RealTime Transcriptions

TRANSCRIPTION OF THE

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

MARIKANA

BEFORE TRIBUNAL

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FARLAM (RETIRED) - CHAIRPERSON MR TOKOTA SC MS HEMRAJ SC

HELD ON

DAY 135 26 SEPTEMBER 2013

PAGES 14285 TO 14382



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Marikana Commission of Inquiry

1	Page 14285 [PROCEEDINGS ON 26 SEPTEMBER 2013]	1	Page 14287 had an opportunity to, well, reflect on what we covered
2	[09:09] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.	2	yesterday. Can you offer us any explanation for why these
3	Colonel, you're still under oath.	3	four different aspects of the SAPS case, the presentation,
4	DUNCAN GEORGE SCOTT: s.u.o.	4	the narrative, Major-General Annandale's testimony, and
5	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Chaskalson.	5	your own first two statements all seem to suggest that the
6	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CHASKALSON (CONTD.):	6	encirclement plan was abandoned on the Tuesday.
7	Thank you, Chairperson. Colonel, when we broke yesterday	7	COLONEL SCOTT: Thanks. I can try.
8	I'd been taking you through the evolution of the SAPS	8	Obviously it's all limited to memory recall as well, and
9	version on when the encirclement plan was abandoned and	9	I've also been pondering on it. At the time that the
10	replaced with the plan to disperse and disarm, and had been	10	operation was running, and as I was mentioning, there was a
11	showing that the version that was first advanced by SAPS in	11	lot of lack of sleep and so on –
12	the presentation, in the narrative, in your first two	12	CHAIRPERSON: Lot of?
13	statements, and in the evidence of Major-General Annandale,	13	COLONEL SCOTT: Lack of sleep and
14	was one which consistently suggested that the encirclement	14	fatigue, and what I've come to appreciate later when
15	plan had been abandoned on the Tuesday in favour of the	15	putting my consolidated statement together, which was the
16	plan to disperse and disarm. You'll recall that section of	16	first time I actually started scouring the documents to try
17	the cross-examination?	17	and get a more objective timeframe and see what I was
18	COLONEL SCOTT: I recall the section,	18	saying at the time, this is where I started picking up that
19	yes.	19	- and it was coming back to memory what was actually
20	CHAIRPERSON: Before you continue, Mr	20	happening with regard to my presentations, and I know it
21	Chaskalson, you remember you put to him what Major-General	21	may be a repetition, but just to go through it, on the
22	Annandale had said and you suggested that he read the	22	Tuesday I definitely presented the whole presentation to
23	passage in the transcript to get the context and so forth	23	the formalised JOCCOM that afternoon at about 2 o'clock.
24	overnight, and then give his answer. I don't know whether	24	The Wednesday morning I only gave the strategic area again
25	it's perhaps appropriate to deal with it first -	25	which dealt with the operational deployment side of phase
1	Page 14286	1	Page 14288
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		I	
1	Page 14289	1	Page 14291
1	were going on longer than I'd expected them to, etcetera.	1	evening, was the tasking now to start with the briefing
2	So in upgrading these slides, by the Thursday I	2	note to the President, which was trying to get as much
3	got to the place where, and with the experience I was	3	information together as possible, because I know that I
4	having at that time as well as these slides were becoming	4	only sent that off officially at about 2 o'clock in the
5	extra information. Most of the people that had seen them	5	morning.
6	by then had seen them and it was just a repetition, and the	6	To get back to the National Commissioner's
7	emphasis was now more on the actual putting up the	7	briefing, I'm not sure, I think that happened at about 10,
8	deployment, still going over the mission, putting up the	8	11 o'clock in the day. I was also mistaken, and I think
9	deployment to show the commanders where they were expected	9	that my statement speaks to the President's briefing being
10	to be and what they were expected to do, explaining to them	10	on the 18th; it was also the 17th, the briefing of the
11	their roles. So by Thursday, the best explanation I've got	11	President. So it was almost two, three, four hours after
12	is that some of the slides are still from the Wednesday. I	12	the National Commissioner's briefing when the President
13	got to sitting in the meeting and changing some of the	13	came, gave a press briefing, and we briefed him after that
14	dates on them and trying to upgrade some of them, but in	14	again. In saying that, the briefing he received would be
15	being incomplete, I – and I speak under correction, I'm not	15	very similar to the one that was given to the media,
16	sure that I presented most of what I was even presenting on	16	because I can't recall upgrading the President's briefing
17	the Wednesday, and definitely not what I was presenting on	17	other than what was shown to the media that day.
18	the Tuesday.	18	Continuing to work on this presentation further,
19	Come the operational period in time, that evening	19	I think after the Commission was announced the decision was
20	after the operation had happened, to the best of my	20	taken that we would need to put together to assist the
21	recollection we knew that there was going to need to be a	21	Commission with something from the SAPS' side of a
22	media briefing by the National Commissioner, and of the	22	presentation to show what the SAPS, how they experienced
23	opinion as well that part of these briefings, and even	22	
23			it, and this is where the beginnings of, I think the first
	briefings to her and other senior officers, I would need to	24 25	version is actually even saved as "President Zuma," but if
25	give some reflection, whether it be a record of what was	25	you look at the date it's already on the Monday when I'm
	Page 14290		Page 14292
1	Page 14290 actually shown needed to be made more viewable or, than	1	Page 14292 working on that, and I've taken parts of the plan from the
1 2		1 2	
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2	actually shown needed to be made more viewable or, than what was there, to try and fix it for the showing to the	2	working on that, and I've taken parts of the plan from the Thursday when I was busy there and I started putting them
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Page 14293 would think it may have been the photographs or the Google printouts of the morning that I handed out which shows the prepositioning of the Nyalas, that it wasn't encirclement because there the prelude to a phase 3 was already structured in part of the planning of a phase 2, which meant that I was now off with encirclement when it had to have been a dispersion action already. I'd forgotten about the meeting on the Wednesday at this stage. That was only, as I say, triggered later this year when I was actually at the offices here and somebody mentioned the cattle, and that brought back a flood of memories, the cattle in the environment, which actually brought back the flood of memories, and I still for a moment thought that that was on, that could have been on the Thursday, but then it was again a little bit later clarified that but Brigadier Engelbrecht was also part of that and he wasn't there at that time, so it had to have been on the Wednesday, because there was that slight conflict for me about exactly where, due to a lack of memory, where to position these things, although now I could recall where, that that had taken place; it was just about where to sequence them. But the objective evidence to me was the handouts that I'd given out on the Thursday morning to the commanders showing phase 2 – 25 CHAIRPERSON: What time did you give them	Page 142951[09:46] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. I2understand the power did blow just after we adjourned, but3it's been restored and so we can carry on with your4evidence. You were in the middle of an explanation about5the problems you had, as I understand it, in reconstructing6what had happened over the relevant period. You were7explaining the various things that you had to do in the8period immediately thereafter which also delayed the9process of reconstruction. Is that an accurate summary of10what you were telling us? Can you remember more or less11the point you had reached, is there something further you12wish to say in that regard?13COLONEL SCOTT: I've actually lost the14point where I was at. I know it was in the second week of15the Marikana –16CHAIRPERSON: It was actually the second17week, you explained how in the second week you said there18were various duties in relation to the preservation of law19and order at that time to which you had to give attention.20And so you were, after some delay really, finally able to21sit down to start reconstructing fully what had happened at22the relevant period. And then you also told us about how23you were involved in briefing the President and also the24inter-ministerial committee. Those were more or less the25points that you were making. Those who later read the
Page 14294 1 out? 2 COLONEL SCOTT: At half past 8 in the 3 morning, Chairperson, and I also, something that also comes 4 back to memory is that it's possible that both tactical 5 options were still on the cards, that we hadn't totally 6 discarded encirclement because encirclement could possibly 7 still be used as an early morning, but that dispersion was 8 definitely brought in for a larger grouping. So I don't 9 know if that may help explain certain issues, but I recall 10 in writing my first statement as well that I'd actually 11 mentioned in phase 3 we had two options, because when you 12 develop options, or tactical options in a plan, you develop 13 always more than one. You consider as many as you can, and 14 then choose the feasible one to continue with, and when I 15 initially wrote my statement I put two in, but then in 16 shortening the statement in a sense I took the opinion of 17 just writing what had actually happened. I didn't think 18 that the – 19 MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, I'm really 20 sorry to interrup	Page 14296 1 transcript will see that there was probably something very 2 important you said just before the power failed which I've 3 forgotten, but you know. Anything you want to add, I think 4 the general thrust of what you were telling us is clear. 5 Then perhaps if you think of anything later that's relevant 6 you can add it. 7 COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I was just 8 checking the – I think it's the finalised presentation at 9 the end of Roots which is Complete Marikana 2012-08-03 is 10 what stands as the heading although I think it is saved 11 only at the end of Roots. And I was just going through 12 that to have a look because certain points I raised 13 yesterday that the plan initially was spread out and then 14 brought back to a certain day. The parts of the plan that 15 were spread out were simply those Google Earth pictures. 16 They were spread out over the three days, but the part of 17 the plan that speaks to phase 1, 2 and 3 came along from 18 the beginning as a slide before days were even put out. 19 And that was one slide which eventually became expanded 20 into more when these pictures were all taken back to the 21 Tuesday. So there was no malicious intent to present that 22 and I see that in the document at the end of Roots it does 23 state there and I'll quote it off the document itself and 24 I've just opened this now in the break to have a look. 25 MR CHASKALSON SC: Chairperson, possibly

