

Executive Summary

on:

■ Steyn Report



The Steyn Portfolio

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Legend

CIS	Ciskei Intelligence Service
DCC	Directorate of Covert Collection; falls under Directorate of Military Intelligence.
GS2	Army Intelligence
GS3	Army Operations
OATI	Onderafdeling Teeninligting (counter-intelligence section of the SADF intelligence division)
RR	Reconnaissance Regiment
SAP CIS	Criminal Information Service (former SB)

Key Players

Genl Kat Liebenberg	Chief of the SADF
Genl George Meiring	Chief of the Army
Genl Joffel van der Westhuizen	Chief of Staff Intelligence
Genl Pierre Steyn	Chief of Defence Force Staff

Dismissed/compulsory leave

1. Major-Genl Hennie Roux	Chief of Staff Army Intelligence
2. Major-Genl Chris Thirion	Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence
3. Brig Ferdi van Wyk	Director, Army Communications Operations
4. Brig 'Tolletjie' Botha	Director, Directorate Covert Collections (DCC)
5. Brig JO van der Merwe	Director, Intelligence Army
6. Brig/Dr Wouter Basson	7 th Medical Battalion
7. Commander HJ Widdowson	
8. Col AJ 'Ar' Nel	Director, Internal Collection of DCC (Interne Subteater)
9. Col CJC 'Mielie' Prinsloo	OC, Special Forces
10. Cmdt J Snyders	
11. JA (Anton) Nieuwoudt	
12. Tony Oosthuizen	
13. JF 'Rich' Verster	
14. Henri van der Westhuizen	
15. CV (Verne) Lange	
16. Staal Burger	
17. LA 'Chappie' Maree	
18. DH (Dawid) Fourie	
19. Steve Bosch	
20. GD (Geoff) Price	
21. Bob Wishart	
22.	
23.	
? Possibly other ex-CCB members employed by DCC: DB Smith, R van Heerden, A Beukman, WJ Basson, ABC Davies, JP du Preez	



Synopsis

18 November 1992

Gen Pierre Steyn appointed to do investigation following raid on DCC by the Goldstone Commission. A Genl Conradie from the SAP was tasked to assist him. Conradie's investigation was conducted in late November and completely exonerated DCC. Genl Steyn based his investigation/ findings on two investigative initiatives already underway - an investigation by OATI (Ops Widow and Crusen) and an investigation by NIS into alleged 3rd Force activities by the security forces.

20 December 1992

These investigations were drawn together and Gen Steyn reported verbally to De Klerk and senior members of his cabinet. The substance of this report was that components of the SADF (DCC, Army Intelligence, Special Forces and the 7th Medical Battalion) were indeed involved in unlawful and/or unauthorised activity. However, as this report was based on intelligence sources and had not been corroborated by hard evidence, it was imperative that a full investigation follow.

A staff report compiled by OATI was given to De Klerk to peruse and then given to Brig Muller of Counter Intelligence for safekeeping. On the basis of this report, Genls Liebenberg, Meiring and Van der Westhuizen were summonsed to Tuynhuis, confronted with the report and asked to draw up a list of people against whom action would be taken. This was despite the fact that the report specifically recommended that action must start against the three generals themselves. This process, according to Steyn, happened in an arbitrary fashion and he was in no way part of it. It included, for example, Genls Thirion (who the report specifically suggested should be exempt from action) and Roux (who De Klerk apparently had a grudge against) and excluded other names.

21 December 1992

De Klerk issued a statement re Steyn's findings and announced that 23 top-ranking officials had been placed on compulsory early retirement (6) or on compulsory leave (16) pending further investigation.

