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TRANSCRIPTION OF THE

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

MARIKANA

BEFORE TRIBUNAL

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FARLAM (RETIRED) - CHAIRPERSON MR TOKOTA SC MS HEMRAJ SC

HELD ON

DAY 78 23 APRIL 2013 PAGES 8263 TO 8374

HELD AT

CIVIC CENTRE, RUSTENBURG, NORTH WEST PROVINCE



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64 10th Avenue, Highlands North, Johannesburg P O Box 721, Highlands North, 2037 Tel: 011-440-3647 Fax: 011-440-9119 Cell: 083 273-5335 E-mail: realtime@pixie.co.za

Web Address: http://mysite.mweb.co.za/residents/pak06278

NCRA.

Email: realtime@mweb.co.za

Page 8263 Page 8265 [PROCEEDINGS ON 23 APRIL 2013] MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is [09:43] CHAIRPERSON: correct, Chairperson. 2 The Commission resumes. U 2 Is he a POP commander as 3 is nog steeds onder eed, Majoor-Generaal. Mr Semenya? 3 MR SEMENYA SC: GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: 4 4 indicated on that document? 5 EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA SC (CONTD.): 5 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: He is indeed a Thank you, Chair. General, yesterday we were dealing with public order policing unit commander, that's correct, 6 6 7 exhibit SS3 and principally the plan dated the 10th of 7 Chairperson. 8 August 2012 and we were on the Greek number 6 of that 8 MR SEMENYA SC: And we commented on his 9 9 document. experience yesterday, did we not? 10 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is 10 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is 11 11 correct, it's my understanding that he has more than 20 correct, yes Chairperson. years' experience in public order policing. 12 MR SEMENYA SC: The plan in relation to 12 13 13 the arrest policy has it under paragraph 10.4.2 that all MR SEMENYA SC: And ML Seboloke, the 14 arrests will be effected in terms of the arrest procedure 14 brigadier? 15 policy and personnel effecting arrests must ensure that 15 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, they do not exceed the powers of the authority as vested in it's my understanding – or let me first say I met Brigadier 16 17 them in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, right? 17 Seboloke after my arrival and on the 14th of August, on that 18 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I see that. 18 Tuesday. It is my understanding that he was the acting 19 It's correct, yes sir. 19 cluster commander for the responsible cluster in which the Marikana police station falls. 20 MR SEMENYA SC: It then deals with how 20 21 the arrests are to be processed but against paragraph 21 MR SEMENYA SC: Shall we now move to that 10.4.3 the plan was that arresting officers must ensure 22 one dated 13 August 2012? In paragraph 1 it deals with the 22 23 that they do not infringe on the constitutional or human 23 situation -24 24 rights of the individual, that they do not exceed the I'm sorry, may I interrupt? CHAIRPERSON: Have you got the right document in front of you? One way 25 limits of force under the circumstances that is required to Page 8264 Page 8266 be necessary and that they be tolerant in the execution of to deal with it, I think, is in the original hard drive 1 2 their task. 2 that we got from the SAPS there are numbers in the top 3 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is right hand corner and am I correct in thinking that it's 4 correct, Chairperson. 4 1674, is the number? 5 5 MR SEMENYA SC: That is how you found the MR SEMENYA SC: That's correct. document as part of the plan when you arrived, the 12th, CHAIRPERSON: I think it's the one - the 6 6 7 7 correct? one we've been looking at up to now is 1665, is that MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 8 8 When I arrived correct, Mr Semenya? 9 9 on the 13th -MR SEMENYA SC: That's indeed correct. 10 The 13th. You will also MR SEMENYA SC: 10 CHAIRPERSON: Now we're moving on to 11 find in that bundle of documents the continuation of the 11 1674, the top right hand corner. That's the part of 12 plan, but now dated 13 August 2012. 12 exhibit SS3 that we're now looking at. 13 13 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, I MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is indeed 14 only have the plan that is dated the 10th of August and then 14 the document that I have in front of me, Chairperson. 15 I have the continuation from the 14th of August as part of 15 MR SEMENYA SC: General, as you point my SS3. Chairperson, I found it, I have that plan in front 16 16 out, the plan in paragraph 1 describes the situation, the 17 of me. 17 nature of the operation, do you see that? 18 MR SEMENYA SC: Just before we do that, 18 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I see that, the plan we were dealing with now, the one dated the 10th 19 Chairperson. you will see at the last page of that document, paragraph 20 MR SEMENYA SC: Shall we just touch on 21 19 dealing with signatures. Do you see that? 21 some of the salient features of this plan? Against 22 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 22 paragraph 1.3 there are risk analyses identified there. I do indeed. 23 yes, Chairperson. 23 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: MR SEMENYA SC: This is a document signed 24 analysis as it's reflected on that 1.3, yes, Chairperson. 25 apparently by the unit commander OJ Merafi. 25 MR SEMENYA SC: What do they read there? ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

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                                                                                                                         Page 8269
            MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                  First, "Murder
                                                                       paragraph 7, "Use of force only on command or self-defence
 1
                                                                   2
                                                                       in accordance with legislation."
 2
     of dissenting persons to strike, damage to property,
                                                                   3
 3
     intimidations, assault, persons gathering illegally, acts
                                                                              MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                                                      And of course it repeats
 4
     of public violence and possession of dangerous weapons."
                                                                   4
                                                                       the policy on the arrest against paragraph 10.4.1 and if we
 5
            MR SEMENYA SC:
                                    And the threats?
                                                                       go to the last page of the document, do you recognise any
            MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                                   6
 6
                                                  The threats
                                                                       of the signatures that appear there?
 7
                                                                   7
     indicate, crime intelligence has been tasked to ensure
                                                                              MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                                                                                    I recognise
     information flow to all the relevant role players. And
                                                                   8
                                                                       three signatures, that of Brigadier Calitz, that of Major-
 8
                                                                   9
 9
     further, the daily threat analysis must be used to
                                                                       General Naidoo and that of Major-General Mpembe.
     determine the daily force deployments.
                                                                  10
                                                                              MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                                                      Any of those individuals
10
11
            MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                  11
                                    It also touches on a
                                                                       with POP experience?
12
     number of things but against paragraph 3 it deals with the
                                                                  12
                                                                              MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                                                                                    Chairperson
13
     concept and focus.
                                                                  13
                                                                       yes, specifically Brigadier Calitz. I think his POP
14
            MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                  Yes,
                                                                  14
                                                                       experience is spanning a period of about 12 years, directly
15
     Chairperson.
                                                                       actively involved with public order policing and then
                                    Under operational orders
16
            MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                       subsequent to that in his current post as the operational,
                                                                  17
17
     it records that, "All forces will parade at the Middle
                                                                       or the provincial commander for operational response
18
     Kraal Rescue Centre, Lonmin mine."
                                                                  18
                                                                       services, one of his functions includes the function of
19
            MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                  That's correct,
                                                                  19
                                                                       public order policing. And then General Mpembe, as far as
20
     Chairperson.
                                                                  20
                                                                       I know, he's been the deputy provincial commissioner for
21
                                                                  21
                                                                       probably a good - it must be more than 10 years and the
            MR SEMENYA SC:
                                    It also, against
                                                                  22
22
     paragraph 3.2.6, records that "Briefing will be conducted
                                                                       nature of his post as a deputy provincial commissioner for
23
                                                                  23
                                                                       operations would also give him that specific exposure in
     by the overall commander and daily briefings will be given
                                                                  24
                                                                       terms of public order policing. General Naidoo, I am not
24
     by crime intelligence to give direction of the deployment."
25
            MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                                       too sure. I think that he served in KwaZulu Natal and he
                                                  It indicates
                                                       Page 8268
                                                                                                                         Page 8270
                                                                       was either part of a public order policing unit or he
     that, Chairperson.
 1
 2
            MR SEMENYA SC:
                                    It then also records
                                                                       worked together in terms of numerous public order policing
 3
     against paragraph 5.2.2 under the heading "Intelligence"
                                                                       incidents in the KwaZulu Natal area.
 4
     that intelligence - "must liaise with intelligence
                                                                   4
                                                                              MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                                                      And we do know that the
 5
     community regarding all available intelligence and provide
                                                                   5
                                                                       evening of the 13th, Colonel Scott then joined the team.
     it to the joint operational centre for operational planning
                                                                   6
                                                                              MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                                                                                   That is
 6
 7
                                                                   7
     purposes." Do you see that?
                                                                       correct, yes, Chairperson.
                                                                   8
 8
            MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                  I do see that,
                                                                              MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                                                      And the plan was further
 9
                                                                   9
     yes, Chairperson.
                                                                       developed following the happenings of the 13th into the
                                                                  10
10
                                                                       14th
           MR SEMENYA SC:
                                    And what is the
                                                                              MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
11
     assignment given to the public order police under paragraph
                                                                                                                   That is indeed
                                                                  11
12
     5.2.4?
                                                                  12
                                                                       so, yes, Chairperson.
13
                                                                  13
            MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                  It indicates
                                                                              MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                                                      We will spend a little
14
     that, "Public order police will be responsible to do the
                                                                  14
                                                                       bit more time with Colonel Scott about how the plans were
15
     following" - first bullet, "Crowd management in terms of
                                                                  15
                                                                       developed from that point but for the purposes of your
     the national policy on crowd management," second bullet,
16
                                                                  16
                                                                       evidence, can we deal with what was conceived to happen in
17
     "record all incidents as they occur," third bullet, "post a
                                                                  17
                                                                       the event the promise to lay down their weapons was not -
                                                                  18
18
     record clerk at the JOC."
                                                                              CHAIRPERSON:
                                                                                                    Before you get on to that,
19
            MR SEMENYA SC:
                                    Against paragraph 7 the
                                                                  19
                                                                       can I ask a question that arises just before you move on to
     plan deals with the use of force.
                                                                  20
                                                                       that point? In this document we've been looking at, or
21
           MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                  Yes,
                                                                  21
                                                                       series of documents actually, SS3, the first document as
22
     Chairperson.
                                                                       we've seen is a document that actually began at page 1665
           MR SEMENYA SC:
                                                                  23
                                                                       of the hard drive. That appears to be the contingency plan
23
                                    Can you tell us what is
    stated there?
                                                                  24
                                                                       or that is the contingency plan as it was on the 10th. It
           MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
                                                 It states under
                                                                       looks as if it was - it was on the 10th and it was signed on
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the 10th so I take it, it effectively was a document in

- 2 place at the beginning of operations, if that's the correct
- 3 word, on the 10th which is Friday the 10th. And as is seen,
- 4 that plan was signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Merafi,
- 5 presumably drawn up by him, I take it, and approved by
- 6 Brigadier Seboloke.

7 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is also my

8 understanding, Chairperson.

9 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, fine. Then the next

10 document which is page 1674 of the police hard drive,

- 11 that's the plan of the 13th and one can see by comparing the
- 12 two documents that the equipment is now more extensive, the
- 13 number of people involved, the report on the situation is
- 14 fuller and that effectively takes the story up to the end
- of the 12th because it ends with what happened on the 12th
- and that now new people have taken over, as you've 16
- mentioned. Brigadier Calitz, I take it, drew up the plan, 17
- 18 it was recommended by Major-General Naidoo and approved by
- 19 Major-General Mpembe. That's correct. Then the next
- 20 document is a far more substantial document. It's called
- 21 Operation Platinum. It hasn't got a page at the end
- 22 indicating who drew it up, who recommended it and who
- 23 approved it but perhaps that's information you can give us
- 24 but is this effectively the plan that came into being after
- 25 Lieutenant-Colonel Scott came on the scene and certain
 - Page 8272

25

1

- decisions were made, I think on the evening of the 13th as
- you've described. That's the third meeting, is that -2
- 3 would that be correct?
- 4 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson.
- 5 yes, it's correct. It started with the arrival of Colonel
- Scott at around 19:30 on that Monday evening and then it 6
- 7 continued basically after the direction that was given
- 8 during that third meeting.
- 9 CHAIRPERSON: Now what I'm leading up to
- 10 is, we don't have a page here that says - as we have in the
- other two so is there such a document in existence, do 11
- 12 you know, or can we, can you just tell us what that
- 13 document would contain if there were one. In other words
- 14 like the last page of the other two plans. The first
- 15 signature is, I take it, the person responsible for drawing
- up the plan. The second is the recommender and the third
- 17 is the approver. Is that how this one would have worked
- 18 also?
- 19 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,
- there is no such a plan that was compiled in the same
- 21 format as the one of the 10th and the 13th, so there's no
- 22 plan where there are signatures attached. The reason for
- 23 that is that there was already now an active protest
- 24 environment and what we do is we go and operationalise that
- 25 specific planning, that's why it was referred to as a

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- contingency planning. We operationalised it in the sense,
- because of the constant changes, the fluidity of the
- situation. You will see in this plan that the essence of
- what is contained in the more formalised plan is also
- contained, even albeit in a different format.
- [10:03] CHAIRPERSON: 6 It now had a name,
- 7 Operation Platinum.
 - MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,
- 9 yes. That was something that was decided by us on that
- 10 Tuesday, that it's easier when we refer to a - when we do a
- planning we refer to it, so it was just a name that we 11
- 12 dubbed the operation.
- 13 CHAIRPERSON: Not necessarily. If there
- 14 had been a last page such as we have in the two previous
- plans, what would it have contained? Who would have signed
- it? In other words who is responsible for drawing it up -
- I understand, with inputs from other people who then
- recommended it, if someone recommended it, and who then is
- 19 being regarded as the person who approved it?
- 20 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, it
- 21 would have been drawn up by a planning team and then it
- 22 would have been recommended by Brigadier Calitz as the
- 23 operational commander and it would have been signed off by
- 24 Major-General Mpembe as the overall commander.
 - CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR SEMENYA SC:

Page 8274 Yes. General, that plan

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- Operation Platinum, as we will deal with it more fully with
- Colonel Scott, does it look familiar to you with the
- 4 various slides that are in it?
- 5 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: It does look
- familiar, yes Chairperson. 6
- 7 And in broad brush, how MR SEMENYA SC:
- 8 was this from time to time developed in the JOC?
- 9 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,
- 10 the plan was developed on that Tuesday in terms of six
- 11 stages, starting with monitoring and dialogue, then it was 12 the stage 2, the phase 2 as a positioning of police assets,
- 13 specifically referring to the barbed wire as well as a show
- 14
- of force. The third phase was one in terms of dispersal,
- 15 disarming as well as arrest. The fourth phase would have
- 16 been the arrest and the processing of those people that
- 17 have been arrested as well as then the dangerous weapons
- 18 confiscated, the fifth phase being intelligence led
- 19 operation in terms of intelligence information that would
- 20 have been gained by those people arrested and then the last
- 21 phase was the cordoning and search of specific identified
- areas, inclusive but not limited to specific hostels.
- 23 Every one of the phases would have started with the
- 24 monitoring and the dialogue.

25 MR SEMENYA SC: Shall we just again, in 18

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broad terms maybe, describe what was contemplated in

2 respect of each phase?

