that time, and seeing these pictures will cause

24 great distress to their family and loved ones.

[09:26] So those people in the auditorium today who feel

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that they do not wish to see this footage because they do

- 2 not wish to undergo the pain and distress that seeing this
- 3 footage will cause them, they will be given an opportunity
- 4 to leave and the showing of the footage will only start in
- 5 two minutes' time. Those who wish to leave may do so
- within the next two minutes. When the footage is over, we 6
- 7 will send a message outside so that those who wish to
- 8 return then will be able to do so. About a minute and a
- 9 half have gone since I made the announcement I did. No-one
- else seems to be wishing to go at this stage. A number of 10
- people have left, so perhaps despite the fact that two 11

12 minutes have not elapsed, we can proceed.

13 MS LE ROUX: Thank you, Chair. Colonel

14 Scott, we paused at a point in the Reuters footage where

15 there's an edit, and annexure KS3 to the Katherine Scott

statement sets out the analysis undertaken by the Human 16

Rights Commission team, comparing Reuters footage with 17

water cannon footage and CCTV footage, and through that

comparison and analysis we have concluded that the edit

20 lasts for 35 seconds. Have you had the opportunity to

21 consider that analysis, and do you have any comment on it?

22 COLONEL SCOTT: The judgment I've made

for myself is somebody like a Katherine Scott or the people

24 that have done the objective evidence on the photos and the

25 movies are reputable and, you know, I would go with what

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they say because I'm not an expert in that environment to

- 2 actually go and duplicate their work, or to challenge their
- 3 work. So unless it's proven otherwise, I have no reason to
- 4 doubt what they are saying.
- 5 CHAIRPERSON: You accept, subject to that
- caveat that you've expressed, if someone else proves the 6
- 7 contrary that doesn't matter, but you are prepared to
- 8 accept that that 35-second assessment of the length of the
- 9 pause is correct?

10 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, Chairperson.

11 MS LE ROUX: Thank you, Colonel Scott.

12 Chair, if we could now watch the remainder of the Reuters

13 clip after its edit, and Colonel Scott, if you could

specifically listen out for the sound of shots that we'll 14

15 then get to in the Katherine Scott analysis.

16 [VIDEO SHOWN]

17 Colonel Scott, if I could now ask you to turn to 18 page 10 of Katherine Scott's affidavit, this is a table

19 that has been prepared by Ms Scott.

Are you mentioning her 20 COLONEL SCOTT:

21 first one, not the final obviously?

22 MS LE ROUX: Correct, attached to her

first affidavit, page 10 of that affidavit, and Chair, for 23

housekeeping purposes if we could mark the Katherine Scott

affidavit and its annexures as an exhibit, so it would be

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JJJ198, and Colonel Scott, just to summarise, because I'd

like you to keep this table up when we look at the video

footage, what this table does is it summarises Ms Scott's

analysis and findings and the first column lists under the

5 title "shot number" the 41 shots that she manages to

6 identify, having enhanced and analysed the audio of the

7 Reuters clip. The second column sets out the time in that

8 footage where that shot can be heard, and then the third

9 column sets out the type of shot that she understands it to

10 be. Within that she has managed to identify rifle shots

11 specifically, and those are listed. She's managed to

12 identify, when she says "gunshot, not a rifle," that means

13 it could be a pistol or a shotgun discharging rubber

14 rounds. Shots 5 and 6 are amended in her second statement.

They're listed as "rifle with echo, two noises audible,"

but those in fact she now believes are stun grenades that

17 make the double bang, and then she's identified other

aspects on the audio, such as the calls for cease fire. So

19 for example if we go down the table, we see that there are

20 18 shots that she identifies before the volley of fire.

She then concludes that the volley of fire lasts eight 21

22 seconds, and then the first call for cease fire on the

23 Reuters footage is at 22 seconds, second one a second

24 later, and then she identifies further shots all the way up

to shot number 29, which is where the edit appears.

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1 So if we could now watch KS1 up until the point

of that edit, and Chair, for the members, the family

members and others in the room, what the video footage does

is it's the Reuters footage and then there's a count at the

5 bottom of the screen which counts up the number of shots

6 that she's identifying and correlates those to this table.

7 She also then circles things and highlights things on the

8 video clip, such as for example teargas and stun grenades.

So you'll see those on the video aspects in the footage,

10 and then at the top of the screen are when there are things

11 like a cease fire call or sort of the verbal commands that

12 are given that are audible on the Reuters footage, those

13 appear in script at the top of the screen. So if we could

14 now watch annexure KS1 up to the point of the edit. 15

[VIDEO SHOWN]

16 And if we could pause there. So Colonel Scott, 17 what Ms Scott manages to analyse when she enhances and 18 analyses what they call the gunshot layer of the audio is 19 that up until the point of the edit there were 29 distinct

20 shots heard. 18 of those are rifle shots, and then of

21 course there's the volley lasting eight seconds. But

critically what we are now able to see, if we play the rest

of KS1, is that Ms Scott has identified at least four rifle

shots that follow the edit, and because we know the edit is

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35 seconds long, we know that these rifle shots come 55

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Page 15059 Page 15061 you're putting to him, because he wasn't there. So at best seconds after the first call for cease fire. So if we can 1 for you, you're asking him about the information he 2 watch the end, the rest of KS1. 3 [VIDEO SHOWN] received when he was in the process with his colleague 4 So Chair, that's the first of the rifle shots. 4 Colonel Visser of compiling the presentation. 5 [VIDEO SHOWN] 5 MS LF ROUX: That's correct, Chair. That's the second. 6 6 MR SEMENYA SC: No, Chair, are we asking 7 7 [VIDEO SHOWN] the witness to give us some hearsay even for that matter? 8 That's the third rifle shot. 8 How accurate can that be? 9 9 [VIDEO SHOWN] CHAIRPERSON: Well, in a commission 10 And that's the fourth. hearsay is receivable. Strict rules of evidence don't 10 [VIDEO SHOWN] apply. It's a question of cogency and relevancy, and 11 11 12 12 Colonel Scott, just to summarise, and this is inasmuch as this witness was charged with receiving I'm going to read to you what's set out in Katherine 13 information from various people for the purpose of 13 14 Scott's first affidavit, which is at paragraph 35. So this 14 compiling the presentation, it's not as remote and follows the edit. "There are a further four rifle shots 15 irrelevant as would otherwise be, but let's hear, is there 16 audible at timestamp 42:16, 44:18, 50:04, and 53:10, as 16 anything further you want to say? I mean she's just asking 17 well as additional gunshots at 46:10, 54:03, 58:00, and 17 - well, let's get her question precisely now in the light 18 01:01:16." Her analysis concludes that, "The first of 18 of your objection and let's see whether, how we deal with 19 these is not from a rifle, but is more likely to be from a 19 it then. 20 pistol or a shotgun firing non-lethal rubber rounds. 20 MR SEMENYA SC: What possible threat 21 However, the remaining three discharges could potentially 21 could there have been at time, is the question. How can 22 be from a rifle at distance and therefore I've labelled 22 this witness ever be able to answer that question? 23 23 these as gunshot in the appendix as I'm unable to rule out CHAIRPERSON: The question so phrased 24 24 that these originated from rifles. If they are not rifle clearly goes too far, doesn't it? 25 25 discharges they are likely to be from pistols or shotguns MS LE ROUX: Well, Chair, let me rephrase Page 15060 Page 15062 it then. Colonel Scott, are you aware of any information firing non-lethal rubber rounds." So despite Ms Scott's 1 of a threat existing after the eight-second volley that 2 best efforts there is at least some ambiguity and there may 3 potentially be a further three rifle shots, but she cannot 3 would justify the use of rifles? 4 conclude that. 4 COLONEL SCOTT: No, I'm not aware of 5 5 any – What she can conclude though is summarised in 6 CHAIRPERSON: paragraph 36, as amended by her second affidavit, which I take it you're talking 6 7 states in summary, "Audible in the footage provided, 7 about scene 1. 8 MS LE ROUX: Correct, Chair. 8 following the initial call for cease fire, are at least 9 9 CHAIRPERSON: Before we carry on, eight apparent rifle discharges and seven other gunshots. 10 Colonel, do you know what the time interval was between the 10 The eight discharges follow the edit, starting at 42:16, 11 incident at scene 1 and the incident at scene 2? 11 and come approximately 55 seconds after the first audible 12 call for cease fire, which is at 22:09, and include at 12 COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, just doing 13 13 least four rifle discharges." the math, it was approximately 15 minutes or thereabout, I 14 14 would think. Now Colonel Scott, in light of Ms Scott's 15 15 CHAIRPERSON: analysis that there are still rifles being used 55 seconds So any sounds that sound after the first call for cease fire, and certainly after 16 like rifle shots or gunshots that are in this little 17 the volley which, as you put in exhibit L, only lasts eight 17 section that we're dealing with could not have come from 18 18 seconds, are you aware of any information of what possibly scene 2. 19 19 threat was still being perceived by your members at scene 1 COLONEL SCOTT: No, but may well have 20 at that time? originated from around the back of the kraal with members 21 MR SEMENYA SC: No, Chair, surely this 21 still, we knew there were policemen still around that area 22 witness cannot testify to that. 22 in armoured vehicles -CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I take it you're 23 MR SEMENYA SC: 23 This is the conjecture, 24 asking him for information he received. I mean he can't be 24 Chair, which I object to. aware from his own knowledge of any of the things that 25 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, to take you ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

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    back to where we started with this, in exhibit L, and in
    slide 188 at the eight-minute mark, the SAPS narrative says
2
3
    the shooting lasts eight seconds -
4
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                  Starts, I think you mean
5
    eight seconds.
6
           MS LE ROUX:
                                No, eight-minute, in that
7
    slide. The SAPS narrative states, "The shooting lasts
    eight seconds until cease fire is called by members who can
8
9
    see the threat no longer exists." Katherine Scott has
10
    analysed that Reuters footage and concluded that there are
11
    rifle shots at least 55 seconds after cease fire is called,
12
    and what I'm trying to establish from you in terms of when
13
    that SAPS narrative was introduced into exhibit L, did you
14
    have any information that there was a threat that justified
    the use of rifles beyond the eight-second volley?
15
           CHAIRPERSON:
16
                                  I'll allow the question
17
    framed in that fashion.
18
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     No. I didn't.
19
           MS LE ROUX:
                                Colonel Scott, I'd now like
20
    to move on to scene 2 and you testified earlier that
21
    working out what happened at scene 2 became your baby.
22
    Those were the words you used, and you said that it had
23
    been a vague area for SAPS and that you tried to build up a
    picture of what happened through October last year. Do you
24
25
    recall that testimony?
                                                       Page 15064
1
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     Yes, I do. Just to
    clarify, though, IPID obviously would be investigating it
2
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Page 15065 who was there assisting you, was it you and Colonel Visser? 2 COLONEL SCOTT: Colonel Visser wasn't 3 there, he was working on the remainder of the presentation 4 still. I think it was predominantly myself, I'm not sure 5 which other police officers were there and then the SAPS 6 legal team. 7 MS LE ROUX: Okay and then to clarify, 8 people were called in one by one -9 CHAIRPERSON: The SAPS legal team, I take 10 it you mean like Captain Moolman or -11 COLONEL SCOTT: No, the -12 CHAIRPERSON: Oh. 13 MS LE ROUX: And, Colonel Scott, the 14 members you said were called in one by one, who were they, 15 was that everybody who was at scene 2 or only certain people? Who was actually called in? 16 17 COLONEL SCOTT: I can't testify that 18 everybody that was there was there, I didn't do the call 19 up, but they were grouped into their different groupings. 20 So Captain Kidd's group and the people that were with him, but I'm aware that it was quite a large group that he had, 21 22 but I'm pretty sure that whole group wasn't there. And 23 similar with the K9, I think the NIU was represented as well, but again not all the members. I think that some of the groupings only had some of their commanders or one or Page 15066 two others with them because they come from extensive areas around the country to bring them all in. So I think it was a slightly smaller group than was actually present at scene 2, but people representing the groups and then as many a 5 could be brought in were brought in. And did you arrange that 6 MS LE ROUX: 7 call up? 8 COLONEL SCOTT: No. 9 MS LE ROUX: Did you identify who you 10 wanted to be called up? 11 COLONEL SCOTT: No. It wasn't done by 12 me. I'm not sure who did the actual call up, but I also 13

3 further, but for the purposes of the presentation that's 4 what I was referring to with becoming my baby, to try to 5 reflect it as best as I could. [09:46] MS LE ROUX: 6 Thank you for that clarification, that is the ambit of my question for the 7 8 purposes of your understanding of what happened. How did 9 you go about establishing what happened at scene 2? 10 COLONEL SCOTT: At Roots I think there may have been a grouping that would have come to Colonel 11 12 Visser with what information they had. I think it would 13 have started there already and then somewhere around the first week of October, I think it's around the first week 14 15 of October, we were still not clear at all. So we called 16 together the groupings of people that were at scene 2 to a 17 conference room where we allowed them to come in one by 18 one. This was the time period that I'd taken the 19 photographs that I had around scene 2 and tried to time sequence them and I actually displayed them on a wall in 21 time sequence so that the members could actually go and identify where they were, from the air now. And then sit 22 and tell us how they arrived, what they were doing there 24 etcetera to try and give us a better idea. MS LE ROUX: And just so I understand,

a slightly smaller group than was actually present at scene
2, but people representing the groups and then as many a
could be brought in were brought in.

MS LE ROUX: And did you arrange that
call up?

COLONEL SCOTT: No.

MS LE ROUX: Did you identify who you
wanted to be called up?

COLONEL SCOTT: No. It wasn't done by
me. I'm not sure who did the actual call up, but I also
didn't identify the persons specifically that were called
up. I was part of a group just to listen and to try and
reconstruct what they were saying.

MS LE ROUX: Okay and when the members
came in one by one, first of all did any of them bring you
anything that enabled you to establish what had happened at
scene 2? Did you bring you cell phone footage, did they
bring you photographs, did they bring you notes or diaries
or anything?

COLONEL SCOTT: Not notes and diaries,
I'm just trying to think when Captain Ryland gave me his
footage. It may have been there or it may have been
earlier, but I think – if I think of Sergeant Mohlatsi with

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Well I was working with

Page 15069

Page 15067 his iPhone he was made aware to me there that he had 2 footage. I remember there was difficulty in downloading 3 his footage and how it got to me I'm not too sure. He may 4 have emailed it or downloaded it, but I don't think we 5 could open it at the time, but we viewed it on his phone for that matter -6 7 MS LE ROUX: And other than Captain 8 Ryland and Sergeant Mohlatsi did -9 CHAIRPERSON: I think he was saying something else before you started your question. Do you 10 want to add something before the next question is put? 11 12 COLONEL SCOTT: No I was just saying I 13 viewed it, it wasn't in front of the whole meeting. 14 MS LE ROUX: Other than Captain Ryland and Sergeant Mohlatsi did you receive any other cell phone 15 footage or video footage, photograph footage from anyone? 16 COLONEL SCOTT: 17 Not that I can recall. 18 CHAIRPERSON: Are you referring to from 19 the people involved in scene 2 because there was a lot of 20 other footage he got obviously? 21 MS LE ROUX: Yes, Captain Scott, my questions are on this day when members were coming in one 22 23 by one, that's what I'm asking you. 24 **COLONEL SCOTT:** I don't recall receiving 25 anything other than those and I think it was actually maybe

the photographs and as you can see the photographs would actually show the positioning of the people. So in listening to what they were saying - I don't recall specifically back to that, but I tried to as accurately, as best then reflect thereafter in exhibit L what I had been 6 told, knowing where the dog unit was, etcetera. 7 MS LE ROUX: And approximately how long 8 was each member or each group with you if you had 40 to 50 9 in a day? 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Well it varied. So it 11 varied between the amount of members and you know whether 12 somebody in the group as a commander got up and represented 13 because they were given the opportunity first to go and 14 view the photographs to orientate themselves to see where 15 they were. I'm just trying to recall, but I think at times there may have been a commander that spoke to his group and 17 then reflected and at other times there were also individuals that would come out just to explain their role 19 and where they were. But anything from a half an hour, it's difficult to say. Some groups may have been a half an 21 hour, others may have been an hour. 22 MS LE ROUX: And did those groups refer 23 to any notes when they were addressing you? 24 COLONEL SCOTT: No. I don't recall them having notes. We would put up the photograph of the scene

just Sergeant Mohlatsi. I think Ryland may have given his 1 2 footage earlier, but I don't recall receiving any other 3 than that, no. MS LE ROUX: And could you hear audio on 4 5 the footage when you watched it on the cell phone? COLONEL SCOTT: I don't recall either. I 6 7 think that was one of the issues we had was that we could 8 eventually view it, but not hear it. Something to that 9 effect, I'm just trying to remember as you're bringing it 10 up. 11 MS LE ROUX: Through the course of the day how many members do you think came in that you 12 13 interviewed? 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Well as I say, they came 15 in, in groups, so it would be a whole group, but I would probably estimate between 40 to 50. 16 17 MS LE ROUX: Okay and did you take notes 18 of what was being said or was it recorded in any way? 19 COLONEL SCOTT: I didn't take notes, I'm not sure if there was a record taker there, but I didn't 20 21 no. 22 MS LE ROUX: How did you take the information they gave you that day and put it into exhibit 23 24 L?

COLONEL SCOTT:

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25

3 MS LE ROUX: 4 what they were telling you? 5 COLONEL SCOTT: 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 So it was trying to understand who faced what threat where, 20 who could maybe say this specific person I shot because at 21 Roots we were dealing with commanders. And that becomes possibly even up to third hand hearsay knowledge because

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as such with all the vehicles and they would come and point themselves out and basically tell us where they were. And then how did you record I don't recall now, but or I may have been working on the slide show while they were actually there in trying to summarise what they were saying and then saying well that must have been an incident 1, trying to work out. I think by then - I'm not sure if I had the Protea Coin footage already but I tried to analyse that quite in depth, to watch the movement of the vehicles. And to see who was where, so it was just a matter of understanding what went on, on the ground. The broader knowledge of understanding who came form what direction that I already knew and I think I showed that already at Roots where we could see arrows. But it was trying to figure beyond that now, who and why and we were aware we had to try and account for everybody as far as we could.

RealTime Transcriptions Email: realtime@mweb.co.za

you've got commander represents there. He speaks to

possibly a team leader back at the unit who's interviewed

his individuals and he gets the report and reports to Roots

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                                                                                                                         Page 15073
    now with information that he has. And I thought that was
                                                                       he could understand what the shooting was about.
                                                                   2
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
2
    maybe why it was so vague around scene 2 and that maybe
                                                                                                   Colonel Scott, could you go
3
    talking to a broader group or to the individuals that were
                                                                   3
                                                                       to exhibit SSS7 which is a statement from Warrant Officer
4
    on ground may help.
                                                                   4
                                                                       Myburgh? Are you familiar with that statement?
                                                                   5
5
           COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ:
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       I haven't read it, no.
                                            Colonel, did you
                                                                                                   If we could display - yes
    compile any narrative as a result of these interviews?
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                   6
6
7
                                                                   7
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    No, Ma'am. I don't
                                                                       and specifically paragraph 3 please.
                                                                   8
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
8
    recall how I actually - but I worked a lot from memory, I
                                                                                                     Have you read the statement
                                                                   9
9
    normally do. But I don't recall taking notes at Roots, not
10
    at Roots, at the Rustenburg venue.
                                                                   10
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       I haven't, Chairperson,
11
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                   11
                                                                       but I'll follow on the screen.
                                  The people whom you were
                                                                   12
12
    interviewing had they already made statements to IPID?
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     Do you wish to read it for
13
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    As far as I knew yes,
                                                                   13
                                                                       a short while before you answer questions on it?
14
    Chairperson, and I'm not sure if the strategy was to call
                                                                   14
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       I'm happy to continue,
    up those that had said that they had fired their firearms.
                                                                   15
15
                                                                       but I'm not sure if that's legally wise, I don't know.
16
    So I'm not too sure about that, but anyone that had said
                                                                   16
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     Miss Le Roux, is it
17
    they had fired, had provided warning statements, I think
                                                                   17
                                                                       necessary for you to ask these questions at this point in
18
    within a day or two after the actual incident and they may
                                                                   18
                                                                       the cross-examination or could it stand over until after
19
    have been identified in that way.
                                                                   19
                                                                       tea with the witness being given an opportunity to read the
                                                                       statement during the tea adjournment?
20
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                  What I was leading up to
                                                                   20
21
    was when you performed the exercise you're describing now
                                                                  21
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   Chair, he could read it
22
    did you have copies of the statements that these people had
                                                                  22
                                                                       during tea, but very briefly, I mean, Colonel Scott, you
23
    made beforehand?
                                                                   23
                                                                       haven't read this statement before?
           COLONEL SCOTT:
24
                                                                   24
                                    No.
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       No.
25
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                  25
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                  So you didn't use any
                                                                                                   Of Warrant Officer Myburgh,
                                                      Page 15072
                                                                                                                         Page 15074
    statements that had been taken in that way for the purposes
1
                                                                       you're not familiar at all? Then that curtails my cross-
    of your work?
2
                                                                   2
                                                                       examination on that in any event, Chair.
3
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                   No.
                                                                   3
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     Yes, I understand that, but
4
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 Thank you.
                                                                   4
                                                                       I don't want to stop you unnecessarily and unfairly. But
5
           MS LE ROUX:
                               Colonel Scott, other than
                                                                       on the other hand I've got to be fair to the witness as
    this one day when 40 to 50 members came in to point things
                                                                   6
                                                                       well. So if it's - I don't know how sequentially prepared
6
7
                                                                   7
    out on photographs did you do anything else to establish
                                                                       your cross-examination is, if you can return to this topic
    what happened at scene 2?
                                                                   8
8
                                                                       after tea, after he's had an opportunity to read the
9
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                   9
                                   Just for the record it
                                                                       statement then I think the witness would be better able to
    was two days, not for exhibit L that I can recall, no. I
                                                                   10
10
                                                                       answer your questions.
    did thereafter help Mr De Rover when he came out to become
11
                                                                   11
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   Chair, that's fine. Colonel
12
    the police's expert witness and he need to be orientated.
                                                                   12
                                                                       Scott, let me ask you another way. Are you aware of the
13
    I then went with him to scene 2 as well, but not for the
                                                                   13
                                                                       allegation that a constable in the NIU unit shot a
14
    purposes of exhibit L, no.
                                                                   14
                                                                       protester at close range using his service pistol? Are you
15
           MS LE ROUX:
                                                                   15
                               When you say you oriented Mr
                                                                       aware of that allegation?
    De Rover at scene 2, was that taking him there or what do
                                                                   16
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       Yes.
17
    you?
                                                                   17
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   When did you become aware of
18
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                   It was a reconstruction
                                                                   18
                                                                       it?
    of sort, but it's not a reconstruction as we would know it
                                                                   19
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       At that same meeting at
    in an expert or professional sense. It was again just
                                                                   20
                                                                       Rustenburg.
21
    bringing in the different groups of people that on these
                                                                   21
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   And who made you aware of
22 spread sheets had fired, I think, it was more than five
                                                                   22
                                                                       it?
    rounds. For them to explain to us where they were, what
                                                                  23
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       I'm not sure of his rank.
24 they were looking at, etcetera. But again we kind of split
                                                                   24
                                                                       but Myburgh himself actually spoke to that.
25 up around the environment, it was more for his purposes, so
                                                                  25
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   When was this meeting?
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                                                                                                                        Page 15077
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    I think, I think it's the
                                                                       the record that at page 121, paragraph 7.6.13 of Mr White's
1
    first week of October.
                                                                   2
                                                                       final statement he identifies and categorises various
2
3
           MS LE ROUX:
                               And this is the meeting
                                                                   3
                                                                       statements received from members at scene 2, it's not
4
    you've already testified about when members were coming in
                                                                   4
                                                                       relevant for Colonel Scott now because he hasn't seen
                                                                       those, but just for the record that's where they're
5
    to explain -
                                                                   6
6
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                       appearing -
                                   Yes.
7
                                                                   7
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
           MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                     It makes it easier for us
                               - scene 2 to you. And this
                                                                   8
                                                                       when we read the record to cross-reference, thank you.
8
    is before you finished preparing exhibit L?
9
                                                                   9
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    It is, yes.
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                  Thank you Colonel Scott,
10
           MS LE ROUX:
                               Okay, when Warrant Officer
                                                                       if I could ask you to turn to Mr White's final statement
                                                                  10
    Myburgh made you aware of this allegation did you do
                                                                  11
                                                                       and page 118 of that statement please.
11
                                                                  12
12
    anything to investigate it further?
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     Remind me, what is the
13
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    No, I didn't, but it was
                                                                  13
                                                                       exhibit number of the final statement?
14
    passed on to, I'm not sure who, it was passed on I know to
                                                                  14
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                  JJJ178.
    some of the generals who I believe - I don't know the route
                                                                  15
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     Thank you. Did I
15
                                                                       understand you to say you're referring to paragraph 118?
16
    it took from there, but I think it went to IPID for further
                                                                  16
                                                                  17
17
    investigation.
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                  Page 118.
18
           MS LE ROUX:
                               And surely this was
                                                                  18
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     Page 118, paragraph?
    important information, why didn't you include it in exhibit
19
                                                                  19
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   7.6.7. Chair, I'm in your
20
    L?
                                                                  20
                                                                       hands in this regard. What I'd like Colonel Scott to do is
21
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    Because there's not much
                                                                  21
                                                                       read through to page 120 paragraph 7.6.11 to confirm the
    that I've actually said there about any individual
22
                                                                  22
                                                                       factual basis of Mr White's statement. I'm not sure if you
23
    shootings and at that stage it was - well it was an
                                                                  23
                                                                       would like me to read all of it into the record or -
24
    allegation. It was information, but to put it into a
                                                                  24
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     I think that might be an
                                                                  25
25
    presentation and it's still unfounded as to whether it's
                                                                       exercise which would take up a lot of time without much
                                                                                                                        Page 15078
                                                      Page 15076
1
    proven or not.
                                                                       corresponding value to us, but the document already before
2
           MS LE ROUX:
                                But, Colonel Scott, surely
                                                                   2
                                                                       us is an exhibit and we've made arrangements for most of
3
    at that point in time everything was unfounded. Everything
                                                                   3
                                                                       the exhibits except those that will cause distress to
4
    was based on what members told you they saw.
                                                                   4
                                                                       people and one where the identity of the deponent is
5
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    Well that is case, but
                                                                       confidential. We've made arrangements for all the exhibits
    still to put something in like that which could become
                                                                   6
                                                                       to be put onto the website so people who are following the
6
7
    damaging to a specific person and it's as I say unfounded
                                                                   7
                                                                       proceedings will be able to have reference to the exhibits,
                                                                   8
8
    at that stage. But again what's reflected there is the
                                                                       so it's not necessary to read it out. Specifically the
9
                                                                   9
    macro pictures specifically.
                                                                       expert, the final statement of Mr White will be on the
10
                                                                  10
           MS LE ROUX:
                                And are you aware of any
                                                                       website for all those who wish to read it to be able to do
     follow up that's being made on this allegation by IPID or
                                                                  11
11
                                                                       SO.
12
    by anyone else?
                                                                  12
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   Thank you, Chair, but
13
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    No, I'm not.
                                                                  13
                                                                       Colonel Scott, if I could just ask you to read through to
14
           MS LE ROUX:
                                Colonel Scott, with respect
                                                                  14
                                                                       paragraph 7.6.11 on page 120 and if you could tell me if
    to the statements of members at scene 2, did you consider
                                                                       any of the factual statements made there are incorrect to
15
                                                                  15
    all of them when you were preparing exhibit L?
                                                                  16
                                                                       the best of your knowledge.
17
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    Did you say the
                                                                  17
                                                                       [10:06] CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                       But that will also take a
18
    statements?
                                                                  18
                                                                       bit of time. Isn't that something that could also be done
19
            MS LE ROUX:
                                                                       at teatime? Unless this will interfere with your cross-
                                Yes.
20
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    I haven't read the
                                                                  20
                                                                       examination unfairly.
21
     members' statements that were on the ground.
                                                                  21
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                  No, Chair, that's fine.
           MS LE ROUX:
                                Okay, have you ever read
                                                                  22
                                                                       Colonel Scott, if I could ask you to do that -
22
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     You understand time is a
23
    them?
                                                                  23
         COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    No.
                                                                  24
                                                                       very valuable commodity here.
           MS LE ROUX: Chair, just to highlight for
                                                                  25
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                  Yes, Chair. Colonel Scott,
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18

19

2021

22

slide 239 of exhibit L, please.

paragraphs? Are you still -

MS LE ROUX:

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this paragraph.

