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TRANSCRIPTION OF THE

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

MARIKANA

BEFORE TRIBUNAL

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FARLAM (RETIRED) - CHAIRPERSON
MR TOKOTA SC
MS HEMRAJ SC

HELD ON

DAY 95 20 MAY 2013 PAGES 10059 TO 10151

HELD AT

CIVIC CENTRE, RUSTENBURG, NORTH WEST PROVINCE



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<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10059</p> <p>1 [PROCEEDINGS ON 20 MAY 2013]</p> <p>2 [10:10] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.</p> <p>3 Generaal-Majoer, u is nog steeds onder eed.</p> <p>4 CHARL ANNANDALE: s.o.e.</p> <p>5 CHAIRPERSON: Ms Barnes, do you wish to proceed with your cross-examination?</p> <p>7 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS BARNES (CONTD.):</p> <p>8 Thank you, Chair. Good morning, General.</p> <p>9 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Good morning,</p> <p>10 Advocate.</p> <p>11 MS BARNES: General, when we left off on Friday you said that on the 16th of August 2012 Mr Mathunjwa had in fact been given a police escort to go to the koppie. Is that what you said?</p> <p>15 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, Brigadier Tsiloane was besig om te reël vir sodanige begeleiding, maar mnr Mathunjwa het vertrek op sy eie.</p> <p>18 MS BARNES: What arrangement precisely was Brigadier Tsiloane making?</p> <p>20 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, hy het gereël met Kaptein Seleke wat die bevelvoerder was van die lede van Mobiele Operasies om begeleiding te doen, en hy het ook gereël vir 'n Lonmin bussie wat beskikbaar was om dan die delegasie na die koppie toe te neem.</p> <p>25 MS BARNES: Was Mr Mathunjwa to your</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10061</p> <p>1 translation, please? I didn't follow that at all.</p> <p>2 MR HANABE: The translation was that</p> <p>3 Brigadier Tsiloane had in his occurrence book made note of the fact that arrangements were made and that transport was provided, the escort that took the delegation, the AMCU delegation.</p> <p>7 MS BARNES: So are you saying that a police escort was in fact provided to the AMCU delegation?</p> <p>9 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Aldus die voorvalleboek inskrywing van Brigadier Tsiloane, maar uitgesluit mnr Mathunjwa.</p> <p>12 MS BARNES: Do you have any explanation for why Mr Mathunjwa's evidence on this aspect was not challenged in this Commission?</p> <p>15 CHAIRPERSON: Ms Barnes, that's not how you ask the question. The question you ask, did you hear the evidence being given, did you draw to your counsel's attention, and then you can go on from there. You just can't ask the question like that, like shooting into the bush.</p> <p>21 MS BARNES: As the Chair pleases. Sir, were you aware of Mr Mathunjwa's evidence on this aspect that he gave in this Commission?</p> <p>24 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter nee, nie in terme van sy getuenis nie. Ek dink hy het</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10060</p> <p>1 knowledge informed that he should wait, that a police escort is being organised for him?</p> <p>3 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, ja sover ek kan onthou het Generaal Mpembe vir hom gesê dat ons besig is om te reël.</p> <p>6 CHAIRPERSON: Forgive me, Ms Barnes, forgive my asking a question which shows my ignorance. Which of his two visits to the koppie on the 16th are you talking about, the first or the second, or does this apply to both, the question?</p> <p>11 MS BARNES: First visit, Chair. Because, Genera, Mr Mathunjwa gave detailed evidence on this aspect and he said in summary that he repeatedly asked first for a SAPS vehicle to take him to the koppie and this was not provided, and that thereafter he asked to at least be provided with a police escort to the koppie, and that was also not provided. That evidence was not challenged in this Commission.</p> <p>19 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, daar was sodanige reëlings getref. Die voorvalleboek inskrywing wat ook gemaak is deur Brigadier Tsiloane verwys daarna dat dan die res van sy delegasie van AMCU het agtergebleb en dat dan sodanige begeleiding aan hulle gegee was nadat hy reeds vertrek het.</p> <p>25 MS BARNES: Could you repeat the</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10062</p> <p>1 vermelding gemaak in sy verklaring daarvan.</p> <p>2 MS BARNES: Did you see Mr Mathunjwa's statement?</p> <p>4 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is korrek, Voorsitter.</p> <p>6 MS BARNES: And you'll agree with me then that he deals with this aspect in detail in paragraph 69 to 72 of his statement? Would you like to have a look at that? It's exhibit NN, I beg your pardon.</p> <p>10 CHAIRPERSON: For Nellie?</p> <p>11 MS BARNES: That's correct.</p> <p>12 CHAIRPERSON: Did you read that statement before Mr Mathunjwa came and give evidence? It was distributed beforehand.</p> <p>15 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter nee, ek het dit nou gelees met die beskikbaarste van die bewyssukkies pertinent toe Adv Barnes aangedui het dat dit een van die bewyssukkies is waaruit hulle vrae gaan vra aan my.</p> <p>20 MS BARNES: General, what is peculiar is how on Wednesday, the 15th of August, when Mr Mathunjwa pleaded with SAPS to be allowed to address the strikers from outside the Nyala, he was not allowed to do so, and yet the following day on the 16th of August he was allowed to go to the koppie without a police escort, let alone a</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10063</p> <p>1 Nyala. Would you like to comment on that?</p> <p>2 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,</p> <p>3 ek het my getuienis verduidelik dat die 15de was 'n</p> <p>4 polisie-gereëlde besoek in terme van die versoek van</p> <p>5 Generaal Mpembe. Voorsitter, en ook dat op die 16de het</p> <p>6 ons sodanige begeleiding gereël. Die delegasie het daar</p> <p>7 gestaan en wag sodat die reëling getref kan word vir die</p> <p>8 voertuie, en mnr Mathunjwa het op sy eie het hy vertrek.</p> <p>9 MS BARNES: And you conceded on Friday,</p> <p>10 General, that you knew Mr Mathunjwa was going to give bad</p> <p>11 news to the strikers and that you knew it was going to</p> <p>12 upset them. Was it not irresponsible for the police to let</p> <p>13 Mr Mathunjwa go to the koppie without a police escort in</p> <p>14 those circumstances?</p> <p>15 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,</p> <p>16 ek het ook getuig dat mnr Mathunjwa het aangedui dat hy</p> <p>17 weet wat van hom as 'n leier verwag word, en dat hy die</p> <p>18 situasie sodanig sal hanteer, maar ek het ook gesê dat in</p> <p>19 retrospek is dit iets wat die polisie sou moes gedoen het</p> <p>20 om ekstra moeite te doen om weereens te vergader met</p> <p>21 Lonmin.</p> <p>22 MS BARNES: Perhaps you'll agree with me</p> <p>23 then in my next proposition, General, that what had in fact</p> <p>24 happened on the 16th was not that negotiations between the</p> <p>25 parties had deadlocked. All that had happened was that</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10065</p> <p>1 Lonmin, whether it's true or not is another matter. That –</p> <p>2 MS BARNES: I accept that, Chair.</p> <p>3 CHAIRPERSON: That's not relevant for</p> <p>4 your question.</p> <p>5 MS BARNES: Indeed.</p> <p>6 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,</p> <p>7 ek kan net sê ja dat ek nie vertrouwd was met die</p> <p>8 samesprekings tussen mnr Mathunjwa en Lonmin nie, maar die</p> <p>9 verbreking in die onderhandelinge was ook tussen die</p> <p>10 polisie-onderhandelaars en die vyf leierskap, of die vyf</p> <p>11 persone in terme van die klein groepie leiers. Daar was</p> <p>12 ook geen verdere – die poging van die onderhandelaars om</p> <p>13 verdere onderhandeling met hulle te bewerkstellig het ook</p> <p>14 nie geslaag nie.</p> <p>15 MS BARNES: Would you agree with me that</p> <p>16 there had been great hope the night before, on the evening</p> <p>17 of the 15th, that Mr Mathunjwa might be able to assist in</p> <p>18 bringing a negotiated solution to bear? Correct?</p> <p>19 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Die hoop was</p> <p>20 op mnr Mathunjwa om die groepering te oortuig om hulle</p> <p>21 wapens neer te lê.</p> <p>22 MS BARNES: I put it to you, General, for</p> <p>23 your comment - because this is what we're going to argue –</p> <p>24 that the real reason that SAPS did not bother to contact</p> <p>25 Lonmin on the morning of the 16th, or bother to provide Mr</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10064</p> <p>1 Lonmin had reneged on its earlier commitment and in those</p> <p>2 circumstances the police could and should have taken steps</p> <p>3 to get the process back on track. You agree with me in</p> <p>4 relation to that proposition at least in retrospect?</p> <p>5 MR VAN AS: Sorry, Mr Commissioner, it's</p> <p>6 simply a version of Mr Mathunjwa that Lonmin reneged on the</p> <p>7 agreement. The question can't be phrased in such –</p> <p>8 CHAIRPERSON: Ms Barnes, it's a</p> <p>9 controversial question as to whether – one of the matters</p> <p>10 on which we'll have to make a finding in the end, as to</p> <p>11 whether Lonmin did really renege on an undertaking, but the</p> <p>12 police of course, according to what we've heard, didn't go</p> <p>13 back to Lonmin and say this is what Mr Mathunjwa alleges,</p> <p>14 is it correct. So presumably your point is based upon what</p> <p>15 they, the information available to the police. So if you</p> <p>16 put the proposition in that way, I think you may find that</p> <p>17 there won't be an objection from the side of Lonmin.</p> <p>18 MS BARNES: Yes, Chair, I'm happy to put</p> <p>19 it on the basis that Mr Mathunjwa informed the police that</p> <p>20 Lonmin had reneged on their undertaking. The proposition</p> <p>21 really, General, is that there wasn't truly a deadlock on</p> <p>22 the morning of the 16th; there was information that Lonmin</p> <p>23 reneged and steps could have been taken to deal with that.</p> <p>24 CHAIRPERSON: It's information that Mr</p> <p>25 Mathunjwa gave. Whether Lonmin – yes, I see. Whether</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10066</p> <p>1 Mathunjwa with a police escort, was because SAPS was no</p> <p>2 longer interested in facilitating a negotiated solution,</p> <p>3 because SAPS had already at that stage decided to go</p> <p>4 tactical. Would you like to comment on that?</p> <p>5 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,</p> <p>6 dit is nie waar nie. Die polisie-onderhandelaars het</p> <p>7 steeds probeer om verdere onderhandeling voort te sit. Die</p> <p>8 polisie het wel begeleiding gereël. Die bevestiging</p> <p>9 daarvan is dat die res van die AMCU delegasie agtergebly</p> <p>10 het; mnr Mathunjwa het op sy eie besluit om te ontrek.</p> <p>11 Daar is 'n voorvalleboek inskrywing tot die effek van die</p> <p>12 begeleiding, en dan Brigadier Tsiloane en ek is seker ook</p> <p>13 Kaptein Seleke sal sodanige reëlings kan bevestig.</p> <p>14 CHAIRPERSON: Ms Barnes, I take it you</p> <p>15 have that reference. It's note, entry number 1004 in</p> <p>16 exhibit FFF25, and it is said that the Lonmin branded Combi</p> <p>17 went, was driven to the koppie with other members of AMCU</p> <p>18 and Captain Seleke of Mobile Operations escorted them. Now</p> <p>19 do your clients deny that? Do the members, the other</p> <p>20 members of AMCU deny that they were driven to the koppie at</p> <p>21 round about 11:55 in the Lonmin branded Combi and that</p> <p>22 Captain Seleke of Mobile Operations escorted them? Because</p> <p>23 that's the basis, as I understand it, of this evidence.</p> <p>24 MS BARNES: Chair, I was really just</p> <p>25 cross-examining in relation to what had happened in</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10067</p> <p>1 relation to Mr Mathunjwa. Now General, you've conceded 2 earlier in your evidence that the decision to go tactical 3 had been taken before 1:30 on Thursday, the 16th of August. 4 Is that correct?</p> <p>5 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter 6 ja, dit was tydens die oordrag deur die oorhoofse 7 bevelvoerder, Generaal Mpembe, aan die Proviniale 8 Kommissaris, Generaal Mbombo.</p> <p>9 MS BARNES: You said that it was as a 10 result of that decision being made, that is the decision to 11 go into the tactical phase, that the JOCOM meeting was held 12 at 1:30 on the 16th of August. Correct?</p> <p>13 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is 14 korrek.</p> <p>15 MS BARNES: What time was the decision 16 made? Was it before 1 o'clock? Was it before 12 o'clock? 17 [10:30] GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter ek 18 kan nie presies die tyd onthou nie, maar dit was 19 waarskynlik so in die omgewing van 13:15, daar rond gewees 20 het.</p> <p>21 MS BARNES: You've testified that one of 22 the reasons why it was considered necessary to go into the 23 tactical phase on the 16th of August was because threats had 24 been made to the police, is that correct?</p> <p>25 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Een van die</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10069</p> <p>1 three threats. At 11:20 he asked them to remove the wires 2 but he's not going to ask them again, in an aggressive tone 3 apparently. Then at 13:40 he said, according to slide 192, 4 he can see the SAPS are making ready for war and he said to 5 Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh, "We must sign a paper so that 6 the world can see how we kill one another today," and then 7 it looks at, round about 15:40 after Brigadier Calitz gave 8 Colonel Makhubela the instruction or the command to start 9 with the uncoiling of the barbed wire, that Mr Noki came 10 forward once the first Nyala started uncoiling the wire, 11 came to the front window of the negotiation Nyala and said, 12 "These hippos would not leave this place and you will all 13 die today," and that he would not be returning again. So 14 those were the three incidents to which you are referring. 15 Is that correct?</p> <p>16 MS BARNES: Yes thank you, Chair, I was 17 drawing attention specifically to the two threats mentioned 18 in slide 192 and I just wanted to get the witness to 19 confirm that these would have, would not have been taken 20 into account in deciding that it was necessary to go into 21 the tactical phase on the 16th of August. Is that correct?</p> <p>22 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dis korrek, 23 Voorsitter.</p> <p>24 MS BARNES: You could go still in exhibit 25 L to slide 189. You'll see there's a reference in that</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10068</p> <p>1 redes, dis korrek, Voorsitter.</p> <p>2 MS BARNES: Yes, one of the reasons. If 3 you could go to exhibit L, the police presentation, to 4 slide 192. This is a reference here to two threats that 5 were allegedly made by Mr Noki against the police. You'll 6 see that the first threat is recorded as having been made 7 at 15 - well in fact you need to read the paragraph in that 8 slide the other way around. The first threat is recorded 9 as having been made at 13:40 and the second threat is 10 recorded as having been made at 15:40. So those threats 11 were made after the decision to go tactical had already 12 been taken, is that correct?</p> <p>13 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dis korrek, 14 maar daar was ook 'n dreigement gewees min of meer soos ek 15 dit onthou, 11:20 van dieoggend van die 16e.</p> <p>16 CHAIRPERSON: That's dealt with in the 17 occurrence book, exhibit FFF25 as entry 998 or 11:20 which 18 says, "Situation report, Papa1 reported that the group were 19 moving towards the Nyala. The group leader asked the 20 police officials to remove their wires and he said he's not 21 going to ask them again as he's also aggressive." That's 22 the note to which you are referring. It does appear as if 23 according, if one reads the exhibit L, the slide in exhibit 24 L to which you've referred, Ms Barnes, 192, together with 25 this entry in the occurrence book there were basically</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10070</p> <p>1 slide both to the mood of the strikers changing and also to 2 the fact that the media were withdrawing in fear of their 3 safety, and those events are recorded as having taken place 4 at 25 to 4 on the 16th of August, correct?</p> <p>5 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Korrek, 6 Voorsitter.</p> <p>7 MS BARNES: So those events would also 8 not have been factors which you took into account in 9 deciding that it was necessary to go tactical on the 16th, 10 correct?</p> <p>11 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 12 dis korrek, maar daar was ook 'n ander geval gewees wat die 13 polisie video-operateurs gedreig was en dan ook op 10:40 op 14 "slide" 156 wat daar verwysend is na die gemoed van die, 15 van die stakers.</p> <p>16 MS BARNES: If you go, General, to slide 17 170, you'll see that that deals with the withdrawal of the 18 video operators and you'll see that that took place at 25 19 past 1 on the 16th.</p> <p>20 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is 21 korrek, Voorsitter.</p> <p>22 MS BARNES: So it seems that that also 23 took place after your decision had already been made, 24 correct?</p> <p>25 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10071</p> <p>1 korrek, Voorsitter.</p> <p>2 MS BARNES: General, another reason you 3 gave for your decision to go tactical on the 16th of August 4 was that you said not even the president of AMCU could 5 persuade his members to lay down their arms, correct?</p> <p>6 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Korrek, 7 Voorsitter.</p> <p>8 MS BARNES: You were in that regard 9 operating on the assumption that the majority of the 10 strikers were AMCU members because that's what you had been 11 told by Lonmin. Is that correct?</p> <p>12 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Apology, 13 Chairperson, could you just repeat the question?</p> <p>14 MS BARNES: I said in holding that view 15 you were presumably operating on the assumption that the 16 majority of the strikers were AMCU members because that's 17 what you had been told by Lonmin. Would that be correct?</p> <p>18 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 19 ja maar ook in terme van die intelligensie verslae en dan 20 ook die feit dat alhoewel daar talle NUM lede teenwoordig 21 was, het ons dit verstaan dat die meeste van hulle in die 22 proses is om oor te gaan vanaf NUM na AMCU in terme van 23 lidmaatskap. Voorsitter, en dan die pertinent verwysing na 24 bewyssuk TT5 waar daar telkens verwysend is, selfs so 25 vroeg as Februarie dat AMCU vermoed was dat hulle pertinent</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10073</p> <p>1 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 2 ek weet nie of daar enige so oordrag plaasgevind het nie. 3 CHAIRPERSON: You seem to have got a 4 report about what the AMCU people as they're described in 5 the occurrence book had said, because if you look at entry 6 10:10 which is at 13:25 in exhibit FFF25, it appears that 7 P1 gave a report as to what had happened and what AMCU had 8 said just before they left. Is that correct?</p> <p>9 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 10 dis reg, daar is so 'n inskrywing en terugvoer. 11 CHAIRPERSON: AMCU hadn't reported back 12 to you, you already knew from P - whose P1 again?</p> <p>13 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Calitz. 14 CHAIRPERSON: Yes so you already knew 15 from Brigadier Calitz what had happened there.</p> <p>16 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 17 ja die terugvoer wat hulle gegee het is in terme soos daar 18 verskillende sprekers was, ek dink daar was vyf of ses 19 sprekers gewees en dat die president was die laaste 20 spreker.</p> <p>21 CHAIRPERSON: But it goes further than 22 that, because it says AMCU promised that they will be back 23 after half an hour with the mine management because the 24 group are not satisfied. So while, when you, at the moment 25 when you were told that AMCU were leaving and hoping to</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10072</p> <p>1 betrokke was. Maar pertinent dan ook die ontvangs wat die 2 onderskeie presidente gehad het op die 15de in terme van 3 dat die president van NUM verwerp was en dan AMCU verwelkom 4 was.</p> <p>5 MS BARNES: Now General, if you would go, 6 still in exhibit L, to slide 161. You'll see that Mr 7 Mathunjwa's first address finished at 25 past 1, do you see 8 that?</p> <p>9 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is 10 korrek. Ekskuus, Voorsitter, ek's nie seker of sy 11 toespraak klaargemaak het nie, want die inskrywing meld 12 net, "The leadership of AMCU stated that they were going to 13 speak to the mine's management."</p> <p>14 MS BARNES: What is stated there, at 15 least in the last line of that paragraph, is that the 16 leadership of AMCU left the scene, that is the scene of the 17 first address, at 25 past 1, they went, in order to go and 18 find the police in order to report back. Do you agree with 19 me?</p> <p>20 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter 21 ja, die laaste sin dui aan dat die leierskap van AMCU het 22 die toneel verlaat.</p> <p>23 MS BARNES: So at that stage there had 24 certainly not been any feedback from AMCU to the police 25 about that first address, correct?</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10074</p> <p>1 come back in half an hour with the mine management, you 2 decided to implement the plan. I don't quite understand 3 that.</p> <p>4 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 5 ek het die vraag gehoor dat daar, die samespreking, die 6 polisie, is nie met "mine management" nie.</p> <p>7 CHAIRPERSON: It is so, but that's not 8 the point. The point is that Brigadier Calitz reported to 9 the JOC at 13:25 according to note 1010 what appears here, 10 and that indicated that the promise, the AMCU people 11 promised the people on the koppie that they were, would be 12 back within, after half an hour with the mine management. 13 That you people in the JOC knew at 13:25, the very moment 14 you decided to proceed with the plan, the tactical option. 15 Now I have difficulty understanding, that's why I put my 16 problem to you so that you can help me to understand it.</p> <p>17 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 18 dis reg, ons was bewus daarvan.</p> <p>19 MS BARNES: Isn't it correct, General, 20 that you had in fact made the decision to go tactical, well 21 you said at about quarter past 1. So by the time you 22 received this situation report you had already made the 23 decision to go tactical and you were going to go ahead with 24 that regardless. Isn't that correct?</p> <p>25 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter</p>