30 December 1992

It was announced that the 15 SADF members had been cleared of possible links to illegal or criminal actions and that a Board of Enquiry would be constituted to examine possible illegal and/or criminal or

	unauthorised actions involving 3 SADF and 4 civilian members.
Early January 1993	The Steyn documents were handed over to team of investigators consisting of the AGs of Witwatersrand and Transvaal, the SAP and the Auditor -General, under the direction of the Tvl AG, Jan D'Oliviera. While some documents were referred to the Goldstone Commission, D'Oliviera decided that they would not form part of the team but liaison would happen via Adv Pretorius of the Goldstone Commission. This division in terms of mandate was rigidly followed and Goldstone were only allowed to investigate those aspects that fell directly within their brief.
13 January 1993	Steyn sent a letter plus an interim report to De Klerk. This report largely repeats the December report.
10 March 1993	Steyn submitted notes on procedure and progress to Minister of Defence, Kobie Coetzee.
2 April 1993	A progress report was given to De Klerk verbally; written form submitted 5 April. Steyn expressed concern that as far as further investigations were going, little progress was being made.
25 August 1993	Steyn submitted his last progress report to the Minister of Defence, Kobie Coetzee. Again Steyn indicated concern around the fact that investigations did not seem to be producing desired results and that his impressions were that the SAP were doing little to investigate. He again pointed out the need for a concerted and coordinated investigation.

A. INTRODUCTION

Following a raid by the Goldstone Commission on the offices of the Directorate of Covert Collection (DCC), Pres De Klerk announced on 18 November 1992, that an investigation into the activities of the DCC would be conducted and that General Pierre Steyn had been appointed to take charge of this investigation. Genl Steyn's brief was given as follows:

- ◆ 'assume immediate command of all intelligence functions of the SADF, including the Division of Military Intelligence and the intelligence branches of the four services' [ie Army, Navy, Airforce and Medical];

B. What Genl Steyn told Pres de Klerk on 20 December 1992

Relevant documentation: Onderzoek van Militere Inligting en kovert operasies

- ◆ There were definite signs of Third Force activity or an unofficial revival of the CCB. SADF structures implicated in this activity were:
 - DCC
 - GS2 (Army Intelligence)
 - GS3 (Army Operations)
 - some Reconnaissance units of the SA Army
 - 7th Medical Battalion.

A number of individuals within these structures had clear influence on the top management of SADF (eg Chief of SADF, Chief of Army, Chief of Staff Intelligence, SADF) thus by implication the SADF itself could be construed to be involved in the creation of violence and intimidation.

- ◆ There was a need for immediate and encompassing action at all levels, including top officials; dismissals of members such as those involved in DCC front organisations forthwith; the introduction of strong controls over covert projects some of which should be closed down where necessary; where possible court action should be instituted following a Board of Inquiry and a SAP investigation; new management rules must be instituted.

- ◆ Recommended that the State President confront the following individuals:

Genl Liebenberg

- historically involved with agendas & thus impotent to act
- re-employed CCB members (or allowed to happen);

LtGenl Meiring

- following own political agendas
- misuse of covert project funds
- unwillingness to exercise proper control

Lt Genl Van der Westhuizen

- responsible for DCC
- without acting against him it would not be possible to act against those under his control.

These individuals should be asked to take early retirements or forcibly retired if necessary.

- ◆ Similar actions - or where possible prosecutions - should be pursued in respect of those in subordinate positions involved in these activities. New appropriate appointments should be made and new operational and financial controls instituted.

- ◆ do 'a complete and comprehensive analysis' of intelligence activities of the SADF and make recommendations in regard to whether these functions needed to be restructured;
- ◆ in conjunction with Lt-Gen Alwyn Conradie of the SAP, 'secure immediate control' over all DCC's documentation and determine whether their activities contravened the law or government policy. This process should happen in conjunction with the Goldstone Commission.

The Steyn investigation thus began in November 1992 and lasted through much of 1993. It spawned and/or intersected with a number of other investigative initiatives and a number of these appear in the file. The most significant being:

- ◆ The investigation into the structure and function of intelligence work in the SADF, and the process of restructuring of military intelligence. There are a number of components to this:
 - ◇ A report that Maj-Genl Ralston did. [*Relevant documentation: This is not included in the file, except for an extract annexed to the minutes of the ISR (Military Intelligence Staff Council) meeting of 25 March 1993 in Section B*]
 - ◇ The Botha/Fieldhouse report: An investigation was conducted into certain irregularities in the re-appointment of ex-CCB personnel to DCC that was headed by Brig JP Botha. One of the members of his team, Brig FW Fieldhouse drew up a report on the outcome of this investigation. [*Relevant documentation: Letter dated 8/1/93 from Chief of Staff Personnel to KYK Distr (??); Report dated 2/3/93 written by Brig Fieldhouse to Chief of Staff Personnel. Both are under Section B*]
 - ◇ The Verbeek report: A committee, under Genl-Maj Verbeek, was appointed to oversee the termination of DCC front companies. [*Relevant documentation: Letter dated 8/1/93 from Chief Staff Intelligence to KYK Distr to be found under Section B*]
- ◆ The investigation into whether DCC activities had contravened the law or exceeded its mandate. Here there are a number of subsidiary and independent investigations that were drawn into or intersected with Steyn's investigation, some of which preceded Steyn's appointment.
 - ◇ The Conradie Report: This is the report based on the investigation initiated by Lieut-Genl Alwyn Conradie of the SAP into DCC's activities. The investigation basically took place between 20 - 23 November and consisted of a team of people working through the files and finances of DCC. [*Relevant documentation: Conradie report in Section F*]
 - ◇ The OATI or 'Crusen' investigation: Steyn relied heavily on the assistance of Military Intelligence's Directorate of Counter-Intelligence. They had been conducting an investigation, known as Operation Crusen, over the previous year. The reasons for their investigation are given as the need to ensure that DCC was

operating within its mandate, because of the potential for misuse given the nature of covert collection.¹ It was also OATI who drew up the staff report that was presented to De Klerk in December to read and was then given to Brig Muller, head of Counter-Intelligence for safekeeping.

[*Relevant documentation: - Document titled 'Riskante Bedrywighede' (nd) [in writing across top Inset Deur TI (SAW) and Op Crusen]*

- Document titled 'Aanduidings van die moontlike voortbestaan/ herlewing van die CCB' Aanhangsel A by Op Crusen Vorderingsverslag dd 22 Sept 92

- Document titled 'Stafgeskrif vir die Steyn Kommissie oor beweerde riskante bedrywighede van SAW komponente.' [document plus annexures A-F]²

- ◇ The NIS investigation: NIS as well had been involved in an investigation into possible Third Force activity involving the security forces and Steyn's various reports rely heavily on their material. [*Relevant documentation: 'Riskante Bedrywighede van SAW Komponente' (nd) [Handwritten across top: 'Memo deur NI Dr Scholtz' - ie NIS head Counter Espionage]*

- ◇ The Gleeson Board of Enquiry: Following Steyn's initial findings, and his report to De Klerk on 20 December, an internal Board of Enquiry under Lt-Genl IR Gleeson was appointed on the 28 December 1992 to investigate many of the allegations raised by the Crusen investigation. This initiative was a bit of a dead duck and it basically decided not to run counter to the other investigations that were being conducted. [*Relevant documentation: The Gleeson Report, such as it is, is to be found under Section C*]

- ◇ SAP/A-Gs and Goldstone: Running alongside the Gleeson Board, further investigations were meant to be conducted by the SAP, the A-Gs of Transvaal and Witwatersrand, headed by D'Oliviera and the Goldstone Commission where applicable. [*Relevant documentation: Venda enquiry in Section J; Goldstone letters in Sections M and NO. There is no material in the file on the SAP/AG investigation team aside from comments in Steyn's reports to the SP*]

- ◇ Financial report: There were some enquiries into financial administration of certain projects and attempts to get proper audits and controls put in place. [*Relevant documents: series letters/memos in Section PQ*]

¹ During discussions with Genl Steyn, it emerged that this investigation had been initiated by him when he had assumed the position of Chief of Defence Force Staff, owing to concerns and suspicions he had about 'unconventional operations.' He also suggested that this operation was directed by Genl Joffel van der Westhuizen.

² This is the document that was given to De Klerk at the 20 December briefing and then given to Brig Muller.