3 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

4 phase 1 was a command group under the command of Brigadier

- 5 Calitz as the operational commander. He would have then
- had negotiators, four negotiators with him in the command 6
- 7 Nyala. It consisted of five Nyalas in total with close to
- 8 50 public order policing personnel. Inclusive of that, the
- 9 negotiators that are referred to, as well as two public
- 10 order policing information officers that also acted as the
- 11 video operators. The intention was that this group will go
- forward to the so-called frontline area close to the koppie 12
- 13 and position themselves a distance away from the grouping
- 14 of the protesters. 100 metres behind them there was a TRT
- 15 deployment that was responsible for the protection of those
- public order policing members, should they be specifically 16
- 17 threatened in life threatening situations.
 - The tasking was that the negotiators must make
- 19 contact with a leadership element of the protesters, that
- 20 they should create a climate and atmosphere that is
- 21 conducive for potential negotiation and communication. The
- 22 intention was that they would then communicate with this
- 23 leadership element, that the police are there to find a
- 24 peaceful resolution to the situation, to indicate to them
- 25 that it's an illegal gathering and that the possession of
 - Page 8276
 - the dangerous weapons in itself is illegal, that they
- should do these negotiations through the interpretation of 2
- 3 a person that is familiar with Fanagolo, that they should
- 4 do it from the confines of the protected armoured vehicle
- 5 using a public address system. They should then also
- indicate to the striking mineworkers that there are 6
- 7 processes in place that they can address their grievances
- 8 through, that the police's interest is in the maintenance
- 9 of law and order.
- 10 MR SEMENYA SC: Thus part of the plan
- was, as you told us yesterday, implemented in full and 11
- 12 successfully.
- 13 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: This part was
- 14 indeed implemented, yes, sir.
- 15 MR SEMENYA SC: But of course we know
- 16 that the group at the koppie did not disarm.
- 17 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: They did not,
- 18 no, Chairperson.
- 19 MR SEMENYA SC: Despite the negotiations
- that were engaged with its leadership.
- 21 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Despite that,
- yes, Chairperson. 22
- MR SEMENYA SC: Can you now tell us 23
- broadly what phase 2 contemplated?
- 25 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:

Phase 2 was six

armoured Nyala vehicles, all six of them had barbed wire

- trailers that had the potential of deploying three strands
- or three rows of barbed wire for a distance of maximum 100
- 4 metres. They were under the command of Colonel Makhubela.
- He also had approximately 50, I think just less than or
- just over 50 public order policing members in those Nyalas. 6
- 7 Those Nyalas were kept back at the forward holding area 1
- 8 for the Tuesday as well as the Wednesday. They were moved
- 9 forward on the Thursday and they were pre-positioned just
- 10 about 10 metres in front of the command line, the
- 11 negotiators and monitoring group of Brigadier Calitz and
- 12 Colonel Mere. They were positioned from the power station,
- that is to the basically to the south of the koppie. 13
- 14 That power station formed a natural barrier in terms of the
- 15 fence that's erected around the power station and they were
- 16 then positioned from that southern position more towards
- 17 the north, about 80 metres apart and five of them being in
- 18 line, with the sixth Nyala initially slightly forward and
- 19 in a westerly direction. They were just pre-positioned and
- 20 the barbed wire was not deployed. The stage 2 Nyalas moved
- 21 in during the stage 1 deployment. It was done as a
- 22 contingency based on the intelligence that we received
- 23 during that morning at the JOCOM meeting.
 - MR SEMENYA SC: What intelligence was
- 25 that?

24

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MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 1

Colonel Isaacs that represented Brigadier Engelbrecht from crime

- 3 intelligence indicated to us at the time of the meeting at
- 4 6 o'clock that there were already 300 people at the koppie
- 5 and that they are armed with dangerous weapons, that the
- 6 information indicates that the people will not lay down
- 7 their arms, that they will not disperse and leave the
- 8 koppie and that they were willing to fight the police if an
- 9 attempt is made to disarm them. That made us then to put
- 10 that contingency in place because we were convinced at that
- 11 stage and we had a firm belief that at 9 o'clock the people
- 12 will disarm as per the discussions we had the previous day,
- 13 specifically with the president of AMCU, Mr Mathunjwa.
- 14 Chairperson, it didn't make sense to us that the 15 people, if they intended to disarm, that they will come
- 16 with their arms to the koppie, then they just might as well
- 17 just leave it at their homes. So the first indications
- 18 was, that there were still people coming to the koppie now
- 19 with arms. So we thought of not leaving the stage 2 barbed
- 20 wire trailers to move in later on because we were mindful
- 21 of the fact that that might raise alarm because it's
- something that is different to the previous day's 22
- 23 deployment. So it was moved in, these six Nyalas with the
- 24 other five Nyalas and then positioned as indicated.
 - MR SEMENYA SC: What was the thinking of

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all of that stage, i.e. the show of force?

2 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

3 that would have been, together with a show of force, in

- 4 terms of moving reserve groups from the forward holding
- 5 areas also forward. This is part of a specific show of
- 6 force that has worked successfully for us over many, many
- 7 years in thousands and thousands of specific dealing with
- crowd management situations. The principle is that if you 8
- 9 go and deploy additional personnel, that those personnel
- 10 deploy in a disciplined manner, that those personnel will
- 11 have a variety of resources, specifically armoured vehicles
- 12 as well as other vehicles, other units present, then it
- 13 will give the indication that the police are organised and
- 14 the police have the numbers to actually deal with any
- aspect of lawlessness. So the idea was that should there 15
- be any threat, specific threat made at the negotiating 16
- 17 Nyalas as well as the police officers deployed behind that,
- 18 inclusive of the media, that the police will be able to
- 19 rapidly deploy that six barbed wire or the wire on the
- 20 barbed wire trailers and that would have enclosed the
- 21 police then basically on three sides.

1

- 22 MR SEMENYA SC: Before we deal with the
- 23 barbed wire and its presence there, what message is sought
- 24 to be communicated by this display of force?
- 25 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, we

- barricade that you put, whether it's a road block, whether
- it's a closure of a road which we have done on thousands
- of occasions people do not want to enter into that area
- because they see that as a police action and the barricade
- 5 that's erected, people traditionally move away from that.
- 6 We saw it in that sense but we also made sure that we had a
- 7 distance of approximately 80 metres away from the
- 8 protesters at the koppie.
- 9 [10:23] MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, now that we're
- 10 talking about the barbed wire, what distance does that,
- 11 when deployed, give the police and protesters in this
 - example?

12

15

13 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

14 let me just understand the question, what distance does it?

MR SEMENYA SC: The barrier that is

created by the barbed wire itself, what distance would that

17 create between the police line and the protesters?

> CHAIRPERSON: Are you interested in the

19 measurement? How far would the police be from the

20 protesters after the barbed wire was in place, is that the

21 auestion?

22 MR SEMENYA SC: That is the question,

23 properly phrased there, Chair.

24 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

the closest police officers were then approximately 80

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3

4

5

- were mindful of what had happened on the Monday when there
- was a police line that was behind a group of protesters and 2
- 3 we also know the challenges, that once the protesters move
- 4 in between police officers as they are positioned and then
- 5 the difficulty to deal with individual confrontations,
- 6 because the moment you have that you will have protesters
- 7 and police officers and you will have them all mixed
- together. It then makes it extremely difficult for police 8
- 9 officers to use aspects like CS gas or that they use stun
- 10 grenades or even rubber because there will be just police
- 11 officers and people mixed. So the intention was to create
- 12 a physical barrier but also a psychological barrier, that
- 13 we can indicate that this is where the line stops, this is
- 14 police area, this is a no-go area.
- 15 MR SEMENYA SC: That tactic,
- historically, what result has it yielded for public order 16 17 management?
- 18 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,
- 19 the deployment of barbed wire is known as a defensive
- measure. It is used and has been used successfully in
- terms of protecting assets, be it a key point, an

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- 22 identified key point or in this case then human resources.
- 23 And I'm not personally aware of any historical data that
- 24 police or that people, protesters, tend to move towards
- 25 that. People normally move away from that, whether it's a

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- metres from the smaller group. There were two distinct
- 2 groups, a bigger group and then a smaller group.
 - MR SEMENYA SC: What was the thinking
 - behind that strategy?
 - MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: It was
- 6 initially that when we deploy that, that it's not deployed
- 7 directly in front of them so that the people can see that
- 8 there's a distance still kept and it was also communicated
- 9 because I must just indicate that at around 11 o'clock
- 10 there was a small group, that smaller group moved their
- 11 position and they positioned themselves in front of the
- 12 sixth Nyala that was slightly towards the west. Then there
- 13 were also specific threats made to say that we should move
- 14 those Nyalas and they are not going to ask again. It was
- 15 then explained by the negotiators to Mr Noki but it was
- 16 explained over the public address system for obviously
- 17 everybody to hear what the purpose of the wire was, that
- 18 the wire is positioned there exactly for the protection of 19 the police, to indicate that's the police neutral area. So
- 20 that was the initial thinking, that we can keep it away so
- 21 that we can just deploy that without raising alarm and then
- 22 the people starting, responding to that. I can then
- 23 mention, based on that threat we moved that Nyala, that
- 24 sixth Nyala then back more to the eastern side, more to
- enclose the police officers.

1	Page 8283 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: General, you say it	1	Page 8285 was between 11 and 11:20.
2	was explained by the negotiators, the purpose of the barbed	2	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes, sir.
3	wire?	3	CHAIRPERSON: But is it possible that it
4			·
	•	4	was later?
5	yes. The feedback that we received from the command Nyala	5	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: It is possible,
6	to the joint operational centre was that – and we also	6	Chairperson, yes.
7	received a picture that was sent by Colonel Vermaak from	7	CHAIRPERSON: Can I ask a question?
8	his Blackberry device to indicate this smaller grouping	8	There was a recording clerk, was there, in the JOC?
9	that have now positioned themselves in front of that	9	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That's correct.
10	specific Nyala. And then there was, Mr Noki came forward	10	CHAIRPERSON: Responsible for keeping the
11	and he said that what is this wire doing here, it must be	11	occurrence register?
12	removed and we're not going to ask again. And then it was	12	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is
13	explained what the purpose of this barbed wire is.	13	correct, Chairperson.
14	CHAIRPERSON: What time was that,	14	CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, did I say – it's
15	General?	15	called occurrence register –
16	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,	16	MR HANABE: Occurrence book.
17	that must have been around between 11 o'clock and 11:20.	17	CHAIRPERSON: Occurrence book, ja. And
18	Maybe 10 to 11 and 11:20 if I can remember.	18	that's the document we have, FFF25, am I right?
19	MR SEMENYA SC: We will later, General,	19	MR SEMENYA SC: General, let us –
20	deal with what actually happened. For now I just want us	20	CHAIRPERSON: There is a note, I notice
21	to understand what the plan contemplated.	21	now, in support of what you say at page 23 of exhibit
22	CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before we move on	22	FFF25. 11:20, it's note number 998 and it says, "Situation
23	though, this discussion that you've mentioned between Mr	23	report Papa 1" – you'll tell us in a moment who Papa 1 was
24	Noki and – would it have been Brigadier Calitz or whom did	24	-
25	he speak to, or was it Lieutenant-General Macintosh?	25	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is
	·		
	Page 8284		Page 8286
1	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, it	1	Brigadier Calitz.
2	was with Macintosh and I'm not 100% sure but I think he was	2	CHAIRPERSON: "- reported that the group
3	at this stage in the same Nyala of Brigadier Calitz. It	3	are moving towards the Nyala. The group leader" – that
4	might be that it was in any of the other five so-called	4	must be Noki, I take it, "asked the police official to
5	monitoring Nyalas.	5	remove their wires and he said he's not going to ask them
6	CHAIRPERSON: You see, the only reason I	6	again as he's also aggressive. About 3 500 people
7	ask the question is, this is a detail which is not in	7	gathered." That's note number 998. So that's obviously
8	exhibit L at all. It doesn't mean it isn't correct but	8	the piece of evidence that you're busy with at the moment,
9	it's just not in exhibit L. There is mention of two later	9	is that correct?
10	exchanges involving Mr Noki at slide 192, one being at	10	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is the
11	13:40 when Noki apparently approached the Nyala - I think	11	part and as I remember it, that it was at that time, yes,
12	that's the negotiation Nyala - and he said he can see the	12	Chair.
13	SAPS are making ready for war and then that goes on. And	13	CHAIRPERSON: And that was recorded
14	then there's a subsequent exchange according to slide 192	14	presumably contemporaneously by the recording clerk in the
15	at 15:49 but the exchange you're now talking about, it was	15	occurrence book, exhibit FFF25. Is that – do I understand
16	an earlier one you say, somewhere between 11 and 11:30AM.	16	it correctly?
17	Do I understand you correctly?	17	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes, sir.
18	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson	18	CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. And you were
19	yes, I'm under correction. It can be 11 to 11:20 but it	19	going to tell me who Papa 1 was, if you remember, otherwise
20	can also be that exchange and that the 11, 11:20 was when	20	Mr Semenya will have to tell us.
21	there was the positioning in front of the Nyala and then	21	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Papa 1 was the
22	based on that then we moved the position of the Nyala. I	22	overall commander, Brigadier Calitz.
\	The second of the Hydra I	1	2.1. 2. Communication of Displacement of the Communication of the Commun

MR SEMENYA SC:

you again to step back and we examine what it is that the

plan contemplated before we deal with the actuals. You

General, let me invite

23

23 think that Brigadier Calitz and/or Colonel Macintosh will

CHAIRPERSON: I understand. You think it

24 be able to give exact detail in terms of the time.

have referred earlier to the use of barbed wire as a

2 defensive measure. What do you mean by that?

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 3 Chairperson,

4 defensive measures are not concerned as part of the

5 deployment of the continuum of force. So you will have

6 defensive measures and then you will have offensive

7 measures and with offensive measures then you'll start with

the first level of potential, or the use of the minimum

9 force continuum.

10 MR SEMENYA SC: That's pretty technical. 11

Let's try to simplify it. You would remember around the

use of barbed wire is an accusation that one cannot deploy

13 it before you announce its deployment, do you remember

14 that?

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15 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I remember

16 that, yes, Chairperson.

17 MR SEMENYA SC: Please explain the 18 defensive deploy - strategy and offensive strategy in

relation to at which point does one make the announcement

20 and at which point does one not make the announcement.

21 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, I

22 see the advocate wants to turn me into a public order

23 policing expert, which I'm not, but I have a good

24 understanding in terms of the processes. The defensive

25 measures would be a number of measures, for instance

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21

- patrolling, that is seen as a defensive measure. It can be
- isolating a specific area to prevent people from having 2
- 3 access to a specific area. It can be cordoning a specific
- 4 area, also have negotiations that you're doing. So you do
- 5 not require, it's not a police action that would be seen of
- 6 having the potential that you have to use any form of
- 7 force. If I deal specifically with the deployment of
- 8 barbed wire as a defensive measure, it is not appropriate
- 9 to go and give a warning prior to deploying that because
- 10 then you can find a group of people that, knowing that
- 11 you're going to do that, to move exactly into that area
- 12 that you want to enclose or cordon off. It's also not a
- 13 requirement that any such warning has to be given, not in
- 14 terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, nor in the
- 15 standing order 262. The warning that's referred to is
- warnings that you must give prior to implementing offensive 16
- 17 measures, so basically before you would start with
- 18 dispersal actions.
- 19 MR SEMENYA SC: So if you're going to put a road block, you don't tell people I'm going to put a road
- 21
- 22 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: No. I haven't
- done it in my career, no. 23
- MR SEMENYA SC:
- So the plan in phase 2
- would have had the barbed wire rolled out at a particular

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Page 8289 point and at what point would the announcements be made?