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1	Page 14297	1	Page 14299
1	if I can assist here, the document to which Colonel Scott's	1	may well be appropriate to return to it, if you wish, later
2	referring is going to be in exhibit. We've provisionally	2	in your evidence, maybe re-examination. But I think, if I
3	given it the number JJJ155, JJJ155. It's the PowerPoint –	3	speak for myself only, it might be appropriate for us to
4	CHAIRPERSON: Has it been put in yet?	4	move to other matters and then later on when all the
5	MR CHASKALSON SC: It has been put in. I	5	documents are in and the whole picture is before us perhaps
6	don't have a page reference for it at this stage. It will	6	we can come back to it if it's necessary. But perhaps you
7	be in one of the later files. I can get –	7	can just clarify what it is that you're referring to as
8	CHAIRPERSON: No, has it been referred to	8	opposed to the document Mr Chaskalson thinks you're
9	yet in the course of the evidence?	9	referring to, just to get that thinned down as it were now
10	MR CHASKALSON SC: It hasn't been	10	and then we'll move on. Do you agree with that?
11	referred to.	11	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, yes, Chairperson, it
12	CHAIRPERSON: So shall we, just for the	12	was just the stage 3 there, it reads, "Stage 3 Tactical
13	sake of good housekeeping, record it as exhibit now?	13	option Of encircle, dialogue to disarm or second sub-
14	MR CHASKALSON SC: Indeed, Chairperson.	14	bullet, Disperse into smaller groups, encircle and disarm."
15	CHAIRPERSON: JJJ155 and how does one	15	It's reflecting both of the tactical options in that slide,
16	describe it?	16	Chair.
17	MR CHASKALSON SC: The PowerPoint	17	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Chaskalson, do you –
18	presentation entitled Complete Marikana –	18	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: May I just seek
19	CHAIRPERSON: Complete?	19	clarity about something please?
20	MR CHASKALSON SC: - Complete Marikana	20	In your statement and you testified to this as
21	2012-08-03.	21	well in 8.22 about a conversation you have with General
22	CHAIRPERSON: How can that be right?	22	Annandale. I just need to know exactly when this took
23	COLONEL SCOTT: I think that 08 is	23	place please. 8.22 of your statement, it's on page 63 of
24	supposed to be an 09.	24	HHH20. You say there when Major-General Annandale and I
25	CHAIRPERSON: It sounds like it, unless	25	started discussing phase 3 the angle of encircling the
	Daga 14200		Dogo 14200
1	Page 14298 it was a 10.	1	Page 14300 strikers while they were a large group and aware of police
1 2	it was a 10.	1 2	strikers while they were a large group and aware of police
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	Page 14301		Page 14303
1	been on the 16th.	1	and then you set the points out in sub-paragraphs and then
2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2	the statement continues essentially elaborating on what
3	CHAIRPERSON: Theoretically, even if you	3	appears in the very sub-paragraph 8.22. So it does appear
4	had come up with a complete plan involved in the	4	as if you're only talking about a discussion with General
5	abandonment of the encirclement and replacement by	5	Annandale, as I read it. If I'm wrong you must correct me.
6	something else, even if you had done that on the Wednesday,	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Well I remember the
7	theoretically the JOCCOM might have said we don't agree.	7	discussion being predominantly between the two us,
8	We think that new plan of yours is inherently risky and we	8	Chairperson, but I know it was in the JOC which means – and
9	think that the encirclement one, if done the way we've seen	9	the JOC was never empty where it was only the two of us
	-		
10	it so far is less risky. So they might theoretically have	10	there, there would have been other permanent role players
11	done that, whether they would or not is pure speculation	11	sitting around the table. But I do recall it being an
12	but that's a possibility I take it. Is that right?	12	informal meeting, it wasn't something sat down and spoken
13	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct,	13	to. Brigadier Engelbrecht does refer to what seems to be a
14	Chairperson, I think that explains why we didn't go into	14	little bit more of a formalised meeting when we reviewed
15	the detail of the new proposed phase 3, but just the	15	the actual phase 3 where I gave a presentation on that.
16	strategic idea of an alternative option was considered. If	16	But he doesn't speak to the points afterwards which were
17	we couldn't encircle what would we do and then disperse	17	definitely – General Annandale and myself, I can only
18	them rather into smaller groups and then try to encircle	18	remember the two of us sort of brainstorming against each
19	smaller, more manageable groups for that matter. And that	19	other, coming up with why this thing couldn't work. I
20	strategy to the best of my recollection now is berthed on	20	don't remember any other inputs though, or from other
21	the Wednesday.	21	people.
22	CHAIRPERSON: Only in private discussion	22	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: But there was
23	between you and General Annandale.	23	consensus reached between you and Major Annandale, Major-
24	COLONEL SCOTT: It was in the JOCCOM, but	24	General Annandale at that stage as to how you would
25	it wasn't a formalised meeting. I think –	25	progress with the matter the following day?
	Page 14302		Page 14304
1	CHAIRPERSON: Decision was taken on it?	1	COLONEL SCOTT: I think that I can say
1 2		1 2	COLONEL SCOTT: I think that I can say that the consensus was reached that an encircling of that
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Marikana Commission of Inquiry

Pretoria

1 2 3	Page 14305 MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, it's – CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you carry on, Mr Chaskalson, one question I'd like to ask you before he	1 2 3	Page 14307 morning and abandoned later? And in that context you were, I think, explaining why some of the documents that you produced after the event suggested that the abandonment
4	proceeds. It follows on the question that my colleague,	4	took place later on the Thursday. My question was in fact
5	Advocate Hemraj, put to you. It's 8.23 of your statement,	5	a slightly question, my question related to the fact that
6	at the foot of page 64 where you make the point, I take it	6	as between us now it's common cause that the plan wasn't
7	you still adhere to it, that "for many good reasons	7	abandoned on the Tuesday, it wasn't abandoned on the
8	encirclement could only be feasible for an early morning	8	Wednesday morning either. And was at least on the table
9	deployment where a small number of less than 55 were on the	9	until the JOCCOM meeting at 6 o'clock on the Thursday. Is
10	koppie." So encirclement as planned was only a viable	10	that correct?
11	option early in the morning, first light basically,	11	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
12	possibly before sunrise.	12	MR CHASKALSON SC: And yet if we go to
13	COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, that's	13	four different elements of the SAPS version that were
14	correct. As it was envisioned for the Tuesday morning	14	presented earlier, they all suggest that the plan was
15	initial –	15	abandoned on the Tuesday. And I was asking you to explain
16	CHAIRPERSON: I know, but you're now	16	why that would be the case. Why would four different
17	talking, as I understand it, in 8.23 about –	17	aspects of the SAPS version, the presentation, the
18	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, yes as I mean, we	18	narrative, your first two statements, Major-General
19	couldn't do it Tuesday, I envisioned it possible for	19	Annandale's evidence, why would they all suggest that the
20	Wednesday –	20	plan was abandoned on the Tuesday when we know now that
21	CHAIRPERSON: You couldn't do it for	21	that's not the case? It was at best abandoned on the
22	Wednesday, subject to what you're now telling us, it could	22	morning of the 16th, at the Thursday 16th 6:00am JOC
23	hold over until Thursday, but according to what you say	23	meeting. So why the different version from SAPS to begin
24	there was no formal decision at the JOC to abandon that	24	with?
25	idea –	25	COLONEL SCOTT: I think that what you're
1	Page 14306	1	Page 14308
1	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	1	saying in abandoned, I can't speak for General Annandale
2	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: - before Thursday morning.	2	saying in abandoned, I can't speak for General Annandale and the comments that he made, but what we were trying to
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Marikana Commission of Inquiry

