RealTime Transcriptions

TRANSCRIPTION OF THE

# COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

# MARIKANA

### **BEFORE TRIBUNAL**

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FARLAM (RETIRED) - CHAIRPERSON MR TOKOTA SC MS HEMRAJ SC

## HELD ON

DAY 134 25 SEPTEMBER 2013

PAGES 14123 TO 14284



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1	Page 14123 [PROCEEDINGS ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2013]	1	Page 14125 particularly at what Mr Budlender stated to be the opinion
2	[PROCEEDINGS ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2013] [10:12] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.	2	particularly at what Mr Budlender stated to be the opinion of the evidence leaders. The fourth one he said, and I
2	Before we proceed with the evidence, before I remind the	2	quote, "We have obtained documents which in our opinion
4	Colonel that he's still under oath I'd like to read a	4	demonstrate that the SAPS version of the events at Marikana
5	statement which we issued on Friday, which unfortunately	5	as describe in the SAPS representation to this Commission,
6	did not receive the publicity to which I think it was	6	and in the evidence of SAPS witnesses at this Commission,
7	entitled. It reads as follows. "The statement issued by	7	is in material respects not the truth." The concern is
8	the spokesperson of the Commission on the 19th of September	8	grave, because Chair, the evidence leaders are an extension
9	did not, as appears therein, contain the views of the	9	of the Commission. They have been appointed by the
10	Commission. What it did contain were the submissions made	10	Commission. They work and do their work for and on behalf
11	to the Commission by Mr Geoff Budlender SC, the senior	11	of the Commission, and if they express a pronouncement that
12	evidence leader, in support of an application for the	12	even before hearing all the evidence, even before all the
13	postponement of the sittings of the Commission until	12	investigation is completed, even before the arguments have
14	Wednesday, 25 September 2013, to enable, (1), the evidence	14	been proffered by us on behalf of the South African Police
15	leaders to work through the new material, running into	14	Service, a pronouncement that the documents they have
16	thousands of pages, which had been made available by the	16	demonstrate that a version we placed before this Commission
17	South African Police Service; and (2), the SAPS legal team	17	is in material respects not the truth, is very damning.
18	to provide explanations on certain matters arising from the	18	For this reason, Chair, we invite Mr Budlender and the
19	documents seen so far. It is important to stress three	19	evidence leaders that they must identify with sufficient
20	facts.	20	particularity the document on which that opinion rests.
21	(1), during the course of Mr Budlender's	21	They must identify in what manner those documents
22	submissions he stated that in the opinion of the evidence	22	demonstrate that the version that we place as being the
23	leaders some of the documents obtained demonstrated that	23	version of the events at Marikana is in material respects
24	the SAPS version of the events at Marikana as described in	24	untrue.
25	its presentation, and the evidence of SAPS witnesses in the	25	But not only that; as the pronouncement goes,
	Page 14124		Page 14126
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		1	
1	Page 14127 and that too is not correct. What I said was the	1	Page 14129 to tell them where our concerns are, if it's not
2	following; I raised the various matters and I said we	2	sufficiently clear.
3	recognise that it is important that the SAPS should have	3	CHAIRPERSON: - deal with the matter.
4	the opportunity to explain the matters which have raised	4	Thank you.
5	our concern. However, we have to say that absent a	5	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: I think I would
6	convincing explanation, the material which we have found	6	like to place on record that as Commissioners we are not
7	has serious consequences for the further conduct of the	7	arriving at any conclusions, provisional or otherwise,
8	work of the Commission. Of course it's a matter for the	8	until we've heard all the evidence and seen all the
9	SAPS to respond and we have raised a number of matters with	9	documentation in this process. I think we want to place
10	them so far. We will raise further with them.	10	that on record.
11	So it's not as though the evidence leaders have	11	CHAIRPERSON: Alright. So we can now
12	reached conclusions set in concrete. We have very serious	12	proceed, I think. I hope that some of the confusion that
13	concerns. We've identified certain of them. We'll	13	previously existed because of what happened last week has
14	continue to identify them as we go along. Certain of the	14	now been removed and we can now continue with our eyes on
15	matters which have given us cause for concern will be	15	the ball, consider the evidence that the witness is going
16	raised during the further cross-examination of Colonel	16	to give and the questions that are going to be put to him.
17	Scott and they'll become clear as the cross-examination	17	Colonel, you're still under oath.
18	proceeds, and we will in due course respond further to what	18	DUNCAN GEORGE SCOTT: s.u.o.
19	has been said by our colleagues for the SAPS.	19	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Chaskalson, you're still
20	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Anything you	20	cross-examining.
21	wish to add or say by way of further reply, Mr Semenya?	21	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CHASKALSON (CONTD.):
22	MR SEMENYA SC: Only to say, Chair, in	22	I am, Chairperson. Colonel, I'm going to ask you a series
23	reply, the issues that were raised by the evidence leaders	23	of questions in relation to the plan, the SAPS plan, or
24	fall into two categories. They related to concerns which	24	plans (plural) at Marikana, and how those plans developed,
25	they had and to which we are responding in writing to those	25	and where I'd like to start is with the original absence of
1	Page 14128	1	Page 14130
1	concerns. About the version being untrue, that is a	1	contemporaneous documents, and you may recall, Colonel,
2	concerns. About the version being untrue, that is a different matter to which I do not hear any answer about	2	contemporaneous documents, and you may recall, Colonel, that before contemporaneous documents emerged, we had been
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	concerns. About the version being untrue, that is a different matter to which I do not hear any answer about it. It was very definitive; it was said, it was not made lightly. It was considered and it was said that the version of the SAPS is untrue, and evidence of certain witnesses which must still be identified is untrue, given the documents that have been obtained. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Budlender says that certain matters will become clear during the course of the further cross-examination of the present witness. Let's find out from him whether the point that you make about the allegation that the version is untrue, whether that's one of the matters that will be covered in the further cross-examination of the witness. Mr Budlender. MR BUDLENDER SC: Yes, it will be. CHAIRPERSON: The further question that Mr Semenya raises relates to the witnesses who the evidence leaders believe at this stage, in the absence of an explanation, have given false evidence. Will that become clear from the cross-examination, or is it something that you'll communicate privately to Mr Semenya in due course, or as soon as possible? MR BUDLENDER SC: Chair, I think at least	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	contemporaneous documents, and you may recall, Colonel, that before contemporaneous documents emerged, we had been given two different versions of the SAPS plan at Marikana, neither of which were contemporaneous. The first were the files that SAPS – sorry, were the plans that SAPS furnished to IPID, if I can hand them in as an exhibit, they will be JJJ53, and Commissioners, they appear from page 429 of file 2. We don't need to have them displayed. CHAIRPERSON: I've recorded that exhibit JJJ53 will be the SAPS plans handed to IPID, which you say are at pages 429 and following of file 2. MR CHASKALSON SC: Now Colonel, will you agree that the – CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you carry on, those files were given to us. I'm not sure that the witness has got one, and I'm not sure that that description then adequately describes them for the purposes of the record, but if you're not able to give us the full description now, you can give it to us later after the tea adjournment. MR CHASKALSON SC: I must apologise to the witness. Can we just show up on the screen JJJ53 then? And Colonel, you'll see there's an IPID reference number

#### Marikana Commission of Inquiry

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1	Page 14131 Lonmin Mine Marikana 13 August 2012." I don't want to	1	Page 14133 have been created –
2	spend too much time on this document, but I merely want you	2	CHAIRPERSON: Wouldn't it be quicker if
3	to confirm that this is not in fact a contemporaneous	3	you – sorry to interrupt you. Wouldn't it be quicker if
4	document that was produced as the plan for 13, 14, 15 or 16	4	you just looked through your copy now, because it's going
5	August 2012.	5	to take a bit of time to flash them all up on the screen,
6	CHAIRPERSON: Before you carry on, have	6	and all you need tell us is pages - then give us the
7	you got the document in front of you?	7	numbers – were contemporaneous in the sense that you've
8	COLONEL SCOTT: I have, Chairperson. I'm	8	described?
9	just quickly paging through it.	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. 429 – hang on a
10	CHAIRPERSON: It's got other markings on	10	second. Our page numbers differ.
11	it. I don't know what they are. It's A195 and also page	11	CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, again Adv Hemraj
12	655. Now do you know what those are, Mr Chaskalson?	12	makes a valid point. You wanted him to say whether the
13	MR CHASKALSON SC: The A195 is an IPID	13	document was contemporaneous, and he gave an answer to the
14	reference number. The 000655 was I think a paginated	14	effect that a good deal of it wasn't, but part of it
15	number from the original IPID files.	15	consisted of documents which were contemporaneous, and then
16	CHAIRPERSON: I see. Anyway, let's wait	16	he gave a definition of contemporaneousness. Are you happy
17	to make sure the witness has got the document before we	17	to accept his definition, or do you want him to deal with
18	proceed.	18	more precision, to state with more precision which
19	COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I can	19	documents were contemporaneous, in the strictly
20	confirm that this, the majority of the document is not	20	contemporaneous sense?
21	contemporaneous. There are some of the slides which were	21	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, my real concern
22	handed to the commanders on the day, which were	22	was with establishing which consolidated documents were
23	contemporaneous, which are inside the actual document, but	23	contemporaneous and which were not. What we see is –
24	the majority of it is not.	24	CHAIRPERSON: No, but the question is
25	CHAIRPERSON: I think for the sake of	25	what do you mean by contemporaneous. You see, he says by
	Page 14132		Page 14134
1	good order we should now ascertain which are the documents	1	contemporaneous, existed as at the end of the 16th, as I
2	which you say were contemporaneous, and which were not,	2	understand him, whereas if a document dated the 13th only
3	because if we just leave that thing dangling in the air it	3	existed at the end of the 16th, that wouldn't be
4	may lead to confusion later. I was also asked by my	4	contemporaneous in the strict sense. So I think we must
5	colleague Commissioner Hemraj to ask what page does this	5	get clarity on this before we proceed.
6	exhibit end, because we've handed in 429 etcetera, but the	6	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, to provide
7	terminus ad quem I think is the expression that Mr -	7	that clarity, can we treat as what is contemporaneous a
8	MR CHASKALSON SC: 466, is what I am	8	document which was presented as part of a plan on the day
9	told.	9	under which it resides in this consolidated document? So
10	CHAIRPERSON: Alright. So it's pages 429	10	if it says 13 August 2012, it would be contemporaneous if
11	to 466. That's 38 pages in all.	11	it was presented on the 13th of August as part of a plan on
12	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, just return	12	that day, not if it was produced on the 15th of August to
13	to the – yes, Chairperson, it is.	13	reflect what may have been presented orally at the JOC on
14	CHAIRPERSON: Alright, my question was	14	the 13th.
15	which of those 38 pages was a contemporaneous document, or	15	CHAIRPERSON: You understand the
16	were contemporaneous documents, so then we'll know that the	16	question? It's a little bit more restrictive than I think
17	others were produced later? Is it possible for you to tell	17	you thought, to be fair, but anyway, can you go through the
18	US, OF -	18	documents and tell us which documents were contemporaneous
19	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, Chairperson, I'm	19	in that sense, which were in existence on the day in
20	wondering if we page through them on the screen and I'll	20	question?
21	page through them as well in the file I have, and then to	21	COLONEL SCOTT: I'll go through the
22	the best of my recollection I can say that was created in	22	slides as I can recall them, Chairperson. I just want to
23	the duration, not on any specific day, but in the duration	23	note, our page numbers differ, so if I, what you're seeing
24	of those three days, the Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday,	24 25	as 655 I have as 429.
	those files would have been created, or those slides would	25	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, the
A	RCHIVE FOR JUSTICE		

1	Page 14135 Commissioners have your pagination as well.	1	Page 14137 started building the plan on the 13th, that evening when I
2	COLONEL SCOTT: Alright, okay.	2	arrived, that's why I put the initial date in as the 13th.
3	CHAIRPERSON: I've got - as I indicated,	3	CHAIRPERSON: You arrived on the Monday.
4	the first document has got three numbers on it; 429, which	4	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
5	I think is the overall number in the files which the	5	CHAIRPERSON: After the engagement near
6	evidence leaders gave us; 655 appears to be some IPID	6	the railway line.
7	numbering, and A195 is also some kind of IPID reference, as	7	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
8	far as I can make out. Which are the ones you've got?	8	5
0 9	COLONEL SCOTT: I seem to have the same	0 9	CHAIRPERSON: Okay. COLONEL SCOTT: So this would have been a
10	as you, the 429 –		
11	CHAIRPERSON: You've got 429?	10 11	slide that was created early in the building of the presentation as the plan as such. The scope, I'm not sure,
12	COLONEL SCOTT: - sequencing, ja.	12	I normally put a scope in but if I don't get to conclude
13		13	the full presentation I would normally then exclude the
13	5	14	
14	MR CHASKALSON SC: Chairperson, just for the convenience of people watching from the gallery, the	14	scope because it wouldn't be a reflection of what would be lower end. So I'm not sure whether this is
16 17	only number that they don't have is the 429 number. So possibly if after quoting your 429 number you could give	16 17	contemporaneous, it would have been part of my building of a presentation in the beginning, from the Monday but as I
18	the printed number, so your 429 would be 000655.	18	say, if I didn't get to all the points I would have removed
19	[10:31] COLONEL SCOTT: It's fine if we can do	19	the slide not to have the audience that I was briefing be
20	that, if they can just keep up with what I'm doing here	20	expecting what would be on the scope slide. So I can't
20	because I think once we get into the slides, mine are	20	speak to that one, I don't think that one would have been
22	blacked out. I can't see the 655s.	22	contemporaneous at the time.
23	CHAIRPERSON: The 655 is vertically	22	CHAIRPERSON: I marked the first one, my
23	reflected on the screen, on the bottom right-hand corner.	23	copy of the first one 655, I marked that C at the bottom
25	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. Okay the opening	25	left-hand corner. I've marked this one C? Would that be
20		20	
	Page 14136		Page 14138
1	Page 14136 slide which we see there was contemporaneous, that was	1	Page 14138 accurate?
1 2	5	1 2	•
	slide which we see there was contemporaneous, that was		accurate?
2	slide which we see there was contemporaneous, that was created during the operation.	2	accurate? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. And the black slide
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		I	
1	Page 14139 in the top right corner we can see the symbol of the globe,	1	Page 14141 so on. So these additions of yours, were they
1 2	the earth and I would normally click on that and that would	2	contemporaneous in the sense that we're discussing or did
3	take me into the Google Earth program itself, a hyperlink	3	you put those in later in order to make your presentation
4	which then enables me to actually move around on the map to	4	after the operation clear to people to whom you were
5	show the people more clearly exactly where they are, where	5	presenting it?
6	the trouble spots are, where incidents have taken place up	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, it was as
7	till then. The next slide being 434 is contemporaneous. I	7	contemporaneous slide, it was put in on the Tuesday but the
8	downloaded that somewhere around 6 o'clock on the Tuesday	8	slide in itself represents the overview. So when the
9	morning, experiencing the cold as one of the ways just to	9	people see the slide I immediately – I don't explain the
10	assist those in the briefing, to pre-warn them as if	10	picture, the picture is just there because the initial one
11	they've got to work nightshifts etcetera, of the	11	was the geographical orientation. Now in the geographical
12	temperature conditions to be expected. And obviously to	12	orientation you don't want to already put your operational
13	bring warm clothing or to utilise warm clothing when they	13	overview on the same map. Because what happens then while
14	go out for deployments.	14	you're trying to orientate them the commanders are already
15	The risk assessment slide 435 this is	15	trying to figure out what the operational overview or
16	contemporaneous as well and I'm recognising it by obviously	16	deployment's going to be. So in the geographical
17	the slide name "Risk Assessment." There may be small	10	orientation it's simply about orientation then to where
18	changes within the bullets or the wording within the	18	they are, where the incidents have been occurring and so
19	bullets, it could have changed from the Tuesday to the time	19	on. Whereas this view, this picture that you see on screen
20	that it was given to IPID but it looks contemporaneous to	20	deals with the operational overview, now to start
21	me. We've got slide on page 436, that's another	21	explaining by going to the Google Earth map, by clicking on
22	introductory slide for the briefing of audiences after the	22	the hyperlink in the top right corner to what the actual
23	Marikana incident. That was not contemporaneous. The SAPS	23	deployment is going to be. As I say, the picture that you
24	Strategy was not contemporaneous, to the best of my	24	see in screen would have been in screen throughout until
25	knowledge it was not contemporaneous. The next slide which	25	the 16th. It was an icon rather of what was to come by
			······································
	Page 14140		Page 14142
1	is 438 was contemporaneous and initially the slide spoke to	1	clicking on the earth, the Google Earth icon in the top
1 2	is 438 was contemporaneous and initially the slide spoke to Marikana on 14 August. This is obviously a later version	1 2	clicking on the earth, the Google Earth icon in the top right corner.
	is 438 was contemporaneous and initially the slide spoke to Marikana on 14 August. This is obviously a later version after it was evident to me the operation would be going		clicking on the earth, the Google Earth icon in the top right corner. CHAIRPERSON: I understand, but you
2	is 438 was contemporaneous and initially the slide spoke to Marikana on 14 August. This is obviously a later version after it was evident to me the operation would be going beyond the 14th of August and thus I changed the word "on"	2	clicking on the earth, the Google Earth icon in the top right corner. CHAIRPERSON: I understand, but you haven't really answered my question. It's not too clear
2 3	is 438 was contemporaneous and initially the slide spoke to Marikana on 14 August. This is obviously a later version after it was evident to me the operation would be going beyond the 14th of August and thus I changed the word "on" to "from" which is depicted in this slide. But the rest of	2 3	clicking on the earth, the Google Earth icon in the top right corner. CHAIRPERSON: I understand, but you haven't really answered my question. It's not too clear from the screen, the hard copy we've got is a little bit
2 3 4 5 6	is 438 was contemporaneous and initially the slide spoke to Marikana on 14 August. This is obviously a later version after it was evident to me the operation would be going beyond the 14th of August and thus I changed the word "on" to "from" which is depicted in this slide. But the rest of the wording in the slide remains as was at the time. The	2 3 4	clicking on the earth, the Google Earth icon in the top right corner. CHAIRPERSON: I understand, but you haven't really answered my question. It's not too clear from the screen, the hard copy we've got is a little bit clearer. You inserted on this, amongst other things, the
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	Page 14143		Page 14145
1	Platinum Initial Plan.KMZ.	1	pick something up in the slide that I would know would be
2	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, there was, I think	2	changed afterwards, that's what I'm mentioning but the
3	it's OPS Platinum 2, the KMZ file is OPS Platinum 2 that	3	slide as a whole other than possibly just the word "stage"
4	would come up there on the Tuesday.	4	which would have been "phase" which was contemporaneous
5	MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes.	5	then to the 15th.
6	COLONEL SCOTT: The next page being 441,	6	MR CHASKALSON SC: The only point that I
7	this was also contemporaneous. It was, as far as my	7	want to clarify at this stage is that what you're doing
8	memory, it was created later on the Tuesday, midday if I	8	through this exercise is you're going slide by slide trying
9	have it correct this was contemporaneous as well. And with	9	to remember today if a slide in that exact form was
10	that there was also a showing of a Google Earth of the	10	presented, you accept that your memory may not be 100%
11	actually zones which were zoned to show which was	11	correct.
12	particularly hazardous possibly and that which was more	12	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
13	friendly towards the police at that time. The next page	13	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Can I just seek
14	442, I recall this being presented daily and I do that	14	clarification. When you said contemporaneous for the 15th
15	because I was wondering whether the people that were	15	are you saying this particular slide was not in existence
16	hearing it were not getting tired of hearing it but to my	16	on the 13th?
17	knowledge this was contemporaneous as well and shown. 443	17	COLONEL SCOTT: Commissioner, it was
18	Coordinating Instructions, this was not contemporaneous,	18	created on the 14th initially, the operational overview
19	again it was a slide brought in to better help with the	19	which would have shown similar to what we see there other
20	briefing to an audience that wasn't present. The next	20	than it would have had possibly less information. But as I
21	slide is - the next page is 444, this is a contemporaneous	21	said, as we went on and the 14th became history, the morning
22	slide and it was initially there as well on the Tuesday, on	22	of the 15th I would update that slide to better reflect the
23	the Wednesday morning I upgraded the slide for showing	23	numbers and the people which we had on the 15th. I know,
24	again for the deployment there, after hearing at the outset	24	for instance, on the 14th there were seven POPs armoured
25	of the JOCCOM, the numbers of OPS that were there,	25	vehicles that were in the line at the front and this being
1	Page 14144	1	Page 14146
1	etcetera. So this is contemporaneous for the Wednesday.	1	the Wednesday there were only five on that day. So I can
2	etcetera. So this is contemporaneous for the Wednesday. CHAIRPERSON: Contemporaneous for the 15th	2	the Wednesday there were only five on that day. So I can see the differences like that, but I know that the
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	Doco 14147		Dogo 1/1/0
1	Page 14147 made changes as you went along –	1	Page 14149 that I could try to put something forward which reflected
2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct,	2	something close to what it would be.
3	Chairperson.	3	CHAIRPERSON: So that's 444 that we're
4	CHAIRPERSON: - to accommodate changes in	4	talking about.
5	what was happening. For example the number of Nyalas	5	COLONEL SCOTT: 444 yes.
6	changed so therefore you changed that, is that -	6	CHAIRPERSON: Now is there anything you
7	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct,	7	want to say to us about that slide?
8	Chairperson.	8	COLONEL SCOTT: No, that's, as I say
9	CHAIRPERSON: Am I understanding you	9	that's - I think we've -
10	correctly.	10	CHAIRPERSON: We've exhausted it, so now
11	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	11	we can move onto 445.
12	CHAIRPERSON: All right, thank you.	12	COLONEL SCOTT: 445, 445 the concept of
13	COLONEL SCOTT: The foundation of the	13	it was also contemporaneous. It was also introduced, I'm
14	presentation with what we see as the headings other than	14	not sure if it would have been there already on the
15	those that I'm showing not to be contemporaneous to the	15	Tuesday, it was definitely there on the Wednesday and it
16	best of my memory that would have been there because that's	16	existed even onto the Thursday. And the Wednesday would
17	how I would have set up a planning as I have many times	17	have been also during the JOCCOM trying to update the
18	before. And you're correct in saying I started it on the	18	content of it but my recollection of the Thursday is that I
19	Monday evening the 13th, that's why it would have had the	19	just didn't get the time to finish this because what I was
20	date the 13th. But the first full presentation that I wanted	20	– and we can see that from the actual deployment numbers.
21	to present was possibly only really between 6 and 7 o'clock	21	So I don't know if I showed this on the Thursday, I don't
22	on the Tuesday morning after talks earlier that evening or	22	think I showed this on the Thursday, because of the
23	that very early morning with Colonel Merafe, Mr Sinclair,	23	inaccuracy of the numbers and the placement of the people
24	etcetera. So it was a time period, it wasn't all completed	24	in it. But it was a contemporaneous slide created already
25	on the Monday evening. It was – the first briefing I	25	during the operation.
	Page 14148		Page 14150
1	Page 14148 wanted to give was really to my understanding for the 6	1	Page 14150 [10:51] CHAIRPERSON: But again, would I be
1 2	5	1 2	
	wanted to give was really to my understanding for the 6		[10:51] CHAIRPERSON: But again, would I be
2	wanted to give was really to my understanding for the 6 o'clock JOCCOM. Although when the people weren't there I	2	[10:51] CHAIRPERSON: But again, would I be correct in saying that it wasn't contemporaneous in the
2 3	wanted to give was really to my understanding for the 6 o'clock JOCCOM. Although when the people weren't there I still upgraded it a little until I realised it's not going	2 3	[10:51] CHAIRPERSON: But again, would I be correct in saying that it wasn't contemporaneous in the sense it wasn't a document existing in this form on the
2 3 4	wanted to give was really to my understanding for the 6 o'clock JOCCOM. Although when the people weren't there I still upgraded it a little until I realised it's not going to happen at that time. And then I continued working on the plan thereafter until the midday JOCCUM where General Annandale had arrived and all the commanders were – and	2 3 4	[10:51] CHAIRPERSON: But again, would I be correct in saying that it wasn't contemporaneous in the sense it wasn't a document existing in this form on the evening of the 13th, or even on the 14th, but I understood
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		I	
1	Page 14151	1	Page 14153
1	content of it, I can't recall. But this was reverse	1	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there's a grid there.
2	engineered because it was saved over. The 15th, for	2	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
3	instance, we just changed the "14" to a "15" and then I	3	CHAIRPERSON: You say this one isn't
4	would upgrade the times and what was happening in some of		another version -
5	the bullets, and then similarly for the 16th, well, as I	5	COLONEL SCOTT: No.
6	say, on the 16th, I don't recall presenting that slide, and	6	CHAIRPERSON: - of that? Okay.
7	the reason for that being that I saw already on the 15th,	7	COLONEL SCOTT: I think this slide, no,
8	that we were not able to stick to the times that I'd	8	because I think the numbers would have come up on this
9	actually put in, in the planning, so they were not showing	9	slide. The slide 65 spoke to the patrol which was
10	accuracy – accurately, what we are trying to do, as far as	10	implemented before the official phase 1. But it was
11	the timing was concerned. I know again this slide was	11	contemporaneous, 449. I don't particularly recognise 450.
12	presented on 14 and on 15, because of the actual using this	12	I can see the Wonderkop Hostel, I presume it's the
13	to educate the commanders with regard to the strategy of	13	Wonderkop Hostel in the left, far left of the slide, which
14	what the stages, or the phases were beyond just a phase 1	14	is strange to me because normally that should sit to the
15	that they were deploying into. So 672 as it stands with	15	right of the slide, unless the slide has just been put into
16	"14" written on it is not contemporaneous. The concept of	16	the, I think it's been put into the display upside down.
17	that slide in the planning is a contemporaneous slide that	17	In other words, south is north and north is south at the
18	would have been there in a different version.	18	moment, because the hostel on the left, the white
19	CHAIRPERSON: Has the original one of the	19	buildings, which look like stripes should be on your right-
20	14th then disappeared, because you updated that on your	20	hand side. That's a better view. That would just be a
21	computer.	21	closer shot. Whenever I do put in the slides and the
22	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. Similar	22	handouts for commanders, I always make a close up of the
23	to the, I think it was the operational overview, when I	23	environment of the operation, and then I make an area plan
24	changed the amount of Nyalas and I would be changing the	24	for the helicopters in case something is happening off the
25	date and whatever else would be changing in the slide	25	immediate target area so that they are able to talk to two
	Page 14152		Page 14154
1	Page 14152 itself. The next page is 447, and similar to the previous	1	Page 14154 different an area, and an immediate – where there are
1 2		1 2	0
	itself. The next page is 447, and similar to the previous		different an area, and an immediate – where there are
2	itself. The next page is 447, and similar to the previous page, it's – for what – no, it's not contemporaneous.	2	different an area, and an immediate – where there are immediate operations taking place. So these two slides,
2 3	itself. The next page is 447, and similar to the previous page, it's – for what – no, it's not contemporaneous. Again there are words changed in it, "stage" should have	2 3	different an area, and an immediate – where there are immediate operations taking place. So these two slides, the previous one and this one, this would now be the close
2 3 4	itself. The next page is 447, and similar to the previous page, it's – for what – no, it's not contemporaneous. Again there are words changed in it, "stage" should have read "phase" at that time. Even at this time encirclement,	2 3 4	different an area, and an immediate – where there are immediate operations taking place. So these two slides, the previous one and this one, this would now be the close up, whereas the previous slide would have been the area of
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	itself. The next page is 447, and similar to the previous page, it's – for what – no, it's not contemporaneous. Again there are words changed in it, "stage" should have read "phase" at that time. Even at this time encirclement, it does say "encirclement" sorry, ja, was still on the cards. Chairperson, this is probably the most, out of all these slides, reflecting co-ordinating instructions, this one would be the closest to be contemporaneous, other than the word "stage" which should just read "phase." COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Contemporaneous to when? The 13th? COLONEL SCOTT: The 15th. To the 15th, Chairperson. The next page is 448, this is not contemporaneous, again it's just an introductory slide to, what was to come. Page 449, I am assuming this is possible hand-outs that were made on the 14th, which would have had grid lines on them, so that the commanders would be able to speak to the, from ground to air and air to ground, and locate places, people, whatever events may be occurring on the ground that they needed to relate to one another. CHAIRPERSON: This is not too clear of course. Is this another version, as it were, of slide 65	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	different an area, and an immediate – where there are immediate operations taking place. So these two slides, the previous one and this one, this would now be the close up, whereas the previous slide would have been the area of Marikana. CHAIRPERSON: This is contemporaneous. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. The next page is 451, and that's not contemporaneous, again it's introductory slide. The 452 – CHAIRPERSON: Before you deal with that, 451 you have explained to us is not contemporaneous, but presumably is a sort of cover sheet almost – COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: - for the documents that follow. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: And it indicates that they are documents relating to the 16th of August. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON: Now, does that mean stage 2, I think it says, 16 August stage 2, does that mean that
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	itself. The next page is 447, and similar to the previous page, it's – for what – no, it's not contemporaneous. Again there are words changed in it, "stage" should have read "phase" at that time. Even at this time encirclement, it does say "encirclement" sorry, ja, was still on the cards. Chairperson, this is probably the most, out of all these slides, reflecting co-ordinating instructions, this one would be the closest to be contemporaneous, other than the word "stage" which should just read "phase." COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Contemporaneous to when? The 13th? COLONEL SCOTT: The 15th. To the 15th, Chairperson. The next page is 448, this is not contemporaneous, again it's just an introductory slide to, what was to come. Page 449, I am assuming this is possible hand-outs that were made on the 14th, which would have had grid lines on them, so that the commanders would be able to speak to the, from ground to air and air to ground, and locate places, people, whatever events may be occurring on the ground that they needed to relate to one another. CHAIRPERSON: This is not too clear of course. Is this another version, as it were, of slide 65 of exhibit L?	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	different an area, and an immediate – where there are immediate operations taking place. So these two slides, the previous one and this one, this would now be the close up, whereas the previous slide would have been the area of Marikana. CHAIRPERSON: This is contemporaneous. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. The next page is 451, and that's not contemporaneous, again it's introductory slide. The 452 – CHAIRPERSON: Before you deal with that, 451 you have explained to us is not contemporaneous, but presumably is a sort of cover sheet almost – COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: of the documents that follow. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: of the documents that follow. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: And it indicates that they are documents relating to the 16th of August. COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON: Now, does that mean stage 2, I think it says, 16 August stage 2, does that mean that this document 452 purports to be a document prepared on the