COLONEL SCOTT:

is the, where we're going and this was the final paragraph,

just go through them to establish the factual accuracy of

Vyory

24 what's contained in there. They cover different topics to

is it still necessary to go through the previous

Page 15079 Page 15081 if you could do that in the tea adjournment. If I could COLONEL SCOTT: Alriaht. 1 ask you then to focus on page 120, paragraph 7.6.11, and if 2 CHAIRPERSON: 2 The paragraphs referred to 3 we could display that paragraph, and Colonel Scott, if I include what appear to be eight specific criticisms of the 4 could direct your attention to the final two sentences of SAPS actions at scene 2, and as I understand it, Ms Le Roux 5 that where Mr White notes that prior to the - that Mr De wants you to tell us whether as far as you can see the 6 factual bases for the criticism are correct. I think Rover believes that at least nine people shot at scene 2 6 7 7 were shot by what he calls incidental fire. Mr White notes that's what you want, is it? he doesn't know how Mr De Rover reached that conclusion. 8 MS LE ROUX: 8 That's correct, thank you, 9 9 Do you know how Mr De Rover reached that conclusion? Chair. 10 No, Chair, surely that 10 MR SEMENYA SC: CHAIRPERSON: But there are eight 11 11 specific points of criticism which he will presumably can't be a question. 12 elaborate on, and I take it she wants to know whether the 12 MS LE ROUX: Chair, let me rephrase. 13 Colonel Scott, do you know the factual basis for Mr De 13 factual basis is in issue. 14 Rover – what Mr De Rover considered factually in reaching 14 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, if I could 15 the conclusion that nine people died through incidental 15 direct you to the third bullet point there, which states, "Lieutenant-Colonel Gaffley started instructing armed 16 fire at scene 2? 17 COLONEL SCOTT: I can only reflect back 17 protesters who were moving around" - oh, sorry, the fourth bullet point. "Shots were fired from an undetermined 18 to the layman reconstruction of scene 2 where the officers 19 were asked to go and stand where they had originally come 19 direction and Lieutenant-Colonel Gaffley determined that to 20 from, or for that matter to then move to where they shot, 20 sweep and clear at that time would be dangerous for the STF 21 21 members as gunfire was heard all around the perimeters of and Mr De Rover would interview them specifically where 22 the koppie." Did you interview Lieutenant-Colonel Gaffley 22 they were, what they were looking at, what they were 23 23 seeing, but again I wasn't present for all of those, so I to prepare this part of exhibit L? 24 24 **COLONEL SCOTT:** don't want to elaborate on what he heard or what he asked. Again I, he was, I think 25 he was at the Rustenburg group as well, so he would have I can't do that, but I know that he spoke to individuals to Page 15080 Page 15082 been there reflecting what he experienced. 1 try and ascertain -2 MS LE ROUX: Do you recall him reflecting 2 CHAIRPERSON: Wouldn't it be better to 3 ask these questions of Mr De Rover? I mean again an 3 what he experienced? Do you? 4 enormous amount of time will be spent if one gets multiple 4 COLONEL SCOTT: No. But I mean, as I 5 hearsay about matters upon which Mr De Rover relied, and say, there were so many people there giving their views on that could prolong the proceedings for a very long time what was going on, so, and I mean Colonel Gaffley and 6 6 7 7 without corresponding value, I wouldn't have thought, but myself did speak at the time and probably on occasions thereafter, being in the same unit. So he would have 8 perhaps these are questions that you should ask Mr De 9 9 Rover, not this witness. reflected at some stage his view to me. 10 10 MS LE ROUX: And when you say you spoke MS LE ROUX: Chair, I will do that. I 11 at the time, do you mean in Marikana on the 16th, or do you 11 just needed to establish from Colonel Scott whether you provided any information to Mr De Rover about scene 2 12 mean at Rustenburg at this debriefing meeting? 12 13 13 specifically on this question of nine people being killed COLONEL SCOTT: As far as I can remember 14 through incidental fire. 14 we did speak on the 16th. I'm not sure whether it would 15 COLONEL SCOTT: 15 have included what is said there now, but we, I remember 16 MS LE ROUX: Then if we could display 16 speaking to him on the 16th afterwards, yes.

about scene 2?

COLONEL SCOTT: Again as to the best of my recollection, and it may be contrary to what he may say in his statement, so that they had moved close to the actual tree line. He had taken the task force members out of the vehicle. He could see the strikers inside the bushes moving backwards and forwards, and he had lined the

recollection what did Lieutenant-Colonel Gaffley tell you

To the best of your

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Can I just ask, if that

Colonel Scott, if you could

MS LE ROUX:

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Page 15083 Page 15085 members up, initially the task force members to start with MS LE ROUX: 1 And then if you turn the 2 a sweeping action, but in doing so he started first page, at paragraph 5.9.2 we see three months' experience in 3 verbally speaking to the strikers, asking them to come out. Public Order Policing based at Unit 2, Diepkloof, and that 4 They were refusing to do that and he said that, I'm not indicates a 2002/2003 date. Is that a typographical error, 5 sure when the shooting started, but he determined that it or were there two instances when you were in that -6 6 was too dangerous to send his members in to the actual COLONEL SCOTT: No, it's the same time. 7 7 environment because he didn't know where the shooting was I'm trying to recall, it was from October, possibly 8 8 coming from at that stage, and it, I think at some stage, October, November of 2002, around to February. My records 9 9 I'm not sure it was then or later that he determined that will reflect that I've been in the unit longer, but in the 10 it was police units that were shooting from different 10 month of February I moved into the Special Task Force 11 sides. 11 selection process, which runs for over half a year, and 12 12 MS LE ROUX: Did he identify which only after that half a year is completed do you physically 13 specific police units he ultimately established had been 13 get transferred. So my police record would show longer, 14 shooting? but my actual time at that time was between three, three 15 COLONEL SCOTT: 15 No, I know that he knew months, maybe a bit more. 16 16 that the dog unit, which was to his rear, 30, 40 metres MS LE ROUX: Okay, so it does appear to 17 back, were shooting past them. So it was also one of the 17 be a typographical error. You were only in Unit 2 18 reasons I think he could his members back into a safe 18 Diepkloof POP in 1992/93. 19 19 position. COLONEL SCOTT: Oh, sorry, I see the 20 MS LE ROUX: Did Lieutenant -20 2000 - yes, yes, that should be 1992/93. 21 CHAIRPERSON: These matters were dealt 21 MS LE ROUX: Okay, so your total POP 22 with in his statement, which is an exhibit. It deals with experience in a POP unit is three to four months in 22 23 these matters in detail. Now if there is something 23 1992/93. 24 24 specific that this witness can help us on, then obviously COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 25 MS LE ROUX: 25 you can ask the question, but I don't see any point in just Okay, and then with respect Page 15084 Page 15086 re-traversing what he says in his statement, what Colonel to your training in POP, at page 12 of your statement is 1 2 Gaffley says in his statement, because that evidence is 2 the only place we can find training in that. This is 3 already before us in the form of his statement. But if 3 paragraph 5.13.2, the second bullet point refers to there is something specific that this witness can help us 4 internal stability course 1992, a six-week POP training. 4 5 on which we won't learn from rereading the statement, you 5 CHAIRPERSON: He amplified that when he 6 can ask about it, but -6 gave evidence. He said it's a six-week course, two weeks 7 MS LE ROUX: 7 of which were POP, according to my note. Thank you, Chair, I was 8 8 planning to move on. Colonel Scott, did you provide any COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, 9 9 assistance to the SAPS legal team when they were preparing Chairperson. their opening statement? Because that seams to go further 10 10 MS LE ROUX: And then, Colonel Scott, if than what you've just testified Lieutenant-Colonel Gaffley we go down to the bullet fourth from the bottom, in your 11 11 12 reported to you. Did you assist in any way with the 12 operational commanders training in 2002, that covered POP 13 opening statement of SAPS regarding incidental fire at 13 as well, correct? 14 scene 2? 14 COLONEL SCOTT: That covered POP. 15 COLONEL SCOTT: 15 Something that is not mentioned here because it wasn't a No. 16 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, I'd now like 16 certified course, when you come to the Public Order unit 17 to turn to your consolidated statement, HHH20. Do you have 17 itself, I had to do a one-week sort of bridging course, that in front of you? And Colonel Scott, I'd like to start 18 18 which then you are permitted to start operating with the with the question of your POP experience because in your 19 Public Order Policing members at that time. 20 statement, if we turn to page 5, paragraph 5.7.3, this MS LE ROUX: Now Colonel Scott, this 21 indicates that in your SAPS career path 1992 you 21 commanders course, that was following the findings of the 22 transferred to the Public Order Police Unit 2 in Diepkloof. Goldstone Commission, correct? How long were you in that unit? 23 COLONEL SCOTT: From my understanding COLONEL SCOTT: Between three to four 24 that's, that was one of the results that the police months. initiated an operational commanders training, yes.

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Page 15087 MS LE ROUX: Okay, and in that training 1 2 course that you undertook in 2002, did you review or 3 consider the recommendations that came out of the Goldstone 4 Commission, specifically relating to Public Order issues? 5 COLONEL SCOTT: I don't think we did, but I know we would have dealt with the Regulation of 6 7 Gatherings Act, which I think is a result of the Goldstone 8 Commission, and then of course the, probably the POPs 9 policy at that time as well as the tactical options, which comes down to the standard operating procedures utilised by 10 11 POPs, which to date hasn't changed much. 12 CHAIRPERSON: If you refer to the book 13 that was published by the Goldstone Commission, or 14 published on behalf of the Goldstone Commission, of which extracts have been put before the Commission, and I think the act then in draft bill form is part of the book. Did 16 you refer to that book? It's got -17 18 COLONEL SCOTT: 19 CHAIRPERSON: You didn't? 20 COLONEL SCOTT: No. I don't recall there being a type of study, prescribed book on the course. 21 CHAIRPERSON: 22 There would have been 23 course material, I take it, that you got at the course? 24 **COLONEL SCOTT:**

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equipment, the development of sophisticated tactical

contingency plans, all these and more must be directed to

3 avoiding the situation we have described for once it

occurs, there is no satisfactory solution." The situation

5 that's being described is having police confront a hostile

6 crowd of demonstrators. So, Colonel Scott, do you agree 7

then that a key aspect of avoiding confrontation between a 8 crowd and police would be good planning, and particularly

9 contingency planning?

> COLONEL SCOTT: I've actually read the extracts which have been put before us and I think it's, they're looking at it in a little bit more of a broader sense than where you're going. They're actually taking it to the point where the crowd has at this stage looked like they may encircle, or are going to get to the place where they're going to force the use of legal force to protect lives for that matter, and, but in saying that, from what I'm reading here as well and from what you've just mentioned and read is that this is where you had the opportunity to have a section 4 meeting in line with the Regulation of Gatherings Act.

There was sufficient time to go ahead and to plan the full protest or march, and in that time period of course that would be something to be considered, and I have built similar plans in the past which actually deal with

Page 15088

CHAIRPERSON: Which perhaps included

Yes, there would, there

2 extracts, but you wouldn't know?

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was.

3 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, if they may have

included extracts out of the book.

5 MS LF ROUX: Chair, I'd like to go to that publication that you're referring to. It's exhibit 6

7 TT1. Colonel Scott, what I'd like to do is identify two

excerpts in that for you, and if you could tell me whether

9 these were covered by that commanders course that you

10 undertook. The first, if I could start at the bottom of

page 36 in exhibit TT1 where it states, "The likelihood of 11

12 the police making a fatal mistake once confronted by the

13 situation by reacting with lethal force either too quickly

or too slowly, is the basis for our most important 14

15 recommendation" -

16 CHAIRPERSON: I would appreciate it if

17 that particular page were enlarged on the screen because

18 I'm afraid I have difficulty in following it on the screen,

19 but perhaps others with sharper eyesight than mine can see

20 it. Ah, that's better.

"Every effort should be made 21 MS LE ROUX: to plan, equip, and train police so that a dangerous

situation does not occur. Explicit advance discussion with

24 the organisers, the use of physical barriers, the movement

of reinforcements, the availability of sub-lethal

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Public Order incidents where the Special Task Force and the

NIU are also involved specifically in roles, from what I've

read in here, without the knowledge of what I've read here,

I've identified as well, and if necessary those can be made

available to the Commission to review. So the fact that

6 it's not taken into consideration, it is taken into

consideration.

The limiting factors however become the fluidity of the operation, the not knowing of what's going on, no hindsight like we have now, and of course at that time the Standing Order 262 as we would know it with an operational commander, with his overall commander and so on, is almost on a smaller type operation because if you look at what we were dealing with, we had formed a JOCCOM where we had a much larger inputting circle into what was actually going on.

So the role of the planner, so to say, is very at liberty of the people within the JOCCOM. Yes, the strategy is presented to the JOCCOM, and then the JOCCOM makes the comments back on the strategy or whether or not, but at that level then it becomes operationalised by the operational commander and the specific operational commanders that are underneath him in their different ambits of the different units. So as I say, moving to where we're going here, I

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don't think this is always applicable, and I agree with

- 2 that they're saying in the good world of placing this type
- 3 of stuff and having the ideal situation to work towards,
- 4 but I think it has to be applied in the context of what we
- 5 were facing and experiencing at Marikana, the uncertainty
- 6 of day-to-day, hour-to-hour, what would be going on, not
- 7 knowing the exact amount of forces that we would be
- receiving every morning to go ahead and to make certain 8

9 contingency plans.

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And maybe just lastly to add is that I do understand that the Commission is very restricted when it comes to viewing presentations and so on, but a presentation is just that; it's something that's presented and then is spoken to. So, and it's difficult for me to recall everything said now, but my rationale of how I would have spoken to that is reflected very much in my statement, the consolidated statement. So to view the contingencies within that planning period as simply what's reflected on screen is not always accurate because it's not the verbal of what was being said, considering that these meetings lasted up to two and a half hours in the morning, is not

22 reflected per se in contemporaneous documents. 23 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, I'd also like 24 to direct your attention to what starts at the bottom of page 37 under the heading "Command and control of police," 25

information given to you on what to do, but in that, after

- 2 you'd put down your ideal plan, you would do a risk
- 3 analysis and in order to identify risks you would obviously
- 4 go through a process of seeing a history of what maybe the
- crowd was capable of doing, what were the inherent risks
- 6 around the environment, key points and things like that.
- 7 But if you did the risk you needed to have a mitigating
- 8 action in order to lower that risk or to try to deal with
- 9 that risk should it occur, and so that is always part of it
- 10 and that's always part of any planning that I still do
- 11 today, is go through those specific - because that then
- 12 will speak to what you've put forward as an operational
- 13 concept and then inside your operational concept you would
- 14 have the ideal of how you'd want it to go, but you would
- 15 have your contingency plans that would run alongside that
- 16 to say should that risk manifest, this is what I need to do
- 17 to try and deal with that risk as best as I can in order to
- 18 minimise the risk and bring it back to normality again as
- 19

far as possible.

COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Ms Le Roux, does this publication deal at all with scenarios where the marches, the protest marches are not planned?

23 MS LE ROUX: Sorry, where the marches

24 are?

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COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Not planned. If

Page 15092

- where it states from the second sentence and then
- continuing on to page 38, "It is of the utmost importance 2
- 3 that the policing of Public Order operations is
- 4 characterised by thorough planning and preparation. Senior
- 5 officers must consider and make contingency plans for
- various scenarios, from those thought to be highly probably 6
- 7 through to those considered possible, however unlikely.
- 8 Through these means the police will avoid being surprised
- 9 by unexpected events and thus retain maximum control over 10

their own officers and the events themselves."

So having done your operational commanders course in 2002, you were made aware of that recommendation, correct, that contingency plans for a range of scenarios, from the highly probable to the possible, however unlikely, that that was a requirement in planning. You were aware of that, correct?

COLONEL SCOTT: Not as it's being stipulated here, but we do have a part of the planning process where we look at contingencies. There's a common thread running throughout. Obviously when you analyse the situation that you would be going towards, as is taught on 22 the operational commanders training, and at my time that I was there all the plans we had to build were for

24 forthcoming events, never for spontaneous events. 25 [10:26] So you had the time and the luxury and the

they do, could you perhaps direct me to that? Because I

seem to recall that this publication deals with all those

that are planned and where there is time for a meeting and

4 proper planning, and that the comments are in relation to

those. If it does in fact refer to unplanned marches,

6 could you perhaps refer me to them?

MS LE ROUX: Commissioner Hemraj, I'll certainly check. My recollection aligns with yours that it deals predominantly with planned gatherings, but of course the submission would be that similar principles would apply whenever encountering a gathering. But I will check that the, I will just confirm that in the adjournment.

COLONEL SCOTT: Maybe if I can just add to that, Commissioners and Ms Le Roux, that was - and again I keep on referring to having the hindsight now of knowing what happened and where everybody was, but when you don't per se have the convenor of that gathering speaking to you and informing you beforehand, or even during of what the intentions are, you're forever playing what we call an Ooda loop. You observe, you orientate yourself, you make decisions, and you act, and continually you're doing that and that is a process on foot that happens when policing operations unfold where you don't have control or don't have the knowledge of where you're going. You're continually observing, orientating yourself to it, deciding

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on what to do, and acting on that, and that's a common

- 2 strategy used in operations in the task force right down to
- 3 the most basic of police operations as well.

4 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, in your

5 experience, whether the gathering is planned or unplanned,

does it change the principles that apply in policing it?

COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when it's planned you have certain advantages because as we say, you've got

8

9 the convenor that would come to you and explain to you what

it's about. You would have your representative from your 10

local government or your municipalities and they would 11

12 assist you as well with the environment that you'd be

13 moving through, what the restrictions are, what the bylaws

14 are, etcetera. So in essence when that meeting dissolves

15 there's an understanding to the convenor of what the

restrictions are and hopefully consensus on where the march 16

can take place, what's the safest routes for everybody, and 17

18 it's amicable for all, and the police know what is expected

19 of them. The police will then go away after that and start

20 doing the risk analysis to say well, should it become

21 rowdy, should it, maybe alcohol start becoming involved and

22 they start breaching the rules, what can we expect, and

23 then you would police it on that. So all of that gives you

24 that time and that's why an operation, operational

25 commander can go and build his plan, brief his lower-level

Page 15097 then taken on the ground. But for instance I'm not aware

of any operational commander's plan that would already

include a dispersion. You don't plan to disperse. That's

brought about by the actions of the gatherers. Thus

5 there's a standard operating procedure that all commanders

6 understand that when we disperse, these are the principles

7 that apply and we are told we need to disperse the crowd

8 because they've violated certain laws, whatever the case

9 may be, and then it's carried out, and the principles again

10 are brought in obviously of the, what is a positive

11 attraction point, the negatives towards the key points,

12 etcetera, etcetera, and the force continuums and the

13 negotiations and dialogue with the crowd. But that's not

14 built into an operational commander's plan. That's a

given. It's a training standard operating procedure that

all those POPs members will understand so that when they're 16

17 told it needs to happen it will be on the spur of a moment.

You can't have an in-depth briefing. They just need to

19 know where do I need to be, where do you want the

20 dispersion action towards, and the commander will take

charge and actually execute it according to standard

22 operating procedures.

> So there are principles that apply even in spontaneous gatherings, if I could put it that way, and we

try to apply them. We try to go into bringing a police

Page 15096

commanders, explain to them where he expects them to be on

2 route, and then actually have the reserves set out so that

3 the contingency plans can be built for instance by the

4 reserve. The plans, the tactical plans can again be built

5 by the lower-level commanders, and this is all before any

of this happens. They will come back, brief the 6

7 operational commander. If he's not happy, he'll send them

away again to make changes. They'll come back, and when 8

9 everybody is satisfied there's a full briefing that will

happen. The time is there. In fact there are times, and 10

we've done this in operations before with POPs where you'll 11

12 actually have a rehearsal possibly even the day before so

13 that people can go to the mission area, orientate

14 themselves, know where they are, see where the danger

15 points are, walk the plan, so that by the time this major

16 march happens, everybody is quite familiar of what should

17 go on, and then it's a matter of observing and starting to

18 catch the early signs of any of the risk issues that were

19 mentioned so that you can start catching them at an early

time, negotiate it again with obviously the convenors of

21 that gathering or march as to we've decided that this can't

22 happen, speak to your people, and obviously if that doesn't

happen then we start moving into what decisions need to be

24 taken after that, if there's defensive measures, if there's

25 necessity for offensive measures, and these are decisions

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presence, not a major police presence, just what we felt

2 was sufficient at Marikana to protect the lives of those

3 policemen going forward because we didn't know what the

4 possible threat of the strikers were after Monday's

interaction. Thus we put the Nyalas forward. Thus I had

6 actually explained in the strategic guidelines, don't

7 enter, exit the vehicles at all to make yourself a visible

8 possible target, in case they had an intention of

9 retaliation possibly for them feeling that some of their

10 colleagues had been killed by the police. We wanted to

limit that as best as we could. There was the TRT line to 11

12 the back of that, because I knew that they had been

13 torching vehicles and I knew that the possibilities there

14 that if they did surround a Public Order vehicle and he

15 couldn't move due to possibly driving over people, that

16 they could start burning the vehicle, which would force the

17 policemen out, and we see this in cash in transit robberies

18 how they get the security guards to exit those vehicles.

19 So there was contingency planning built into everything

20 that I had done. It's not necessarily reflected well in

21 the presentation, but as I say, the reasoning is there.

22 The briefing, I can't recall word for word what I briefed,

23 but I would pretty much have explained the reason why I'm 24 placing people where I did. I think I'll stop there, but

that's just going as far as the phase 1 for instance.

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25 remember the detail of it.