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1 nee, ek het verduidelik dat die operasionele bevelvoerder 2 die oomblik as so 'n plan tenuitvoer gebring word, dan word 3 daardie oordrag gedoen aan die operasionele bevelvoerder, 4 dat die oordeel van sodanige optrede word dan oorgelaat aan 5 die operasionele bevelvoerder sou omstandighede sodanig 6 verander dat dit nie tenuitvoer gebring moet word nie, en 7 so was dit dan ook gewees dan om 15:30 toe die plan 'n 8 aanvang moes nie wat dit nie begin het nie weens die 9 teenwoordigheid steeds van Mr Mathunjwa. So, so 'n plan 10 kan op enige stadium nog gestop word in terme van terugvoer 11 vanaf die operasionele bevelvoerder of die besluit van die 12 operasionele bevelvoerder, gegewe die omstandighede wat 13 afspeel voor sodanige persoon.	1 oortuig dat mnr Mathunjwa die sodanige invloed het op sy 2 lede dat hulle sou wapens neerlê. 3 CHAIRPERSON: But the transcript of what 4 happened on the 15th when Mr Mathunjwa spoke to the police 5 ends on a note almost of jubilation and congratulation. 6 Are you saying that that congratulation was not sincere, 7 that in fact you didn't believe him that he could do what 8 he said he was going to try to do?		
14 CHAIRPERSON: I think he said depending 15 on the feedback that he receives from –	9 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Nee, 10 intendeel, Voorsitter, ons was vas oortuig – ek het gesê 11 op die 16de het dit verander.		
16 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 17 en so oordrag kan van beide kante af wees, hetsy terugvoer 18 vanaf die operasionele bevelvoerder of dan uiteraard uit 19 die JOC, of van die oorhoofse bevelvoerder weer na die 20 oorhoofse bevel –ag, na die operasionele bevelvoerder toe.	12 CHAIRPERSON: What decision was made on 13 the 15th then?		
21 [10:49] MS BARNES: General, I put it to you that 22 if you had truly believed that Mr Mathunjwa could persuade 23 the strikers to lay down their arms and go back to work, 24 you would not have made the decision to go tactical while 25 he was still addressing them and before you had received a	14 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 15 ek kan nie – ek weet nie waarna u verwys nie – 16 CHAIRPERSON: I understood you a few 17 minutes ago to say – I actually thought you said it and I 18 wasn't sure, so I put to you again and said did I 19 understand you correctly to say the decision was made on 20 the 15th, and you said, yes, and I said why on the 15th, and 21 you said, no, well, we didn't believe that Mathunjwa could 22 do what he said he was going to do. That was your 23 evidence, as I understand it, unless I misunderstood, in 24 which case I apologise.		
	25 MS BARNES: I must say I have that		
1 report. Would you like to comment on that? 2 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 3 ons het geglo op die 15de, die veranderings op die 16de was 4 sodanig dat – en mnr Mathunjwa se eie erkenning wat hy 5 gemaak het aan Kolonel McIntosh, wat hy gesê het dat hy 6 beheer verloor het oor sy mense. 7 MS BARNES: But, General, one of the 8 reasons you gave for why the police had to adopt the 9 tactical phase on the 16th of August was that not even Mr 10 Mathunjwa could persuade his members to lay down their 11 arms, but yet when you made that decision, you'd not yet 12 given him an opportunity to do so, or received a report- 13 back, isn't that correct? 14 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 15 nee, hy het al interaksie gehad met sy lede voor die 16 besluit geneem was, so vroeg as net na 12:00, en verdere 17 geleenthed was aan hom gegee en die plan kon op enige 18 stadium sou daar 'n positiewe draai gewees het in terme van 19 'n potensieel van neerlê van wapens kon dit nog steeds 20 gestop word. 21 CHAIRPERSON: I just want to interrupt 22 and go back for a moment. Did you say a decision was taken 23 the previous night? Did I hear you correctly? 24 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Nee, 25 Voorsitter, ek sê die vorige aand, die 15de, was ons vas	Page 10076	1 understanding as well. The decision was made on the 15th 2 and it had to do with Mr Mathunjwa's own admission to 3 McIntosh that he'd lost control – 4 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Nee, 5 Voorsitter, dit was op die 16de gewees. So tydens die 6 voorligting wat Brigadier Calitz en al die bevelvoerders 7 ontvang het in daardie tyd, op die 16de, en dit moes min of 8 meer so 14:30 gewees het wat Mnr Mathunjwa met Kolonel 9 McIntosh gepraat het. 10 CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, Major-General, I 11 don't understand it now. I thought you said the 15th. I 12 was surprised at that. That's why I specifically asked 13 you, did I understand you correctly, and I repeated it, and 14 I said the 15th, and you said, yes. Did you misunderstand 15 me, perhaps? 16 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 17 nee die enigste verwysing wat na die 15de gemaak het was 18 die aand wat ons vas geglo het dat mnr Mathunjwa sodanige 19 beheer het dat die lede dit sal neerlê, en op die 16de het 20 dit verander en dan die bevestiging was ook gewees toe mnr 21 Mathunjwa self aan Kolonel McIntosh die oordrag gemaak het. 22 MS BARNES: What time was this 23 conversation between Mr Mathunjwa and Colonel McIntosh? 24 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Kommissaris, 25 dit was in die tyd gewees dat Luitenant-Kolonel Scott en	Page 10078