#### Marikana Commission of Inquiry

		1	
1	Page 14155	1	Page 14157
1	use on that very day?	1	he done that? Have you had a chance to do that yet,
2	COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, if I am	2	Colonel?
3	looking at the actual, what we have here, I am not sure who	3	COLONEL SCOTT: I've endeavoured to do
4	actually, they got this from me, I didn't hand it myself to	4	that, Chairperson.
5	IPID, so I am trying to also as we go just sort of	5	CHAIRPERSON: Alright.
6	understand, but it was a, it was more a briefing document	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Can I give the list?
7	to people after the fact.	7	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, if you can
8	CHAIRPERSON: So in other words, it's not	8	just give the list. Start with the contemporaneous ones.
9	contemporaneous.	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Okay, I've made three
10	COLONEL SCOTT: No.	10	categories, which is contemporaneous, not contemporaneous,
11	CHAIRPERSON: 452 isn't contemporaneous.	11	and then the uncertain ones, or ones which are
12	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, 451 is not	12	contemporaneous with word changes in them. Contemporaneous $% \left( {{{\left( {{{\left( {{{\left( {{{c}}} \right)}} \right)}} \right)}_{0,2}}}} \right)$
13	contemporaneous. 452 –	13	is the following page numbers. It's 429, 432, 433, 434,
14	CHAIRPERSON: 451 is just a cover really.	14	435, 438, 440, 441, 442, 444 – sorry, 444 is an
15	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	15	uncertainty. It's, so it's 442, 445, 449, 450, 456, 457,
16	CHAIRPERSON: A covering slide. 452?	16	465. The uncertainties, 430, 432 –
17	COLONEL SCOTT: It's not contemporaneous,	17	CHAIRPERSON: You've got 432 in your
18	it's an operational overview again. I think it's been	18	contemporaneous list.
19	upgraded to actually show. It may have been one of the	19	COLONEL SCOTT: Oh, sorry, it's –
20	slides that I was working on during the JOCCOM of the 16th	20	CHAIRPERSON: According to my notes.
21	for presentation but I think there would maybe be a clearer	21	COLONEL SCOTT: Okay, I have it as well,
22	or an older version of that showing that it's not, it would	22	that there may be a word in it, that it may be – it was
23	not have been in line because I don't particularly remember	23	there, it's just there's a word in it that's changed. For
24	showing that either. I may have, but I don't remember	24	instance 'phase' to 'stage.'
25	showing that at the JOCCOM on the 16th. It's possible I	25	CHAIRPERSON: Alright, I've added it in
	Page 14156		Page 14158
1	did, but as I say, the operational overview slide would	1	both lists.
2	have been brought over from the 15th again, it would have	2	COLONEL SCOTT: Okay.
3	been upgraded to reflect the 16th, similarly as the co-	3	CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.
4	ordinating instructions were as well.	4	COLONEL SCOTT: Sorry, I have that as
5	CHAIRPERSON: Is this a convenient stage	5	well for 444, also that there may be a word in 444 that
6	for us to take the tea adjournment, or is there something	6	is –
7	you want to add first before we do that?	7	CHAIRPERSON: You gave us 444 originally
8	COLONEL SCOTT: No, I am find,	8	in your list of contemporaneous document and then you
9	Chairperson.	9	deleted it and said sorry, that's uncertain, but -
10	ARBITRATOR: Mr Chaskalson?	10	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
11	MR CHASKALSON: Fine, Chairperson.	11	CHAIRPERSON: But it now fits in the
12	ARBITRATOR: We will take the tea	12	uncertain column.
13	adjournment at this stage.	13	COLONEL SCOTT: Uncertain.
14	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]	14	CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.
15	[11:34] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.	15	COLONEL SCOTT: 447, I think that's also
16	You're still under oath, Colonel.	16	in contemporaneous. I've actually drawn them across –
17	DUNCAN GEORGE SCOTT: s.u.o.	17	okay, not –
18	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CHASKALSON (CONTD.):	18	CHAIRPERSON: 447 isn't in the
19	Mr Chairperson, to speed things up, I asked the Colonel	19	contemporaneous.
20	during the break just to work through the slides and to	20	COLONEL SCOTT: And then 452.
21	prepare a list of those which he recalls as being	20	CHAIRPERSON: And then you have to give
-	contemporaneous and those which he recalls as not being	21	us the non-contemporaneous ones. That's the others.
22	contemporaneous.	22	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, and the uncertainties
24	CHAIRPERSON: I was hoping he was going	23 24	
			are simply word choices that may – CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, yes –
	to give us a list of them all in one go, but anyway, so has	25	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, yes –

	Page 14159		Page 14161
1	COLONEL SCOTT: - differ slightly. Okay,	1	consists of the plans that were sent to IPID.
2	the non-contemporaneous –	2	MR CHASKALSON SC: Indeed, Chairperson.
3	CHAIRPERSON: It's 'phase' to 'stage' and	3	CHAIRPERSON: And that's the first set of
4	that kind of thing.	4	plans.
5	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, things like that.	5	MR CHASKALSON SC: That's the first set
6	CHAIRPERSON: And then the rest are non-	6	of plans.
7	contemporaneous?	7	CHAIRPERSON: And then the second set of
8	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	8	plans is exhibits?
9	CHAIRPERSON: 'Reverse engineering' is	9	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, the second set
10	the usual phrase.	10	of plans were the plans originally discovered by the SAPS.
11	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, or introduction	11	Unfortunately we no longer have those plans, but it's not a
12	slides to –	12	major issue. They were subsequently replaced by exhibit
13	CHAIRPERSON: Reverse engineering or	13	SS3.
14	introductory, sort of almost like cover sheets.	14	CHAIRPERSON: So SS3, is that what you
15	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. Do you want those	15	call – for the sake of brevity – the second set?
16	slide numbers as well or not? I'm not sure.	16	MR CHASKALSON SC: I'll call them the
17	CHAIRPERSON: I suppose for the sake of	17	third set because they are the third set, but they were
18	completeness you'd better give them to us.	18	furnished to us in December last year, and it's common
19	COLONEL SCOTT: Okay, the non-	19	cause that those are plans that you reverse engineered in
20	contemporaneous, 431, 436, 437, 439, 443, 446, 448, 451,	20	December last year.
21	453, 454, 455, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 466.	21	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, and as I
22	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.	22	say it was not a misleading presentation. I'd actually
23	MR CHASKALSON SC: Thank you, Colonel,	23	made known at that time that I didn't have an original
24	and before we leave this point, I do want to put to you	24	contemporaneous set and that this was the best I could do
25	that although what you've given us obviously reflects your	25	is to reverse engineer what I did have to best reflect for
	Page 14160		Page 14162
1	best memory at this stage, it's not necessarily going to be	1	the sake of the Commission.
2	foolproof. Would you accept that?	2	MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, and you do make
3	COLONEL SCOTT: I would accept that, yes.	3	that clear in your statement at page 138, page 48, where
4	MR CHASKALSON SC: And to illustrate my	4	you set it out. I don't want to go through the exercise
5	proposition, you'll recall that on Tuesday last week when	5	that we've just gone through, but what I would – we'd
6	we were discussing slides that conflated AMCU with the	6	managed, I think, to identify the source components of SS3
7	protesters, you were fairly confident that those were	7	and I propose to read them out. I'll then give them in a
7 8	protesters, you were fairly confident that those were slides that had been introduced for the first time when you	7 8	and I propose to read them out. I'll then give them in a list form to SAPS and if SAPS has any difficulties with our
7 8 9	protesters, you were fairly confident that those were slides that had been introduced for the first time when you reverse engineered SS3 in December, and then we took you to	7 8 9	and I propose to read them out. I'll then give them in a list form to SAPS and if SAPS has any difficulties with our list, SAPS can come back to us, but –
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#### Marikana Commission of Inquiry