		1	
	Page 14309		Page 14311
1	[10:05] COLONEL SCOTT: I understand that,	1	must have known that you were going to have to show to this
2	Chairperson, yes.	2	Commission that the plan that was ultimately implemented
3	CHAIRPERSON: So surely inaccuracy can't	3	was one that had been designed with all of the care
4	be preferred to something which the reader will have	4	required of a reasonable police force dealing with the
5	difficulty in following which will ultimately presumably	5	situation with which you were confronted at Marikana. Will
6	with guidance be able to follow. That must be so, surely,	6	you accept that?
7	or am I overstating it?	7	COLONEL SCOTT: I think that the view I
8	COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, as I say,	8	had – and I can only speak for myself, not for others – was
9	there was no malicious intent to because –	9	that although the plan was created and there was the stages
10	CHAIRPERSON: No, no, 1'm not	10	that were there and the strategy to me was sound, the fact
11	suggesting malice.	11	that it never got to roll out the way it was envisioned to
12	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja.	12	roll out was to me, and unless it's proven otherwise still
13	CHAIRPERSON: I'm just saying effectively	13	my belief that there was an intention from those strikers
14	you want him to be saying, I don't think you thought it out	14	to confront the police with aggression. So there was
15	properly, but really an inaccurate statement you seem to be	15	never, and that was my point of view from what I'd seen and
16	suggesting is better than a statement which is more	16	from the evidence I was shown, and so as I say, there was
17	difficult to understand.	17	no, the planning as itself never got to roll out. I never
18	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	18	had a reason to -1 believe that if the plan that its
19	CHAIRPERSON: You don't mean that, do	19	chance to have been effectively rolled out the way that it
20	you?	20	was envisioned to roll out, there would have possibly been
21	COLONEL SCOTT: No.	21	far fewer injuries for that matter, or incidents that would
22	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, in your	22	have occurred.
23	explanation you said something along the lines that it was	22	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, Colonel, that's
23	never anticipated that this would be controversial. I	23	a completely different chapter of this cross-examination,
24	think the word you used was 'controversial,' but I must put	24	which we're unlikely to reach before we break today, but we
25		25	which were unlikely to reach before we break today, but we
	Page 14310		Page 14312
1	Page 14310 to you that SAPS must have anticipated that this would be	1	Page 14312 will have to discuss that, but my present concern is
1 2	6	1 2	
	to you that SAPS must have anticipated that this would be an important issue before the Commission, because SAPS		will have to discuss that, but my present concern is something slightly different. It's you and SAPS must have
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2 3	to you that SAPS must have anticipated that this would be an important issue before the Commission, because SAPS implemented a plan on the 16th. Things went horribly wrong, for whatever reason, and 34 people ended up dead. Now one	2 3	will have to discuss that, but my present concern is something slightly different. It's you and SAPS must have realised that you were going to have to show this Commission that you put all of the appropriate care into
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3 apprint degenaries and other officers at the joint 3 MR CHASKALSON SC: And there's certainly in ond going to be any detailed debate within the's coccol. 4 operational centre to achieve the object of dispersing and disarming over 3 000 protestrom where work now its is the limiting factor, and that's why this shift in the is the limiting factor, and that's why this shift in the structure or wasn't correct, that the dispersal and the tormal occol meeting of the debate within they inmediately inplemented. From that version to the any automately implemented. From there like a plan that was the for two days. Let's look at a important shift because if it had been there for two days. Let's look at the function of an area. So th, any plant the dotal of phase 3 as to how the action any distance of the principles mentioned, if subject of meliculus scenario planning by generals in the 15 in debati and the debaties to adapt that when you do speak to a development that. The for two days. Let's look at the JOC on Wednesday, but that wasn't any structures disease at the lock on whether structure is a statement that the detail of phase 3 as to how the action any distance of a strategy in two dub action that, but the first point at which detail a specific area or target. The subject of unciplement that the detail of phase 3 as to how the action any distance of a strategy introving and a doption by the JOCCOM in the first point at which detail a strate and distance of a strate and that the days. Let's look at the JOCCOM is at the 1:30 JOCCOM. Is that a specific area and age, pragraphs 12.4 and 12.5 of your statement, and you describe the principles and that you describe a wasn't at wore on apoint discussed to the MAD VOCCOM is to the JOCCOM is at	1	consequences resulted" - and this is the passage I would	1	morning.
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23 outline of phase 3 as phase 2 was in essence also a23 that morning for the phase 2 deployment where I felt the	20	the mission and strategic guidelines and then speaking		
	20 21	the mission and strategic guidelines and then speaking directly to the Google Earth satellite photo with icons	21	to brief the JOCCOM. I explained on the Google Earth
24 prepositioning in case phase 3 was to be implemented." So 24 dispersion should take place, with the different units in	20 21 22	the mission and strategic guidelines and then speaking directly to the Google Earth satellite photo with icons arranged on it. In explaining phase 2 I mentioned the	21 22	to brief the JOCCOM. I explained on the Google Earth satellite photo which I'd printed out for the commanders
	20 21 22 23	the mission and strategic guidelines and then speaking directly to the Google Earth satellite photo with icons arranged on it. In explaining phase 2 I mentioned the outline of phase 3 as phase 2 was in essence also a	21 22 23	to brief the JOCCOM. I explained on the Google Earth satellite photo which I'd printed out for the commanders that morning for the phase 2 deployment where I felt the
25 again you're not providing any detail of phase 3 in the25 their different roles and areas of responsibility. On	20 21 22 23 24	the mission and strategic guidelines and then speaking directly to the Google Earth satellite photo with icons arranged on it. In explaining phase 2 I mentioned the outline of phase 3 as phase 2 was in essence also a prepositioning in case phase 3 was to be implemented." So	21 22 23 24	to brief the JOCCOM. I explained on the Google Earth satellite photo which I'd printed out for the commanders that morning for the phase 2 deployment where I felt the dispersion should take place, with the different units in