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Page 15099
                                                                                                                            Page 15101
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                 Ms Le Roux, when you reach
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                    Were you ever made aware of
 1
    a suitable stage for us to take the adjournment, would you
 2
                                                                         the sequencing, that teargas and stun grenades were used
 3
     let me know so that we can take it soon?
                                                                         before the attack on the police?
 4
           MS LE ROUX:
                               Chair, we can take it now.
                                                                     4
                                                                                COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        Yes, I - well, "ever"
 5
     It's fine -
                                                                     5
                                                                         means thereafter as well, yes.
 6
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 I'm in your hands.
                                                                     6
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                    When did you come to
 7
           MS LE ROUX:
                               No, we can -
                                                                     7
                                                                         understand that sequencing?
 8
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 I mean if you want to take
                                                                     8
                                                                                COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        I don't know, it could
                                                                     9
 9
     this point further before we adjourn, you're free to do so.
                                                                         have been when I watched the videos, but you know, I mean,
                               No, we can take the
10
           MS LE ROUX:
                                                                         logical deduction also tells me that if the police said
                                                                    10
11
     adjournment now.
                                                                    11
                                                                         they tried to divert or to disburse or to move them, and
                                                                         there were teargas and stun grenades used, I am sure it
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           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 We'll take the tea
                                                                    12
13
     adjournment at this stage.
                                                                    13
                                                                         would have been mentioned there. I just don't recall it
            [COMMISSION ADJOURNS
14
                                          COMMISSION RESUMES]
                                                                    14
                                                                         specifically but it was probably, was said.
15
     [11:02] CHAIRPERSON:
                                    The Commission resumes,
                                                                    15
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                    And when you watched the
     Colonel, you are still under oath. Ms Le Roux?
                                                                         videos of the 13th, that was only after the 16th had
16
17
                                                                    17
                                                                         occurred, correct?
           MS LE ROUX:
                               Thank you, Chair. Colonel
18
    Scott, could I ask you to turn to page 21 of your
                                                                    18
                                                                                COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        Yes.
19
    consolidated statement, HHH20, and paragraph 6.12 Chair,
                                                                    19
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                    Okay, in the briefing to the
20
    for the record, I don't intend to go there, but this is
                                                                    20
                                                                         National Commissioner that you were present for was it made
21
    dealt with in Gary White, page 51, paragraph 5.3.1.
                                                                    21
                                                                         clear that the tear gas and stun grenades were used without
22
                                                                    22
    Colonel Scott, in your statement here, you refer to the
                                                                         command being issued to use them?
23
    briefing given to the National Commissioner by the
                                                                    23
                                                                                COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        No, I don't recall them
24
                                                                    24
    commanders involved in the conflictive incident earlier in
                                                                         mentioning anything about instructional command or -
25
                                                                    25
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
    the day, which had tragic results. This is the incident at
                                                                                                    Okay. And do you recall
                                                        Page 15100
                                                                                                                            Page 15102
                                                                         whether it was briefed to the National Commissioner that
     the railway line on the 13th. In that briefing that you
 1
     present for, was it made clear that there was at least one
 2
                                                                         the teargas and stun grenades were used without any warning
 3
     teargas canister and at least two stun grenades that had
                                                                         to the protesters?
 4
     been fired at the protesters before they attacked the
                                                                     4
                                                                                COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        No, also not. What I do
 5
     police?
                                                                         recall from that was just, I think it was Colonel Merafe
 6
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     I can't say with
                                                                     6
                                                                         actually gave his experience of what he saw but a lot of it
     certainty. I know that the reflection was given of what
                                                                     7
 7
                                                                         had to do with the after effect that he had to carry his
 8
     happened, and it was my understanding then that the police
                                                                         member away, so it was not a nice, it was pretty emotional.
 9
     had tried to just divert them. They probably did mention
                                                                         I don't know if they were themselves struggling to come to
10
     with tear gas and stun grenades to which the attack
                                                                    10
                                                                         terms with exactly what had gone on as well, that's why I
11
     happened. But I don't remember obviously word for word or
                                                                         am not too sure that the detail on the exact sequencing of
                                                                    11
12
     what was said.
                                                                    12
                                                                         everything was given.
13
                                                                    13
            MS LE ROUX:
                                 But specifically on the
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                    Alright. In that briefing
     point that teargas and stun grenades were used before the
                                                                    14
                                                                         to the National Commissioner, was it made clear that the
14
15
     protesters turned and attacked the police, was that briefed
                                                                    15
                                                                         members on the ground wanted to kill Major-General Mpembe
                                                                    16
                                                                         because they thought he was responsible for the deaths of
16
     to the National Commissioner?
17
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     Again, I think - you are
                                                                    17
                                                                         members?
                                                                    18
18
     asking me to recall specifics and it's a bit difficult, I
                                                                                COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        I don't, no, I don't
     wouldn't be able to put 100% to say yes, and I would have
                                                                         remember that being said. I am not sure, I did hear that,
     to rely on, you know deduction again, just to say, but
                                                                         I don't think it was said in that meeting, no. But I did
21
     obviously there is a situation was described of what
                                                                    21
                                                                         pick that up somewhere, that evening still.
22 occurred there, what they intended to do and then obviously
                                                                    22
                                                                                MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                    But you don't recall where
23 that it turned into a confrontation with the strikers but I
                                                                    23
                                                                         you heard of those death threats?
24 don't remember the specific sequencings and so on. I don't
                                                                    24
                                                                                COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        No. I know this, because
```

General Mpembe initially remained behind and where I went

to sleep that night, he went to sleep in the same - it's

- not a bungalow, it's a big mine sort of training hall with 2
- 3 a lot of beds, so I just didn't know if he didn't want to
- 4 go home, or whether he was just feeling a bit unsafe, and
- 5 wanted to remain behind, or sleep where, somewhere where
- 6 close to where I was.
- 7 MS LE ROUX: And did you take any steps
- 8 to investigate the incident further, once you'd heard that
- 9 there had been death threats against Major-General Mpembe?
- 10 COLONEL SCOTT:
- MS LE ROUX: 11 Colonel Scott, if I could
- then ask you to turn to page 39 of your statement in 12
- paragraph 7.14 in particular. Here you set out what you 13
- 14 call a synopsis of the strategic guidelines and
- 15 expectations that you'd appreciated the previous evening in
- the meetings with police senior officers. So these derived 16
- from the JOCCOM meeting held the previous evening, the 17
- 18 evening of the 13th. Correct?
- 19 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, just - the JOCCOM
- 20 was formalised on the Tuesday. This was more an
- 21 informative meeting for the National Commissioner, the
- 22 initial one, and then when she came back from mine
- 23 management, she just wanted to know where to, what do we
- 24 do? What's the way forward? So it was, I think at that
- 25 stage, it was not a JOCCOM meeting, it was more a meeting,
 - Page 15104

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13

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and informative meeting, but yes.

1

- 2 MS LE ROUX: Alright. And then three
- 3 strategic guidelines you said here, that SAPS will enter
- 4 dialogue, they'll protect life and property and they'll
- exercise caution to protect members against any aggression. 5
- 6 Who set those strategic guidelines? Who owns them?
- 7 COLONEL SCOTT: Well, they came from my
- understanding at the end of that meeting. Nothing was said 8
- 9 in specific wording like that. I did understand after
- 10 making the suggestion of the negotiations to the National
- 11 Commissioner, she initially didn't answer to that, she
- 12 moved on, and maybe some time thereafter, came back to
- 13 actually saying what this member said, I think we need to
- 14 follow, we need to go into dialogue with the protesters and
- 15 try to negotiate a peaceful resolution to this. So that
- comes from that. The protection of life and property, I 16
- 17 don't quite recall but that to me would for instance
- 18 emanate from our constitutional obligation as well, and my
- 19 mindset to that was the fact of, we didn't know the next
- 20 day what was going to happen, whether they would go to that
- 21 koppie or not, and whether that was a meeting point for
- 22 them to move elsewhere to continue with what had been going
- on over that weekend for that matter and for that matter on
- 24 the Monday, where they mobilised towards something, so it

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was to look at some measure that we would need to consider

- Page 15105
- the key points of the mine and innocent individuals maybe
- 2 trying to go to work, protecting that in case the mass of
- 3 the group mobilised. And then the last one was something
- that was a deduction given from what happened on Monday,
- 5 that we didn't know the intentions and as I said at that
- 6 stage, the impression I had and I think it was possibly the
- 7 same with the other officers was, this had gone to a level
- 8 which was unprecedented with regard to labour disputes, the
- 9 murdering of police officials and not only that, because it
- 10 could be to a lesser degree, I don't even think justified,
- 11 but if it was just a killing, because they felt they were
- 12 trying to defend themselves but to rob the police officials
- 13 of his weapons and armament etcetera, thereafter showed a
- different intent. So it was to protect the SAPS officials
 - thereafter, so that we wouldn't have a repeat and in saying
- that, it goes deeper than that, by protecting the police
- 17 officials in essence it was also to prevent confrontation
- 18 because inevitably any confrontation then would have
- 19 resulted in probably casualties on both sides.
- 20 MS LE ROUX: And then, Colonel Scott, if
- 21 I could ask you to turn up page 67 of your statement,
- 22 paragraph 8.25. You state there, that the strategic
- 23 guidelines spoke to disarming the strikers, but of course,
- 24 the three strategic guidelines listed on page 39 don't
 - mention disarming strikers. So where did the disarming

Page 15106

- strikers as a strategic guideline come from?
- 2 COLONEL SCOTT: From the OB, that, the OB
- 3 entry made by the Provincial Commissioner and I think we've
- been through that, I am not sure at what stage I was made
- 5 aware of that, but at some stage around the planning it was
- 6 mentioned to me.
- 7 Colonel Scott, I just want MS LE ROUX:
- to get the chronology correct, because I understand the 9 meeting with the National Commissioner comes after the
- 10 Provincial Commissioner makes the entry you are referring
- to in the occurrence book, and for the record, it's entry 11 12
 - 37 in exhibit FFF25.
 - COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct.
- 14 MS LE ROUX: So surely the guidelines set
- 15 at the meeting by the National Commissioner trump what
- 16 comes first from the Provincial Commissioner.
 - COLONEL SCOTT: I don't think -
- 18 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, I am not aware of
- 19 any guidelines said by the National Commissioner.
- 20 COLONEL SCOTT: As I've tried to depict 21 here, there's no specific, this is what's going to happen,
- this is what's going to happen given by the national 22
- 23 command. What in essence they do is, they give in the
- 24 deliberation of that meeting, certain strategies are
 - accepted like, let's go into the dialogue and negotiation,

2

Page 15107 but the National Commissioner for one obviously doesn't know the tactical options open to POPS, should have to be

3 moving in that direction. So she would just give that

4 strategic insight into listening to her commanders, like

5 she did, and acknowledging what was being said, and then

saying, I think we to follow this route. So - but I must 6

7 say that that night, I don't recall any strategy with

regard to a way forward tactically being offered. It was 8

9 more you know, a case of, this is where we are, what do we

do? And all I do recall in detail was that we will enter 10

into dialogue but knowing then obviously at the operational 11

12 levels you need to create the options thereafter, if

13 dialogue evidently doesn't work out.

14 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, I'd now like 15 to move on to the topic of intelligence and intelligence 16 gathering. This is dealt with for the record in Gary 17 White, page 59, section 6.2, where in essence Mr White 18 criticises the adequacy of the intelligence obtained and 19

how that factored into your planning, you deal with this as 20 far as I can tell in your consolidated statement commencing

21 at page 22, paragraph 6.15 and 6.16.

22 CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, will you give that 23

reference again.

24 MS LE ROUX: Page 22, paragraph 6.15 and

25 6.16. Paragraph 6.15 commences, "the second point in an and demonstrators, isn't quite accurate for what was going

on here, is it? If one uses the word "strikers" then I

take that it's more accurate, but -

4 MS LE ROUX: Chair, my understanding had been that some of the people on the koppie were not 6 employees on strike, but I can certainly use the language

7 of strikers or the group sympathetic to the strikers, the

8 people on the koppie.

> CHAIRPERSON: The use of the expression "demonstrators" and "protesters" is also inaccurate, because more inaccurate than talking about strikers covering all of them. It's just a question of language but sometimes if one uses the wrong language one gets the wrong

14 idea. 15

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MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, returning to the incident on the 13th, did you have any information that could help you analyse who was responsible for the police deaths on the 13th of the group of strikers that were present on the koppie? Did you have any information that identified people on the koppie and linked them to the 13th?

COLONEL SCOTT: I was, I am not sure at

22 what stage I became aware that there was video footage, and

23 I understand the process then, it would be handed over to

24 either the crime intelligence or to detectives, to start a

process of trying to identify the individual, and then

Page 15108

appreciation is to analyse the opponent." Now who did you 1

2 view as your opponent?

3 COLONEL SCOTT: It's just to put that

4 into perspective, the opponent here would have been the

5 strikers on the koppie.

6 MS LE ROUX: So was that everybody who

7 was protesting on the koppie, or -

COLONEL SCOTT: 8 At that time -

9 MS LE ROUX: - only a group of them?

COLONEL SCOTT: 10 No, it was at that time,

remember I think we are speaking here still to, prior to 11

12 Tuesday, or maybe into the early hours of Tuesday morning.

13 At that stage it's just known as that group of people

striking there. I wasn't aware yet that there was a 14

15 smaller more militant grouping of them.

16 CHAIRPERSON: Ms Le Roux, you use the 17 expression "people protesting on the koppie." I have tried 18 to, repeatedly too adhere to the nomenclature as "the 19 strikers." People talk about protesters but I am not quite sure what they were protesting about. Also, the people,

21 demonstrators. I am not sure what they were demonstrating

22 about either. I suppose there was the peripheral protest

about the fact that their remuneration was less than

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24 R12 500 a month. To some extent there was a demonstration

about that, but really, to use the language of protesters

Page 15110

obviously trying to identify his place of residence which

would be a starting point to seek to arrest but I think at

some stage possibly, Mr Sinclair did mention that the

issues regarding the unions obviously with his reflections

to the incidents on the Sunday with their intention to go

6 to the NUM office so -

CHAIRPERSON: That is the Saturday.

8 Well, there were two, yes.

9 **COLONEL SCOTT:** Ja.

> CHAIRPERSON: They went on the Saturday,

11 and again they went on the Sunday.

12 COLONEL SCOTT:

> CHAIRPERSON: When they were going on the

Sunday, the two securities were killed. 14

COLONEL SCOTT: That is right. So, but I am just trying to recall whether maybe in those discussions

17 or when he was filling me in on the background, that he

18 mentioned that it's possible that these people were

19 specifically AMCU related. I don't recall specifically but

I recall something in the line of that, the Karee Hostel

21 possibly had something to play with it, because I know I was initially of the impression that the group coming to

the koppie that had the confrontation on the Monday I

24 thought were coming from the Karee Hostel to the koppie. I

didn't know they had moved away from the koppie and somehow

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Page 15113

Page 15111

- were intercepted on the way, and were trying to return to
- 2 the koppie. So that was my understanding at that stage
- 3 that it was an AMCU grouping and that that group
- 4 specifically that had gone away, was possibly just trying
- 5 to join the other, the rest of the major group at the
- koppie, to form a, or the bigger grouping of people that 6
- 7 were there striking.
- MS LE ROUX: 8 Okay, we will come back to
- 9 the people from the Karee Hostel shortly, but just to
- answer my question then, you didn't have any intelligence 10
- that linked particular people present at the incident on 11
- 12 the 13th, to being on the koppie on the 14th, 15th or 16th.
- 13 COLONEL SCOTT: Not that I can recall.
- 14 MS LE ROUX: Thank you. Then you
- 15 mentioned your belief that some of the people who had
- clashed with the police on the Monday came from the Karee 16
- Hostel and that's in your statement page 66, paragraph 17
- 18 8.24.4 where you say that "not all of them, not all of the
- 19 strikers who would need to be dispersed resided in Nkaneng,
- 20 some of them came from the open direction to the west, from
- 21 the Karee Hostel and the surrounding areas. I understood
- 22 many of these to be from a militant group that had clashed
- 23 with police on the Monday, and were still possibly part of
- 24 that group." What was the basis for that information?
- 25 COLONEL SCOTT: Again, I was led to
 - Page 15112
- believe with the inter-union rivalry that the and I can't 1
- quite remember who spoke to me about this, it may have been 2
- 3 one of the mine security that a union would for instance, a
- 4 hostel area would start becoming unionised in a sense, so
- 5 that that group of people at that hostel specifically would
- start all affiliating to a certain union or that those were 6
- 7 affiliated to a union would be dominantly to a specific
- 8 union and this being part of the clash of what happened on
- 9 the Saturday, to my understanding was that the majority
- from the Karee hostel, being AMCU, had tried to move 10
- through the Wonderkop hostel on the Saturday, and the 11
- 12 Wonderkop hostel, being predominantly NUM hostel, had tried
- 13 to prevent the movement towards the NUM office and thus
- that clash happened. So this was the information that I 14
- 15 had received at that time and what my mindset was with
- regard to what I knew. 16
- 17 [11:22] MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, at page 29,
- 18 paragraph 6.34 you repeat along the same lines of what
- you've just testified that based on the information that
- the strikers who had killed the police members came from
- the Karee hostel area to the west. And I don't want you to
- 22 repeat the testimony you've just given about you understood
- 23 the union rivalry and predominance in a particular hostel
- 24 but what was the source of that information, who had told
- you that?

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- COLONEL SCOTT: I can't say with
- certainty. I was chatting obviously with as many people as
- I could around, but predominantly I would speak to Mr
- Graham Sinclair, but I can't say for certainty it was him.
- 5 I received most of my information from him, I don't think
- 6 Mr Dirk Botes was part of the scene at that stage. It
- 7
- could have been from the police official that had gained
- 8 information as well from other sources at Lonmin mine. I
- 9 don't specifically recall.
 - MS LE ROUX: Did you specifically request anyone to verify whether the strikers who had clashed with
- 12 the police on the Monday came from the Karee hostel?
- 13 COLONEL SCOTT: I don't recall doing
- 14 that.
 - CHAIRPERSON: Was it information, direct
- information that the strikers who killed the police, came
- from the Karee hostel as you put it here in Para 6.34? Or 17
- was it an inference that was drawn from the fact that this
- 19 group of people when they were met near the railway line
- 20 were coming from the direction of Karee and the Karee
- 21 hostel?
- 22 COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I think that
- 23 somebody had mentioned to me that they are from Karee that
- 24 I'd made the deduction that they were coming from Karee.
 - It was that deduction, but it was sorry that it was -
 - Page 15114
- that's how I made the deduction they must have been coming 2
 - from the hostel then.
- 3 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, do you know
- whether that information is correct, do you know whether
- 5 these people came from Karee hostel?
- 6 CHAIRPERSON: How can he know whether
- 7 information is correct? Well he's actually been asked the
- question, but I don't see how he can answer it. Do you
- 9 know whether that information was correct?
- 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, at a later
- 11 stage I think it was in November, possibly early December,
- 12 I undertook a small exercise just to have a look at those 13 that were wounded or deceased, I had to try and work out
- 14 according to the mine records where they had come from.
- 15 And I'm not sure where that is now, but I almost formed a -
- 16 from the Marikana koppie on a Google Earth map I think I
- 17 tried to look at the directions that people came from. And
- 18 a broad synopsis of that was they came from 360 degrees,
- they came from far away, close. About half of them came
- from the Nkaneng environment if I recall, probably about a
- 21 third or more came from that side, Karee hostel or the
- 22 smaller settlements around karee hostel. But it's only at
- 23 that stage that I sat down and actually started to try and
- 24 track specifically where these people that were involved in
- the actual conflict with the police came from.

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the first time then?

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Page 15118

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koppie.

wasn't he?

that stage?

CHAIRPERSON:

COLONELS SCOTT:

CHAIRPERSON:

COLONEL SCOTT:

COLONEL SCOTT:

directly, no, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON:

CHAIRPERSON:

Page 15115 MS LE ROUX: So. Colonel Scott, to return 1 2 to the intelligence that you had available at the time, it 3 was very limited, you really didn't know for sure whether 4 the people who had clashed with the police on the Monday 5 were present at the koppie or where they had come from. Is 6 that correct? 7 **COLONEL SCOTT:** Sorry I think I was just 8 9 MS LE ROUX: Sure. Returning to the question of the intelligence that you had at the time, it 10 11 was very limited, you didn't know whether the strikers who 12 had clashed with police on the Monday were present at the 13 koppie. And you didn't know for sure that they came from 14 the Karee hostel as opposed to Nkaneng or somewhere else. 15 16 COLONEL SCOTT: Are we talking about on 17 the Tuesday now? 18 MS LE ROUX: Yes. 19 COLONEL SCOTT: Well I was aware that 20 after the group that had clashed with the police on the 21 Monday had continued still to move towards the koppie. So 22 again the deduction because what we're dealing with and 23 this is why the information forthcoming at Marikana at the 24 time was so sketchy because in order to become intelligence 25 you need to verify that information first. And this is Page 15116 where we were struggling. The intelligence services could 1 not infiltrate or get informers properly within that 2

2 COLONEL SCOTT: I suspect he was there at 3 the meeting with the - no, he was there at the meeting 4 because I remember the National Commissioner pertinently 5 saying how can we run an operation when we don't have 6 intelligence. I know that was a big issue for her that she 7 brought up on the Monday night. So that would have been 8 dealing with the intelligence issues and the lack thereof 9 at that time wanting to know who are these people, what's 10 the modus operandi. So that was brought up on the Monday 11 night and as I say, it's quite possible that that the lapa 12 we were in is not very well lit and obviously everybody's 13 sitting around the table, so whether he was sitting in a 14 position and I couldn't see him. But I do recall him being 15 there on the Tuesday morning very early, around about 6 o'clock because he was one of the few that were there that 17 I thought were ready for the meeting. 18 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, given that 19 the National Commissioner, as you've just testified, 20 highlighted the lack of intelligence as a problem do you know of any steps that were taken to improve intelligence 21 22 following that meeting on the 13th? 23 COLONEL SCOTT: From what I can remember 24 at that meeting, I'm not sure if it was the acting Divisional Commissioner of Crime Intelligence or possibly

grouping of people. So a lot was down to deduction. Having information but deducting from that information because it couldn't be verified to make it intelligence per se. But my deduction was that after the conflict on the Monday that these people had still continued to move in 8 that direction. As we know that they'd moved to the koppie and had actually joined the rest of the group on the 10 11 12 13 14 15

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didn't particular go there.

MS LE ROUX:

This statement you make here paragraph 6.34, page 29, is that a statement of your understanding of the situation on the Monday night? Now at that stage had you had conversations or heard what was said by someone like -I think Brigadier Engelbrecht was in charge of intelligence He was, yes. Had you spoken to him at I hadn't spoken to him And when did you see, I

Yes.

know this is what he told you, but when did you see him for

Gauteng assist to bring in people to help with the analysing part of the operation. MS LE ROUX: And do you know what particular tasks those people undertook? COLONEL SCOTT: In hindsight I do. I didn't know at the time, but I know that part of their job was to receive as much footage as they could and they were doing the process of trying to identify individuals. I would assume that they would then go to the mine with the photographs of the individuals and ask whether this tied up with employees at the mine. And where they would then reside in order that what I'd envisioned as a phase 5 going out to targeted venues to try and retrieve possible stolen or robbed items as well as make arrests would occur -MS LE ROUX: And when was this process undertaken, the identifying people from footage? COLONEL SCOTT: Again I think it would have been possibly maybe on the Tuesday it could have started. Or possibly from the Wednesday, but they sat in a different - they were not sitting with us in the JOC. They sat in a different office at the mine buildings, so I

So when you were sitting

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the Provincial Commissioner at the time of Gauteng who were

both there, but the decision I think was made to have

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planning they weren't feeding in any information to you

2 that you could incorporate into your planning.

3 COLONEL SCOTT: No, we needed – Brigadier

4 Engelbrecht was the representative of the Crime

5 Intelligence at the JOC and his role as the rest of the

6 JOCCOM members was to be present as much as possible and

7 anything forthcoming would come in through him as far as

intelligence was concerned. There's other ways of getting 8

9 information and that's why I'd placed out observation posts

10 because observation posts is another way of giving you the

11 real time, ground picture of what's going on as best as

12 they could. Ideally they should have been placed closer to

13 the action environment because they did struggle with

14 definity, pick up what weapons etcetera were in the crowd I

15 would think from being over a kilometre away. But that was

one of the mechanisms put in place to try and get real time 16

information on movements as well as the helicopters in the 17

18 air. But the intelligence side of actually finding out

19 more the in depth as you're alluding to with the unions

20 possibly and the locations of members and so on. That's

21 left to the Crime Intelligence obviously we couldn't speak

22 to that from the tactical intelligence gathering.

23 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Semenya.

24 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, I say this with a

25 little bit of trepidation because the one moment I Page 15121

you describe as your normal method of planning, to carry

out an appreciation by consulting witnesses, police

personnel, any other source available, record documentation

and open source media. You said that that's normally what

5 you do. Is that what you did in this case to establish

6 intelligence?

7 COLONEL SCOTT: I wouldn't have been able to cover all of those bases obviously. I don't think I had

9 access to as yet open source media or even the police's

10 video footage. But it is a matter of trying to speak to

who I could. And in saying that it was difficult that 11

night to get hold of some of the officers because if they 13 left the JOC room I was not even sure where they would go.

I didn't really know where I was myself. You're arriving

in the dark, you had a specific room, you don't know where

they're going, so when they were called to come to the

17 JOCCOM meeting, not JOCCOM, but the meeting of the National

Commissioner I would sit and listen to what everybody was

19 saying. But still difficult to understand at that stage

20 who was actually who and who was in command and many of

21 these members it was the first time I was actually seeing

22 them. I had worked with General Mpembe before in the

23 soccer World Cup but the rest and Brigadier Calitz of

24 course, but the rest not so. It was only when Colonel

Merafe was told to come to me that I could talk to him for

Page 15120

discussed with my learned colleague, Ms Le Roux, was that

she was going to be talking on two issues, the statement of 2

3 Mr White and that of Scott. So we're going all over the

4 show, I don't know whether it's still within those tram

5 lines or not.

1

CHAIRPERSON: I thought that one of Mr 6 7 White's criticisms was that the police didn't have adequate

8 intelligence and I take it that's what she's busy

9 exploring. Am I right?

10 MS LE ROUX: That's correct, Chair, for 11 my learned friend it's section 6.2 of Mr White's statement

12 that covers the inadequacy of intelligence.

13 CHAIRPERSON: A lot of this of course has been traversed before. So I think Mr Semenya is afraid 14

15 that you are ranging far and wide over the field, so

16 perhaps this point can be presented in a more focused way.

17 But I understand this is Mr White's criticism and I

18 understand it's got to be covered with police witnesses.

19 So I'm not stopping you but I am concerned that we may be

going a bit more widely over the area at this point than