		1	
	Page 14163		Page 14165
1	COLONEL SCOTT: I would, I presume so,	1	December the legal team representing the police requested
2	yes, Chairperson.	2	me to provide a copy of the presentation plan for each day
3	CHAIRPERSON: But anyway, we don't have	3	of the operation. It was apparently required to be
4	to spend time on it. I'm sure SAPS legal team will be able	4	submitted as evidence while Brigadier Mkhwanazi was
5	to tell us that once they've made the necessary	5	testifying. I explained that there were no daily versions
6	investigations.	6	because the daily presentations were built over as the
7	MR CHASKALSON SC: Chairperson, it would	7	operation proceeded on each consecutive day. I said that I
8	have been before mid-October, because that's when we	8	would try to reverse engineer the presentation from the
9	received them from IPID. If we come to SS3, and I wonder	9	final product as it stood on 16 August 2012, as closely as
10	if we can call SS3 up on the screen?	10	I could recall, to represent what existed and what was
11	CHAIRPERSON: Not all of it, surely.	11	shown on the 15th and 14th August 2012." Now it's not
12	MR CHASKALSON SC: And we'll run through	12	altogether clear to us what you're saying there. Are you
13	it very quickly. SS3 appears to us to have eight	13	saying that the reverse engineering that you did in
14	components. The first components starts at what we see now	14	December relates not only to the 14th and 15th, but also the
15	and runs from pages 1 to 5, and that appears to be an	15	16th, or only to the 14th and 15th?
16	original contingency plan for the 10th of August, is a	16	COLONEL SCOTT: No, it relates to the 16th
17	contemporaneous document.	17	as well.
18	If we can then run through to page 6, that's the	18	MR CHASKALSON SC: Okay, because there is
19	second component and that again appears to us to be an	19	that sentence, "I said I would try to reverse engineer the
20	original contingency plan for the 13th of August.	20	presentation from the final product as it stood on 16
21	If we can run through to page 14, this is the	21	August 2012." You agree that the final product as it stood
22	third component and this as far as we can work out, derives	22	on 16 August 2012 is no longer in existence?
23	from a presentation which you created on the 13th of	23	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, I, if I can actually
24	December 2012, called "Ops Platinum 14 August 2012	24	refer to a plan that I believe is the closest to, it's your
25	Initial.pptx."	25	exhibit JJJ43A – no, sorry, I have the wrong one.
	Dogo 14144		Dogo 14144
1	Page 14164 If we can then run to page 23, this is the fourth	1	Page 14166 MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, maybe
1 2	If we can then run to page 23, this is the fourth	1	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, maybe
1 2 3	If we can then run to page 23, this is the fourth component, again it's a presentation that you created.	1 2 3	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, maybe what we can – I mean you're welcome to refer to whatever
2 3	If we can then run to page 23, this is the fourth component, again it's a presentation that you created. This presentation was created also on the 13th of December		MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, maybe what we can – I mean you're welcome to refer to whatever you want, but I am going to take you through –
2 3 4	If we can then run to page 23, this is the fourth component, again it's a presentation that you created. This presentation was created also on the 13th of December 2012, called "Ops Platinum 14 August 2012 Sector Policing	3	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, maybe what we can – I mean you're welcome to refer to whatever you want, but I am going to take you through – COLONEL SCOTT: Okay.
2 3 4 5	If we can then run to page 23, this is the fourth component, again it's a presentation that you created. This presentation was created also on the 13th of December 2012, called "Ops Platinum 14 August 2012 Sector Policing Plan.pptx."	3 4	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, maybe what we can – I mean you're welcome to refer to whatever you want, but I am going to take you through – COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. MR CHASKALSON SC: - all of the
2 3 4 5 6	If we can then run to page 23, this is the fourth component, again it's a presentation that you created. This presentation was created also on the 13th of December 2012, called "Ops Platinum 14 August 2012 Sector Policing Plan.pptx." If we run forward to page 37, that's the fifth	3 4 5	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, maybe what we can – I mean you're welcome to refer to whatever you want, but I am going to take you through – COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. MR CHASKALSON SC: - all of the contemporaneous documents that we've been able to find in
2 3 4 5 6 7	If we can then run to page 23, this is the fourth component, again it's a presentation that you created. This presentation was created also on the 13th of December 2012, called "Ops Platinum 14 August 2012 Sector Policing Plan.pptx." If we run forward to page 37, that's the fifth component, again deriving from presentation you created in	3 4 5 6	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, maybe what we can – I mean you're welcome to refer to whatever you want, but I am going to take you through – COLONEL SCOTT: Okay. MR CHASKALSON SC: - all of the
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		1	
1	Page 14167	1	Page 14169
1	that file in due course. It was last saved on the 23rd of	1	We're going to have to zoom in quite a lot more than this.
2	August. You accept that?	2	If we could possibly zoom in a little further. Thank you.
3	COLONEL SCOTT: The one I'm speaking	3	And if we could also just open the key to the temporary
4		4	places, Ops Platinum 2.kmz on the left-hand side of the
5	MR CHASKALSON SC: If it's "Ops Platinum	5	screen so that we can see higher up. Higher up.
6	14 August 2012."	6	[11:54] It's in the box above that, higher up, and just
7	COLONEL SCOTT: 23rd of August, that's	7	click "open ops," exactly, yes thank you. Oh, no, we
8	correct.	8	didn't want that. Alright. We will do the illustration, I
9	MR CHASKALSON SC: So that was a full	9	think that we may have now ticked all the boxes by mistake.
10	week after the event.	10	But it may be that all the boxes are ticked by mistake.
11	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	11	Colonel, can I ask you, do you have your copy up in front
12	MR CHASKALSON SC: Our submission in	12	of you? Are there any boxes in the key that are unticked,
13	relation to that document is that there have been some very	13	that should be unticked at this point?
14	material changes to it since what appears to have been a	14	COLONEL SCOTT: No.
15	contemporaneous document, but we'll get there in due	15	MR CHASKALSON: Good. Now Colonel, you
16	course. If we can then move to what we know are	16	spoke to this plan in your evidence-in-chief, and I'd like
17	contemporaneous documents, and at the outset I want to make	17	to take you over some of the same ground. It may be a bit
18	clear that you are the person who gave us these	18	repetitive for you and for me, but I think it's quite
19	contemporaneous documents, and I want to thank you for	19	important that the Commission and all parties present
20	that. On the 21st of May this year you invited us to look	20	understand this plan fully. And to begin with, if we can
21	at your hard drive and to take the original files relating	21	just indicate that the key that one sees under Ops Platinum
22	to plans off your hard drive, and those are the documents	22	2 KMZ, a copy of which appears at pages 160 and 159 of the
23	which I would like to discuss with you now.	23	Commissioners' bundle, is a key which will bring up or shut
24	The first contemporaneous document is a document	24	down individual icons that have been plotted on this Google
25	that you've already addressed in chief, which is the Google	25	Earth photocopy. Is that correct?
	Page 14168		Page 14170
1	Page 14168 Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early	1	Page 14170 COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
1 2	- 5	1 2	
	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early		COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
2	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early morning of the 14th, which was called "Ops Platinum Initial	2	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR CHASKALSON:And you describe the plan
2 3	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early morning of the 14th, which was called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" and "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." Your "Ops	2 3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON: And you describe the plan in your evidence-in-chief and if we can start with the blue
2 3 4	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early morning of the 14th, which was called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" and "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." Your "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" was handed in as JJJ4. I'd like	2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR CHASKALSON:And you describe the planin your evidence-in-chief and if we can start with the blueand orange line, the blue and orange line that we see
2 3 4 5	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early morning of the 14th, which was called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" and "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." Your "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" was handed in as JJJ4. I'd like us to hand in Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz as JJJ49.	2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR CHASKALSON:And you describe the planin your evidence-in-chief and if we can start with the blueand orange line, the blue and orange line that we seerunning round the koppie with a T attached to it, is the
2 3 4 5 6	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early morning of the 14th, which was called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" and "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." Your "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" was handed in as JJJ4. I'd like us to hand in Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz as JJJ49. That will be the electronic file with all of the icons	2 3 4 5 6	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR CHASKALSON:And you describe the planin your evidence-in-chief and if we can start with the blueand orange line, the blue and orange line that we seerunning round the koppie with a T attached to it, is thebarbed wire cordon that we going to be drawn around the
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early morning of the 14th, which was called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" and "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." Your "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" was handed in as JJJ4. 1'd like us to hand in Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz as JJJ49. That will be the electronic file with all of the icons ticked. CHAIRPERSON: Give me the description. JJJ49, how do I describe that for the record? MR CHASKALSON SC: Google Earth file called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." CHAIRPERSON: "Initial Plan 2.kmz." MR CHASKALSON SC: Dot kmz. CHAIRPERSON: K-M? MR CHASKALSON SC: Dot kmz. CHAIRPERSON: K-M? MR CHASKALSON SC: M, M. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. So I don't just leave that out, make sure I've got it right, Google Earth file "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." MR CHASKALSON SC: And Commissioners,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON: And you describe the plan in your evidence-in-chief and if we can start with the blue and orange line, the blue and orange line that we see running round the koppie with a T attached to it, is the barbed wire cordon that we going to be drawn around the koppie, is that correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON: Now, if one goes to the key and ticks "cordon," which is third from the bottom. Can we just tick, untick cordon, the blue disappears. So that the cordon is in fact the blue line. If we re-tick "cordon" and now if we can down the key, to eight items from the bottom on the key, where one sees an icon called "untitled path," eight from the bottom, no, no, further down, eight from the bottom, it has three orange squares linked together with lines, that's it, "untitled path," if you click that, that is the orange part of the chain around the cordon, and when we unclick it, what we see is that the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early morning of the 14th, which was called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" and "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." Your "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" was handed in as JJJ4. 1'd like us to hand in Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz as JJJ49. That will be the electronic file with all of the icons ticked. CHAIRPERSON: Give me the description. JJJ49, how do I describe that for the record? MR CHASKALSON SC: Google Earth file called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." CHAIRPERSON: "Initial Plan 2.kmz." MR CHASKALSON SC: Dot kmz. CHAIRPERSON: K-M? MR CHASKALSON SC: Dot kmz. CHAIRPERSON: K-M? MR CHASKALSON SC: M, M. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. So I don't just leave that out, make sure I've got it right, Google Earth file "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." MR CHASKALSON SC: And Commissioners, we've tried to print out screenshots from this plan and	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR CHASKALSON:And you describe the planin your evidence-in-chief and if we can start with the blueand orange line, the blue and orange line that we seerunning round the koppie with a T attached to it, is thebarbed wire cordon that we going to be drawn around thekoppie, is that correct?COLONEL SCOTT:That's correct.MR CHASKALSON:Now, if one goes to thekey and ticks "cordon," which is third from the bottom.Can we just tick, untick cordon, the blue disappears. Sothat the cordon is in fact the blue line.If we re-tick"cordon" and now if we can down the key, to eight itemsfrom the bottom on the key, where one sees an icon called"untitled path," eight from the bottom, no, no, furtherdown, eight from the bottom, it has three orange squareslinked together with lines, that's it, "untitled path," ifyou click that, that is the orange part of the chain aroundthe cordon in fact goes all the way round the koppie, so
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early morning of the 14th, which was called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" and "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." Your "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" was handed in as JJJ4. 1'd like us to hand in Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz as JJJ49. That will be the electronic file with all of the icons ticked. CHAIRPERSON: Give me the description. JJJ49, how do I describe that for the record? MR CHASKALSON SC: Google Earth file called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." CHAIRPERSON: "Initial Plan 2.kmz." MR CHASKALSON SC: Dot kmz. CHAIRPERSON: K-M? MR CHASKALSON SC: Dot kmz. CHAIRPERSON: K-M? MR CHASKALSON SC: M, M. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. So I don't just leave that out, make sure I've got it right, Google Earth file "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." MR CHASKALSON SC: And Commissioners, we've tried to print out screenshots from this plan and from the key, because it's the interaction between the key	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON: And you describe the plan in your evidence-in-chief and if we can start with the blue and orange line, the blue and orange line that we see running round the koppie with a T attached to it, is the barbed wire cordon that we going to be drawn around the koppie, is that correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON: Now, if one goes to the key and ticks "cordon," which is third from the bottom. Can we just tick, untick cordon, the blue disappears. So that the cordon is in fact the blue line. If we re-tick "cordon" and now if we can down the key, to eight items from the bottom on the key, where one sees an icon called "untitled path," eight from the bottom, no, no, further down, eight from the bottom, it has three orange squares linked together with lines, that's it, "untitled path," if you click that, that is the orange part of the chain around the cordon in fact goes all the way round the koppie, so the blue line represents the barbed wire cordon around the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early morning of the 14th, which was called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" and "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." Your "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" was handed in as JJJ4. I'd like us to hand in Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz as JJJ49. That will be the electronic file with all of the icons ticked. CHAIRPERSON: Give me the description. JJJ49, how do I describe that for the record? MR CHASKALSON SC: Google Earth file called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." CHAIRPERSON: "Initial Plan 2.kmz." CHAIRPERSON: "Initial Plan 2.kmz." MR CHASKALSON SC: Dot kmz. CHAIRPERSON: K-M? MR CHASKALSON SC: Dot kmz. CHAIRPERSON: K-M? MR CHASKALSON SC: M, M. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. So I don't just leave that out, make sure I've got it right, Google Earth file "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." MR CHASKALSON SC: And Commissioners, we've tried to print out screenshots from this plan and from the key, because it's the interaction between the key and the plan that are important, and they appear at, a	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON: And you describe the plan in your evidence-in-chief and if we can start with the blue and orange line, the blue and orange line that we see running round the koppie with a T attached to it, is the barbed wire cordon that we going to be drawn around the koppie, is that correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON: Now, if one goes to the key and ticks "cordon," which is third from the bottom. Can we just tick, untick cordon, the blue disappears. So that the cordon is in fact the blue line. If we re-tick "cordon" and now if we can down the key, to eight items from the bottom on the key, where one sees an icon called "untitled path," eight from the bottom, no, no, further down, eight from the bottom, it has three orange squares linked together with lines, that's it, "untitled path," if you click that, that is the orange part of the chain around the cordon in fact goes all the way round the koppie, so the blue line represents the barbed wire cordon around the koppie. Is that correct?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Earth plan that you designed on the night of the 13th, early morning of the 14th, which was called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" and "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." Your "Ops Platinum Initial Plan.kmz" was handed in as JJJ4. 1'd like us to hand in Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz as JJJ49. That will be the electronic file with all of the icons ticked. CHAIRPERSON: Give me the description. JJJ49, how do I describe that for the record? MR CHASKALSON SC: Google Earth file called "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." CHAIRPERSON: "Initial Plan 2.kmz." CHAIRPERSON: "Initial Plan 2.kmz." MR CHASKALSON SC: Dot kmz. CHAIRPERSON: K-M? MR CHASKALSON SC: Dot kmz. CHAIRPERSON: K-M? MR CHASKALSON SC: M, M. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. So I don't just leave that out, make sure I've got it right, Google Earth file "Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz." MR CHASKALSON SC: And Commissioners, we've tried to print out screenshots from this plan and from the key, because it's the interaction between the key and the plan that are important, and they appear at, a zoomed in version of the plan is at page 161 of your file	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON: And you describe the plan in your evidence-in-chief and if we can start with the blue and orange line, the blue and orange line that we see running round the koppie with a T attached to it, is the barbed wire cordon that we going to be drawn around the koppie, is that correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON: Now, if one goes to the key and ticks "cordon," which is third from the bottom. Can we just tick, untick cordon, the blue disappears. So that the cordon is in fact the blue line. If we re-tick "cordon" and now if we can down the key, to eight items from the bottom on the key, where one sees an icon called "untitled path," eight from the bottom, no, no, further down, eight from the bottom, it has three orange squares linked together with lines, that's it, "untitled path," if you click that, that is the orange part of the chain around the cordon in fact goes all the way round the koppie, so the blue line represents the barbed wire cordon around the koppie. Is that correct? COLONEL SCOTT: They both do. The idea