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10079</p> <p>1 die bevelvoerders by "forward holding area" 1 besig met die 2 "briefing." So ek aanvaar dit moes min of meer so tussen 3 14:30 en selfs 15:00 gewees het.</p> <p>4 MS BARNES: Were you present during this 5 conversation?</p> <p>6 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Nee, ek was 7 nie, Voorsitter.</p> <p>8 CHAIRPERSON: - forward holding area 1, 9 as I understand it, the witness was in the JOC. Obviously 10 Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh must have reported it to him 11 later, I take it.</p> <p>12 MS BARNES: I'm just trying to clarify 13 where he got the information from. Did you – who reported 14 this to you?</p> <p>15 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 16 sover ek kan onthou, was dit met die terugkeer van Pappa1 17 en Brigadier Calitz.</p> <p>18 MS BARNES: I'm going to move on to 19 another topic now, and this relates to evidence that you've 20 given regarding the Provincial Commissioner's media briefing on the 16th of August. That would have been early 21 in the morning at about 9:30 on the 16th of August. Now in 22 relation to that, you were asked – well, in fact, you gave 23 the following evidence. You said that during the 24 Provincial Commissioner's briefing she was asked by one of</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10081</p> <p>1 were civilians – sorry, three of the 10 people who died 2 were civilians. Two of them appeared to have definitely 3 been strikers who were killed on the 13th, and then there 4 was the third civilian who was found stabbed in front of 5 one of the houses in the informal settlement on the same 6 day. So the ones that I think you could regard as murders, 7 that you're talking about, would be seven, I would think, 8 but it's just a detail, but 10 can't be the right number. 9 Am I correct?</p> <p>10 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 11 soos ek dit gehad het, is die arrestasies verbonde aan 12 enige van die sterftes, so enige van die 10 persone, hetsy 13 dit stakers, sekuriteitsbeamptes of gewone mynwerkers is.</p> <p>14 MS BARNES: So you were not told, 15 General, that six people had been arrested for the murder 16 of two police officers on the 13th?</p> <p>17 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 18 nee, dis nie hoe ek dit onthou nie.</p> <p>19 MS BARNES: I'd like to introduce a 20 docket as a new exhibit. It is in the – part of the SAPS 21 hard drive under dockets. It's docket 118 of –</p> <p>22 CHAIRPERSON: It looks as if we can use 23 exhibit GGG38, which we used on Friday and then discarded.</p> <p>24 Thank you. So these are – we've been given two documents.</p> <p>25 The first is headed crime document, or is this all part of</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10080</p> <p>1 the journalists whether any arrests had been made at 2 Marikana and she answered that, yes, six people had been 3 arrested, and you then said that those arrests – I'm not 4 sure whether this is your information or you were reporting 5 what the Provincial Commissioner had said, but the point is 6 that you stated that those arrests were not necessarily 7 linked to the murder of the police officers on the 13th of 8 August. Are you with me?</p> <p>9 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dis korrek, 10 Voorsitter.</p> <p>11 MS BARNES: So was that the information 12 that you had on the 16th of August, that the six arrests did 13 not necessarily relate to the murder of the two police 14 officers on the 13th?</p> <p>15 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 16 ja, soos ek dit onthou was daar 'n vraag gevra aan die 17 Proviniale Kommissaris of daar al enige arrestasies 18 uitgevoer is ten opsigte van die moorde wat plaasgevind 19 het, en dat, soos ek dit verstaan het, was die ses 20 arrestasies nie noodwendig nie, dit kan beteken dit was nie 21 eers enigsins verbind met die polisie moorde nie, dit kan 22 net wees 'n kombinasie van enige van die nege moorde op 23 daardie stadium, of 10 moorde.</p> <p>24 CHAIRPERSON: I think you mean eight, 25 because two of the 10 were – actually three of the strikers</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10082</p> <p>1 the same –</p> <p>2 MS BARNES: I believe it is all part of 3 the same docket. It's just been put together in two 4 bundles.</p> <p>5 CHAIRPERSON: But the top bundle, as it 6 were, begins with a page headed, "South African Police 7 Service, Crime Docket." So that would be – and that's been 8 very thoughtfully paginated for us. So that's exhibit 9 GGG38. Ms Barnes, I assumed this was all one document, but 10 I notice, because Adv Hemraj has drawn my attention to it, 11 that the second batch of documents, which was separately 12 stapled, the pagination begins again at 1. So it does look 13 as if it's two documents, separately paginated, unless the 14 paginator made a mistake and just went over –</p> <p>15 MS BARNES: Yes, I'm afraid, I had 16 intended for it to be paginated as one document, but I'm 17 afraid that wasn't done.</p> <p>18 CHAIRPERSON: "The best laid plans o' 19 Mice an' Men, Gang aft agley." So what we will do is we 20 will call the whole document exhibit GGG38, and possibly 21 the kind person who paginated them incorrectly, can have 22 another go during the teatime at repaginating the documents 23 in the second bundle, stapled bundle. Is that a sensible 24 way to proceed?</p> <p>25 MS BARNES: Yes, thank you, Chair.</p>

	Page 10083		Page 10085
1 CHAIRPERSON:	Fine. Case dockets – I	1 but please endeavour in the future to do so, and that	
2 don't know – case docket CAS118/8/2012. Ja, that's all we		2 applies to everybody, not just to you.	
3 need.		3 MS BARNES: Chair, but I must say, in our	
4 MS BARNES:	Now, you'll see, General,	4 defence, we did circulate an index on Thursday last week,	
5 that this is in fact the docket which relates to the arrest		5 which did make reference to this document.	
6 of the six people that we've been referring to. You'll see		6 CHAIRPERSON: Well, we didn't get it and	
7 on the very last page of the second bundle – so it's the		7 we haven't got – we've made it practice not to look at the	
8 very last page of the combined bundle that you have in		8 documents that have not been put before us. So we are	
9 front of you, there's a reference to accused number 1 and		9 inconvenienced, but never mind. I've said what I want –	
10 2. Do you see that?		10 [11:09] MS BARNES: Chair, I will make sure it	
11 CHAIRPERSON:	I'm sorry to interrupt.	11 doesn't happen again.	
12 That will be page 79 of the overall bundle.		12 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, and you can	
13 MS BARNES:	Yes, that's correct.	13 only promise on behalf of yourself but the others present	
14 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Ek neem dit	14 must listen and silently assent to what you said.	
15 waar, Voorsitter.		15 MS BARNES: General, if you could go then	
16 MS BARNES:	And then on page 25, this	16 to page 7, this is an additional statement by Constable	
17 will accord with your pagination, it's part of the first		17 Mafora and he says the following, four lines into his	
18 section, that deals with accused numbers 3 and 4. It sets		18 statement he says, "Six suspects was identified to be	
19 out there their personal details.		19 present and commit murder of the two police officers during	
20 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Voorsitter,	20 the strike or march. Out of six suspects four was	
21 ek sien dit is verwysend na een persoon.		21 hospitalised due to injuries they sustained and could not	
22 MS BARNES:	On page 25 there's a	22 stand for trial or appear before the court as they are	
23 reference to accused number 3, and then below that there is		23 still ill." So what emerges from this docket is that all	
24 a reference to another person, as accused number 4,		24 these six people were linked to the murder of the two	
25 Mcingwa(?) and Zukululu, do you see that?		25 police officers. They were in fact charged with murder and	
	Page 10084		Page 10086
1 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Ek was in die	1 robbery. Four of them were arrested in hospital, while	
2 verkeerde bundel gewees, die tweede een gewees. Ek sien		2 they were in hospital on the 13th of August. One was	
3 dis in eerste bundel, bladsy 25, verwysend na twee persone.		3 arrested at home on the 13th of August, and one was arrested	
4 MS BARNES:	And then on page 9, there is	4 at his home on the 14th of August. That was early the	
5 the reference to accused numbers 5 and 6.		5 following morning, on the Tuesday. Is it correct then that	
6 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Ek merk op	6 you did not have this information on the 14th, 15th, or 16th	
7 twee persone, 5 en 6.		7 of August?	
8 MS BARNES:	And if you go to page 19,	8 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,	
9 you'll see that there's a statement from the investigating		9 ek het getuig dat die oordrag van die Proviniale	
10 officer in the case, a Constable Mafora, and he says in the		10 Kommissaris het ek nie noodwendig verstaan dat dit ses	
11 second paragraph, he says four suspects that are		11 arrestasies is in die polisie nie. Ek kan net daarby hou.	
12 hospitalised, and he refers to four suspects, and he then		12 MS BARNES: General, you testified that	
13 says "linked to the strike and killing of police officers		13 you were in the JOC on the afternoon of the 16th of August	
14 that took place at Lonmin Platinum Mine, Marikana." Do you		14 from 3:30PM until 5PM and that you were there throughout,	
15 see that?		15 apart from when you stepped outside at various times within	
16 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Ek merk dit	16 that period in order to take three phone calls. Is that	
17 op, Voorsitter.		17 correct?	
18 CHAIRPERSON:	Ms Barnes, I'm sorry to	18 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter	
19 have to say this again, but you know we did ask for		19 nee, ek het nie gesê drie oproepe nie; ek het gesê ek het	
20 documents that are going to be used in cross-examination to		20 twee of drie keer het ek uitgegaan, so dit kon twee oproepe	
21 be made available to us beforehand. If we got them on		21 gewees het, dit kon drie gewees het.	
22 Friday, we could have spent some of the weekend studying		22 MS BARNES: So you're not sure whether it	
23 them, and then be on top of the documents, and it would		23 was two or three calls?	
24 save a lot of time. I understand things happen sometimes		24 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter	
25 in practice, you can't always comply with these rulings,		25 nee, ek is nie.	

	Page 10087		Page 10089
1	MS BARNES: Who were those calls from?	1	Thank you, Mr Chairman and members of the Commission.
2	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ek kan nie	2	General, let me just start there so that I don't have to
3	onthou nie, Voorsitter.	3	canvas that aspect when we are in full-blown cross-
4	MS BARNES: You testified that during the	4	examination. You have just been reminded that you are
5	time that you were receiving reports from the chopper, this	5	under oath and I would take it that you understand that you
6	is during the afternoon of the 16th, that there were two	6	should speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing else
7	women constables who were taking handwritten notes as the	7	but the truth, so help you.
8	information came in. Is that correct?	8	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Goeiemiddag,
9	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,	9	Advokaat. Voorsitter, dit was nog altyd hoe ek dit
10	verwysend na die twee radio-operateurs, ek dink hulle was	10	verstaan het, dat ek die totale waarheid moet praat.
11	beide konstabels.	11	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes. No, it's just that
12	MS BARNES: Can you give us their names?	12	this is our first encounter and I've understood that you've
13	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter	13	said so and, General, you understand that if there was
14	nee, ek weet nie wat hulle name is nie.	14	something you knew had happened and it was nonetheless not
15	MS BARNES: And the notes that they kept,	15	something that you are free to talk about, in this
16	where would we find those notes at this stage?	16	Commission, however, because of the nature of the work the
17	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,	17	Commission has to do you would not fail to disclose that to
18	ek weet nie. Ons sal by hulle moet verneem of hulle die	18	the Commission, simply because there had been an agreement
19	notas beskikbaar het en of hulle dit oorgedra het in die VB	19	between you as colleagues not to talk about it.
20	en dit nie daarna gehou het nie. Ek weet glad nie.	20	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,
21	MS BARNES: You'll agree that those notes	21	ek verstaan my verantwoordelikheid en dat as aspekte
22	will assist us in order to have a more accurate record of	22	relevant tot die Kommissie moet sodanig voorgelê word.
23	what transpired? Is that correct?	23	MR NTSEBEZA SC: You will do so, and I'm
24	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is	24	just asking, you will do so even if between the officers
25	korrek, Voorsitter.	25	themselves there was a view that some things might
	Page 10088		Page 10090
1	MS BARNES: Thank you, Chair, those are	1	embarrass the SAPS if they were known?
2	our questions -	2	MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, I thought to
3	CHAIRPERSON: It is now quarter past 11.	3	restrain myself, but this question assumes a fact not in
4	Is this perhaps a convenient stage for us to take the	4	evidence. There's no suggestion that the officers sat
5	adjournment, or do you wish to ask a few more questions on	5	somewhere and connive not to tell the truth or to suppress
6	this point before we adjourn?	6	the truth. Unless if my learned colleague is going to be
7	MS BARNES: No, Chair, we are done with	7	giving us an indication that he has such intention,
8	our cross-examination.	8	instruction or facts.
9	CHAIRPERSON: I see. Well that's a very	9	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Maybe let me put it on a
10	convenient stage to take the adjournment then. Very well,	10	different basis, General. You probably do know by now that
11	we'll take the tea adjournment at this stage.	11	most of the video footage which the Commission has, has
12	[COMMISSION ADJOURS COMMISSION RESUMES]	12	come from the media, and that the police have not provided
13	[11:45] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. I	13	video footage of the actual occurrence of the shooting,
14	was going to ask if the pages had been repaginated of the	14	particularly on the 16th of August. You do know that?
15	second bundle, but I see they have. So I want to thank the	15	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,
16	persons responsible therefore. Mr Ntsebeza, welcome back.	16	ek is bewus daarvan dat die video materiaal wat beskikbaar
17	I understand you're going to, you're the next counsel to	17	gestel is deur die polisie, dat dit nie pertinent enige van
18	cross-examine, is that correct?	18	die skietvoorvalle hetsy dit op toneel 1 of 2 sodanig wys
19	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes it is, Mr Chairman.	19	nie.
20	CHAIRPERSON: Let me just remind the	20	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now you will know, or
21	Major-General, not that he needs reminding, but I'll still	21	you will have heard that it's one of the features that to
22	remind him, Generaal-Majoor u is nog steeds onder eed.	22	previous witnesses from the SAPS I personally put as a
23	CHARL ANNANDALE: s.o.e.	23	remarkable feature, given the Standing Orders in POPS for
24	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ntsebeza?	24	the video covering of all events and incidents. Are you
25	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NTSEBEZA SC:	25	aware of that?