- 2
 - MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, on
- 3 the completion of the deployment of the barbed wire then
- there will be an announcement made, as per requirement,
- 5 that it should be in two of the official languages and also
- 6 if possible in a third language that is mostly understood
- 7 by the people in the specific area. That warning should be
- audible, making use of the equipment available at the time.
- 9 That will be typically on a public address system or a
- 10 megaphone. Then the protesters would be informed in terms
- 11 of the actions the police intend to take. They will be
- 12 given a reasonable time, so the overall commander in his
- 13 discretion or her discretion will then go and decide, this
- 14 is reasonable given the size of the group and then the
- 15 specific environment and indicate that dispersal actions
- 16 will then follow on failing to disperse.
- 17 MR SEMENYA SC: Just so that we
- 18 understand the configuration as contemplated by phase 2 of
- the plan, shall we look at slide 191 of exhibit L? Do you 19
- 20 have the - that slide?
 - MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I do have the
- 22 slide, yes, Chairperson.
- 23 MR SEMENYA SC: Is that what was
- 24 contemplated about the positioning of the police service,
 - the Nyalas, et cetera?

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- 1 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson
 - yes, the only difference was that initially that sixth
 - 3 Nyala that you will now see that is basically close to
 - 4 where it says 50 metres, that initially in terms of the
 - planning would have been in a position, if you take the
 - fifth Nyala and you will basically take that same angle and 6
 - 7 that same distance and you just move it towards the west,
 - 8 that is the only difference in terms of the initial
 - 9 contemplation but the plan was adapted after the specific
 - 10 threat that was made to that sixth Nyala. The rest of that
 - 11 is in terms of the distances, the positioning of the
 - 12 negotiators and the monitoring group Nyalas behind it and
 - 13 then in terms of the distance where the TRT members were
 - 14 deployed. You will also then see that they are covering
 - 15 the rear flank of the Nyalas, the negotiators' Nyalas as well as there you have a northern flank, a side flank in a 16

 - 17 sort of an L, that they are also providing protection on 18 that open side.
 - 19 MR SEMENYA SC: So Nyala 6, according to 20 plan, would have been as depicted on slide 160 of exhibit 21 L, would it?
 - [10:43] MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is the 23
 - planning and that is the position, yes, Chairperson. 24 MR SEMENYA SC: And can we now go and,
 - again in broad terms, explain what was contemplated by

Page 8291 Page 8293 phase 3? kill them." 1 2 2 That is indeed MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 3 once the stage 3 deployment was necessitated, it would have 3 so, yes, Chairperson. 4 gone over to stage 3 but it all started with phase 1 MR SEMENYA SC: Also reports from the 5 obviously which was in position and then the phase 2 negotiations Nyala are that they have received threats from 6 deployment as I've explained and then only stage 3. 6 the protester representatives. 7 7 CHAIRPERSON: Where is phase 3 in the MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Indeed so, yes, 8 8 document, in exhibit SS3 which we've been looking at, which Chairperson. 9 9 is the Operation Platinum document - or is it not there? MR SEMENYA SC: Also reports from the police on the frontline are that the group is still 10 It appears to be the fifth page from the end, is that the 10 militant. 11 part of the document which sets out what you're now going 11 12 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is indeed 12 to deal with? so, yes, Chairperson. 13 MR SEMENYA SC: Are you, General, at that 13 14 document but a slide dealing with stage 3 and the word 14 MR SEMENYA SC: Also the media have "Mission?"02-28 15 picked up that there is a restlessness amongst the 15 protesters and have been shown a firearm wrapped in a 16 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, I 17 17 have in exhibit SS3 close to the end, there's a heading 18 that says "Operational overview of stage 3." 18 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes. 19 CHAIRPERSON: That appears to be the 19 Chairperson. 20 penultimate page of the exhibit SS3, second last page. 20 MR SEMENYA SC: Also the deadline to lay 21 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, down arms at the morning of the 16th has not been honoured. 21 22 22 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I'm missing that part. Ves 23 CHAIRPERSON: 23 Chairperson. The last page is headed 24 24 "Stage 3 operational overview" and the page before that is CHAIRPERSON: This document can't be part 25 headed "Operational overview of stage 3" and then the page of the original written plan as it existed in the morning Page 8292 Page 8294 1 before that is headed the "Strategic guidelines" and the because it appears from slide 170, the incident with the 2 page before that is headed "Risk assessment." video operators appears to have occurred at 13:25. So this 3 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That's right. document we have before us now, the slide headed "Current 4 CHAIRPERSON: And the page before that 4 information" must have been compiled at some time after has got the police logo and then the words "Operation 5 13:25. So is there a document anywhere which sets out Platinum, Lonmin Mine, Marikana, 16 August 2012 stage 3." stage 3 as it was envisaged on the morning of the 16th 6 6 7 That's followed by "Current information," do you see? 7 before these things started happening? 8 8 That's where we are now. MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes, 9 9 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, Chairperson, there is a document to that extent. 10 CHAIRPERSON: Do you know whether it's in 10 yes, I have the page that says "Strategic guidelines" and 11 SS3 or whether it's somewhere else? 11 then the second slide on that page starts with the 12 operational overview of stage 3. 12 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, 13 MR SEMENYA SC: That plan records, 13 the specific slides as it was reflected during our planning General, that if we start with the page with the police 14 is contained in SS3 but then there's other slides that were 14 logo on it, "The current information that was available at 15 prepared for the Commission in terms of reflecting that 15 16 detail. So it is contained here, yes. 16 that time on the 16th of August 2012," correct? 17 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is 17 CHAIRPERSON: I suppose it's unfair for 18 correct, Chairperson. 18 me to throw the question at you now. Possibly at some 19 MR SEMENYA SC: The document, the plan stage in one of the adjournments you can endeavour to find had noted that the threat level is increasing. the actual formulation of stage 3 as it existed on paper, 21 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: It is noting as it were, at the beginning of the 16th and then we can 22 that, yes, Chairperson. take it further but I don't want to interrupt you in any MR SEMENYA SC: And minuted there is way. It's not fair to expect you to hunt around looking 23 that, "The media reported to Captain Adriao the crowd have 24 for the document at this stage, unless you can lay your identified the SAPS video operators and are threatening to finger on it immediately. ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

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Yes,

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I will 1 2

endeavour to find such a document, Chairperson.

3 MR SEMENYA SC: Of course, General, SS3 4 as it looks, it is slides emanating also from the

5 compilation of the preparation for the Commission.

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:

7 Chairperson.

6

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CHAIRPERSON: At the moment, you

9 understand, I'm interested in the actual plans as they were

10 at the time. I'm not interested in documents that were

11 prepared later because, without wishing to reflect on the

12 people who prepared them, it's obviously safer for our

13 purposes to look at the original documents, not filtered

14 through interpretations that come from hindsight from

things that happened thereafter. Anyway, but at some stage 15

you can draw our attention or one of your assistants can 16

17 draw our attention to the document as it existed in the morning and then there was a revision. I think, at 2

18

19 o'clock that afternoon but that's something that you'll get to later. I take it.

20

21 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I understand.

22 yes, Chairperson.

25

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23 MR SEMENYA SC: General, I admonish

24 myself. I'm seeking really to have us discuss stage 3 as

contemplated in the plan, not the actuals. How would that

forward with his four Nyalas as well as one Casspir

2 armoured vehicle and then the two water cannons would have

been positioned just directly behind that line of Nyalas.

The TRT members that were positioned 100 metres back would

have then formed up behind that line and then the dispersal

6 action would have started, aimed at those people that still

7 remained and did not want to disperse on their own accord,

8 by moving this line out on the side of our barbed wire that

9 was deployed, so to the northern side, then move forward

10 towards that specific group that remained. They will then

11 start with the deployment of the water cannons and then,

12 depending on their response, then they would go to the next

13 levels in terms of the use of force. In this case it

14 excluded police officers that will use shields and tonfas

15 because those shields can just not provide the protection

to that sharp-edged weapons that we have seen that were in

17 the possession of the protesters.

18 Apart from that we have also noted what has 19 happened on the Monday and that the people had two weapons, 20 a lot of them had two weapons. So a typical attack would 21 be that you go low and that you go high at the same time

22 and that you will just not be able to protect yourselves.

23 So that part, in terms of the whole force of continuum,

24 that part was excluded.

The next phase would have been the utilisation of

Page 8296

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unfold if it went according to plan?

2 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, I

3 must state that that was always, stage 3 was always

4 considered as a last resort, when there was a total

5 breakdown in dialogue and communication and negotiation and

6 if the protesters failed to lay down their weapons. The

7 way we intended it to unfold started off with that, after

8 the pre-positioning of the stage 2 and of the deployment of

9 the barbed wire as a defensive measure, then the moving

10 forward of the last of the reserves in terms of a maximum

11 deployment on the show of force. Then after that the

12 warning would be given, time would be allowed for the 13 people to disperse. In that time then the chopper would

14 have also then, the second chopper would have joined. The

15 air force chopper with the additional 12 NIU members would

have been airborne. We expected that the majority of the 16

17 people would, out of their own accord at that stage

themselves would disperse. Should there then be people 18

19 that do not disperse, a second warning would have been

20 given, in that process also to convince the people again to

21 lay down their weapons. Then the forming up in terms of a

22 line with Nyala vehicles, that would have been the command

group, Lieutenant-Colonel Mere and the monitoring Nyalas

24 with Brigadier Calitz, five of them joined by the

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25 additional Nyalas of Lieutenant-Colonel Pitsi who has moved

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pyrotechnics which consist basically of what is known as a

stun grenade. A stun grenade is an acoustic device that

would give, after a delay of 1.5 seconds, it would give a

4 double bang. Apart from the high frequency of the noise also in terms of, it would have the effect in terms of

6 disorientating an individual. And then also CS gas that

7 will then have been used to get the people to then move

8 away and break into smaller groups. Should it then still

9 have been required and that does not have the desired

10 effect and as a last resort in terms of the crowd

11 management principles of applying force, it would have been

12 the utilisation of shotguns with double ball rubber

13 cartridges. At that stage we had the firm belief that we

14 would have broken up this group into much smaller,

15 manageable groups.

> Chairperson, I think I must pause here just to give you an explanation that in terms of our analysis we never thought that we would have to deal with the bigger 3 000 group because there were two distinct groups. The bigger group were mostly armed with what is known as traditional weapons whilst they were loosely basically positioned on a bigger koppie area and the smaller group were about 400 people, were totally different. They had sharpened rods, pangas, spears, they were differently dressed, they were always operating in a group. They had

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definite leaders in their group and they were extremely

- 2 disciplined in their behaviour in terms of they would not
- 3 act unless they would get a command from some of their
- 4 leaders. It was noted that they would sit together, that
- 5 they would stand up together and that there were certain
- hand signals that were made in terms of them to get a 6

7 specific response.

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So our deployment was in line with this smaller group in terms of that there was an expectation that they would be the ones that would not necessarily want to go or disperse out of own accord and that was also the ratio of our human resources and the equipment that we've deployed there. It was also never intended to try to arrest that big a group, not even the full 400 because we also expected

- that once we start with the dispersal action, should it 15
- 16 have been necessary, that even this group, that some of the
- 17 people will leave out of own accord. If I can then
- 18 continue in terms of how we will break up this smaller
- 19 group that remained in their movement.
- 20 [11:03] CHAIRPERSON: That's a topic you can deal
- 21 with after we've taken the tea adjournment, if that's
- 22 convenient.
- 23 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That would be.
- 24 CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the tea
- 25 adjournment.

have mentioned, that on the Saturday the - what's it? -

- 2
- the 11th, as well as the Sunday the 12th, that there were
- 3 rituals performed, and I've also seen photographs that were
- 4 taken by one of our choppers in terms of naked men that
- 5 were forming a line, and then again on Tuesday and
- Wednesday. The administering of "muti," I do not know, I 6
- 7 first saw it as the Saturday and Sunday that that was just
- 8 rituals, not necessarily the administering of "muti," but
- 9 on the Tuesday and/or the Wednesday it was reported that
- 10 there's a vehicle that is bringing buckets and that there's
- 11 a substance that they are sprinkling, or administering.
- 12 CHAIRPERSON: In particular this is dealt
- 13 with in slide 85 and following of exhibit L, where this,
- 14 what is specifically dealt with is what was reported as
- having happened from, it looks like some time after half
- 16 past 3, there's a time at top of slide 85, 15:23, but I see
- 17 from my notes that was corrected in relation to slide 86 as
- 18 being 16:21, but anyway, it's round about middle afternoon
- 19 on the 14th. Now my question is, had you already received
- 20 that information when the plan, as you have described it to
- 21 us, was drawn up?
- 22 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes,
- 23 Chairperson.
- 24 CHAIRPERSON: Was any allowance made for
- 25 the fact that the protesters - if one can call them that -

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[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES] 1

- [11:29] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. 2
- Majoor-Generaal, u is nog steeds onder eed. 3
- 4 CHARL ANNANDALE: s.o.e.
- 5 CHAIRPERSON: I'd like to ask you a
- 6 question, if I may, before you carry on. You were
- 7 explaining to us what you envisaged would happen and how
- the plan was drafted, and so on, and there was going to be 8
- 9 a show of force and various things were going to follow
- after that. Did you know that or I must put it on the 10 11 basis of an allegation. It is alleged that some of the
- 12 strikers, possibly all the hard group had received "muti"
- 13 which was designed to make them invisible, invincible, and
- 14 invulnerable. That's an allegation; it's denied, but this
- 15 was apparently police information – we've got slides which
- appear to indicate people undergoing some kind of ceremony 16
- 17 of some kind. Were you aware of that when the plan was
- drafted? Maybe I should formulate the question more 18
- 19 carefully. At the moment it's an allegation, but what
- 20 we've been told is that this was information - whether
- 21 correct or not is another matter - this was information
- which the police had received. Were you aware that that
- information had been received when the plan was drafted?
- MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
- was aware of four incidents that is relative to what you

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- might not have been deterred by a show of force because
- they would believe, if this information is correct of
- 3 course, they would believe that the bullets will bounce
- 4 off, that they have nothing to fear from a show of force,
- 5 members of the police service armed with R5s and so on,
- because it can have no effect on them? Was that taken into 6
- 7 account when the plan was drafted? In fairness to you I
- 8 think I should ask you first, was your information that the
- 9 people had received "muti" which they believed - or so it
- 10
 - is now alleged, they believed would render them invincible

and invulnerable?

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MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson. can I just ask, there's - it seems to be a technical glitch on our system here. I do not know if the rest of the house experience the same, so we really struggle to hear.

CHAIRPERSON: Let me ask the question, raising my voice somewhat. The question is this; when the plan was drafted had you already received information to the effect that the - or so it is now alleged, whether it's true or not is not the purpose of the question. The question is your information. Had you received information already when the plan was drafted that the protesters, or some of them at least in the hard group had received "muti" which they believed, or allegedly believed would render

them invisible, invulnerable, and – ja, well that's enough.

25 without loss of life.