	Page 14317		Page 14319
1	conclusion, Major-General Annandale requested any further	1	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2	inputs and whether the concept was acceptable." So even at	2	CHAIRPERSON: But there was no current
3	that stage the concept was up for debate.	3	POP member there to make inputs.
4	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	4	COLONEL SCOTT: No.
5	MR CHASKALSON SC: "There were no	5	CHAIRPERSON: There was no current POP
6	objections to the operational concept." So the concept was	6	person there to raise an objection.
7	accepted. Were there any further inputs in relation to the	7	COLONEL SCOTT: No.
8	detail that you'd suggested?	8	CHAIRPERSON: Only one person who's an
9	COLONEL SCOTT: No, and I think maybe	9	ex-POP member. Is that right?
10	I'm, or we're misunderstanding the operational concept, but	10	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
11	the concept, there's the strategy; the strategy was to	11	CHAIRPERSON: I see.
12	disperse smaller groups, disarm, etcetera. The concept is	12	MR CHASKALSON SC: And the detail that
13	now speaking to the, how we're going to do it in broad	13	you're giving, well the detail that's given at the meeting
14	terms, in other words the direction to where we would want	14	seems to come primarily, if not exclusively, from you. Is
15	them to go, the stop and reorganise line, how the teams	15	there any detail that comes from anybody else at the
16	would be lined up and formed up. That's speaking to the	16	meeting?
17	concept here. So there was no objection to that concept,	17	COLONEL SCOTT: No.
18	which is, it's not down to the lower level detail. There	18	MR CHASKALSON SC: And you've already
19	was more detail given at the actual forward holding area 2	19	confirmed that you had no knowledge of Standing Order 262,
20	briefing, which was more at a tactical level than it was at	20	which was the SAPS standing order dealing with Public Order
21	this level.	21	Policing.
22	MR CHASKALSON SC: Okay, can we just go	22	COLONEL SCOTT: I had no knowledge of
23	to exhibit EE, which are the minutes of the 1:30 JOCCOM,	23	that specific standing order. As I say, I had successfully
24	and I'd like you to look at that attendance list. I don't	24	completed a course before that standing order was
25	see any POPs officers there.	25	implemented. I think it was implemented in about 2003/4.
	Page 14318		Page 14320
1	COLONEL SCOTT: No, they were deployed in	1	I'd done my course in, somewhere around 2001/2, which dealt
2	COLONEL SCOTT: No, they were deployed in the field.	2	I'd done my course in, somewhere around 2001/2, which dealt predominantly with the Public Order Policing arena, based
	COLONEL SCOTT: No, they were deployed in		I'd done my course in, somewhere around 2001/2, which dealt predominantly with the Public Order Policing arena, based on what happened at the Ellis Park tragedy. So the
2	COLONEL SCOTT:No, they were deployed inthe field.MR CHASKALSON SC:Okay, so the firsttime that any detail is given to the plan is at the 1:30	2	I'd done my course in, somewhere around 2001/2, which dealt predominantly with the Public Order Policing arena, based on what happened at the Ellis Park tragedy. So the training was embedded through that, as well as the tactical
2 3	COLONEL SCOTT:No, they were deployed inthe field.MR CHASKALSON SC:Okay, so the firsttime that any detail is given to the plan is at the 1:30meeting where the plan, where an order to implement the	2 3	I'd done my course in, somewhere around 2001/2, which dealt predominantly with the Public Order Policing arena, based on what happened at the Ellis Park tragedy. So the
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1	Page 14321 have to implement the plan.	1	Page 14323 many months had taken place on the Thursday, is that what
2	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2	you said?" And then your response was "ja, it may have
3	MR CHASKALSON SC: And this is the very	3	been until we got to Roots or somewhere around there when
4	first briefing that they will receive on how this new phase	4	it was more put into context about what had happened." So
5	3 is going to be implemented.	5	your memory, well let me go back a step, the decision to
6	COLONEL SCOTT: It's the very first	6	move away from the encirclement plan, formally to abandon
7	detailed briefing where it's actually told to them the	7	the encirclement plan couldn't have taken place before
8	concept as I have mentioned earlier, the more detailed	8	those discussions about cattle and humanitarian risks and
9	version of what was meant earlier when said dispersion into	9	so on. Is that correct?
10	smaller groups.	10	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
11	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, what was said	11	MR CHASKALSON SC: So your memory about
12	earlier? What briefing without detail had they received at	12	an issue as important as when that plan was abandoned was,
13	6AM at the JOC?	13	at least until Roots, sufficiently cloudy that you thought
14	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I'm going to need	14	that that plan had been abandoned only after an informal
15	to speak now from deductive logic, but in explaining –	15	discussion in the JOC about cattle and humanitarian risks
16	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, I'd ask you	16	after a JOCCOM meeting that had happened on the Thursday.
17	not to speak from deductive logic, and I'd ask you to speak	17	Is that correct?
18	about what you can remember that you actually said to	18	COLONEL SCOTT: No, I said that the – for
19	people at 6AM at the JOC, and if I might just explain why;	19	a long time looking back at my documents, from that time
20	you said to us yesterday, and I've looked at the	20	which shows encirclement still on the Thursday morning as
21	transcript, when we were discussing when the first plan was	21	part of the JOCCOM slides, it was only later in this year
22	abandoned, your words were, and that conversation about the	22	where something was triggered that actually got my memory
23	problems with encirclement, your words were -	23	but – and I'll come back to something in a moment – that
24	CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps you'd give us the	24	actually got me to realise that these were the reasons that
25	reference to the transcript so that when we read it later,	25	we actually abandoned trying to encircle a larger group.
	Dove 14222		
			Page 14324
1	Page 14322 read this passage later, we'll understand what you're	1	Page 14324 Or when we looked at the idea of doing it, it was not
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Page 14325	Page 14327
1 ask you in answering to rely on what you actually remember 1 the phase 3 strategy had already been clarified?	
2 briefing people about because what the uncertainty around 2 understand discussions about it if we abandon t	
3 the date reveals is that if you start looking at documents 3 encirclement we have to have something in its p	place,
4 that have been created around the time later and then 4 etcetera, I can understand all that, but clarified	is a
5 inferring, you may end up remembering something which has 5 rather strong word isn't it?	
6 the wrong details in it. I mean you're saying to us that 6 COLONEL SCOTT: I think clarified	
7 for many months you remembered all of this happening on the 7 sense that an encirclement of a large group was	s not going
8 Thursday but you now think it happened on the Wednesday. 8 to work and that, as I say, then just as the strain	
9 COLONEL SCOTT: I think the short answer 9 we need to look at rather dispersing because di	
10is that I can't remember much of the 6 o'clock Thursday10not just the physical action, it starts with a verb	
11 morning briefing at all. I know that I did give a 11 action which means that many of these people	
12 briefing, I know that it would have been me that gave the 12 knowing that the police are going to carry some	-
13briefing of the photographs that you see that were given13So when the police generally in terms may spea	-
14 out to the – the handouts to the commanders. I know 14 speaking to another policeman that understand	•
15 inherently through my past and how I would have worked on a 15 you understand the whole flow of what's being	
16 briefing I would have always tried to start with a mission 16 the word. So in saying clarifying there he's clar	5 0
17 because it's something we try to emphasise, that's how I've 17 that an encirclement of a large group that size i	s not
18 been trained. So I would have given that and when speaking 18 going to work.	
19 to phase 2 I know I would have spoken to the purpose and 19 CHAIRPERSON: I'll tell you my pro	
 20 the reasoning of the razor wire. Why it was there and then 21 I would have also alluded to the fact that it was there as 21 encirclement of a large group had never been a 	•
21I would have also alluded to the fact that it was there as21encirclement of a large group had never been a22prepositioning for phase 3. And then, as I say, it's22Encirclement according to the passage we discu	-
22 prepositioning for phase 3. And then, as it say, it's 22 Encirclement according to the passage we discuse 23 deductive reasoning, but I would have said what phase 3 is. 23 had always involved encircling a small group, 50	
24 CHAIRPERSON: With no recollection of 24 first light, possibly even before sunrise.	0 01 1033,
25 this is it all reconstruction, is that right? 25 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	
25 this is it all reconstruction, is that right? 25 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	
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	Page 14329		Page 14331
1	can go back to the briefing that the POPs commanders	1	MR CHASKALSON SC: But Nkaneng is
2	receive in the field at 2:30, it's certainly the first	2	certainly a negative attraction point.
3	detailed briefing they're going to receive on how the new	3	COLONEL SCOTT: It is also for us, yes.
4	phase 3 is to be implemented. And what they'd know from	4	MR CHASKALSON SC: And it's a negative
5	the morning JOCCOM on your version is that the old	5	attraction point of some significance because quite apart
6	encirclement plan has been replaced and there's now a new	6	from the fact that you want to keep the strikers out of
7	plan that involves dispersal and disarming.	7	Nkaneng it's also where they're most likely to go to
8	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	8	because that's where a lot of them live.
9	MR CHASKALSON SC: What more would they	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Well you're calling the
10	have known from the morning JOCCOM meeting in terms of	10	strikers now as one group and –
11	detail?	11	CHAIRPERSON: - a lot of them.
12	COLONEL SCOTT: Well I think in your	12	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, a lot of them. Well
13	words I don't want to put deductive reasoning in place so I	13	it was picked up that a lot of them had walked out, those
14	don't particularly recall the detail of what being said.	14	specifically that were not in the militant group for that
15	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now when you see them	15	matter. I'm not sure where the militant group came from
16	at 1:30 you don't give them anything on paper, oh 2:30, I	16	but the coming and goings of a lot of people from Nkaneng
17	beg your pardon, thank you, Chairperson. You don't give	17	settlement yes walked from there to the koppie.
18	them anything on paper and the only paper that they were	18	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now on the morning
19	given in the morning were the gridded maps that were handed	19	that negative attraction point is covered quite nicely by
20	out to deal with phase 2.	20	the barbed wire line. If you look at that barbed wire
21	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	21	line it screens the entire access route to Nkaneng and it
22	MR CHASKALSON SC: But those gridded maps	22	is designed to funnel protesters to the west which is your
23	no longer describe the situation on the ground because the	23	positive attraction point.
24	movement of Nyala 6 has changed matters significantly.	24	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
25	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	25	MR CHASKALSON SC: If we can cut back to
1	Page 14330	1	Page 14332
1	MR CHASKALSON SC: And can we just	1	181, now if you look at where the barbed wire line is going
2	MR CHASKALSON SC: And can we just illustrate that for the Commissioners by calling up slides	2	181, now if you look at where the barbed wire line is going to go, Nkaneng is being exposed.