		1	
1	Page 14171 be going from south to north, and the other from north to	1	Page 14173 The hopeful outcome there was that the reaction teams would
2	south, closing it off twice as fast as you would if you	2	be out of sight behind koppie 3, what we now know as koppie
3	tried to just do it in one go.	3	3, and the "I" representing the observation post would be a
4	MR CHASKALSON: Yes, I understand that,	4	small team of task force members going closer to the front
5	but if we remove "untitled path" we are left with the blue	5	of koppie 3, to observe actions that, what we now know as
6	line going around the koppie called "cordon."	6	koppie 1.
7	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	7	MR CHASKALSON: Thank you, Colonel. And
8	MR CHASKALSON: That would represent	8	the last icon I'd like to address is that pink shaded shape
9	barbed wire around the koppie, would it not?	9	to the south-west of the koppie, that corresponds to the
10	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	10	key item "untitled Polygon," if we can click on "untitled
11	MR CHASKALSON: And that blue line we'll	11	Polygon," at which point the pink shape disappears and then
12	see surfaces in a lot of other documents that are prepared	12	re-click, at which point it returns, and that, if I
13	from the period. The yellow bands that we see running from	13	understood your evidence correctly was the processing zone
14	the eastern edge of the power station to the northern edge	14	where suspects would be processed for arrest after the
15	or to the north of the koppie, the two parallel yellow	15	operation had successfully been completed. Is that
16	lines, those don't represent barbed wire.	16	correct?
17	COLONEL SCOTT: No.	17	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, they
18	MR CHASKALSON: They represent the	18	would have exited through the razor wire where the orange
19	filtering line of Nyalas that is going to be placed between	19	and blue line would have come together and been brought to
20	the informal settlement and the koppie, is that correct?	20	that area specifically for processing use.
21	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, in the	21	MR CHASKALSON: Can we just click again
22	Google Earth plan that you are seeing here, it is so.	22	on the, to get the orange line back, to click again at that
23	MR CHASKALSON: And if one goes back up	23	icon which is untitled path, thank you. So they would have
24	into the "T" to four from the top, we will see that they	24	been taken out, had you clarified whether it would be to
25	are described as "Nyala line," so if we click that box, we	25	the north, at the north-west or the south-east?
	Page 14172		Page 14174
1	see that the yellow lines disappear. If we can re-click	1	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, it – wherever there
2	see that the yellow lines disappear. If we can re-click it. In your evidence-in-chief –	2	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, it – wherever there was, would be a gap created there, either at the orange and
2 3	see that the yellow lines disappear. If we can re-click it. In your evidence-in-chief – CHAIRPERSON: No, the record will not	2 3	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, it – wherever there was, would be a gap created there, either at the orange and blue, because I know that's where two Nyalas would come
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<ul> <li>COLOREL SCOTT: I don't, however, I must</li> <li>say that initially when the operation was concluded was and the phase at the section of the schedule forgeter about this whole initial plan as it</li> <li>stood then because if worked it into the phase 3 to be. 1</li> <li>more a work session, where I basically well through a</li> <li>problem solving overcise with them to say, this is where to possible</li> <li>problem solving overcise with them to say, this is what out</li> <li>problem solving overcise with them to say, this is what out</li> <li>problem solving overcise with them to say, this is what out</li> <li>problem solving overcise with them to say, this is what out</li> <li>problem solving overcise with them to say, this is what out</li> <li>time, and the I can reall suggesting the enciclement of</li> <li>time, and then I can reall suggesting the enciclement of</li> <li>time, and then I can reall suggesting the enciclement of</li> <li>was a time when the sleep was a little bit -</li> <li>picku psonthing you said therey, you said you dry - you</li> <li>picku psonthing you said therey, you said you dry - you</li> <li>picku psonthing you said therey, you said you dry - you</li> <li>problem solve at you meen by there you at you you meenty pters, you said you you and the time you said you you and you say by the reasoning process again. that if the police</li> <li>ywas at the tree was to file the state, you said you you and you say beneford you you have the you was a pter in the you.</li> <li>to dark we can be appended to you meenty you have said you you and you you are speaking to the shores of you and you you are speaking to the hard core group of the greater, at that stage, what we</li> <li>the infinite thard core group of the greater, at that stage, what we</li></ul>	3		3	
6         say that initially when the operation was concluded even 7         6         up with the initial idea of the encirclement and a 7           7         migred had forgotten about this whole initial para as it 8         6         up with the initial idea of the encirclement and a 7           8         stood the because id worked it into the phase 9         10         intering line. When I vent with W Sinciclement and a 7           10         more a work session, where I bascally wont through a 10         10         10         10           12         problem is that we are facing. This is where the possible 7         10         10         10         10           13         problem is that we are facing. This is where the possible 7         10         <	4	incorporated in the plan that we have just seen?	4	-
7       mysoff had forgotten about this whole initial plan as it       7       filtering line. When I went with MF Sinclair thereafter to         8       stood then because I'd worked it into the phases 3 to be I       9       and all work out out the area and Jush have a look at the         10       more a work session, where I basically went through a       and all work out out the area and Jush have scale back. Colonel Merale and         11       problem solving exercise with them to say, this is where the possible       and all work out plat back up is when I actually got to making         12       problem is. As I say, that were afficing line. X is a sy it       is what you see here, and reasoning on my own at the line.         13       problem is. As I say, that were afficing line. X is a sy it       is was to use this need to asy, that is whet our         14       hours, when I get back up is when I actually got to making       was low as time when the sleep was a little till -         14       informed up the sleep was a little till -       gottig more into the detail of what needed to happen early.         14       pick up sorthing you asid there, you said you dorn - you       into the sleep was a little till -         15       althat slage. I was one more this detail to the sleep was a little till -       colone till strates strategy from 1         14       tool ready course you then worked it into stage       courd was to weak were softle appectator.         12       c	5	COLONEL SCOTT: I don't, however, I must	5	-
8         stood then because I'd worked it into the phase 3 to be. I         9         go and scout out the area and just have a look at the           9         was only reminded later of II, but I don't recall – it was         I         Problem solving exercise with hem to say, this what our           10         problem is that we are facing, this is where the possible         10         them hald life. After going to shee, Ii was all of two           11         formed a works exist, who m X isficiar also         11         them hald life. After going to shee, Ii was all of two           12         problem is that we are facing, this is where the possible         12         what you see here, and reasoning on my own at this lime,           13         time, and then I can recall suggesting the encirclement of         15         at that stage, I was on my own at the JOC. But as I say, It           14         identify and when the selege was all title I -         13         around six ordick, would he a JOCCOM hereing samewhere           14         extinuation when the selege was all title I -         14         14         even though we were going to encircle them, there was still           14         extinuation when the selege was an opportunistic time that were sole was cold that night, I think it         3         appoint the second full time second is a special was on opportunistic time that were that work to ther hostes from the Monday were limital, it was vailed to the special strategy to come. When I eventually get to that.	6	say that initially when the operation was concluded even	6	up with the initial idea of the encirclement and a
8         stood then because I'd worked it into the phase 3 to be. I         9         go and scout out the area and just have a look at the           9         was only reminded later of II, but I don't recall – it was         I         Problem solving exercise with hem to say, this what our           10         problem is that we are facing, this is where the possible         10         them hald life. After going to shee, Ii was all of two           11         formed a works exist, who m X isficiar also         11         them hald life. After going to shee, Ii was all of two           12         problem is that we are facing, this is where the possible         12         what you see here, and reasoning on my own at this lime,           13         time, and then I can recall suggesting the encirclement of         15         at that stage, I was on my own at the JOC. But as I say, It           14         identify and when the selege was all title I -         13         around six ordick, would he a JOCCOM hereing samewhere           14         extinuation when the selege was all title I -         14         14         even though we were going to encircle them, there was still           14         extinuation when the selege was an opportunistic time that were sole was cold that night, I think it         3         appoint the second full time second is a special was on opportunistic time that were that work to ther hostes from the Monday were limital, it was vailed to the special strategy to come. When I eventually get to that.	7	myself had forgotten about this whole initial plan as it	7	filtering line. When I went with Mr Sinclair thereafter to
10       more a work session, where I basically went through a         11       problem solving exercise with them to say, this is what out         12       problem is that we are facing, this is when Mr Sinclar also         13       informed us builts only a few on the kopple at right         14       informed us builts only a few on the kopple at right         15       time, and then I can recall suggesting the encickment of         16       them. I don't cally recall liputs given by the POPS         17       members builts not to say that they didn't. As I say it         18       was at time when the size was all tite bit -         19       MR CHASKALSON:         20       pick up something you said there, you said you don't -         21       more of . I am paraptrasing obviously, your memory of the         23       what do you mean by that?         24       COUNEL SCOTT:       Well, the idea was, when         25       resum back to their hostels or to teir homes for good         26       resonting you asked they didn't want to         27       more or group of the greater, at that stage, what we         28       identified where perstely they didn't want to         24       that time that, and it was cold that right, I think it         25       resont. The reasoning process again, that if the police	8	stood then because I'd worked it into the phase 3 to be. I	8	go and scout out the area and just have a look at the
11       problem solving exercise with them to say, this is what our       11       hours, when I got back up is when I actually got to making         12       problem is that we are facing, this is when the sposible       what you see here, and reasoning on my own at this time,         14       informed us but it's only a few on the kopple at night       11       hours, when I got back up is when I actually got to making         15       time, and then I can recall suggesting the encirclement of       14       is the postioning of forces, more specifically who would do-         16       them. I don't really recall inputs given by the POPS       18       was a time when the size pays and the POPS         17       members but it's not to say that they didnt. As I say it       18       around six oclock, because this needed to happen, but         18       was a time when the size pays and there, you said you don't - your       19       MR CHASKALSON:       Colone is call, potion, if' can just         20       pick up something you said there, you said you don't - your       20       weight be was sait into saige         21       indition is hazy because you then worked it into stage       22       even though we was going to encircle them, there was still         23       what do you mean by that?       20       colone is say, it was an opportunistic time that         24       colone is say because by didn't want to       around six oclock, beca	9	was only reminded later of it, but I don't recall - it was	9	actual environment, and we came back, Colonel Merafe and
12       problem is that we are facing, this is where the possible       12       what you see here, and reasoning on my own at this lime,         13       problem is. As I say, that we wint is fave on the koppies at night       13       the positioning of forces, more specifically with would do -         14       informed us built's only a few on the koppies at night       13       the positioning of forces, more specifically with would do -         15       time, and then I can recall suggesting the encirclement of       is then later when this could'n happen, bat         16       them. I don't really recall inputs given by the POPS       16         17       members built's not to again that given by the POPS       16         18       was a time when the sleep was a liftle bit -       14       acound six oclock, because thy information somewhere         18       was a time when the sleep was a liftle bit -       18       around six oclock, because thy information somewhere         19       while there was still a could six oclock, because thy information somewhere       18       around six oclock, because thy information somewhere         21       intal plan is hazy because by olivously, your memory of this       12       to 6, are even found in this initial planing, things like,         22       culdes set if there were so few, and as 1 say, the reasoning       around six oclock, because thy olivously, your memory olivouslates         23 <td>10</td> <td>more a work session, where I basically went through a</td> <th>10</th> <td>them had left. After going to sleep, it was all of two</td>	10	more a work session, where I basically went through a	10	them had left. After going to sleep, it was all of two
13       problem is. As I say, that's when Mr Sinclair also       13       the positioning of forces, more specifically who would do –         14       informed us but it's only a few on the kopple at right       13       the positioning of forces, more specifically who would do –         16       them. I don't really recall inputs given by the POPS       14       inft then I can recall suggesting the encirclement of         16       them when the sleep was a filted bit –       14       inft then V can recall suggesting the encirclement of         16       them when the sleep was a filted bit –       14       inft and is koroteck, because this needed to happen, but         17       members but it's not to say that they didn't. As I say, it       14       it's then later when this couldn't happen because I was         18       was dime when the sleep was a filted bit –       14       it's then later when this couldn't happen because I was         19       MR CHASKALSON:       Colonel, if I can just       10       koroteck, because this medded to happen early.         12       initial plan is hazy because you menvy of the       12       koroteck, because this medded to happen early.         13       used there was still       2       initia plan is hazy because thy out was still         13       the down worked it into stage       2       initia plan is hazy because thy out was stilia the         14 <td>11</td> <td>problem solving exercise with them to say, this is what our</td> <th>11</th> <td>hours, when I got back up is when I actually got to making</td>	11	problem solving exercise with them to say, this is what our	11	hours, when I got back up is when I actually got to making
14       informed us but it's only a few on the kopple at night       14       getting more into the detail of what needed to happen, but         15       time, and then I can recall suggesting the enciclement of       14       getting more into the detail of what needed to happen, but         16       time, and then I can recall suggesting the enciclement of       16       time has the When I this couldn't happen because I was         17       members but it's not to say that they didn't. As I say it       16       time has the when I this couldn't happen because I was         18       was a time when the skep was a little bit –       17       expecting that there would be a JOCCOM meeting somewhere         19       MR CHASKALSON:       Collonel, if I can just       11       then hater when I this couldn't happen because I was         21       initial plan is hazy because you then worked it into stage       3       what do you mean by that?         23       was close to Zero J.       Weith them to come out.       24       We didn't want to have tog to to a tactical option.         24       COLONEL SCOTT:       Weith thight, I think it       14       getatest strategy to come.       When I was         24       could see if there were so few, and as I say, the reasoning       a strat time that, and it was cold that inght, I think it       14       work on the Tuesday morning, and it the time work on the sopple is taken as a possibility for a t	12	problem is that we are facing, this is where the possible	12	what you see here, and reasoning on my own at this time,
15       time, and then I can recall suggesting the encirclement of       15       at that stage, I was on my own at the JOC. But as I say,         16       them. I don't really recall inputs given by the POPS       15       at that stage, I was on my own at the JOC. But as I say,         18       was a time when the sleep was a little bit –       16       16       16       17       then I can recall suggesting the encircle ment of         19       MR CHASKALSON:       Colonel, If I can just       17       exercing that there would be a JOCCOM meeting somewhere         20       pick up something you said there, you said you don't – your       18       around six o'clock, because this needed to happen early,         21       to 6, are even found in this initial planning, things like,       21       to 6, are even found in this initial planning, things like,         22       even though we were going to encycle them, there was still       20       even though we were going to encycle them, there was still         24       could see if there were so few, and as I say, the reasoning       at that tand it was cold that night, I think it       3       apple 14176         1       could see if there were so few, and as I say, the reasoning       3       greatest strategy to come. When I eventually get to that,         2       at that tang in that, of the process gain, that if the police       3       greatest strategy to come. When I eventually get t	13	problem is. As I say, that's when Mr Sinclair also	13	the positioning of forces, more specifically who would do -
16       them. I don't really recall inputs given by the POPS       16       it's then later when this couldn't happen because I was         17       members but it's not to say that they didn't. As I say it       18       was a time when the select was       17       expecting that there would be a JOCCOM meeting somewhere         19       MR CHASKALSON:       Colonel, If I can just       18       around six orclock, because this needed to happen early.         20       pick up something you said there, you said you don't - your       18       around six orclock, because this needed to happen early.         21       indial plan is hazy because you then worked It into stage       21       to 6, are even found in this initial planning, things like,         22       event hough we were going to encicle them, there was still       23       going to be dialogue to negotiate with them to come out.         24       COLONEL SCOTT:       Well, the idea was, when       25       etcetra, so all the way, this was dovetailing with the         2       ve actually, as I say, it was an opportunistic time that we       Page 14176       greatest strategy to come. When I eventually get to that,         3       was close to zero degrees. If there were people staying ot reasoning process again, that if the police       fifting General Annandale initially, it was viable to         5       return back to their hostels or to their homes for good       fifting General Annandale initially, it	14	informed us but it's only a few on the koppie at night	14	getting more into the detail of what needed to happen, but
17       members but it's not to say that they didn't. As I say it       17       expecting that there would be a JOCCOM meeting somewhere         18       was a time when the sleep was all title bit –       18       around six oclock, because this needed to happen early,         19       MR CHASKALSON:       Colonel, if I can just       17       expecting that there would be a JOCCOM meeting somewhere         18       was a time when the sleep was all title bit –       18       around six oclock, because this needed to happen early,         19       while there was still out point them to come out.       14       while there was still at the         20       kopple. Some of the aspects of the greater strategy from 1       10       to 6, are even found in this initial planning, things like,         21       to 6, are even found in this initial planning, there was still       ging to be dialogue to negotiate with them to come out.         24       We didn't want to have to go to a tactical option,       20       tectera, so all the way, this was dovetailing with the         2       that koppie, it's possibly because they didn't want to       restart strategy to come. When I eventually get to that,         3       was close to zero degrees. If there were pople staying of       a that time that, and it was cold that night, I think it         4       that koppie, it's possibly because they didn't want to       rereturn back to their hostels or to their homes for go	15	time, and then I can recall suggesting the encirclement of	15	at that stage, I was on my own at the JOC. But as I say,
18       was a time when the sleep was a little bit –       18       around six oclock, because this needed to happen early,         19       MR CHASKALSON:       Colonel, If I can just       18       around six oclock, because this needed to happen early,         19       wike there was still very few strikers still at the       20       kopple. Some of the aspects of the greater strategy from 1         21       initial plan is hazy because you then worked it into stage       2       is a for the optice on found in this initial planning, things like,         22       initial plan is hazy because you then worked it into stage       3       was do you mean by that?         24       COLONEL SCOTT:       Weil, the idea was, when       20       We didn't want to have to go to a tactical option,         25       etcetera, so all the way, this was dovetailing with the       20       Page 14176         1       could see if there were so few, and as I say, the reasoning       1       greatest strategy to come. When I eventually get to that,         2       that thoppie, it's possibly because they didn't want to       5       return back to their hostels or to their homes for good         6       reason. The reasoning process again, that if the police       7       who had arrived with their, the commanders could be         1       that they could possibly be part of the leadership, sort of       1       solid on the weet tag	16	them. I don't really recall inputs given by the POPS	16	it's then later when this couldn't happen because I was
19       MR CHASKALSON:       Colonel, if I can just         20       pick up something you said there, you said you don't – your         21       memory of, I am paraphrasing obviously, your memory of this         23       an that yoe cause you then worked It into stage         24       COLONEL SCOTT:       Well, the idea was, when         25       we actually, as I say, it was an opportunistic time that we         26       could see if there were so few, and as I say, the reasoning         2       could see if there were so few, and as I say, the reasoning         3       was close to zero degrees. If there were people staying o         4       that koppie, it's possibly because they didn't want to         5       return back to their hostels or to their homes for good         6       return back to their hostels or to their homes for good         7       were there and filming, maybe somebody would have         8       identified where perpetrators from the Monday were living,         10       that koppie, it's possibly be part of the leadership, ort of         11       the arrest mat group, possibly that would be the leadership of         14       good reason, and that if we could initially apprehend and         15       arrest that group, possibly that would be the leadership of         16       the striking group, possibly that wo	17	members but it's not to say that they didn't. As I say it	17	expecting that there would be a JOCCOM meeting somewhere
20       pick up something you said there, you said you don't – your       20       koppie. Some of the aspects of the greater strategy from 1         21       memory of, I am paraphrasing obviously, your memory of this       21       to 6, are even found in this initial planning, things like,         22       initial plan is hazy because you then worked it into stage       23       what do you mean by that?         23       what do you mean by that?       23       going to be dialogue to negotiate with them to come out.         24       COLONEL SCOTT:       Well, the idea was, when       25       even though were to go to a tactical option.         25       even though were to go to a tactical option.       25       electera, so all the way, this was dovetailing with the         26       vas close to zero degrees.       If there were people staying o       1       greatest strategy to come. When I eventually get to that.         27       work on the Tuesday morning, and at the time when I was       5       briefing General Annandale initially, it was viable to         3       option for the police still, but considering that it didn't       4       work on the Tuesday morning, now that the forces         7       work on the were sore of the greater, at that stage, what we       5       briefing General Annandale initially, it was viable to         6       reason. The reasoning process again, that If the police       6	18	was a time when the sleep was a little bit -	18	around six o'clock, because this needed to happen early,
21       memory of, I am paraphrasing obviously, your memory of this       21       to 6, are even found in this initial planning, things like,         22       initial plan is hazy because you then worked it into stage       23       3, what do you mean by that?         24       COLONEL SCOTT:       Well, the idea was, when       25       even though we were going to encircle them, there was still         25       we actually, as I say, it was an opportunistic time that we       We didn't want to have to go to a tactical option,         26       even though the were so few, and as I say, the reasoning       1       greatest strategy to come. When I eventually get to that,         27       that koppie, it's possibly because they didn't want to reason. The reasoning process again, that if the police       1       greatest strategy here is taken as a possibility for a tactical         3       was close to zero degrees. If there were people staying       0       option for the police still, but considering that it didn't         4       that koppie, it's possibly because they didn't want to       work on the Tuesday morning, and at the time when I was         5       return back to their hostels or to their homes for good       6       still do this on the Wednesday morning,         6       that koppie of being picked up. Other than that,       10       that they could possibly be part of the leadership, sort of         11       thehad core group of the greater, a	19	MR CHASKALSON: Colonel, if I can just	19	while there was still very few strikers still at the
<ul> <li>initial plan is hazy because you then worked it into stage</li> <li>what do you mean by that?</li> <li>COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the idea was, when</li> <li>we actually, as I say, It was an opportunistic time that we</li> <li>Page 14176</li> <li>could see if there were so few, and as I say, the reasoning</li> <li>at that time that, and it was cold that night, I think it</li> <li>was close to zero degrees. If there were people staying of</li> <li>that kopple, it's possibly because they didn't want to</li> <li>return back to their hostels or to their homes for good</li> <li>reason. The reasoning process again, that if the police</li> <li>were there and filming, maybe somebody would have</li> <li>identified where perpetrators from the Monday were living,</li> <li>and they were scared of being picked up. Other than that,</li> <li>that they could possibly be part of the leadership, sort of</li> <li>that they could possibly be part of the leadership of</li> <li>arrest that group, possibly that would be the leadership of</li> <li>arrest that group, possibly that would be the leadership of</li> <li>of the question you asked me.</li> <li>MR CHASKALSON: Maybe if I can remind</li> <li>you, you are speaking to the leaders was slightly</li> <li>different. You said, and again I an paraphrasing, you</li> <li>cont recall details of the process by which it was</li> <li>cont are used in the process by which it was</li> <li>cont are called and you vage sted that this was due to the fact</li> <li>still dot prove screet of you asked me.</li> <li>MR CHASKALSON: Maybe if I can remind</li> <li>you, you are speaking to the leadership, you</li> <li>and how it was generated. My question was slightly</li> <li>different. You said, and again I an paraphrasing, you</li> <li>cont recall details of the process by which it was</li> <li>different. You said, and again I an paraphrasing, you</li> <li>cont recall details of the process by which it was</li> <li>different. You said, and again I an paraphrasing, you</li> <li>cont recall details of</li></ul>	20	pick up something you said there, you said you don't - your	20	koppie. Some of the aspects of the greater strategy from 1
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1	Page 14179	1	Page 14181
1	Mbombo when she visited the JOC at Lonmin, had stated.	1	listen to your strategic officers or your generals within
2	'JOC visit, and as shown the different points of	2	the police. For instance, earlier the evening, the same
3	gathering,'" – sorry, I am lost. "The planning has been	3	thing, when the National Commissioner was there, listening
4	adjusted to disperse the gatherings. All police officials	4	to what their expected outcome would be or the strategy
5	on duty to conduct searches and confiscate all dangerous	5	that they wanted to have followed, that combined obviously
6	weapons. All those that can be identified on the footage	6	with the Constitution to keep us in line with what we need
7	should be picked up and deployments to key strategic areas	7	to do, and then the OB of General Mbombo from earlier that
8	should be enhanced. In terms of our policing on crowd	8	day, being a strategic officer, also compliments the
9	management, all members to conduct themselves within the	9	mission as it was laid out.
10	limits of this policy unless the situation dictates	10	MR CHASKALSON: So you were trying to
11	otherwise, ensure that peace prevails. Signed, Lieutenant-	11	convey that engaging this – in this planning process, you
12	General Mbombo." So you would have been guided by the fact	12	had to be guided by the expectations of your senior
13	that in relation to crowd management issues, the Provincial	13	officers or the Provincial and National Commissioner as
14	Commissioner wanted members to conduct themselves within	14	reflected in the occurrence book entry 37, what was that
15	the limits of SAPS crowd management policy.	15	reference there for?
16	COLONEL SCOTT: I didn't, at the time	16	[12:14] COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the occurrence book
17	when I was setting up that initial plan, I didn't yet know	17	30 -is it 37, made earlier that day, reflects what the
18	this entry in the OB. This only became knowledgeable to me	18	Provincial Commissioner expected, some of her expectations
19	I think later on the Tuesday, even possibly later than	19	of what needed to happen in Marikana, and although it was
20	that, but it's – why I am saying is because the mission	20	made I believe before the event of the 13th with the
21	still reflects what she's put here, and maybe a lapse in my	21	incident where the police and members of the strikers were
22	memory but because we - when I had the meeting with Colonel	22	killed or attacked, it still as prevalence to run through
23	Merafe and the two other, we were actually in the initial	23	the operation, still a guiding statement that needed to be
24	police JOC, we moved off to a side room.	24	observed.
25	MR CHASKALSON: I have a difficulty with	25	MR CHASKALSON SC: Okay, so that had to
	Page 14180		Page 14182
1	reconciling that answer with what you say in paragraph	1	guide you through the operation?
2	35.7, back to page 110, "what was to be achieved," and you	2	COLONEL SCOTT: It was one of the guiding
3	are talking now about what was to be achieved in that very	3	statements, yes.
4	first planning process, "according to the strategic	4	MR CHASKALSON SC: You can't recall today
5	guidance was reflected by the Provincial Commissioner's	5	whether you were aware of it when you set out to do your
6	expectations as reflected in OB entry 37." So you are	6	initial plan or not?
7	saying in fact you weren't aware of OB entry 37 when you	7	COLONEL SCOTT: No, I don't recall, no.
8	engaged in that process.		
9		8	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, let's look at
	COLONEL SCOTT: No, I am saying I don't	9	that guidance that should have guided you.
10	COLONEL SCOTT: No, I am saying I don't recall, it's a possibility that I was made aware of it	9 10	that guidance that should have guided you. CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, can I just ask a
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1	discover it, but instinctively it also falls within what I	1	me to the environment, but the detail of the plan was set
2	would have put in the mission anyway.	2	up somewhere around 4 o'clock in the morning, half past 4
3	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I take it we'll find	3	in the morning onwards to about 6 o'clock, half past 6.
4	out when they give evidence –	4	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: May I just ask a
5	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	5	question? Did you have to rely on the knowledge of Colonel
6	CHAIRPERSON: But I imagine it's probable	6	Merafe and anyone from POPs as to what had happened prior
7	that Colonel Merafe was aware – he was around earlier,	7	to your arrival?
8	wasn't he?	8	COLONEL SCOTT: Commissioner, I don't
9	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	9	recall having much to do with Colonel Merafe before that
10	CHAIRPERSON: He was aware of what the	10	meeting, but I recall him being part of the meeting with
11	Provincial Commissioner had written.	11	the National Commissioner where he explained that day what
12	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	12	happened from his point of view. I remember he was pretty
13	CHAIRPERSON: And he was of course one of	13	broken because I think he had to carry one of his
14	the people with whom you'd discussed the matter -	14	colleagues off to the hospital, so he was pretty emotional.
15	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	15	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, there's just
16	CHAIRPERSON: - when you formulated your	16	one aspect of this guidance that I want to take up with
17	first plan.	17	you. "In terms of policing on crowd management, all
18	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	18	members to conduct themselves within the limits of this
19	CHAIRPERSON: So probably – I'm just	19	policy unless the situation dictates otherwise." So in
20	putting a probability to you now, but probably if what you	20	relation to crowd management, the Provincial Commissioner
21	had proposed was contrary to what the Provincial	21	wanted members to conduct themselves within the limits of
22	Commissioner had said, he would have pointed that out to	22	SAPS crowd management policy. That's correct; will you
23	you.	23	accept?
24	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, Chairperson.	24	COLONEL SCOTT: That's her statement
25	CHAIRPERSON: So even if you weren't	25	before the incident of the 13th, yes, but that's what she
			, j,
	Page 14184		Page 14186
1	Page 14184 directly influenced by what the Provincial Commissioner had	1	Page 14186 says.
1 2		1 2	-
_	directly influenced by what the Provincial Commissioner had		says.
2	directly influenced by what the Provincial Commissioner had said, had written, I take it we can assume as a probability	2	says. MR CHASKALSON SC: But that's what you
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	directly influenced by what the Provincial Commissioner had said, had written, I take it we can assume as a probability that you would have been at least indirectly influenced by it because Merafe, who presumably, or may well have known what the Provincial Commissioner had written, was present and agreed with what you did. COLONEL SCOTT: It could be, yes, Chairperson. MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, Colonel, I hate to take issue with the Chairperson's probabilities, but I do want to test that proposition. You said earlier that your meeting with Colonel Merafe, if I understood, if I recollect your evidence correctly, was, I think did you say 20 to 30 minutes? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. I'm estimating. MR CHASKALSON SC: And it wasn't a meeting at which detail was discussed. Is that correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Not the detail of the plan, no. MR CHASKALSON SC: Right, that only emerged after you had thereafter met with Mr Sinclair and then had a couple of hours sleep and – COLONEL SCOTT: Mr Sinclair was part of	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	says. MR CHASKALSON SC: But that's what you said you were going to be guided by. COLONEL SCOTT: I was guided by certain elements within her statement, and if I can point those out to you; disperse the gatherings, conduct searches and confiscate all dangerous weapons. Those that are identified on the footage need to be picked up. Phase 5, deployment to key strategic areas, the NIU was deployed over that time period of the Tuesday, Wednesday, and the evening, I think to the morning of the Thursday, to strategic areas which looked like they would be targeted by the strikers. I think she speaks to disarming – conduct searches and confiscate all dangerous weapons. So as I say, it's a strategic statement and we need to operationalise it, which impacted, whether it impacted at the time of the initial plan, that's difficult for me to say. As I say, my memory is not very good concerning that evening, but it definitely impacted throughout the day on the Tuesday with the, coming together with the final strategy. MR CHASKALSON SC: I'm interested in that sentence, "In terms of policing on crowd management, all