C. Activities the NIS/OATI investigations revealed:

Relevant documentation:

- Document titled 'Riskante Bedryghede van SAW Komponente' (nd) [Handwritten across top: 'Memo deur NI Dr Scholtz' - ie NIS head Counter Espionage]
- Document titled 'Riskante Bedryghede' (nd) [in writing across top Inset Deur TI (SAW) and Op Crusen]
- Document titled 'Aanduidings van die moontlike voortbestaan/ herlewing van die CCB' Aanhangsel A by Op Crusen Vorderingsverslag dd 22 Sept 92
- Document titled 'Stafgeskrif vir die Steyn Kommissie oor beweerde riskante bedryghede van SAW komponente.' [document plus annexures A-F]

The following is a summary of the various documents used in the briefing of the State President and that was summarised in the staff report that he was given to read.

- ◆ These documents suggest that based on a variety of sources - facts, confirmed as well as unconfirmed intelligence from reliable sources, as well as evidence of witnesses in trials and other investigations - it was evident that members, contract workers and coworkers of the SADF were involved in unlawful, unauthorised action including:
 - assassinations
 - deeds of terror
 - destabilisation of neighbouring states
 - corruption
 - encouraging factional politics within parties
 - flagrant disregard for state policy.
- ◆ These activities were centred around
- ◇ DCC which was implicated in:
 - the planning and execution of coups in the independent homelands
 - manipulating important role players in the independent homelands
 - fanning unrest through murder, arming of political factions and intimidation actions
 - participation of members in planning to escalate violence in order to thwart government's reform initiatives
 - corruption irt illegal arms deals
 - involvement in planning assassination with great political implications (eg Flores)
- ◇ GS2(ie Army Intelligence)
 - discrediting the ANC and other political opponents
 - actions via media and within the SADF aimed at influencing perceptions
 - informational support for destabilising actions
 - involvement of members in coup plans
 - spreading disinformation.

- ◇ **Spes Magte (Special Forces)**
 - destabilisation actions in black townships
 - stockpiling arms and developing operational springboards in neighbouring countries
 - training military wings of internal as well as external movements, eg, Inkatha, Renamo
- ◇ **7th Medical Battalion**
 - Chemical Biological Warfare programme
 - involvement in poison murders
 - involvement of some members in corruption for personal gain
 - chemical attack on Frelimo
 - handling of drugs for operational use.

The following elaborates on these allegations:

Destabilisation

This encompassed a variety of actions broadly designed to destabilise the internal and external situations. It is implied that certain forces planned to create sufficient disorder so as to enable the military to step in credibly to create order.

◆ Violence

With regards to violence, activities ranged from targeted assassinations or involvement in inter-organisational conflict to seemingly random violence such as the train massacres. Groups involved included DCC, Special Forces (Recce Regiments 1 & 5), Vlakplaas and the 7th Medical Battalion via Wouter Basson.

Specific allegations include:

- ◇ Although concrete evidence was not available, monitoring of conversations, movements and transport suggested that, under cover of Operation Pastoor, elements of Special Forces were involved in East Rand violence; that Recce Regiments 1 & 5 were active in Kwazulu, raising the possibility that they may be involved in activities there.
- ◇ There were rumours that 5 RR, together with ex-Selous Scouts were involved in train violence through the medium of its 'pseudo capacity'. [5 RR was said to have a 'pseudo capacity' in that it specialised in a range of activities whereby Recce members would masquerade in various guises as the situation demanded]. The ex-Selous Scouts were said to have regrouped at Pietersburg under the command of Col Herman van Niekerk with Tinus van Staden as the operational officer. Other members were Jim Laferty, Mike Kennedy and Mark van der Merwe. There were also reports that Spoomet's intelligence structure which comprised old Special Force members were involved in the train massacres. A Spoomet employee apparently regularly reported to Col Mielie Prinsloo when and where massacres would take place and had said that Special Forces were involved. Ex-Special

Forces members with Spoornet were identified as: Brig Archie Moore, Kol Daan Kershoff, Nick Liebenberg, Nick Basson, Maj Buks Buys.