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10091</p> <p>1 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 2 daar is so 'n Staande Order en sodanige vereiste. 3 MR NTSEBEZA SC: And just so that - 4 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ekskuus, 5 Voorsitter, Voorsitter, en ek het ook getuig dat histories 6 gebruik ons meestal slegs een kamera en die Kommissie net 7 bewus wees dat ons het nie geweet dat daar gaan 'n toneel 1 8 of 'n toneel 2 of enige sodanige skietery homself afspeel 9 nie. Voorsitter, en ons as 'n JOCOM het maatreëls 10 daargestel wat ons op die stadium onder die indruk was dat 11 dit voldoende is in terme van die vyf kameras waarna verwys 12 was. Vyf kameras, pertinent verwysend na die video 13 kameras, en dan het ek ook getuig die omstandighede rondom 14 pertinent die twee video-operateurs van OOP, en dan ook die 15 waterkanonne, hoekom daar nie sodanige beeldmateriaal 16 beskikbaar is nie. 17 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed you have. I'm 18 not seeking to explore that. I'm conscious, I think this 19 matter was canvassed with you by several counsel. But what 20 I put to some of the witnesses from SAPS, and I'd like to 21 put to you as well, is that - and without indicating or 22 volunteering to produce that evidence, because I don't have 23 that evidence, but I was putting it on this basis. The 24 remarkable absence of that material may well be 0 and I'll 25 come to your taking the oath to speak the truth - it may</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10093</p> <p>1 tell this Commission what I know, and in my submission, Mr 2 Chairman, members of the Commission, that's a fair question 3 to put. 4 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya, I'd like to put 5 this to you, get the benefit of your reply. Generally 6 speaking when a cross-examiner puts something to a witness 7 he has direct evidence to support what he's putting. But I 8 don't understand the rules to go so far as to say that if 9 the fact the counsel wishes to put to the witness depends 10 upon circumstantial evidence, he can't put it to the 11 witness. It would depend obviously on the circumstances. 12 Now in this case, as I understand Mr Ntsebeza's argument, 13 what he's saying is, he didn't mention the case of Govern 14 and Skidmore but it was, I'm sure, present in his mind, as 15 it is I'm sure in yours, but the civil test for 16 circumstantial evidence would apply, the more plausible 17 inference from the facts. He said what the facts are and 18 he says he will argue at the end of the day that applying 19 the principals of circumstantial evidence to these facts 20 the more plausible inference is that there was a 21 suppression of material, and that fact, or that inference 22 that he seeks to draw he's putting to the witness for his 23 comment. How would you deal with that argument? I know 24 it's not quite what he said, but I thought that was 25 basically -</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10092</p> <p>1 well be that the video camera material was taken; it was 2 found to be against the interest of the police and 3 therefore was withheld. Now if that was so, given your 4 oath, would you be prepared in this forum to say you see, 5 yes we did have that material? 6 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair - 7 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya? 8 MR SEMENYA SC: There is again no factual 9 foundation for that and it is not cured by making it an 10 "if" question. 11 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Is that an objection? 12 MR SEMENYA SC: Yes, it is an objection 13 that it is an assumption resting on another one. There is 14 no factual foundation for it. 15 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I'm putting it as a 16 proposition to the witness because it is preceded by the 17 fact that every rule seems to have been broken insofar as 18 the taking of video footage is concerned. I'm aware of the 19 evidence that the witness has given with regard to cameras 20 that didn't work and all of that. But it is still 21 remarkable that all other material that we have is from a 22 source other than the SAPS, and I'm putting it as a basis 23 for argument and I would like his comments. If it was so 24 that there is material but that material was withheld, 25 would he be prepared to break rank and say I am going to</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10094</p> <p>1 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I'm willing to adopt 2 that, Chair. 3 CHAIRPERSON: Sorry? 4 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I'm prepared to adopt 5 that, Mr Chairman, as an indication of where I'm - 6 CHAIRPERSON: [Inaudible] do that, but 7 let's hear what Mr Semenya says. 8 MR SEMENYA SC: Well, Chair, even 9 circumstantial evidence must be consistent with the 10 accepted facts. If Mr Ntsebeza still accepts there is an 11 explanation, that explanation must be wrong for his 12 supposition to stand. We are being told that the reasons 13 the cameras, or the visuals were not taken of the actual 14 shooting was XYZ. If that evidence stands, it cannot be 15 consistent with the supposition now being placed by Mr 16 Ntsebeza. 17 CHAIRPERSON: It's premature to say 18 whether it stands, but one particular aspect of the 19 evidence which one can't say without more, but it stands, 20 and that is the evidence of the two videographers who were 21 on the kopje who were told that the, there's a threat to 22 kill them and they then left and went, according to their 23 statements they went back to the JOC. Now it's something 24 they're going to have to answer why they went back to the 25 JOC instead of just moving to a protected area and taking</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10095</p> <p>1 videos from there. So obviously if their evidence that 2 they went back to the JOC and they didn't go to protected 3 area and take photographs, as one would have expected them 4 to do, but if the evidence that they went back to the JOC 5 is accepted then you're correct, but it's not possible for 6 us to say at this stage whether that evidence will be 7 accepted. So I put the point to you so that you can deal 8 with it.</p> <p>9 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, maybe the word 10 "stand" is too strong, not that it is ultimately so found. 11 What I'm meaning by my objection is we will lead that 12 evidence and we will put the proposition at the level of 13 saying that evidence will be led. Now it is either Mr 14 Ntsebeza has information that that evidence is untrue and 15 therefore he is able to then say I can put a hypothesis 16 which controvert that fact. Our objection is firstly he 17 says if there is a collusion happening, would you on the 18 basis of that "if" break rank with it, and I'm saying the 19 question of breaking rank can't arise if the fact that 20 there was a collusion is not established, there's no 21 intention to establish it, there's no basis even for 22 offering it. That's the nature of the objection I'm 23 raising, Chair.</p> <p>24 CHAIRPERSON: I'm not prepared to allow 25 the question insofar as it rests upon a suggestion of</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10097</p> <p>1 everything that happens at a scene, he said he did not seek 2 to know what had happened to that video material. Do you 3 understand? He did not seem to be able to tell the 4 Commission why he did not - given who he is, he did not 5 express an interest in seeing what he was being told is 6 available SAPS video material.</p> <p>7 [12:05] Now, if you were the one who knew of the 8 existence of this video material, which Brigadier Mkhwanazi 9 didn't express any interest in seeing, even though he was 10 told it was there, would you be prepared to disclose it's 11 presence?</p> <p>12 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 13 daar was tydens die Potchefstroom vergadering was daar 14 bespreking gewees rondom die beskikbaarheid van polisie 15 videomateriaal, en ek weet nie of Brigadier Mkhwanazi na 16 dieselfde videomateriaal verwys as wat ek van bewus is nie.</p> <p>17 CHAIRPERSON: I'm not sure that's 18 correctly interpreted. Did you not say that you don't know 19 whether Mkhwanazi looked at the same material that you saw, 20 or did I misunderstand?</p> <p>21 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: - was aware of 22 the same video material that I was aware of, which I will 23 elaborate now too, Sir. Voorsitter, dit was pertinent die 24 videomateriaal wat geneem was deur Luitenant-Kolonel Botha, 25 wat hy getaak was om te neem en wat hy nie beskikbaar gehad</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10096</p> <p>1 collusion between the police officers concerned to suppress 2 evidence, but on the narrower issue as to the Govern and 3 Skidmore inference that one draws in relation to the 4 videographers who instead of moving to a protected area to 5 take photographs went off to the JOC and didn't take 6 photographs or videos, I'm prepared to allow you to ask 7 questions on that.</p> <p>8 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Thanks, Mr Chairman. 9 General, then if there was - or put it this way; do you 10 know Brigadier Mkhwanazi?</p> <p>11 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ek doen, 12 Voorsitter.</p> <p>13 MR NTSEBEZA SC: And you are aware that 14 he has given evidence here?</p> <p>15 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is 16 korrek, Voorsitter.</p> <p>17 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now some of his evidence 18 was that at a meeting in Potchefstroom he became aware that 19 other than the video footage from the media, there was 20 other video footage that has been taken by the police which 21 was not shown. He was told by someone there that there was 22 other video footage taken by the police. When we asked him 23 whether he wondered, or he expressed a desire to see them, 24 given his position in POP and given his understanding that 25 video material from SAPS and POP would be material of</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10098</p> <p>1 het tydens Potchefstroom se bespreking nie, en wat hy gesê 2 het hy gaan nie beskikbaar stel aan ons nie, synde dat dit 3 'n potensiële bewysstuk is vir die IPID ondersoek. Dit was 4 aan hom oorgedra dat hy 'n verpligting het en dat sodanige 5 videomateriaal moet beskikbaar gestel word vir die 6 Kommissie, en dit was dan ook sodanig beskikbaar gestel, en 7 ek weet nie of dit dan dieselfde is wat Brigadier Mkhwanazi 8 na verwys het nie.</p> <p>9 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now, the long and short 10 of what I was trying to get to establish from you, and 11 probably there is a basis for me to move on, is whether I 12 can accept it from you that as you sit there, having sworn 13 before God to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 14 else but the truth, you will not hesitate to tell this 15 Commission anything on the basis only that it would not be 16 favourable to SAPS.</p> <p>17 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 18 ek wil dit onomwonde stel dat ek nie bewus is van, dat dit 19 nie onder my aandag gekom het, dat ek geen aanduiding het 20 nie van enige ander videomateriaal wat beskikbaar is in die 21 polisie se besit wat nie voorgelê is aan die Kommissie nie, 22 en, Voorsitter, sou ek daarvan bewus gewees het, sou ek dit 23 reeds al openbaar gemaak het.</p> <p>24 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I'm pleased to hear 25 that, General. General, I didn't even introduce myself</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10099</p> <p>1 properly. I represent the families of most of the people 2 who were killed by the police on the 16th of August, and 3 those who were killed also on the 13th of August.</p> <p>4 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dankie, 5 Voorsitter, ek het so kennis geneem.</p> <p>6 MR NTSEBEZA SC: You do accept that they 7 were killed by the police, just to make sure that –</p> <p>8 CHAIRPERSON: He conceded that when he 9 was cross-examined by other counsel, but the isiXhosa 10 interpreter hasn't had a chance to interpret the reply 11 anyway, so you must allow him to interpret as well before 12 you proceed, but the witness has already said he accepts 13 that the people to whom you refer were killed by the 14 police.</p> <p>15 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Chairman, I won't dwell 16 on, but stranger things have been - have happened –</p> <p>17 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ekskuus tog, 18 op die 13de, Voorsitter, daarso is 'n derde persoon wat 19 gekry was, sy liggaam, en sover ek weet is daar geen 20 polisie aandadigheid in terme van die sterfte nie.</p> <p>21 CHAIRPERSON: You said that it's not 22 clear what happened. That person was stabbed, in any 23 event. What happened in respect of the third civilian 24 deceased on the 13th –</p> <p>25 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dis korrek,</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10101</p> <p>1 you understand that?</p> <p>2 CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to ask him 3 that?</p> <p>4 MR NTSEBEZA SC: No, I'm simply putting 5 it to him to understand the context.</p> <p>6 CHAIRPERSON: Alright, now when you've 7 finished explaining to him the heavy obligations that you 8 bear, then perhaps you can start asking him some questions.</p> <p>9 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, I will, Mr 10 Chairman, you can be sure of that. Now there is an area 11 about which you have been asked by other counsel and I 12 don't intend to be longer than I need to be, but it is an 13 area that was sparked by a comment that was made by a 14 counsel for SAPS and a response that you gave, and that is, 15 a reference to a so-called Scott plan and to which you 16 expressed pleasure that it had been put in the form of a 17 so-called Scott plan. Now I just want to ask if it is your 18 evidence that the plan was a so-called Scott plan?</p> <p>19 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, I can't follow the 20 question.</p> <p>21 CHAIRPERSON: It seems that there was a 22 passage in the examination-in-chief – I don't remember it, 23 but he says there was – where you asked him a question and 24 you referred to "the so-called Scott plan." He wants to 25 know whether there was a so-called Scott plan. That seems</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10100</p> <p>1 Voorsitter.</p> <p>2 CHAIRPERSON: But you have accepted 3 unequivocally that the two strikers who were killed on that 4 day, and the 34 who were killed on the 16th, were killed as 5 a result of police action, but there are other aspects that 6 you've mentioned.</p> <p>7 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dis korrek, 8 Voorsitter.</p> <p>9 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now you'll appreciate 10 that the families that I represent are not sophisticated 11 people. For instance, some of the questions that come to 12 us, frequently asked questions, are, why was it necessary 13 for the police to kill the mineworkers. Do you understand 14 that? I'm not asking you to respond, but I'm simply 15 indicating to you the questions that I will seek to explore 16 with you, because I've got to provide answers to those whom 17 I represent. For instance, that's one of the frequently 18 asked questions. Why was it necessary for the police to 19 kill the mineworkers?</p> <p>20 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 21 ek verstaan dit so.</p> <p>22 MR NTSEBEZA SC: And some of the 23 questions that they want us to try and canvass is, for 24 instance, what danger did those mineworkers who got killed 25 present to the police. That's one of the questions. Do</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10102</p> <p>1 to be the question.</p> <p>2 MR NTSEBEZA SC: What I want to know, 3 with respect, without interrupting you, sorry, Sir, is 4 whether, because he seemed to - in the manner in which he 5 answered, he seems to have accepted that it was a so-called 6 Scott's plan.</p> <p>7 CHAIRPERSON: Can you perhaps give us the 8 reference in the transcript so that Mr Semenya can check 9 it?</p> <p>10 MR SEMENYA SC: No, Chair, I remember in 11 my examination-in-chief –</p> <p>12 MR NTSEBEZA SC: It's at TH205.</p> <p>13 MR SEMENYA SC: - I said to the witness, 14 "And what is about the so-called Scott's plan?" and he 15 said, "I'm glad you're asking me that question," and 16 answered that it was not a Scott's plan.</p> <p>17 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Well, my learned friend 18 will remember, because he –</p> <p>19 CHAIRPERSON: No, he says he remembers 20 it, but I was still asking the page.</p> <p>21 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I gave the page number.</p> <p>22 CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I didn't write it 23 down. What's the page?</p> <p>24 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Well, you were attending 25 to my learned friend.</p>

	Page 10103		Page 10105
1	CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well, I can only	1	collective input that we received from all of our," – so he
2	listen – I'm challenged, I can only listen to one person at	2	confirms that the appellation so-called Scott's plan is the
3	a time. What's the page?	3	correct appellation.
4	MR NTSEBEZA SC: It's TH205.	4	CHAIRPERSON: No, no, no, that flowed
5	CHAIRPERSON: Give it again, TH2...?	5	from cross-examination of earlier witnesses, I think in
6	MR NTSEBEZA SC: It's transcript, H205.	6	particular Brigadier Mkhwanazi, who was questioned about
7	The witness went on to say "It was never Scott's plan; it	7	the plan, and you remember that one of the points of
8	was a police plan that was a collective input that we	8	criticism of some of the experts is it was a mistake for a
9	received from all our commanders that we had present in	9	Public Order Policing operation to be the subject of a plan
10	terms of having a permanent representative," etcetera,	10	drawn by someone from the STF, and that was the basis of
11	etcetera. Why do you, if I interpret whatever your	11	the criticism, and I think still is, from the experts. And
12	responses have been, why do you insist that it was a so-	12	certainly, as far as I can recall, when Brigadier Mkhwanazi
13	called Scott's plan, it was not a plan that had been	13	was giving evidence, this was freely referred to by cross-
14	conceptualised, that had been conceived by Scott?	14	examining counsel as being the Scott plan, and that's where
15	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,	15	Mr Semenza got this expression, the so-called Scott plan,
16	maar ek het pertinent gesê dit is nie 'n Scott plan nie,	16	and the witness then tried to explain why so-called was a
17	dit is 'n polisie plan.	17	useful word to use in front of the expression "Scott plan"
18	MR NTSEBEZA SC: I mean nobody is going	18	for the reasons he gave.
19	to deny that at some stage the police might have applied	19	[12:24] MR NTSEBEZA SC: Mr Chairman, thank you
20	their minds, but what I am seeking to clarify with you, is	20	very much. I want to canvas with the witness, because I
21	why you are insistent that it was not Scott's plan, it was	21	want to make submissions later on that it's important that
22	just something that all the police officers had come around	22	there shouldn't be any doubt as to who was the author of
23	the table to do and produced?	23	the plan and why it was significant and why the outcome
24	MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, on our record, I	24	would have been different had the author of the plan been
25	think the page is 8228.	25	somebody else. That's it.
	Page 10104		Page 10106
1	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, why do you call it	1	CHAIRPERSON: You're perfectly at liberty
2	the so-called Scott's plan?	2	to put questions along those lines to the witness. I was
3	MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, it is not the	3	afraid that we were getting bogged down, the needle was
4	witness who's calling it a Scott's plan. Those are the –	4	sticking in the groove on the so-called Scott plan point
5	MR NTSEBEZA SC: He certainly concurs	5	and I was trying to enable you to move on to the points
6	with whoever called –	6	that obviously you're going to make.
7	CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenza called it the	7	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
8	so-called Scott plan in the question which elicited the	8	Now you'll correct me if I'm wrong; my own sense is that
9	answer which has been read. Mr Semenza, you -	9	Scott in his statement identifies two situations and he
10	MR SEMENYA SC: And it was because in	10	speaks to those two situations. In the first one he talks
11	cross-examination it was persistently put to the witness	11	really about what has come to be known as an operational
12	the Scott's plan, the Scott's plan, the Scott's plan.	12	strategy and a mission, and if we go to his statement and
13	MR NTSEBEZA SC: I read from the	13	read paragraphs 8 and 9 of his statement -
14	transcript, Mr Chairman. Mr Semenza SC, "Now can we pause	14	CHAIRPERSON: In fairness, you should
15	for a moment here and talk about what is happening in the	15	give the witness the exhibit number so that he can find it
16	JOC in relation to the plan – the operational plan - the	16	in his file and then he can turn to paragraphs 8 and 9 and
17	so-called Scott's plan?" That's Mr –	17	be able to converse with you along the lines you wish him
18	CHAIRPERSON: That's the point Mr Semenza	18	to converse.
19	makes. He says he called it the so-called Scott plan, and	19	MR NTSEBEZA SC: FFF18. If you'll bear
20	he's explained why he did so.	20	with me, Mr Chairman. Have you got the passage? Do you
21	MR NTSEBEZA SC: The response from this	21	see that, General?
22	witness, "Chairperson, I'm glad that the advocate is	22	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,
23	referring to it as the so-called Scott's plan. I think I	23	ek het net Luitenant-Kolonel Scott se addisionele
24	want to place it on record that it was never Lieutenant	24	verklaring; ek het nie sy oorspronklike verklaring nie.
25	Scott's plan, that it was a police plan, that was a	25	Maar ek het hom nou ontvang.