21 is necessary to make the point you want to make. But

22 anyway please carry on but bearing mind Mr Semenya's

comment. 23

MS LE ROUX:

Thank you, Chair. Colonel

25 Scott, on page 22 at paragraph 6.15 you set out there what

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Page 15122 the first time. Other than that, as I say, it was only

General Annandale that I think out of the way the operation

would go normally when I arrived, brought me up to speed

with what he knew, gave me over to Mr Graham Sinclair to

5 continue with what he knew which was a wider range spanning

6 more the weekend and so on as well. And obviously all of

7 this is what I'm trying to take in at that time before I

8 went to sit down for a National Commissioner's briefing and

9 listen to what gets said there again and so on. So that

10 whole process and thereafter and it's not just about the

11 intelligence gathering around what we deemed to be the

12 opposing party but it's also about the environment.

13 Because I needed to know foundationally where am I. What's

14 going on, what are targets, what did the environment look

15 like which was all unknown to me at that time, that

16 evening. And these are all the aspects I had to try and 17 figure out at that course of time.

18 MS LE ROUX: On that evening of the 13th did you ask whether there was any video footage of the 19 20 incident that day?

21 COLONEL SCOTT: I didn't ask, no, but I

22 think - I don't know how but if I recall they passed

24 I don't recall asking if there was video footage, no.

MS LE ROUX: And later in your statement,

photographs around of the scene or of the deceased persons.

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Page 15123
    for the record it's page 98, paragraph 26.3, you say that
                                                                       sector, so four groups in essence were sent out to get
    the first time you saw the CCTV footage of the incident on
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2
                                                                       intelligence.
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    the 13th is only on the night of the 16th. But you hadn't
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
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    previously seen any video footage?
                                                                    4
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
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           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    I don't know if it was
                                                                       came back?
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    the night of the 16th, if I did mention it I may have been
                                                                    6
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
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    wrong, but I recall when we were putting the National
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
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    Commissioner's presentation together that there footage was
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                                                                    9
    made available. And at that page I didn't yet know how to
                                                                        and area roads?
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    cut and manipulate it into a presentable format for the
                                                                   10
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
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    presentation and that's where IT personnel from Lonmin
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    actually came in to assist with that process. So I
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13
    continued working on the photographs within the
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    presentation and General Mpembe with the IT specialist
    worked on the actual video footage to put that together so
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    that he could speak to that when it was presented to the
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                                                                   17
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    media.
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           MS LE ROUX:
                               And just so I'm clear, the
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                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
    video footage you're referring to is the CCTV footage, not
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                                                                   19
20
    the -
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           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                   21
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    I don't remember seeing
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    the police video either until that day.
                                                                   22
                                                                              MS LE ROUX:
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           MS LE ROUX:
                               Okay, if I could ask you to
                                                                   23
                                                                       up and -
    then turn to page 38 of your statement. In paragraph 7.9.3
                                                                   24
24
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
25
    and 7.9.4 you say that police patrols were tasked to gather
                                                       Page 15124
    intelligence and specifically regarding area roads and
1
                                                                        members to get too close to the strikers at that stage
                                                                       without considering that they may find themselves in a
2
    specifically the approach route to the neutral area, the
3
    atmosphere around the area and information on the attitude
                                                                        position that they don't want to be in. Not having a
4
    of local people towards the police. How many teams were
                                                                        structured strategy on going forward to have to be close to
5
    deployed?
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Four groups, yes. Okay and what information They didn't -If we take these in turn what information came back to you about the approach route I think that was the only information that I did receive and that was that the route I'd envisioned initially they said was difficult. I don't know why, but I think there was a little bit of mud or some gridlock in the road system that would make it difficult for the Nyalas to move through. That's the only one that I do recall and that came back from somebody that was driving around in the actual settlement area. So you didn't get any information back about the atmosphere around the area or the attitude of local people towards the police? No. Did you ask anyone to follow No. I'd asked for that information and obviously maybe it was difficult for the Page 15126

COLONEL SCOTT: Again at that stage it's difficult to say, but I do remember saying that the armoured vehicles, the Nyalas should stay as a group of a minimum of three. And that the other members from either or that were driving the soft skin vehicles needed to accompany the Nyalas for that matter and they shouldn't break up. I was worried about previous knowledge of experiences in previous situations in townships where Nyalas can be isolated and burnt etcetera, etcetera. So I know that obviously I had the four sectors. How many were in each of those sectors I'm not too sure because at that stage there wasn't an in depth planning. It was more just 18 a planning of I need the police force to get out, to go and patrol and to bring back information and then the forces would have been dealt with or spread out pretty evenly between those sectors. But I'm aware there was enough at 22 that stage to put a least three, I'm sure there must have 23 been enough to put at least three Nyalas and probably three 24 soft skin vehicles per sector if not more.

MS LE ROUX: So that would be one per

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the strikers. But I don't recall receiving any other information other than on the actual environment of the roads MS LE ROUX: And other than this first deployment of the four teams to get intelligence did you repeat that exercise at all? COLONEL SCOTT: Repeat which exercise? MS LE ROUX: Did you send people out again to try to establish the atmosphere around the area or COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MS LE ROUX: - the attitude of local people to the police? COLONEL SCOTT: Well I'd sent out the special task force team to go and try an establish an OP

I don't think they actually got to the koppie 3 itself,

height they need, they could see that obviously there was

post, an observation post on what I thought at the time was

a higher koppie which was - that now we know as koppie 3.

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Page 15127 Page 15129 bushes and rocks that there was a lot of, well I don't know COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 2 2 CHAIRPERSON: Did you need any more? about a lot, but there was movement of human movement 3 backwards and forwards between koppie 1 and koppie 3. COLONEL SCOTT: Well, Chairperson, if you 4 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, you'll agree wanted to move to a situation where you looked again to 5 with me that when you're planning a tactical option and we residences to arrest and so on you would need that leave aside for now whether it's encirclement or the 6 information forthcoming about who are we looking at, who 6 7 7 are the targeted individuals that we want to go to in the dispersion plan, but was ultimately adopted, that intelligence is essential to planning that tactical phase, 8 hostel, in their place of residence and so to start putting 8 9 9 correct? a plan of that magnitude in place that's what you would 10 COLONEL SCOTT: want to do. The alternative of that is just going to do Well obviously 11 the hostel cordon and search which is hopefully everybody 11 intelligence is essential. We would want to tick the boxes 12 that's there then would be searched and if you identify the 12 of when we do an appreciation, what we would like to know 13 people inside the hostel then by photograph to face you can 13 and then obviously if you don't you need to start making 14 deductions and deductions lead to risk analysis which leads 14 make the arrest. But it's a long shot. Not really 15 15 to risk mitigation again and takes you in the full circle. So it's what you observe again which orientates you, which 16 CHAIRPERSON: Did you know that, Major 16 makes you have a decision on which you want to act on going General Mpembe had asked Mr Sekwane, the President of NUM 17 17 18 back to the Ooda loop. on the Wednesday evening if NUM could provide information, 19 MS LE ROUX: And, Colonel Scott, I want 19 obviously on an anonymous basis as to where arms were in 20 to ask you whether you agree with your colleague, Major-20 the hostels and in the informal settlements. As I understood the evidence Mr Sekwane indicated that attempts 21 General Annandale who at day 79 page 8504 to 05 said that 21 22 would be made to comply with that request. Did you know 22 he thought that the intelligence gathered, he described it 23 as limited and that he would have liked more intelligence 23 that? 24 24 No, I didn't, before launching the operation. Do you agree with those COLONEL SCOTT: 25 Chairperson. 25 statements by Major-General Annandale? Page 15128 Page 15130 Because by the time you [11:42] COLONEL SCOTT: Well it depends what you 1 1 CHAIRPERSON: 2 want to do with that intelligence. I do agree that the 2 moved over to action it was too early for any feedback in 3 intelligence was limited. Previous operations again, when 3 that respect, wasn't it? 4 we talk about an intelligence brief we talk about something 4 COLONEL SCOTT: Well I don't know, if 5 pretty in depth and I think we can see from the 5 you're saying that was the Wednesday evening. 6 presentation or, you know what was actually said on those 6 CHAIRPERSON: Wednesday evening, ja. morning meetings is extremely limited and vague, very wide. 7 7 **COLONEL SCOTT:** Ja, but we went into 8 8 So you would want more specific information and that action obviously the Thursday but I wasn't aware -9 9 determines, if General Annandale was saying that, he CHAIRPERSON: The time for feedback was a 10 possibly also had a strategy in mind maybe other than the 10 very limited? 11 one we employed. I'm not sure, I can't speak on his 11 COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, it hadn't come in 12 behalf. But obviously, you know one can again go back to 12 yet, yes. 13 what is described in books as the ideal. But you've got to 13 CHAIRPERSON: It might have been wiser to 14 have waited but there were other considerations, weren't 14 apply what you've got to the scenario that you're in or to 15 the operation that you're in and with what we had is what 15 there? we had and when we were instructed that we needed to do the 16 16 **COLONEL SCOTT:** Yes, I also think there 17 tactical movement that's all we had and we had to make best 17 were other considerations involved. 18 use of it as we could. 18 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Colonel, who 19 CHAIRPERSON: What you had was they 19 commanded the sector policing patrols to gather 20 didn't want to move, leave the koppie, they didn't want to 20 intelligence, were they reporting to you directly? The 21 hand over their arms and if someone tried to prevent them 21 sector policing patrols. from doing what they wanted to do, either chase away from 22 **COLONEL SCOTT:** Yes. the koppie or take their arms away they were going to 23 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: To gather 24 fight. It wasn't, that was the information you got wasn't 24 intelligence. 25 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.

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Page 15131 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Under whose command 1 2 were they? Were they reporting all the intelligence 3 obtained directly to you or to someone else? 4 COLONEL SCOTT: By that time Brigadier Calitz had arrived. So he was already operational 5 commander and briefing that plan, its, as I say it wasn't 6 7 even a structured JOCCOM at that stage. It was just about get the commanders that are available in here, let's 8 9 present it to you, go out, do it, so Brigadier Calitz would 10 have gone out, formed them into their different groups and 11 sent them off on their way. 12 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, I'd now like 13 to move onto a topic that's for the record covered in Gary 14 White, page, commencing at page 39, section 4.3. This is where Mr White criticises the lack of an audit trail of the decision making through the course of the events at 16 17 Marikana and I don't intend to address each and every point 18 made in that section but I've got five specific issues that 19 I want to cover with you that arise from that. The first 20 is if you could go to page 42 of Mr White and specifically 21 to paragraph 4.3.2. which continues onto page -22 CHAIRPERSON: Before we get there. Ms Le 23 Roux, and am I correct in thinking that what is said in 24 4.3.1 particularly sub para A is to some extent over, it

are those notes available. 2 MS LE ROUX: Chair, our understanding is 3 that with respect to them, I mean if we just go through them, the JOC meeting at 11 pm on the 13th, JOCCOM at 2 5 o'clock on the 14th. JOCCOM on the evening of the 14th and 6 then the JOC debrief on the 15th we still don't have any 7 handwritten notes, nothing on those specific -8 CHAIRPERSON: You may be correct on that. 9 I was focusing on the ones we've got. But it's not directly relevant to your cross-examination, I thought I 10 11 would make the point while it occurred to me. 12 MS LE ROUX: No, so with respect to that 13 point which is made at A4.3.1 that for these identified JOC and JOCCOM meetings there are no notes or minutes or anything that point as far as I understand it remains correct. Colonel, to return you to page 42 paragraph 4.3.2 17 Mr White sets out there essentially that an audit trial should be kept of the decision making in a police operation 19 for two reasons. The first is to allow a reconstruction 20 after the event if that's necessary and the second is 21 because the very requirement to document decisions and 22 their rationale helps ensure that the rationale is 23 correctly and carefully thought through. Do you agree with 24 those propositions? 25 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do.

notes taken at some of the meetings which have subsequently been provided? Was it, can you tell us whether Mr White was aware of those documents? MS LE ROUX: Chair, my instructions are that these specific meetings identified on page 40 we still don't have any contemporaneous documentation. So they have not been overtaken by the production of the handwritten notes. CHAIRPERSON: Were handwritten notes taken at the various JOCCOM meetings which have now been provided by the police. MS LE ROUX: Yes, Chair, but to the best of our knowledge these, the four meetings that are identified there we still don't have documentation. CHAIRPERSON: That may be covered in the evidence. I'm not sure -MS LE ROUX: - point. CHAIRPERSON: No, we're not talking about

minutes taken at the meeting. We're talking about notes

with the view to being incorporated in minutes of the

that were made obviously with the view to being obviously

subsequent stage by some or other scribe who was there. I

think there's notes by Captain Moolman for example taken at

meeting at 6 o'clock on the morning of the 16th. So there

has in some extent been overtaken by the contemporaneous

Secondly, do you agree with MS LE ROUX: Mr White that the need to maintain a clear audit trail is heightened, it's all the more so in operations where higher level of force is already been used by police and there's a distinct possibility that it may need to be used again. COLONEL SCOTT: I agree, any audit trail is actually pertinent to the operation towards the end as well. It helps with the debrief, it helps with environments that we find ourselves in now as well. MS LE ROUX: And then do you also agree that because the police should be prepared to justify any use of force and it's reasonably foreseeable that where higher level of force may well have to be used by the police the operation will be subjected to some form of ex post facto scrutiny and so it's all the more important to have a proper audit trail. **COLONEL SCOTT:**

COLONEL SCOTT: I agree but I just want to say that when we're talking about as the members have claimed that it's a private or self defence issue that was not something that was in essence planned into the operation. It's a given in any operation that at any stage one may need to use self defence or private defence but to have that in some form of an audit trail, we wouldn't have per se put that in there because I think that's just part of the task of being a police officer. You understand that

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24 the various meeting, at the meeting, in particular the

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Page 15135 Page 15137 part that's what you are trained in and hopefully never MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, my last 2 have to get to. question on this is whether you agree with Mr White if you 3 MS LE ROUX: And given what we've already turn to page 41 of his statement, it continues at the top 4 covered. Did you also agree that where there's, that of 42, paragraph 4.3.1F 1 to 5. He lists five particular 5 5 there's a distinct lack of a documentary audit trail for decisions that he would have liked to have seen a the decisions taken at Marikana from the 14th to the 16th? 6 contemporaneous record of reasoning for the following 6 7 Yes, there is a lack and 7 COLONEL SCOTT: decisions and they are listed at the top of page 42, if we again I know that you'll possibly find in speaking to even 8 can go to that part of the statement. It's the decision to 8 continue with the stage 1 deployment on the morning of the 9 other first world countries when operations start going to the extent that they were going at Marikana one of the 10 15th, the decision to abandon the proposed stage 3 10 first parts that starts to take a knock is your audit trail 11 encirclement option, the decision to deploy the stage 2 11 12 strategy on the morning of 16 August, the decision 12 or your record keeping but in saying that this a lesson apparently around midday to withdraw Nyala 6 and reposition 13 learnt. That we need to and it would have been wonderful 13 14 14 if we had, all the briefings I gave for instance, it near the kraal and finally the decision to proceed to 15 videotaped and I would have been guite happy to have that 15 stage 3 tactical option prior to the 1:30 JOC on the 16th of August. Do you agree that the rationale for those 16 done, I think it would have saved a lot of time and efforts 17 particular decisions should have been documented? 17 even in this commission. But is something that I've 18 personally learnt to employ to the future if we see that 18 COLONEL SCOTT: If I can just highlight 19 the minute taking or the documenting and the audit trail is 19 though that there wasn't per se a decision taken on the 20 starting to suffer because of the rapidness or quick 20 Wednesday the 15th, the decision was held on Wednesday the 21 15th to abandon that initial, in light of the bigger crowd decision making taken from senior managers, etcetera that 21 22 22 at least we need to record it via video or at least with an and going towards the D&D plan as an option for phase 3. 23 23 But that decision would have been taken thus at the end of auditory device. 24 24 the JOCCOM on the, sorry that evening or that -MS LE ROUX: Right. 25 25 CHAIRPERSON: CHAIRPERSON: But in this case we had at Let's just go through them Page 15136 Page 15138 one by one. F1 isn't recorded but in fact the reason's 1 the 6 o'clock meeting, I think it was on the Thursday, we obvious because they were still negotiations that would 2 had Captain, Colonel Moolman who was a legally trained 3 person, an admitted advocate in fact, he was taking notes 3 have been regarded as a breach of good faith. 4 and on other occasions Brigadier Pretorius was taking 4 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 5 5 notes, she was the minute taker, she's an officer of a high CHAIRPERSON: Two, he says apparently at some stage on 15 August, I think it's now clear from the 6 rank, she's a Brigadier. 6 7 **COLONEL SCOTT:** 7 Yes. evidence you gave being cross-examined by Mr Chaskalson, CHAIRPERSON: 8 So the argument is not a 8 that the encirclement option was still formally on the 9 9 first world country doesn't cut much ice in this context table on the Thursday morning. 10 COLONEL SCOTT: where the minute taking is being done by an admitted 10 That's right. advocate who was then a Captain in the one case and a high CHAIRPERSON: And was only abandoned 11 11 12 ranking officer in the form of a Brigadier in the other, 12 officially at some stage on the 16th? isn't that so? 13 13 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 14 COLONEL SCOTT: 14 CHAIRPERSON: The limited one, there's a Chairperson, I agree. I 15 15 think one must just look at the circumstance thought and I whole lot of issues think it's evident even in the commission that this is 16 16 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 17 recorded for transcript and it would be wise and that's 17 CHAIRPERSON: That were debated between 18 maybe what I'm trying to say because anybody taking minutes 18 you and Mr Chaskalson, but that was on Thursday. So when 19 can, unless they're superhuman keep to the speed of Mr White talks about apparently at some stage on the 15th of whoever's speaking and the different talking that's going August he obviously wrote that in ignorance of the 21 on. So there's possibly keywords being jotted and then concessions he would make being cross-examined by Mr 22 they move on and, but in a far more accurate version which 22 Chaskalson, is that correct?

23

24

COLONEL SCOTT:

CHAIRPERSON:

Yes, yes.

extent a criticism of the minutes as we have them now of

Alright. F3 is to some

is what I would ascribe to would be just to video record it

24 in the future or to take it down on a Dictaphone and then

25 have a transcript made thereof.

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Page 15139 1 the meeting at 6 o'clock, the JOCCOM meeting at 6 o'clock. 2 That was, those were minutes that were subject to Page 15139 1 White, what he's actually speaking to and I know 2 be done in very formalised meetings is you actual	D 45444
	Page 15141
L Z - That was those were minutes that were stipled to L Z - De done in very formalised meetings is voit actual	
3 substantial revisions from time to time at Roots, is that 3 decisions after they've been discussed and a decision after the decision	
4 correct? I think you've conceded that as well? 4 taken and you record the decision which makes see	
5 COLONEL SCOTT: Ja. 5 that would have assisted obviously in environmen	
6 CHAIRPERSON: But we have the original 6 find ourselves again in a commission of inquiry. E	
7 notes that were made by Captain Moolman. 7 also then assists, just to give a, throw a lot more	•
8 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 8 on what was actually the discussion and this is the	
9 CHAIRPERSON: Contemporaneously at the 9 pertinent decision taken. So I do understand whe	re he's
10 meeting. 10 coming from.	
11 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 11 CHAIRPERSON: He's coming from so	mewhere
12 CHAIRPERSON: Which tell us something 12 else to. He says you must record the decision.	
13 anyway and then far as F4 is concerned that's, that looks 13 COLONEL SCOTT: Ja.	
14 like a good point, we've got no detailed reasoning for that 14 CHAIRPERSON: And you must give t	ne
15 at all. No reason at all in fact. Am I right, recorded I 15 reasons, you don't have to obviously have the -	
16 mean? 16 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, yes.	
17 COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, not in the JOC, I'm 17 CHAIRPERSON: A long essay but –	
18 not sure if the operational diary of that vehicle, the 18 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, ja that's wha	1
19 person inside or whether there was an OB entry made to that 19 mean. You need to obviously show the rationale	ind then
20 effect. But, because that was a decision taken, as far as 20 when the rationale's thrown open record the decision	ion taken,
21 I know there was no JOCCOM sitting to take that decision. 21 obviously recording the rationale that was put out	as well.
22 CHAIRPERSON: The evidence is Major 22 MS LE ROUX: Yes, thanks, Chair. Co	
23 General Annandale took the decision. 23 Scott, Mr White's point is precisely that. That not	
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24 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 24 must you record the decision but you must record	the
24 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 24 must you record the decision but you must record	the
24 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 25 CHAIRPERSON: And there, as far as we 26 reasoning for it. The rationale for it.	
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24 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 25 CHAIRPERSON: And there, as far as we 26 reasoning for it. The rationale for it. Page 15140 1 know he made no note at the time as to why he did it. 1 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	Page 15142
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comfort back in the near future but when the appropriate
stage arises you'll let me know.
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3 MS LE ROUX: Chair, now is actually

4 convenient. I was moving onto another topic.

5 CHAIRPERSON: We'll take a break for 10

minutes 6

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7 [COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES1 [12:18] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes, you 8

are still under oath, Colonel. Ms Le Roux.

9 10 MS LE ROUX: Thank you, Chair. Chair, 11 during the adjournment we just confirmed and it still remains the case that the four meetings listed at page 40, 12 13 we still do not have contemporaneous documents. They are 14 not in the more recent production and then similarly, we checked again with respect to the five decisions that were identified at page 42, and we do not have anything in the 16 new evidence that contradicts the point why it makes that 17 18 there was no documentation of the rationale for those -

CHAIRPERSON: 19 The witness has made 20 substantial concessions on that point. Are you going to go

21 back to the point that stood over before tea, or are you

22 going to do that later? Remember there were some points 23

that you put to the witness, you gave him some reading to 24

do during the tea adjournment. I don't know whether he has

25 had an opportunity to do that. Have you, Colonel? Page 15145

considered there was bound to be conflict again should the

2 police use force to diffuse the situation with the

3 protesters that armed as they were and with their emotions

running as high as they did at the time." If I could then 5

take you to page 24, paragraph 6.2.1 of your statement where you say there, in relevant part, "my assessment of 6

7 the situation," -

> CHAIRPERSON: 6.2.1, it's 6.21.

9 MS LE ROUX: Sorry, 6.21, thank you,

10 Chair. 6.21 which commences, "my assessment of the

11 situation was that the POPS members would be in danger if

12 they needed to confront the strikers with a tactical

13 option." And then lastly, if you could turn to page 27,

paragraph 6.26, and it's the last sentence of that

paragraph, which says, "I was however mindful that any

tactical option by POP could be met with the same responses

17 as was experienced earlier that day on Monday, 13th, being

that the advancement of POP to carry out a tactical option

19 towards the strikers could be met by some of the strikers

20 closing the ground on the POP members to disrupt the police

21 action with violent action." So in light of those three

22 sections in your statement, I'd like to put to you that you

23 knew that a tactical option would carry a high risk of

24 violence, and that you should have taken it into account

when you were planning and that you did so, because you

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1 **COLONEL SCOTT:** No, Chairperson, I

2 confess I didn't, no.

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3 CHAIRPERSON: Alright, well obviously 4

you'd better leave that point until after lunch, those

points until after lunch.

6 MS LE ROUX: That's fine Chair. Colonel 7 Scott, where I would like to go next is to the question -

to the issue relating to the tactical option being a last

9 resort, and your evidence thus far and regarding how you

contemplated it in your planning, is that the tactical 10

option was to be the last resort, correct? 11

12 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.

MS LE ROUX: And what I'd like to do is take you to three passages in your consolidated statement

14 15 and then I'll ask a question, for the record, but we don't

need to go there, this is covered in Gary White commencing 16

17 at page 85, paragraph 6.5.2.1, so if we can start in your

18 statement at page 20, paragraph 6.10, and specifically the

19 last sentence of that paragraph - well, let me read the

whole paragraph. "I suggested during the meeting that the

21 emotions on both sides were high due to the loss of life

and that should the police move into disperse the crowd the

next morning, that the intervention could possibly be

24 interpreted by the media and the public as retaliation

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25 instead of enforcement of the law. I said this, because I

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held it over as the last resort.

CHAIRPERSON: Three questions in one, do

you think you can handle all three of them at once? Or do

you want the question broken up? Sorry, Mr Semenya?

5 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, these events

6 related to the 13th, before even the witness got to

Marikana.

8 CHAIRPERSON: No, I don't think that's 9

correct, the passages put, I think relate to what he, what

his thinking was on the evening of the 13th, after he got 10

11 there, but if I am wrong on that, I will be corrected.

12 MR SEMENYA SC: 6.26 is about the Monday,

13 Chair.

14 CHAIRPERSON: Look at the second

15 sentence, "I was however mindful that any tactical option

by POP could be met with the same response as was

17 experienced earlier that day on Monday 13th. In other

18 words, what he's talking about is his thought processes,

19 what he was aware of that evening, Monday evening, based

20 upon what has happened earlier that day. So I think that's

correct. I think you better carry on, Ms Le Roux, unless

22 Mr Semenya wants to take the objection to another angle.

23 MS LE ROUX: Thank you, Chair. Colonel 24 Scott, let me break my question down. So in light of those

three references, am I correct that you knew that the

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tactical option carried a higher risk of violence in these 2 circumstances.

3 CHAIRPERSON: No, I take it, the question now relates to what he knew on the 16th, does it? I think that's just -

MS LE ROUX: No Chair, it's during his planning, from the time he arrived in Marikana, became aware of what had happened on the 13th.

COLONEL SCOTT: If I can maybe answer that, it may suffice as well that on that evening of the 13th, going into the morning of the 14th, while planning then, I was very aware that emotions would be high on the Tuesday, so I was aware of any tactical option on that

13 14 Tuesday morning, I was, of my opinion, would cause

15 conflict. This doesn't distract from the fact that even in

16 planning which went through to the 16th, again, as I have

17 mentioned earlier I was hopeful that it would be resolved

18 in the easiest way, and even saying that in the tactical

19 option in the easiest way that through verbal warning on

20 the actual dispersion pan that the majority would move

21 away, I was wary of the militant group, and as I've

22 mentioned I had to anticipate that that group may make a

23 stand and may make a stand against the police action, and

24 so I was aware of that at that time as well that if there

25 was a possibility, but I was hoping that by that stage

Page 15148 through dialogue and through the energy that the police had

been putting in to try and resolve this through dialogue 2

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and showing the strikers that they were not just there to 4 be a strong arm of the law, and exercise something against

5 them as in a tactical option at the outset on the Tuesday,

that somehow there would have been some form of an 6

7 acceptance that the police would be just doing their job.

8 But again, that was the hopeful side but planning for

9 contingencies again and understanding that there was a risk

10 against the very policemen that would need to go and do

11 that, I needed to put something in place as a contingency

12 for their safety as I had mentioned in the strategic

quidelines as well. 13

> MS LE ROUX: Thank you. And Colonel Scott, your testimony that you've just given seems to indicate that on the night of the 13th, you thought emotions were running high, going tactical would elicit a violent response. Is that an accurate restatement of your

19 evidence?

20 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MS LE ROUX: Did that view change over 21 the course of the 14th and 15th and into the 16th? Or did you continue to believe over that week, that given what had

24 happened, a tactical response was likely to elicit a

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25 violent response?

COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I think, like I 1

said, and on the Tuesday, when we did get down to dialogue

3 and I had heard that the dialogue was in essence

4 succeeding, because they'd made arrangements to meet the

5 Wednesday morning, I was to be pretty relieved, I was

6 hoping it was going to go that way, because as I say, on

7 that day, that Tuesday, I suspected that could be a

8 watershed, that should the police have gone tactical there,

9 that it would have really gone bad. Thus, the suggestion

10 of that dialogue and so on but - and as it went on in

11 dialogue, so it - I was more hopeful. I became aware later

12 after Marikana, of, what I mentioned I think last Thursday,

13 which was you know, how the police's dialogue actually came

14 to more or less an end, sort of midday Wednesday, after the

strikers had heard that they are not there to discuss

16 labour issues with them, but again, the hope was instilled

17 with, still the police going to the unions and bringing the

union presidents in, so I think the strikers looked at that

19 as a possible outcome. So we even went into Thursday

20 hoping that dialogue would win the day. But I think as

21 I've just stated, as a strategist, I had to keep in mind

22 that if we needed to go tactical, which is a decision that

23 would have then been taken, the police going forward

24 couldn't just be thrown into harm's way to go and execute a

tactical option, and as I say, that's maybe something

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that's not within my decision making powers, but still if

the police does need to go forward as a planning officer,