2 3	MR CHASKALSON SC: And can we just illustrate that for the Commissioners by calling up slides 149 and 50 of exhibit L? So that's what they got from the	2 3	181, now if you look at where the barbed wire line is going to go, Nkaneng is being exposed.COLONEL SCOTT: It's being exposed
2 3 4	MR CHASKALSON SC: And can we just illustrate that for the Commissioners by calling up slides 149 and 50 of exhibit L? So that's what they got from the morning that was one and if we can go to 150. Those were	2 3 4	 181, now if you look at where the barbed wire line is going to go, Nkaneng is being exposed. COLONEL SCOTT: It's being exposed because the razor wire line now is a protection wire for
2 3 4 5	MR CHASKALSON SC: And can we just illustrate that for the Commissioners by calling up slides 149 and 50 of exhibit L? So that's what they got from the morning that was one and if we can go to 150. Those were the two maps that they had from the morning.	2 3 4 5	181, now if you look at where the barbed wire line is going to go, Nkaneng is being exposed. COLONEL SCOTT: It's being exposed because the razor wire line now is a protection wire for all assets inside what we call the police safe zone.
2 3 4 5 6	MR CHASKALSON SC: And can we just illustrate that for the Commissioners by calling up slides 149 and 50 of exhibit L? So that's what they got from the morning that was one and if we can go to 150. Those were the two maps that they had from the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	2 3 4 5 6	 181, now if you look at where the barbed wire line is going to go, Nkaneng is being exposed. COLONEL SCOTT: It's being exposed because the razor wire line now is a protection wire for all assets inside what we call the police safe zone. There's still a line of police officials as you can see
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8	MR CHASKALSON SC: And can we just illustrate that for the Commissioners by calling up slides 149 and 50 of exhibit L? So that's what they got from the morning that was one and if we can go to 150. Those were the two maps that they had from the morning. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON SC: And what they now have to implement is what is described in slide 181, if we can	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	181, now if you look at where the barbed wire line is going to go, Nkaneng is being exposed. COLONEL SCOTT: It's being exposed because the razor wire line now is a protection wire for all assets inside what we call the police safe zone. There's still a line of police officials as you can see with the vehicles and the red and green depicting TRT and IUSDF. Remembering again that once that razor wire line
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	D		D
1	Page 14333 and search authorisation –	1	Page 14335 CHAIRPERSON: The plan seems to have been
2	COLONEL SCOTT: It was –	2	to block off that main route before Nyala 6 was moved.
3	CHAIRPERSON: - by the Provincial	3	COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I think the
4	Commissioner?	4	initial – the concept behind the plan was, as I say, to
5	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was, Chairperson,	5	bring out, to give a warning, to allow those that want to
6	but it was a bit optimistic to – I think that would have	6	leave to move off and that simply to prevent violent or
7	taken a lot personnel to have to cover that, it would have	7	aggressive, emotional strikers from running into the
8	been a literal house to house and in my opinion been very	8	Nkaneng settlement. Thus the police's action to move
9	dangerous for that matter for the police members involved.	9	towards the south and sweep towards the west so we could
10	MR CHASKALSON SC: But you will agree	10	push anyone that was emotional, violent or wanting
11	that the new configuration of the barbed wire creates a new	11	confrontation away from areas where there would be innocent
12	dimension, that until you can get your police armoured	12	people.
13	vehicles out around the barbed wire into the position that	13	CHAIRPERSON: - I don't understand you to
14	we see at slide 181, Nkaneng is exposed.	14	be disagreeing with me, you're actually agreeing with me
15	COLONEL SCOTT: It is.	15	but giving the reasoning why.
16	MR CHASKALSON SC: And if we go down to	16	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
17	slide 193 which is just at the start of the operation, we	17	CHAIRPERSON: Ja.
18	see that you illustrate it's the start of the operation.	18	MR CHASKALSON SC: And we know that in
19	Nyala 1 has moved out, it's barbed wire Nyala 2, you see	19	due course when the militant protesters did decide to move
20	that some of the protesters are - if I can just identify -	20	the direction in which they moved was towards Nkaneng.
21	there's Nyala 1, I'm marking Nyala 1 for record purposes,	21	COLONEL SCOTT: Well that's debatable,
22	it's the Nyala just above the long red arrow with the	22	there's the direction they could have moved was towards the
23	dotted line behind it. You have marked on this slide	23	police line. So I'm not going to agree to the fact that
24	"protester organised group remain with others on the koppie	24	they were trying to go to Nkaneng.
25	while a number of the protesters are departing." And the	25	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well objectively the
	Page 14334		Page 14336
1	Page 14334 protesters who are departing are departing to Nkaneng along	1	Page 14336 direction in which they moved was the direction of Nkaneng.
1 2	•	1 2	5
	protesters who are departing are departing to Nkaneng along this line of the white arrow that I am flagging with my laser pointer.		direction in which they moved was the direction of Nkaneng.
2	protesters who are departing are departing to Nkaneng along this line of the white arrow that I am flagging with my laser pointer. COLONEL SCOTT: That is so. But if you	2	direction in which they moved was the direction of Nkaneng. It was to the east.
2 3	protesters who are departing are departing to Nkaneng along this line of the white arrow that I am flagging with my laser pointer. COLONEL SCOTT: That is so. But if you look carefully there are other protesters walking along the	2 3	direction in which they moved was the direction of Nkaneng. It was to the east. CHAIRPERSON: They weren't necessarily intending to go to Nkaneng. They may have been intending to implement threats that was apparently and allegedly
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	Page 14337		Page 14339
1	deployment, the only Nyala that has moved has been Nyala 6.	1	COLONEL SCOTT: It's right what you're
2	MR CHASKALSON SC: But that movement has	2	saying, but I have a problem with how you're putting it.
3	significant implications to the plan.	3	You're making it, or trying to make it sound as though
4	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	4	there are people that are standing that can visually not
5	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now you don't brief	5	see, or I'm somewhere deep inside a Vito and maybe only
6	them with any new paper; you brief them by showing the plan	6	four or five can see the screen, which is not the case.
7	on your laptop in the back of a Mercedes Vito.	7	MR CHASKALSON SC: We may have to have an
8	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	8	inspection in loco with a Vito.
9	MR CHASKALSON SC: Can you just describe	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
10	the situation a bit more clearly to us? Where were you	10	MR CHASKALSON SC: But it does seem to me
11	sitting?	11	that the possibility of some of the 20 not seeing the
12	COLONEL SCOTT: I sat just inside the	12	screen seems to be quite a high possibility in those
13	seat, so that I was under the roof, so that there was a	13	circumstances, or not being able to make out what is being
14	little bit of darkness for the computer screen so that	14	depicted on the screen.
15	people could see it better, with the audience standing just	15	COLONEL SCOTT: No, I can't speak to
16	outside the Vito.	16	that. I can't agree with you on that either.
17	MR CHASKALSON SC: And does the Vito have	17	CHAIRPERSON: I take it your point would
18	a sliding door that opens on the side?	18	be that if someone couldn't see and wanted to know what was
19	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	19	being shown, he could have raised his hand and said please
20	MR CHASKALSON SC: So you're sitting	20	give me a chance to see it as well.
20	inside the Vito with the sliding door open on the side.	20	COLONEL SCOTT: This is –
22	The Vito is parked in the open air.	22	CHAIRPERSON: And that didn't happen, I
22	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	22	take it. Is that right?
23 24		23	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. Yes, Chairperson.
24 25	MR CHASKALSON SC: And you've gone inside to get some shade so that your screen is visible.	24 25	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now according to your
23	to get some shade so that your screen is visible.	25	Mik Chaskalson Sc. Now according to your
	Page 14338		Page 14340
1	Page 14338 COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	1	Page 14340 statement your briefing lasts approximately 45 minutes.
1 2		1 2	5
	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.		statement your briefing lasts approximately 45 minutes.
2	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR CHASKALSON SC: And are you sitting	2	statement your briefing lasts approximately 45 minutes. You say it started at 2:30 sharp and you got back to the
2 3	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR CHASKALSON SC: And are you sitting with the laptop facing you or facing the people outside?	2 3	statement your briefing lasts approximately 45 minutes. You say it started at 2:30 sharp and you got back to the JOC at 15:15.
2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR CHASKALSON SC:And are you sittingwith the laptop facing you or facing the people outside?COLONEL SCOTT:It's facing the people	2 3 4	statement your briefing lasts approximately 45 minutes. You say it started at 2:30 sharp and you got back to the JOC at 15:15. COLONEL SCOTT: No, there's travel time
2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:Yes.MR CHASKALSON SC:And are you sittingwith the laptop facing you or facing the people outside?COLONEL SCOTT:It's facing the peopleoutside.It's, I'm sitting to the side of it with them – I	2 3 4 5	statement your briefing lasts approximately 45 minutes. You say it started at 2:30 sharp and you got back to the JOC at 15:15. COLONEL SCOTT: No, there's travel time involved on the return. So it was about at most half an
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1	Page 14341	1	Page 14343
1	didn't. Whether the briefings were even concluded by 15:30	1	remembering that speaking at the operational level, they
2	I can't say. MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, if we can	2	are going to execute it at the tactical level on ground.
3		3	So this is why when you talk to those commanders and you say we want you to deploy the razor wire and close it, as
4	then just recap the details, recap. We're talking about a	4 5	it was mentioned earlier at the 6 o'clock meeting that that
5	plan now, the details of which were designed on the day, the 16th.		-
6	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	6 7	would be something to form a barrier line between the police for that matter, the negative and positive, or
8	MR CHASKALSON SC: By yourself.	8	negative attraction points and to where the strikers were
0 9	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	0 9	seated, there's not much more in detail that you need to
9 10	MR CHASKALSON SC: And from what we can	9 10	explain to them on that, other than what I've mentioned in
11	work out, without material input from anybody else. Is	11	my statement. When you say to the dispersion line that you
12	that correct?	12	need to come out and disperse in this direction, you don't
12	COLONEL SCOTT: Pretty much, yes.	13	explain dispersion to POPs, Public Order Policing members;
14	MR CHASKALSON SC: And in particular	14	they understand dispersion through their training. So it's
14	without input from commanders with crowd management	14	a matter of where do you want me and where do you, and how
16	expertise.	16	do you want me to disperse in what direction, and that's
17	COLONEL SCOTT: No, but they did have the	17	what actually occurs there. There were slight amendments
18	opportunity even whilst I was briefing them in forward	18	to that plan because what I did explain to them was start
19	holding area 1 to have given inputs for that matter.	19	with water cannons, where necessarily water cannons
20	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, let's	20	wouldn't be the first way of starting a physical dispersion
20	interrogate that. The decision had already been taken to	20	- I'm talking outside of the actual pre-warning phase -