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10107</p> <p>1 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now it seems to me if 2 you read paragraph 8, paragraphs 8 and 9, you do get the 3 sense that at that stage he talks about an operational 4 strategy and a mission, and he says why he was putting that 5 forward. Do you see that? Now for instance in paragraph 8 6 - before you answer, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, on the 7 tenth line from 8 he says the following, "I presented the 8 following strategy to the JOC senior management for 9 approval. SAPS will enter into dialogue with the 10 protesters, giving an opportunity for a non-tactical 11 resolution. SAPS will protect life and property, should 12 the need arise, by responding proportionally to such force; 13 and thirdly, SAPS will exercise caution to protect its 14 members without provoking aggression from the protestors."</p> <p>15 Then in paragraph 9 he says, "I thereafter 16 proposed the SAPS mission which would provide a guideline 17 for the operational deployment to achieve the desired 18 outcome, namely a combined SAPS force will restore 19 stability to the Lonmin Mine area in Marikana from 14 20 August 2012 by deploying proactively with a visible show of 21 force, isolating the transgressing group and ensuring an 22 orderly processing of gatherers to extract weapons and 23 identify suspects involved in the unrest. The mission was 24 accepted and adopted by the SAPS senior management of the 25 JOC."</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10109</p> <p>1 gaan nie. Kolonel Scott was reeds op die Maandagaand, die 2 13de, was hy aangewys om die beplanning te koördineer, so 3 insette te versamel en te koördineer.</p> <p>4 CHAIRPERSON: I think an important word 5 is not just information but inputs, the witness spoke about 6 inputs, inputs from other –</p> <p>7 MR HANABE: Inputs yes, instead of 8 information. That all the inputs gathered, that he would 9 coordinate this.</p> <p>10 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.</p> <p>11 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 12 en die strategie en die missie was dan alreeds in terme van 13 insette wat so vroeg ontvang is soos die Maandagaand, is 14 daarvan begin werk, en dit was na aanleiding van 'n gesprek 15 wat ons gehad het, Nasionale Kommissaris was teenwoordig, 16 die Provinciale Kommissaris, die pertinente drie 17 vergaderings op die Maandagaand, en dan ook die nag se 18 werkery wat Luitenant-Kolonel Merafe betrokke was saam met 19 Luitenant-Kolonel Scott die nag van die 13de, die ooggend 20 van die 14de. Voorsitter, maar die belangrikste is op 21 bladsy 10, en dit is die laaste sin, "The mission was 22 accepted and adopted by the SAPS senior management of the 23 JOC," en ek wil, ter illustrasie wil ek hierso meld, in 24 polisie beplanning is dit nie relevant wie die individuele 25 beplanner of beplanningsspan is nie, nie relevant in die</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10108</p> <p>1 Now before you answer, I want you to look at 2 paragraph 8 where he says, "I concluded an appreciation of 3 the environment incorporating the background information I 4 had been given during the course of the night, and 5 reflected the police's views on how to deal with the 6 situation, as was discussed that evening." Now what I want 7 to put to you is that to the extent that there was other 8 participation by police officers, it was to the extent of 9 the formulation of the operational strategy and mission as 10 is captured in paragraphs 8 and 9. Nothing more.</p> <p>11 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 12 Kolonel Scott het deurgaans verwys na homself in terme van 13 sy eie verklaring en hy het nie die royal "we" gebruik soos 14 wat ek verneem ek Adv Ntsebeza het na verwys in terme van 15 die kollektiewe verwysing na persone nie.</p> <p>16 CHAIRPERSON: The royal "we" actually is 17 when someone is actually in the first person singular, when 18 he puts it "we," you know as the Queen does, that's why the 19 royal "we," we decide this, when the Queen says it, it 20 means I decide it. But your point is he didn't use the 21 first person plural, he used the first person singular.</p> <p>22 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Thank you, Mr Chairman.</p> <p>23 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 24 en ek het reeds omvattend daarna verwys en pertinent in die 25 bewyssuk op bladsy 8228, en ek kan nie in detail daarin</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10110</p> <p>1 konteks dat op die einde van die dag word sodanige 2 beplanning, word dit goedgekeur, en die goedkeuring beteken 3 dat die JOCOM en dan pertinent die oorhoofse bevelvoerder 4 hulle self versoen met dit wat sodanig vermeld is in 5 sodanige beplanning of benadering.</p> <p>6 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, General, I mean 7 that's a long answer, but I don't disagree with you in what 8 you are saying. I'm simply putting to you that what Scott 9 proposed at that stage and what inputs were given by SAPS 10 officers, spoke to operational strategy and the mission, 11 and that is distinct from the plan about which we are going 12 to have a conversation now.</p> <p>13 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 14 dis in lyn met die beplanning; die strategie en die missie 15 is in lyn met die beplanning.</p> <p>16 MR NTSEBEZA SC: And what I will put to 17 you is that when we look at the evidence - whether it's in 18 the statements by Merafe and everybody else's statement, 19 and even General Mpembe - what the police participated in 20 by way of comments and input and whatever, was the broad 21 strategy and mission of how to deal with what had arisen, 22 and that is what Scott - Scott, incidentally, is the one 23 who had been formulating the operational strategy, but he 24 invited the input of all other police officers. That is 25 what you see in paragraphs 8 and 9 of his statement. I</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10111</p> <p>1 will put it to you that when it came to the plan he was the 2 sole author of the plan, and there is no evidence 3 throughout that in the conceptualisation of the plan he got 4 input from anybody else.</p> <p>5 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is nie 6 waar nie, Voorsitter.</p> <p>7 MR NTSEBEZA SC: And I'll put it to you 8 that the reluctance to admit that it was his plan is 9 because he was not the person, professionally, who should 10 have been drawing the plan to contain what was going on at 11 the mountain, or in Marikana.</p> <p>12 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, but the fair 13 treatment of the evidence, again we refer to the statement 14 of General Mpembe, paragraph 26, where it reads, "The 15 commanders of the various SAPS units and disciplines 16 participated in the development of this plan. After 17 consulting everyone at JOCOM, I then approved both the 18 operational strategy and the mission statement." So it is 19 clear on that, that it is the commanders of the various 20 SAPS units and the various disciplines who participated in 21 the development of the plan.</p> <p>22 CHAIRPERSON: The interesting point seems 23 to be that General Mpembe in paragraph 27 says, "Based on 24 the mission statement and the operational strategy, a six- 25 stage plan was adopted, premised on the following</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10113</p> <p>1 testifying about where what is. I would have expected that 2 if I'm putting a wrong proposition to the witness, he would 3 say that is not what is contained. It doesn't seem to be 4 the basis. It seems to be that he's telling us what the 5 testimony is, and I have dealt with Mpembe. I'll come to 6 Mpembe. In fact, Mpembe says exactly what we are saying. 7 I'm throwing two distinct situations here. Scott comes and 8 conceptualise - he does all those things he says he does in 9 paragraph 8. He comes up with an operational strategy – 10 broad, it's a broad brush against the canvas - and then he 11 comes with a mission. So where Mpembe talks about there 12 having been a discussion about generals and what, he refers 13 to exactly what is contained by Scott in his statement in 14 paragraphs 8 and 9.</p> <p>15 Now, I am putting to this witness that what – and 16 I'll come to Mpembe, and it will be clear that we are 17 talking about two distinct situations here. The one is 18 where everybody is, throw your input, broad strategy brush 19 against the canvas to see what your inputs are. For what? 20 To achieve these objectives. SAPS will enter into 21 dialogue. SAPS would protect lives. SAPS will exercise 22 caution, and in paragraph 9, this will be the mission. We 23 will patiently demonstrate that that is the fullest extent 24 of participation by other officers. Anything else – that's 25 why Mpembe, in spite of himself, ends up by saying, you</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10112</p> <p>1 approach." So he seems to suggest that the mission 2 statement and the strategy come first and then the plan is 3 adopted based on that. The questioning, as I understand 4 it, seems to suggest that things went the other way around. 5 The plan came first, which is entirely Scott's work, and 6 then the strategy and the mission statement came in respect 7 of which the other officers participated. Mr Ntsebeza –</p> <p>8 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, it was on a –</p> <p>9 [12:44] CHAIRPERSON: What do you say about this 10 passage? I understand what paragraph 26 says, but what do 11 you say about the first sentence - in a sense you're 12 putting what you say the evidence is - about the first 13 sentence in para 27 where, "Based on the mission statement 14 and the operational strategy, a six-stage plan was 15 adopted." Now which comes first; the mission and the 16 strategy go after the plan, or is it the other way around?</p> <p>17 MR NTSEBEZA SC: That's what was just put 18 to the witness –</p> <p>19 CHAIRPERSON: So what exactly are you 20 putting to the witness?</p> <p>21 MR NTSEBEZA SC: No, no, I'm saying this 22 - it's a very simple proposition. I'm saying, and I don't 23 know whether the interjection was by way of an objection by 24 my learned friend, or whether he's doing his re-examination 25 now to clarify a point, because I don't know why he's</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10114</p> <p>1 know, after we had made our input, we adopted the 2 operational strategy and mission.</p> <p>3 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair –</p> <p>4 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ntsebeza, are you in 5 effect relying on what appears at the top of page 4 of the 6 statement by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, FFF18, where he 7 says, having set out –</p> <p>8 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.</p> <p>9 CHAIRPERSON: - the strategy and the 10 mission, he then says, "I hereafter" –</p> <p>11 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed.</p> <p>12 CHAIRPERSON: - "conceptualised three 13 escalating stages of deployment in line with the police's 14 strategy to reach the desired outcome," and then he 15 explains how this was done through what he calls three 16 escalating stages.</p> <p>17 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.</p> <p>18 CHAIRPERSON: So you say that's the plan?</p> <p>19 MR NTSEBEZA SC: That's the plan.</p> <p>20 CHAIRPERSON: And you say he says he 21 conceptualised three escalating stages –</p> <p>22 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.</p> <p>23 CHAIRPERSON: - therefore it's his plan.</p> <p>24 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Is that your point, in a nutshell?</p> <p>25 MR NTSEBEZA SC: That's going to be the</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10115</p> <p>1 basis, and we'll take it step by step just to show that 2 it's not a question of semantics where one thinks one was 3 using royal "we," when one was not using a royal "we." 4 It's a question where even the other witnesses, or the 5 other statements, Merafe and everybody else nowhere - 6 CHAIRPERSON: The witness has heard the 7 discussion between us. I hope he now understands the point 8 that you're making that I've been trying to understand, 9 which I now think I understand, and perhaps he can give us 10 the benefit of his comments on that exchange between us.</p> <p>11 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed.</p> <p>12 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 13 nee, in terme van die verklaring van Scott het hy, deur die 14 nag het hy informasie ingesamel en hy sê ook dan daar in 15 paragraaf 8, "I started working on an operational strategy 16 which would provide the operational concept," en dit is toe 17 voorgelê aan die JOCOM vergadering op die 14de in die 18 oggend. Dit was sodanig dan aanvaar deur die JOCOM, die 19 oorhoofse bevelvoerder en die verteenwoordigers van die 20 JOCOM, nadat daar insette gelewer was deur die 21 verteenwoordigers van die betrokke JOCOM vergadering, dat 22 die strategie en missie eerste gekom het en daarna, 23 voortspruitend uit die JOCOM goedkeuring, het die plan toe 24 begin ontvou.</p> <p>25 MR NTSEBEZA SC: General, you can be sure</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10117</p> <p>1 conceptualises, he identifies three stages of deployment in 2 paragraph 10 thereof. Do you see that?</p> <p>3 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ek sien dit 4 op bladsy 4 onder paragraaf 10, dis korrek.</p> <p>5 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now you can see there 6 it's a detailed plan, stage by stage. It's not just 7 principles that speak to strategy. There now he gives, as 8 Scott, a detailed indication of who must do what, why, 9 where, when. Would you agree?</p> <p>10 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 11 ja, hy sit dit uiteen; net so sit Generaal Mpembe dit 12 uiteen.</p> <p>13 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Ja, we'll come to what 14 General Mpembe says, but you know, we can't give words 15 meanings that they do not have. When Scott says "I 16 conceptualise," and doesn't say anywhere thereafter that 17 Major-General Annandale said, no, you can't do this, 18 General Mpembe critiqued this, nowhere. Throughout he 19 conceptualises. He takes it to the JOC, the JOC approves, 20 yes, we implement it. That is what is remarkable about the 21 plan. You can put your inputs in the strategy, but in the 22 plan no-one ever contributes anything.</p> <p>23 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 24 ek het reeds getuig dat Luitenant-Kolonel Scott kan 25 duidelikheid daaroor gee hoekom hy dit is sy verklaring</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10116</p> <p>1 that we will patiently take you through the evidence to 2 show that that plan didn't evolve on its own. It had an 3 author who was informed by a particular mindset, and that 4 is what we are going to be arguing to the Commission at the 5 end of the day. You have just repeated what you have said. 6 I don't disagree with you. On the 14th, you all assembled 7 there. You talked about - and Scott says, you know, look, 8 if we are going to contain a situation like this, this is 9 what we must - I've got these three operational strategy 10 plans, one, two, three; this is our mission. I agree with 11 you, but then thereafter, as the person whom you had 12 invited to come and deal with this situation, you had said, 13 I want Scott, because of these qualities. You didn't say, 14 who is going to do crowd control? Oh, Mkhwanazi, Mkhwanazi 15 must be - you chose Scott, and he then says I then, after 16 all that input about what the strategy is and what the 17 mission is, I then went to conceptualise a plan. That is 18 what we are going to investigate.</p> <p>19 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 20 ek volstaan dat Luitenant-Kolonel Scott die koördineerde 21 was, en hetsy dit Scott of Mkhwanazi was, die rol sou 22 dieselfde gewees het, om insette te kry van al die ander 23 rolspelers en dit sodanig te vervat in die betrokke plan.</p> <p>24 MR NTSEBEZA SC: And it is very 25 interesting to see what he proposes. On page - but what he</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10118</p> <p>1 vermeld het of nie vermeld het nie. Hy kan ook meld watse 2 insette hy in ag geneem het. Ek weet, en ek was 3 teenwoordig toe dit voorgelê was by 'n JOCOM vergadering 4 met sowat 30-plus bevelvoerders. Ek weet, en ek was 5 teenwoordig toe hy met myself in gesprek getree het, ook 6 met Generaal Mpembe in gesprek getree het, ook met Generaal 7 Naidoo en Brigadier Calitz. Ek weet dat elkeen van die 8 offisiere teenwoordig die geleentheid gehad het om hul 9 insette te lewer, hetsy dit dan iets nuut is, nie saamstem 10 nie of byvoeg, en ek weet dat as voorsitter, as jy 'n 11 voorstel maak en niemand het enige objeksie teen dit nie, 12 is dit hulle totale ondersteuning in terme van dit wat 13 voorgedra word; en ek weet ook dat Luitenant-Kolonel 14 Merafe, wie 'n baie ervare Openbare Orde Polisiëring 15 beampie is, saam met Kolonel Scott gewerk het die nag van 16 die 13de; en ek weet ook dat ons 'n verskeidenheid van 17 senior offisiere teenwoordig gehad wat gesamentlik 18 tientalle jare ervaring in Openbare Orde het, niemand 19 minder as Brigadier Calitz homself, Kolonel Makhubela, 20 Pitsi en Mere, en ander wat ek reeds genoem het.</p> <p>21 MR NTSEBEZA SC: After lunch, General, 22 we'll go to General Mpembe's affidavit so that we can put 23 this thing to rest about what he says. Subject to your 24 permission, Mr Chairman, we'll ask to take the lunch break 25 now.</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10119</p> <p>1 CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Thank you, Mr 2 Ntsebeza. We'll take the lunch adjournment at this stage. 3 We'll endeavour to reassemble just after 2 o'clock. 4 [COMMISSION ADJOURS COMMISSION RESUMES] 5 [14:06] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission continues, 6 resumes. Generaal-Majoor, u is nog steeds onder eed. 7 CHARL ANNANDALE: s.o.e. 8 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ntsebeza, do you have 9 any more questions for the witness? 10 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NTSEBEZA SC: 11 Thank you, Mr Chairman. General, I don't know whether 12 you've had time to look at Mpembe's affidavit, exhibit 13 GGG13. Do you have it – 14 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Mr Ntsebeza, I 15 think it's GGG12. That's the number I have on my exhibit. 16 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Possibly. It is 17 possible. I'm – 18 CHAIRPERSON: Well, I'm informed by both 19 the Commissioners that it's GGG12. If you've got a 20 document called GGG13 then we, there's something wrong. 21 According to our information Brigadier Calitz's statement 22 is GGG13. 23 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes. It looks like 24 these are different index, because – 25 MS PILLAY: Chair, it is that Brigadier</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10121</p> <p>1 follows to the effect that "The commanders of the various 2 SAPS units and disciplines participated in the development 3 of this plan," and obviously the plan referred to is this 4 operational strategy. He then says, "I then approved both 5 operational strategy and the mission statement," just like 6 Colonel Scott said in his own affidavit in paragraphs 8 and 7 9. You see that? 8 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ek sien dit, 9 Voorsitter. 10 MR NTSEBEZA SC: And when you have regard 11 then to Scott's statement in paragraph 10 thereof, he then 12 sets out what he says he conceptualised and we'll see in 13 his additional affidavit how he builds up on the three 14 stages, because he talks about six stages. But more to 15 General Mpembe's statement, paragraph 26, then – I mean 27, 16 says, "Based on the mission statement and the operational 17 statement, a six-stage plan was adopted, in summary the six 18 stages," and then he goes on. Do you see that? 19 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ek sien dit, 20 Voorsitter. 21 MR NTSEBEZA SC: In fact we will submit 22 that there is confirmation – maybe let me go back, Scott's 23 statement – do you see page 4 of FFF18? 24 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ek sien 25 bladsy 4, Voorsitter.</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10120</p> <p>1 Calitz is GGG13 and Mpembe is GGG12. 2 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Sorry, it's GGG12. Do 3 you have that, General? 4 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Korrek, 5 Voorsitter, ek het die bewysstuk. 6 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now in that statement, 7 when you were being cross-examined by Adv Jele, your 8 counsel drew the attention of the Commission to paragraph 9 26 of the statement, but in order to put the context 10 properly, I would like us to have regard to paragraph 25. 11 Do you have paragraph 25? 12 CHAIRPERSON: It appears to be on page 9 13 of the statement. 14 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed. Indeed, Mr 15 Chairman. 16 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dis reg, 17 Voorsitter. Ek het die paragraaf. 18 MR NTSEBEZA SC: So before you read 19 paragraph 26, it seems to me to put it in its proper 20 context, is to read 25 also. Do you see that, "That 21 Lieutenant Scott proposed the following operation strategy, 22 which was then adopted by JOCOM." Do you see that? 23 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ek merk dit 24 op, Voorsitter. 25 MR NTSEBEZA SC: And then paragraph 26</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10122</p> <p>1 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now he goes through the 2 various steps. In stage 1 in the affidavit, you see what 3 he says there, the deployment and what have you, say, "SAPS 4 to deploy a monitoring contingent." Do you see that? 5 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ek sien dit, 6 Voorsitter. 7 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now keep your finger on 8 that and go to exhibit L, and you'll see that in slide 71 9 the operational strategy is being discussed. Do you see 10 that? 11 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dis korrek, 12 Voorsitter. 13 MR NTSEBEZA SC: But more importantly it 14 is the plan that I want to draw your attention to. Slide 15 72 and 73, if you look at page 4 of Scott's statement, and 16 you look at slide 72 of exhibit L, you will find that there 17 are no substantial differences, substantive differences at 18 all. Page 4 says, "SAPS to deploy a monitoring contingent 19 of POP members with a negotiating component to engage in 20 dialogue." [Inaudible] says "SAPS said to deploy one 21 [inaudible] monitoring contingent with a negotiating 22 component to engage in dialogue." If you read any - maybe 23 let me give you an opportunity to read both and draw our 24 attention to any differences, if there are any. We will 25 submit that there are no substantive differences at all.</p>