Page 1489         Page 1489           2         presumably the policy embodied in Standing Order 262.         anderstanding 322 in its holisite form, there are many a superisk therein like the producing of tacking how which just           3         of, built fixes aware of the policy of Standing Order 262.         anderstanding 322 in its holisite form, there are many a superisk therein like the producing of acticular plans drafted, seeing events which are may be a weak in the coming and           7         MR CHASKALSON SC: Woll, where is SAPS         5         doesn't have the time to be done. When 282 was drafted, seeing events which are may be a weak in the coming and           7         MR CHASKALSON SC: Woll, where is SAPS         6         tractical plans drafted and have the plans and have           8         tactical plans drafted and have the plans and have         tactical plans drafted and have the plans and have           10         tactical plans drafted and have the plans and have         tactical plans drafted and have the plans and have           11         tactical plans drafted and have the plans and have         tactical plans drafted and have the plans plans in the bits           12         MR CHASKALSON SC: Was ot arained in the         14         MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, let me           13         statement, paragraph 52,5,1 was not trained in the         14         MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, let me           14         tacontrofted asplans         thas standing Order 262. The			Ι	
2         understanding 242 in its holistic form, there are many           3         Windl you accept that?         3           4         COLONEL SCOTT: Its her understanding         5           5         of, bull if she's aware of the policy of Standing Order 242,         5           6         then yes, it would be.         5           7         MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, where is SAPS         6           8         policy in relation to crood management set out?         6           10         National Instruction 22, but the policy fistelf is a policy         1           11         thational instruction 22, but the policy fistelf is a policy         1           12         MR CHASKALSON SC: You see, why I'm         13           13         concerned about this is that you say dage 143 of your         13           14         statement, the principies, and         14           15         current Standing Order 262, and was not aware of its         15           16         contents* of Syouh ado ta knowledge of the contents of         15           17         Standing Order 262, me was standing order for instance. Now 1         14           16         contents* barding order 262 and was not aware of its outstonce?         14           17         COLONEL SCOTT: But you must remember, which weight abulk order	1	5	1	0
3         Would you accept the?         3         appects therein like the producing of fact all plans which in elect to go back to the operational commander, which just is the next. It is her understanding Order 262, the then yss. It would be.           6         then yss. It would be.         5         densrt have the time to be done. When 262 was dirtled, there is SAFS, there's sufficient time to set up these plans and have.           7         MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, where is SAFS, there's sufficient time to set up these plans and have.         5           8         There's sufficient time to set up these plans and have.         6           9         COLONEL SCOTT: At this time it is in the int is the theoling test's a policitation.         10           11         thet's derived by the Minister's office.         11         applied as best as possible with the principles, and           12         statement, paragraph 52, 5; Twas not trained in the is analy to daw and waxene of its contents of the contents.         15         standing Order 262.         16         Standing Order 262.				
4       COLONEL SCOTT:       Its the understanding       4       need to go back to the operational commander, which just         5       of, but if she's aware of the policy of Standing Order 262,       then yes, it would be.       5       docsm't have the time to be done. When 262 was drafted,         7       MR CHASKALSON SC:       Well, where is SAPS       7       there's sufficient time to be done. When 262 was drafted, and have the pain reviewed, and have         8       policy in relation to crowd management store       18       tactical plans affarde and have the pain reviewed, and have         10       National instruction 262, but the policy itself is a policy       10       actually lakes 262 as applicable to Marikana, it has to be         12       Instruction 262, but the policy up us any tage if Ha Set Marian       13       spontanety of the event.         13       concerned but this the but out say tage if the contents of       15       as this; you say you werent aware of the contents of         14       statement, paragraph 52, 5: 11 was not trained in the       15       as this; you say you werent aware of the contents of         15       contents: 5: 50 you had no knowledge of the contents of       15       as this; you say you werent aware of the contents of         16       contents: 5: 50 you had no knowledge of the contents of       15       standing Order 262. In marking thamed         17       Standing				
5       of, but if she's aware of the policy of Standing Order 262,       5       decample of the section of the policy for section of the sect				
6         then yes, it would be.         6         Scoling vectors which are maybe a week in the coming and marked back in the coming and the contents of there's sufficient time to set up these plans and have           7         MR CHASKALSON SC:         Well, where is SAPS polky in relation to crow management is out?         7           9         National instruction 22, but the polky itself is a polky that's derived by the Ministers office.         10         activity lates 22 as applied as best as possible with the principles, and about his is that you say at page 13 of your to concern datout this is that you say at page 13 of your concerns about this is that you say at page 13 of your concerns sufficient time to set up these plans and have           10         concerns about this is that you say at page 13 of your concerns about his is that you say at page 13 of your concerns sufficient time to set up these plans and have           11         statement, paragraph 12, 5, 'I was not trained in the contents.'' So you had no knowledge of the contents of 15         15           15         content sate date are involution of more state.         16         Standing Order 262.           16         content sate inter contents of 17         Standing Order 262.         11         19           16         state proposed draft National harboutcon, power of 18         14         100 and check, but there are ulos and regulations with the sate 18           17         Standing Order 262 in the absence, because there was avoid. There 18         14         100 and check, but ther		0		
7       MR CHASKALSON SC:       Well, where is SAPS       7       there's sufficient line to set up these plans and have         8       policy in relation to reword management set out?       6       tattical plans drafted and have the plan relevised, and have         10       National Instruction 262, but the policy itself is a policy       10       adually takes 262 as applicable to Markana, it has to be         11       that's derived by the Ministers office.       11       applied as best as possible with the principles, and         12       oncreated about this is that you say at page 143 of your       13       spontanetly of the event.         13       statement, aparagrap 52, 27, thus an ot trained in the       15       ask this: you say you werent aware of the contents of         16       Standing Order 262. The BAPS didn't create a Standing       19       which regulate Public Order Policing, but to say 1 knew         17       cOLOMEL SCOTT:       But you must remember, so which and in the creater so didn't create a Standing       19       which regulate Public Order Policing, but to say 1 knew         12       barding Order 262 and was not aware of its is       12       POPS, 1d never read the document specifically, no.         13       statement, barding order 262 are was not aware of its is       19       which regulate Public Order Policing, but to say 1 knew         14       baroad and the previous versions, and if you l				
8         policy in relation to crowd management set out?         8         tactical plans drafted and have the plan reviewed, and have           9         COLONEL SCOTT: At this time it is in the         9         0         forces properly briefed and put into positions, so when one           11         Instruction 22, but the policy ited is a policy         10         actually takes 226 as applicable to Markana, it has to be           12         OMR CHASKALSON SC: You see, why I'm         12         about sy with the, paragraph 14, which speaks to the           13         stantement, paragraph 52,5,1 was not trained in the         14         stantement, paragraph 14, which speaks to the           14         statement, paragraph 52,5,1 was not aware of its         15         skith; you say you weren't aware of the contents of           15         contents         14         Standing Order 262.         The asthet see arrelings and regulations within SAPS           10         order 26.2 In the absence, because there was a void. They         19         which regulate Public Order Policing, but to say 1 knew           11         had updiated arrelinus straining order for instance. Now 1         1         POSE, I drever read the document specifically with           12         that proposed draft Mational Instruction, 90% of it is         10         POSE, I drever read the document specifically with           13         the proposed draft Mational		5		
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10       National Instruction 262, but the policy itself is a policy       10       actually takes 262 as applicable to Marikana, it has to be         11       that's derived by the Minister's office.       11       applied as best as possible with the principles, and         12       MR CHASKALSON SC:       You see, why I'm       13       applied as best as possible with the principles, and         13       concerned about this is that you say at page 143 of your       14       statement, paragraph 14, which speaks to the         14       statement, paragraph 12, 5, 'I was not trained in the       14       MR CHASKALSON SC:       Well Colonel, let me         15       contents." So you had no knowledge of the contents of       15       standing Order 262.       Well colonel, let me         16       contents." So you had no knowledge of the contents of       15       standing Order 262.       16       Standing Order 262.       Werey variant were say that I -         17       Standing Order 262.       messame, berewise standing order for instance. Now 1       14       Nich regulate Public Order Policingly, no.       29       Verkowledge was there was a void. The         12       trained in still covered the tactical options, and if you look even       14       14       Standing Order 262 ame out, no.         13       the previous standing order for instance. Now 1       29       Verkowledge was the c				
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12       MR CHASKALSON SC: You see, why I'm       12       obviously with the, paragraph 14, which speaks to the         13       concerned about this is that you say at page 143 of your       13       spontaneity of the event.         14       statement, paragraph 52, 71 was not trained in the       15       such that you and no knowledge of the contents of         15       contents." So you had no knowledge of the contents of       16       Standing Order 262.       17       COLONEL SCOTT:       Lant even say that 1-         19       something preludes 262. The SAPS didn't create a Standing       17       COLONEL SCOTT:       Lant even say that 1-         10       order 262 in the absence, because there was a vold. They       18       How that there are rules and regulations within SAPS         11       us trained on the previous versions, and if you look even       14       How that there are rules and regulations within SAPS         12       say that Standing Order 262 again with amendments. So what I was       14       POPs, Id never read the document specifically, no.         12       esernee the tolerance of how Public Order Policing should       1       tog and check, but there are document should hed alt         13       therapite sensities of the Constituton?       1       tog and check, but there are document should hed alt         14       eseried out.       1       tog and check, but th			_	
13       concerned about this is that you say at page 143 of your       13       spontanelly of the event.         14       statement, paragraph 52, 5, 1 was not trained in the       14       MRC HASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, Let me         15       cortents.' So you had no knowledge of the contents of       15       skiths: you say you werent aware of the contents of         16       contents.' So you had no knowledge of the contents of       16       Standing Order 262.       User a was of this         17       Standing Order 262.       The SAPS didn't create a Standing       17       COLONEL SCOTT:       Let work that there are rules and regulations within SAPS         18       Norder 262 in the absence, because there was a void. They       18       Iknow that there are rules and regulations within SAPS         20       order 262 in the absence, because there was a void. They       14       Standing Order 262 again with amendments. So what I was         21       rearied in still covered the tactical options and in       20       COLONEL SCOTT:       Chairperson, I would need         23       at the proposed draft National Instruction, 90% of I is       23       you knowledge was there a standing order which dealt with         24       the contents of the contents of its sec. Nowl       You is contents.       24       Public Order Policing prior to Standing Order 262 in the acouse. I would need         25		-		
14       statement, paragraph 52.5, 'I was not trained in the       14       MR CHASKALSON SC: Well Colonel, let me         15       current Standing Order 262 and was not aware of its       ask this: you say you werent aware of the contents of         17       Standing Order 262.       17       Standing Order 262.       17         18       COLONEL SCOTT: B daPS didn't create a Standing       9       which there are rules and regulations within SAPS         19       something preludes 262. The SAPS didn't create a Standing       9       which regulate Public Order Policing, but to say I knew         20       Order 262 in the absence, because there was a void. They       14       I tast Standing Order 262 by number dealt specifically with         21       was trained on the previous varions, and If you look even       22       COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, I would need         22       was trained in still covered the tactical options and in       23       your knowledge was there a standing order 262 to mis current form represents         3       MR CHASKALSON SC: Would it be fair to       an attempt by the SAPS to harmonise crowd management policing         24       they were simply training documents, bacause I did the       4         3       and the contents of the Constitution?       1       1         7       COLONEL SCOTT: If I look at Standing       1       1       1       1 <td></td> <td>5</td> <td></td> <td></td>		5		
15       current Standing Order 262 and was not aware of its       15       ask this; you say you weren't aware of the contents of         16       contents." So you had no knowledge of the contents of       15       Standing Order 262. Were you aware of its existence?         17       Standing Order 262. The SAPS didn't create a Standing       14       I know that there are rules and regulations within SAPS         18       Order 262 in the absence, because there was a void. They       16       I know that there are rules and regulations within SAPS         19       had updated a previous standing order for instance. Now       12       POPs, 1'd never read the document specifically with         20       was trained on the previous versions, and If you look even       24       Yourk nowledge was there a standing order which dealt with         21       the proposed draft National Instruction, 90% of it is       3       your knowledge was there a standing order which dealt with         25       trained in still covered the tactical options and in       25       COLONEL SCOTT:       Chairperson, I would need         1       to go and check, but there are occuments that deal with       24       Public Order Policing order 262. Came out, to         23       as the proposed draft National Instruction, 90% of it is       3       3       24         2       trained in still covered the tactical options and in       25       C	13		13	
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17       Standing Order 262.       17       COLONEL SCOTT:       I can't even say that I –         18       COLONEL SCOTT:       But you must remember,       18       I know that there are rules and regulations within SAPS         19       something preludes 262.       The SAPS didn't create a Standing       Order 262 in the absence, because there was a void. They         20       Was trained on the previous versions, and if you look even       at the proposed draft National Instruction, 99% of it.       22       OHAIRPERSON:       Before 262 came out, to         21       at the proposed draft National Instruction, 99% of it.       Verk nowledge was there a standing order which dealt with         22       trained in still covered the tactical options and in       22       OCLONEL SCOTT:       COLONEL SCOTT:       Colonet Science, the tolerance of how Public Order Policing should         2       trained in still covered the tactical options and in       23       Was ChASKALSON SC:       Would it be fair to         3       attempt by the SAPS to harmonise crowd management public       0       operational commanders training course, I think it was the       5         4       say that Standing Order 262 in reading it after the fat, and looking at the       9       operational commanders training course, I think it was the         3       attempt by the Say out and by out actually take the time to work       1       management, a	15	-	15	
18       COLONEL SCOTT:       But you must remember,       18       I know that there are rules and regulations within SAPS         19       something preludes 2.62. The SAPS didn't create a Standing       19       which regulate Public Order Policing, but to say I knew         20       Order 2.62 in the absence, because there was a void. They       20       that Standing Order 2.62 by number dealt specifically, no.         21       was trained on the previous versions, and if you look even       21       POPs, I'd never read the document specifically, no.         22       vas trained in still covered the tactical options and in       22       CHAIRPERSON: Before 2.62 are mout, to         23       the proposed draft National Instruction, 90% of it is       23       your knowledge was there a standing order 2.62 are mout, to         24       rubit Order 2.62 and with amendments. So what I was       24       Public Order Policing?         25       trained in still covered the tactical options and in       2       COLONEL SCOTT:       Charperson, I would need         26       essence the tolerance of how Public Order Policing should       5       a natempt by the SAPS to harmonise crowd management policy.       1       to go and check, but there are documents, btat deal with         2       wold re2.62 in reading it after the fact, and looking at the       4       operational commanders training courset. Think It was the       5       y				
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	Page 14191	1	Page 14193
1	MR CHASKALSON SC: Did you disclose that	1	set up, had it not, the day before, on the Monday.
2	at any stage to Colonel Merafe?	2	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, the JOC –
3	COLONEL SCOTT: No.	3	CHAIRPERSON: So it was that meeting that
4	MR CHASKALSON SC: So Colonel Merafe	4	you, about which you're now talking, could that be
5	wouldn't have known at the time that you weren't aware of	5	described as a meeting of the JOCCOM or was it not?
6	what 262 said?	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, Chairperson, the
7	COLONEL SCOTT: No.	7	JOC is set up, the joint operation centre, the JOCCOM being
8	MR CHASKALSON SC: Did you disclose it to	8	the committee, the actual joint operation command
9	Major-General Annandale?	9	committee, or joint operation centre committee. That to my
10	COLONEL SCOTT: No. MR CHASKALSON SC: Would he have been	10	knowledge up till that time had not sat officially yet.
11		11	There was no real roll-call of who was there, etcetera, and
12	aware of the fact that you didn't know what 262 said? COLONEL SCOTT: He wouldn't have been,	12	run according to an agenda of sort. There had been
13 14		13 14	meetings prior to that, for instance the Monday night where the National Commissioner was there. There were senior
14	no. MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, moving on	14	role players there, but those were more informative
15	from 262, we're still talking about that plan that you	15	meetings; everybody sit down, let's hear what happened,
17	designed in the early hours of Tuesday morning. You say in	10	later again second meeting to look for a strategy to go
18	your statement at page 50, paragraph 7.25, that your plan	18	forward on, to listen to the inputs of the different
19	was first presented to the JOCCOM Tuesday at 14:00.	19	commanders, and so on, but the official meeting where a JOC
20	COLONEL SCOTT: That's the phase 1, or	20	structure of the representatives, or the ambassadors of
21	the plan that dealt initially to get the police contingent	21	every unit, if I can put it that way, were present, seated
22	to go and deploy in a phase 1, yes.	22	or standing around the JOC, that happened for the first
23	MR CHASKALSON SC: If we can just go to	23	time on, where I was present, on, at about 2 o'clock on the
24	page 50 –	24	Tuesday afternoon.
25	CHAIRPERSON: While you're doing that,	25	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, just to go
	Page 14192		Page 14194
1	can I ask you a question?	1	back to page 50, paragraph 7.25, "The first briefing I gave
2	can I ask you a question? COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, Chairperson.	2	back to page 50, paragraph 7.25, "The first briefing I gave to a structured JOCCOM, which included the different police
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1	to say that that Google Earth plan that we have been	1	Platinum Aerial Grid at page 86 of file 1.
2	looking at earlier today, Ops Platinum Initial Plan 2.kmz,	2	MR CHASKALSON SC: Thank you,
3	would have been part of what you would have presented as in	3	Chairperson. And if we can just quickly run through the
4	the course of presenting the operational strategy based on	4	slides on these grids, there are only two of them so if we
5	phases 1 to 6?	5	can go to the next one. So what we see are fairly long
6	COLONEL SCOTT: I can only speak to the	6	range aerial shots of the Marikana area. For present
7	best of my recollection, but as you saw when you untick	7	purposes I'd merely draw your attention to the fact that
8	icons, they fall away, and when speaking to phase 1 we	8	that blue barbed wire cordon is around the koppie in these
9	would have found the Nyala line left in position to now	9	aerial grids. Would you confirm that?
10	represent the Nyalas in position as in their monitoring and	10	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, but I think you're
11	negotiation group, and I think that even continues through	11	misinterpreting what it means in this context now. As I
12	to the Thursday where the same line represents the Nyala	12	said, when you set up that Google Earth program you've got
13	line. Instead of going to recreate new icons, which is	13	certain icons already in place. They are not named on the
14	timeous, the icon that the members see on the screen now	14	map, so to re-use them for other purposes - and if you can
15	represent phase 1, and you unclick everything that you	15	see the name of that map, it's called Hotspot. And then
16	don't want them to see.	16	the blue is showing the environment now where the
17	MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, but what you say	17	protesters are grouped together with a T for the target
18	in your statement is that they were called back from the	18	area on koppie 1. That's not depicting that there is an
19	sector patrols to hear the operational strategy based on	19	encirclement plan in place, this was given out to those
20	phases 1 to 6, not just phase 1.	20	commanders on that Tuesday for the purposes of reference to
21	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, that's correct, but	20	the hotspot area.
22	further in the statement I actually mention that only phase	22	MR CHASKALSON SC: But, Colonel, what
22	1 was discussed in detail and the others were only	22	you've used to demarcate the hotspot happens to coincide
	-		
24 25	mentioned by name due to the time constraints, and at that	24 25	exactly with what your plan says the barbed wire cordon will be.
25	stage also due to the lack of detail in the planning of the	20	will be.
	Page 14196		Page 14198
1	rest of the phases. It was a strategy that was presented	1	COLONEL SCOTT: It may be so, but what
2	to them in detail, the strategy being 1 to 6, not the	2	I'm telling you now is that doesn't show that there must be
3	detail within each of the phases, except for phase 1	3	a barbed wire cordon put around the people on the Tuesday
4	because that's what we needed to get them back out into the	4	afternoon. I mean the pictures that show the deployment of
5	field to go and do.	5	the Tuesday afternoon clearly show that the Nyalas are
6	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now would anyone		
		6	
7	-	6	standing in position and monitoring a negotiation is
7 8	walking away from that meeting have realised that the plan		standing in position and monitoring a negotiation is ongoing. If they were given this and told to go and
7 8 9	walking away from that meeting have realised that the plan for tactical action, if that plan was to eventuate, would	6 7	standing in position and monitoring a negotiation is ongoing. If they were given this and told to go and encircle with barbed wire then that would have been what
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	Page 14199		Page 14201
1	present on sector policing. It's something that you	1	CHAIRPERSON: Pages?
2	address at page 38, paragraph 7.11 of your statement. Is	2	MR CHASKALSON SC: That's pages 87 to 91.
3	that correct?	3	CHAIRPERSON: Of file 1.
4	COLONEL SCOTT: These were created early	4	MR CHASKALSON SC: Indeed, Chairperson.
5	but there was a different set of slides printed out for the	5	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
6	sector policing deployment. Those are the slides which	6	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now this appears to
7	actually show the different four sectors with the numbers	7	depict the sector patrols that you discuss from page 37
8	of the sectors in each of those slides.	8	paragraph 7.8 of your statement, is that correct, 1, 2, 3
9	MR CHASKALSON SC: What are these gridded	9	and 4 are sectors?
10	maps for, what were they for?	10	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
11	COLONEL SCOTT: Well this was just of the	11	MR CHASKALSON SC: I'd again draw your
12	environment at the time. As I say, this was, if I'm	12	attention to the blue line around the koppie.
13	looking at my properties, this was made at 9 o'clock in the	13	COLONEL SCOTT: That is so, that's
14	morning. This was way after the koppie had filled up	14	showing the area where the protesters are getting together
15	already, so this is to assist. And it's not to say that at	15	with the T. As you rightfully pointed out earlier when it
16	this stage I'm already thinking to the phase 1, 2, 3 to 6	16	had an orange part to it, it showed the razor wire
17	approach and preparing for something, but in the meantime	17	encirclement that was envisioned for that first light.
18	while I'm preparing this I'm understanding that the police	18	Understanding too that I still saw that same initial plan
19	can't just sit back while the planning officers are	19	as a viable option as a stage 3 for Wednesday morning
20	waiting. A police presence needs to go into the vicinity	20	should things not go according to plan on Tuesday. But
21	thus the sector policing plan is initiated and put into	21	here it is depicted to the members as being the environment
22	play whilst this preparation of stages, well phases 1 to 6	22	where the strikers are gathered.
23	is still being put into document format for when General	23	MR CHASKALSON SC: But is that the
24	Annandale eventually arrived at about 11:00.	24	environment where the strikers were gathered, were there
25	MR CHASKALSON SC: So, Colonel, are you	25	any strikers gathered as far south as that line goes?
	Page 14200		Page 14202
1	Page 14200 saying then that this was just a document that you prepared	1	Page 14202 COLONEL SCOTT: That line is basically
1 2	6	1 2	-
	saying then that this was just a document that you prepared		COLONEL SCOTT: That line is basically
2	saying then that this was just a document that you prepared for yourself as a working document as opposed to one that	2	COLONEL SCOTT:That line is basicallyjust covering koppie 1 and 2, surrounding koppie 1 and 2.
2 3	saying then that this was just a document that you prepared for yourself as a working document as opposed to one that was going to be distributed?	2 3	COLONEL SCOTT:That line is basicallyjust covering koppie 1 and 2,surrounding koppie 1 and 2.MR CHASKALSON SC:In due course we'll
2 3 4	saying then that this was just a document that you prepared for yourself as a working document as opposed to one that was going to be distributed? COLONEL SCOTT: It was one that was meant	2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT: That line is basically just covering koppie 1 and 2, surrounding koppie 1 and 2. MR CHASKALSON SC: In due course we'll get to various closer up images of that line, what I want to put to you is that it covers an area in which no strikers were gathered and which corresponds exactly with
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1	Page 14203	1	Page 14205
1 2	Now presumably these gridded maps would have been distributed to the teams that had to do the sector policing	1 2	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I'm sorry to interrupt you but as appears from the heading to para 7.21.2 of your
2	on the 14th and if we can just quickly run through the full	2	statement, exhibit HHH20 there were various versions of
	presentation which will show the full gridded maps. Would	4	phase 2.
4 5	it be correct that the teams that had to do the sector	4 5	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
6	policing, patrolling would have been given these gridded	6	CHAIRPERSON: And this heading indicates
7	maps?	7	that were talking in 7.21.2, the various paragraphs of that
8	COLONEL SCOTT: They were briefed on them	8	about phase 2 Tuesday version.
9	initially and then I needed to find a printer as well to	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
10	print them out on. So I'm not sure at what stage, but they	10	CHAIRPERSON: So what you're being asked
11	were given them. At some stage they were given them when they went out to go and do the sector policing	11 12	by Counsel is what we're looking at here on the screen now
12	they went out to go and do the sector policing.		does that link up with what you set out in 7.21.2 of your
13	MR CHASKALSON SC: Okay. Colonel, the	13	statement i.e. the Tuesday version of phase 2?
14	next file, contemporaneous file that we have is a	14 15	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, Chairperson, as I'm
15	screenshot called A.JPG and it looks like it may well have	15	saying the picture you're seeing has got the same strategy,
16	been your source file for the slide that we see at page 44	16	but the picture was only created on the Thursday morning,
17	of SS3 which is describing stage 2 on the 14th of August.	17	the 16th at 8:29 if I'm not mistaken. So the strategy
18	So if we can first call up the file A.JPG, it will be	18	existed on Tuesday already and the strategy was always a
19 20	JJJ9.1, JJJ9.1. Commissioners, I have a page reference, page 200, I'm afraid I don't have a file reference, we'll	19 20	show of force and a prelude to a stage 3. So what's
20			mentioned on the Tuesday already, but is not shown in any
22	come back to you after the lunch break with that. And if we can then cut to page 44 of SS3, it's file 3.1,	21 22	way is similar to what is depicted now. I think the only changes that were brought in is that bringing forward
22	Commissioners. Sorry, have we got page –	22	
23 24	CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, file 3.1, page 44.	23 24	immediate reaction areas or bringing forward the task force from the MIU to the immediate reaction areas, to be closer
24	MR CHASKALSON SC: No, no SS3, page 44.	24 25	to respond in case there was a threat posed during the
25	Nik Christianskanster 30 No, no 333, page 44.	20	to respond in case there was a threat posed during the
	Page 14204		Page 14206
1	SS3 has two slides to a page, if we can just scroll down to	1	phase 2. That, I think, is the only real difference from
2	the bottom half of the page and it appears to us that the	2	what it was on the Tuesday to what it was on the Thursday.
3	photograph that we see as A.JPG is in all likelihood the	3	MR CHASKALSON SC: So you've identified
4	source file for that slide in SS3. Well, can I ask you is	4	what are the only differences between what that photograph
5	it the source file for that slide?	5	depicts and what you've described as the phase 2 Tuesday
6	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	6	version?
7	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now that slide in SS3	7	COLONEL SCOTT: Well on the wider picture
8	is describing phase 2 on the 14th of August and if I look at	8	there would have been a forward holding area 2 as well. At
9	the file A.JPG it appears to be depicting what you describe	9	this time I don't really recall if there were any other
10	in your statement at paragraph 7.2.1 on page 44, if we can	10	minor tactical details changed from the phase 2 as it was
11	go there as phase 2 [Tuesday version].	11	envisioned on Tuesday as to how it was briefed and deployed
12	COLONEL SCOTT: I think we need to look	12	on the Thursday. And I know that this is obviously talking
13	at the properties of that source document you're talking	13	as well to – because over here there is no immediate
		14	reaction area, immediate reaction force is still at the
14	about, that was only created on the 16th.		
15	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well I know it was	15	forward holding area but -
15 16	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well I know it was only created on the 16th. I'm going to come back to that	16	MR CHASKALSON SC: Sorry, just to
15 16 17	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well I know it was only created on the 16th. I'm going to come back to that with you in due course, but what it describes is what you	16 17	MR CHASKALSON SC: Sorry, just to illustrate what the Colonel is speaking to I wonder if we
15 16 17 18	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well I know it was only created on the 16th. I'm going to come back to that with you in due course, but what it describes is what you describe in relation to phase 2 Tuesday version.	16 17 18	MR CHASKALSON SC: Sorry, just to illustrate what the Colonel is speaking to I wonder if we can call up that file A.JPG again. So on this file there
15 16 17 18 19	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well I know it was only created on the 16th. I'm going to come back to that with you in due course, but what it describes is what you describe in relation to phase 2 Tuesday version. CHAIRPERSON: Do you agree with that,	16 17 18 19	MR CHASKALSON SC: Sorry, just to illustrate what the Colonel is speaking to I wonder if we can call up that file A.JPG again. So on this file there is no immediate reaction areas –
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<ol> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> </ol>	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well I know it was only created on the 16th. I'm going to come back to that with you in due course, but what it describes is what you describe in relation to phase 2 Tuesday version. CHAIRPERSON: Do you agree with that, Colonel? MR CHASKALSON SC: Do you agree with it, Colonel? COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, the phase 2	<ol> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> </ol>	MR CHASKALSON SC: Sorry, just to illustrate what the Colonel is speaking to I wonder if we can call up that file A.JPG again. So on this file there is no immediate reaction areas – COLONEL SCOTT: That's a close-up. If you go to B, this is A, if you go to B it now shows you in B the wider area because the immediate reaction areas are not here in pictures. If you zoom out which picture B then