3 you need to plan for the safety of your police at that

stage, so that they're at least taken care of and if they

are taken care of, hopefully they don't need to exercise

6 lethal force then against the threat that is posed towards

them.

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MS LE ROUX: So Colonel Scott, if I can just summarise and confirm my understanding of what you've just said. You were hopeful when you saw how the situation was essentially stable on the Tuesday and the Wednesday into Thursday, so you became increasingly hopeful around the stability of the situation but you nevertheless anticipated that when the police went, if the police and when they went tactical, it may elicit a violent response from the strikers?

COLONEL SCOTT: I was mindful of that. I think it would have been naïve of me not to have been mindful of that, but in saying what I say, and this even relates back to unarmed combat training, and it results there and this is why we have negotiators within the police, as you always need to give the opponent the opportunity to move away without conflict and to try and to some degree save their dignity in doing so, and that was the mind set I was coming from. That's why when dialogue

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was actually ongoing, I was extremely hopeful that this

- 2 strategy had actually succeeded and that we wouldn't need
- 3 to go any further than that. But like you are saying
- 4 rightfully, by Thursday the fact that a tactical option
- 5 then became necessary, I had to consider the fact that
- there would be a certain grouping that I assumed would 6
- 7 withstand the police in some form, but that doesn't
- distract from the matter at that stage that we were said, 8
- 9 exercise the tactical option and you know, one can't just
- send the police then into a blatant death trap for 10

themselves if one would want to say that. 11

MS LE ROUX: And because of this risk of violence, with a tactical option, that's why you kept it as the last resort, correct?

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COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I think with any sorry, but any tactical option, not just at Marikana, if we talk any policing action, the tactical option is always the last resort.

19 MS LE ROUX: Right. And then of course, 20 keeping the tactical option only as a last resort, it is

21 consistent with standing order 262 which requires that the

22 use of force be minimised and that the police must always

23 seek to de-escalate matters. I don't need to take you

24 there, for the record it's at page 8, section 11, which is

25 titled "execution," and it's paragraph 3(a) of standing

Page 15152

order 262. But essentially because the goal is to minimise

- 2 the use of force, and attempt to de-escalate matters a
- 3 tactical option is the last resort.
- 4 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I agreed, and as I
- 5 say I think that reflects the absolute principle of
- policing, the spirit of tolerance in essence, but when 6
- necessary, to still enforce the law and unfortunately then 7
- having to go towards a tactical option is to carry it out 8
- 9 in the very way you have mentioned now.
- 10 MS LE ROUX: Right

11 **COLONEL SCOTT:** With the minimum force

12 necessary to re or de-escalate back to a place of

acceptability. 13

14 MS LE ROUX: Right. Colonel Scott, in

15 your statement at page 27, paragraph 6.27, you set out your

two conditions for when the police should move to the 16

- 17 offensive POP tactical option. The first is if the
- 18 strikers escalated the threat of violence and destruction
- 19 by mobilising as a group to move to a predetermined target,
- possibly Lonmin Mine property or towards employees who were
- refusing to participate in the striker, and secondly, the
- 22 other alternative which could dictate police action would
- be if all other options resolve the situation without
- 24 force, were exhausted, and there was no other means to
- 25 restore order to the area, but to bring the strikers back

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in line with the legal requirements of lawful protest. For

2 the record, this is covered in Mr White's statement page

76, section 6.5.5 but what I'd like to do is explore with

you whether you think the two conditions that you set were 5 met, to move to the tactical option.

6 So in your statement, at page 79, paragraph 12.1

7 you were recounting the 13:30 JOCOM meeting and you say

8 there, "Major-General Annandale chaired the meeting and

9 said the decision had been taken for the police to move to

10 a phase 3 deployment. The reasons given were that the

11 threat had escalated and the situation was volatile and

12 needed to be resolved with the phase 3 strategy," and then

13 if I could ask you to turn over to page 81, paragraph 13.2,

14 in the second sentence you say, "I recall starting by

15 explaining that a special JOCOM meeting was held and that

16 we had been told to move to phase 3." So those two

17 references seem to indicate, I think you have testified

18 about this, you were simply informed that you had to move

19 to phase 3, you were told that this needed to happen. At

any stage, were you asked whether you thought your 20

21 conditions that you had set for the move to phase 3 had

22 been met?

23 COLONEL SCOTT: No, I wasn't asked. But

24 I am also not sure that I had mentioned those, obviously

being a lower rank, to a senior officer, that this is what

Page 15154

I feel, please you know, comply with them, before you make

your decision. I wouldn't have done that either, out of

3 respect for the senior decision-makers, but no, I wasn't

4 asked.

5 MS LE ROUX: But did you consider when

6 you were sitting at the 13:30 JOCOM on the 16th of August,

7 did you think that there had been escalation in the threat

8 of violence and destruction and that the group was moving

9 to a predetermined target? Did you think that was

10 happening?

11 COLONEL SCOTT: No, they weren't mobile,

12 that we know, and that I was also aware of them. I had

13 picked up through the day whether it be by - it's difficult

14 to put my finger on it now but maybe through the radio

15 that's continually, you know the operational members are

16 talking over the radio but it did sound like the atmosphere

17 or the attitude was volatile. Just the fact that they

18 hadn't, they'd chosen not to lay down arms, or for that

19 matter and to come back to the koppie that day, was already

20 a problem for the police, so - but I am just trying to go

on, on what I can recall or the gut feeling I had at the

22 time was that things were escalating, so I kind of, when

23 they said it's time to go to phase 3, the threat is

24 escalating, that made sense to me, when they said so, and I

could also foresee that if dialogue had ended, we didn't

17

18

Page 15157

Page 15155

- know what would happen that night, whether there would be a
- 2 similar reaction to what has happened in Impala Platinum or
- 3 whether mine property would have been destroyed that night
- 4 and innocent individuals attacked and so on, so I wasn't
- 5 aware fully of the decision-making process as to why the
- decision was taken go to the tactical option but as I say 6
- 7 in my intuition if one would, as a policeman, it made sense
- to me at the time that something needed to happen because 8
- 9 we'd left it, we didn't know and anticipate, and by the
- 10 next morning we could have had a real situation of anarchy
- 11 on hand that we would have been trying to deal with and not
- necessarily with everybody back at the koppie, but split in 12
- different directions causing violence and destruction 13
- around the mine. 14

15 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, I don't -

this has been traversed by the evidence leaders, so I don't 16

want to spend too much longer on it, but just to return to 17

18 my question, the first condition you set which was that the

19 group begins to mobilise to a predetermined target

20 escalating the threat for violence and destruction, that

21 had not occurred, correct?

22 COLONEL SCOTT: It had not occurred, yes.

23 MS LE ROUX: Turning then to your -

24 CHAIRPERSON: The other point you make at

25 the same sentence, is the possibility of the strikers I - if I recall at the time, I did, somebody had mentioned

- that, I think it was about 27 000 employees were on
- 3 Lonmin's personnel strength, and obviously the deduction
- 4 that only about 3 000 of those were positioned at the
- 5 koppie, meant that there were probably 20 000 plus still
- 6 trying to keep the mine afloat or running.
- 7 [12:38] CHAIRPERSON: They were RDOs, you see.
- 8 And unless you had rock drill operators drilling the rocks,
- you didn't have any ore being produced. So obviously ore
- 10 that had been drilled from the rocks before the strike
- 11 started could be dealt with. But if rock drill operators -
- 12 that's my understanding, if it's wrong I'll be corrected
- 13 but if the rock drill operators are on strike then there's
- not much else that can go on, on an onward basis. That's why the mine was losing so much money every day because

there was no production. 16

> COLONEL SCOTT: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: So anyway the question, the

19 issue that interests me, but if you can't help me I'll have

20 to ask someone else who can, is to whether from a practical

21 point of view the intention of the strikers to enforce

22 their unprotected strike was not in fact being achieved

23 through a combination of circumstances.

24 COLONEL SCOTT: I can't answer that,

Chairperson, I don't actually know, but I thought that

Page 15156

- mobilising towards employees who were refusing to 1
- participate in the strike. Now as far as you knew, was the 2
- 3 mine operating at the time?
- 4 COLONEL SCOTT: As far as I knew, they
- 5 were, Chairperson, specifically the BMR smelter and that's
- also one of the reasons that I positioned the police as 6
- 7 forward holding area 1 there, was because of the knowledge
- 8 that I think that was still ongoing and that would be a key
- 9 point actually, and possibly the strikers knew that to be
- 10 one of the key points on the mine which still caused the
- 11 mine to -
- 12 CHAIRPERSON: There was some evidence
- 13 that there was no smoke coming from the smelter because
- there was no ore being mined. I won't go into that with 14
- 15 you now, the shafts were closed, weren't they? Or don't
- 16 you know?
- 17 COLONEL SCOTT: I don't know that
- 18 Chairperson. And insofar as the activities of the strikers
- or some of them, appear to have been directed to enforcing
- the unprotected strike by violence if necessary,
- 21 intimidation and violence. If large sections of the mine
- 22 were not operational, then effectively the unprotected
- strike was in place. That's my impression, I don't know
- 24 how accurate that is, but are you able to comment at all?
- COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I think what

- Page 15158 there were still maybe further away shafts linked to the
- mine that were still running.
- 3 CHAIRPERSON: You may be right but I
- 4 think if there weren't any rock drill operators working
- then there wasn't much being done in the shaft. Anyway
- 6 that's a matter which presumably will become clear when the
- 7
- Lonmin witnesses testify. 8
 - MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, turning to
- your second condition that you record in paragraph 6.27, did you believe that all other options to resolve the 10
- 11 situation without force had been exhausted?
- 12 COLONEL SCOTT: Well I mean there's
- 13 always other tactical options as we know, but that dialogue
- 14 had come to an end that I knew of. It had seemed that
- 15 there was no longer dialogue and as I say I wasn't aware of
- 16 I think Bishop Sekota or any of that happening. I was just
- 17 aware that the -
- 18 CHAIRPERSON: Bishop Seoka, Sekota is
- 19 somebody else, so it's Bishop Seoka.
- 20 COLONEL SCOTT: - but I was just aware of
- 21 the police dialogue and then the dialogue with the unions
- which had all, to my understanding fallen short or fallen
- 23 apart.
- 24 MS LE ROUX: Were you aware that Mr
- Mathunjwa was still to report back on his attempts to end

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the occupation of the koppie? 1

2 COLONEL SCOTT: No.

3 MS LE ROUX: Why was it not an option to

4 just maintain the stage 2 deployment, in your view? 5

COLONEL SCOTT: Well as I stated earlier.

6 when we were told that this needs to go to a tactical

7 option I had taken it in good faith as well that

8 discussions had been taken at a high level and these

9 reasonings had been done which I'm sure they were. And

10 it's considering the remainder of the people around

Marikana and as I mentioned now to the Chairperson 27 odd 11

12 thousand people there and only a minority of that actually

13 participating in a strike what would happen to the

14 remainder? I thought that they were actually still working

to some degree. And I was aware that there were 15

individuals that were being targeted and my perception that 16

17 if we'd allowed it to continue overnight is that by the

18 next morning we would have had a relatively serious

19 situation of destruction and violence if not death going on

in order to force the mine's hand. As again, as I say 20

21 which is apparently what happened at Impala Platinum to

22 concede to the demands of the strikers.

23 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, there had

24 been some discussion of an early morning tactical option.

> COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.

more people arrive. So I don't recall us having the

ability at that time to do the early morning

reconnaissance, however, we do know that the crowds started

approaching according to our helicopters I think which flew

5 in at about half past seven, quarter to eight. They would

6 fly over the reconnaissance flight first and then take some

7 photos, come to the JOC show us what size the crowd was and

8 so on. But it was never a consideration for the Wednesday

9 and the Thursday morning due to the fact that, that's the

10 15th and 16th now, due to the dialogue, wanting to, in the

11 spirit and dialogue and negotiation, not wanting to break

that trust that the police had hopefully built. But for

13 the morning of the 17th, as I say there are personal reasons

14 that I thought that maybe we had got to the place where

this was supposed to be a surprise strategy. That our

surprise was no longer really going to be that effective

because surely the longer we go on the more the striking

employees are going to understand that if they continue at

19 some stage the police has to intervene. And that to then

20 move in they had time to possibly witness our razor wire

21 cart at forward holding area 1 already etcetera. So to me

22 the strategy became less feasible as we actually moved

23 further down into the operation. I'm not saying that it

24 couldn't happen but it may have been something that when we

decided on it or spoke about it in the JOC which we didn't,

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MS LE ROUX: And given that people had

left the koppie the night of the 14th, left it on the night

3 of the 15th was there any reason for you to think that they

4 wouldn't leave on the night of the 16th and why couldn't you

5 have done a tactical option the morning of the 17th?

CHAIRPERSON: 6 Two questions in one. I

suggest you break the question down. Double questions are

8 never helpful.

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MS LE ROUX: Thank you, Chair. Colonel

Scott, did you have any knowledge or understanding as to

why the night of the 16th would be different to the night of 11

12 the 14th or the 15th where people left the koppie?

COLONEL SCOTT: Well on the night of the

13th for that matter as I say , on the morning of the 14th

15 we were aware that there were people there which is what

16 initiated that strategy. It wasn't followed up on to do

17 the reconnaissance thereof due to the dialogue being in

18 place by the morning of the - the Wednesday morning, the

19 15th. And again and I'm not sure if there was some issue

with the helicopter flights either, but I know that the

21 police choppers refused to fly until it was light. Whereas

22 initially the Lonmin chopper was flying for us in the very

first light of the day which was beneficial to us because

24 that is a time that we would want to have started moving

25 into an operation like that. The longer you leave it the

but if we did these are the type of points that would have

come up. And it would have - but I can't say to why it

never happened the 17th. As I say the decisions were taken

4 on the 16th to go tactical and for that matter I didn't know

who was at that stage staying on the koppie on the night of

6 the 16th. But it was mentioned on the night of the 15th

7 that the police should please leave the people at the

koppie alone. They wanted to deliberate on their way

9 forward for the next day and we should not bother them that

10 night. So to me that still meant that there was someone on

11 the koppie that night or in that environment of the koppie.

12 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, just to

13

return to the question. It's not possible to say that your 14 second condition was not met, sorry let me rephrase that so

15 that it's clear. At the 1:30 JOCCOM there was no

16 information that indicated that your second condition to

17 move to tactical had been met. There was potential, other

18 contingencies that could have played in, correct?

19 COLONEL SCOTT: There are, but I think,

20 as I was saying it and that time as well that feeling of it

becoming volatile and something needs to happen, the police

need to intervene is the feeling I got, what was being

23 portrayed. So because of that I didn't particularly

24 question, it was simply a matter of accepting that the

decision have been made and let's go ahead as best as we

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can to disperse the crowd. MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, I'd now like

2 3 to move onto your planning process. And let me start at

4 page 67 in Mr White's final statement. Paragraph 6.4.4.

5 Colonel Scott, I'm actually going to add this to your

homework for the lunch adjournment if I can because what 6

I'd like you to do is read Mr White from 6.4.4 through to 7

6.4.6 on page 69. 8

11

16

9 CHAIRPERSON: How long do you want the

lunch adjournment to be for? 10

MS LE ROUX: It's only three pages,

Chair. And again the question is whether there's anything 12 13

factually inaccurate in these sections.

14 COLONEL SCOTT: Just 6.4.4 till? 15 MS LE ROUX: To 6.4.6 which ends at the

top of page 70. So page 67 to page 70 and I'll return to

17 that after the lunch break. If I could ask you to then 18 turn to page 71 of Mr White, paragraph 6.4.10 in

19 particular. This is where Mr White deals with the problem

20 that arises from not having a written operational plan and

21 the first aspect of Mr White's criticisms that I'd like to

22 address with you are what he describes as the challenge

23 process. Now is it factually correct that at the 1:30 JOC

24 you were told that phase 3 was being implemented. It

25 lasted for 30 minutes and in that 30 minutes there was no Page 15165

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CHAIRPERSON: The criticism by Mr White you see, at page 72 sub PARA 2 or Roman 2, was there was no

written plan for the implementation of stage 3. You showed

them a Google slide, you then gave oral explanation, but

5 there was no written plan. That's correct isn't it?

6 COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct, 7

Chairperson.

MS LE ROUX: Thank you, Chair. And then thirdly Mr White states the JOCCOM meeting took only 30 minutes from beginning to end which was hardly enough time for Lieutenant-Colonel Scott to brief on the plan, let alone allow other commanders to challenge it. Do you agree

13 with that that 30 minutes was to short a period of time for

14 you to brief on it, let alone be challenged on it.

15 COLONEL SCOTT: Well the 1:30 JOCCOM took its pace. If it had needed to go on longer it would have 17 gone on longer, but I'm not sure. It was only half an

hour, but if it was half an hour, 40 minutes that's when it

19 ended. We were not restricted at that JOCCOM for time, but 20 in essence maybe what's been put forward is that we had a

21 half an hour, do everything quickly, hurry he needs to go.

22 I think the decision was only taken at the JOCCOM after the

23 briefing on the phase 3. Okay well in that case we want to

24 start at half past three, 15:30 that afternoon. So what

I'm trying to say it was kind of an open ended session, it

Page 15164

real challenge to the plan that you provided in the JOC

2 because it took essentially the whole JOC for you - the

3 entirety of that meeting for you to explain your plan. Was

4 there challenge to your plan?

5 COLONEL SCOTT: None that I can recall.

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MS LE ROUX: So then you'll agree with Mr White's three points which appear at the top of page 72 of his statement, the first of which is that those present at

10 the JOCCOM were not asked whether to implement stage 3,

they were only asked how to do it. We've covered that 11 12 already today. Secondly that they were briefed using the

13 stage 2 plan because at that stage there wasn't yet a stage

14 3 written plan of any description, is that correct?

15 COLONEL SCOTT: At what stage of the day?

16 MS LE ROUX: This is your 1:30 JOCCOM. 17 COLONEL SCOTT: No, no, they were shown

on Google map and it's the same Google map, Google Earth

19 map now, that was handed out to the commanders earlier. 20 But in showing that I simply went and showed them and

21 depicted where the forces would go, where they would line

22 up, what the strategy would be to sweep through and

disperse and so on. So it wasn't on a stage 2 plan, it was

24 just the map utilised as a visual aid and then the stage 3

explained to them on -1-30-4 ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

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just came to that point where it had ended by that time.

So to say that the senior officers had no time, I don't

3 know if that's accurate. They would have been analysing

what I was saying as I was saying it and going through it,

5 so obviously they could have made notes if there was a

discrepancy and then brought that up. 6

7 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, if I could ask you to go to page 64 of Mr White's statement, paragraph

6.3.8. It continues on page 65. Chair this is where Mr

10 White sets out the challenge process that he's familiar with when he presents operational plans where the use of 11

12 higher levels of force are likely. 6.3.8 commencing on

13 page 64. Mr White states "In my experience a plan for a

14 major operation with the use of higher levels of force was

15 likely would have been subject to the most rigorous levels

16 of scrutiny. Planning would begin with the overall

17 commander referred to in the UK as the Gold Commander

18 setting the strategy for the event. The purpose of the

strategy is to establish a set of strategic objectives

relevant to the knowledge of the situation and an analysis

21 of the threats and risks involved. The Gold Commander owns

22 the strategy and is therefore accountable for its

23 objectives and any action taken in response to the specific

24 threat." So, Colonel Scott, to map the cross you would be

the Gold Commander.

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Page 15167 CHAIRPERSON: I think you're looking at 1 2 silver. MS LE ROUX: 3 I'm incorrect. 4 CHAIRPERSON: I think you're looking at 5 silver at the moment. MS LE ROUX: Yes, I'm incorrect. "So the 6 7 strategy is then to indentifying anticipated outcomes which are preferred acceptable or unacceptable and it should 8 9 identify contingencies to resolve unacceptable outcomes that might arise. The tactical commander, the Silver 10 Commander is required to develop and present the plan to 11 12 the strategic commander and members of the strategic 13 planning group. For an event of this nature the group 14 would have been likely to include the force lawyer. The plan would have been required to contain a number of 15 16 scenarios each of which would have been explained in detail 17 and challenged on issues of necessity and proportionality 18 regarding the use of force. The tactical plan would have 19 been developed by a planning group which have included 20 technical advisors who could provide specialist input. 21 When I presented plans in these circumstances the plan has 22 been subject to extensive examination and challenge to 23 ensure that as far as possible all eventualities have been considered." 24 25 CHAIRPERSON: Can I interpose by saying I

Page 15169 that environment where we do produce plans. The members in essence would sit that you are briefing initially whether 3 it be the command group first before we brief it to the 4 members below and they would play devil's advocate on that. 5 Because many a time if I set up the operational plan I will 6 brief my operational officers and they would need to bring 7 their tactical plans. But in briefing them on what my 8 operational strategy was they would highlight it and issues 9 and so on before they went away to go and build their 10 tactical plans now to compliment what I've asked them 11 operationally. And again, as I say, it's a process I would 12 follow in certain other types of operations. It wasn't one 13 that was necessarily followed here. This is why the JOCCOM 14 took that role of me presenting a strategy to them with them having the ability to in that JOCCOM, in that briefing to say but hang on you haven't considered this. Or you 17 should do that, or I feel this is a problem or -18 MS LE ROUX: And in your experience where 19 you had the devil's advocate approach was someone 20 specifically tasked with being devil's advocate or was it just in the course of that briefing people would 22 spontaneously raise concerns with the plan? 23 COLONEL SCOTT: Well I must admit if I am 24 normally sitting in a planning briefing I automatically

Page 15168 was wrong when I said that you were the silver, in fact the silver was Calitz who wasn't even there. Am I right? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. If I can just put that into perspective, that's why I say it was kind of a strange setting having an overall commander and the operational commander and then a JOCCOM and a strategist and so it didn't quite - it was in unprecedented situation which in the essence brought together a strategy of planning that wasn't the norm. But in saying this we were dealing with a spontaneous and fluid event and I know that Mr White is actually very correct in what he's saying, but you need the time to do what he's saying which was not our luxury at -MS LE ROUX: And, Colonel Scott, the force of Mr White's point is not "did you follow this

precise procedure?" Of course, you know it doesn't translate into South African – into South African policing structures, but are you familiar with any similar type of challenge process in planning where a plan is presented to a group and there's a specific part of the process where it must be challenged, pulled apart, examined, analysed? COLONEL SCOTT: Well yes and we normally

call it, well the proverbial term again, the devil's 23 advocate. We would have somebody, but I'm talking again maybe just within my own environment, being 20 years in

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nightmare, but in other plans that I present and it's just

assume that role. I'm normally the planner's worst

customary in the unit I represent that the members take up

that role anyway, specifically the more experienced and

seasoned members. They're not appointed as such, no,

unless I actually do that role and there are times that I

6 do, do that, when I'm planning for bigger operations which

7 are further in advance where I would actually ask somebody

8 after a planning to take my plan specifically and to go

9 through it to tell me - in effect it's called the Red Team

10 Role. I actually allow them to become the terrorist or the

11 opponent and they need to see how I've planned and how they

12 would challenge that plan from an opponent's point of view.

13 And then I would see whether I countered their strategy to

14 disrupt my plan effectively enough with my contingency

15

16 [12:58] But as I say that's in a process where I would be

17 planning a major event or a major operation, where I have

18 the time and the luxury to do that. But in essence,

19 otherwise it's an accepted norm again, within the circles

20 that I am in that this gets done and challenged as you

21 brief the more senior and experienced members. I accept 22 that.

23 MS LE ROUX: Okay, just so I am clear, the devil's advocate role would happen during the course of

the planning but then also at briefings, it would happen

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Page 15171
                                                                                                                          Page 15173
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
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    spontaneously.
                                                                    1
                                                                                                    If you need longer please
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            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     Well, if I present an
                                                                        tell me, because obviously your questioning on these
3
    operational concept initially for an approval, that would
                                                                        matters you have been asked to read is important, and so I
4
    normally go upwards. You would find that senior officers
                                                                        don't want to put you at a disadvantage or deal with you in
5
    automatically would do that. They would look at your
                                                                    5
                                                                        anyway that is unfair.
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
    operational concept because you would try to provide an
                                                                    6
                                                                                                       No, Chair, I think 45
6
                                                                    7
                                                                        minutes is fine.
7
    operational concept before you go into the detail of any
    plan. And it is customary in the courses that you do that
                                                                    8
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                    Well, we will take the
8
9
                                                                    9
    you will provide more than one operational concept. So
                                                                        adjournment to quarter to 2, if for some reason you are not
10
    immediately they have got more than one option to look at
                                                                   10
                                                                        ready please let me know.
                                                                               [COMMISSION ADJOURNS
                                                                                                            COMMISSION RESUMES1
                                                                   11
11
    and to possibly tell you to combine elements of all three,
                                                                   12
                                                                        [13:49] CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                       The Commission resumes.
12
    or to choose one of the three which you will then go into
13
    the detail planning of. And then of course the devil's
                                                                   13
                                                                        Colonel, you're still under oath.
                                                                               DUNCAN GEORGE SCOTT:
14
    advocate role happens at the lower level because at
                                                                   14
                                                                                                               s.u.o.
                                                                   15
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                    Before Ms Le Roux asks her
15
    strategic level they are looking at your operational
                                                                        next question, I want to ask you this; would you say,
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    concept, whereas at the tactical level your members want to
                                                                        looking at the matter with hindsight, that it would have
17
    know that what you have planned for them is ensuring their
18
    safety as well, and that you covered all bases for the
                                                                        been better if you'd been able to get Brigadier Calitz and
19
    safety of those that they need to go out to save, protect,
                                                                        some of the other commanders from the field into the JOC
20
    whatever the case may be.
                                                                   20
                                                                        when the plan that you outlined was duly put before the
21
                                                                   21
                                                                        JOC?
           MS LE ROUX:
                                But at the 1:30 JOCCOM no
                                                                   22
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
22
                                                                                                       I'm presuming the 13:30
    one played a devil's advocate role?
23
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     Well, I would expect that
                                                                   23
                                                                        meeting?
                                                                   24
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                    I'm talking about the 13:30
24
    the senior officer sitting there were being briefed on the
25
                                                                   25
    plan. And as I say the opportunity was there for them, but
                                                                        meeting.
                                                       Page 15172
                                                                                                                          Page 15174
                                                                                                        Yes, it would obviously,
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
1
    there were no inputs forthcoming, as I have mentioned.
                                                                    1
2
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                        having the part of the plan being Public Order Policing
                                 Ms Le Roux, when it's
3
    convenient for you, can we take the lunch adjournment?
                                                                    3
                                                                        orientated to have them there if there would be an input
4
           MS LE ROUX:
                               Yes, sure, I just have one
                                                                    4
                                                                        for that, it makes sense, Chairperson.
                                                                    5
5
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                      Was there a reason why they
    more question on this.
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                    6
                                                                        weren't invited back? Was there a lack of time, or what
6
                                 Alright, you can have two.
7
                                                                    7
           MS LE ROUX:
                               Colonel Scott, do you think
                                                                        was the problem? Or was it just not thought of?
    that the introduction of a formal challenge process would
                                                                    8
8
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        Chair, I actually don't
                                                                    9
9
    improve operational planning? Even in the fluid situation
                                                                        know. As I say, I've tried to recount that as well and I
    your describe. That a requirement to have a challenge
                                                                        know when I was told to come in for that meeting it was
10
                                                                   10
    would improve the planning?
11
                                                                   11
                                                                        probably 10 minutes or so before the meeting, because I can
12
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                   12