	Page 10123		Page 10125
1 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Voorsitter,	1 11 with what you see in slides 75 and 76. Take your time,	
2 die eerste "bullet" op "slide" 72 is basies die eerste sin		2 General. I don't want to be unfair to you.	
3 op bladsy 4 van "stage" 1 en die eerste "bullet."		3 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Dit is reg,
4 Voorsitter, sonder om deur al die detail te gaan, die, in		4 Voorsitter.	
5 "slide" 72 word daar 'n korter weergawe verwys na wat in		5 MR NTSEBEZA SC:	Now stage 3, which you
6 die eerste twee "bullets" van "stage" 1 op bladsy 4 van		6 will find in paragraph 12, or from paragraph 12 of Scott's	
7 Luitenant-Kolonel Scott se verklaring is.		7 affidavit, very detailed as to what will have to happen in	
8 MR NTSEBEZA SC:	Yes, you're not	8 stage 3. He, if you compare that to L78 to L80, the slides	
9 suggesting that that is a substantive difference? In fact		9 78 to 80 of exhibit L, give yourself some time to reflect	
10 I would understand you to be saying what you find in		10 on that. It will be 78 to 80, in other words 78, 79, 80.	
11 Scott's statement, describing of stage 1, is reflected in		11 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Dis korrek,
12 terms in slide 72 of exhibit L. Is that right?		12 Voorsitter. Daar is groot ooreenkoms.	
13 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Dit wat op	13 MR NTSEBEZA SC:	Now because it will be
14 "slide" 72 is, is basies die gedeeltes onder "stage" 1, die		14 our submission, and you may or may not comment on this,	
15 eerste twee "bullets."		15 that firstly Scott says so, in so many words, that this is	
16 MR NTSEBEZA SC:	Well, if you look at	16 his plan, and when you read his statement together with	
17 slide 73 and compare slide 73 with the remainder of the		17 exhibit L, our submission will be that it is very clear	
18 bullets in paragraph 10 of Scott's statement, you see that		18 that he devised the plan. We will argue – before you	
19 third bullet on Scott's statement says "A reserve group		19 respond – that there were no changes to that plan, so what	
20 comprising of" da-da-da-da, da-da-da-da, and it then goes		20 was presented to this Commission is what is contained in	
21 on. Second bullet it describes SAPS helicopters.		21 this plan.	
22 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Dis reg, op	22 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Voorsitter
23 bladsy 5 egter net na die twee "bullets" aan die bokant van		23 nee, ek stem nie saam nie. Dit was, Kolonel Scott was	
24 die bladsy, die paragraaf wat begin met "These units," en		24 aangestel om die koördinasie te doen van die insette, so hy	
25 wat dan eindig in hakies, "towards the west," is dan nie		25 het dit gekonsolideer. Met sy konsolidasie het hy dit	
	Page 10124		Page 10126
1 noodwendig, blyk dit vir my op "slide" 73 gereflekteer nie.		1 uiteraard dan verwoord, en dit is soos dit in sy verklaring	
2 MR NTSEBEZA SC:	Of course I'm not	2 vermeld is. Voorsitter, daar was ander opsies oorweeg en	
3 suggesting that, you know, it's a replica.		3 dit is op die einde van die dag is dit bevind dat dit nie	
4 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Nee.	4 geïmplementeer gaan word nie. Ek stem nie saam met die	
5 MR NTSEBEZA SC:	What I'm suggesting to	5 argument van Adv Ntsebeza nie.	
6 you is that the presentation which was made to the		6 MR NTSEBEZA SC:	Of course you don't
7 Commission by way of exhibit L mirrors almost in identical		7 agree because it gainsays anything that you have said so	
8 terms the Scott statement, which in our submission will be		8 far to the contra –	
9 that it is the plan.		9 CHAIRPERSON:	Mr Ntsebeza, it's not
10 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Maar	10 necessary to make comments on the answers the witness has	
11 Voorsitter, dan ook so bewysstuk GGG12 vanaf paragraaf 27		11 given. Please concentrate on asking questions.	
12 op bladsy 10 en Generaal Mpembe se verklaring, maar dan		12 MR NTSEBEZA SC:	Yes, Mr Chairman. Now
13 nader aan die woorde van Luitenant-Kolonel Scott as dit in		13 in paragraph 18 of his statement, do you see paragraph 18	
14 Generaal Mpembe s'n.		14 of his statement?	
15 MR NTSEBEZA SC:	Now stage 2 as described	15 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Paragraaf 18
16 by Scott appears in paragraph 11. In his statement Scott		16 van my eie verklaring, GGG1, ek merk dit op, Voorsitter.	
17 says this would have to be what goes on into the plan.		17 MR NTSEBEZA SC:	You see for instance in
18 [14:26] Now if you look at the SAPS presentation to the		18 paragraph 18 he does say what was happening at 6 o'clock in	
19 Commission, and we are talking about slides 75 and 76,		19 the morning on that day, on the 15th of August.	
20 again we will make the same submission in that what is		20 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:	Ekskuus
21 presented to us here when the slide exhibit L was tendered		21 Voorsitter, ek het dit verkeerd gehad. Ek dog dis my	
22 in evidence, those slides 75 and 76, a mirror substantively		22 verklaring –	
23 of the plan that Scott in his own words says he		23 CHAIRPERSON:	Isn't that dealt with in
24 conceptualised. I'll give you an opportunity to look		24 17? "17, on Thursday, 16 August at 6 o'clock I chaired the	
25 through paragraph 11 and compare what you see in paragraph		25 JOCOM," and he goes on about what happened.	