	Page 14207		Page 14209
1	file is basically created at the same time, one is just a	1	razor wire would serve as a contingency plan for the phase
2	zoomed in. As I said I always create an area which is	2	2 deployment by closing off the neutral area to create a
3	wider and a closer up which is of the actual operational	3	police safe area should the strikers approach the police at
4	area.	4	any time in a large group with potential aggressive
5	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well let's look at	5	motives. So the line in which they would close is that
6	this picture as – in the light of what you say at paragraph	6	barbed wire line in orange?
7	7.21.2 in your document phase 2 – in relation to phase 2	7	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
, 8	Tuesday version. And if you can identify what is depicted	8	MR CHASKALSON SC: This I thought should
9	on this document. You say phase 2 would be an escalation	9	prevent confrontation considering that possibly POPS
10	of force levels by the police by bringing the reserve	10	members may need to employ less then lethal force to
11	forward from the forward holding area. This would be to	11	prevent any strikers breaking through the weak points
12	provide a show of force to dissuade illegal activity or	12	between the Nyalas and the trailer which carried the razor
13	planned violence towards the police in the phase 1	13	wire. I planned to have TRT teams to move to each Nyala
14	deployment strategy. Phase 2 was only to be initialised	14	when it deployed the razor wire to support the POP members.
15	when the threat level against the police increased or it	15	So you, those TRT teams as I see it are those six soldier
16	became evident the strikers would want to mobilise as a	16	icons or uniformed armed icons to the east of the barbed
17	mass group to move to anticipate at key points behind the	17	wire line and the Nyala line, is that correct and that
18	police line towards the east. The POP reserves in armoured	18	yellow, those yellow band again would represent the Nyala
19	vehicles from the forward holding area would reinforce the	19	line as they would have on the first plan from Tuesday?
20	phase 1 police monitoring and negotiation line at the	20	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
21	koppie as a show of force to dissuade the crowd aggression	21	MR CHASKALSON SC: I'd like to put it to
22	being focused towards the police members. Am I correct	22	you again that the blue line in this context given that
23	then that that would be reflected in those five blue	23	we're talking about a prepositioning for phase 3 would have
24	vehicles? Five blue vehicles, the six vehicles are barbed	24	represent a barbed wire cordoned around the koppie.
25	wire vehicles.	25	MR SEMENYA SC: No, there's no basis for
	Page 14208		Page 14210
1	COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking to the	1	that proposition being put.
2	COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking to the reserves that are brought forward?	2	that proposition being put. MR CHASKALSON SC: Well let the witness
	COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking to the reserves that are brought forward? MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes.		that proposition being put. MR CHASKALSON SC: Well let the witness answer the question, Mr Chairperson.
2	COLONEL SCOTT:Are you talking to thereserves that are brought forward?MR CHASKALSON SC:Yes.COLONEL SCOTT:No. They're not shown on	2	that proposition being put. MR CHASKALSON SC: Well let the witness
2 3	COLONEL SCOTT: Are you talking to the reserves that are brought forward? MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes. COLONEL SCOTT: No. They're not shown on this map.	2 3	that proposition being put. MR CHASKALSON SC: Well let the witness answer the question, Mr Chairperson. MR SEMENYA SC: I'm objecting to the question.
2 3 4	COLONEL SCOTT:Are you talking to thereserves that are brought forward?MR CHASKALSON SC:Yes.COLONEL SCOTT:No. They're not shown onthis map.MR CHASKALSON SC:Okay.	2 3 4	that proposition being put. MR CHASKALSON SC: Well let the witness answer the question, Mr Chairperson. MR SEMENYA SC: I'm objecting to the question. CHAIRPERSON: What do you say about the
2 3 4 5	COLONEL SCOTT:Are you talking to thereserves that are brought forward?MR CHASKALSON SC:Yes.COLONEL SCOTT:No. They're not shown onthis map.MR CHASKALSON SC:Okay.COLONEL SCOTT:But they are iconic, it's	2 3 4 5	that proposition being put. MR CHASKALSON SC: Well let the witness answer the question, Mr Chairperson. MR SEMENYA SC: I'm objecting to the question. CHAIRPERSON: What do you say about the objection, Mr Chaskalson?
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	Dogo 14211		Dago 14012
1	Page 14211 persisted in. Carry, Mr Chaskalson, please proceed, you've	1	Page 14213 a dialogue and negotiations. The actual more detail of
2	got five minutes, we'll take lunch at about 1 o'clock.	2	what happens in a phase 2 and a phase 3 for that matter is
3	When you reach a suitable stage in your cross-examination	3	looked at on the Wednesday.
4	let me know.	4	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, Colonel, I have
4 5	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well let me take this	4 5	two problems with that answer. The first is when you went
	one further with you, Colonel. Phase 2 is a prepositioning	5 6	
6		0 7	back in December to reverse engineer slides that would depict what the plan was on Tuesday the 14th you used this
7 0	for phase 3, is that not so?		depict what the plan was on Tuesday the 14th you used this slide as phase 2 for Tuesday the 14th. That appears in \$\$2
8	COLONEL SCOTT: Phase 2 is a	8	slide as phase 2 for Tuesday the 14th. That appears in SS3.
9	prepositioning amongst others for phase 3, yes.	9	COLONEL SCOTT: And I mentioned in my
10	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now on Tuesday the	10	statement that the time that I had to reverse engineer
11	phase 3 involved encircling the koppie.	11	these was literally a day, give or take an afternoon. I
12	COLONEL SCOTT: At that time, yes. But	12	was rushed to have to do this. So I put this, the reverse
13	it was also said that before that operation would commence	13	engineered version together as quickly as I could. But how
14	that all forces would be returned and briefed thoroughly	14	does that four, five months after the fact deal with what's
15	before it would happen.	15	actually happening at the time when this is actually
16	MR CHASKALSON SC: No, Colonel, I don't	16	created on the morning of the 16th.
17	understand that to be what your evidence in your statement	17	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, it was last
18	is in relation to phase 2. Because the logic of the	18	saved on the morning of the 16th.
19	prepositioning of phase 2 in advance of phase 3 was to have	19	COLONEL SCOTT: It was first saved I
20	your barbed wire Nyala vehicles in position so that they	20	think on the morning of the 16th.
21	could proceed to phase 3 quickly?	21	MR CHASKALSON SC: We can investigate
22	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	22	that but whether it was first saved or last saved on the
23	MR CHASKALSON SC: Is that not correct?	23	morning of the 16th it reflects what your phase 2 Tuesday
24	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	24	plan describes, is that not so?
25	MR CHASKALSON SC: So the barbed wire	25	COLONEL SCOTT: The picture doesn't to
		<b> </b>	
	Page 14212		Page 14214
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1 2	Nyalas are not going to return. COLONEL SCOTT: No, but the commanders	1 2	justice to what was envisioned. As I say the phase 2 on the Tuesday was in strategy form. It was a good idea to
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<b></b>		1	
1	Page 14215 Tuesday. I'm not suggesting that at all, what I'm	1	Page 14217 also explained I think that the plan was then to encircle
2	suggesting that it depicts what you describe in your	2	on Wednesday morning?
3	statement as phase 2, Tuesday version.	2	COLONEL SCOTT: That was my –
4	COLONEL SCOTT: It does depict that.	4	CHAIRPERSON: Your plan?
5	That was what was envisioned.	5	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well then maybe we've	6	CHAIRPERSON: Now this is Tuesday
6		7	afternoon.
7	been having an argument at cross purposes. That is the	8	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
8	only –	8 9	CHAIRPERSON: Therefore encirclement
9	COLONEL SCOTT: I think the issue is that		
10	you're moving to say that this was already the idea on the	10 11	wouldn't have happened yet. Wednesday morning encirclement
11	Tuesday and that encirclement was the order of the day all	12	wouldn't have happened yet. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
12	the way through which is not so.		
13	MR CHASKALSON SC: We'll get there and	13	5
14	we'll get to examine each piece of evidence as we go along.	14	you had to do was twofold. You had to at some stage take
15	But, Chairperson, at this stage I think it may be a	15	action to disarm, arrest and so forth the strikers, the
16	convenient –	16	armed strikers, is that right? That we can call the
17	CHAIRPERSON: Commissioner Hemraj wants	17	proactive phase.
18	to a question before we take lunch.	18	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
19	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Colonel, if that	19	CHAIRPERSON: But before you reached the
20	blue line around the koppie represents the encirclement,	20	proactive stage all along you had you have a reactive
21	did you at any stage have sufficient number of Nyalas with	21	phase, you had to make sure that the situation held.
22	barbed wire to cover which ever that area is that it	22	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
23	depicts there?	23	CHAIRPERSON: That the murder and mayhem
24	COLONEL SCOTT: Ma'am, I think at the	24	didn't burst out, that what had happened for example on the
25	time when I was looking at the initial encirclement I was	25	Sunday with people being killed and property being damaged
	Page 14216		Page 14218
1	hopeful but I worked it out to be about 700 odd metres that	1	and so on wouldn't happen. You had to in other words keep
2	we would need to cover. But what we do have is six	2	the peace.
3	vehicles and what came to my knowledge is that with six	3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
4	vehicles we're going to be way too close, it may be enough	4	CHAIRPERSON: Is that right? We call
5	to encircle the protestors at the koppie but we're going to	5	that the reactive phase. So you had forces in place, I
6	be way to close to them, we would literally have the	6	think you call them assets, police assets in place to hold,
7	members doing the encirclement, the rolling of that wire	7	keep the position peaceful, maintain law and order?
8	and pulling it out within 10 or 15 metres of the strikers,	8	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
9	which is, would have been way to dangerous in my opinion.	9	CHAIRPERSON: Stop murder and mayhem, is
10	So we needed to look at a bigger circle if encirclement was	10	that correct?
11	going to happen and this is what brought up discussions on	11	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
12	the Wednesday about the fact that we just don't have enough	12	CHAIRPERSON: And Tuesday afternoon's
13	wire to actually safely do what we envisioned doing for	13	operation was intended to be reactive in that sense?
14	that matter if the group is that large.	14	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, it was.
15	CHAIRPERSON: Okay, can I ask a question	15	CHAIRPERSON: Is that correct?
16	before we take the lunch adjournment. Just to make sure I	16	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
17	understand what's going on. Is it said that this is what	17	CHAIRPERSON: Your thinking at the time
18	we now see represents the situation as you reverse	18	on the proactive aspect –
19	engineered it, but for Tuesday afternoon?	19	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja.
20	COLONEL SCOTT: The concept –	20	CHAIRPERSON: Related to at earliest
21	CHAIRPERSON: Yes.	21	Wednesday morning?
22	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, the concept.	22	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
23	CHAIRPERSON: Okay now originally you had	23	CHAIRPERSON: Is that right?
24	an idea of encircling the koppie on Tuesday morning, that	24	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
2		0.5	
25	you couldn't do for reasons which you've explained. You	25	CHAIRPERSON: Okay. So those vehicles we

	Page 14219		Page 14221
1	see there, the red ones with the, should be the Nyalas I	1	minutes of TT3 they will bear you out in some respect, the
2	think with the barbed wire.	2	minutes of the 15th. It is TT3, 2.3, support issues, eight
3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	3	razor wires are available if the need arises, and you
4	CHAIRPERSON: And the blue ones and the	4	recall that being reported at the JOC at six o'clock on the
5	uniformed people with the firearms they are all part of the	5	15th?
6	reactive phase to keep the peace on Tuesday afternoon, is	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I didn't recall, I
7	that correct?	7	think I've read it somewhere but I didn't recall it, I know
8	COLONEL SCOTT: In the strategy, although	8	that we went over these issues, about what was available
9	it was not deployed that way but in the strategy –	9	because that was part of, the actual start of the JOC was
10	CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm talking about what	10	to say who was there, with how many people and what
11	your idea was.	11	resources and then they would be tallied together to make
12	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	12	known, so I would have been aware on that day, the
13	CHAIRPERSON: That your strategy was, am	12	
		_	Wednesday, yes, of that.
14 15	I understanding your correctly?	14	MR CHASKALSON SC: That there were eight
15	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	15	available?
16	CHAIRPERSON: Alright. I think we can	16	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
17	take lunch at this stage, Mr Chaskalson.	17	MR CHASKALSON SC: You said that some of
18	MR CHASKALSON SC: Thank you,	18	them went operational?
19	Chairperson.	19	COLONEL SCOTT: I can recall, there was
20	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]	20	some issue with one or two of them, I don't know if it had
21	[14:13] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission continues.	21	to do with tyres or what the issue was but I know, if I can
22	Colonel, you're still under oath. Mr Chaskalson?	22	recall correctly those that were operational, hooked
23	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, just before	23	Nyalas, I'm not sure what the issue was with those that
24	we broke, in response to a question from Commissioner	24	weren't, but they were left where the helicopters were
25	Hemraj you indicated that you needed at least seven barbed	25	landing on that side and normally all the other operational
	Page 1/220		Page 1/222
1	Page 14220 wire trailers to encircle the koppie and then in response	1	Page 14222 assets were put to the opposite side, some of the vehicles
1 2	wire trailers to encircle the koppie and then in response	1	assets were put to the opposite side, some of the vehicles
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	Page 14223		Page 14225
1	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes –	1	presuming they were under the impression that there
2	CHAIRPERSON: - on the one hand and the	2	wouldn't be people on the koppie which means you can close
3	police and the media on the other, is that right?	3	the circle in onto the koppie, which is why I say seven
4	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, it is true, it was	4	would be sufficient if you wanted to call a tight cordon,
5	just to create a barrier, so I'm not sure how we got to the	5	or a tight encirclement, but to do that with police members
6	six, as I say I'm not sure if there were two that were	6	with strikers which are angry, would be totally unsafe and
7	dysfunctional or it was just decided that six were	7	one would need to expand the cordon outwards to be a safe
8	sufficient, I don't particularly recall the detail of that.	8	distance from them while doing it and because the circle
9	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, it is quite an	9	obviously gets bigger there is not sufficient wire to have
10	important detail, Colonel, because the commissioner asked	10	done that.
11	you, did you ever have enough barbed wires available to	11	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
12	encircle the koppie, so that's the question that needs to	12	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, Colonel, I need
13	be answered, did you ever have enough barbed wires?	13	to clarify your answer to me a few minutes ago, you said
14	COLONEL SCOTT: To safely do it, no.	14	not to do, not to encircle the koppie safely, there wasn't
15	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, -	15	enough barbed wire to encircle the koppie safely. Does
16	CHAIRPERSON: We saw the video the other	16	that mean that you needed more than seven and you didn't
17	day of Brigadier Calitz addressing the members of the	17	have more than seven or does that mean, or what does it
18	service, of the 18th.	18	mean?
19	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct,	19	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, from what I recall
20	Chairperson.	20	in our discussions on the Wednesday is that there wasn't
21	CHAIRPERSON: And the plan was to	21	sufficient barbed wire to have done the job sufficiently,
22	encircle the koppie on the 18th I think for a particular	22	amongst others, for being one of the reasons to having to
23	reason, and was that actually carried out?	23	look at an alternative plan.
24	COLONEL SCOTT: No, and I hear that was	24	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, Colonel, I need
25	the plan. To my knowledge the vehicles which were left on	25	a bit more precision than that, we have a minute of the
		Î.	
1	Page 14224	1	Page 14226
1	the evening of the 16th were damaged by the strikers that	1	morning of Wednesday saying there are eight barbed razor
2	the evening of the 16th were damaged by the strikers that night that were left in place, I think they slashed the	2	morning of Wednesday saying there are eight barbed razor wires available if the need arises. Do you accept that
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		1	
1	Page 14227 MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, so we had eight	1	Page 14229 done but a lot of times in the briefing it was about the
2	on the Thursday, do you know how many were – on the	2	concept and the strategy I gave. The allocation of actual
3	Wednesday, I beg your pardon, do you know how many were	3	forces to areas was predominantly done thereafter by
4	available on the Thursday?	4	General Annandale.
5	COLONEL SCOTT: No.	5	CHAIRPERSON: Colonel, I'm sorry to
6	MR CHASKALSON SC: And do you have any	6	interrupt you but you're talking about stage 2 on Tuesday?
7	reason to believe that if there were eight available on the	7	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
8	Wednesday there would have been less than eight available	8	CHAIRPERSON: Now on Tuesday was there
9	on the Thursday?	9	any idea of using the razor wire not for encirclement, but
10	COLONEL SCOTT: No, unless as I say that	10	to protect the media and the police in the so called
11	some were rendered unserviceable.	11	neutral area, or when did the concept of using razor wire
12	MR CHASKALSON SC: And do you have any	12	to protect people in the so called neutral area first come
13	reason to believe that some were rendered unserviceable?	13	up for consideration?
14	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, that's why I'm	14	COLONEL SCOTT: Chairperson, maybe it is
15	saying, I remember some of them standing on the side of the	15	good that you ask that because when I actually put together
16	helicopter, the helicopter's landing area which is not	16	my consolidated statements, if I can explain it in this
17	where the operational deployed vehicles would go to, they	17	way, I remember the reasoning and I remember conversations
18	were on the opposite side of the road.	18	we had and so on, but the exact timing of everything was
19	MR CHASKALSON SC: But of course they	19	something that I had to go back to documents to try and
20	would only become operational deployed vehicles if you were	20	align to sequence correctly. I had to look at other
21	moving to stage 3 and encirclement? For stage 2 and	21	people's statements to see what they had said when and to
22	encirclement on your diagrams you only have six barbed wire	22	try and put this all into alignment. So as best as my
23	Nyala vehicles.	23	knowledge was and it is possible that some of hindsight of
24	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, that's correct,	24	the Wednesday reasoning why stage 2 has found its way into
25	that's the Thursday morning.	25	a Tuesday version of a stage 2, because as I say the amount
1	Page 14228	1	Page 14230
1	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, on any morning, if you were, until you go to stage 3 you're not going to	1	of sleep I'd had on the Tuesday night, I don't recall very much detail unless I look at things which trigger memory
3	need more than six, is that not correct?	3	concerning all of that.
4	COLONEL SCOTT: I'm not, - you're	4	CHAIRPERSON: I think that the sleep you
5	talking, which version or stage there, is it the Wednesday	5	had on the Monday night, Tuesday morning?
6	morning suggested encirclement?	6	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
7	MR CHASKALSON SC: Any version of stage	7	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, okay, so I understand
8	3, are you ever going to need more than six, - or let's put	8	there is a fair degree of reconstruction and hindsight
9	the question differently. Are you ever going to need more	9	which of course may be less than perfect.
10	than six barbed wire Nyalas for any of the versions of	10	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
11	stage 2?	11	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and what I'm
		1	• • • •
12	COLONEL SCOTT: For stage 2, no, but I	12	interested in is, was there any suggestion on the Tuesday
12 13	COLONEL SCOTT: For stage 2, no, but I must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how	12 13	interested in is, was there any suggestion on the Tuesday or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required
	-		
13	must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how	13	or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required
13 14	must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how many were there, the idea was just to place the razor wire	13 14	or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required in order to create a neutral area which members of the
13 14 15	must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how many were there, the idea was just to place the razor wire out between the police and, on the stage 2 version of, - on	13 14 15	or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required in order to create a neutral area which members of the service and the media could be protected, or did that only
13 14 15 16	must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how many were there, the idea was just to place the razor wire out between the police and, on the stage 2 version of, - on the Tuesday version of stage 2.	13 14 15 16	or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required in order to create a neutral area which members of the service and the media could be protected, or did that only surface as an idea on either the Wednesday or the Thursday?
13 14 15 16 17	must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how many were there, the idea was just to place the razor wire out between the police and, on the stage 2 version of, - on the Tuesday version of stage 2. MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, but the question	13 14 15 16 17	or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required in order to create a neutral area which members of the service and the media could be protected, or did that only surface as an idea on either the Wednesday or the Thursday? COLONEL SCOTT: It is possible,
13 14 15 16 17 18	must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how many were there, the idea was just to place the razor wire out between the police and, on the stage 2 version of, - on the Tuesday version of stage 2. MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, but the question was, if you are at stage 2 and not stage 3, the only	13 14 15 16 17 18	or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required in order to create a neutral area which members of the service and the media could be protected, or did that only surface as an idea on either the Wednesday or the Thursday? COLONEL SCOTT: It is possible, Chairperson, that it only came up with more thought and
<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> </ol>	must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how many were there, the idea was just to place the razor wire out between the police and, on the stage 2 version of, - on the Tuesday version of stage 2. MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, but the question was, if you are at stage 2 and not stage 3, the only operational number that you need is six, you don't need	<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> </ol>	or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required in order to create a neutral area which members of the service and the media could be protected, or did that only surface as an idea on either the Wednesday or the Thursday? COLONEL SCOTT: It is possible, Chairperson, that it only came up with more thought and detail into the plan on the Wednesday, because as I said on
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how many were there, the idea was just to place the razor wire out between the police and, on the stage 2 version of, - on the Tuesday version of stage 2. MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, but the question was, if you are at stage 2 and not stage 3, the only operational number that you need is six, you don't need more than six. Well, can we agree on that much?	<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> </ol>	or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required in order to create a neutral area which members of the service and the media could be protected, or did that only surface as an idea on either the Wednesday or the Thursday? COLONEL SCOTT: It is possible, Chairperson, that it only came up with more thought and detail into the plan on the Wednesday, because as I said on the Tuesday we, or I concentrated very much on the stage 1,
<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> </ol>	must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how many were there, the idea was just to place the razor wire out between the police and, on the stage 2 version of, - on the Tuesday version of stage 2. MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, but the question was, if you are at stage 2 and not stage 3, the only operational number that you need is six, you don't need more than six. Well, can we agree on that much? COLONEL SCOTT: Again I say to you that	<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> </ol>	or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required in order to create a neutral area which members of the service and the media could be protected, or did that only surface as an idea on either the Wednesday or the Thursday? COLONEL SCOTT: It is possible, Chairperson, that it only came up with more thought and detail into the plan on the Wednesday, because as I said on the Tuesday we, or I concentrated very much on the stage 1, on the phase 1, the deployment of the negotiated and the
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<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> <li>25</li> </ol>	must also say that on the Tuesday I wasn't counting how many were there, the idea was just to place the razor wire out between the police and, on the stage 2 version of, - on the Tuesday version of stage 2. MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, but the question was, if you are at stage 2 and not stage 3, the only operational number that you need is six, you don't need more than six. Well, can we agree on that much? COLONEL SCOTT: Again I say to you that no detail on the Tuesday was given to it. On the Wednesday, I'm not too sure, well, in my, how can I put it,	<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> </ol>	or the Tuesday afternoon that razor wire would be required in order to create a neutral area which members of the service and the media could be protected, or did that only surface as an idea on either the Wednesday or the Thursday? COLONEL SCOTT: It is possible, Chairperson, that it only came up with more thought and detail into the plan on the Wednesday, because as I said on the Tuesday we, or I concentrated very much on the stage 1, on the phase 1, the deployment of the negotiated and the others were more conceptual in name although I had a rough idea of what should be happening in each, so it is possible