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Page 8303 Page 8305 And invincible, sorry. Invincible, the three in-Vs: CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I must report that when I turn my microphone off it - when I turn it on invisible, invincible, and invulnerable. 2 3 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: As ek dit reg it seems to be alright, but when I turn it off the light 4 het, is dit onsterflik, onoorwinbaar, en onsigbaar. flickers and it makes a scratching noise [inaudible]. When 5 5 VOORSITTER: Heeltemal reg. I turn it off, when it's on, it's on now, when it seems to **GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE:** 6 6 Dankie be in order, but when I turn it off the light flickers 7 7 Voorsitter. Chairperson, no, we did not get that around where the light normally is, and it makes a scratchy 8 kind of sound. Does that mean there's something wrong with 8 information specifically as that this is how they would 9 9 feel, but we discussed it in the JOCOM and in, during the my microphone? Adv Tokota has got a similar problem, I 10 JOC in terms of experiences of police officers in terms of 10 understand. 11 typically what the "muti" would do, and the question of 11 MR HANABE: And also the interpreter's invincible came up in terms of certain AMT - not ATM, cash-12 12 mike, I cannot hear at all, Commissioner. 13 CHAIRPERSON: 13 in-transit interactions that the police had that the people As long as I don't say 14 anything it doesn't matter, but is the interpreter's 14 would stand in line and that they would have this feeling 15 of invincibility, and we considered that, Chairperson, as a 15 microphone now working properly? specific risk and it was built in our plan in terms of 16 MR HANABE: No, it's having this 16 17 distorting sound, Commissioner. 17 certain specifics that we've built in; part of that the 18 positioning and the deployment of the barbed wire, as well 18 CHAIRPERSON: Can you really not hear me 19 as then the distance we kept and the deployment of the 19 when I speak loudly? 20 front line officers in armoured vehicles, but we were 20 MR HANABE: I can hear only when I'm 21 confident that the moment we break up that cohesive group 21 looking at you, then I can hear what you are saying. 22 22 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: into smaller groups, that even although the potential was Chairperson, we 23 there that people will resist when we try to arrest them, 23 can hear you over the mike, but it's making such a noise 24 here that -24 and that they would refuse to lay down their specific 25 25 weapons that they have in their possession, we saw that CHAIRPERSON: I think what you're saying Page 8304 Page 8306 is not being recorded. What you've just said is that the 1 more as isolated incidences and that our ratio of deployment at that time would be such that our police problem is if you turn the machine off you can hear my 2 3 officers from the TRT with the specific skills that they unamplified voice, but if it's turned on then there's 4 hold in their training, that they will be able to perform distortion and disturbance and static almost, as if it was 5 an arrest and that they would be able to then - om so 'n a radio breakup, which makes it difficult to hear. Is that 6 aanval af te weer. 6 what you're saying? The trouble is we can't turn it off 7 CHAIRPERSON: Ward of such an attack. 7 because then what is being said is not recorded. Is there 8 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Thank you, Sir. anything that can be done to solve the problem? Should we 9 CHAIRPERSON: Was it envisaged that that take a short adjournment for five minutes to enable you to might not be entirely successful and that some of the 10 10 address the problem? Because obviously it may affect the 11 warriors - if one can call them that - in the front, might quality of the recording; it may be difficult for the 11 12 be killed. 12 transcribers to transcribe, or to hear and then thereafter 13 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, it 13 to transcribe what's being said, and this evidence, like 14 was never envisaged that - we did not foresee it, and we 14 all the other evidence of this witness, is important. So 15 15 did not plan for that that person would be killed. I'll adjourn for five minutes, or rather more accurately, 16 I'll adjourn until you report to me that we can continue. 16 CHAIRPERSON: I didn't say "would be," I 17 said "might be." Was it foreseen that some small number 17 [COMMISSION ADJOURNS **COMMISSION RESUMES**] 18 perhaps of the members of the front group might in the 18 [11:49] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes. 19 19 process be killed? Are we now in a situation where we're back on the air 20 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 20 without static? Is that correct? 21 21 no, not in the way that we intended the plan to roll out MR HANABE: Yes, Commissioner. because there would have been a line of armoured vehicles 22 CHAIRPERSON: Alright, well let's proceed and that the people would have been broken down into such 23 on that basis. You're still under oath, Major-General. 24 small groups that they will be able to deal with that 24 CHARL ANNANDALE: s.u.o.

25

Mr Semenya, in a static-

CHAIRPERSON:

			D
1	Page 8307 free atmosphere, would you like to proceed?	1	Page 8309 MR SEMENYA SC: Or where they are no
2	EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA SC (CONTD.):	2	longer feasible and the tactical option needs to be
3	Indeed, Chair. The subject we have been dealing with now,	3	employed.
4	General, can I invite you to exhibit FFF25? At page 14	4	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That's correct,
5	there is all the recordings of the 15th of August.	5	Chairperson.
6	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, I	6	MR SEMENYA SC: As bullet point 3
7	see that in front of me.	7	indicates, "The dispersion strategy would enable the police
8	MR SEMENYA SC: And on page 17 against	8	to deal with more manageable disorganised groups."
9	the hour 14:00, entry 192 –	9	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is
10	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I see the	10	correct, Chairperson.
11	entry, yes, Chairperson.	11	MR SEMENYA SC: You had already indicated
12	MR SEMENYA SC: It is reported there that	12	that there was no plan to arrest 3 000 people.
13	"Pappa 1 reports that there is a Toyota bakkie, white in	13	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I have, yes,
14	colour, drove towards the group at koppie to deliver	14	indicated that, Chairperson.
15	buckets of 'muti' (suggest so) and lot of people moving	15	MR SEMENYA SC: The fourth continuum that
16	back from the village to the koppie."	16	you testified about is also captured in slide 79 of exhibit
17	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes,	17	L. Am I correct?
18	Chairperson.	18	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is
19	MR SEMENYA SC: That's what you were	19	correct, Chairperson.
20	referring to?	20	MR SEMENYA SC: And for the record, it
21	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes,	21	refers to the giving of verbal command at the commencement
22	Chairperson.	22	of the offensive action.
23	MR SEMENYA SC: On page 18 against the	23	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is
24	time 16:10, entry 204, there is also a situation report	24	correct, Chairperson.
25	indicated there.	25	MR SEMENYA SC: The use of water cannon.
1	Page 8308 MA IOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That's correct	1	Page 8310
1 2	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That's correct,	1 2	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes.
1 2 3	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That's correct, Chairperson.	1 2 3	<u> </u>
2	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That's correct, Chairperson. MR SEMENYA SC: And the entry reads,	2	MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes. MR SEMENYA SC: Teargas. MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes.
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1 Lonmin, and we gave them that feedback. We repeated it

- 2 again that we are waiting for that, that at 9 o'clock
- 3 there's the potential that the people will disarm and
- 4 disperse on their own accord.

5 MR SEMENYA SC: General, let me interrupt

6 us here and step back. According to the plan, what was to

- 7 happen with the video recording of the stage when
- 8 implemented? What provision was made for video capturing

9 of the operation?

10 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, we

11 had two video operators from Public Order Policing. They

- were operating in the Nyalas in the command line, one of
- 13 those five Nyalas. We also then had two water cannons that
- 14 are fit, or equipped with a camera system. We also then
- 15 had the additional arrangement that we made with
- 16 Lieutenant-Colonel Botha that was made through the
- 17 intervention of Brigadier Van Zyl, that he should be
- 18 airborne at the time that the dispersal action starts and
- 19 also then make video recordings. That is just referring to
- 20 the video recordings, not to the still cameras.

21 MR SEMENYA SC: And can we then proceed

- 22 with the morning of the 16th of August 2012? We now know
- 23 that the belief that the people will disarm proves
- 24 incorrect.

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25 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, I

1 eastern side, and then the report that I referred to

- 2 earlier that it was reported by Brigadier Calitz at around
- 3 11 o'clock that the leader group approached them and said4 that the wire must be removed and that they're not going to
- 5 ask again. He also reported the behaviour of the leader in

6 terms of being aggressive.

7 CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to interrupt you.

8 You mentioned observers who were placed near the smelter, I

- 9 think you said. Now if one looks at page 22 of exhibit
- 10 FFF25, that's the occurrence book, there is an entry
- 11 numbered 978 at 9:45 which says, "Situation report, OP1
- 12 reported 600 people arriving at the koppie, heavily armed;
- 13 lot of people still was coming from eastern side." Is OP1
- 14 reference to those people who were near the smelter?

15 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairpersor

16 yes, it stands for observation post 1.

17 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR SEMENYA SC: You have also made

19 reference to the media briefing. What in broad terms was

20 that about?

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21 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, it

22 was a media briefing that was called by the Provincial

23 Commissioner of North West, Lieutenant-General Mbombo. It

24 was decided that we go and brief the public in terms of the

happenings in the Marikana area that was basically a build-

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- would not say proved incorrect because we still had the
- 2 understanding that potentially at 9 o'clock when Mr
- 3 Mathunjwa will go back, that even although they're armed at
- 4 that stage, that they will lay down their arms, but we were
- $\,\,$ 5 $\,\,$ concerned because as I've mentioned earlier, why would you
- 6 then go this heavily armed if in any way you intend to just
- 7 lay down your arms then at 9 o'clock?

8 MR SEMENYA SC: And after 9 o'clock?

9 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, I

left at around 8:30, just after 8:30, with Lieutenant-

11 General Mbombo to go to a press briefing and I only

- 12 returned to the JOC after that media briefing. The media
- 13 briefing was not held at the general area where the JOC was
- 14 situated. On my return I received an update in terms of
- 15 some of the aspects that have transpired during our absence
- 16 because it was also General Mpembe was present in that
- 17 media briefing, so both of us were away at the time -
- 18 basically touched on a number of aspects; at about 9
- 19 o'clock the helicopter reported that there were people
- 20 moving in the streets and that people are moving to the
- 21 koppie, also that the two Special Task Force members that
- 22 were posted on the observation post on the BMR smelter
- 23 reported that they noticed about 600 people arriving at the
- 24 koppie and that they are all heavily armed, and that more
- 25 people are on their way to the koppie from specifically the

- Page 8314

 up from the 10th. The media briefing from the police's side
- 2 was attended by General Mbombo, as I've indicated, and then
- 3 also myself and Major-General Mpembe, and we also had
- 4 Captain Dennis Adriao from our Communication Services
- 5 present. General Mbombo then in a release in her briefing
- 6 she informed the media that, she gave the history in terms
 - of what has happened.

She gave an overview in terms of the happenings on the Friday that there was a march, then on the Saturday there was the conflict between NUM, as well as AMCU, as well as the events on the Sunday where there were two security officials that were killed. She made mention of the intimidation, the assaults, damage to property,

specifically, if I can recall, referring to a number of
vehicles that were burned.
She indicated that the escalation in terms of

She indicated that the escalation in terms of the violence necessitated that there will, that more police officers were to be deployed in the Marikana area, in terms of the police's responsibility to maintain law and order, public order.

She gave a short overview in terms of the incident on the Monday. She indicated that there was a specific negotiation with a group of protesters that were armed, and that they refused to disarm, and that there was an incident where there then were two police officers

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Page 8315

- killed, as well as a further police officer that was
- seriously injured, and she indicated that three other mine 2
- 3 employees also died during this whole situation.
- 4 [12:09] She indicated that there was a further escalation
- 5 in terms of police resources, that we also have the support
- from other provinces, and there was already reports in the 6
- 7 media that the National Defence Force is deployed, and she
- explained that the people that is generally referred to as 8
- 9 National Defence Force, that they are members from the
- 10 South African Police Service Special Task Force, and they

11 wear a different uniform, which might be perceived as being

12 National Defence Force.

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She also explained that there's a, the only asset and the support that we have from the National Defence Force is through the South African Air Force, through their provision of an Oryx helicopter. She indicated that there's discussions between ourselves and the unions in an attempt to ensure that there's, there would be a peaceful resolution to this, and that she's confident that we will be able to end this today.

Chairperson, the, I think there were then questions and some of the questions, if I can remember people asked in terms of the wellbeing of the officer that was injured. They have asked in terms of the, if there were any arrests performed and carried out, and she

Page 8317

CHAIRPERSON: I see, thank you.

MR SEMENYA SC: We saw it; it's not a

complete footage of the media briefing.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, okay. If you consider

it necessary that the Major-General should give the

evidence about material that's not available on the video, 6

7 then obviously he must proceed. I just thought if there's

stuff that's available on video we can safe time by passing

9 over it fairly quickly.

> MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, that's about all I can remember of that specific media briefing in anyway. Chairperson, I would expect that it would be available somewhere on video because there were a number of media houses present.

MR SEMENYA SC: On page 7 of your statement at the top you address the situation if the group did not keep true to laying down their arms.

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson yes, I refer to a contingency that must be in place and that contingency was the prepositioning of the barbed wire trailers that was positioned, but not deployed, but that can do a rapid deployment in the case of an aggressive

23 action towards the police. But I reiterated that we will

24 still continue with negotiations; we will still try to find

a solution in terms of the peaceful resolution of the

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- mentioned that there were already six people suspected to
- 2 be involved in some of the murder cases, that were
- 3 arrested, not necessarily relating to the police officers
- but in terms of the nine people that already died.
- 6
- 7 is that right, Mr Semenya? Or is it only, I think we saw a
- 8 small part of it because if we have it available on video
- 9 you don't have to take us through it fully because we will
- 10
- 11 correct, Mr Semenya?
- 12 Not in full. Slide 155.
- 13 it does not depict in full what the General -
- 14 CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes, I understand, but
- 15
- 17 clip? Because if it is then we can safe time by not going
- 18 through the detail.
- 19
- 20 FFF18.
- 21 CHAIRPERSON:
- 22 briefing?
- MS PILLAY: I'm not sure it's the entire 23
- 24 media briefing, but it is Lieutenant-General Mbombo's

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- 1 event.

- 4
- 5 CHAIRPERSON: Am I correct in thinking
- that the media briefing is available on video? Slide 155,

- have it, but let's just check that that's correct. Am I
- - MR SEMENYA SC:
 - no, I understand that, thank you, but apart from what we
- were shown is the whole media briefing available on a video
- MS PILLAY: It is an exhibit, Chair,
 - Is that the whole media
- address during the media briefing.

Page 8318

- 2 You also deal with the MR SEMENYA SC:
- deployment of various personnel there.
- 4 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
- Chairperson, yes, it was basically the same as per the previous day, on
- the Wednesday, with deployment, the front deployment, the
- 7 positioning of the wires and the backup in terms of that 8 deployment, and then the forward holding area 1 under the
- command of Major-General Naidoo, with the assistance of
- 10 Lieutenant-Colonel Gafley. He had a reserve in terms of a
- 11 small number of Public Order Policing members, Tactical
- 12 Response Team members, National Intervention Unit members,
- 13 Detective Services, a few detectives - I think there were
- 14 four detectives or so, a few members from the Local
- 15 Criminal Record Centre, also K9 handlers and their dogs.
- He had a number of Mounted Unit members and horses, and
- 17 then they had the assistance of the Lonmin Mine's disaster
- 18 unit, if I can call it that, in terms of fire brigade. I 19 think there were - and then contracted, and that's my
- 20 understanding, contracted 911 medical personnel, contracted
- 21 by Lonmin in terms of their normal agreement that they
- 22 have. 23 Then also a forward holding area 2, Lieutenant-
- Colonel Pitsi was in command of that holding area. He had
 - a bigger deployment available in terms of a reserve for

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- Public Order Policing. He also had TRT members. He had a
- bigger grouping of TRT members because of a specific key 2
- 3 point that we wanted to provide a protection to. It's an
- 4 informal settlement or a village more to the south-western
- 5 side of the koppie, and he had a small deployment of K9
- handlers. 6
- 7 Then we had the Special Task Force, two 8 groupings, or two teams in terms of counter sniper that
- 9 were deployed with the Nyalas of Lieutenant-Colonel Mere,
- 10 and then the Special Task Force, two members on the
- observation post. Then we had the 12 members from NIU that 11
- 12 were kept back at the bigger area of the JOC to be deployed
- 13 with the South African Air Force Oryx helicopter. Then
- 14 that is what I referred to as the, let's call it the
- 15 frontline operational deployment, which was then probably
- close to 600 personnel. Then we had the intelligence 16
- analyst and gatherers, other detectives, 10 members from 17
- 18 the Mobile Operations unit, which I explained yesterday
- 19 would be there for escorting; also if we would make arrests
- 20 and trucks would go to the police stations, the JOC
- 21 personnel, and representatives, and then also, let's call
- 22 it generic operational support people in terms of supply
- 23 chain management, the issuing of radios and just people
- 24 that we have for that purpose. What I left out is we had
- 25 five trucks available, referred to as prisoner transport

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- trucks, and there were 10 people allocated to them from
- Visible Policing, which would be the local Marikana police 2
- 3 station and probable support from another police station,
- 4 and two teams of water cannon operators, I think they were
- 5 two-two, maybe two-three, I'm not too sure, Chairperson. I
- 6 think that was the deployment.
 - MR SEMENYA SC: That deployment, General,
- 8 is also captured in exhibit L from slides 136 to slide 147.
- 9 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,
- yes, I see on slide 146 I did not mention the two police 10
- choppers in terms of the deployment on that, as reflected 11
- 12 under slide 146, and slide 147, but that is a reflection of
- 13 the deployment.
- 14

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- MR SEMENYA SC: And the commanders are 15 obviously indicated in each slide who was responsible for
- 16 what type of deployment. Correct?
- 17 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Commanders as
- 18 reflected in the respective slides, yes, Chairperson.
- 19 MR SEMENYA SC: Against paragraph 19 of
- your statement you then deal with what happens next after
- 21 the media briefing.
- 22 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:
- correct, Chairperson. 23

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- MR SEMENYA SC:
- Can you tell us?
 - MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I have alluded RCHIVE FOR IUSTICE

That is

- to earlier that the observation post also then reported the
- 600 people. There was a further report that the helicopter
- crew reported that there were a, what was referred to, I
- referred to it as a warrior group that were moving up and
- 5 down, and that there was still consistently people that
- 6 were joining the people on the koppie, and the report by 7
- Brigadier Calitz in terms of the approach with, by that
- 8 leader group, where the leader indicated that the wire must
- 9 be removed and that they are not going to ask again.
 - MR SEMENYA SC: And under paragraph 20 of course you deal with the fact that the belief that the people would lay down their arms comes short.
- 13 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That's correct,

14 yes.