	Page 10127		Page 10129
1	MR NTSEBEZA SC: No. It starts -		1 toelighting.
2	COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: I think perhaps you		2 CHAIRPERSON: I think the point Mr
3	can tell us first of all which statement are we looking at,		3 Ntsebeza is endeavouring to make is that the plan was
4	Mr Ntsebeza.		4 unchanged, that there were no modifications or
5	CHAIRPERSON: Presumably it's GGG –		5 qualifications to the plan. The plan had been laid out on
6	MR NTSEBEZA SC: It's Scott's statement.		6 Tuesday, and on Wednesday morning it was still in place,
7	CHAIRPERSON: Oh, Scott's statement		7 and I think the point he's now making is that by Wednesday
8	[inaudible] don't deal with, you see, so I thought		8 evening there was still no change. Is that your point, Mr
9	obviously he deals with things in his statement. So it's		9 Ntsebeza?
10	Scott's statement.		10 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed. Indeed, Mr
11	MR NTSEBEZA SC: No, no, Scott's		11 Chairman.
12	statement. I'm sorry. I'm sorry, members of the		12 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter
13	Commission. You see in Scott's statement in paragraph 18,		13 nee, daar was veranderings gemaak. Byvoorbeeld ons het
14	he says though, you know, he confines himself to what		14 "forward holding area" 2 het ons by gebring op die
15	happened on Tuesday where inputs were made, but he does		15 Woensdag.
16	mention in the context of what happened on Wednesday, he		16 MR NTSEBEZA SC: What I'm putting to you,
17	tells us everything, and there's no suggestion there that		17 General, is that Scott doesn't say so, and I will take to
18	there was a review of what had been agreed or there were		18 what the other people you said were planning this, were
19	further inputs or there were any criticisms, or there were		19 conceptualising this plan with Merafe and everybody else.
20	things that were taken out of that statement. Do you see		20 What I'm putting to you now is that he doesn't say so here
21	that?		21 that we made some changes to my plan as a consequence of A,
22	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dis reg,		22 B, C, D. It doesn't.
23	Voorsitter.		23 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,
24	MR NTSEBEZA SC: And he then goes on to a		24 ek het reeds daarna verwys en dit was nie Scott se plan
25	debriefing in the evening of the, on the 15th, and he also		25 nie, soos wat die Advokaat nou gemeld het, Voorsitter, en
	Page 10128		Page 10130
1	mentions a JOCOM meeting during the evening of the 15th in		1 dat elke persoon kan self getuig in terme van wat hy of sy
2	paragraphs 20 to 21. Do you see that?		2 besluit het om in hulle verklarings te meld en wat hulle
3	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter		3 uitgelaat het. Dit neem nie weg dat daar sodanige
4	nee, ek sien nie die verwysing in die paragrawe na die		4 besprekings plaasgevind het nie.
5	JOCOM vergadering nie.		5 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I hear you, General.
6	CHAIRPERSON: Which paragraph are you		6 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is net
7	referring to, Mr Ntsebeza? If you're talking about the		7 nie sodanig verwoord nie, Voorsitter. Dit was die
8	debriefing, you're referring to para 20, and then in the		8 operasionalisering van 'n plan. Dit was nie 'n behoorlike
9	second line it says it was reported to JOC that the AMCU		9 plan soos in wat mens geskryf het in terme van 'n OCT
10	leadership had informed the police. Admittedly it doesn't		10 formaat nie.
11	say about a committee meeting, but it certainly refers to		11 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes? No, I hear what
12	reports made to the JOC.		12 you are saying, but I want to put it to you that our
13	MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, and in 21 he refers		13 argument will be that when there was input that Scott got
14	to discussions that took place at the JOC. Do you see		14 from SAPS officers of whatever rank, he stated so in so
15	that?		15 many words.
16	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ek neem dit		16 [14:46] CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that a question for
17	waar, dis reg, Voorsitter.		17 you to ask Lieutenant-Colonel Scott when he comes? I'm not
18	MR NTSEBEZA SC: And the point - I think		18 sure the witness can deal with it. But may I interrupt you
19	I've already indicated to you that the point here is that		19 for a moment and ask this question; you said there was at
20	there is no suggestion that at those meetings there was a		20 least one change on the Wednesday and that was forward
21	reviewal of the plan as we now know it, or there was any		21 holding area 2 was added. Can you remember who suggested
22	addition or a qualification, subtraction, to the plan.		22 that?
23	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,		23 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,
24	tydens die JOCOM vergaderings was die, elke dag was die		24 nee, ek kan nie onthou nie maar dit was met die addisionele
25	plan weer deurgegaan in terme van 'n Google lewendige		25 senior offisiere wat ons van Gauteng gehad het, spesifiek

	Page 10131	Page 10133
1	Brigadier Whitman en daar was 'n Kolonel Smit en nog 'n kolonel van Openbare Orde Eenhede en dit was met die addisionele personeel wat daar toe besluit is dat ons moet 'n addisionele tweede area identifiseer.	1 anyway, we won't go there now.
2		2 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, we seem to read
3		3 paragraph 10, page 5, just below the two bullet points, he
4		4 then deals with the forward holding area 2.
5	CHAIRPERSON: I see from slide 115 it looks as if an additional 36 members had arrived, were deployed to the Marikana region, which presumably is what necessitated that change. Were there any other changes that you can recall?	5 CHAIRPERSON: Where is this? You say page 5?
6		7 MR SEMENYA SC: Page 5 just below the two bullet points that are at the top of the page.
7		9 CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
8		10 MR SEMENYA SC: Then in that paragraph he deals in parenthesis -
9		12 CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see, yes. Yes, I'm sorry, you are correct. Originally in the passage to which I referred where he was, he seemed to be talking about the original conception, but you are correct, the passage in square brackets higher up indicates that this is something he introduced on the Wednesday. Thank you for drawing that to my attention. What we were busy with, was - we went on a "dwaalspoor" through my fault - was the changes that we introduced to the original plan, and one was the addition of forward holding area 2 occasioned by the arrival of reinforcements from Gauteng, and the second was the abandonment of the 360-degree encirclement. Were there any other changes?
10	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, ja, op 'n stadium was dit oorweeg om filter lyne, om dit daar te stel vanaf al die windrigtings. Voorsitter, dan was daar ook die kwessie wat -	25 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,
11		
12		
13		
14	CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, but that wasn't done. That change may have been - that possible change may have been discussed but it wasn't accepted. Is that correct?	
15		
16		
17		
18	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, ja, dit was bespreek maar dit was nie prakties uitvoerbaar nie, weens 'n verskeidenheid van redes wat ek reeds na verwys het.	
19		
20		
21		
22	CHAIRPERSON: But the question I'm asking you is were there any changes effected, apart from the addition of the extra forward holding area for the reasons you have explained, on the Wednesday?	
23		
24		
25		
	Page 10132	Page 10134
1	GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, dan ook die aanvanklike "encirclement" was die bedoeling gewees dat ons draad reg rondom die groot koppie gooie. Voorsitter, en daar was daarna verwys as die "encirclement group." Voorsitter, die verandering wat ons toe ingebring het is dat die ses Njala sal aanvanklik, hulle sou op die Woensdag net in die reserwe groep gebly het op "forward holding area" 1, en die besluit was toe gewees dat dit sal slegs 'n reguit lyn maak aanvanklik met die sesde Njala net ietwat weswaarts en toe lateraan te verskuif na ooswaarts in terme van 'n fisiese lyn tussen die stakers en die polisie.	1 klein veranderings. NIU het toe later, aanvanklik was dit STF of NIU sou uit die Oryx helikopter uit gefunksioneer het. Dit was toe lateraan net NIU geword.
2		2
3		3
4		4 MR NTSEBEZA SC: General, I notice you seem to be fairly conversant with English and you have been indicating to the interpreter how he is not interpreting what you are saying. Are you comfortable and fairly conversant with English?
5		5
6		6
7		7
8		8
9		9 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,
10		10 laat ek dit sommer nou vir die rekord stel, ek is nie 'n kampvegter vir Afrikaans nie.
11		11
12	CHAIRPERSON: If Colonel Scott's description of the plan as he conceptualised it in fact incorporates the subsequent amendments that were effected, as you have explained, because I see he seems to speak already of forward holding areas 1 and 2. This is the last bullet on page 5, foot of page 5. So it would seem from what you say that we can't rely entirely on his statement for a description of the plan as originally conceptualised by him, but - and I couldn't find the reference to the 360-degree encirclement, unless I read it badly, which was discarded later for the reasons you gave. So that's a useful warning light that shines in respect of the accuracy in some of the things Lieutenant-Colonel Scott says, but	12 CHAIRPERSON: Anyway, it will be better -
13		13 MR NTSEBEZA SC: You are not a what?
14		14 CHAIRPERSON: He is not a "kampvegter," a campaigner I would think.
15		15 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Oh, okay.
16		16 CHAIRPERSON: Everyone has the fullest right to use his own language. If I was being cross-examined in Afrikaans, I would prefer to give my evidence in English, even though I could understand the questions being put. I would be more at ease; I would feel I am better able to do justice to what I wanted to say. So I have no problem with the Major-General using his first language. He is prepared to answer questions put to him in English, and where he feels that there is something wrong
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<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10135</p> <p>1 with the interpretation he corrects it, but I haven't got a 2 problem with that myself. I will tell you what I would do 3 in similar circumstances and I would, I know what your 4 reaction would be, Mr Ntsebeza, so I won't ask you.</p> <p>5 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Mr Chairman, I'm not 6 accusing the General of anything and I'm not, I'm just 7 observing that Mathunjwa, whose first language is isiZulu 8 and who is not clearly conversant with the English 9 language, in the interests of progress spoke the English as 10 he understands it and as he can, and all of us are of the 11 view that he was -</p> <p>12 CHAIRPERSON: That was his choice, he was 13 given the opportunity.</p> <p>14 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Indeed.</p> <p>15 CHAIRPERSON: But when the witness says 16 something which counsel later want to use against the 17 witness, the witness can't then be heard to say well I'm 18 sorry, I was speaking in my second language, please forgive 19 me.</p> <p>20 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, no, no.</p> <p>21 CHAIRPERSON: So in fact there are both, 22 this sword is "n tweesnydende swaard." It's got edges on 23 both sides. So anyway, let's carry on. Perhaps we can 24 carry on after tea with this interesting linguistic 25 discussion, if that's convenient for you, Mr Ntsebeza?</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10137</p> <p>1 fields were present, including the senior command of the 2 operation. The operation was described as tense on the 3 ground at Wonderkop, with the police media liaison officer, 4 Captain Dennis Adriaan, reporting that the media who had at 5 all times been amongst the protesters were moving behind 6 police lines for protection as they now feared for their 7 lives. The brief was that the police needed to move to 8 implement stage 3 of the operational strategy." Then 9 paragraph 30 he says, "I briefed the JOCOM on a strategy to 10 employ the dispersion action with the aim of breaking the 11 protesters up using crowd management dispersion techniques, 12 water cannons, teargas, and if necessary, stun grenades and 13 rubber bullets, displacing them from the kopje, then 14 confronting smaller groups to disarm and arrest those with 15 dangerous weapons. Should the protesters advance on the 16 POP dispersion line and the members' lives become 17 endangered, the members would tactically retreat to their 18 Nyalas, leaving the TRT, NIU, and STF line behind them to 19 confront the protesters." Then paragraph 32, let's read 31 20 as well, "The second line of tactical force was armed with 21 their standard issue weapons, with sharp-point ammunition. 22 Two STF teams were to be placed in rows of Nyalas 23 overlooking the protesters in order to provide feedback on 24 protester activities, and if necessary engage any threat 25 posed by protesters taking up higher ground and shooting at</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10136</p> <p>1 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I'm quite comfortable 2 with the General using Afrikaans.</p> <p>3 CHAIRPERSON: Alright. Shall we take the 4 tea adjournment then on that comfortable note?</p> <p>5 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.</p> <p>6 CHAIRPERSON: We will take the tea 7 adjournment.</p> <p>8 [COMMISSION ADJOURS] COMMISSION RESUMES]</p> <p>9 [15:23] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.</p> <p>10 Generaal-Majoor, u is nog steeds onder eed.</p> <p>11 CHARL ANNANDALE: s.o.e.</p> <p>12 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ntsebeza, are you still 13 on an existing point or are we moving on?</p> <p>14 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NTSEBEZA SC (CONTD.):</p> <p>15 I will pursue that point. I want to be able to make 16 submissions to you at the end of the day on the basis of 17 evidence. Thanks, Mr Chairman. Now General, I have heard 18 your evidence about what seems to be speaking to the 19 implementation of the plan rather than to the 20 conceptualisation thereof. I want to take you to paragraph 21 29 of Scott's statement where he writes about a meeting 22 that you chaired on the day of the killings, the 16th of 23 August. He said that, "At about 13:30 I was called for 24 special JOCOM meeting, which was chaired by Major-General 25 Annandale. Most of the senior command representing their</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10138</p> <p>1 police members from their advantage position. The proposal 2 was accepted by the JOCOM and I was instructed by Major- 3 General Annandale to brief the commanders. I made the 4 arrangement over the radio to meet the commanders from the 5 different units and deployment points. At forward holding 6 area 1 Brigadier Pretorius, the JOC staff officer, 7 accompanying me to forward holding area 1, arriving at 8 14:30. I briefed the commanders and explained the stage 3 9 deployment strategy with reference to [inaudible], the same 10 one I used to describe the strategy to the JOCOM. The 11 briefing was as follows," and then he gives a detail of the 12 briefing. Do you see that?</p> <p>13 What I want to put to you is the following, that 14 from all of that what essentially comes out is that Scott 15 briefed the JOCOM on stage 3, that it was accepted and 16 approved, and there is nothing there where he even hints 17 that he had to adapt the plan at that stage based on 18 suggestions from members of JOCOM or anyone else. What's 19 your comment on that?</p> <p>20 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 21 die plan was reeds ooreengekom. Dit was om net weer deur 22 die pertinente detail te gaan en dan was daar addisionele 23 lug, of 'n Google lugfoto wat dit net beter grafies 24 aangedui het in terme van hoe die plan homself gaan uitrol. 25 Daar was nie werklik verandering in terme van hoe die plan</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10139</p> <p>1 bespreek was die oggend van die 16de tydens die JOCOM 2 vergadering nie. Daar was net meer detail gegee in terme 3 van die pertinente koppie wat TRT sal moet vee, en dan hoe 4 Taakmag en NIU die groter koppie sal vee. Daar was 5 bevestiging gegee dat die sesde Njala van posisie 6 intussen tyd verskuif het. Dit is basies net in verdere 7 fases opgedeel en dan pertinent dat die draad wat nou 8 geprepositioneer was, dat dit nou sal ontplooい word. 9 MR NTSEBEZA SC: In fact I'm going to 10 refer you – and I'm told it is not yet an exhibit, Mr 11 Chairman, but there is an additional affidavit made by 12 Scott in which he makes it very clear - or clearer, if he 13 has not made it clear so far – that he drafted the plan, 14 that it was his plan and all he did was to take it to your 15 good selves for approval and implementation.</p> <p>16 CHAIRPERSON: We'd been given copies of a 17 document headed "Affidavit," which appears to be a second 18 affidavit, or certainly a further affidavit, I'm not sure 19 if it's second or subsequent, unsigned, but dated November.</p> <p>20 MR NTSEBEZA SC: It is signed, Mr 21 Chairman. Certainly the one I have, on the last page 22 thereof, 19th of November 2012.</p> <p>23 CHAIRPERSON: On my copy I haven't got 24 that.</p> <p>25 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I believe there's a</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10141</p> <p>1 What exhibit number has it been given? 2 CHAIRPERSON: GGG39. 3 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Thank you, Mr Chairman. 4 I thought the Chairman would use the fancier, call it 5 triple G, 39. 6 CHAIRPERSON: If you want me to say that 7 I will. 8 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now do you have the 9 triple G, 39, or GGG39, General?</p> <p>10 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNADALE: I have the 11 document described in both ways, yes, Sir.</p> <p>12 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Now I would like to draw 13 your attention to paragraph 4 thereof. He says there, "In 14 my affidavit of 18 October 2012 I described a three-stage 15 strategy of dealing with the problem at the koppie." We 16 already have that. "My strategy in fact comprised six 17 stages. The reason I did not mention stages 4 to 6 was 18 that these stages were never implemented because 19 developments that day, 16 August 2012, did not unfold as we 20 had anticipated. The plan that I proposed to the JOC did 21 not anticipate an armed attack on the police line by the 22 protesters while the police were preparing for the tactical 23 option. When that happened, some of the planned stages had 24 to be adjusted (stage 4) or become temporarily unattainable 25 for that day (stages 5 and 6). Those stages involved the</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10140</p> <p>1 signed – I don't know what's going on. Maybe yours is not 2 signed –</p> <p>3 CHAIRPERSON: No well, I don't know, 4 there's something strange happening here. My two 5 colleagues have got a statement dated the 19th of November, 6 signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott. I've got a, what might 7 be interpreted as a concept, it's a statement in blank with 8 slightly different pagination, the date not filled in. 9 Anyway, so there are different copies of the same document 10 floating around. I don't know why I'm a disadvantaged 11 citizen and not given the one signed and dated.</p> <p>12 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I've been given only the 13 one –</p> <p>14 CHAIRPERSON: I would have thought, 15 regard being had to my position in the chair, I'm entitled 16 to be treated at least on the same basis as everybody else. 17 But I suppose one must accept these problems with 18 equanimity. Right, I've now got a proper document. It's 19 exhibit GGG39, I take it. It's its second statement, or 20 shall I just call it "Further statement?" Further 21 statement, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, dated 19/11/2012. I 22 don't know why we weren't given this previously, but I 23 suppose I must be grateful we have it at least now. 24 Exhibit GGG39. Yes, Mr Ntsebeza?</p> <p>25 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Thank you, Mr Chairman.</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10142</p> <p>1 following actions. Finally, I want to add that in my 21 2 years at the SAPS, 19 of which were in the STF, I'm not 3 aware that SAPS has ever," as oppose, not never, "has ever 4 been confronted with a situation of the kind with which 5 members were confronted on the ground on 16 August 2012. 6 The plan or strategy that I prepared and proposed for 7 adoption by the JOCOM was the first of its kind. Neither 8 crowd management strategies, for which Standing Order 262 9 provides, nor the hostage management strategies were 10 appropriate in isolation. I thus devised what I considered 11 at the time to be an appropriate plan for an unprecedented 12 situation, being one which had to be encompassed, the 13 principle of Standing Order 262, but moving beyond the 14 restriction of the Standing Order to effectively plan the 15 disarming of the protesters while considering the 16 protection of the police officers and the community in the 17 area when dealing" – so, and then he ends off what I want 18 to be bringing to your attention. In paragraph 7, the last 19 sentence in paragraph 7 seems to – and I will submit that 20 is so – again he says, "The only alternative in my 21 respectful submission, considering the circumstances, was 22 to employ defensive strategy to limit the opportunity for 23 attacks on police members and other possible targets, such 24 as the media, by restricting access by armed protesters to 25 them."</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10143</p> <p>1 So the point here I'm making, which is the point 2 I've been making throughout, is that there doesn't seem to 3 be any doubt – and so we will argue – that this is a plan 4 which is conceptualised by this officer whom you had 5 invited to come and plan for how to deal with the situation 6 that had arisen, and unlike earlier on when you were 7 discussion the overall operational strategy and mission, 8 after that had been approved, there doesn't seem to be 9 anywhere where that plan is not his and all he does is to 10 submit to JOCOM the plan for implementation and/or 11 approval.</p> <p>12 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 13 my antwoord en kommentaar bly presies dieselfde as wat ek 14 deurgaans na verwys het tydens my getuienislewing en ook 15 in kruisonderondervraging.</p> <p>16 [15:43] Voorsitter, in respek vir die tyd wat dit sal in 17 beslag neem, gaan ek nie deur al die detail gaan nie want 18 daar is verskeie verwysings in terme van Kolonel Scott se 19 rol en die ander [onhoorbaar] se rol. Voorsitter, ek wil 20 net twee verdere verwysings gee wat dit miskien sal 21 duidelicker stel. Selfs as 'n mnr White of 'n mnr Hendrickx 22 of 'n mnr De Rover vir ons 'n beplanning aangestuur het en 23 ons het dit aanvaar, dan is dit nie een van hulle 24 beplannings nie, dan dit word die oorhoofse bevelvoerder en 25 die JOCOM se beplanning, en as ek 'n brief skryf aan die</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10145</p> <p>1 brought it to you and that was the plan that you 2 implemented. No change was made to it after that meeting 3 on the Tuesday.</p> <p>4 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter, 5 ek volstaan met my antwoord, getuienis, en kommentaar.</p> <p>6 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, indeed. Now let's 7 look at the affidavits of the commanders whom you testified 8 had made suggestions or had provided input into the plan, 9 and Ms Jele may have canvassed this thing with you. Was it 10 your testimony, if I follow the transcripts well, that 11 Merafe, Colonel Merafe assisted Scott during the early 12 morning of 14 August?</p> <p>13 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is 14 korrek, Voorsitter.</p> <p>15 MR NTSEBEZA SC: And of course I should 16 ask this from Scott, but you don't, you have no explanation 17 as to why Scott himself does not make any specific mention 18 of Merafe?</p> <p>19 CHAIRPERSON: How can you expect him, 20 this witness, to answer that question?</p> <p>21 MR NTSEBEZA SC: He may know, Mr 22 Chairman, but I want this, but I just put it to you that 23 there is no specific mention of Merafe having helped Scott, 24 given that this is what you had expected to happen.</p> <p>25 MR SEMENYA SC: That is also not</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10144</p> <p>1 volgende gesag en ek vra my sekretaresse om die brief vir 2 my te verwoord en ek plaas my handtekening daarop, dan is 3 dit my brief, nie haar brief nie.</p> <p>4 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I put it to you, 5 General, that you understand very well that is not what I'm 6 suggesting to you. You testified that this was never 7 Scott's plan. You testified that it was a police plan that 8 was collective input that was received from all the 9 commanders. You testified that during the JOCOM meetings 10 you had most of the officers, most of the commanders 11 present, and you testified that how the process worked is 12 that Scott was responsible to coordinate the input. Now I 13 am putting to you that with all due respect to your 14 reference to a PA or a secretary, that Scott was not just a 15 secretary. This was his - what do you call it? This was 16 his plan. There's an English word I want to put, like you 17 know, this was his baby. He was the architect.</p> <p>18 CHAIRPERSON: Is "brainchild" perhaps the 19 word?</p> <p>20 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Brainchild, there you 21 are. There you are, Mr Chairman. This was, in all 22 seriousness, the plan that got to be accepted by JOCOM, was 23 his brainchild. After that meeting on the Tuesday where a 24 broad strategy and a mission had been dealt with and inputs 25 were received, he then went on and conceptualised the plan,</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10146</p> <p>1 completely correct, Chair, because the views of the police, 2 says Colonel Scott, were considered.</p> <p>3 CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, could you repeat it?</p> <p>4 MR SEMENYA SC: That the views of the 5 police as far as Colonel Scott's statement goes, were 6 considered. So to say it did not have that of Merafe is 7 technically not correct.</p> <p>8 CHAIRPERSON: It sounds like a good 9 point, Mr Ntsebeza. What do you say about it?</p> <p>10 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I didn't hear it, Mr 11 Chairman.</p> <p>12 CHAIRPERSON: Well, he repeated it twice, 13 but you can say it again for the benefit of Mr Ntsebeza.</p> <p>14 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, to say that the 15 statement of Colonel Scott does not mention the input by 16 Merafe is not correct, when the statement of Colonel Scott 17 itself says the views of the police were considered.</p> <p>18 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I see. Mr Chairman, the 19 only thing I isolate, the only basis I'm isolating Colonel 20 Merafe seems to be what comes out of the evidence where the 21 witness mentions Merafe as having being one of the people 22 who he had - I put the question just now whether it is so 23 that in terms of his testimony Merafe had assisted 24 Lieutenant-Colonel Scott during the early morning of the 25 14th of August 2012, and the witness said yes. So it was</p>