22	implement the plan at that stage.	22	because I was trying not to have police members close to
23	COLONEL SCOTT: To implement the, or	23	strikers. I was trying to keep a gap between them so that
24	dispersion with, as we know the strategy and the concept of	24	there would not be conflict for that matter. So those were
25	moving them off towards the west, smaller groups, encircle	25	the small changes made for instance in that force
	Page 14342		Page 14344
1	Page 14342 them as smaller groups, isolate and arrest - disarm and	1	continuum, which is not a major, if you consider that the
1 2	them as smaller groups, isolate and arrest - disarm and arrest, yes.	1 2	continuum, which is not a major, if you consider that the water is simply water and used to disperse people. It's a
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		1	
	Page 14345		Page 14347
1	respond. I've given you my version of my experiences while	1	Before we proceed with the evidence, I want to say that we
2	I was there.	2	received a letter from the legal representatives of the
3	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, in relation to	3	South African Human Rights Commission who wanted a meeting
4	this particular plan, what meticulous scenario planning	4	with us to discuss certain rulings that I gave in the
5	took place involving generals and other senior officers at	5	course of the cross-examination, I think it was of Major-
6	the JOC?	6	General Mpembe, by counsel appearing for the Human Rights
7	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the best I can	7	Commission. We indicated we didn't think it appropriate
8	explain it is that when I'm explaining to them strategies	8	for us to meet parties, discuss rulings outside the
9	and presenting possible solutions to them, they were	9	Commission. What we'll do is we would address the
10	sitting absorbing what I'm saying and if there are going to	10	questions raised in the letter in an open sitting of the
11	be inputs or if there are going to be any changes or,	11	Commission so that all the parties would know what the
12	that's where it would be done. So the fact of the matter	12	questions were that were raised and what our answers are in
13	was that the generals were involved in that sense. They	13	respect thereof.
14	were briefed, they were made aware, as were most of the	14	The first question related to the question of
15	commanders that were there, if not all the commanders at	15	whether there was an onus of proof to be satisfied by a
16	least in the morning JOCCOMS. So I can't speak beyond	16 17	cross-examiner in respect of questions that were asked, and
17 18	that. MR CHASKALSON SC: But in terms of the	17 18	the comment we make in respect of this query is the following. There's no onus of proof in the proceedings of
		10	the Commission. The Commission will evaluate all of the
19 20	detail of this plan, which emerged for the first time at	20	available evidence and come to a view as to the
20	13:30, the role of the generals was at best passive. It was listening to what you had to say and identifying	20	probabilities on the facts. It's permissible for a cross-
22	whether there were any flaws that they wanted to – flaws or	22	examiner to put a proposition to a witness on the basis of
	additions that they wanted to add and deciding that there	22	
23 24		23 24	a hypothesis as to what the facts before the Commission
24 25	weren't. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	24 25	will reveal. A cross-examiner is not required to prove the
20	COEONEL SCOTT. Pes.	20	correctness of that hypothesis before putting that
	Page 14346		Page 14348
1	Page 14346 MR CHASKALSON SC: And this whole line of	1	Page 14348 proposition to the witness. The witness may respond by
1 2	6	1 2	5
	MR CHASKALSON SC: And this whole line of		proposition to the witness. The witness may respond by
2	MR CHASKALSON SC: And this whole line of cross-examination started with the strange anomaly that the	2	proposition to the witness. The witness may respond by asserting that the hypothesis is false and the question
2 3	MR CHASKALSON SC: And this whole line of cross-examination started with the strange anomaly that the SAPS case as we first saw it suggested very strongly that	2 3	proposition to the witness. The witness may respond by asserting that the hypothesis is false and the question therefore falls away, by answering the question on a
2 3 4	MR CHASKALSON SC: And this whole line of cross-examination started with the strange anomaly that the SAPS case as we first saw it suggested very strongly that the plan that was ultimately implemented was a plan that	2 3 4	proposition to the witness. The witness may respond by asserting that the hypothesis is false and the question therefore falls away, by answering the question on a provisional basis in the sense that the answer is given
2 3 4 5	MR CHASKALSON SC: And this whole line of cross-examination started with the strange anomaly that the SAPS case as we first saw it suggested very strongly that the plan that was ultimately implemented was a plan that had really been on the table for more than two days inside	2 3 4 5	proposition to the witness. The witness may respond by asserting that the hypothesis is false and the question therefore falls away, by answering the question on a provisional basis in the sense that the answer is given without admitting the correctness of the hypothesis, or by
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		1	
1	Page 14349	1	Page 14351
1	functions; he or she gives evidence and he or she advises	1 2	DUNCAN GEORGE SCOTT: s.u.o.
2	the cross-examiner in respect of evidence which has been	2	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Chaskalson, you're wanting to move on to another topic, I understand.
3 4	given or is to be given by other witnesses. Where it is put to a witness that another witness, including an expert	4	MR CHASKALSON SC: I do, Chair.
		4 5	
5	witness, will give certain evidence or has expressed	_	CHAIRPERSON: I may say that we have
6	certain opinions, a statement incorporating that version	6	agreed in advance to sit until 12:30 and I have to make
7	ought in ordinary circumstances to have been provided in	7	some short announcements in respect of future progress of
8	advance to the Commission and to the parties. Where a	8	the Commission, which will take me about five minutes, so
9	party has received advice from an expert witness who is yet	9	the cross-examination itself will end today at about 25
10	to give evidence, the party may in cross-examination put	10	past 12. I don't think it likely that it will be finished
11 12	propositions to a witness in accordance with the advice which has been received.	11 12	by then, so it will have to resume at a later date, but
		12	that's a matter I'll deal with when we get there. Mr Chaskalson.
13	It should, however, ordinarily not be identified		
14	as the opinion or advice of the expert who is yet to give	14	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CHASKALSON (CONTD.):
15	evidence, unless it is contained in a statement by that	15	Thank you, Chairperson. Colonel, I'm going to move now to
16	witness which has been distributed. This will not prevent	16	the reasons for the abandonment of the encirclement plan,
17	the expert witness from in due course making a written statement and giving evidence which reflects the view which	17 10	and I want to take you through the different reasons that have been offered by SAPS at different stages. Some of
18	he or she has expressed to the party instructing him or	18	-
19		19	this is material we traversed already; we can skim through
20 21	her, subject to the Commission's general approach to the	20 21	it in cases where we have already addressed it. The first
	desirability of early distribution of statements by		reason for not proceeding with the encirclement plan was
22	witnesses.	22	the reason that is given in the presentation, exhibit L,
23	Specifically in relation to Mr White, the	23	slide 63, and was the reason that was offered in your
24 25	Commission recognises that Mr White has not yet submitted a final statement. The reason for that is that the South	24 25	second statement, GGG39, page 2, paragraph 3, where it was, it's the reason that the plan wasn't proceeded with on
25		23	is the reason that the pair wasn't proceeded with on
	Page 14350		Page 14352
1	Page 14350 African Human Rights Commission was awaiting a response by	1	Page 14352 Tuesday because not enough forces were there and oriented
1 2	5	1 2	5
	African Human Rights Commission was awaiting a response by		Tuesday because not enough forces were there and oriented
2	African Human Rights Commission was awaiting a response by Mr De Rover to the questions raised by Mr White, asking for	2	Tuesday because not enough forces were there and oriented to be able to proceed on Tuesday.
2 3	African Human Rights Commission was awaiting a response by Mr De Rover to the questions raised by Mr White, asking for clarification of certain matters in Mr De Rover's	2 3	Tuesday because not enough forces were there and oriented to be able to proceed on Tuesday. Now that of course just explains why the plan
2 3 4	African Human Rights Commission was awaiting a response by Mr De Rover to the questions raised by Mr White, asking for clarification of certain matters in Mr De Rover's statement. That response was received a few days ago. A	2 3 4	Tuesday because not enough forces were there and oriented to be able to proceed on Tuesday. Now that of course just explains why the plan wasn't proceeded with on Tuesday. It doesn't explain why
2 3 4 5	African Human Rights Commission was awaiting a response by Mr De Rover to the questions raised by Mr White, asking for clarification of certain matters in Mr De Rover's statement. That response was received a few days ago. A final statement by Mr White is expected to be available	2 3 4 5	Tuesday because not enough forces were there and oriented to be able to proceed on Tuesday. Now that of course just explains why the plan wasn't proceeded with on Tuesday. It doesn't explain why the plan wasn't proceeded with after Tuesday, and in any
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	African Human Rights Commission was awaiting a response by Mr De Rover to the questions raised by Mr White, asking for clarification of certain matters in Mr De Rover's statement. That response was received a few days ago. A final statement by Mr White is expected to be available shortly. That final statement will, however, be subject to the qualification that it is based on the statements thus far made available by the SAPS and the evidence which has thus far been given. Mr White will necessarily have to review his opinions in the light of any further statements made available by the SAPS and by further evidence. The last question in respect of which we consider it appropriate to give a response to the Human Rights Commission relates to the weight to be attached to warning statements. Warning statements are taken from suspects or accused persons when they are informed of a charge pending against them. At that stage they are informed of their various rights, amongst which is the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate themselves. A cross- examiner cannot attach any weight to the fact that such statement is silent about an issue as the maker of the statement might have done so in the exercise of one of his or her rights. Those are our comments in respect of the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Tuesday because not enough forces were there and oriented to be able to proceed on Tuesday. Now that of course just explains why the plan wasn't proceeded with on Tuesday. It doesn't explain why the plan wasn't proceeded with after Tuesday, and in any event, if we look at your current statement, it seems not to be a reason at all, because if we go to page 20, paragraph 6.10, where you discuss your meeting with the National Commissioner on Monday night, you say the following. "I suggested during the meeting that the emotions on both sides were high due to the loss of life and that should the police move in to disperse the group the next morning, that the intervention could possibly be interpreted by the media and the public as retaliation instead of enforcement of the law. I said this because I've considered there was bound to be conflict again should the police use force to defuse the situation with protesters that's armed as they were, and with their emotions running as high as they did at the time. I suggested to the National Commissioner that the police should initiate dialogue to defuse the situation by introducing police negotiators who could provide the strikers with an alternative means to ending the standoff,