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15 MR SEMENYA SC: And you deal with the contact between General Mbombo and the president of AMCU,

17 Mr Mathunjwa.

> MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson.

- 19 yes, after the press briefing that we had, we returned to
- 20 the JOC and we were under the impression that at 9 o'clock
- 21 when we were to have the, or at the same time that we had
- 22 the press briefing, which actually started after 9, that Mr
- 23 Mathunjwa would then honour his commitment that he will be
- 24 back at the koppie, speaking to the people, only to find
 - that he did not go to the koppie.

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- What time did you 1 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ:
 - return after the media briefing?
 - 3 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Commissioner,
 - 4 that must have been around 10:30, I reckon, maybe slightly
 - 5 after that. General Mbombo then spoke to Mr Mathunjwa on
 - 6 her cellular telephone. I mention in my statement that the
 - 7 assumption was that it was on his cell phone, but I can
 - 8 also remember that potentially it was on somebody else's
 - 9 cell phone, maybe Mr Mokwena's cell phone, because we did
 - 10 not have his number at - or I'm not too sure, but she spoke
 - 11 to him over her cell phone, but potentially it could have
 - 12 been on somebody else's cell phone. It was then reported -
 - 13 she asked him why didn't he go to the koppie as he has
 - 14 promised. He then indicated that he was at Lonmin and
 - 15 Lonmin do not want to commit to further negotiations, but
 - he indicated to her that he will come to the JOC and then 16
 - 17 he will speak to her in person.
 - 18 He arrived at the JOC shortly after that,
 - 19 probably within 15 minutes, Chairperson, and General Mbombo
 - wanted to know from him why did he go back on his word and
 - 21 why is he not accepting the responsibility as a leader to
 - 22 honour his commitment that he would actually go and do
 - 23 that, and she reminded him how important this was, because we were all in the belief that there would be a lay-down of
 - weapons at 9 o'clock, and she indicated to him that it's
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critical that the people lay down their arms.

2 [12:29] He responded and then he said that he had a

- 3 meeting that morning at the same time when we had the press
- 4 briefing, he had a meeting with representatives from
- 5 Lonmin, I do not know if it's part of the management but he
- had a meeting with a person or persons at Lonmin, and he 6
- 7 wanted to have some commitments there - that was my
- understanding in terms of the process of further 8
- 9 negotiations, which I assumed was then between AMCU and
- Lonmin, and he said it's because of that reason that he did 10
- 11 not go to the koppie, because he needed that commitment
- 12 before he can go and address the people at the koppie. He
- was reminded by Lieutenant-General Mbombo that her concern 13
- 14 is with finding a peaceful resolution and that he must live
- 15 up to his responsibility in addressing the group and
- convince them to lay down their arms. Chairperson, he was 16
- not too happy with that because he says that he has reasons 17
- 18 why he didn't go there, and he referred to Lonmin in terms
- 19 of that he do not get their commitment and that they do not
- 20 want to get onboard, but he said he will go to the koppie
- 21 now. He then asked us that we should provide transport for
- 22 him and his delegation to go there, and I indicated to him
- 23 that we do not have transport readily available at that
- 24 moment. He then showed me the two Vitos, the Vitos that
- 25 was used on the Wednesday to go to the koppie. He

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- indicated but there are those same Vitos that took us -1
- Vito is a Mercedes Benz minibus that took us there, so 2
- 3 they are available there, and I indicated to them yes, the
- 4 vehicles are there but the personnel, the members from the
- 5 Special Task Force are already, everyone is deployed, but I
- then in anyway, I think I asked Colonel Scott or Brigadier 6
- 7 Tsiloane to go and see if we can make arrangements that we
- 8 can still take him to the koppie. He then left, and it was
- 9 my understanding that he left then with his own vehicle,
- 10 and he left the rest of the delegation, he travelled on his
- 11 own. He left the delegation behind and then he went on his
- 12 own; that must have been just prior to 12 o'clock.

13 MR SEMENYA SC: So he was not refused 14 transport to go to the koppie; it was explained why that

15 was not practically feasible. 16 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

17 no, after he left, Brigadier Tsiloane came back and he

18 indicated to me that he has arranged now for the members of

19 Mobile Operations to take him through to the forward

holding area 1, but then he has already left.

21 MR SEMENYA SC: In paragraph 21 you deal with the report you receive about Mr Mathunjwa being at the 22

23 koppie.

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:

That is

25 correct, Chairperson.

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MR SEMENYA SC: What was the report?

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: We received a

JOC report that he arrived shortly after he left, probably

10 minutes or so, he arrived then at the koppie in his own

vehicle. If I can remember, it's a report that's a Toyota

6 Fortuner. They also reported that there were a number of

7 speakers, people addressing the protesters at the koppie,

8 but on his arrival he did not directly address the people

9 at the koppie, but he had a meeting with some of the media

10 people that were standing around and he addressed the media

then specifically, and that later on, probably - I do not 11

12 know - in the area of 1 o'clock or so, it might have been a

13 bit later, he then in turn also addressed the protesters.

14 I did not get the detail in terms of his address, apart

15 from the commander who reported that the people, there was

a change in behaviour after his address to them; he said

there was a noticeable change – he used the word, if I can

remember, that the people were unhappy when he left.

MR SEMENYA SC: That is recorded in slide

20 161 of exhibit L. Am I right?

> MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Ja, I see that,

22 yes, Chairperson.

19

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23 MR SEMENYA SC: At around 13:30 there is

24 a special JOCOM meeting called, as you deal with it against

paragraph 22.

Page 8326 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is

correct, Chairperson.

3 MR SEMENYA SC: Can you tell us more

about it?

4

5 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

prior to that meeting at 13:30 Major-General Mpembe briefed

7 the Provincial Commissioner, General Mbombo. I was

8 partially present during that briefing, but he, and she was

9 also there from time to time, so she was aware of a number

10 of the happenings. It was not as if she's now receiving

11 the first information of what has transpired on that day,

12 but he indicated the feedback that we received from the

13 operational commander. He indicated the change in

14 behaviour of the people. He indicated the threats that's

15 been made by the leadership of the protesters to the

16 police, and he indicated that there's a real risk

17 associated if we would not take action to disperse the

18 people. The risk was discussed without much detail, but it

19 basically boiled down to the fact that if this disgruntled

group of people, that we all had the impression that they

would lay down their arms and that they would disperse

peacefully, that that didn't happen and seems like the,

23 even the president of AMCU, that he cannot control the

that the real risk is here that these people would go back

members, he cannot convince them to actually lay down, and

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- from the koppie, all of them in that group, armed as they
- were, that they would move into the neighbourhoods and the 2
- 3 villages and then we will have incidents again of serious
- 4 intimidation, of assaults and murders, and damage to
- 5 property. Chairperson, we're only too mindful what has
- 6 happened in Implats earlier in the year where there were
- 7 several cases reported in terms of exactly the risk that we
- feared. My only experience in that regard is that it's 8
- 9 extremely difficult to control any such groupings once they
- 10 break up into literally tens of smaller groupings, and

people go into the neighbourhoods and then you cannot 11

12 control individual actions.

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In Sasolburg in Zamdela is a recent specific reference to what I'm referring to because that started with a small group of about 100 people; they were joined with a number more and then the people took to the streets. Chairperson, in that process there were more than 32 shops that were looted and about 180 foreign shops but we've experienced that in my years that you will get, the moment you break up such a group and those groups go back, then they will loot and they will intimidate and they will attack and people can get killed.

The Provincial Commissioner in terms of that briefing then said that we should go over on a stage 3 deployment and based on that I called a special JOCOM

Page 8329 the warning that they should just lay down their arms where

- 2 they are seated and then leave on their own. It was agreed
- 3 that should dispersal still be necessary, that it will be
- 4 aimed against those people that remain and that do not lay
- 5 down their arms out of own accord, and then in the process
- 6 dispersal to isolate the people into smaller manageable
- 7 groups, confiscate the specific arms, and to perform
- 8 arrests, and after that there will be a further sweeping of
- 9 the area for weapons and that would entail the involvement
- 10 of the TRT on the smaller koppie adjacent to the big
- 11 koppie, and NIU and Special Task Force on the bigger

12 koppie, and then bringing the K9 as well as the Mounted

13 Unit.

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Lieutenant Scott then did an official presentation on a PowerPoint format. He indicated that it was already decided, and we have already repositioned the sixth barbed wire trailer to basically form an enclosure on the side of the police neutral area where the media is also situated, and then he gave an overview in terms of the three phases under stage 3, first one being the deployment of the barbed wire, phase 2 being the two lines that we will form with the Public Order Policing members in the armoured Nyala vehicles and the water cannons in the middle. He reiterated the force in continuum -

MR HANABE: He reiterated?

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- meeting because even although stage 3 was always part of
- 2 the plan from the Tuesday, during the morning JOCOM meeting
- 3 we did not go into the detail of that planning because we
- 4 were still confident that there will be a lay-down of arms.

13:30. Present was Provincial Commissioner Lieutenant-

- 5 We started with the special JOCOM meeting at
- 7 General Mbombo, the overall commander Major-General Mpembe,
- myself as the chairperson, we had Brigadier Fritz, 8
- 9 Brigadier Tsiloane, Brigadier Van Zyl from the Detectives,
- 10 Colonel Isaacs from Intelligence, and we had Brigadier
- 11 Pretorius as the operational room commander, and Adv
- 12 Moolman from the Police Legal.

We started the meeting by Lieutenant-General

14 Mbombo giving an overview of the happenings of that morning

- 15 in terms of specifically her discussions with Mr Mathunjwa,
- and in terms of his failures to go back and to be able to 16
- 17 convince the bigger group to actually lay down their arms.
- 18 She indicated that we go over to the stage in terms of the
- 19 dispersal and then the disarming and the arrest. We then
- 20 went into some detail of the plan and we agreed that the
- overall commander will again attempt to communicate and see 21 22 if he can pick up again the negotiations. We were still
- hopeful that the people will, when he announces that, when
- he starts giving the warning, that the people will still

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lay down their arms, and it was communicated when he gives

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The force in

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:

continuum process which started off with a warning and then

- 3 the advance line moving forward, utilisation of water
- 4 cannons, the stun grenades and the CS gas, and then the
- 5 rubber bullets, Chairperson, also then the TRT to be
- 6 deployed as a backup for Public Order Policing during the
- 7 dispersion, and with the specific responsibility that after
- 8 this group would be broken into smaller manageable groups,
- 9 that they will clear high ground and that they will
- 10
 - actually perform these arrests.

The phase 3 of that was then the actual encircling, so the prior was the sweeping of the closest koppie, and then the phase 3 in terms of where we would actually encircle the people and carry out the - I then indicated that Colonel Scott, accompanied by Brigadier Pretorius, must travel to the forward holding area and that they should go and personally brief the commanders in the

- 18 forward holding area.
- 19 [12:49] I did not want to do it over the radio, the one
- 20 side because information gets lost in terms of trying to
- explain that, but we were also mindful of the police radio
- that was robbed on the Monday. If I can remember, 22
- 23 somewhere on Tuesday there was a report made by a police
- 24 officer that he heard somebody trying to speak over the
- police radio network and he said it was just clear to him

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that this was not a police officer.

The reason why I've sent Brigadier Pretorius as the operational room commander to accompany Colonel Scott was so that she can also be totally familiar in terms of

5 the deployment, that she can again confirm the call signs,

6 and I've instructed Colonel Scott to take aerial

7 photographs, or in a Google format, so it's actually not an

8 aerial photograph, a Google format of the area, where he

9 indicates in graphics in terms of how this deployment will

10 unfold. I indicated to them that they must be back at

11 quarter past 3 as I was mindful, or I indicated to them

12 that I want to start the operation at 15:30. Chairperson,

13 I was mindful of the fact that around quarter to 6 at

14 latest the, it would be the setting of the sun, and that I

do not want the operation to go into the dark hours because

that presents its own challenges.

Chairperson, before, after the initial presentation by Colonel Scott, the Provincial Commissioner departed. She left to go and visit Lieutenant Baloyi, who was still recovering from his injuries sustained on the

21 Monday. After she left, I just continued with a checklist

22 where I indicated that the commanders must make sure in

23 terms of certain things to be in place, and then the

24 meeting concluded at 14:00 and Colonel Scott and Brigadier

25 Pretorius then left a couple of minutes later. indicated to me that it's his understanding that Mr

Mathunjwa is upset. I then asked the joint operational

centre, I think I asked Brigadier Pretorius, or it might

have been one of the radio operators, to speak to Major-

General Naidoo at the forward holding area 1 and see if he

6 cannot intercept Mr Mathunjwa on his way to the koppie so

7 that he can have a discussion with him and indicate the

8 SAPS availability so that whatever he would then go and

9 speak to the people, that he would be not still upset in

10 terms of when he speaks to the people, and I left it at

11 that. It's my understanding later on that they did not

12 manage it. He drove past that forward holding area; he did

13 not go through that area, took another route, and they saw

him as he approached the actual koppie again with his 14

15 vehicle.

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16 MR SEMENYA SC: Chair, may we perhaps

17 deal with what then happens after lunch?

> CHAIRPERSON: Very well. We will take

19 the lunch adjournment and resume at 2 o'clock.

20 [COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES1

21 [14:02] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.

22 You're still under oath, Major-General.

23 CHARL ANNANDALE: s.u.o.

24 CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya, I take it

you've got some more questions.