1	Page 14231	1	Page 14233
1 2	CHAIRPERSON: That means, does it not, that the razor wire as of Tuesday would only have been	1 2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. MR CHASKALSON SC: So when you put your
3	envisaged for use in the encirclement process. The idea of	2	mind to it you thought that six was what you needed for
4	using it for another purpose, i.e. demarcating a neutral	4	phase 2?
4 5	area, that's something that only arose later or appears to	4 5	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
6	have, would that be right?	6	MR CHASKALSON SC: So we're someway along
7	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, Chairperson.	7	the line to the answer to the first question, there were
8	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, going back a	, 8	eight Nyalas, eight barbed wire trailers at the disposal of
9	few steps, I'm still trying to establish how many barbed	9	SAPS and it doesn't seem from your evidence that there is
10	wire Nyalas were available for the SAPS. We know that as	10	any real reason to believe that any of them were not in a
11	of the morning the minute recorded eight were available if	11	condition to be used, is that fair?
12	needed, if the need arises. Did anyone inform you	12	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, it is, - yes, from
13	specifically that some of these eight were not serviceable?	13	what I know, yes.
14	COLONEL SCOTT: No.	14	MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, somebody else may
15	MR CHASKALSON SC: So if I understand	15	come and testify with personal knowledge, but from your
16	your evidence correctly then, the only fact from which you	16	knowledge. There is then the second question which is, how
17	might infer that one or two of them were not serviceable is	17	many do you need to encircle the koppie? Your first answer
18	that you've seen a picture of one or two of them on the	18	was seven, you now seem to be suggesting that you need a
19	helicopter side of the field at the JOC?	19	bit more than seven. Can you explain why?
20	COLONEL SCOTT: And I vaguely recall it	20	COLONEL SCOTT: That's why I said seven
21	has been mentioned and I'm sure it can be clarified if	21	is, if we're doing an early morning encirclement where
22	those dealings specifically with those vehicles, etcetera,	22	there is a very few people at the koppie and you have to
23	were to just be asked.	23	just do a basic tight circle around those that are there,
24	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, we will ask but	24	the moment the crowd got to a larger crowd, if encirclement
25	you vaguely recall it being mentioned but no one	25	was still going to be applicable then one would need more
1	Page 14232 specifically informed you that any of them were	1	Page 14234 than ten, because the radius went from roughly a 700 metre
2	unserviceable?	2	to a kilometre plus of razor wire required.
3	COLONEL SCOTT: No.	3	MR CHASKALSON SC: We're on the same
4	MR CHASKALSON SC: Alright, now the fact	4	page, Colonel. So for an early morning encirclement you
5	that they were on the helicopter side of the JOC, I want to	5	needed seven, it appears you had eight. Once the crowd
6	put to you, is neutral in relation to whether or not they	6	starts gathering the situation changes materially as far as
7	were available because the vehicles that were in the	7	encirclement is concerned and thereafter you're going to
8	operational area of the JOC so to speak, would be vehicles	8	need more than seven, you're suggesting possibly ten.
9	that were needed immediately for operational purposes and	9	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
10	if we're at stage 2 on Wednesday, - if we're only	10	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now the line that you
11	anticipating stage 2, either at Wednesday or on Thursday,	11	drew around the koppie in that original plan, that blue
12		12	line, that was a line that could have been accommodated by
12	it is only six razor wire trailers that are going to be		
13	it is only six razor wire trailers that are going to be needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct?	13	seven.
			seven. COLONEL SCOTT: To the best of my
13	needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct?	13	
13 14	needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I never took much	13 14	COLONEL SCOTT: To the best of my
13 14 15	needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I never took much notice of the actual amount of razor wire trailers to be	13 14 15	COLONEL SCOTT: To the best of my recollection, I'm not sure if I measured that one
13 14 15 16	needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I never took much notice of the actual amount of razor wire trailers to be honest, with the deployment of a stage 2. What was there,	13 14 15 16	COLONEL SCOTT: To the best of my recollection, I'm not sure if I measured that one specifically, but at some stage along the line I actually
13 14 15 16 17	needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I never took much notice of the actual amount of razor wire trailers to be honest, with the deployment of a stage 2. What was there, if we were going to go to a stage 2, it would have been	13 14 15 16 17	COLONEL SCOTT: To the best of my recollection, I'm not sure if I measured that one specifically, but at some stage along the line I actually measured the distance to needing about seven, which was
13 14 15 16 17 18	needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I never took much notice of the actual amount of razor wire trailers to be honest, with the deployment of a stage 2. What was there, if we were going to go to a stage 2, it would have been dealt with more in detail when that call was made.	13 14 15 16 17 18	COLONEL SCOTT: To the best of my recollection, I'm not sure if I measured that one specifically, but at some stage along the line I actually measured the distance to needing about seven, which was about 700 metres, yes.
<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> </ol>	needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I never took much notice of the actual amount of razor wire trailers to be honest, with the deployment of a stage 2. What was there, if we were going to go to a stage 2, it would have been dealt with more in detail when that call was made. MR CHASKALSON SC: But, Colonel, that	13 14 15 16 17 18 19	COLONEL SCOTT:To the best of myrecollection, I'm not sure if I measured that onespecifically, but at some stage along the line I actuallymeasured the distance to needing about seven, which wasabout 700 metres, yes.MR CHASKALSON SC:So provided you were
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I never took much notice of the actual amount of razor wire trailers to be honest, with the deployment of a stage 2. What was there, if we were going to go to a stage 2, it would have been dealt with more in detail when that call was made. MR CHASKALSON SC: But, Colonel, that call ultimately was made on the morning of the 16th and you	<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> </ol>	COLONEL SCOTT:To the best of myrecollection, I'm not sure if I measured that onespecifically, but at some stage along the line I actuallymeasured the distance to needing about seven, which wasabout 700 metres, yes.MR CHASKALSON SC:So provided you weremoving to stage 3 and encirclement first thing in the
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<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> </ol>	needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I never took much notice of the actual amount of razor wire trailers to be honest, with the deployment of a stage 2. What was there, if we were going to go to a stage 2, it would have been dealt with more in detail when that call was made. MR CHASKALSON SC: But, Colonel, that call ultimately was made on the morning of the 16th and you handed out detailed maps with very detailed positioning of the barbed wire Nyalas, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. MR CHASKALSON SC: And you provided very	<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> </ol>	COLONEL SCOTT: To the best of my recollection, I'm not sure if I measured that one specifically, but at some stage along the line I actually measured the distance to needing about seven, which was about 700 metres, yes. MR CHASKALSON SC: So provided you were moving to stage 3 and encirclement first thing in the morning, you had the barbed wire Nyalas at your disposal to do that once the crowd gathered it was a difficult
<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> <li>24</li> </ol>	needed to be in the operational area, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: Well, I never took much notice of the actual amount of razor wire trailers to be honest, with the deployment of a stage 2. What was there, if we were going to go to a stage 2, it would have been dealt with more in detail when that call was made. MR CHASKALSON SC: But, Colonel, that call ultimately was made on the morning of the 16th and you handed out detailed maps with very detailed positioning of the barbed wire Nyalas, is that not correct? COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> <li>23</li> </ol>	COLONEL SCOTT: To the best of my recollection, I'm not sure if I measured that one specifically, but at some stage along the line I actually measured the distance to needing about seven, which was about 700 metres, yes. MR CHASKALSON SC: So provided you were moving to stage 3 and encirclement first thing in the morning, you had the barbed wire Nyalas at your disposal to do that once the crowd gathered it was a difficult situation though.

1	Page 14235 bit of a digression triggered by questions from the	1	Page 14237 again.
2	Commissioners. I want to go back to the contemporaneous	2	MR CHASKALSON SC: JJJ07 –
3	documents, because we're almost at the end of the list of	3	CHAIRPERSON: Yes?
4	actual contemporaneous documents which were produced on or	4	MR CHASKALSON SC: Point 1020196, and
5	before 16 August. The next document that we'd been able to	5	1020197. Those are two photographs taken at the JOC on the
6	identify as a contemporaneous, a genuine contemporaneous	6	16th, on the evening of the 16th, round about 7:27, and my
7	document, is a presentation called "Ops Platinum Cordon and	7	question to you is, are these the gridded photographs to
8	Search.pptx." That will be JJJ48, and Commissioners,	8	which you're referring in your statement, are these the
9	that's at pages 669 to 679 of file 3.	9	photographs that were handed out to the commanders on the
10	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that exhibit then will	10	morning of the 16th?
11	be so marked, JJJ48, Ops Platinum Cordon and Search. The	11	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct. They
12	document, as you say, is the document which is in file 3 at	12	were given out to show the stage, or the phase 2 deployment
13	page 669 to 679.	13	to the commanders. So that was given to the commanders
14	MR CHASKALSON SC: And Colonel, to us	14	just after the JOCCOM of the 16th in the morning 6 o'clock
15	this seems to be the cordon and search plan which you	15	JOCCOM, about half past 8, before 9 o'clock, before they
16	describe in your statement as having worked on after the	16	left to brief their members.
17	JOC of the morning of the 16th. It's page 77, paragraph	17	MR CHASKALSON SC: Thank you, Colonel.
18	9.5.	18	Then there are two other files from the 16th that we have
19	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	19	been able to find. The one is the one that we have already
20	MR CHASKALSON SC: Then there is a	20	discussed in relation to those slides about AMCU and
21	document which we have already – no, I'm getting ahead of	21	protesters. That's the presentation file Ops Platinum
22	myself. Then in terms of contemporaneous documents, I want	22	JJJ50, and you've already confirmed that that's the file to
23	to refer you to aspects of your statement. At page 74,	23	which you're referring in paragraph 46.2.7 at page 133 as
24	paragraph 9.4, you mention that at the 6 o'clock JOC on the	24	the presentation saved as Operation Platinum where you
25	16th of August you spoke to a Google Earth satellite photo	25	tried in the immediate aftermath of the events of the 16th
	Page 14236		Page 14238
1	on which icons had been arranged.	1	to, as it were, set out the briefings that you had given.
2	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
3	MR CHASKALSON SC: And if I can just	3	MR CHASKALSON SC: Then there is also one
4	quote from that statement, "When I was asked to show the deployment I briefed the commanders by showing the mission	4	last file which is called "Ops Platinum Action.kmz," a
5 6	and strategic guidelines, and then speaking directly to the	5	Google Earth file called "Ops Platinum Action.kmz," JJJ46 at pages 142 to 144 of file 1, and I wonder if we can call
7	Google Earth satellite photo with icons arranged on it,"	6 7	that file up. Can we call up Ops Platinum Action?
8	and then later on you mention, in fact when you're talking	8	Colonel, there appears to be a bit of a delay in getting
9	about your briefing at 1:30, it's page 80, paragraph 12.4,	9	Ops Platinum Action. Maybe we can come back to it later.
10	you mention that you'd printed out the Google Earth	10	For present purposes, do you have access to your Ops
11	satellite photo for the commanders for the phase 2	11	Platinum Action?
12	deployment, and I take that to refer – not in fact I take	12	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
13	it to refer, what you say at paragraph 12.4, "I asked if I	13	MR CHASKALSON SC: Can you confirm that
14	may suggest a course of action, to which I was given the	14	it's a Google Earth file that you created on the evening of
15	floor to brief the JOCCOM. I explained on the Google Earth	15	the 16th after the tragedy?
16	satellite photo which I had printed out for the commanders	16	COLONEL SCOTT: It's maybe just important
17	that morning for the phase 2 deployment, where I felt the	17	to point out that when the kmz file is saved into a
18	dispersion should take place."	18	document outside of Google, it's when it gets its name or
1		19	its date properties. So yes, it is created on the 16th, I
19	Now we don't necessarily have that actual photo,		
19 20	Now we don't necessarily have that actual photo, but what we do have is photographs that Captain Van Heerden	20	think around 18:00 or somewhere, but it's not to say that
		20 21	think around 18:00 or somewhere, but it's not to say that that's when the icons necessarily were placed.
20	but what we do have is photographs that Captain Van Heerden		-
<b>20</b> 21	but what we do have is photographs that Captain Van Heerden took of the JOC on the 16th, which I think might depict that	21	that's when the icons necessarily were placed.
20 21 22	but what we do have is photographs that Captain Van Heerden took of the JOC on the 16th, which I think might depict that photo, and if I can show you two gridded maps on the wall of the JOC on the 16th, which will be exhibits JJJ07, 1020196, which is the number of Captain Van Heerden's –	21 22	that's when the icons necessarily were placed. MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, well that leads
20 21 22 23	but what we do have is photographs that Captain Van Heerden took of the JOC on the 16th, which I think might depict that photo, and if I can show you two gridded maps on the wall of the JOC on the 16th, which will be exhibits JJJ07,	21 22 23	that's when the icons necessarily were placed. MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, well that leads to my next question, which is I assume that you actually

	Page 14239		Page 14241
1	scratch, but working from the Google Earth file that you'd	1	MR CHASKALSON SC: If we go to the key,
2	used to brief the commanders at 2:30. Is that correct?	2	for what it's worth, can we just click on the key, that
3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.	3	yellow zone remains Nyala line. Can we just click on –
4	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now that it's up, I	4	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
5	wonder if we can zoom in? And possibly zoom in quite a lot	5	MR CHASKALSON SC: - Nyala line, and re-
6	further because we want to go a little bit west. And now	6	click. Was it meant to describe a Nyala line?
7	down at this point. Now there are two icons of sort of	7	COLONEL SCOTT: No, as I say, what you're
8	flames at scene 1 and scene 2. I presume that those would	8	showing there was put together on the Tuesday and
9	have been added after the event.	9	throughout the duration of the Wednesday, Thursday, instead
9 10			
		10	of recreating whole new icons, because the members don't
11	MR CHASKALSON SC: And I recall you	11	look at what's on the key, they look at what's on the
12	testifying, or possibly a passage in your statement that a	12	screen, I would just manipulate the Nyala line now to show
13	range of details relating to – sorry, if we can just zoom	13	a police safe area.
14	back then these details will become apparent. If we can	14	MR CHASKALSON SC: Alright, Colonel.
15	stop there. A range of those details flagging potential	15	From as far as we can work out, there are no other
16	vulnerable points from a Lonmin perspective, or potential	16	contemporaneous files on your computer that would describe
17	Lonmin targets, were added after the event. That's my	17	plans in a form that they were saved between 13 and 16
18	recollection. I don't want to put it any -	18	August. Are you aware of any?
19	COLONEL SCOTT: They were added during	19	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
20	the event. I think it was the Wednesday with Mr Dirk	20	MR CHASKALSON SC: Sorry, yes you are
21	Botes.	21	aware of any?
22	MR CHASKALSON SC: Thank you. So what	22	COLONEL SCOTT: No, I'm aware of what
23	you would have added after the event is the flames at scene	23	you're saying, yes.
24	1 and scene 2. Is there anything else you would have added	24	CHAIRPERSON: You agree with what Mr
25	after the event?	25	Chaskalson is putting to you? He's listed the
	Page 14240		Page 14242
1	Page 14240 COLONEL SCOTT: I may have adjusted the	1	Page 14242 contemporaneous documents.
1 2	9	1 2	-
	COLONEL SCOTT: I may have adjusted the		contemporaneous documents.
2	COLONEL SCOTT: I may have adjusted the red Nyalas, just looking at the positioning of them to	2	contemporaneous documents. COLONEL SCOTT: That's right,
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1	Page 14243	1	Page 14245
1	encirclement plan. If I can – CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I interpose?	1	now quite clearly. It was only triggered to my memory in
2 3	CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I interpose? Have you seen Brigadier Engelbrecht's statement?	2	about June this year when somebody actually mentioned the cattle issue. I totally completely forgot about it, and
4	COLONEL SCOTT: I have, Chairperson.	4	then of course that raised more issues about did we have
4	MR CHASKALSON SC: Chairperson, it will	4 5	sufficient wire, why were the people sitting so widely
	be JJJ167 and if we can call it up, the passage that I'm	6	spread out. We initially thought possibly that somebody
6 7	interested in starts on page 4, paragraph 7, and if we can	7	inside the JOC – and regrettably I must say we thought
		8	possibly some of the Lonmin personnel sitting behind the
8	just start on page 4, "On 15 August 2012 I attended a JOC	9	CCTV cameras may be leaking out what our possible plans
9 10	meeting early in the morning," and then the Brigadier describes matters relating to his reports, and over the	10	were to the protesters, because of the fact that they had
11	page where he's still describing what happened at the	11	spread themselves out so widely, and this triggered a
12	JOCCOM, keep going down, approximately 10 lines down on	12	conversation on – and for that matter I think General
13	what we can see, "I recall that during this meeting	13	Annandale, if I can recall, called a meeting on phase 3 to
14	Lieutenant-Colonel Scott explained how the disarming and	14	say listen, let's review it, let's see what's going on, and
15	dispersal would happen, and he did so by way of a	15	I don't remember presenting the actual presentation as it's
16	PowerPoint presentation. As explained by Lieutenant-	16	said there, but I don't deny it either. I think I probably
17	Colonel Scott, the operation would include trying to	17	did, and then of course there's $-$ I'm not sure if I'm
18	encircle the protesters at the koppie with barbed wire,	18	running ahead of the Advocate, but there were certain
19	making an opening in the cordoned off area and then	19	reasonings given for why a phase 3 wouldn't work, and
20	processing the protesters through the opening." So	20	amongst others I know the point I raised was thinking of it
21	Brigadier Engelbrecht recalls a presentation of the	21	then, what happens if the group of strikers simply stood up
22	encirclement plan. Do you recall making that presentation?	22	and walked away while we were trying to encircle the koppie
23	COLONEL SCOTT: I initially didn't until	23	and we encircled an empty koppie and they'd be maybe 400
24	I read his statement and it's my opinion, but I think where	24	metres or so away. General Annandale raised the point that
25	he's maybe not quite on par is that this meeting took place	25	if we did succeed in encircling them, that we could have a
	Page 14244		Page 14246
1	after the JOCCOM, not during the JOCCOM.	1	humanitarian crisis on hand because if they decided not to
2	after the JOCCOM, not during the JOCCOM. MR CHASKALSON SC: So it was later on in	2	humanitarian crisis on hand because if they decided not to come out we would have weather conditions to contend with
2 3	after the JOCCOM, not during the JOCCOM. MR CHASKALSON SC: So it was later on in the morning?	2 3	humanitarian crisis on hand because if they decided not to come out we would have weather conditions to contend with if it got to night-time and these people were cold. We
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1	Page 14247		Page 14249
1	but also for the phase 2, and they were only pre-positioned	1	thought about encirclement, you were already thinking of
2	as they were to form a barrier, so – and so this fell into	2	early in the morning, first light.
3	line for me when I made my consolidated statement, to get	3	COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct.
4	the times right, the sequencing of when the actual	4	CHAIRPERSON: So if you can't remember
5	decisions and so on were taking place.	5	this, you can't help me, but this reference to your talking
6	CHAIRPERSON: This encirclement that you	6	about an attempt to encircle would that have been in this
7	are talking about according to Brigadier Engelbrecht on the	7	particular context? A reference to an attempt, envisaged
8	Wednesday, would that have been, this is what you were	8	or suggested attempt on the Thursday morning.
9	talking about at the time, would that have been on the	9	COLONEL SCOTT: No, Chairperson, but what
10	Thursday morning?	10	I think was happening there was the idea of encirclement
11	COLONEL SCOTT: Wednesday morning.	11	was being explored to see whether it was feasible anyway
12	CHAIRPERSON: No, no, this is the	12	beyond what its initial planning was to be, and whether it
13 14	discussion on Wednesday. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	13	could handle the greater group if necessary, if
		14	encirclement was still going to become an option and that's
15 16	CHAIRPERSON: As you see, at the foot of what we can see on the screen.	15 16	why I say - CHAIRPERSON: - I talked about envisaged
17	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.		CHAIRPERSON: - I talked about envisaged or suggested, obviously we don't know what exactly was
18	CHAIRPERSON: I have never seen the	17 18	discussed, we can only go on what is on the screen at the
19	statement before but he talks about the summit to be held	19	moment.
20	the next day, the 16th, so therefore he's talking about that	20	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
21	day, the 15th, the Wednesday. And he says, "as explained by	20	CHAIRPERSON: But so you say that there
22	Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, the operation would include	22	was also a discussion, examination perhaps of a possible
23	trying to encircle protesters at the koppie with barbed	23	encirclement not at first light, but during the course of
24	wire," and then he goes on. Now, if you said, I mean, if	24	the day on Wednesday afternoon. Is that so?
25	you can't remember saying it, well, you can't answer the	25	COLONEL SCOTT: I don't remember it being
1	Page 14248	1	Page 14250
1	question, but if that's what you said, well, if he's	1	for Wednesday afternoon that there was ever said there was
2	question, but if that's what you said, well, if he's correct in saying this is what you said, then would that	2	for Wednesday afternoon that there was ever said there was going to be a planned encirclement for that time. I know
2 3	question, but if that's what you said, well, if he's correct in saying this is what you said, then would that proposed encirclement, or that attempted encirclement	2 3	for Wednesday afternoon that there was ever said there was going to be a planned encirclement for that time. I know that it was always there as a considered option, it was
2 3 4	question, but if that's what you said, well, if he's correct in saying this is what you said, then would that proposed encirclement, or that attempted encirclement that's talked about there, have been envisaged to take	2 3 4	for Wednesday afternoon that there was ever said there was going to be a planned encirclement for that time. I know that it was always there as a considered option, it was something that we had to have as part of the plan, a
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	question, but if that's what you said, well, if he's correct in saying this is what you said, then would that proposed encirclement, or that attempted encirclement that's talked about there, have been envisaged to take place on the Thursday? Before you answer the question, Advocate Hemraj points out that we can see that from the foot, from the top of what's on the screen, that a decision was taken, that's on the Wednesday, that SAPS would not proceed with the disarming and disbursal operation that afternoon so there wasn't going to be a proactive rumour, we talking about proactive and reactive. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: There wouldn't have been any proactive action – COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: - on the Wednesday. COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: So therefore disarming and dispersal which would have been proactive, wasn't going to happen on the Wednesday afternoon. COLONEL SCOTT: That is correct. CHAIRPERSON: And then they, he goes on to talk about the operation would include trying to	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	for Wednesday afternoon that there was ever said there was going to be a planned encirclement for that time. I know that it was always there as a considered option, it was something that we had to have as part of the plan, a tactical option. And for that matter, if it was called upon on Wednesday, we would need to have produced something on Wednesday, and I think maybe that's why General Annandale was, just wanted to explore it further to see the feasibility of it because what I had initially planned it for was very limited, to the early morning, and should an encirclement or a tactical option be necessary for going into the day where there's more people, that's what was I think being explored here to see whether it's still going to be feasible or not, and I know there's another picture somewhere that I've saved at some stage where I've seen the wires were even moved to try and see how it would, if we used the natural barrier, being the power station to see how much extension we can get using the power station as a base and whether the Nyalas would then still fit around, but there were too many aspects that were brought up that spoke to this not being a feasible option, thus the decision to rather disperse smaller groups and then deal with them.