                                                                        see via my SMS'es I started contacting the helicopter.
                                    Again, it makes total
13
    sense that something like that would improve any plan,
                                                                   13
                                                                        Obviously General Annandale had said to me, listen, we've
    because as a planner you are not necessarily considering
                                                                   14
14
                                                                        got to go to stage 3, or phase 3, we're going to go
15
                                                                   15
    something and I think with wise counsel around you to maybe
                                                                        tactical, and knowing that I knew that we needed the
                                                                   16
16
    bring up experiences that they have had or knowledge that
                                                                        helicopter. So I tried to do that, but it's - there was no
17
    they may have that you are not aware of, that is why
                                                                   17
                                                                        pre-warning to it. So I've got a feeling that they decided
18
    something like what you are suggesting now is pertinent and
                                                                   18
                                                                        listen, we need to meet now, we need to guickly thrash this
19
    should be done in planning procedures, yes.
                                                                   19
                                                                        out so that we can get going.
20
           MS LE ROUX:
                               Thank you, Chair, we can -
                                                                   20
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     You can't tell us the
21
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 Lunch adjournment, I think
                                                                   21
                                                                        reason, if there was one?
    until quarter to two, will that give you long enough to a,
                                                                   22
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        No.
    have lunch, and b, do the homework you have been asked to
                                                                   23
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
23
                                                                                                      Ja. Now another point that
24
    do?
                                                                   24
                                                                        was raised was the question of there were no objections
25
           COLONEL SCOTT:
                                   Yes.
                                                                        raised by those present. There was no-one playing the role
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3

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of devil's advocate. Again looking at it with hindsight,

- 2 was there anything - I know you're the wrong person to ask,
- 3 but I'll ask you all the same. Was there anything that a
- 4 devil's advocate really could have raised, regard being had
- 5 to the fact that we understand that the operation had to
- take place that afternoon, so there wasn't much room for 6
- 7 manoeuvre. I can understand arguments about the timing and
- 8 it should have been the next day and various other things,
- 9 but none of those points were available to be raised, as I
- 10 see it, prima facie. So given the fact that you were
- 11 ordered to move to the tactical option that afternoon, and
- you were giving sort of the broad outline of the plan, the 12
- 13 detailed briefing part you in fact only gave to the
- 14 commanders in the field with the aid of your laptop, but as
- 15 far as the broad outline that you gave, could anyone had
- done any better, regard being had to the circumstances in 16
- which you found yourself? 17
- 18 COLONEL SCOTT:
 - Chairperson, no. I've
- 19 also obviously gone back and had a look at what I maybe
- 20 would have done differently, and the only thing I would
- 21 have thought now looking in hindsight is to have taken
- 22 Brigadier Calitz and placed him into a chopper as well so
- 23 that he would have had a better view of what was going on.
- 24 But what I'd proposed there at that 1:30 meeting,
- 25 considering the fact that we must go now, we must do

Page 15176

25

- something now, I still can't think that I would have done
- 2 something else because the question can be raised, why not
- 3 just disperse them into Nkaneng, and simply the reasons are
- 4 there that I've mentioned in my statement and that we've
- 5 gone over, but I still, as I say, foresaw that any approach
- to that militant group was not going to result in them 6
- 7 dispersing per se. They were going to take a stand or go
- 8 to the koppies or, I was hoping, disperse into the open
- 9 field simply to regroup, with the water cannon spraying
- 10 them, you know, violently with water so that they couldn't
- 11 stay in a tight group. But I can't see any rationale
- 12 behind that, considering that we needed to disarm and not
- 13 simply disperse and cause possible rioting and destruction
- into the Nkaneng village, as I was saying. So with regard 14
- 15 to the, what I'd presented then, I would probably still
- 16 suggest the same thing now. In fact I have -
- 17 CHAIRPERSON: Given that, those
- 18 situation -

1

- 19 COLONEL SCOTT: Given the same
- 20 situation -
- 21 CHAIRPERSON: Given the situation that
- you had to act that afternoon. 22
- COLONEL SCOTT: 23
- 24 CHAIRPERSON:
- Ja. There are other
- possibilities that could be debated, but none of those

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- arises in the context of an order from above that you had
- to go to the tactical phase that afternoon?
 - COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
- 4 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.
 - COLONEL SCOTT: And then with respect to
- 6 also Adv Chaskalson's view, it is so that with more time I
- 7 think as well that one would have had more time to go into
- the depth of the risk analysis and analyse the terrain a
- 9 bit better, understanding that there, you know, koppie 3
- 10 could become an issue, but there just wasn't that amount of
- 11 time available to go that deep into it. And as I say, my
- 12 time then was, the rationale was that I didn't know what
- 13 the strikers were going to do per se and I needed that
- 14 police line to stop, to reorganise themselves, to
 - reconsider now what the action would be thereafter before
- going forward then with their disarming and arresting
- 17 action. So in essence I left that part of the operation up
- 18 to those ground commanders to do, which I think they're
- 19 quite capable of doing.
- 20 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. There may have
- 21 been better proposals, but I'm just asking you whether you 22
- can think of any at the moment, anything a devil's advocate
- 23 could have provided, and you've given the answer. Thank
- 24 you. Yes, Ms Le Roux?
 - CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LE ROUX (CONTD.):

Page 15178 Thank you, Chair. Chair, for the record, Colonel Scott, I

- 2 don't think I've given you this to read, so we can always
- 3 come back to it, but Mr White at paragraph 6.5.12, which
- 4 commences on page 79 all the way through to 6.5.32, sets
- 5 out the various things that he thinks a devil's advocate
- 6 could have raised even under the circumstances in play on
- 7 the 16th. But we don't need to do that exercise now. What
- 8 I'd like to do though is ask you to turn - well, let me
- 9 first check on your homework through the lunch break. If
- 10 we could start with, from page 67, paragraph 6.4.4, to page
- 11 69, 6.4.6, was there anything there that you wanted to
- 12 correct or change from a factual perspective?
 - COLONEL SCOTT: Only on page 69, which is
- 14 6.4.6(e) -

13

- 15 MS LE ROUX: Yes.
- 16 COLONEL SCOTT: And that was just to say
- 17 that that briefing in the sentence which begins with
- 18 "Lieutenant-Colonel Scott briefed the JOCCOM on how to
- 19 implement the option using stage 2 plan conducted that
- 20 morning," that just needs to be clarified as I briefed the
- JOCCOM on the Google Earth stage 2. It, there was no
- writing involved on that. It was essentially the handout
- 23 I'd given to the officers when they left to go into the
- 24 field that morning.
- 25 MS LE ROUX: Right.

Yes.

1

Page 15179 COLONEL SCOTT: Otherwise I find that all 1 in order. 2 MS LE ROUX: 3 And then the second section 4 you were looking at started at page 118, paragraph 7.6.7 5 through to 120, 7.6.11. Was there anything in that section that you wanted to correct? 6 7 COLONEL SCOTT: Just a concern here or 8 there that I don't know if I can be the person to agree in 9 essence. If you take 7.6.7, just the last sentence says "Further, the number of live rounds fired appears 10 11 disproportionate to the threat encountered" -12 MS LE ROUX: Right, Colonel, stop. 13 That's obviously Mr White's conclusion. 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 15 MS LE ROUX: Your review is just for the factual accuracy of what's in those sections. 16 17 COLONEL SCOTT: Okay, and then 7.6.8, 18 "General Mpembe has confirmed that there was no-one 19 coordinating the actions at the various units at scene 2," 20 it may have been a very, or considered to be a poor 21 attempt, but I know Colonel Vermaak was trying to 22 coordinate the forces that took place, took part in the 23 dispersion action further at scene 2. He was driving the 24 two water cannons to the north and southern side and 25 certain armoured vehicles to go with them and so on. I'm

where there is a possibly lethal threat to the rest of the police officers, so that your more professional forces will be able to deal with that. And then I think there's just a couple of, 7.6.11, with regard to around the koppie, he is mentioning that, you know, and maybe 7.6.10, there's a lot 6 of communication but not much going on. This is again, I 7 think as the Commission and myself being apart from those 8 members that were on ground, we were not sure of what 9 verbal commanding was going on between commanders on 10 ground. I would assume that Colonel Gaffley for instance 11 didn't know of Captain Kidd, so I would assume that but I 12 would also then realise then I think he did speak to some 13 of the National Intervention Unit members coming through, 14 so to some degree there is communication and coordinating 15 taking place in the smaller pockets of forces around the koppie, but not necessarily from a global perspective where 17 somebody is watching it all and coordinating it all. 18 MS LE ROUX: So Colonel Scott, taking you 19 back to the first section I asked you to read commencing on 20 page 67, which addresses the contemporaneous planning 21 documentation, you would then agree with Mr White on page 22 68 at paragraph 6.4.5 where he says that, "The 23 contemporaneous planning documents do not contain anything 24 that could be described as a comprehensive written operational plan for the stage 3 disperse, encircle, and

the west and from the south, so, but he was making an 2 3 attempt. So just to say that no-one was coordinating I 4 don't think is purely accurate. There was an attempt made 5 to -6 MS LE ROUX: Any other factual 7 corrections through to paragraph 7.6.11? COLONEL SCOTT: I think I've testified to 8 9 this before on page 119, B2, if we see, it's Mr White's input with regard - if I would read, "I would have expected 10 11 that such a report of live fire in an operation would have 12 immediately been followed asking," so obviously that's the 13 way that they would deal with it in Britain. As I've 14 testified, and in the environment that I do work in, in the 15 task force, we would allow the shooters, if they were shooting, to give the feedback initially so that the radio 16 17 channel not get clogged. In other words radio silence would be initiated on that shooting. Alternatively, if 18 they could identify the shooter, they would be the one also - and if nothing is forthcoming within five or so seconds, then the operational commander or team leader would fill

22 that space and ask for a situation report, and I agree with

25 direct your more specialised forces to that environment of

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the rest of what he's saying. Is somebody able to see the

24 gunman, because obviously then what you would want to do is

sure he wasn't aware of the forces that were arriving from

Page 15182 disarm operation, as required by Standing Order 262." You 2 would agree with that? 3 COLONEL SCOTT: I would agree, but if I 4 can just maybe elaborate, I think I mentioned this yesterday as well, this is a planned tactical option and if 6 there was time there should have been a more detailed plan 7 written out, gone through a devil's advocate procedure, or 8 a challenge procedure, and briefed well with the time 9 available. Tactical forces on ground should have presented 10 their own plans, as we know, but in essence when we do get 11 to spontaneous operations, there is not always time to 12 brief a force, and when you tell them I need you to 13 disperse, the dispersal standard operating procedure is 14 understood. They simply need the strategic guidelines on 15 whereto, what time, that type of thing, to continue with 16 that operation. So it's maybe a little bit of a balance, 17 but it is so that there was no detailed operational plan 18 for phase 3 itself. 19 MS LE ROUX: Thank you, Colonel Scott. 20 I'm now going to turn to highlight just certain aspects of Mr White's criticism of the final stage 3 plan. For the record, section 6.5 commencing at page 73 of his statement 22

sets out a number of criticisms, but I'd like you to focus

from page 80, paragraph 6.5.14, and it runs through to

paragraph 6.5.32. But we'll take them in stages, so we'll

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correct?

Page 15183

just keep it focussed on particular points of criticism.

but essentially Mr White in those sections highlights three 2

3 criticisms of the final plan that I'd like to spend some

4 time on with you now.

The first of these relates to the issue of positive attraction points, and the consequences of the movement of Nyala 6 in your plan. Now I understand that there's a disagreement between yourself and Mr White about what a positive attraction point, what that term means. You seem to use it differently, but that doesn't actually matter. The terminology is not important for now. What I'm interested in is am I correct that when you deployed your resources in the plan, the barbed wire in particular, you did so in a way that that deployment would discourage movement towards Nkaneng, and you hoped to encourage

18 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.

19 MS LE ROUX: Okay, and in your view - and

movement towards the open veld to the west. Is that

20 I'm getting this from page 83 of your statement,

21 specifically at paragraph 13.5.1 where you state, this is

when you're briefing your commanders and you said, it's at 22

23 the top of page 83, you say, "I explained that the razor

24 wire would secondly assist the police" - this is the top of

25 83 - "I explained that the razor wire would secondly assist

COLONEL SCOTT: The channelizing it's

actually talking of is once the dispersion action starts, 2

3 so that the option if - or let's put it this way. If there

4 wasn't razor wire placed out and the police had in essence

5 still lined up from the north coming down to the south to

6 try to disperse to the side, you would simply find that the

7 protesters would have probably gone in both directions,

8 east and west. So that was used as a, as the name depicts,

9 a channelizing measure, that once the dispersion had

10 started that they saw, because of the natural barrier, or

11 the police-made barrier now that the only option was to

12 move off to the open fields, that was what I was hoping was

13 going to happen and anticipated to happen with the razor

14 wire placed out.

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MS LE ROUX: But Colonel Scott, in the period of time where just the razor wire is deployed, you've just testified that the protesters are still, if they're moving off the koppie, they could well still try to come around to the east. The presence of the razor wire at that stage of the plan would not channelize them to the west.

COLONEL SCOTT: No, the channelizing is to, is part of the dispersion. The phase 1, which is the drawing out of the razor wire, was simply to enhance that channelizing, but also now to put up a protective barrier

Page 15184

- the police to channelize the dispersion towards the west
- 2 and away from the east, where some of the police support
- 3 assets and media were waiting." Now Mr White from page 82
- 4 to 84 looks at this change, looks at the deployment of the
- 5 razor wire in the plan, and I'd just like to go through his
- factual assumptions with you, if you can just confirm those 6
- 7 for me. So firstly Mr White is correct that the plan
- anticipated a period after the first phase of stage 3 where 8
- 9 the razor wire would dog-leg towards the east, correct?

COLONEL SCOTT: 10 Yes.

MS LE ROUX: And at that time the POP, 11

12 NIU, STF, and TRT units would not yet be deployed to the

north-west of the kraal. Is that correct? 13

14 COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct.

15 MS LE ROUX: If we could display page 84

of Mr White's statement, it should assist those in the

auditorium. That's the diagram indicating phase 1 of stage

18 3. So the razor wire is deployed in the orange dog-leg,

19 but as yet the other units have not been deployed to the

north-west of the kraal. So given that there's a period of

21 time where the razor wire will be deployed but no other

22 forces will be shielding Nkaneng, do you agree with his

conclusion that during that period of time the deployment

24 of the razor wire would not channelize protesters to the

west?

17

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so that violent actions may not come against the police,

and in essence again not have to have the police retaliate

3 against the protesters because of a natural barrier between

them - a razor wire barrier, not a natural barrier.

5 [14:09] COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Colonel, how much

time did you estimate it would take for the units to move 6

to the north, in your planning what you -

COLONEL SCOTT: I thought that would happen quite rapidly, Commissioner. You know, once the razor wire was out and the vehicles were confirmed in position it was a matter of immediately go out. There wasn't supposed to be some long period of wait, it was a flowing operation so when you call in phase 1 is completed, it's immediately okay, initiate phase 2 and that's when the vehicles went, have driven around. So it's almost close to

15 immediate. 16

17 MS LE ROUX: But Colonel Scott, I'm 18 correct that you - the original plan was that the razor

19 wire would be deployed, then a warning would be given to

the crowd to disperse and only once some time had been

21 given for people to leave, would a dispersal plan be put

22 into place. So it's not immediately upon deployment of the

23 razor wire, there would have been a period of time after

24 the warning for people to leave before further steps would

25 be taken to disperse them.

13

14

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The warning, as I stated, COLONEL SCOTT:

- 2 that was left to the operational commander at his
- 3 discretion, so I can't go into when he would have taken
- 4 that but I would have done that after forming up, making
- 5 sure that we were placed and ready and then I would have
- 6 given the warnings and given the intentions of what we
- 7 wanted to do, obviously and then given the time periods and
- as it flows in the dispersion. So initially there will be 8
- 9 two warnings. It was left to Brigadier Calitz to decide
- 10 when he was going to and I think maybe he'll testify as to
- 11 when he was going to and I was cautious not to dictate to
- 12 the public order commanders because I knew that this is
- 13 what they do, this is their speciality and I didn't want to
- 14 tell him what to do in that essence but as I say, how I'd
- envisioned it was to be, was to go out, form up, warn them, 15
- wait 15 to 20 minutes, re-warn them again that the action 16
- 17 is about to commence and then commence.
- 18 MS LE ROUX: Right. Colonel Scott, could
- 19 I ask you to turn to page 110 of Mr White's final statement
- 20 and paragraph 7.5.6 in particular? This is where Mr White 21 says that, "The choreography of the implementation of stage
- 22 3 of the plan was shambolic" and he's dealing with the fact
- 23 that the barbed wire was rolled out consecutively rather
- 24 than simultaneously and that it took 9 minutes and 30
- 25 seconds for the barbed wire to be rolled out and then he
 - Page 15188
 - says, "In my experience of crowd behaviour, an action by
- police provoked a reaction by the crowd. It's entirely 2
- 3 unsurprising that the crowd moved off the koppie during the
- 4 9 and a half minutes but it appears that SAPS did not
- 5 anticipate their move." Do you agree with that statement
- by Mr White? 6

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- COLONEL SCOTT:
 - Well, I planned it to
- 8 happen simultaneously so - and this is why I think when the
- 9 Chairperson asked earlier in the Commission, you know, the
- anticipation now that they were going to approach the 10
- 11 police line, I hadn't done because I expected the razor
- 12 wire to be rolled out simultaneously, not giving the
- 13 protesters that much time to come towards the police. And
- 14 in essence part of the contingency plan for that was to
- 15 have had the public order line that was stationary as the
- 16 monitoring line in support of those rolling out the razor
- 17 wire as well as backup TRT teams in case it got to the
- 18 place where it became violent, to life saving
- circumstances. So those contingencies were built in there
- but in my ideal of the operation it was going to happen
- 21 simultaneously and happen quickly and then obviously the
- 22 move out, but you're right in saying that if they had taken
- the option to disperse on the verbal warning of disperse,
- 24 my point of view was they were to be left and I think the
- 25 commanders understood that too, they were to be left. Then

- Page 15189 it would've simply been not us having to create a volatile
- situation or raise emotions which would've conflicted in
- 3 the townships or had the fruits thereof shown there, but
- 4 that would've then given us the opportunity to go over to
- 5 the cordon and search operations later that night at the
- 6 hostels, but the fact was that the police then were showing
- 7 that we now need to end this. So it was never one of those
- 8 where we were going to force the situation into ripeness,
- 9 if I could put it that way. If they had dispersed on
- 10 verbal, then they dispersed on verbal. That was what, how
- 11 I envisioned it happening.

MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, to go back to the start of my question, do you accept Mr White's premise that an action by police provoked a reaction by the crowd?

15 COLONEL SCOTT: I do and again, you know,

it's taking it into the classic crowd control situation.

17 So crowds differ, as we know, but again the defensive

18 measure which was done here was something that, in our

19 standard operating procedures, doesn't need to be

20 communicated for the very reason that you don't want them

- 21 to understand that you're about to either isolate a key
- 22 point, draw a barrier between you and them for a very
- 23 strategic reason and if it did invite response, the
- 24 responsible citizen should have had the response of moving
 - away, not moving toward, which -

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- CHAIRPERSON: You didn't have any belief that you 1 had a congregation of responsible citizens in front of you,
- 3 did you?

4

COLONEL SCOTT: No, but I didn't

anticipate necessarily - the anticipation was there but it

6 wasn't high on my scale of probability, if I can put it

7 that way, that they were going to come to the razor wire.

8 I did anticipate that it could happen at points, thus the

9 contingency plans for those Nyalas and their members.

10 CHAIRPERSON: But to be fair to you, there were

11 two things that you hadn't planned for, for which you can't

12 be held responsible. The one was that the barbed wire was 13

uncoiled sequentially and not simultaneously and you 14 realised that if it was done sequentially - you've dealt

15 with this with Mr Chaskalson - there would be problems that

you were intending to prevent by having it done 16 17

simultaneously.

COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.

19 CHAIRPERSON: And the second thing is you didn't

20 know that the Nyala, is it Nyala 6, had been moved. 21 COLONEL SCOTT: I was aware, I saw a

photograph, Chairperson. I didn't take the decision but I

was aware that it had been moved because I'd seen a 23 24 photograph of the deployment on ground.

CHAIRPERSON: That's before -

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Page 15193

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carry on.

Nkaneng but the point I -

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Page 15191
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    Before the 13:30 JOCCOM.
 1
            CHAIRPERSON: But did you apply your mind to the
 2
 3
     possible consequences of that move?
 4
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    I didn't. I didn't
 5
     expect the crowd as such, as a group, to stand up and move
     in the direction it did. I did anticipate that possibly
 6
 7
     happening once the physical dispersion occurred, that there
     may be a closing of the ground on which the POP members
 8
 9
     but I never anticipated that happening at that time of the
10
     operation.
11
           MS LE ROUX:
                                Chair, if we could go back
12
     to page 84 of Mr White's statement in the display, which is
13
     the picture of phase 1 of stage 3 of the plan. So Colonel
14
     Scott, would you accept, do you agree that the razor wire
     as it rolled out and the way that it rolled out channelled
15
     the protesters towards Nkaneng and towards, around the
16
17
     kraal rather than that they should move to the west, that
18
     the act of where the razor wire was deployed could still
19
     have served to canalise, to channel them towards Nkaneng
20
     rather than force them to move west.
21
           COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ:
                                            Ms Le Roux, hasn't
22
     the witness repeatedly said that channelising was part of
23
     the dispersal action? Is that question fair in the light
24
     of that answer?
25
           MS LE ROUX:
                                Commissioner Hemraj, I'll -
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MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, do you agree 1 with me that the unintended consequence of the deployment of razor wire was to channel people towards Nkaneng? 4 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: I'm afraid I still have a difficulty with that question in the light of his 6 previous answers. I think you need to rephrase it. I'm 7 sorry, were you going to say something, Mr Semenya? 8 MR SEMENYA SC: Exactly. 9 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya, please proceed. 10 No, I was just going to MR SEMENYA SC: raise the same point, Chair. We see what we see. I don't 11 12 know what the opinion of this witness will even add to what 13 we see. 14 MS LE ROUX: Chair, I'm not sure I 15 understand the difficulty because as I understand where we are, the proposition put by Mr White is that the deployment of the razor wire in fact channelled people towards 17 Nkaneng. If they were leaving the koppie they were likely 19 to return home, the razor wire would then channel them to 20 that part, to Nkaneng. The unintended, the fact that it 21 may have been an unintended consequence of Colonel Scott's 22 plan then begs the next question, which you, Chair, have 23 already put which is, did you anticipate this consequence 24 and the answer was he didn't. So Mr White's point is not that it was an unintended consequence but that it, the very

know what I mean, and channelling in the passive sense of being channelled, not because it was intended that that 5 should happen but it was a result of what had happened and the question as phrased I think is ambiguous. Perhaps you - and he's made it quite clear that he never intended to 8 channel them or canalise or whatever the correct word is, towards Nkaneng, on the contrary but the question you ask seems to ignore that point that he's made. So perhaps you 10 11 could rephrase it in a way that it's fair. 12 **COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ:** Perhaps the 13 appropriate question would be that it left an approach 14 towards Nkaneng wide open or something to that effect. 15 MS LE ROUX: Chair and Commissioner 16 Hemraj, the point I'm trying to get comment on from Colonel 17 Scott is, I hear him saying that it was an unintended 18 consequence that it would channel protesters towards

CHAIRPERSON: - a problem with what you want to

put to him, our difficult is the way it's being phrased,

22 which raises difficulties which I don't think you even want

to encounter. So perhaps you could rephrase the question

24 in a way which addresses the points put to you, then we can

CHAIRPERSON: You see there's a distinction, I

think, between channelling as a transitive verb, if you

Page 15194 result of the way the razor wire was deployed once Nyala 6 had been moved back was to channel people towards Nkaneng. If they saw the police roll out barbed wire and they wanted to get home, it would channel them into that area around the kraal. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya? MR SEMENYA SC:

Chair, obviously with the appreciation that these witnesses like Mr White have not testified and even the conclusions they draw have not been challenged, I think we should do this with a little bit of caution, with respect, and particularly I don't see where Mr White is saying the razor wire was channelling them towards Nkaneng.

MS LE ROUX: Chair, perhaps we can frame this in terms of Mr White's own statement. Page 84 at the bottom of the page he says, "Because the POP, TRT, NIU and STF are not yet deployed to the north of the koppie, the Lshape of the razor wire invites or channels protesters to move towards the informal settlement until such time as the members move into position to the north-west of the kraal." So I'm asking Colonel Scott whether, in his plan, when Nyala 6 has moved back and the shape of the razor wire changes and the members are not deployed, does he accept Mr White's conclusion that it in fact channelled people. CHAIRPERSON: You see the problem is he uses the

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word "channels" in quotation marks, so he's not using it in

- 2 its ordinary sense and that I think gives rise to some of
- 3 the difficulty. Perhaps we can try and invite - you see
- 4 what Mr White says, that he says because you, the POP, TRT,
- 5 NIU and STF hadn't yet been deployed to the north of the
- koppie, the L-shape of the wire "invited" as he suggests, 6
- 7 in quotation marks, the protesters whom I would prefer to
- 8 call the strikers, to move towards the informal settlement
- 9 until such time as the members into position to the north-
- 10 west of the kraal which would, of course, have prevented
- them from going there. That's his point. The question is 11
- 12 do you agree with it or don't you and if you don't agree,
- 13 the next question will be why don't you?

14 COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, and maybe it's me playing devil's advocate again, but we know what we 15

16 know now and we see what we see from aerial photography. 17 The perception that existed in the strikers' minds at that

- 18 time is maybe what's the question because Nyala 5 where it
- 19 was positioned could still have driven straight. We know
- 20 that Nyala 6 was moved because it had, the militant group 21 moved to it and it was thus brought back to safety. So in
- 22 essence for the strikers to have known that the police were
- 23 now planning to isolate themselves, in essence, I'm not
- sure whether that was known, specifically sitting at ground 24
- 25 level and seeing the line in front of you with Nyala 6

- Page 15196 which was obviously approached and was moved away. So
- that's just one question and the second question again, 2
- 3 moving off in a so-called militant group like we see, even
- 4 in the recent footage which has come to light, when that
- 5 group turns to face the police they take up the same stance
- and before they even leave, they're leaving with the same 6
- militant stance of tapping weapons together, et cetera, as 7
- was experienced on Monday. So the question is, if it was 8
- 9 merely a matter of going home or wanting to disperse on
- 10 their own, why the same action as was displayed which was
- 11 militant towards the police and then to approach the police
- 12 in the same manner? So these are questions on the opposite
- 13 side of the coin which also still need to then be put
- 14 forward.

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CHAIRPERSON: That raises a question which I've been puzzling about for a long time and I hope that by the end of the Commission we may have found the answer, is were

- 18 the militant group advancing towards the police because
- 19 they were on their way to Nkaneng or were they advancing to
- 20 the police because they wanted to attack them and drive
- 21 them away so that they could be left undisturbed? There
- 22 were threats that were made by them before that, whether
- those were just empty threats or they intended to be
- 24 implemented, we don't know. There's a suggestion that they
- may have thought they were invincible and invulnerable,

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- which might also have strengthened that inference but it's
- a question to which I don't know the answer and you
- obviously don't know the answer either, but the present
- 4 question presupposes that they were moving towards Nkaneng
- to get there and not that they were moving towards the
- 6 police to attack them. But having made that point, the
- 7 question still is there whether, assuming they were moving
- 8 towards Nkaneng, was it not made more possible for them -
- 9 we'll use different language - by the configuration of the
- 10 wire? And I suppose the answer to that, in retrospect,
- with hindsight it must be yes but other things flow from 11 12 that -

13 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: - which presumably may be explored.

15 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, with respect,

these are the difficulties we have. As a matter of fact,

Chair, we know 3 000 people moved westwards, so why were 17

18 they not invited to Nkaneng by the barbed wire? All of

19 these things are legitimate questions we must still engage

20 Mr White about.

CHAIRPERSON: What I'm seeking to do is to get

22 this witness's comment on what Mr White says. In due

23 course Mr White will come, you will question him about it

24 but in the meanwhile, inasmuch as we have the person

responsible for the plan giving evidence, it seems

Page 15198 appropriate to put what Mr White says so that he can deal

with it. No further -

MS LE ROUX: Chair, if I can just clarify

4 before Colonel Scott answers, Mr White isn't saying

5 anything about the intention of the strikers. He's not

6 saying are they going home, they're coming to attack, he

7 says nothing about intention. He's merely commenting on

8 the change in the plan and the way the razor wire is

9

deployed and he says in his opinion it channels them 10

towards Nkaneng and that's what you're being asked to

comment on.

12 CHAIRPERSON: I think it should be made clear

13 that, if this is in fact correct, that there's no

14 suggestion that there was any conscious - am I correct - no 15 suggestion there was any conscious intention on the part of

16 the police to get the people or the militant group or

17 whatever it is, to move towards Nkaneng. You are only

18 dealing, as it were, with the benefit of hindsight, with

19 the objective consequences of what was done, is that

20 correct?

21 MS LE ROUX: Yes, Chair. Where all this is going is on the next page of Mr White's statement where

23 he says, "It does not appear that the consequences of the

24 movement of Nyala 6 were properly considered by the overall

commander or by Colonel Scott." So it's all relating to -

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1 CHAIRPERSON: I understand that.

2 MS LE ROUX: - the effects on the plan.

3 CHAIRPERSON: But surely, you know when you talk

4 about a consequence and whether consequences were

- 5 effectively considered, the first question I whether the
- 6 consequence was foreseen at all. Or the first question is
- 7 really, was it, objectively viewed, a result, i.e. a
- 8 consequence? If the answer to that is yes, the next
- 9 question is, was it foreseen? If it wasn't foreseen and
- 10 it's merely a consequence which is, objectively seen with
- 11 the benefit of hindsight, that's one thing but of course if
- 12 there's a suggestion that it was considered in some way or,
- 13 considered in some way, that's a different matter. So the
- 14 question at the moment I'm afraid, there's a number of
- 15 uncertainties about it. I think it would be helpful to us
- 16 all if that uncertainty could be removed and the question