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1 MR SEMENYA SC: You also deal with the

contact you would have had with Mr Mathunjwa via SMSes. 2

> MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

4 that is correct, yes. At 14:15 I received an SMS from Mr

5 Mathunjwa and if I can just read the exact details of the

6 SMS. The SMS indicated, and I quote, "Since no person who

7 is available to give feedback to, we are going back to

8 employees to inform them that no-one is available. We have

9 tried our best, without cooperation from anyone. Let peace

10 prevail." This SMS concerned me, Chairperson, and I found

11 Major-General Mpembe was just standing outside of the joint

12 operation centre and I discussed it with him, and he

13 indicated that he also received such an SMS. He indicated

14 to me that he tried on a number of occasions after

15 receiving that SMS to see if he can get hold of Mr

Mathunjwa on his cell phone, but he did not succeed. 16

I then at 14:28 I replied also by SMS, and I

quote, "SAPS is available at exactly the same spot as we

had our earlier discussions. We are always available and

willing to have discussions towards finding an amicable and

peaceful solution." I did not receive a response from him

22 and it was my understanding from Major-General Mpembe that

some of his delegation, of the AMCU delegation, indicated

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24 that Mr Mathunjwa was at the JOC area, and that must have

25 been the time when we had the special JOCOM meeting, and he

EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA SC (CONTD.):

Indeed, Chair. Before the break for lunch we had just

dealt with the SMSes and what they were saying, and you had

dealt with paragraph 24 of your statement.

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That's correct.

6 Chairperson.

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MR SEMENYA SC: Can you tell us what you

8 have under paragraph 25?

> MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

10 from, or at 15:30 when I wanted the operation to start, Mr

11 Mathunjwa was at the koppie and he was busy, so the

12 operation commander reported that back, and based on that

13 he was obviously given permission to continue with the

14 process of allowing him to conduct his, address his

15 members, and then just around 15:40 the, Brigadier Calitz

16 indicated that he's busy, or that they're busy deploying

17 the wire, and from there on there was continuous feedback,

18 or continuous discussions between Brigadier Calitz and

Lieutenant-Colonel Vermaak, and they occupied most of the

discussions over the radio for a good half an hour. It was

21 indicated, and what we heard over the radio, that when the

police started deploying the wire, that there was a

movement from the group on the koppie towards the police

line. Further reports indicated that the police line came

under attack.

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It was further indicated - and I cannot really 1 recall whether it was Vermaak or whether it was Calitz at 2 3 specific times - that people are moving, that the police 4 officers have deployed teargas and stun, and rubber. I can 5 also remember that it was mentioned that there were people 6 standing around in the villages, that the veld was set on 7 fire, that people are moving, that Brigadier Calitz 8 indicated that the water cannon should move, and he also 9 remarked that where's the TRT line, the TRT line must move, 10 and from the chopper that Colonel Vermaak indicated 11 direction that people must move. There was a stage where 12 Brigadier Calitz indicated that the people must not engage 13 unless you're being engaged, or words to that effect. 14 There was a stage where he mentioned that people must get out of the Nyalas and that they must perform arrests. I 15 16 can also remember that he said, "Take the panga; take the 17 panga." I can remember Colonel Vermaak mentioned that there are bodies lying down and that he indicated that the 18 19 water cannons, that the water cannons must split, that the 20 one must be on the other side. 21

It was also indicated to a group of officers, I think it was to TRT members, a direction that they should move, and it's indicated that there's a gap or an area where the people will go through and he indicated then that the water cannons must stop spraying, which Brigadier

evidence -

MR BUDLENDER SC: Chair, I don't want to interrupt my learned friend. Can I suggest it might be helpful for the Commission and for all of us if the General first described what was in his mind at the time from what. from the reports and information that he's receiving, and then deals separately with what he described from videos which he subsequently saw, because otherwise it will be difficult to know what he knew and what he did at the time, unencumbered by subsequent discoveries.

CHAIRPERSON: It seems sensible, Mr Semenya. I think you'd agree with that.

MR SEMENYA SC: Except, Chair, as the witness was testifying, from the information related then there's no scene 1, scene 2. That's why I attempted to break it, otherwise he'll be speaking as though he's speaking about scene 2 when I'm trying to focus his attention on scene 1, but just tell us what you were told and then we'll go back to where I think we should.

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: indicated that whilst the wire was being deployed, and it was up to the third Nyala that has deployed and at the position of the fourth Nyala, that this group tried to go in front of the Nyala before it deployed, to access into that neutral area, that there was the first incident of

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Calitz then repeated and he said "Water cannons, stop 1

spraying," and that the group, or the people, that they are 2

3 encircled, and Brigadier Calitz indicated that the people

4 must get out and perform arrests. That is the flow, not

5 necessarily in that order, Chairperson.

MR SEMENYA SC: Can we, General, break this into the scenes as we now are told that is scene 1 and scene 2? Shall we start with scene 1? What are the reports that you received around what happened at scene 1? MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, the picture I had in my mind whilst it was unfolding was

12 that there was, all of these are happening within the area 13 of the koppie and that when the people were regrouping and

14 that the people at the koppie, I saw then that the people

15 then basically moved back to that koppie area, the bigger

16 koppie area. In terms of the feedback I received and what

17 has happened at, now known as scene 1, that when the barbed

18 wire was deployed there was a movement of a sizeable group

19 of protesters, probably around 400 plus, and the -

20 MR SEMENYA SC: Shall we break it a

21 little bit there, and General, perhaps – unless there are

22 objections that will come, I would wish to solicit your

evidence in relation to the video material that you have

24 had an opportunity to see as well, and can we do this also

in relation to slide 152 so that we are able to follow your

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where the police then responded in terms of utilising rubber and stun and CS, if I'm not mistaken. This Nyala then proceeded with deploying the wire and managed to prevent this group from actually entering at that position 5 of the first incident.

There was then a second incident in terms of this same group a minute or two later where they then basically just moved back and moved forward again to a further point in line with the deployment of the wire, and that that was close to the one side of a kraal. I say the one side, the more southern side of that kraal, that this Nyala, this Nyala 4 then continued, he did not go as per the deployment of wire to the next position where 5 would then move to 6, and 6 would move onwards. He continued driving and he then drove right into the side of that kraal to cut them off again from going into the neutral area. They indicated that there's some group, that the majority, if not all of the people, had dangerous weapons, specifically sharp-edged weapons, pangas, spears, with them, and that there was also shooting from this group at the police line, indicate that the same group then basically went back and then went around the kraal to the northern side of that kraal, and that the Public Order Policing members of the reserve that, as they, the incident 1 unfolded and so on, that they moved

towards that flank and then the members were outside of the

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- Nyalas, some of them; others were still inside the Nyalas,
- and that they were responding again with stun grenade, CS 2
- 3 gas, as well as then rubber rounds. They indicated that
- 4 none of these had any effect on this advancing group, that
- 5 this group was still continuing forward into this
- 6 unprotected - if I can call it unprotected area, because
- 7 there was no wire on that side, that they, as they entered
- into the space between the Nyalas where the Public Order 8
- 9 Policing members were, a number of these Public Order
- 10 Policing members then retreated back into the Nyalas and
- 11 that the group continued, they went into that policing
- 12 area, and they indicated that members reported that a

13 number of members fired rounds with a combination of 9mm

14 and R5 assault rifles, and that the members reported that

they did so in defence of their own and their colleagues,

as well as then the media's lives.

They also indicated – but these reports now come through probably after half past 6 - 4 o'clock, after half past 5, half past 4, 4:30, that then they started reporting that there's a number of people that's been injured, that there's also a number of people that have been killed. They indicated that was in that immediate area around the

23 kraal where most of the people were that were found to be

killed. 24

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MR SEMENYA SC: And what were the reports Page 8341

Page 8342

It was also reported that more or less the, just

shortly after the veld was set on fire, that General Naidoo

- started moving with some of these K9 members and that he
- responded to where he also heard the shooting, which was at
- the original koppie 1.
- 6 [14:22] I think he also mentioned that he heard that
- 7 there was a call for medical assistance and based on the
- 8 veld that was set on fire, as well as the medical
- 9 assistance required and the shooting that he heard, he
- 10 first left the medical personnel that was at this holding
- 11 area, who was now at the time at the, what is now known as
- 12 the immediate reaction area 1 which was just behind the
- 13 power station, indicated that they must remain behind so
- that he first go with police officers to go and see if the
- area is safe so that they can respond to the fire as well
- as to the medical. It was indicated that on his way there
- 17 with these K9 members they had to move past, or in close
- proximity to this third koppie.

MR SEMENYA SC: General, we will deal with the actual evidence with General Naidoo and the other

21 members who were on the ground. I'm just trying to obtain

your evidence in relation to your experience and what is in

23 the documents. Can I now invite you to go to slide 152,

24 exhibit L?

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25 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I have slide

Page 8340

in relation to what we now have termed scene 2?

2 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, it

3 was only in the explanations that we received and the

- 4 feedback through Brigadier Calitz and Major-General Naidoo
- 5 that we started getting an idea in terms of another koppie,
- 6 because the whole time it was this big koppie with the
- 7 adjacent koppie, that there's another koppie about 350, 400
- 8 metres more to the west of the bigger koppie, and that the
- 9 core of this group that formed the three advances on the
- 10 police line, that they regrouped and moved back and that
- 11 they first positioned themselves behind - I say behind, on
- 12 the western side of the smaller koppie which is adjacent to
- 13 the big koppie, that Brigadier Calitz with his Nyala
- 14 groupings, that they were going on the, approaching from
- 15 the north, basically from the northern side, going around
- 16 to the, more towards the west, and that the TRT line that
- 17 was supposed to follow up with that, remained behind, and
- 18 Brigadier Calitz indicated that's why he was enquiring on
- 19 the radio where's the TRT line that is supposed to move
- 20 with his Public Order Policing members. As explained that
- 21 that role was then taken over by the National Intervention
- 22 Unit members, and that the Public Order Policing then with
- 23 the water cannons then approached this group again to
- 24 disperse them. This group then moved further to another
- 25 koppie, the third koppie, the one that's more to the west.

152 in front of me.

MR SEMENYA SC: Would that be the

formation that was conceived in the plan?

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

the formation, apart from that six Nyala again that should

6 move to the other side, this was the initial formation

7 which was then later changed after 11 o'clock when that

Nyala moved. 8

9 MR SEMENYA SC: I just want for now to

10 solicit your opinion, your evidence in relation to the

11 topography there. The topography is what was there at the

12 time. Am I right, General?

> MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is

14 correct, Chairperson.

15 MR SEMENYA SC: According to plan, what 16 would have constituted the positive attraction points in

17 relation to that slide?

18 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:

the positive attraction point would be the area to the

20 west, so basically behind that koppie, away from the

21 policing line.

22 MR SEMENYA SC: In fact, General, my

23 learned colleague says perhaps what would give us a better

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understanding, is slide 116, although it was the day 24

before. Are you on that slide?

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Page 8343 Page 8345 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: from that and not move towards that, and the area to the I am, yes, back, to the west is probably a couple of kilometres. It 2 Chairperson. 3 MR SEMENYA SC: So in relation to that can be as far as four kilometres before you really go into 4 slide your positive attraction would be where? real built-up neighbourhood areas, and also the width of 5 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Positive 5 that area, if you take it from north to south, is probably attraction would be to the left of the slide in the area 6 more than a kilometre. So it's a vast open area, just 6 7 7 behind the, where the, we can see the people are gathering, field and there's some pathways with short grass and then 8 8 but also to the top of the slide, which will be in a the few koppies, the three koppies that we can see in the 9 9 general northern direction. area. Chairperson, even if you wanted to go to the eastern 10 MR SEMENYA SC: 10 side, it just required that you move a couple of metres Were you given information what would have happened to the 3 000 more 11 back towards the west and then you head north, and then you 11 12 can enter into that, in that village area. 12 people that were at the koppie at the time of the deployment of the wire? What happened to those people? 13 13 MR SEMENYA SC: General, can I invite you MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 14 Chairperson, 14 to look at exhibit EEE14.1? Exhibit EEE14.1. Chair, this 15 yes, it was confirmed, and I also saw that on pictures, is the exhibit handed in by the evidence leaders during that the vast majority, probably 90% of the total cross-examination. 16 collective people gathered there moved away in that 17 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 17 18 specific direction. EEE14.1, it seems like an aerial photo, in front of me. 19 MR BUDLENDER SC: Sorry, Chair, to 19 Chairperson. 20 interrupt. In what direction is the General talking about? 20 MR SEMENYA SC: This more or less 21 In the north or, to the top or to the left, where he says represents what was seen from the helicopter on that day. 21 22 the majority went? 22 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I take note. 23 MR SEMENYA SC: 23 General? Chairperson. 24 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 24 That would have MR SEMENYA SC: What do we make of the 25 been most of them going to the west, so to the left, but evidence that when the barbed wire was deployed, it was Page 8344 Page 8346 also a percentage, a good percentage, it was filter lines. 1 1 going to encircle the protesters? It was groups of people, they were consisting smaller 2 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 2 Chairperson. 3 groups of people, but also going north and then going back 3 there was, there were six vehicles with barbed wire 4 sort of easterly direction into that, in that corner we can trailers, which are quite sizeable trailers with barbed 5 5 see it looks like a - I do not know if it's a squatter camp wire on them, that was visible less than 80 metres from 6 or whatever the case might be, or an informal settlement, 6 this gathering group. Chairperson, there was no other 7 7 but also moving from more of a northern, coming back, area, barbed wire standing behind that line. There was no other 8 8 that there was indications of people. 9 9 MR SEMENYA SC: was no other positioning of barbed wire available. It was Would the police line 10 have prevented people moving in those directions you 10 in a clear line and it indicated the actual gaps between

11 mentioned? 12 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: No. 13 Chairperson. 14 MR SEMENYA SC: Given your experience, 15 what do you make of a version that says the, what you call the warrior group, the small 3 to 400 member group, were 17 unable to go to the informal settlement except through the 18 police line? 19 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, no, that's, that cannot be. There's, that police line was 21 about not even 400 metres. That police line was five vehicles in a straight line with the sixth vehicle turned 22

back towards the police. My experience in terms of any

public order event and any major event where there's an

obstruction placed by the police, is that people move away

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barbed wire that we had at the forward holding area. There the vehicles, what would be the movement when they deploy, 11 12 and it was also explained as such to the leadership 13 element, that five representatives of the protesters, when 14 they were told that these barbed wires that you see here, 15 they are for the defence and for creating a specific area, 16 a neutral area for the police. Chairperson, I can really 17 not understand that, if you look of the vastness of that 18 area, that you would think that you would be able to go and 19 encircle that. If we would go around that koppie to 20 encircle that koppie, it's probably 1.3 kilometre of wire 21 that we will need. 22 MR SEMENYA SC: In fact, when we look at 23 EEE14.1, what would you say is the positive attraction 24 there?