	Page 14353		Page 14355
1	implement tactical option on Tuesday.	1	barbed wire from Lonmin.
2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, of	2	COLONEL SCOTT: No, I didn't mention he'd
3	dispersal now, of confrontation.	3	obtained barbed wire –
4	MR CHASKALSON SC: Would encirclement	4	CHAIRPERSON: You didn't say he obtained
5	still have remained a possibility on Tuesday morning?	5	them, but what you said was in relation to the question
6	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, when I'm writing	6	about how much barbed wire there was you talked about
7	this at that time I'm not considering any tactical option	7	Lonmin having purchased some barbed wire. That's what you
8	yet. I'm just of the opinion that any confrontation with	8	said yesterday.
9	the strikers is going to result in possible conflict again,	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
10	and that it's not in the interest of the police for that	10	MR CHASKALSON SC: I'm sorry for putting
11	matter to do that.	11	it incorrectly. Were you aware of when Lonmin purchased
12	MR CHASKALSON SC: So if there wasn't	12	this barbed wire?
13	going to be a tactical option on Tuesday, the	13	COLONEL SCOTT: It arrived, I think it
14	unavailability of forces to employ the encirclement	14	arrived, or somewhere in the process of the operation it
15	tactical option on Tuesday really doesn't explain why that	15	arrived.
16	encirclement option was taken off the table.	16	MR CHASKALSON SC: When you say in the
17	COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not clear on where	17	process of the operation –
18	you're going, but the encirclement option is only come up	18	COLONEL SCOTT: Before the end of the
19	with as an impromptu plan in the early hours of Tuesday	19	16th.
20	morning because of the smaller grouping and it's, and	20	MR CHASKALSON SC: Before the end of the
21	understanding that encirclement there is simply putting up	21	16th?
22	a barrier again around the few members that are left on the	22	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
23	koppie, with the idea that once they're encircled they're	23	MR CHASKALSON SC: Before the start of
24	going to be spoken to, dialogue, and requested now to exit	24	the 16th?
25	through a specific point. There at this stage, and even at	25	COLONEL SCOTT: I would be inaccurate in
	Page 14354		Page 14356
1	the stage of the morning of the Tuesday, in-depth thought	1	trying to pinpoint it, but somewhere in the course of that
2	the stage of the morning of the Tuesday, in-depth thought has not been given yet to should they refuse to come out of	2	trying to pinpoint it, but somewhere in the course of that three days. I wouldn't presume it was the first day, but
	the stage of the morning of the Tuesday, in-depth thought has not been given yet to should they refuse to come out of the encirclement area on request on the dialogue, what the	2 3	trying to pinpoint it, but somewhere in the course of that three days. I wouldn't presume it was the first day, but somewhere in the course of those days it arrived.
2 3 4	the stage of the morning of the Tuesday, in-depth thought has not been given yet to should they refuse to come out of the encirclement area on request on the dialogue, what the options would be then.	2 3 4	trying to pinpoint it, but somewhere in the course of that three days. I wouldn't presume it was the first day, but somewhere in the course of those days it arrived. MR CHASKALSON SC: And do you know how
2 3 4 5	the stage of the morning of the Tuesday, in-depth thought has not been given yet to should they refuse to come out of the encirclement area on request on the dialogue, what the options would be then. MR CHASKALSON SC: Alright, well at any	2 3 4 5	trying to pinpoint it, but somewhere in the course of that three days. I wouldn't presume it was the first day, but somewhere in the course of those days it arrived. MR CHASKALSON SC: And do you know how much barbed wire there was?
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1	the circle, you know, to operationalise that razor wire you	1	showed of Brigadier Calitz's briefing.
2	still need to put it on some form of a trailer, take it to	2	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I recall the
3	the area and have it deployed in the police's case rather	3	briefing. I wasn't aware that – well, I didn't know about
4	rapidly, which I'm not sure how that would have actually	4	koppie – ja, I heard him say koppie 3, I think was to be a
5	worked.	5	base camp or something, but I wasn't aware of channels and
6	CHAIRPERSON: Do you know whether Lonmin	6	things between –
7	used barbed wire normally, and if so, how they used it?	7	CHAIRPERSON: Anyway, it did appear from
8	COLONEL SCOTT: I know that around the	8	what he said the area he was going to encircle was
9	chopper field, I'm not sure if it's shown there, but there	9	substantially larger than the area which was the subject of
10	is Lonmin barbed wire that is cordoning off that chopper	10	your original encirclement plan. Is that correct? So
11	field, and I would think some of their more sensitive areas	11	therefore it would seem that more barbed wire would have
12	as well of where maybe the precious metals are smelted and	12	been available, by that stage anyway.
13	so on, that they would want to use it in areas like that to	13	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
14	prohibit unauthorised access, striking groups possibly from	14	MR CHASKALSON SC: But going back to the
15	trying to access to intimidate workers, that type of thing.	15	16th, we were agreed earlier that at that stage SAPS had
16	But I'm guessing at the moment.	16	enough barbed wire to run an encirclement plan if it was
17	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, that	17	going to be run early in the morning with a limited number
18	photograph is taken at 9:40, approximately 9:40 in the	18	of protesters at the koppie, not if it was going to be run
19	morning. Colonel Vermaak's camera clock was 9:40:32. I	19	later on in the day with a large number of protesters at
20	haven't done a conversion off that.	20	the koppie.
21	COLONEL SCOTT: The date, sorry?	21	COLONEL SCOTT: If my estimations were
22	MR CHASKALSON SC: Of the 16th.	22	correct, they would have needed about 700 metres, which
23	COLONEL SCOTT: Okay.	23	sort of relates to seven trailers. If there were seven
24	MR CHASKALSON SC: If we zoom in to the	24	available still on the morning of the 16th, yes.
25	next photograph, which is the, it's the same photograph	25	CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, could I ask you a
1	Page 14358	1	Page 14360
1	zoomed in, we see the, what appear to be the six barbed	1	question? Looking at the picture we see piles of barbed
2	zoomed in, we see the, what appear to be the six barbed wire trailers which were going to be rolled out as part of	2	question? Looking at the picture we see piles of barbed wire. Now how many trailers' worth would you say do we see
2 3	zoomed in, we see the, what appear to be the six barbed wire trailers which were going to be rolled out as part of the phase 2 deployment on the 16th in the foreground of that	2 3	question? Looking at the picture we see piles of barbed wire. Now how many trailers' worth would you say do we see there?
2 3 4	zoomed in, we see the, what appear to be the six barbed wire trailers which were going to be rolled out as part of the phase 2 deployment on the 16th in the foreground of that zoomed in picture, and inside the square, where we'll zoom	2 3 4	question? Looking at the picture we see piles of barbedwire. Now how many trailers' worth would you say do we seethere?COLONEL SCOTT:I see one trailer there.
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2 3 4 5 6	zoomed in, we see the, what appear to be the six barbed wire trailers which were going to be rolled out as part of the phase 2 deployment on the 16th in the foreground of that zoomed in picture, and inside the square, where we'll zoom in a little bit further, is the excess barbed wire, and if we can move to the next, it seems that some of it has	2 3 4 5 6	question? Looking at the picture we see piles of barbed wire. Now how many trailers' worth would you say do we see there? COLONEL SCOTT: I see one trailer there. CHAIRPERSON: You see one trailer, but trailers' worth of barbed wire.
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1	Page 14361 8.15 of your statement, that's the cattle risk and the risk	1	Page 14363 COLONEL SCOTT: Well this is why what
2	of a cattle stampede through the barbed wire. The second	2	you're saying now is the exact type of inputs we would have
3	was a concern that you raised at page 63 paragraph 8.22.1	3	been expecting had I briefed that plan on Tuesday morning
4	which is the risk that the mine workers could avoid the	4	at 6 o'clock. The what ifs, what if we go and that
5	problem by just walking away from the koppie and putting	5	happens, then the inputs start coming from commanders well
6	themselves outside the range of what you could encircle.	6	what do we do then. But in never getting to official brief
7	The third which you address at page 64, 8.22.3 is the	7	that at a JOCCOM other then after the JOCCOM on the
8	potential humanitarian problem that would be created if you	8	Wednesday where Brigadier Pretorius says in that smaller
	encircle people who sat it out, as it were and you then		
9		9	grouping where we had a look at a phase 3 –
10	faced a situation where you had people encircled overnight	10	MR CHASKALSON SC: Brigadier Engelbrecht.
11	in the cold. If we can take these one by one. The walking	11	COLONEL SCOTT: Brigadier Engelbrecht,
12	away problem I want to put to you that again is a problem	12	ja. So it never got to that level of dealing with the what
13	that arises only in the context of encirclement of a large	13	ifs.
14	crowd.	14	MR CHASKALSON SC: But if we think now
15	COLONEL SCOTT: That was, it was only	15	about the what ifs the first what if may well be a reason
16	thrashed out there could it could happen even with a	16	not to try the plan during the middle of the day or at any
17	smaller crowd for that matter. But thus the first light	17	stage, whether on a large number of mine workers there.
18	and as I said the element of surprise issue. If we could	18	But for a group of 50 on the mountain it's not a
19	deploy an encirclement and from two different directions as	19	particularly problematic what if for SAPS, they can cope
20	quickly as we could at first light it was anticipated then	20	with that, would you accept that?
21	that we would catch them unawares, they would not have seen	21	COLONEL SCOTT: That is, in fact that
22	necessarily groupings come in to do that to them. But as	22	it's the culture of the police. Many a police officer
23	the days progressed and they started becoming aware of what	23	whether be in a police van or working in the public order
24	the police assets were and that obviously, one of the	24	you're taught to think on your feet in crisis management
25	things I'm also taught to do is to try to think like my	25	because that is in essence the job of the police member.
	Page 14362		Page 14364
1	opponent, what he would be considering we would be doing	1	You arrive in situations which are ongoing, which are fluid
2	opponent, what he would be considering we would be doing and then counteract that again. So I would be continually	2	You arrive in situations which are ongoing, which are fluid and you've got to think on your feet to be able to do what
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	Page 14365		Page 14367
1	sit it out, they're going to stay there the whole night,	1	see as important is that 6 o'clock JOCCOM meeting where on
2	we're not going to resolve the problem, you can send your	2	the SAPS version is at it stands, General Annandale
3	tactical forces in to affect the high risk tactical arrests	3	announced the abandonment of the encirclement plan and the
4	if you think that that risk is not, is outweighed by the	4	adoption of a new phase 3. At the same JOCCOM meeting a
5	humanitarian risk of forcing people to stay on the mountain	5	decision was taken to move to phase 2. Call that two
6	overnight.	6	steps.
7	COLONEL SCOTT: It's a possibility what	7	COLONEL SCOTT: If I can maybe just input
8	you're saying but I think we must just understand that the	8	something there. It must be remembered that the initial
9	points that you're raising now were raised when the	9	encirclement plan as such, the strategy thereof was never
10	encirclement plan was discussed to consider whether the	10	understood by the greater group of commanders. They would
11	larger group, whether it was still feasible for a larger	11	have only seen the word encirclement understanding that
12	group, it wasn't in the context of looking at the smaller	12	that would have been our tactical option. As I say there
13	group.	13	was never a full briefing given to them on that. So I'm
14	MR CHASKALSON SC: That's in fact where I	14	just trying to relate to General Annandale abandoning the
15	wanted to end up. Because it seems to me that all of the	15	encirclement plan. So for him speaking to the commanders
16	concerns that you're realising are really concerns which	16	that their opinion has been that the tactical option is
17	explain very reasonably why you couldn't run encirclement	17	going to be encirclement should we move there, it's likely
18	with a larger group.	18	that their opinion again is going to be that we're
19	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	19	encircling the larger group, not understanding that it was
20	MR CHASKALSON SC: But they don't explain	20	an initial plan drafted for a Tuesday morning, seen for a
21	why you couldn't run encirclement at first light?	21	Wednesday morning, evaluated during the day on the
22	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	22	Wednesday for a larger group. Seen that it's not going to
23	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now as the Chairperson	23	be feasible and thus turn over that paper. Because the
24	has put to you earlier encirclement couldn't have been run	24	understanding of the commanders that were in the JOCCOM
25	at first light on Thursday morning or it could have but it	25	having the plan not explained to them but only reading it
	Page 14366		Page 14368
1	Page 14366 wasn't desirable to run it on first light on Thursday	1	Page 14368 and having me saying that the tactical option would be
1 2		1 2	5
	wasn't desirable to run it on first light on Thursday		and having me saying that the tactical option would be
2	wasn't desirable to run it on first light on Thursday morning because Mr Mathunjwa had been sent away essentially	2	and having me saying that the tactical option would be encirclement and going on. There could be of the opinion
2 3	wasn't desirable to run it on first light on Thursday morning because Mr Mathunjwa had been sent away essentially to try to resolve the problem consensually and while that	2 3	and having me saying that the tactical option would be encirclement and going on. There could be of the opinion that the encirclement meant the larger group.
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	Page 14369		Page 14371
1	7.21.6.2 page 46 you explain what the operational strategy	1	arrests because you've got arrests for four and five.
2	for a phase 3 deployment was at that stage. Based on the	2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's, well ultimately
3	initial operational concepts i.e. the plan to encircle the	3	if there was going to be a tactical option –
4	koppie and then you enlarge on that in 7.21.6.3. So	4	CHAIRPERSON: No but you explain, you
5	apparently operational strategy which you explained but	5	explain we're going to do three.
6	according to what you say here in paragraph 7.25 that was	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
7	conveyed to the commanders at 14h00 hours on Tuesday	7	CHAIRPERSON: You thought to.
8	afternoon, is that right?	8	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
9	COLONEL SCOTT: No, Chairperson.	9	CHAIRPERSON: You then say we're moving
10	CHAIRPERSON: Or am I missing something?	10	out of 4 and 5. 4 and 5 presuppose arrests.
11	COLONEL SCOTT: No, no. This is what my	11	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
12	envisioned, we're talking about 7.2.6.1 or 7.2.1.6 speaking	12	CHAIRPERSON: Alright so therefore
13	of the phase 3. That was my, how I had reasoned out the	13	they'll understand that 3 must include arrests.
14	strategy but the briefing of that I think I mentioned it	14	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
15	elsewhere in my statement, I'm not sure of the paragraph	15	CHAIRPERSON: Encirclement.
16	now, where I actually say it was carried over to them	16	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
17	basically in the coordinating instruction slide where it	17	CHAIRPERSON: And then arrests.
18	just had the names in principle but I specifically	18	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
19	concentrated on the phase 1 to go into the dialogue.	19	CHAIRPERSON: That at least they know.
20	CHAIRPERSON: You also say in paragraph	20	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes and as I say much of
21	7.27 on page 51 that you gave a full presentation in	21	that comes from the strategy of the early morning. But to
22	respect of phase 1 but you also gave, you also referred to	22	how much of that I actually discussed with them, I would be
23	the other five phases in lesser detail which implies that	23	using deductive reasoning if I had to go there. I can't
24	there was a certain degree of explanation, at least a	24	really remember. But I'm sure there must have been some of
25	sentence of two and all we need is a sentence or two to get	25	their statements of the members from those days that will
1	Page 14370	1	Page 14372
1	what you have in 7.21.6.3, isn't that right or am I	1	be able to clear that up.
2	what you have in 7.21.6.3, isn't that right or am I misunderstanding it?	2	be able to clear that up. MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, getting back
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RCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