- ◊ DCC was known to be handling a number of PAC members in the Transkei and was said to have issued instructions to them to kill ANC members. It was also believed that DCC had close links to an ex-Vlakplaas group, consisting of an eight-man hit-squad under Eugene de Kock. It was also believed that 12 Askaris were being stowed away on a DCC farm and that they had access to arms, ammunition and supplies. Steve Bosch (ex-Vlakplaas, DCC) reportedly told colleagues that Henry van der Westhuizen was using ex-Vlakplaas people against the ANC and that money to pay these members came from Ferdi van Wyk, GS2 [discrediting or elimination?]. At Nel was suspected of also being involved.
- ◊ Again the 'pseudo capacity' of 5 RR, with intelligence support of GS2, was believed to be deployed on internal structures of the ANC and PAC. [No further details are given, and it is not clear, whether they masqueraded as ANC/PAC members and acted as 'agents provocateurs' in terms of fanning violence; or whether they eliminated ANC/PAC members]
- ◊ With regards to the Boipatong massacre, Anton Nieuwoudt (Military Intelligence/CIS) had said: 'wel Inkatha is wat hulle geklap het, met so n bietjie ondersteuning hier en daar'. He further said that an individual who knew how to work these things, needed to sort out Polla (sic) Park.
- ◊ An elimination group, under Dr/Brig Wouter Basson was said to exist comprising ex-members of a group that Charl Naude (CCB/ Special Forces) had previously run. This group was said to be in charge of all SADF elimination actions. It was believed that Genl Kat Liebenberg had been fully aware, and possibly until 1989 personally involved in the planning, of this group's activities. Others said to be connected included Genl Lothar Neethling of the SAP's forensic division, Johan Theron of 4 RR, Johan Truter, financial manager of Roodeplaats Navorsingslaborim (connected to the CBW programme), and Col At Nel. There are also references to an ex-CCB group known as the 'Binnekring' who were monitoring black radicals. [Is this possibly the same group?]
- ◊ There seemed to be a possibility that both Col At Nel and Brig Ferdi van Wyk (GS2) knew of plans involving Leon Flores to assassinate Dirk Coetzee.

◆ Caches and springboards:

- ◊ Numerous allegations revolve around stockpiling arms in caches in various countries (largely African - Kenya, Zambia and Mauritius - but Portugal is also mentioned) and creating 'springboards' in these countries for potential military action. Much of this appeared to happen in Nature Reserves and it seems as though Wouter Basson had some connection here. These activities operated largely through an official project called Operation Pastoor (previously called Operation Phantom) and there was also a suggestion that there was close contact with the

British SAS.

- ◇ Two Portuguese operators involved in this project were captured and it was alleged that Basson ordered they be killed if it were not possible to free them.
- ◇ The wing of one of the aeroplanes used by Operation Pastoor had a specially modified wing that was used to conceal and transport arms.
- ◇ A member of a DCC front company was involved in setting up a company in Namibia to channel arms and there seemed to be some doubt as to whether this was an official sanctions-busting operation.
- ◇ Aside from Basson and the case mentioned above, the structure largely involved appeared to be Special Forces. Names mentioned include: Genl Kat Liebenberg, Genl George Meiring, Brig Jake Swart, Col 'Mielie' Prinsloo, Brig 'Tolletjie' Botha, Brig/Dr Wouter Basson.

◆ Training and arms

There are a number of allegations around the issue of training, both internally and externally. Again there seems to be some doubt as to what was official and what unofficial.

- ◇ Several sources indicated that Recces 1 and 5 were involved in giving training to 'resistance movements' in eight countries. Some of this training appears to happen under the banner of Pastoor. Names: Col Bert Sachse, Shaun Gullen, Rod Rodrigues, Roelie Roelofse, Sers Americo. Ex-CCB members as well as Recce members were supposedly involved in training Libyans. Names: arms-dealer, Adrian Kashoggi; Tai Minnaar (links to Maj Eddie Webb and had security company involved in Gabon); Genl Tienie Groenewald; a Shelley Thompson; a French national, Jacque Migotte.
- ◇ Internally training was alleged to be given to both Inkatha and Ciskei security forces by DCC. As regards Inkatha, training was also given to supporters who were then armed by security companies with strong ex-Rhodesian links. Companies specifically cited are: Coin, Hullets and Shield. This was said to run from the Durban DCC offices under JP Prinsloo
- ◇ Arming of Renamo appeared to be happening via DCC and Craig Williamson, Sakkie van Zyl and 'Celeste' were said to be linked to this.
- ◇ Arms were also said to be transported to SA from Mozambique. One route was via the Kruger National Park to the PWV area; another organised by the Durban security police involved smuggling AK47s for Inkatha.