1	Page 14251		Page 14253
	difficulties of the encirclement tactical option, the	1	MR CHASKALSON: So Lieutenant-Colonel
2	cattle, the humanitarian risk, the risk that the protesters	2	Merafe's question as it were, would not have been part of
3	might just step outside the encirclement zone, that	3	those discussions.
4	discussion you thought for many months had taken on the	4	COLONEL SCOTT: No.
5	Thursday, is that what you said?	5	MR CHASKALSON: Now Brigadier
6		6	Engelbrecht, when – if I understood your evidence
7	COLONEL SCOTT: Ja, it may have been until we got to Roots or somewhere around there when it	7	correctly, you referred to – well, let me ask the question
	с. С		
8	was, more was put into context about what happened, but	8	differently. When did it strike you that Brigadier
9	initially, for instance, another example is Colonel Merafe,	9	Engelbrecht's presence would have been indicative of the
10	I remember him standing up and asking a question in the JOC	10	fact that these conversations took place on the Wednesday,
11	to General Annandale, and I was convinced as well that that	11	rather than the Thursday? When? When did that penny drop
12	was Thursday, that was the Thursday morning JOCCOM, and I	12	as it were?
13	was only later shown that he wasn't there on the Thursday	13	COLONEL SCOTT: Well, his confirmation of
14	as well, it was the Wednesday. And I can only attribute	14	this was now recently, a week or two back, it was a
15	this to – I actually drew my vehicle's AVL, which is the	15	confirmation to me of that fact, because as I say, I
16	tracking device in the vehicle, and looking at the times	16	really, and I am referring now way back to initially after
17	that it was switched on, switched off, I am getting to an	17	the operation, when I was, I thought that that whole – not,
18	average of about four hours sleep a night during that week,	18	and I don't even recall him particularly being there, and
19	and thinking back to that, it was actually, felt strange	19	the possibility of that as well, his possible explanation
20	that it was only a three day operation, it felt longer, it	20	for that is that when I had gone out to actually get the
21	felt as though it was a four to five day operation that was	21	prints done every morning for the people that were newly
22	actually underway. So this is why placing issues back to	22	arrived, it's possible the conversation already stated up,
23	where they belonged in sequence was a bit difficult. I	23	because I've read in this statement, but there are issues
24	could remember them, but I couldn't quite remember where	24	he's raising there with regard to the intelligence that I
25	they were positioned precisely on what day. And those were	25	don't recall. So it's possible that was said in me busy
1	Page 14252	1	Page 14254
1 2	two issues that I had, I had placed on Thursday which was shown to me that the two members that I'd thought on the	1	printing out the hand-outs for the commanders, but coming back in, again I don't really recall giving that briefing
2	Thursday, were not there.	3	but it's very possible I did, where I was told, put up
4	MR CHASKALSON: Well, let's – the two	4	phase 3, let's have a look at it, and we proceeded from
5	members I understand you to refer to are Colonel Merafe and	5	there.
	Brigadier Engelbrecht.	5	
6		6	
7		6	MR CHASKALSON: But you see you said for
7 8	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	7	MR CHASKALSON: But you see you said for many months you thought that these discussions happened on
8	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes. MR CHASKALSON: Colonel Merafe, you	7 8	MR CHASKALSON: But you see you said for many months you thought that these discussions happened on the Thursday.
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1	Page 14255 convenient, we will take the tea adjournment. If you want	1	Page 14257 MR CHASKALSON SC: Certainly.
2	to round this point off first, you can do so, if you want	2	COLONEL SCOTT: When we look at the
3	to stop now, I am in your hands.	3	pictures to follow this one, Chairperson, and to start with
4	MR CHASKALSON: If we might stop at this	4	this one, on the Wednesday afternoon at some stage
4 5	point.	4 5	Brigadiers Tsiloane and Fritz were requested to start
6	CHAIRPERSON: We take the tea		-
7	adjournment?	6	looking at the planning of the cordon and searches
8	[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]	7	operations for phase 6 and one can see that in the middle
		8	of the picture is the mine hostels of Wonderkop. So what's
9	[15:29] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.	9	shown to the left, being the amended encirclement type
10	Colonel, you're still under oath.	10	strategy, was something that I can only think was done
11	DUNCAN GEORGE SCOTT: s.u.o.	11	earlier in the day when I was sitting with General
12	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Chaskalson.	12	Annandale to look at the options of whether encirclement
13	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CHASKALSON (CONTD.):	13	with a larger group would be feasible or not, because when
14	Chairperson, just to give the Commissioners a reference to	14	we do move to the next picture beyond this one, again we
15	the Brigadier Engelbrecht statement, it's file 3.5, pages	15	see that it moves to a, I think a hostel without the
16	2276 to 2282. 2276 to 2282.	16	vehicles and the wire in, and the pictures following that
17	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.	17	again to different hostels, being the Karee Hostel to the
18	MR CHASKALSON SC: Colonel, we were	18	east – ag, to the west, sorry. So these pictures were
19	discussing when the encirclement plan was abandoned and I	19	initially saved, thinking of the phase 6.
20	just want to refer you to a series of other contemporaneous	20	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but before we go away
21	documents that may be relevant in this regard. A short	21	from that point, we do notice what we had seen earlier -
22	while before the break you spoke about a file that you	22	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
23	found on your computer which had showed barbed wire being	23	CHAIRPERSON: - much earlier, that the
24	run from the power station, to try to use the power station	24	encirclement, if one can call it that, although it's no
25	as part of the cordon, as it were. I think we know the	25	longer a circle, it's now a horseshoe –
	Page 14256		Page 14258
1	Page 14256 file to which you're referring. It would be JJJ9.2 at page	1	Page 14258 COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
1 2	•	1 2	
	file to which you're referring. It would be JJJ9.2 at page		COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.
2	file to which you're referring. It would be JJJ9.2 at page 185 of file 3.1. I wonder if we can call up JJJ9.2 so that	2	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. CHAIRPERSON: - is half blue and half
2 3	file to which you're referring. It would be JJJ9.2 at page 185 of file 3.1. I wonder if we can call up JJJ9.2 so that you can just confirm that that is the –	2 3	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right. CHAIRPERSON: - is half blue and half orange.
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	Page 14259		Page 14261
1	the encirclement, the encirclement would be in the middle	1	MR CHASKALSON SC: If we can then go to
2	of the picture, and not the hostel, the mine hostel shown	2	11.jpg and call it JJJ9.3.
3	in orange, and if we do move to next pictures which were	3	COLONEL SCOTT: And I'm not sure if I
4	taken at 17:20:21:22, at that stage you'll see it's dealing	4	need to explain, but this is now looking at the areas that
5	solely with the hostels.	5	the cordon and search operation was looking at targeting,
6	CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you.	6	being the two hostels, Karee in yellow, Wonderkop in
7	I could understand that answer, but subject to this point;	7	orange, and the Nkaneng settlement in red. Again if you
8	that if these relate to the cordon and search and the areas	8	move on it, I think the next photo actually goes to each of
9	demarcated squatter camp and the mine hostels are the	9	those in turn.
10	places where the cordon and search is going to take place,	10	MR CHASKALSON SC: That's broadly
11	what we see on the, the horseshoe on the left would seem to	11	correct. If we can go to 12.jpg, which will be JJJ9.3 –
12	indicate that the cordon and search was planned against the	12	CHAIRPERSON: No, it won't; it will be
13	background of what looks like what we loosely call the	13	JJJ9.4.
14	encirclement, although it's a horseshoe, but obviously the	14	MR CHASKALSON SC: Sorry, 9.4. That's at
15	main focus of what we see is the cordon and search. But it	15	page 187 of the Commissioners' bundle. The earlier one was
16	appears to – I can't make this as a positive statement, I'm	16	at 186, and if we can just move on to 13.jpg, which will be
17	just asking you for your comment – it does look as if the	17	JJJ9.5 at 188, at page 188. Now –
18	horseshoe encirclement may well have been a given, as it	18	CHAIRPERSON: That will be 13.jpg, will
19	were, which was regarded as the necessary background for	19	it?
20	the cordon and search. How do you comment on that?	20	MR CHASKALSON SC: 13.jpg. Now the 11,
21	COLONEL SCOTT: I can understand that	21	12, and 13, were saved between 5:20PM and 5:22PM on the
22	it's viewed that way, Chairperson, but that's why I'm	22	15th, on the Wednesday. Is that correct?
23	saying I think if we do view the next photos to come, it	23	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct.
24	will show that these are supposed to be only dealing with	24	MR CHASKALSON SC: If we can go to the
25	the cordon and search, and I know General Annandale gave	25	plan for the cordon and search, that's JJJ48; we've
	Page 14260		Page 14262
1	the two brigadiers specifically instruction then, and on	1	referred to it already, and that may explain the sequence
2	the two brigadiers specifically instruction then, and on the Thursday morning I assisted them because they hadn't	2	referred to it already, and that may explain the sequence of photos.
	the two brigadiers specifically instruction then, and on the Thursday morning I assisted them because they hadn't yet had a full, or a briefing in place for that, and that's	2 3	referred to it already, and that may explain the sequence of photos. CHAIRPERSON: JJJJ?
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# Marikana Commission of Inquiry

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Pretoria

	Page 14267		Page 14269
1	CHAIRPERSON: You know you talked	1	initial interim operational strategy considered was to
2	previously about official JOCCOM meetings –	2	prevent the protestors from coming to the koppie armed by
3	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	3	deploying a filtering police line to search those
4	CHAIRPERSON: - and formal JOCCOM	4	approaching or moving along approach routes, to encircle
5	meeting, and so on. Was there a – I don't think we've got	5	the few protestors at the koppie estimated less than 50
6	minutes, have we, of a JOCCOM meeting on the Wednesday	6	disarmed, arrested and transport for processing to Marikana
7	night? We've got a transcript of certain discussions that	7	Police Station. This was deemed not feasible due to the
8	took place with General Mpembe on the one hand and Mr	8	forces called up from distant locations not having arrived
9	Zokwana and Mr Mathunjwa on the other, but there doesn't	9	yet and those who were there had not yet been orientated to
10	appear from the documents we've received to have been a	10	the mission area or briefed sufficiently," and then if we
11	formal minuted JOCCOM meeting on the Wednesday night. That	11	cut forward to slide 71 to 82, particularly slide 78 to 81,
12	is correct, I think, isn't it?	12	the clear suggestion that the revised stage 3 of disbursal
13	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct,	13	who was adopted on the Tuesday, so it sets out a stage 3 on
14	Chairperson. So yes, the, to the best of my recollection	14	slide 78. Stage 3 addressed the protestors to disburse
15	the first time that it was actually mentioned that the	15	into smaller groups to encircle and disarm, etcetera, an
16	strategy for phase 3 has changed, was at the 6 o'clock	16	option that was considered and deemed preferable was to
17	JOCCOM meeting of the Thursday.	17	disburse into smaller groups, encircle and disarm, the
18	MR CHASKALSON SC: And that's your	18	disbursing strategy, etcetera, etcetera. So that's the
19	recollection today. You say that at an earlier stage you	19	final strategy that was applied, is that not correct?
20	thought that it would have been later because all of those	20	COLONEL SCOTT: No, in the presentation
21	discussions about the difficulties with encirclement you	21	that was built for the Commission initially these were all
22	had thought had happened on the Thursday.	22	placed onto their own days and then it was thought that it
23	COLONEL SCOTT: That's correct, and I	23	is going to be confusing to run plans and then go to a new
24	also say that with the knowledge that the slides that still	24	day through all the histories and so on, so it was deemed
25	speak to encirclement on the morning of the, in the	25	that on the Tuesday it would just reflect the whole plan up
	Page 14268		Page 14270
1	coordinating instructions on the morning of the 16th is what	1	until the Thursday and then on the Thursday specifically
2	I would have been going back to, to check what was going on	2	speak to the plan itself again, and I think you'll find
3	in the morning meeting of the 16th, and as I say, later I	3	that even on the Wednesday there is no mention made of the
4	realised that I'd never really worked on, or completed	4	plan but it only speaks again on the Thursday to the
5	working on all those slides to present them on the morning	5	planning then. So the plans were initially split between
6	of the 16th.	6	the days and then brought back to just Tuesday so that the
7	[15:48] MR CHASKALSON SC: Okay, we'll get to	7	plan could be dealt with in whole instead of –
8	those slides in due course. I just want to clarify what	8	MR CHASKALSON SC: But you have a
9	your recollection today is first before we interrogate it.	9	presentation that is bookended by day, as it were, so there
10	So, to put it this way, you're quite clear that in terms of	10	is a slide that says Tuesday, 14 August and that slide is,
11	formal JOCCOMs, it was no earlier than the JOCCOM of the	11	I think that slide would have been slide 62, if we go to
12	16th, that the encirclement plan was taken off the table.	12	slide 62, so that's the introduction to Tuesday.
13	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.	13	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
14	MR CHASKALSON SC: Now I want to put to	14	MR CHASKALSON SC: And then shortly after
15	you some difficulties I have with other versions that had	15	that we hear that the encirclement plan was considered but
16	come out of SAPS in relation to that issue and the first is	16	abandoned because forces haven't been orientated yet.
17	Exhibit L, because if we go to Exhibit L, the very clear	17	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes.
18	message conveyed by Exhibit L is that in fact the	18	MR CHASKALSON SC: A little lower down,
19	encirclement plan wasn't abandoned on the Thursday, it was	19	still under Tuesday and before we get to Wednesday we see a
20	abandoned on the Tuesday. So if we can start at slide 63	20	stage 3 that describes a new stage 3, a disbursal and
21	of Exhibit L -	21	disarm stage 3 which is not the encirclement stage 3 and we
22	CHAIRPERSON: You said slide 63?	22	only get to Wednesday much later at slide 111. So when we
23	MR CHASKALSON SC: 63.	23	read the presentation and when we saw the presentation, our
24	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.	24	clear understanding was that the disbursal plan had been on
25	MR CHASKALSON SC: And it says at 6, "The	25	the table since Tuesday afternoon and that the encirclement
A	RCHIVE FOR JUSTICE		

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Page 14271 plan had been abandoned on Tuesday afternoon, but that we know is incorrect. Are you suggesting, - well, can you just repeat your explanation for it? COLONEL SCOTT: As I said the plan in its whole to show the stages, was initially split between the days and then it was brought all back to the Tuesday, so that when dealing with the plan it would deal with the whole plan so that the person that was understanding the presentation would understand then thereon and then only on the Thursday, specifically to the Thursday it was mentioned again. I'm also just trying to get two slides, - I'll actually also go to look in certain of the presentations before the final presentation L. MR CHASKALSON SC: We're going to stay	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Page 14273 feasible? Is it not feasible, so it is abandoned, your reason for not feasible is that there weren't enough personnel, as I understand it, well, the forces have not arrived, at that time. COLONEL SCOTT: We're going back to the initial plan now? COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: No, we're going to slide 63, the last point which says, this was deemed not feasible due to the forces called up from distant locations not having arrived yet and those who were there had not yet been orientated to - now what does that mean, does that mean that you had abandoned completely the encirclement at that stage? COLONEL SCOTT: For that day, that
15 16	with this topic tomorrow, so I wonder if I can ask you to do that looking overnight so that I can put all of my	15 16	envisioned time to execute that operation, Commissioner. COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: So was it never
17	concerns to you before we break shortly.	17	going to recur, the encirclement plan, was that ever going
18	COLONEL SCOTT: Because, and as I, if I	18	to recur or was it -
19	look even at slide 74 where the Google Earth pictures are	19	COLONEL SCOTT: It remained with me as an
20	put in to depict, it is also after the fact, built	20	option for Wednesday morning, where we're speaking to in
21 22	pictures, so there was no contemporaneous at this stage documentation put in on that –	21 22	slide 63, specifically speaking to the six o'clock of the Tuesday morning, that it was no longer feasible for them
22	CHAIRPERSON: There is a calendar at the	22	because of the swelling of the crowds, etcetera.
23	top right hand corner of the slide and what's the date	23	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: I'm sorry, Mr
25	depicted on the calendar?	25	Semenya.
1 2 3	Page 14272 COLONEL SCOTT: It is all on the Tuesday, - CHAIRPERSON: Ja –	1 2 3	Page 14274 CHAIRPERSON: And when did the crowd swell? I thought what's in here is something different, I'm not quarrelling with you, I'm just trying to understand
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	D 14275		D
1	Page 14275 encirclement then –	1	Page 14277 koppie armed by deploying a filtering police line to search
2	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes –	2	those approaching or moving along the approach routes, to
3	CHAIRPERSON: - with 3,000 people on the	3	encircle the few protestors at the koppie, estimated less
4	koppie.	4	than 50 disarm, arrest and transport for processing to
5	COLONEL SCOTT: That's right.	5	Marikana Police Station. This was deemed not feasible due
6	CHAIRPERSON: Ja.	6	to the forces called up from distant locations not having
7	MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, -	7	arrived yet and those who were there had not yet been
8	CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to make a	8	orientated to the mission area or briefed sufficiently."
9	point?	9	Then it shifts to the visible policing strategy,
10	MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, just going a little	10	but if we go down two pages or three pages to page 44,
11	back as to what calendar date is appearing in respect of	11	still under the heading, Tuesday, we get an operational
12	plans and what impression that creates, what the witness	12	overview of the plan which says, "Tactical option to
13	has also said is, if you look at Exhibit L you will not	13	encircle, enter into a dialogue or disarm because of
14	find plans for Wednesday.	14	logistical problems, specifically the lack of enough barbed
15	CHAIRPERSON: Ja, that is correct, yes.	15	wire, it was not considered further," still under Tuesday
16	MR SEMENYA SC: So it can't be that there	16	and then the second alternative, "To disburse into smaller
17	were no plans on Wednesday.	17	groups, encircle and disarm. It was the more manageable
18	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, no I understand	18	option and planning was done around this," and we only
19	that, you're making a point and I think it will be covered	19	reach Wednesday on page 63 at 2.2.6, if we can just drop
20	in argument later, but you're correct in pointing out that	20	down a little?
21	there were no plans on Wednesday.	21	So very clearly in the Wednesday section of the
22	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, Colonel, I've	22	narrative we have a statement effectively saying that the
23	heard your explanation, I should point out that the	23	encirclement, - sorry, in the Tuesday section of the
24	confusion that we experienced was reinforced by the	24	narrative we have a statement effectively saying that the
25	narrative document which came with the presentation,	25	encirclement plan is abandoned for logistical reasons this
	Page 14276		Page 14278
1	Page 14276 Exhibit HHH28, which also has headings for days and I'll	1	Page 14278 time and passed over in favour of the disburse and disarm
1 2		1 2	
	Exhibit HHH28, which also has headings for days and I'll just give you the references because I'm sure the explanation is the same but at page 41, paragraph 2.2.5 we		time and passed over in favour of the disburse and disarm plan and that all comes before Wednesday. Is there any explanation for that?
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	Page 14279		Page 14281
1	CHAIRPERSON: Alright.	1	disbursing strategy," and you go on to describe it.
2	MR CHASKALSON SC: I wonder if I can read	2	You don't mention encirclement and if we go down
3	this to you, Colonel, and maybe in relation to this you can	3	to page 10 at paragraph 18 we see that the discussion that
4	answer tomorrow morning, the last issue relates to your own	4	preceded all of this is all within the timeframe of
5	statement. Mr Budlender puts to Major-General Annandale,	5	Tuesday, because Wednesday only starts in paragraph 18 at
6	"General, the plan for operation platinum and stage 3 was	6	page 10. So the first statement makes no mention of the
7	in place before the evening of the 15th of August." Major-	7	encirclement plan and suggests to the reader at any rate,
8	General Annandale, "Dit is korrek, ja." So when he said	8	that disburse and disarm was the strategy on Tuesday. You
9	those words General Mpembe knew that stage 3 involved a	9	partially corrected that in your second statement which is
10	disbursal followed by a disarming, that was at a stage when	10	GG39. Can we call up GG39? GGG39, I'm sorry, at page 2.
11	we thought that that was what stage 3 was on the Wednesday	11	CHAIRPERSON: That was in the bundle of
12	night. Major-General Annandale, "Generaal Mpembe wou	12	statements we were given by the SAPS when the witness
13	oordra soos ek dit waargeneem het, dat daar 'n geweldige	13	testified in chief.
14	verantwoordelikheid is op die leierskap van die unies dat	14	[16:08] MR CHASKALSON SC: Yes, Chairperson, it
15	hul hulle lede so ver moet kry om die wapens neer te lê en	15	had been made an exhibit in fact before Colonel Scott's
16	uiteraard sou hy nie die totale strategie van die polisie	16	testimony. So in paragraph 2 you say, "The first fact to
17	op die tafel gelê het nie." Mr Budlender, "General, did	17	which I wish to point is that the initial operating
18	General Mpembe know when he said those words that stage 3	17	strategy that I had proposed at the JOC on the morning of
19	would involve disbursal and then disarming?" Major-General	10	Tuesday, 14 August 2012, was that the protesters must be
20	Annandale, "Dit was reeds die beplanning vanaf die Dinsdag	20	prevented from converging on the koppie armed with
21	middag."	21	dangerous weapons. I proposed that this should be done by
22	So that's an express statement from Major-General	22	deploying a filtering police line that would search those
23	Annandale that the plan was disburse and disarm from	23	approaching the koppie for dangerous weapons, which would
24	Tuesday afternoon, which of course ties in with the	24	be confiscated. At that time, around 6:00, there was an
25	impression that was created by the presentation and the	25	estimated group of 50 protesters at the koppie. I proposed
		20	
	Page 14280		Page 14282
1	narrative. Now you can't answer for Major-General	1	that these be encircled, disarmed, and arrested, in order
1 2	narrative. Now you can't answer for Major-General Annandale and you haven't had this section of the	1	•
	narrative. Now you can't answer for Major-General		that these be encircled, disarmed, and arrested, in order
2	narrative. Now you can't answer for Major-General Annandale and you haven't had this section of the transcript in front of you, so what I would suggest is that you look at it overnight, if there is something you do want	2	that these be encircled, disarmed, and arrested, in order to prevent an escalation of violence." Next paragraph, "That strategy was abandoned because additional forces that had been called from distant areas had not yet arrived by
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2	would come related to the operation as such. But initially	
3	I only wrote to what had happened and not to what had been	
4	proposed to happen, and that didn't take place. So FFF18	
5	is simply speaking to the events that occurred, and again	
6	with the same strategy, as I say there, trying to educate	
_		
7	the reader with regard to the full plan, and then take it	
8	back into the context of the days. GGG39, the issue there?	
9	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, you saw fit to	
10	mention the encirclement plan.	
11	COLONEL SCOTT: Yes, that was now not in	
12	the light of the phase strategy, the sequential phase	
13	strategy of 1 to 6. I'm speaking there to specifically the	
14	initial plan, the standalone plan of the Tuesday morning,	
15	and in my consolidated statement, as I say, when I put	
16	everything into context, everything that I could remember,	
17	that is when I mentioned it to be part of the phase 3 for	
18	the Tuesday afternoon, to be implemented on the Wednesday	
19	morning, if so deemed by the police.	
20	MR CHASKALSON SC: Well, Colonel, we've	
21	run quite a long way past 4, but I think we'll have to pick	
22	this up tomorrow morning.	
23	CHAIRPERSON: Have you finished this	
24	topic, or are there further questions –	
25	MR CHASKALSON SC: There are a series of	
	Page 14284	
1	further questions on this topic, Mr Chairperson.	
2	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there's a possibility	
3	we may have to have a meeting with officials of the	
4	department at 9:00 tomorrow, but it also may be at teatime,	
5	so we'll adjourn until 9 tomorrow, but I want to make it	
6	clear in advance that we may not start at 9 if the meeting	
7	to which I've referred takes place at 9. We'll adjourn	
8	provisionally, as it were, until 9, and if for the reason	
9	I've mentioned we can't resume at 9, we'll resume as soon	
10	thereafter as we can. So we now adjourn until tomorrow 9	
11	o'clock.	
12	[COMMISSION ADJOURNED]	
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