<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10147</p> <p>1 only on that basis because he doesn't, he seems to remember 2 that Merafe is one of the people who helped Scott with the 3 plan, and all I was putting to the witness is that there 4 doesn't seem to be any mention anywhere in the statements 5 available so far by Scott, that one of the people that he 6 worked with was Mr Merafe.</p> <p>7 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenza, do you wish to 8 reply?</p> <p>9 MR SEMENYA SC: That Colonel Merafe is a 10 policeman, so if the views of the police are taken into 11 account, how can my learned colleague conclude that those 12 of Colonel Merafe were not?</p> <p>13 CHAIRPERSON: Which paragraph in 14 particular are you referring to?</p> <p>15 MR SEMENYA SC: Paragraph 8.</p> <p>16 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Scott's statement in 17 paragraph 8, in fact paragraph 8 -</p> <p>18 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ntsebeza, paragraph 8, 19 line 9 he says, having described what he did, how he worked 20 on the operational strategy, he says, "I concluded an 21 appreciation of the environment" -</p> <p>22 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.</p> <p>23 CHAIRPERSON: - "incorporating the 24 background information I had been given during the course 25 of the night, and reflected the police's views on how to</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10149</p> <p>1 problem I have got is these are points that you can put to 2 Lieutenant-Colonel Scott. You can also find out from 3 Colonel Merafe what input, if any, he provided.</p> <p>4 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.</p> <p>5 CHAIRPERSON: But I don't know that this 6 witness can be called upon to answer for deficiencies which 7 you allege exist in Lieutenant-Colonel Scott's statement or 8 even the fact that there, Merafe doesn't claim the credit 9 for anything in his statement. Maybe he is more modest 10 than Scott.</p> <p>11 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Mr Chairman, I seek to 12 do no more. I merely canvass what I have canvassed this 13 morning and afternoon, and simply to say the plan was 14 conceptualised and is Scott's brainchild, and if it assists 15 then other objective evidence in the form of statements by 16 Merafe and all the other people whom the witness himself 17 indicates were the people who had assisted Scott, on the 18 face of it those statements do not show that to be so. I 19 seek to do no more.</p> <p>20 CHAIRPERSON: No, these are points for 21 argument. I understand the, because you have made it clear 22 what it is. I understand the argument that you wish to 23 present.</p> <p>24 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes.</p> <p>25 CHAIRPERSON: And you have extracted a</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10148</p> <p>1 deal with the situation as was discussed that evening." So 2 what he is saying is that he incorporated into the document 3 he prepared, the views of the police which had been 4 communicated to him and as had been discussed the evening 5 before. So he does at least there refer to other policemen 6 and views that had been communicated to him.</p> <p>7 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Mr Chairman, the one 8 point I'm making is a very narrow one as far as this is 9 concerned.</p> <p>10 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the other point -</p> <p>11 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I'm simply saying this 12 witness has accepted that in his testimony he, Lieutenant- 13 Colonel Merafe worked with Scott. Now, and I prefaced my 14 question by saying maybe it's a question that I must put to 15 Scott when Scott testifies, or if he comes to testify.</p> <p>16 CHAIRPERSON: I understand he will, and 17 if he is not called we will subpoena him.</p> <p>18 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Yes, Mr Chairman. So 19 all I was putting to the witness is that Scott doesn't 20 mention having, maybe it is because it is included in that 21 globular statement in paragraph 8 where he says the police, 22 the police being everybody, including Merafe, but having 23 been specifically mentioned, we will go to what Merafe 24 himself says and see -</p> <p>25 CHAIRPERSON: No, Mr Ntsebeza, the</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">Page 10150</p> <p>1 certain amount of material from this witness from which you 2 are going to base your argument, but I don't know if you 3 can take it any further at this stage.</p> <p>4 MR NTSEBEZA SC: That's okay, Mr 5 Chairman.</p> <p>6 CHAIRPERSON: I'm not hampering you in 7 your cross-examination, I'm just commenting that I wonder 8 whether you have taken this point as far as is necessary in 9 your case, and perhaps you should move onto another point, 10 if you have one.</p> <p>11 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Die agteros kom ook in 12 die kraal.</p> <p>13 MR MAHLANGU: What that means is even the 14 cow that is following right at the back eventually arrives 15 at the kraal.</p> <p>16 CHAIRPERSON: The ox, the rear ox also 17 gets home to the kraal eventually.</p> <p>18 MR NTSEBEZA SC: Chairman, I did indicate 19 right from the start that some of the questions put to the 20 General, I don't seek to traverse them more than it is 21 necessary. It's just that certain aspects thereof I would 22 like - but I accept what the Chairperson has indicated and 23 all I was going to put to the General, and perhaps that 24 would be something that we could do after the adjournment -</p> <p>25 CHAIRPERSON: Do you mean, by after the</p>

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1 adjournment do you mean here today after we have adjourned,
2 or tomorrow morning?

3 MR NTSEBEZA SC: No, tomorrow morning, Mr
4 Chairman.

5 CHAIRPERSON: Okay.

6 MR NTSEBEZA SC: I was going to go to a
7 new area of -

8 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we'll move on to a new
9 area and we can do that more appropriately tomorrow
10 morning.

11 MR NTSEBEZA SC: As the Commission
12 pleases.

13 CHAIRPERSON: The Commission will now
14 adjourn until 9:30 tomorrow morning.

15 [COMMISSION ADJOURNED]

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