- 17 could be put clearly to the witness so he and the rest of
- 18 us can understand what precisely is being put.
- 19 [14:29] MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, let me try
- 20 again. What I'd like your comment on is Mr White's
- 21 conclusion that because POP, TRT, NIU and STF were not yet
- 22 deployed to the north and the razor wire is deployed in the
- 23 L-shape, that this in fact would channel protesters to the
- 24 particular point where scene 1 occurred. That's what I'm
- 25 asking for your comment on. He says nothing about the

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- intention of the strikers or whether this was considered,
- 2 because it appears not to have been considered, but just
- 3 that it had that effect.

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- 4 COLONEL SCOTT: The best way I –
- 5 CHAIRPERSON: If we insert the words "objectively
- 6 viewed with hindsight" into the question -
 - COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. And objectively
 - viewed with hindsight and my reply, objectively viewed with
- 9 hindsight, my reply is that again if the strikers had seen
- 10 the opportunity to move directly north to continue moving
- 11 north, which we knew they could have, that I can accept,
- 12 even if the razor wires were being pulled out because at
- 13 the stage where Nyala 4 did close in on the kraal, we can
- 14 see from the recently presented footage that they still
- 15 make a determined effort at that stage to come around the
- 16 kraal in a militant fashion and confront the police, where
- 17 the first reaction from the police is to try and rush the
- 18 armoured vehicles out to form a stop line, that not
- 19 proceeding they start or succeeding, they start with the
- 20 sub-lethal force as it's mentioned in overseas terms, but
- 21 they still push through this. Now that's the difficulty I
- 22 have. Sure, with Nyala 6 being pulled back it opened a
- 23 direct route to the north but any person not seeking

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- 24 confrontation or wanting to in any way get involved with
- 25 the police action, would have moved away from that directly

- north and not tried to come into the police action, even
- 2 after Nyala 4's closed off. So, and I don't want to go to
- 3 the point of trying to prove intention but I can agree that
- 4 they could've moved directly north but still have pushed
- 5 the point to try to come through where the police were
- / visibly sleeing off it/o difficult for me to say that
- 6 visibly closing off, it's difficult for me to say that
- 7 there wasn't intent then on the miners' part or on the
 - strikers' part to confront the police.
 - MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, and I know
- 10 that we inserted the words "objectively and considered with
- 11 hindsight," but Mr White's point is precisely the opposite,
- Thindsight, but will write a point is precisely the opposite,
- 12 that it should have been seen, with foresight, that it
- 13 should have been taken into account in the plan that this
- 14 change to deploy the razor wire in an L-shape, where you'd
- 15 asked people to disperse and leave, that there would be a
- 16 sizeable contingent that would then be channelled towards,
- 17 towards Nkaneng. Does that change your answer at all?
 - COLONEL SCOTT: Well, if you're saying
- 19 when you've asked them to leave they hadn't been asked to
- 20 leave, which was part of the problem and the other part of
- 21 the problem was being that they had chosen to leave still
- 22 grouped well together within that militant group with the
- 23 attitude and actions displayed. So again to expect the
- 24 police then not to try to form some form of a barrier and
 - what they're seeing on ground level becomes difficult to

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- lered, 1 explain, at least from somebody that wasn't there. So
 - 2 again it's just not human nature, unless you're seeking
 - 3 confrontation with the police, to move towards the police
 - when you can see the police are visibly preparing to carry
 - out a tactical option on you.
 - 6 COMMISSIONER HEN
 - COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Colonel Scott, it
 - was not part of your plan that the razor wire be deployed
 - 8 in that L-shape.

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- 9 COLONEL SCOTT: It wasn't part of the
- 10 initial plan, no ma'am.
 - COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Yes.
- 12 COLONEL SCOTT: It was as a result that I
- 13 had to work around that now.
- 14 MS LE ROUX: Yes, and Commissioner
- 15 Hemraj, to build on that point, Colonel Scott I think a lot
- 16 of this back and forth is coming because we seem to be
- 17 talking about two different points. Mr White's point is
- 18 that it should have been anticipated in the plan that the
- 19 way the razor wire was being deployed would channel people
- 20 towards Nkaneng. Your testimony seems to concentrate on
- 21 how it was actually done on the day and the execution on
- 22 the day, which is a different point. Mr White has other
- 23 things to say about that and I'll ask it one more time and
- 24 then I'll move on. With respect to Mr White's point that
- 25 in your plan, once the Nyala 6 has pulled back, the razor

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wire is being deployed in an L-shape and before the other

2 members are deployed to the north, that deployment of razor 3 wire invites the protesters around the kraal to where they

4 confronted the police.

COLONEL SCOTT: I can understand and what he does say, that sometimes police action precipitates an action in response from the crowd and if it was a bona fide action to simply disperse on their own, I could understand that they would want to disperse and disperse away and that means even walking north parallel to the wire. That's 10 understandable but I can't concede or even admit to why 12 they would want to come to the point. I don't think it's 13 channelising them to that point of the kraal, no. I think 14 that's a decision taken by them to move that way,

irrespective of what the police are trying to do. 15

16 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, I'm moving on 17 to Mr White's next criticism of the plan, which is - let me 18 just state for the record, this commences in Mr White's 19 statement at page 85 paragraph 6.5.21. This is where Mr

20 White deals with the fact that in his view your plan

21 carried a high risk of the need to use live ammunition and

22 if we can start in your second statement which was GGG39

23 and in particular at page 4 of that statement, paragraph 8,

24 this states, "During of the offensive tactical option of

25 dispersing, isolating smaller groups or individuals,

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disarming and then arresting, a strategy to deploy a

2 defensive line to protect the lives of the POP members and

3 to confront belligerent armed protesters who needed to be

4 disarmed and who refused to respond to the public order

5 policing measures, was to deploy the TRT, NIU and STF to

6 approach the armed protesters who could, if necessary,

7 protect themselves and the POP members with sharp

ammunition against life-threatening attacks." So Colonel 8

9 Scott, what I want to put to you is that there was in fact

an element of your plan which anticipated the need to use

sharp ammunition.

COLONEL SCOTT: That is so and I admit to that, not anticipate it but as a contingency. Looking at the threat against the police, I had to put something in place to prevent policemen being killed unnecessarily by unlawful actions and attacks on the police because the police action was not unlawful but any attack coming towards the policemen carrying out their duty was going to be unlawful and surely the right to life is applicable to all and specifically to those policemen who were standing with less than lethal force capability and then the 22 proportionate side of this is absolutely unproportionate toward them, where they would have shotguns with rubber at

24 maximum, trying to defend themselves against people with

25 pangas, spears and possibly live ammunition firearms. So

something had to be put in as a measure to help protect

that POP line and then the way I saw it as well, after

Monday's incident if you wanted the POPS to carry out their

duty effectively and keep the mind focused on the non-

5 lethal side, you needed to give them the assurance that

6 somebody was there to protect them in case they got

7 isolated, in case something happened which put them in

8 harm's way. So it was never the intention to go out in any

9 way to use live ammunition to shoot any protester but as I say, it's part of your policing duty, you need to save life

11 and sometimes in order to save life you need to take a life

12 or wound somebody for that matter.

MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, I understand in that paragraph where you say, "TRT, NIU and STF would use sharp ammunition against attacks on POP members." But you also say that you would deploy the defensive line to confront belligerent armed protesters who needed to be disarmed and who refused to respond to the public order policing measures. And you contemplated that being done by the TRT, NIU and STF who only had sharp ammunition, correct?

COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct but understanding as well that with water cannons, and maybe it's not putting context there properly, but that militant group with water cannons and the rest of the less than

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lethal force being applied to them, would have found it

very, very difficult to have remained in a static position

and grouped together as they were, so - and as I said, my

perception was going to be that they, worst case, would

have approached the POPS, next scenario was that they would

have taken up hiding on higher ground where POPS members 6

7 could not get to them and that would have anyway broken

8 that group up because they would not have been able to keep

9 their formations. They would have, in essence, gone into

10 smaller groups, if not individuals, and the sweep through

11 of those tactical units was thus to go forward and then to

12 challenge those who were then standing as individuals or

13 hiding or in small pockets with their own force continuum,

14 to disarm and arrests then to be carried out. That was the

15 envisioned plan of it.

16 MS LE ROUX: But those particular 17 tactical units, TRT, NIU, STF, they didn't have anything 18 but sharp ammunition, correct?

COLONEL SCOTT: You would have found some Taser weapons within the STF but again, I think you're jumping to the far side of the force continuum. Again those officers, if they didn't need to close the gap onto that specific person or persons, they wouldn't have done that. There are other measures which we didn't want to get

into the Commission in speaking about because it can just

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make our opponents in the future wiser to the tactics we'd

- 2 use but that is at the far extreme. There were other
- 3 measures available which I know of that could have been
- 4 implemented as such to actually disarm, with less than
- 5 lethal force, those very protesters that were presenting
- that threat, but what you can't do is dictate the action of 6
- 7 the striker and if he decided in close quarter at a 10
- 8 metre distance or so that he was now going to attack the
- 9 police, they had no other option than obviously to defend
- 10 themselves but the idea was not that the police were going
- to go up to him with his panga and eventually shoot him out 11
- 12 of measure because you don't want to put it down. There
- 13 were other measures in place to deal with that.

14 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, on the crisp 15 point that you anticipated that confrontation, you

anticipated the possibility that your tactical units would 16

17 have to engage with sharp ammunition, I'm correct in that

regard?

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19 COLONEL SCOTT: Like I say, in self-

defence. I anticipated that scenarios could arise where

21 the police came under illegal attack from protesters or

22 from strikers where they would need to defend themselves,

23 yes.

24 MS LE ROUX: And then in your

consolidated statement if we go to page 84 paragraph 13.9,

sharp ammunition to defend his life then that becomes a

legal on behalf of the police in self-defence or private

defence in that matter.

MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, given that you had made, an aspect of your plan made provision for the

use of sharp ammunition to respond to an attack, do you 6

7 think that this was the right plan?

8 COLONEL SCOTT: Well, considering that a 9 dispersion had to take place because we said a tactical

10 option had to take place, taking the POPS members, as I've 11 stated, who are not able to defend themselves against what

12 they were going to face due to the lack of the ability to

13 defend themselves proportionately, to in essence take the

14 life of a striker should their life be in danger, unless

15 going for a pistol which we know is not always the case,

16 something needs to be put in place. And as I've stated

17 before, the essence of how I planned it, I would still plan

it today because the police never went forward with

19 malicious intent at all and any policeman who has been

20 through the Police College as these have, are all trained

21 to understand what private defence and self-defence are and

22 there's very little circumstances outside of that, that one

23 may even use your firearm other than section 49(2) which

24 has got a lot of criteria stuck to it as well. So these

members are quite aware and are only going to utilise those

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there you say, "I did, however, not expect that the smaller

- 2 militant group would submit to the request to disperse but
- 3 considered three options when planning, that they may
- 4 choose to follow, which I covered in the briefing." The
- 5 first of those that you say you covered was where they
- 6 closed the ground on the POP line to confront them with
- 7 their sharp-edged weapons. So as I understand your
- 8 evidence from the statement and your testimony today, you
- 9 foresaw the risk of an attack on the police and your plan
- 10 for how to respond to such an attack was to have your
- 11 tactical units respond with everything up to and including

12 sharp ammunition.

13 COLONEL SCOTT: The response initially

for the POPS, who would be obviously positioned in front of

any tactical line, was to go straight back to their

armoured vehicles, but I'm also wise to the fact that it's 16

17 possible that, as I've mentioned, doors can be closed while

18 members are still outside, it is possible that POPS members

19 can be isolated and again not forgetting that the police

20 are not carrying out an illegal action. Any attack upon

21 the police is the illegal action and thus the

22 proportionality to that is to save the life of that POPS

member by going forward and, if necessary, if they are

24 hacking him with pangas as what happened on Monday, is then

to defend his life and if it means that you need to fire

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firearms at times when their lives, they feel, are 2 endangered. If they move outside of those boundaries that

3 is something that they would then need to attest to and

4 explain, but as far as the planning is concerned, as I say,

5 it would be naïve of me to say that I didn't anticipate any

6 attack on the police, I did. I tried to put contingencies

7 in place first in order to not have to use live ammunition

8 but if there was an imminent attack on a police official

9 and there was no other way other than using live

10 ammunition, then that is what needed to have occurred. 11

MS LE ROUX: And am I correct that you thought this risk of the need to use sharp ammunition to, on your testimony, to protect your members, was so significant that you needed almost 200 officers that were

COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the amount of officers who were there wasn't necessarily my doing or saying, the amount, but - and that's why I had simply chosen the smaller koppie, koppie 2 for the lesser trained TRT to deal with, anticipating that koppie 1 was larger and would be more difficult to have to clear or to sweep over and clear. So the amount of members, in essence, I'm not

23 sure is - if one can even work that into proportionality

24 for that matter because it still comes down to whether

there were 10 or 50, the same task at hand needed to be

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armed with rifles?

Page 15213

Page 15211 dealt with. 1 2 MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, returning to 3 your background and in your first statement GGG39 - just 4 for the record, we don't need to go there, page 3 paragraph 5 6 - you said that "The plan or strategy I prepared or proposed was the first of its kind." And then in paragraph 6 7 6 of your second statement you said that you weren't aware 8 of this plan that disperses into small groups, encircle and 9 disarm, ever being used by the SAPS but on that, have you ever deployed a tactic, in your experience, where the POP 10 11 would go forward to confront an armed, aggressive crowd and TRT and NIU follow with live ammunition as a backup to the 12 POPS? Have you ever done that aspect of the plan? 13 14 COLONEL SCOTT: I've not done that in 15 person but I'm aware of operations where public violence is at a large level, where the NIU get called in to assist the 16 public order policing in townships and so on. Exactly how 17 18 they go about it, I'm not sure but I would imagine it would 19 be something similar, that the National Intervention Unit 20 members would only be employed again where life was threatened in xenophobia-type attacks, et cetera but I 21 22 can't speak to those, I haven't been involved in planning 23 any of those in -24 MS LE ROUX: And Colonel Scott, following 25 up, are you aware of any circumstance where the SAPS have Page 15212 used this plan to disperse into small groups, encircle and disarm?

2 would be happening from day to day or hour to hour. 3 MS LE ROUX: Right, and then we don't 4 need to go there, but for the record, Mr White in his final 5 statement, page 66, paragraph 6.4.3, says, "As a basic principle if one chooses to adopt a fluid approach to 6 7 planning, it's important to pay particular attention to 8 risk analysis and contingency planning." Do you agree with 9 him? 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I do. 11 MS LE ROUX: In respect of risk analysis, 12 the only risk analysis that we can find in your 13 contemporaneous plans is contained in exhibit JJJ50, five 14 zero, slide 7, if we could display slide 7 of exhibit 15 JJJ50. This is a slide headed "Risk Assessment." It consists of two bullet points, the first, "AMCU possibly 17 defiant, feeling the clash with SAPS resulted in their 18 victory with killing of police officials and seizing police 19 radios and weapons." The second point, "Witch doctor providing muti to AMCU group, creating mindset of 20 21 invincibility." So Colonel Scott, as a matter of fact 22 these are the only two dimensions to a risk analysis that 23 we can find in your contemporaneous planning. Is that 24 correct? 25 COLONEL SCOTT: That's what you can find.

anticipate how it would change, so yes, we didn't know what

1 2 3 COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not personally, but 4 then again as we've shown, my public order policing 5 experience is limited, so whether it's been done before, 6 I'm not sure 7 CHAIRPERSON: What that means is you didn't base the plan on anything that you knew had happened 8 9 successfully in the past. 10 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, 11 Chairperson. 12 CHAIRPERSON: So as far as you were concerned it 13 was an original idea. 14 COLONEL SCOTT: It's - yes, not using 15 "original" in a proud way but -16 CHAIRPERSON: No, no. 17 [14:49] MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, I'd like to 18 turn now to the last of Mr White's three criticisms that we're highlighting around the planning and this relates to the lack of contingency planning. We've touched on it a 21 little bit earlier today, but you stated, and I'm correct, 22 I think, that you adopted a fluid approach to the planning between 14 to 16 August because the situation was changing,

Well, we couldn't

24 correct?

COLONEL SCOTT:

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Page 15214 That was set up on the Monday evening, early hours of Tuesday morning, as I have mentioned, and that presentation ran into the Tuesday and it's all that we knew at that stage. So as the operation drew on and the JOCCOM started 5 sitting, so I didn't deal anymore with intelligence, and 6 for that matter when the intelligence was delivered you 7 would initially look at the risk inherent with that 8 intelligence given. So I'd been moved straight on to just 9 dealing with the strategy, or briefing the strategy to the 10 commanders in the JOCCOM. But when it does come down to 11 contingency planning, as I state, we can take each phase 12 and I can explain the phase with the contingencies that 13 were built into it, both on behalf of the strikers as well 14 as on behalf of the police, but - and I've mentioned that 15 that being a presentation, it's not all that was done or 16 said. There was speaking to this, which obviously is far 17 more comprehensive that what you would see in the 18 presentation, dealing with amongst others the rationales, the mindsets, the contingencies that go with the 20 positioning of different forces in different areas. 21 MS LE ROUX: Right, Colonel Scott, I understand that broader context and where it fits into your 23 planning process, but just to go back -24 CHAIRPERSON: Can we perhaps take the tea adjournment at this stage, unless you want to make this -

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Page 15215 ask the question first? I'm in your hands. considered how to respond to the use of firearms by the strikers away from the koppie, was there? 2 MS LE ROUX: No, that's fine, Chair. 2 3 3 CHAIRPERSON: Alright, we'll take the tea COLONEL SCOTT: Well, this is an essence 4 adjournment at this point. why an officer carries his weapons, otherwise you know, 5 [COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES1 we'd move without that in essence. So the mere fact that [15:13] CHAIRPERSON: Colonel, you're still under you have tactical units such as TRT, NIU, and STF, which 6 7 oath. 7 are position behind the Public Order Policing is in essence 8 DUNCAN GEORGE SCOTT: S.U.O. 8 what he's saying, I understand, is that in the context 9 9 CHAIRPERSON: Adv Le Roux. where he's worked he would place dedicated officers in the 10 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LE ROUX (CONTD.): 10 Public Order Policing line, which would then be given the 11 Thank you, Chair. Colonel Scott, just to round out the 11 instruction to engage, if necessary, a deathly threat point that we were on before the tea adjournment, I'm 12 12 against the police. We know that in the Public Order correct that other than slide 7 of exhibit JJJ50 with its 13 13 Policing, or I was aware at the time that every eighth 14 two bullet points, we have no other written risk assessment 14 person in the section was issued with an R5 rifle, which is 15 in your contemporaneous documents? similar to what Mr White is attesting to. So, and we see 16 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. that the, I think it's Warrant-Officer Kuhn at scene 1 who 17 MS LE ROUX: Turning then to the question 17 initiated the shooting, is actually in fact the Public 18 of contingency planning, could you confirm what Major-19 General Annandale has already testified about, which is 19 20 that similarly there were no written contemporaneous 20 21 contingency plans at all? 21 22 **COLONEL SCOTT:** 22 One has to look at the 23 23 actual deployment itself. When you look at a phase 2 24 deployment, the pre-placement of razor wire in itself is an 24 25 anticipation of a risk and it's a risk mitigating point in Page 15216 order to close off that police line as quickly as possible, so it's not that there's no written plan as you would find 2 2 engage in one go against them. 3 in an operational commander's planning format, but it's 3 MS LE ROUX: 4 drafted to within the plan. As I've said, that's why if 4 5 you need to understand the planning process and everything that I'd gone through and rationale, then we can follow 6 6 7 7 process and I can explain it in more detail exactly why

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Order Policing member. The Public Order Policing member who's still firing shots after the cease fire, or the members doing that is Public Order Policing member, both issued with R5 weapons, and these are personnel that are deployed upfront in this condition with the Public Order Policing less than lethal force in order to assist to protect, but I didn't see that as adequate to protect the Public Order Policing members against the magnitude of what Page 15218 they may be facing if the crowd of 300 plus decided to Colonel Scott, I just want to understand your testimony that you've just given. So you're saying that the Public Order Policing members, you said every eighth in the line that's issued with an R5 rifle, you contemplated them having particular responsibility to protect their fellow POP members against any attack? 10 COLONEL SCOTT: Well that, this was part of the grouping that I'd inherited and that I was led to understand that one person in the section of eight had an 13 R5 rifle. 14 MS LE ROUX: And that one person's responsibility was what, with respect to that rifle? 16 COLONEL SCOTT: I would assume to protect fellow POPs members against lethal attack. 18 MS LE ROUX: And the STF sharpshooters that you deployed on top of the Nyalas that formed the barbed wire line, am I correct that their responsibility was to respond to an attack from the protesters, so if shot 22 at, they would shoot? COLONEL SCOTT: I think we need to 24 understand the training of a sharpshooter first. He anticipates that rounds pass through people and that any

16 White's statement, page 89, paragraph 6.5.31, and this is 17 the use of firearms by the strikers against the police, but 18 away from the koppie. So I'm correct that there were STF sharpshooters deployed on top of the Nyalas that were in 20 the barbed wire line, correct? 21 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. 22 MS LE ROUX: But there appears to be nothing in the plan for how to deal with the use of 24 firearms by strikers other than an officer acting in self or private defence. There was no part of the plan that ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

people were positioned where they were, why razor wire was

placed where it was, why forward holding areas were created

Colonel Scott, I'd like to

with contingency forces there, as well, or reserve, as well

as medical assets, fire brigades, and so on, which are all

turn to one specific contingency that does not appear to

have been planned for, and for the record, this is in Mr

calculating towards any contingencies that may occur.

MS LE ROUX:

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Colonel Scott, I'd now like

Page 15219

round he may fire may pass through the subject he is aiming

- at and into somebody else. So they're extremely cautious 2
- 3 when that occurs, and they were actually placed on my
- 4 discretion because I anticipated that any shooting that
- 5 would come specifically from a weapon like an R5, which is
- 6 amongst the protesters, because we'd heard the media
- 7 mention that they had seen long weapons rolled in, or a
- 8 long weapon rolled in a blanket, and again part of my, the 9
- way I planned and the way I do things is I tend to try and
- 10 think like my opponent in order to counter that action and I would think that somebody with a weapon like that would 11
- 12 try to go for higher ground so that they could fire over
- 13 their own members in essence, and the sharpshooters were
- 14 thus placed so that somebody who had gone to a higher
- ground to isolate themselves to fire upon the police who 15
- were probably approaching, would then, we would have 16
- 17 sharpshooters that would be able to identify that and to
- 18 actually deal with that threat, if it so required.

MS LE ROUX: But those STF sharpshooters wouldn't have provided any protection once the crowd was

21 dispersed to the west, would they?

COLONEL SCOTT: Again if there was a lone

23 person with an R5 that had taken a stand against police 24 officials, those sharpshooters are trained to shoot pretty

25 extensive distances.

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MS LE ROUX: So would you agree with Mr 1

- 2 White – and this is set out at paragraph 6.5.31(a) where he
- 3 says that, "In a crowd situation where gunmen may be
- 4 surrounded by other individuals who may not pose an
- 5 imminent risk to life, leaving the response to officer
- discretion acting in self-defence is not sufficient." 6
- 7 COLONEL SCOTT: I'm just failing to see
- 8 how that's necessarily in the context at Marikana, because
- 9 I'm assuming what he's saying is that having a gunman
- 10 amongst other protesters who have not got violent intent or
- 11 the intent to take life does pose a problem for the
- 12 policing environment. There again I'm not even sure that
- 13 in South Africa we would find that you would have somebody
- 14 allocated to take a shot. I don't know of that being
- 15 trained in our Public Order Policing, but again the Public
- 16 Order Policeman is taught that he must act in self or
- 17 private defence if so necessary, but obviously considering
- 18 collateral damage. But in saying this, this is why I say,
- 19 in context with what Mr White's saying, whether you're
- confronted with a man with a firearm or a man wanting to
- 21 take your life with a panga or a spear, it's simply the
- matter of the distance between you which matters. Both
- want to take your life. So putting it back into the

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- 24 context possibly of scene 1, I believe that was what the
- 25 members were considering when they opened fire there.

23 the commanders as to what they were supposed to do.

COLONEL SCOTT:

24 Whether they understood that, I'm not sure. Whether they

chose to do it differently, I'm not sure. But it wasn't

to move on to the next topic covered by Mr White, 3 commencing at page 91, section 6.6, which is briefing, and 4 specifically in that section Mr White criticises the 5 circumstances of the briefing of the unit commanders in the 6 Marikana operation, and he highlights some of the evidence 7 of misunderstood briefing. So I have some questions around 8 this issue of briefing. The first is the unit commanders 9 had no detailed knowledge of the plan prior to 2:30, did 10 they, on the 16th?

MS LE ROUX:

COLONEL SCOTT: No. No, they would have maybe just been made aware of the strategy, but not have gone into the detail. But I think I must just emphasise again that - and I've said this on numerous occasions when you tell a POPs officer from a commander to a POPs trained member that he's going to disperse, you won't explain to him the actual action of dispersing. They understand that. So when we're talking about was there sufficient briefing, I think that remains questionable because again, with respect to Mr White and to colleagues from outside of South Africa, we're sitting with 11 official languages here of which many receiving a briefing for instance would not have that as a first language, and so there would be obviously communication issues in understanding and so on. Whether they raise it again,

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- sometimes there's a cultural issue involved in that where
- people don't want to ask questions because of and I
- 3 understand this from training, and training people of
- different cultures in my classrooms where they want to
- 5 understand but they won't ask the question either. So we
- 6 normally need to probe for that, time permitting again.

MS LE ROUX: And Colonel Scott, the unit commanders were briefed just an hour before they were

expected to execute the operation, correct, at 3:30? 9

> COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.

11 MS LE ROUX: And so in those

12 circumstances, and adding in the language difficulty and

13 cultural translation questions that you've just

14 highlighted, you'd agree with Mr White that it's vital that

15 briefing is clear and detailed and leaves no room for

16 doubt, because there won't be another opportunity to get

clarification, or have the briefing repeated? Do you agree

18 with that?

> and obviously you know the test would be obviously what the members did. So there could have been, as Adv Chaskalson has pointed out, some misunderstanding on behalf of some of

What he's saying is so,

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Page 15223 Page 15225 necessarily carried out how I'd requested. your screen? 1 2 MS LE ROUX: 2 Colonel Scott, turning to COLONEL SCOTT: No, the - I think that 3 the circumstances of your briefing, this is described in the commanders were asked to bring with them their, because 4 your statement, page 81, paragraph 13.1, and you say, if we it would be in their possession anyway, but to bring their 5 could display that part of your statement, 13.1, page 81, handouts from that morning, which would have been the stage 6 in relevant parts there you say, "I took my computer and 6 2 photographs, and I believe that Brigadier Calitz when he 7 7 sat inside a Mercedes Benz Vito with the sliding door open re-briefed all his commanders, utilised those again, to brief the commanders, who stood mainly in front of the 8 showing the ground picture and explaining what needed to 8 9 9 door. There were about 20 persons at the briefing. I occur off that. 10 10 displayed the Google Earth satellite photo, which I had MS LE ROUX: And the 10 to 20 commanders 11 adjusted to show the deployment positions. No slideshow 11 that you briefed from the van, do you remember them having 12 those handouts with them, any of them? 12 presentation was given." Now is that the laptop computer 13 13 that you used at that briefing? COLONEL SCOTT: I didn't specifically 14 14 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. take note of that, no. 15 MS LE ROUX: And how big is that laptop 15 MS LE ROUX: Did you notice anyone recording your briefing, whether by taking notes or filming 16 screen? it or any way of recording your briefing? 17 COLONEL SCOTT: I don't know how to 17 18 measure that. Maybe if someone could assist. 18 COLONEL SCOTT: No. I don't recall 19 MS LE ROUX: If you know, 13 inches, 15 19 anything either, no. 20 inches? Do you know? 20 MS LE ROUX: And did you receive any 21 COLONEL SCOTT: questions? Did anybody ask any questions during your No. I don't know. It's a 21 22 standard -22 briefing? 23 MS LE ROUX: I'm instructed it looks like 23 COLONEL SCOTT: I don't recall any, no. 24 a 15-inch, but surely it was quite difficult for 20 people MS LE ROUX: 24 Did you notice members that 25 to see such a small screen through the open door of a van were closer to the van repeating things to those that were Page 15224 Page 15226 1 on a sunny day? 1 further away? 2 2 COLONEL SCOTT: It, well, I can't speak COLONEL SCOTT: No, again it was a 3 for them, but if we actually have to count how many of the commanders' briefing, so once I'd finished briefing, as far 4 commanders that were supposed to be there, I estimate about 4 as I know Brigadier Calitz called his people, I think he 5 20 because obviously more people from around forward spoke to the group initially first and then the commanders 6 holding area 1 were coming to see what was going on, but if that were at the immediate reaction areas and forward 6 7 you do actually count the amount of commanders that needed 7 holding area 2 moved off, and speaking from now what I've 8 to receive that briefing, I don't know, I'm just picked up in building the presentation and talking to the 9 9 brainstorming now, but you'd probably come down to about 10 colleagues, he went back to the neutral police area, called or so. But even so, whether they could see the screen 10 the commanders there together, and I think the drivers of 10 11 clearly or hear the briefing clearly, I can't obviously 11 the vehicles as well, if I have it correct, and explain to 12 testify on their behalf on that. 12 them again what was expected before actually then sending 13 MS LE ROUX: And you didn't pass your 13 everybody away. 14 laptop around then, or they didn't come up in turn to look 14 MS LE ROUX: But he didn't have a copy of 15 15 your, what is exhibit JJJ46, did he? at your screen, did they? 16 **COLONEL SCOTT:** 16 COLONEL SCOTT: No, he had the stage 2 Not that I can remember. 17 I didn't pass the laptop around, but the clarification of 17 briefing handouts from that morning. what was being shown, I don't particularly recall people 18 18 MS LE ROUX: From that morning. 19 shuffling around, no. 19 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Did anyone of the 20 MS LE ROUX: And exhibit JJJ46, your commanders ask for clarification of anything to do with 21 Google Earth map, that's the only thing that you showed 21 your plan when you presented it? 22 them, correct? 22 COLONEL SCOTT: Ma'am, not that I can COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 23 23 remember, no. I'm sure I would have remembers if there was MS LE ROUX: You didn't hand out any 24 something, but I don't recall anything. I don't think documentation to anyone who may not have been able to see anything was asked. ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

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MS LE ROUX: And Colonel Scott, even

after the briefing, did you receive any further

- 3 clarification once the commanders had deployed to their
- 4 members? Did anyone try to get hold of you on the radio or
 - on your cell phone for further questions around your plan?
- COLONEL SCOTT: 6 No. I have checked my
- 7 cell phone records and obviously we know I phoned Captain
- Adriao. I also phoned Brigadier Calitz twice, I think, but 8