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:

Chairperson, if

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Page 8347 Page 8349 we look to the top, slightly to the right top corner of the 1 MR SEMENYA SC: Also evident, and for the record, is a distinct group of people going towards koppie 2 picture, and we take the whole line from the police, barbed 3 3 wire and Nyalas, that's the position that we see three of 4 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, I 4 them, and then we see another one that is at the first 5 smaller kraal, and you take that whole area to that corner, see - koppie 2 is the one that's adjacent to the bigger 6 koppie? 6 but also to the right-hand side of the photo, Chairperson, 7 7 MR SEMENYA SC: Indeed. then you will see what I meant when I said you can just 8 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 8 move a couple of metres back towards the west and then you I see them, ja, 9 9 can move to the right of the picture, which would be the from the police line behind that koppie. 10 10 MR SEMENYA SC: General, I would want to north area, and then you can enter that total area, because 11 deal with you with the various criticisms that have been 11 as we can see the people standing around, there's also 12 made in relation to the operation by the police in Marikana 12 roads, a number of roads that's leading into the area. So 13 if you needed to go to that specific, more to the eastern now. 14 14 side, then that was the way that you can still access that CHAIRPERSON: Have you now finished 15 15 dealing with GGG1, or are you going to go back to the last part of paragraph 25? 16 MR SEMENYA SC: Do we also see the groot [14:42] MR SEMENYA SC: 17 koppie there, the big koppie? Maybe let's finalise your 18 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson. statement, General. Are you there? 19 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 19 yes, I see it close on the left-hand side, just to the left I am, yes, 20 of that rotor blade of the helicopter, close to that power 20 Chairperson. 21 station. 21 MR SEMENYA SC: You were still telling us 22 MR SEMENYA SC: 22 And behind that koppie your evidence in relation to paragraph 25. 23 there, movement would have been unimpeded? 23 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That's correct. 24 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 24 Behind and to Chairperson. Then General Naidoo said that the K9 members 25 the side of the koppie, to the right-hand side, as we as well as the NIU members, members from TRT that responded Page 8348 Page 8350 1 looked at it. from the forward holding area 2 side, that individual 2 MR SEMENYA SC: members came under individual attacks, that there were Can I invite you now to 3 look at EEE14.2? With what we now know, that also shows shots fired. He indicated that there was specifically a 4 the dispersal opportunity that was available for the people 4 shot fired at him and that there was then response by a 5 who were on the koppie. number of police officers, and that in the process there MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 6 6 That's correct. were a number of people that were shot and killed, and that 7 Chairperson. 7 there were also people that were injured. It was also 8 8 MR SEMENYA SC: For the record, to the later on confirmed as we received the figures that there 9 were a number of people arrested - we only had the full entire right side of that frame there is an unimpeded 10 figure much later on that evening - and that there were 259 10 opportunity for people to disperse in that direction. Am I 11 right? 11 specifically arrested at the koppie area. 12 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is 12 MR SEMENYA SC: And just for 13 correct, Chairperson. 13 completeness, the National Commissioner arrived that 14 14 MR SEMENYA SC: Also this frame, for the evening in Marikana. 15 record, shows us a whole number of people who are seen at 15 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is 16 the bottom of that frame. 16 correct, Chairperson. 17 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 17 MR SEMENYA SC: And as she testified, she 18 correct, Chairperson, a grouping of people closer to the 18 received various briefings. Is that correct? 19 19 informal settlement area, plus then also more to the right CHAIRPERSON: Can I ask - answer the 20 of the picture. question first and then I want to ask you a question before 21 MR SEMENYA SC: Also for the record, the we - perhaps my question first before that. You mentioned informal settlement is accessible without the need to go to what Brigadier Calitz told you and Lieutenant-Colonel the police line. Vermaak, and then you said later Major-General Naidoo also 23 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes, 24 told you certain things. Now when exactly was that? When Chairperson. did Major-General Naidoo make that report to you that

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Page 8351 you've repeated to us? 2 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, 3 the first report was a telephone conversation between 4 himself and me on our cellular phones where he gave an 5 overview, and then afterwards, much, much later that evening in terms of when we were at the joint operational 6 7 centre. 8 Can you give an estimate of CHAIRPERSON: 9 the time, firstly the conversation you had on your cell 10 phones - I'm more interested in a ballpark kind of figure 11 than a precise one - and then later the meeting at the JOC, 12 was it, where you met him? 13 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, I 14 know that the first conversation was whilst it was still 15 light. Chairperson, if I have to guess, it must have been 16 in the area of 5 o'clock maybe, and he, the report 17 afterwards, Chairperson, he was on the scene at IPID there. 18 He responded at the time for, to a scene where there were a 19 number of vehicles that were set alight. Chairperson, you

Page 8353 we thought that there was more than one incident where 2 there was - but it was in this very same, so I had the picture that the people are moving around at this koppie area, that there an incident that took place, that they were moving behind people and dispersing them and that 6 there was another incident probably coming from that bigger 7 koppie area. 8 CHAIRPERSON: But you were disabused of 9 that idea at some stage in that telephone conversation. 10 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes, Sir. 11 CHAIRPERSON: Some time after 5 o'clock, 12 before sunset, anyway. 13 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes, 14 Chairperson. 15 CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. 16 MR SEMENYA SC: Exhibit FFF25 on page 27 17 has an entry against the time 19:20 reading, "Major-General Naidoo confirmed four vehicles is burning and they cannot 19 get in the yard of mine premises as there is no access." know at that time there's so many things that's happening, 20 Does that refresh your memory? 21 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson. 22 yes, but that was after he already responded to that, so it 23 was a bit earlier where the report came through in the JOC 24 that they need assistance. 25 CHAIRPERSON: On the previous page

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than that - that there were two scenes, as it were? You

become aware that there were - it must have been earlier

At what stage did you

and time at a stage feels as if it stands still. It could

have been 9 o'clock. It was probably later, but

Chairperson, I really cannot say.

CHAIRPERSON:

know, we talk about scene 1 and scene 2. Presumably you 2

3 weren't aware of that in the JOC when you were just getting

4 messages over the radio, but obviously at some stage you

5 became aware of the fact that there was one particular set

6 of actions at what we call scene 1, and thereafter the

7 action moved, as it were, to scene 2. More or less when

did you become aware of that?

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson. that was probably in the discussion I had with him over the telephone, because I did not understand that, because in our planning it was focussed mostly in terms of that bigger

13 koppie with the adjacent koppie, and then he said no,

14 behind that there's another koppie, so the people - so it

15 was probably there even although I still did not have a

proper visual in terms of that, and I looked then in terms 16

17 of a bigger aerial and then I saw the koppie, which was the

18 most likely koppie which it could have been.

19 CHAIRPERSON: So this was before sunset,

20 in other words, while it was still light?

> MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: You became aware that what

amounts to the division, I suppose - to use a loose word -

between the actions at scene 1 and the actions at scene 2?

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Ja, initially

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Page 8354 there's a reference on page 25 to, or part of entry number

1018 at 16:10 the JOC, "Major-General Naidoo informed the

JOC that the medics must go to the kraal." That's

4 obviously earlier than that, isn't it? "Major-General

Naidoo informed the JOC that medics must go to the kraal

with [inaudible] where the bodies are lying. They will 6

7 need more EMS for assistance." That's obviously before the

8 conversation that you're talking about?

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Yes,

10 Chairperson, that was well before the conversation.

11 CHAIRPERSON: I see that there is an

12 entry, 17:40, a number of entries, but the last one is, "At

13 the small koppie/scene 2, 15 people wounded, 12 dead," and

14 it looks like 3 out of 15 are critically injured." So

15 already by 17:40 the record clerk is recording that there,

16 talking in terms of scene 2.

> MR SEMENYA SC: Is there anything you

18 need to tell us before the arrival of the National

19 Commissioner at the JOC?

20 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:

just that there was then deployment of additional

ambulances, that, and that was mostly done by the

23 assistance of the representative we had from Lonmin, a Mr

Dirk Botes. That was ambulances that needed to be

despatched, that hospitals were placed on standby. I know

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- 1 there was a chopper of Protea Coin that transported medics
- 2 from the, our area to the scene, and there were reports
- 3 coming through in terms of numbers, in terms of people
- 4 being injured, in terms of people being, that was found to
- 5 be dead, but at that stage we did not have confirmation in
- 6 terms of the exact numbers. It was the IPID that was
- 7 contacted. There were reports of groupings of people.
- 8 There were reports of the vehicles that were burned, and
- 9 generators that we moved, generators that the Lonmin Mine
- 10 assisted us with that was moved to the koppie because it
- 11 was now getting already dusk, and detectives and Local
- 12 Criminal Record Centre members that need to be despatched.
- 13 MR SEMENYA SC: And as the National
- 14 Commissioner has testified, she arrived and she was
- 15 briefed.

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- 16 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I take note,
- 17 yes, Chairperson.
- 18 MR SEMENYA SC: And that it was decided
- 19 that a press briefing would take place the following day.
- 20 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,
- 21 yes, the briefing, there were initial briefing when the
- 22 National Commissioner arrived and then there was a meeting
- 23 where the National Commissioner, the Provincial
- 24 Commissioner, the overall commander at a later stage, and
- 25 so on, were in a separate facility, not in the JOC area. I

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- know that Lieutenant-General Mawela, the Divisional
- 2 Commissioner for Operational Response Services was there.
- 3 So they were in offices very close to the JOC, but not in
- 4 the JOC, and I remained in the JOC, and then from time to
- $5\,$ $\,$ time there would be communication where if we get more
- 6 information that we have said that. So in terms of the
- 7 press briefing decision, it was not made in the JOC. I
- 8 assume it was made then at that briefing.
- 9 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Was the National
- 10 Commissioner briefed by any one person specifically, or by
- 11 everyone who was present?
- 12 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, I
- 13 do not think at that time General Naidoo was still in the
- 14 field; Brigadier Calitz was still in the field. It would
- 15 have been probably done by the Provincial Commissioner,
- 16 because she was also in and out of the JOC during the time,
- 17 so she received most of the reports that we received there,
- 18 apart from that we filled her in at the time that she was
- 19 on the telephone or outside.
- 20 CHAIRPERSON: Did you assist Lieutenant-
- 21 General Mbombo to brief the National Commissioner?
- 22 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,
- 23 no, I did not brief the National Commissioner, even though
- 24 I was present at the JOC area. At that time we were
- 25 running around, specifically Brigadier Pretorius and myself

in terms of the assistance that was needed.

2 CHAIRPERSON: Did I understand you to say

3 you were not present when the decision was taken to hold a

4 press briefing the following day, or did I misunderstand

5 you?

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6 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: I was aware of

7 that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It's one thing to be aware,

9 but you weren't present when -

10 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: No, I was not

11 present, but they consistently contacted me in terms of

12 details that must be included in the press release in terms

13 of number of people injured and so on, so as I got update I

14 SMSed it or I would speak to General Mawela mostly, or to

15 Colonel Scott who was busy, also sitting in that group.

16 CHAIRPERSON: Now you say they constantly

17 approached you, or contacted you for information. You used

18 the plural, but was there one particular person who was

19 sort of coordinating the receipt of information, or were

20 there a number of people who asked questions?

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, it

22 was General Mawela and it was, General Mpembe would ask for

23 clarification and then Colonel Scott would get detail, so

24 it was mostly between the three of them. Maybe there was

somebody else, maybe the PC that have asked, but I can

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remember that I had specific discussions with General

2 Mawela. He said that they need the information, but not

3 also, not only for the press briefing, but they were busy

4 compiling a report, because the President was out of the

5 country at the time and they were busy compiling a report

6 that they wanted to make available so that the President

7 can get the information. So that was the initial focus.

8 MR SEMENYA SC: Will this be a convenient

9 stage, Chair?

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10 CHAIRPERSON: The Commission will now

11 take the tea adjournment and resume just after quarter past

12 3, if we can manage.

[COMMISSION ADJOURNS COMMISSION RESUMES]

14 [15:23] CHAIRPERSON: The Commission resumes.

You're still under oath, Major-General.

CHARL ANNANDALE: s.u.o.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Semenya?

18 EXAMINATION BY MR SEMENYA SC (CONTD.):

19 Thank you, Chair. The media briefing of 17 August by the

20 National Commissioner, do you know how that was compiled?

21 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

no, I do not know the exact people that were involved, but

23 I, it was my understanding that it was the same group of

people that were with the National Commissioner that also

25 compiled the report to the President, and that it was done

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Page 8359 that, late that evening, probably early hours of the Friday, and it could have been only completed maybe on that 2 3 Friday morning, but I do not have that detail, no, Sir. 4 COMMISSIONER HEMRAJ: Were you privy to 5 the actual, the contents of the briefing before it was 6 aired, either the briefing or the report to the President? 7 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, 8 the President's one I think I saw a draft before it went 9 out, in terms of confirming the number of deaths as well as 10 the number of injuries that we had at the time. I do not 11 know the one that I saw, if that was then the final 12 product, and the press release I saw before it was actually 13 released. 14 MR SEMENYA SC: Like the National 15 Commissioner, what did you understand to explain the police action resulting in the deaths and injuries of those who 16 17 were affected? 18 CHAIRPERSON: I don't understand the question. I don't know if the witness does. Did he say 19 20 "Like the National Commissioner, what did you understand

2 or both? MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, the, most words were used in terms of self-defence, but there was also mention made in terms of private defence by 6 some of the commanders. 7 CHAIRPERSON: It may be, I suppose, the 8 commander didn't quite know the distinction, but it's clear 9 what they intended to convey, I should imagine. 10 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Ja, I would hope that they would know, but there's confusion in terms 11 12 of that still in our midst. 13 MR SEMENYA SC: Now General, there would 14 ordinarily have followed a debriefing after an event like 15 this. What happened? 16 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, ja, there's, in our language there are levels of 17 debriefing. The one would be where the members themselves will give an account in terms of what has happened to their 20 commander, and then there would be a next level of 21 debriefing where the overall commander would sit down with

they say? They acted in private defence or self-defence,

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Commissioner was not there at the scene when these events 1 2 took place.

was the cause of the deaths?" I mean surely you must ask

him what he understood to be the cause and then one can

General, the National

follow on from there. Or am I misunderstanding the

3 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: No, she was

4 not, Chairperson.

question?

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5 MR SEMENYA SC: You were also not present

where these events actually took place. 6

MR SEMENYA SC:

7 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: No, I was not,

8 Chairperson.

9 MR SEMENYA SC: There was an account given by the commanders in relation to what happened. 10

11 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: That is

correct, Chairperson.

13 MR SEMENYA SC: Through that account, what explanation was given to the National Commissioner in 14 15 relation to the explanation for the various events

16 resulting in the fatalities, as well as injuries?

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, it was reported by the commanders that there are individual

accounts of the members that fired their weapons, that they

20 fired their weapons in self-defence.

21 MR SEMENYA SC: Or what is called private

22 defence?

CHAIRPERSON: You see, self-defence is 23

24 you defend yourself. Private defence is you're under

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attack, I defend you. That's private defence. So what did

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level of debriefing that I described took place in terms of

all role-players, also including the role-players that's

not necessarily from the police, would sit in, in terms of

a final debriefing. It is my understanding that the first

all of the commanders, and then there would be one where

the members giving an account to their commanders, but a

debriefing in terms of as it's prescribed in Standing Order

262, we did not do such a debriefing. There was, however,

a meeting that we had in Potchefstroom, that was from the

27th of August until the 6th of September, excluding the 1st

7 and the 2nd of September, which was a Saturday and a Sunday.

That - yes.

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9 MR SEMENYA SC: Before we get to that 10 debriefing, did a debriefing happen, the one you describe 11 as between the commanders and their overall commander?