		1	
1	Page 14373 move because remember the JOCCOM happened anyway before 9	1	Page 14375 COLONEL SCOTT: Well I can assume so
2	o'clock in the morning. So deciding on a phase 2 at that	2	because as I say I was told probably just before 1:30 come
3	time we're still uncertain as to what will happen at 9	3	and take your seats, we're going to now, we're moving to
4	o'clock. Although information is trickling in that people	4	the tactical option.
5	are arriving at the koppie with weapons, there's still a	5	MR CHASKALSON SC: And if there hadn't
6	hope that something is going to come of it. But there was	6	been a material escalation in the threat there wouldn't
7	no pertinent decision taken there, I think there was an	7	have been a move to the tactical option.
8	anticipation that possibly that day we could go through a	8	[12:14] COLONEL SCOTT: Well, you're asking for
9	tactical option but there was no decision taken at that	9	my opinion, because obviously I can't speak on behalf of
10	time to, that the one was going to be implemented.	10	the SAPS. I think these decisions are taken above my
11	MR CHASKALSON SC: But assuming the	11	level, but I was of the opinion again that if the strikers
12	version that's been put before this commission in exhibit L	12	were going to return to dialogue, continue negotiating with
13	and through the evidence of Major-General Annandale is that	13	their, laying down of their weapons, etcetera, that that
14	the key factor that ultimately determined the move to the	14	would still be the order of the day.
15	tactical phase was the escalation in the threat.	15	MR CHASKALSON SC: But again on the SAPS
16	COLONEL SCOTT: I believe so as well,	16	case there had been this escalation in the threat. The
17	yes.	17	decision was taken to move to phase 3 some time before 1:30
18	MR CHASKALSON SC: Did you understand at	18	and communicated at the 1:30 JOCCOM.
19	the morning JOCCOM that in the absence of an escalation of	19	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
20	the threat there would be no move to phase 3?	20	MR CHASKALSON SC: And then phase 3 was
21	COLONEL SCOTT: I understood it to be	21	implemented some time after 3:30.
22	that way, yes.	22	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
23	MR CHASKALSON SC: Proceeding with the	23	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now in terms of that
24	sequence of events as I understand it, by midmorning it was	24	sequence, have I left anything out critically? Is there,
25	clear that Mr Mathunjwa was not going to be able to get the	25	does that describe how we got to phase 3 on the Thursday?
	Page 14374		Page 14376
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2	mine workers to leave the koppie? COLONEL SCOTT: Well they hadn't as of	2	COLONEL SCOTT: I have a strange feeling you're going to inform me, but as I say, if I speak
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	Page 14377		Page 14379
1	by the miners, there would have to have been an	1	you were conveying, and that you weren't aware of that at
2	implementation of phase 3 that day?	2	the time.
3	COLONEL SCOTT: From what she had said, I	3	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, listening to the
4	understand it that way, yes.	4	video material, it's, I think it's objective to say that
5	MR CHASKALSON SC: Can we now play JJJ92,	5	they said, or that the Provincial Commissioner mentioned
6	which is an interview that she gave shortly after 9:30.	6	that if they don't leave on their own today, as you put it
7	[VIDEO SHOWN]	7	earlier, that the police would need to take steps to ensure
8	So Colonel, the Provincial Commissioner was very	8	that it came to an end.
9	clear at 9:30 that things were going to be "ended today,"	9	MR CHASKALSON SC: We had statements from
10	consensually or non-consensually.	10	the National Commissioner and the Provincial Commissioner
11	COLONEL SCOTT: I hear that, yes.	11	which made clear that the night before the Provincial
12	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now one of the things	12	Commissioner had informed the National Commissioner that if
13	that always struck us as –	13	SAPS could not persuade the strikers to lay down their
14	CHAIRPERSON: At what stage did you	14	weapons and leave the koppie by negotiation, she would
15	learn, if you ever did learn, in the course of that day	15	issue an instruction for the strikers to be dispersed.
16	that the Provincial Commissioner had made that	16	None of that was conveyed to you?
17	announcement?	17	COLONEL SCOTT: No.
18	COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, even up	18	MR CHASKALSON SC: You see, what's come
19	until the special JOCCOM I was not aware of that media	19	to our attention more recently is that the version
20	briefing that had taken place, and I was not aware that, in	20	described in the statements of the National Commissioner
21	this case if there was a pre-decided decision, was made	21	and the Provincial Commissioner – in fact it goes a little
22	either. I was of the opinion that a phase 3 was always on	22	bit further than that version; it wasn't just a
23	the cards due to the fact that my own opinion was again	23	conversation between the Provincial Commissioner and the
24	that the violence would possibly get worse because all	24	National Commissioner. There was a formal minuted
25	avenues of dialogue had been exhausted and there was	25	extraordinary session of the National Management Forum of
1 2 3	possibly no other way for the strikers to go other than what had happened at the Impala Platinum Mine. So, but that there was a pertinent decision made, I was not aware	1 2 3	SAPS on Wednesday night, attended by the National Commissioner, all provincial commissioners, deputy national commissioners, divisional commissioners, and there is a
4	of that.	4	minuted item - which we would hand in as JJJ177 and it's in
5	CHAIRPERSON: General Mpembe and General	5	file 4 now.
6	Annandale were present at the press conference and they	6	CHAIRPERSON: Page.
7	both testified to that effect.	7	MR CHASKALSON SC: Page 204. I wonder if
8	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	8	we –
9	CHAIRPERSON: Did they not report to	9	CHAIRPERSON: So how do I describe it?
10	you –	10	Minutes, National?
11	COLONEL SCOTT: No.	11	MR CHASKALSON SC: The National
12	CHAIRPERSON: - that that decision had	12	Management Forum of the SAPS, and this is an extract from
13	already been announced to the world at 9:30?	13	the minutes. It says "draft," but we're assured by SAPS
14	COLONEL SCOTT: No, they didn't,	14	that this is in fact the actual minute, or a correct
15	Chairperson, and why I can say with certainty is because if	15	minute, and it says, "Agenda item 7, extraordinary session.
16	I was told phase 3 is a definite going ahead and it's in so	16	Attendance, National Commissioner, all provincial
17	many hours time, I would have spent quite a bit of time in	17	commissioners, Divisional Commissioner Operational
18	actually looking at detail and reassessing the situation,	18	Services, Deputy National Commissioner Operational
19	asking for aerial photographs. As I say, when you've got	19	Services, and Acting Divisional Commissioner Crime
20	the time you use it, and when you don't have the time, you	20	Intelligence. The National Commissioner opened the meeting
21	make the best of this little time you have. So I wasn't	21	and requested the Provincial Commissioner North West,
22	aware, no.	22	Lieutenant-General Mbombo, to brief the attendees on issues
23	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, you spoke of	23	of the labour unrest in Lonmin Mine in Marikana, North
24	a - I forget the exact phrase that you used, but of a	24	West. After deliberations, the meeting endorsed the
	decision having been taken already, was the meaning that	25	proposal to disarm the protesting masses and further
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1	indicated that additional resources must be made available
2	upon needs identification by the Provincial Commissioner
3	North West." So it seems that the statement that the
4	Provincial Commissioner made to the world at 9:30 flowed
5	from a decision taken at a meeting of the highest
6	management structure of the SAPS. Were you aware of any of
7	this?
8	COLONEL SCOTT: No.
9	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Chaskalson, when you
10	reach a suitable stage we have to stop, as you know.
11	MR CHASKALSON SC: Mr Chairperson, I have
12	quite a long way to go, so I think at this point we would
13	do as well to stop now.
14	CHAIRPERSON: The Commission is now going
15	to adjourn until the 14th of October. We're taking the
16	recess now, a lot of work to be done during the recess,
17	reading and consideration of material, but we're adjourning
18	till the 14th of October at 9:30. We have already spoken,
19	the three of us, three Commissioners, have spoken to the
20	President personally and indicated that we need an
21	extension; we will not finish our work by the end of
22	October. He asked for an estimate, which we gave him,
23	which had been prepared by the evidence leaders, as to how
24	long we would need. We have not yet had communicated to us
25	to what date the further extension will be, but I am
- 1	Page 14382
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