- 9 I suspect that was to check for the operational readiness
- and, or possibly why the delay, not starting at 15:30. 10
- MS LE ROUX: And Colonel Scott, the 11 12 briefing that you gave you set out at section 13 of your
- 13 statement, and it runs for nine pages, am I correct that
- 14 that reflects the briefing you gave to the members then?
- 15 COLONEL SCOTT: To the best of my
- 16 recollection. Again I, there are certain principles which
- 17 I would do things by and I would use a smear concept when,
- 18 if trying to brief, just to stay structured. That's
- 19 dealing with the situation, just explaining them the
- 20 situation, and I know in this context I didn't need to go
- 21 through the whole of it because it was not applicable to
- 22 the operational option that needed to go down. But then
- 23 explaining to each of them according to the map and on the
- 24 map showing that there's a phase 1, 2, and 3 now, and then
- 25 telling them their positions and what was expected of

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- everybody in the different phases before moving well, 1
- 2
- 3 MS LE ROUX: And I've asked you whether
- 4 anyone asked any questions to seek clarity about your
- 5
- the devil's advocate role? 6
- 7 COLONEL SCOTT:
- Now the statements from 8 MS LF ROUX:
- 9
- 10
- to canvass those with you. Mr White, as he's indicated, is 11
- 12 working on a document that analyses those statements, which
- 13 will be produced once all of the statements from SAPS have
- 14
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- 16
- 17 it, was a key part of your force continuum, correct?
- COLONEL SCOTT: 18
- 19
- 21 barbed wire, and seemingly also for the approach of the
- the lead group of protesters, who were shot by the TRT at
- 24 scene 1. You're aware of all of those facts?

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- the water cannon according to that evidence I think starts
- spraying about seven seconds before the shooting starts.
- To where and why they positioned where they did, I think
- that they anticipated what we thought was or I think that
- those commanders are still of the opinion, is incident 2.
- 6 That's why they moved in there, because the Nyalas
- 7 initially formed up there to face the crowd. But the fact
- 8 that they did try to spray, they did, obviously before that
- 9 shooting occurred, so - and I know you know that, maybe it 10 just wasn't mentioned.

MS LE ROUX: But Colonel Scott, water

cannons were not used. They did not spray at the lead 12

13 protester group. You're aware of that?

> COLONEL SCOTT: I haven't looked at that

15 specifically. I know they sprayed over the kraal. At what

they were spraying at then I'm not too sure.

[15:33] MS LE ROUX: 17 Okay. Chair, for the

record, in the annexure to Mr White's statement, GW6(d),

19 commencing at page 31 is an analysis which establishes in

20 our submission that there was no water cannon sprayed at

21 the lead group of protesters and that any water cannon 22

spray comes only seven seconds before the volley of TRT

23 fire. Colonel Scott, what briefing did you give in respect 24

of the water cannons? When did you want them deployed and where did you want them deployed? What did you brief on?

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dealing with the two forward holding area groupings.

briefing. Did anyone challenge your plan? Did anyone play

Nο

members that the Human Rights Commission has reviewed

reveal that the briefing was misunderstood. I don't intend

been submitted. But I want to focus on two aspects of

briefing. The first relates to the use of water cannon in

your force continuum. So the water cannon, as I understand

MS LE ROUX: And as we now know, the two

water cannons were wholly unprepared for the rollout of the

22 protesters to the kraal. So no water is sprayed towards

COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the - we know that Page 15230

COLONEL SCOTT: I had initially, I was

only aware of one when I briefed the JOCOM at 13:30 and

3 that water cannon I had anticipated going to the middle of 4 the dispersion line once the razor wire was closed and it

5 would move down the centre flank, if I could put it that

6 way, to confront what I assumed would be the militant group

7 which would be situated on the piece of ground that they

8 were occupying. The second water cannon, as far as I know,

9 arrived somewhere probably around, while I was, or just

10 before or sometime during that briefing, but I was made

aware of it and so just instinctively I placed, I asked 11

13 which is not necessarily reflected in the actual Google

14 plans or anything, but it was something that I'd spoken to

15 then, because my idea was that if we had one confronting

that to be placed on the police's side of the razor wire

16 the protesters from the direct north, the second would help

17 to defend the razor wire line because I was aware that it

18 has got weaknesses, as I say there are gaps between the 19 actual vehicle and the beginning of the trailer that people

can come through. People can come underneath the Nyalas

21 for that matter as well so to try and keep any protesters

22 that looked like they were trying to approach that razor

23 wire line, to use the water cannon to try and spray them, 24 to go back, and in the same way, if the water cannon was

able to reach, to assist the first water cannon which was

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planned into the operation, from a different angle, to get

2 the people moving towards the west, with a spray of the

3 water.

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4 MS LE ROUX: And which commanders were

5 present at your briefing that had responsibility for the

water cannon deployment? 6

> COLONEL SCOTT: The water cannon as far

as I know, fell directly under Brigadier Calitz. I am not 8

9 sure that they were worked specifically into a grouping.

10 To my knowledge they only arrived, both of them if I am not

mistaken, on that Thursday. 11

> MS LE ROUX: And do you know why neither water cannon was prepared to move while the barbed wire was

14 being rolled out? Do you know why they didn't move?

15 COLONEL SCOTT: I can only anticipate

that they were waiting for the call to actually go out and

form up on the outside, because for that matter none of the 17

18 Nyalas actually inside did move while the razor wire was

19 being deployed until they saw the crowd approaching, and

20 that's when Brigadier Calitz started directing and calling.

21 MS LE ROUX: Beyond what you've already

22 testified to with respect of how you wanted to use the two

23 water cannons, had you anticipated using them during the

24 dispersion plan to the west, or specifically with respect

25 to koppie 3.

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before the attacking strikers reached them. And within

this, you've included stun grenades. Are you aware that 2

3 the TRT didn't use any stun grenades at either scene 1 or

4 scene 2?

5

COLONEL SCOTT: No. I am not, but I don't

6 know at scene 2 what the reason would be for that, but I

7 know at scene 1 I think that they were caught unawares.

8 So, but I can't speak for their, obviously it's a decision

9 process that they need to go through. But in general, and

this is why, if you do look at the positioning of these 10

11 forces all the way, the idea of having a gap was so that

12 you can have that ability and we teach this in similar

13 tactics even inside when we do the searching of houses,

14 there are certain callers we will turn but we will go wide

because we don't – we want to give the opportunity for

16 decision-making processes instead of just having somebody

17 jump out and on you which is similar tactics to what would

18 have been used inside the bushes, etcetera, so that there's

19 not impromptu decisions made but you have the ability to

20 rationalise to do the Ooda loop, observe, orientate and

21 then decide and act.

> MS LE ROUX: And do you know whether the

23 TRT members carried stun grenades on that day?

24 **COLONEL SCOTT:** I don't know. They are

supposed to be issued with them, as are the NIU and the

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COLONEL SCOTT: No, I had not anticipated

using the koppie 3. It was one of the considerations that

3 they would have been also - that's moving into tactics that

4 we don't want to divulge, but in essence, they were there

5 to break up the more grouped together people, with the hard

spray of water. And as I know, you would find even in a 6

7 standing order 262, that they would speak to maybe the

water cannon coming later in the use of force continuum,

9 but my rationale for using them first was, I needed to keep

the space between the protesters or the strikers and the 10

actual police line so as not to first go ahead with shields 11

12 and Tonfas to try and confront somebody with spears and

13 pangas but rather keep that gap and have the water spray

14 first and then move to tear gas. As you get closer so you

15 start utilising that which becomes into effective range.

MS LE ROUX: If I can move then to the second aspect of briefing, that I wanted to concentrate on

which is, if we can go to page 124 of your statement, and

paragraph 42.18.3 and there you describe the fourth

continuum for the TRT, if they were required to back up the

21 POP once they'd retreated their Nyalas, it says "Should the

22 POP have safely entered their Nyalas and the attack was

then directed towards the TRT line there would be 100

24 metres of distance for the fourth continuum to be applied,

25 being verbal warning, stun grenades and warning shots

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MS LE ROUX: Okay. Because we haven't

yet been able to establish whether they just weren't carrying them or if they just didn't use them. But let me

move on. Colonel Scott, I'd like to move to a topic which

6 is covered in Mr White's statement commencing page 98 7

paragraph 7.3.4 and runs to page 101 paragraph 7.3.9 and

8 this relates to the role of Major-General Mpembe. What I'd

9 like to do is, go through several references to - in your

10 different statements and then pose the question to you, if

11 you could bear with me. So in your first statement, you

13 your second statement, there's no mention of Major-General

don't mention Major-General Mpembe at all, and similarly in

14 Mpembe. In your third statement, you do refer to him and I

15 can give you the list of paragraphs where you referred to

16 him, but it's never as the overall commander or the CJOC,

17 and it's clear from the paragraphs that I will give you

18 that most of your interaction in respect of planning is

19 with Major-General Annandale, and that he chairs the

20 briefings and meetings that you are present at. So for the

21 record, the long list of references in your statement that

I've just referred to you, are paragraphs 7.19, 7.27, 7.37,

23 8.3, 8.4, 8.6, 8.8, 8.12, 9.1, 9.3, 9.4.1.5, 9.4.3, 9.5,

24 12.1, 12.3, 12.5, 12.6, 26.1, 29.1 and 32.2. So all of

those paragraphs suggest to us that it was Major-General

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	Page 15235		Page 15237
1	Annandale who was actually in charge rather than Major-	1	CHAIRPERSON: 199, what's 198?
2	General Mpembe. What is your response to that?	2	MS PILLAY: It's the affidavit of
3	COLONEL SCOTT: I know it's – it wasn't	3	Catherine Scott.
4	at the outset said, and I don't recall it being said	4	CHAIRPERSON: Oh. I missed that, well,
5	necessarily, I think it was on the Thursday, there may have	5	thank you. I didn't put that in my book. Affidavit of
6	been some clarification given to that, I initially did	6	Catherine Scott is JJJ198, and the - and exhibit JJJ199,
7	think when General Annandale came in that he had taken	7	how do I describe that?
8	overall commander position and my rationale was based on	8	MS LE ROUX: Chair, it's the document Ops
9	maybe the events of the previous day that General Mpembe	9	Platinum 14 to 16 August 2012" saved on the 23rd of August
10	maybe had experienced a bit of a traumatic situation, but	10	2012.
11	this is my assumption and my opinion at the time, that I am	11	COLONEL SCOTT: I think it has been, it
12	speaking to now. It was clarified on one of the days	12	was given JJJ151, if I look in the evidence list that I've
13	inside the JOC, I am not sure where General Annandale	13	got from –
14	actually told the people, Major-General Mpembe is the	14	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Adv Hemraj says she's
15	overall commander, although he's just taking the JOCOMs	15	got a copy, so it must an exhibit. Well, let's
16	etcetera because Major-General Mpembe has been occupied	16	provisionally mark it exhibit JJJ199. When was it last
17	very much with management, with union presidents and was a	17	saved you say?
18	lot out of the JOC so there may have been a misconception	18	MS LE ROUX: Sorry, Chair?
19	in the beginning but it was rectified. I am not sure if I	19	CHAIRPERSON: When was it last saved
20	need to answer –	20	MS LE ROUX: 23rd of August.
21	MS LE ROUX: And Colonel Scott, standing	21	CHAIRPERSON: 23rd of August. And if it –
22	order 262 exhibit SS2, we don't need to go there but it's	22	Mr Chaskalson, do you know?
23	page 6, section 9 pre-planning of operations step 1,	23	MR CHASKALSON: I do, Chair, it is in
24	allocates to the overall commander the responsibility for	24	fact JJJ151.
25	ensuring the development of a comprehensive written	25	CHAIRPERSON: Well, then I will delete it
			•
	Page 15236		Page 15238
1	Page 15236 operational plan and then you were obviously designated to	1	Page 15238
1 2	9	1 2	
	operational plan and then you were obviously designated to		-
2	operational plan and then you were obviously designated to do that. But am I corrected that Major-General Mpembe gave	2	– MS PILLAY: My apologies, Chair.
2	operational plan and then you were obviously designated to do that. But am I corrected that Major-General Mpembe gave no – was not a source of direction to you in your planning,	2	MS PILLAY: My apologies, Chair. CHAIRPERSON: - delete any reference to
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Page 15239 Page 15241 General Mpembe possibly for other reasons or not knowing commander, your immediate command was still Major-General that he would be there trying to do negotiations, so I 2 Annandale? 2 3 3 don't know if I'd be able to say, but I did understand in COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 4 the beginning times and I think up until about the Thursday 4 MS LE ROUX: And wasn't Major-General 5 I thought General Annandale was in charge. Mpembe or - present when you did one or other presentation CHAIRPERSON: in the JOCCOM? 6 I want to ask you about 6 7 paragraph 9.4.1.5 of you final statement, page 75, where 7 COLONEL SCOTT: One or other, Chairperson you said, "I cleared with Major-General Annandale on the 8 8 9 9 Wednesday the deployment of the STF and NIU from FHA1 to a MS LE ROUX: One of your presentations in 10 newly created area, namely Immediate Reaction Areas, IRA, 10 the JOCCOM. to the south. General I was at a site behind the power 11 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, yes, he was there in 11 station, and the remainder of the NIU to the far north of 12 the JOCCOMs in the morning as far as I could remember, he 12 was present, at least on the Wednesday and on the Thursday, 13 the koppie, sufficiently away as not to be a target for the 13 14 strikers if they were in soft skinned vehicles." Then you 14 I think he was present as well. go on about that. So that's something you cleared not with 15 CHAIRPERSON: I think the important point 15 Major-General Mpembe, but with Major-General Annandale is when you made, that your impression for what it was 16 which is quite an important change in the plan, because it worth, was that Major-General Annandale was in charge, 17 17 18 involved the deployment of the STF and NIU from the forward whether that impression was correct or incorrect, is 19 holding area, number 1. Now, I take it there were other 19 obviously something you can't tell us about. 20 matters that you had to clear, changes and adjustments to 20 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. 21 the plan, is that right? 21 CHAIRPERSON: But that was your 22 COLONEL SCOTT: 22 There were from time to impression. time, Chairperson, but just in saying that, as I understood 23 23 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. Because when I set 24 it and I think correctly so, I didn't just speak to the 24 this slide up and speaking to the PC and the Major 25 overall commander in the absence of possibly then General Generals, I think if we go back to earlier versions, I was

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Annandale, being there, if I needed to speak, I would need to inform up my chain of command, it would be similar to

3 somebody on the ground, a captain, speaking directly to the

4 overall command and skipping everybody else in between. So

5 you would try to stay in your chain of command so that

6 whoever was talking, would speak to the commanders.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, I understand that.

Did you clear anything with Major-General Mpembe, or did you clear everything that you did clear with Major-General Annandale?

COLONEL SCOTT: The only time I cleared something that I can recall with General Mpembe was on the Tuesday, and that was the sector policing plan. But that was in the absence of General Annandale.

15 CHAIRPERSON: And when you cleared
16 matters with General Annandale, did you get an immediate
17 response or did he say to you, I'll talk to the overall
18 commander and come back to you?

19 COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I think it 20 was more an immediate response but also in the line of yes, 21 we will show it at the JOCOM for their approval in that

22 vein.

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CHAIRPERSON: Thank you

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MS LE ROUX: So whether you knew at the

outset or not, that Major-General Mpembe was the overall

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a bit unsure about who was actually in charge whether it

2 was the Provincial Commissioner or General Mpembe, and that

3 would have been earlier on the Tuesday, but when General

4 Annandale arrived and started taking the JOCCOMs and so on,

5 I assumed, well, he must have been given the role, until it

6 was later clarified in the operation that in fact General

7 Mpembe was still the overall commander and General

8 Annandale was just his aid in essence.

MS LE ROUX: Colonel Scott, I'd like to move on to my next topic which appears in Mr White's statement for the record, commencing page 45 section 4.4, and that's to ask you the following, so am I correct that a fundamental part of your plan was to make arrests and presumably those arrests were intended to then lead to prosecutions. Correct?

COLONEL SCOTT: The arrests were

obviously, is a means of then to secure the presence of that person in court and as we know, but also to interview the individuals to see whether, it is necessary to lay charges then go to court. So in essence that was the idea was to try to give those that are responsible and until you, obviously you arrest persons, interview, if no need to be charged, released, so that you can move to the place where you can actually start getting the information and narrowing it down to who was actually there, the

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                                                                                                                          Page 15245
                                                                        just clarify that point, that I do understand that, I mean
 1
     perpetrators.
 2
                                                                    2
            MS LE ROUX:
                                And part of that process
                                                                        the police official has the right to arrest when a crime is
 3
    would be ensuring that sufficient evidence was gathered to
                                                                        committed in his presence and these weapons that are being
 4
     ensuring assist those prosecutions, so what planning did
                                                                        carried then obviously are in the process of breaking the
                                                                    5
 5
     you make about the collection of evidence? Where do we
                                                                        law, thus -
                                                                    6
 6
    find that in your plan?
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     I understand exactly what
 7
                                                                    7
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                    The collection of
                                                                        you say, particularly in relation to physical evidence.
                                                                    8
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
8
     evidence was to be part of the phase 4, and that was after
                                                                                                        Yes.
                                                                    9
 9
     any tactical option had happened for that matter, or they
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     Okay.
    had laid down their weapons on the koppie and moved off on
                                                                   10
                                                                                                   Now, Colonel Scott, as we
10
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
     their own, as was envisioned possibly with the early
                                                                   11
11
                                                                        know approximately 270 people were arrested during the
12
     morning plan, or with, if they had adhered to what was said
                                                                   12
                                                                        dispersal phase of the plan, yet we've only seen very few
13
     for the Thursday morning at nine o'clock than to have the
                                                                   13
                                                                        statements by those who did the arrests. Have you seen
14
     forensic services actually move forward. There were two
                                                                   14
                                                                        statements from every officer who affected an arrest -
     aspects to the phase 4. One was the actual dealing with
                                                                   15
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        No -
15
16
    human beings, the arrested human beings and that was to be
                                                                   16
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   - on the 16th?
17
     dealt with by detectives, and then there was the aspect of
                                                                   17
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                        I've actually in essence
18
     the evidence that would be found in their possession and
                                                                   18
                                                                        had very little to do with the statements and I only
     that would be dealt with forensics to ensure the evidence
19
                                                                   19
                                                                        familiarised myself with the more senior officers, but not
20
     chain again.
                                                                   20
                                                                        with any of the members on the ground.
21
            MS LE ROUX:
                                                                   21
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                   And follow, - when you were
                               But with respect to phase 3,
     the disarm aspect of the plan, did you anticipate needing
                                                                   22
                                                                        still deployed, following the 16th, were you aware whether
22
23
     to arrest people and secure evidence at that stage of the
                                                                   23
                                                                        members were being followed up with to make those
                                                                   24
24
     plan?
                                                                        statements around the circumstances of the arrests they had
25
                                                                   25
    [15:53] COLONEL SCOTT:
                                      Well, it would have been
                                                                        affected?
                                                       Page 15244
                                                                                                                          Page 15246
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       No, I can't, I don't
 1
     a follow-on from phase 3, any arrests initially that are
                                                                    1
 2
     made, bringing into submission to the polices, the role of
                                                                    2
                                                                        know.
 3
     the tactical units and any tactical officer that's carrying
                                                                    3
                                                                               CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                    It wasn't your job, was it?
 4
     out an arrest would need to inform the person that he is
                                                                    4
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       No.
 5
     being arrested, you are under arrest and these are the
                                                                    5
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                  That's why I asked if he was
                                                                        aware of anyone doing it. Colonel Scott, do you know
 6
     reasons for doing so, but then the detectives then come in,
                                                                    6
                                                                    7
 7
     they would need to obviously take an arresting statement
                                                                        whether there are and where they are, any photographs or
                                                                        videos taken by the police on the day that identify
 8
     from the tactical officer and then they would deal further
 9
                                                                    9
     with the interviewing of the arrested individuals to see
                                                                        specific protestors engaged in illegal acts for which they
     the applicability thereof.
                                                                   10
                                                                        should be prosecuted?
10
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                   11
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
11
                                   And do you normally
                                                                                                       I'm aware the Crime
     collect, well, I know you're not a detective but don't
                                                                   12
                                                                        Intelligence was dealing with that, and they have
12
13
     detectives normally collect evidence first before they make
                                                                   13
                                                                        mechanisms to take photographs out of video footage so that
14
     arrests, and isn't difficult to collect the evidence some
                                                                   14
                                                                        they can actually identify the faces of people and so on.
15
                                                                   15
                                                                        The progress of that I don't know, I've also not been privy
     time after the arrest is made?
                                                                   16
                                                                        to where that's gone or to what investigation that's gone
16
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     Ja, I'm talking about
                                                                        into.
17
     physical evidence, the actual weapons in hand, etcetera.
                                                                   17
18
            CHAIRPERSON:
                                   Ja, okay. Now this point
                                                                   18
                                                                               MS LE ROUX:
                                                                                                  And in your statement, for
19
     raises another point with me, but if Advocate Le Roux is
                                                                        the record we don't need to go there, at page 127,
     going to ask it I won't. Are you going to ask him
                                                                        paragraph 45, you described the process where you came into
20
21
     questions about the videographers in this context?
                                                                   21
                                                                        possession of video and photo evidence for the purposes of
22
            MS LE ROUX:
                                 Yes, Chair, but -
                                                                   22
                                                                        this Commission of Inquiry. Had that evidence already been
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                   Alright, well, then, no, it
                                                                   23
23
                                                                        reviewed in order to support prosecutions of people that
24 is your cross-examination, you ask the questions.
                                                                   24
                                                                        have been arrested? Are you aware of that?
            COLONEL SCOTT: But, Chair, maybe I can
                                                                   25
                                                                               COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       The evidence -
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                                                                                                                        Page 15249
                                                                       you would have sent them out again -
            MS LE ROUX:
                                 Whether it had been
 1
                                                                   2
                                                                                                       Yes -
    reviewed?
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
2
3
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     The evidence that was
                                                                   3
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                     - when stage 3 was going to
4
    given to me?
                                                                   4
                                                                       be implemented?
5
            MS LE ROUX:
                                 Yes.
                                                                   5
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       Yes.
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     I'm not aware if it was
                                                                   6
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                    And they could have safely
6
7
                                                                       taken whatever videos they had to take from the protection
    but I've actually tried to reason why some of the footage
                                                                   7
    was only brought to me later and that's the reasoning or
                                                                   8
                                                                       in the neutral area, is that right?
8
                                                                   9
9
     rational, what I could come up with was that Crime
                                                                              COLONEL SCOTT:
                                                                                                       Yes.
    Intelligence, or detectives were still looking at the
                                                                  10
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                    I see, thank you. On this
10
     footage to get the faces of possible perpetrators and so
                                                                       point, at this stage we'll adjourn until nine o'clock
11
                                                                  11
12
     on, to have the matter followed up on.
                                                                  12
                                                                       tomorrow morning.
13
            MS LE ROUX:
                                So am I correct that there
                                                                  13
                                                                              [INQUIRY ADJOURNED]
14
     was no coherent plan to capture, deal with and retain the
                                                                  14
     best evidence that would be available to assist prosecution
                                                                  15
15
16
     of those who were arrested?
                                                                  16
17
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     I think the -
                                                                  17
18
            MS LE ROUX:
                                On the 16th?
                                                                  18
19
            COLONEL SCOTT:
                                     What you're saying is, a
                                                                  19
20
    coherent plan again comes down to standing orders that
                                                                  20
21
     regulate the actual actions of those two different
                                                                  21
22
                                                                  22
     disciplines, the detectives and the Forensic Services. I
23
    wouldn't explain to a detective what he needs to do in the
                                                                  23
24
     processing of a person, similarly I wouldn't need to have
                                                                  24
                                                                  25
    to explain to a police official what they need to provide
25
                                                      Page 15248
    when arresting a person, because they know they would need
1
2
    to provide an arresting statement for that matter, and
3
    similarly with the evidence chain again, with physical
4
    evidence, those are crime scene experts. So for me to
5
    dictate to them their actions is also out of place.
6
           MS LE ROUX:
                               Thank you, Chair, we'll
7
    follow up through the evidence leaders but if the SAPS
8
    could confirm whether there are any such arresting
9
    statements or -
10
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 Yes, yes -
11
           MS LE ROUX:
                               - video evidence beyond the
12
13
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 Mr Semenya and the rest -
14
           MS LE ROUX:
                               - that have been provided.
15
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 Sorry, Mr Semenya and the
    rest of the team have heard you and I'm sure they will
17
    respond. I would just like to ask one question before we
18
    adjourn and that is, were you aware of the fact, before any
19
    instructions were given in respect of implementation of
    stage 3, were you aware that the official police
21
    videographers had left the vicinity of the koppie and come
22
    back to the JOC?
           COLONEL SCOTT:
23
                                   I wasn't aware at all,
    Chairperson.
           CHAIRPERSON:
                                 If you had been, I take it
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