◆ Relating to negotiations

Numerous allegations centred around whether forces were attempting to manipulate the political process and/or plan for the eventuality of negotiations 'going wrong'. These actions ranged from manipulating bantustan politics through planning/ participating in coups to links with right-wing groups and even planning a military coup.

- ◆ With regard to the bantustans, DCC was said to have planned and executed the Ciskei coup and was responsible for the assassination of Charles Sebe as well as planning to topple Holomisa. Later in the investigation, via Goldstone Commission investigations, it also emerged that there was a possibility of security force involvement in Ramushwana's access to power in Venda in 1990.
- ◆ Key players with regard to bantustan activity were said to be:
 - Planners: Brig F Van Wyk, Col A Nel, Col Prinsloo, Tinus Hamman, Cmdt Henry van der Westhuizen, possibly also Capt Pamela Du Randt
 - Operational level: Cmdt Anton Nieuwoudt, Eugene de Kock, Cmdt Henri Van der Westhuizen; Possible coworkers at op level: Brian Davis - London, Van Greunen, Verne Lange, Jimmy Nieuwoudt
 - Structure: DCC Terrorism Section
 - CIS controlled by Cmdt Nieuwoudt and AO2 Clive Brink; coup & murder Sebe planned Col Nel & Cmdt Nieuwoudt (DCC); Holomisa plan Col Nel, Cmdt Nieuwoudt and Terry Scullen.Much of the planning was said to have happened at a box at Loftus.
- ◆ There were allegations that DCC controlled the 'Zulu participation' in the negotiations. It was said that an infrastructure existed whereby DCC was able to mobilise and arm 24 000 Zulus within 24 hours; 250 000 within 48 hours.
- ◆ A number of allegations also centred setting up covert structures. Again, from the box at Loftus, there were talks of setting up an underground organisation; attempts were made to set up a CCB-type organisation at the beginning of 1992 (see CCB below); a former SADF officer was said to be organising a resistance structure involving old Special Forces members, 32 Battalion and the Parachute Battalion; it was also believed that some of the arms coming from Mozambique were being distributed to the AWB. Groups/ individuals mentioned in relation to some of these included: members of DCC Section terrorism, Ferdi van Wyk (GS2), Col Mielie Prinsloo (Special Forces) and Eugene de Kock. This group was said to have a specific agenda to discredit the ANC, fan violence and abort the negotiations.
- ◆ Lieut-Genl Meiring was also known to have given instructions to D Verkenning not to gather information on right-wing individuals and groups; to ascertain where members of D Verkenning stood politically and who supported him. It was thought, however, that this could simply be part of 'eventuality-planning'.
- ◆ Col 'Mielie' Prinsloo was responsible for leaking selective information to right-wing groups; while Brig Ferdi van Wyk (GS2) was alleged to exaggerated the issue

of violence in his monthly reports as well as in media briefings to create a situation of instability.