12 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson,

13 there was feedback given by the commanders in terms of our

JOCOM meeting the following day. That evening there were

groups that we relieved as they would come back, some

16 people 11 o'clock, some people at 1 o'clock, because there

17 were still regroupings; there was the vehicles that were

set alight. There was still a lot of activities that went

19 into that night. I think myself left something like

quarter to 3 the next morning. So we did not have a sit-

down with the commanders. There was individual accounts as

22 the people came in, accounting for their members. But

23 feedback took place, but that's not a debriefing in terms

of our understanding of how a debriefing should be, because

that would be a SWAT analysis that we would do in terms of

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Page 8363 Page 8365 the event and which that did not take place, no. MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Certainly 2 2 MR SEMENYA SC: Okay, now the meeting in MNR MAHLANGU: U het gesê daar was? 3 Potchefstroom, how did that come about? GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ingesluit in 4 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, die oproepinstruksie was 'n aantal name; dit was die meeste 5 would that be, this be an appropriate time that I can go 5 bevelvoerders wat teenwoordig was op die betrokke, of op back to Afrikaans? Because it was easier with my statement 6 6 die betrokke insident op die 16de, maar dit het ook 7 7 ingesluit 'n aantal regsbeamptes van die polisie se that's prepared, but -8 CHAIRPERSON: 8 regsafdeling. Ook was ingesluit die video-operateurs, die No, no, I always understood 9 9 that we only asked you to speak in English on matters twee video-operateurs van Openbare Orde Polisiëring, die covered by the statement because we thought you shouldn't operateurs van die waterkanonne, Luitenant-Kolonel Botha, 10 be uncomfortable about that, but you're entitled to speak 11 wie dan die video-opnames gemaak het uit die helikopter 11 12 uit. In totaal was daar seker soveel as omtrent 40 12 in your first language and I can't stop you, and if you'd 13 13 be happier, particularly dealing with this part of it in offisiere en lede opgeroep. Ons het dan vermeld in die 14 Afrikaans, you must do so. 14 oproepinstruksie dat alle lede enige videomateriaal, enige 15 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 15 fotomateriaal wat hulle mag in hulle besit hê, moet hulle Thank you, 16 ook saambring. 16 Chairperson. 17 17 CHAIRPERSON: I think I have to ask the Ons het dan ook die geleentheid gebruik - dit het 18 two interpreters the way they did before, it's difficult toe die Maandag begin - die Saterdag, die 25ste 19 for one interpreter to translate into English and into 19 klaargemaak, dan daardie eerskomende Maandag die 27ste het 20 isiXhosa, so the way it was done previously, I think it 20 ons toe in Potchefstroom begin, by 'n konferensiefasiliteit 21 must be done again. I see we have both interpreters here, 21 bekend as The Roots. Die Provinsiale Kommissaris Generaal 22 so there won't be a problem. 22 Mbombo het die, die verrigtinge het sy geopen die eerste 23 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: 23 dag, en sy het 'n oorsig gegee in terme van die kommissie 24 se "terms of reference," verwysingsraamwerk. 24 Voorsitter. Daar was 'n bespreking gewees tussen Generaal 25 25 Mbombo, Generaal Mpembe, Generaal Naidoo, en myself. In Ons het beskikbaar gehad 'n Kolonel Visser van Page 8366 Page 8364 die seksie Organisatoriese Ontwikkeling van die Noord-wes 1 die week wat - ons het eers onttrek op die 25ste Augustus 2 vanaf Marikana. As ek verwys na "ons," Voorsitter, dan provinsie, en ons het hom gevra om die informasie te 3 praat ek van die bevelstruktuur en dan ook 'n persentasie 3 konsolideer [onhoorbaar]. Ons het dan ook vir Luitenant-4 van die lede wat daar ontplooi was het nie onttrek direk na 4 Kolonel Scott gevra dat hy vir ons moet 'n PowerPoint 5 5 die 16de nie. voorlegging moet hy vir ons voorberei, so een dokument was 6 VOORSITTER: Ons moet die isiXhosa tolk 6 'n voorlegging, elektronies, en die ander een was dan die 7 ook kans gee om sy werk te doen. 7 narratiewe wat dan gepraat het met die voorlegging. 8 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: En welwetende 8 [15:43] MNR MAHLANGU: Kan vir voorsitter vir my 9 9 dat daar 'n kommissie, 'n regtelike kommissie van ondersoek help? 10 10 aangestel was deur die President op die 17de, en ons net MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Narratives. 11 eenvoudig nog nie geleentheid gehad het om te begin 11 CHAIRPERSON: The one document was a -12 dokumente te versamel en onsself voor te berei om dokumente 12 MR MAHLANGU: The one document was a 13 te lewer aan die kommissie nie, synde dat ons steeds besig 13 narrative -14 was met 'n aktiewe protes omgewing in die tydperk aanlopend 14 CHAIRPERSON: - was a narrative, and the 15 15 tot die 25ste Augustus, het ons dit bespreek om bymekaar te other one was an electronic presentation. kom as bevelvoerders sodat ons kan inligting bekom en 16 16 MR MAHLANGU: The other one was an 17 versamel ter voorbereiding van die kommissie. Daar is toe 17 electrical presentation 18 'n oproepinstruksie uitgereik uit die kantoor van die 18 CHAIRPERSON: Electronic. Electronic. 19 Provinsiale Kommissaris Noord-Wes, waarin daar dan 19 Is dit reg? Het ons dit korrek vertaal? vermelding gemaak was van die grootste aantal bevelvoerders 20 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ja. I think 21 wat teenwoordig was op die dag, asook dan 'n aantal 21 so addisionele persone wat meestal van die polisie 22 Voorlegging synde 'n VOORSITTER: regsafdeling was. 23 "presentation," en daar was ook 'n, wat u as 'n narratiewe MR MAHLANGU: Once again I'm going to ask 24 deel beskryf het, klaarblyklik 'n "narrative section." if the sentences should be made a bit shorter. 25 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson, ARCHIVE FOR JUSTICE

Ons het ook

Page 8367 yes, because in the presentation we would typically have GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: 2 just bulleted points, so we just wanted a full description, 3 volledige beskrywing. 4 Voorsitter, dit was dan ook 'n geleentheid wat 5 5 CHAIRPERSON: ons gehad het, daar was 'n prokureursmaatskappy aangestel intussentyd, synde dat die Onafhanklike Polisie Klagte 6 6 7 7 Direktoraat -8 CHAIRPERSON: IPID. 8 9 9 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: IPID, yes, Sir. 10 He's talking about IPID, 10 present. CHAIRPERSON: 11 the Independent Police Investigation Directorate. 11 12 12 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: 13 13 MR MAHLANGU: IPID should do what? 14 14 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: They have 15 already started with their investigation. Die ondersoekers 15 het reeds, hulle was uiteraard die nag, die aand van die 16 16 16de was hulle reeds op die toneel en hulle het al op die 17 17 operasie. 18 17de begin om waarskuwing verklarings te neem van 18 CHAIRPERSON: 19 polisiebeamptes, en met die aanwysing van die prokureur was 19 20 daar dan 'n ooreenkoms tussen die ondersoekers, asook ons prokureur -21 21 22 CHAIRPERSON: 22 wat u sê? I think he means "the IPID 23 investigators and our lawyer." Is dit korrek? 23 24 24 korrek, Voorsitter. GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is so. 25 25 Voorsitter, op daardie stadium het ons aangestelde MR MAHLANGU:

gekyk na die videomateriaal wat geneem was deur een van die Openbare Orde operateurs van die insident wat gebeur het op die 13de waarby Generaal-Majoor Mpembe betrokke was. It's one of the POP members who was present at the time of the engagement on the 13th of August, where General Mpembe was involved. So it's video material taken by one of the POP members who was present at the events of the 13th of August, where General Mpembe was GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Ons het ook gekyk na die video-opnames wat gemaak was op die 14de en die 15de, en dan ook die 16de Augustus, soos gemaak deur dieselfde twee video-operateurs - of nie dieselfde twee nie; daar was 'n ander een gewees op die 13de, maar deur die twee video-operateurs wat toegewys was aan die I think he said the third one, the first one was on the 13th. Thereafter there were two who took video material together, it seems, on the 14th, 15th, and 16th, all three being members of the POP. Is dit GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dit is It was one on the 13th and

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prokureurs, het hulle nog nie die besonderhede gehad van 1 2 die verloop van die insident op die 16de nie.

3 CHAIRPERSON: It sounds as if they didn't

4 have a full account of the events, of what happened. The

5 lawyers didn't have a full account of what happened. Ek

neem aan u verwys na wat op die 16de Augustus en die dae 6

voor die 16de plaasgevind het?

7

8 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Absoluut. 9 Enersyds het ons ook die geleentheid gebruik om dan die 10 voorlegging voor te berei sodat ons dit ook aan hulle kan

11 bied sodat hulle kan makliker sien wat daar gebeur het.

12 Ons prokureurs was in 'n aparte fasiliteit by die

13 konferensie-fasiliteit, The Roots, en hulle het ook dan

14 begin om individuele verklarings voor te berei wat ook dan

15 moes beskikbaar gestel word aan IPID. Voorsitter, die hele

sessie, die werksessie, was gefasiliteer deur 'n Brigadier

16

17 Van Graan, wie vanaf ons Regsafdeling op hoofkantoor-vlak

18 is, en die formaat van die werksessie was tipies dat lede -

19 ons het eers het ons gekyk na die videomateriaal wat ons

gesien het wat beskikbaar was op die media wat algemeen

21 getoon was op TV-nuus.

22 CHAIRPERSON: I think he said "the media

video material that had been shown on the news." 23

MR MAHLANGU: I omitted that, yes. The

media video which had been shown on the news.

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then two additional others on the 14th and the 15th. 2 MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE: Chairperson. not additional. Daar was net twee gewees. Daar was een

gewees en toe 'n ander twee, dit was net in terme van die

video-opnames -

6 VOORSITTER: Ek dink hy bedoel 7 addisioneel tot die eerste lid wat teenwoordig was op die 8 13de Augustus wat die video-opname gemaak het van wat 9 gebeur het op die 13de naby die spoorlyn met Generaal

10 Mpembe.

5

11 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Dis reg. 12 Jammer, Voorsitter. Ons het ook na talle foto's gekyk wat 13 geneem was deur Luitenant-Kolonel Vermaak op 'n Blackberry

14 selfoon, en ook 'n ander kamera wat ook behoort, of tot die

15 beskikking is van Kolonel Vermaak. Voorsitter, ons het nie

16 gekyk na die video van Luitenant-Kolonel Botha nie want hy

17 het dit nie beskikbaar gestel nie. Ek het by hom verneem

18 hoekom is die video nie beskikbaar nie terwyl ons gesê het

19 dit moet beskikbaar wees dat ons daarna kan kyk.

Luitenant-Kolonel Botha het gemeld dat die video geneem is

21 vir IPID, of nie gemaak was vir hulle nie, maar dat dit nou

22 synde die ondersoek, dat dit nou die toestemming van IPID

23 moet hê as ons dit wil kry want dit sal 'n bewysstuk wees.

24 Een van ons regsbeamptes het vir hom gesê dat die video

moet beskikbaar gestel word aan die kommissie en ons wil

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Page 8371 die video insluit, en hy het gemeld dat hy sal beskikbaar 2 stel en ons dit dan ook, na The Roots konferensie het ons 3 dit dan gekry toe dit beskikbaar gestel word.

4 Ons het ook nie gekyk na die opnames van die twee 5 waterkanonne nie. Daar was reeds aan ons terugvoer gegee op die 17de Augustus deur die bevelvoerders van die twee 6 7 waterkanon operateurs dat die een het gesê die Noord-Wes waterkanon, die operateur het gesê dat die sisteem nie 8 9 funksioneer nie en dat daar nie sodanige opname was nie. 10 Die Johannesburg water operateur het gesê dat hy nie 11 heeltemal vertroud was met die werking van die videostelsel nie, maar dat hy geweet het dat jy moet, die hardeskyf het 12 13 beperkings op in terme van die opname, en dat hy dit self 14 moes aktiveer, dat hy dit nie net aansit as dit begin en 15 dit aan los nie, maar dat hy dit elke keer moes aktiveer, en dan met die wat daar 'n aanval op die polisielyn was en 16 dat dit nie volgens die beplanning gegaan het nie, het hy 17 18 net nooit die – he forgot to activate it. Ek het eers 19 bewus geraak dat daar wel opnames was, ek dink dit was op 20 die 6de November van 2012 -

by die polisie se Hawks-eenheid is, en die waterkanonne is

toe deur na Pretoria toe wat hy gesê het hy sal kyk, hy het

tegniese agtergrond in terme van sy -

[16:03] Die videomateriaal is toe, ek, die 11de of die

14de van November toe dink ek kon hulle daarin slaag om dit

6 af te laai, of oor te laai. Voorsitter, dan sien ek die

7 advokaat maak vir my ogies, so ek weet nie of dit nou

bedoel ons moet nou iewers breek nie.

VOORSITTER: Ek wil net vir u vra hoe lank verder gaan u getuig, sover u weet? As dit vyf minute is, dan kan ons by die einde kom van u hoofgetuienis, kan ons 'n ekstra paar minute sit, maar as dit bietjie langer as dit sal wees, dan sal ons more moet voortgaan. Wat stel

14 u voor, mnr Semenya? 15 GENERAAL-MAJOOR ANNANDALE: Voorsitter,

vyf minute, as ons kan klaarmaak, asseblief.

17 MNR SEMENYA SC: Daar is nog steeds -18 CHAIRPERSON: I'm misbehaving again. I 19 forgot to put my microphone on. If it's going to be a

20 couple of minutes before the end of his evidence-in-chief 21 we can do it, but if it's going to take a bit longer than

22 that, we'll finish his evidence-in-chief tomorrow. What do

23 you suggest, Mr Semenya?

24 MR SEMENYA SC: That we go up to

tomorrow, Chair. We're still a little while.

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- nadat daar 'n

The 6th of November, the day

op die 16de, dat hy op die betrokke dag vir sy mense gevra

berig aan my gemaak was terwyl ek teenwoordig was hierso by

die Burgersentrum, dat Kolonel Makhubela, wie ontplooi was

het dat hulle vir hom moet wys hoe werk hierdie waterkanon 2

3 se, die hele stelsel, en dit was tydens hierdie opleiding,

CHAIRPERSON:

after Guy Fawkes, he became aware of it.

MAJOR-GENERAL ANNANDALE:

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4 as ek dit so kan stel, wat hulle vir hom gewys het hoe die

5 verskillende stelsels werk, dat hy waargeneem het dat daar

6 beeldmateriaal is van die Marikana omgewing. Ek het daarop

7 het ek gesê dat ons die, beide waterkanonne moet ons op die

8 volgende dag, die 7de November, moet hulle rapporteer

9 hierso in Rustenburg, en op die 7de was ek teenwoordig by

ons prokureurs, aangestelde prokureursmaatskappy, waarna 10

daar ook gevind was dat daar op die Noord-Wes waterkanon 11

12 ook beeldmateriaal beskikbaar is. Een van die operateurs,

13 of een van die opleiers in die hantering van waterkanonne

14 van Johannesburg Openbare Orde, Adjudant-Offisier – ek kan

15 nie sy van onthou nie - ek het hom gevra of die

16 videomateriaal kan afgelaai word sodat ons daarna kan kyk,

17 en hy het vir my gesê dit kan slegs waargeneem word, gekyk

18 word terwyl jy in die waterkanon sit. Hy het aangedui dat

dit 'n, ek dink dis Israeliese waterkanon, die, dis 'n BAT

Systems waterkanon, en hy het vir my gesê dat hulle net nie

21 die tegnologie beskikbaar het om dit af te laai sodat ons

22 dit op 'n gewone rekenaar kan kyk nie. Ek het toe begin

rond bel en ek het geskakel met ons Plaaslike Kriminele

24 Rekordsentrum, Pretoria, en ook Forensies, en ek het, ek is

25 verwys na 'n Kolonel Sales toe wat by die Onafhanklike, of

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Rustenburg

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CHAIRPERSON: Anyway, we will now adjourn

until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

[COMMISSION ADJOURNED]

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Tel: 011 440 3647 Fax: 011 440 9119 RealTime Transcriptions Email: realtime@mweb.co.za

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