◆ Discrediting the ANC

- ◇ Arms caches were deliberately planted in Swaziland and then pointed out to police in an attempt to discredit the ANC. Eugene de Kock, Steve Bosch, Leon Flores (both DCC) and Col At Nel were involved in this. It was also known that Col At Nel met with a man, possibly a journalist, about a 'good story' about ANC arms caches. Col Nel was said to be involved with an extremely sensitive project that involved collecting factual information which, if exposed, would severely embarrass the ANC.
- ◇ There seemed to have been numerous attempts to smear the ANC by linking it to the use of chemical weapons and/or poison. An attack on Frelimo soldiers, using chemical weapons, was one such attempt. A British team from Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment corroborated the use of chemicals; and it was believed that the poison used was stored at Protechnics, a company linked to the CBW programme. People involved in this action included: Dr Wouter Basson, Brig Ferdi van Wyk (GS2) and Col At Nel. An ANC detainee had agreed to testify that the ANC was making use of chemical weapons and poison.
- ◇ Ferdi van Wyk (GS2) was involved in exposure of Winnie Mandela in June 1992 around allegedly missing funds. It was also believed that a variety of discrediting operations happened from the offices of Bevkom [formerly Stratcom], under Van Wyk.

Possible revival of the CCB

A number of allegations in the media during 1992 suggested that the CCB was either still functioning or being revived. Investigations revealed:

- ◇ There was talk of an attempt to get permission to get a CCB-type organisation going again. It would appear that after permission was not forthcoming, it was decided to go ahead with a private initiative. Names mentioned include: Glen Gorman (ex-CCB0, AO1 Pieta van Zyl, Rocky van Blerk (ex-CCB), Dr Vernon Joynt (linked to one of CBW front companies).
- ◇ A Sergeant Mazaruva Tapera Nickedimus of 5RR was questioned by the ZCIO (Zimbabwe Intelligence) during a visit to Zimbabwe & stated that Robson Mugadza, Josphat Dube, Charles Mutanda, Kenneth Dube and Jim Reeves (SA),

were members of the Zimbabwe CCB, were still operational and targeting activists.

- ◇ Joe Verster was known to have been on a recruiting drive in the Johannesburg area in July 1992. It was said that this was connected to him establishing a security and transport company that would transport goods to the Frontline states. However, he also appeared to have access to vast quantities of money (R800 000 was mentioned in connection with an unknown purpose); he had good contact with a general in the SADF; it was rumoured that Eugene de Kock was leaving SAP and going to join him at the end of September. It was said that De Kock's package included a number of colleagues, Inkatha members, his brother, an ex-member of the East Rand Murder and Robbery Squad and weapons. It was also said that De Kock was not really leaving the SAP but was taking over an 'underground part' of D Section of the Special Branch/SAP-CIS.
- ◇ A person (Bruce Anderson aka Bruce Anderson Lynes aka John Whyte) with strong Inkatha links in the PWV had possibly been recruited in connection with the revival of the CCB 'under a false flag' in early 1992.
- ◇ During a conversation with SIB (?) members, Greg Corbett and Geoff Price, it was said that the CCB 'still rocks the boat' and that Special Forces hadn't reduced their activity. Price commented that they 'will burn their fingers' as NIS, Chris Prinsloo and his people have 'already warned them'.
- ◇ With regard to funding a number of sources are suggested: a fund-raiser organised by Dr Vernon Joynt at which Wouter Basson made various promises and suggested that millions [sources vary from R30 to R120 million] were available via Genl Joop Joubert as well as US\$ 7 - 10 million from the Chief of Staff of the Belgian Defence Force; John Truter (Roodeplaats Navorsingslaboratorium) also made reference to 'oom Joop's geld'; Verster was said by ex-CCB members to have R19 million available; funding from criminal activities.
- ◇ A great deal of socialising/ contact was being maintained by ex-CCB members. Favourite hang-outs included: La Fragola Restuarant at Sunnyside, Eagles Nest at Valhalla, Oyster Bar at Lynwood.

CBW and use of poison

Aside from the above cases - viz, chemical attack on Frelimo and attempts to link the ANC to chemical warfare and Basson's connection to establishing bases/ springboards in other countries - other instances involving chemical/ poison were:

- ◇ A CBW programme was operating under Brig/Dr Basson. The project was code-named Project Jota and a process of privatisation was proceeding in order to ensure its survival. Companies involved included: Roodeplaats Navorsingslaboratorium, Roodeplaats Teelonderneming,, Delta G; Protechnics.

- ◇ Following the raid on DCC's offices in November 1992, there was a scurry of DCC members to the offices. It was believed that they were involved in retrieving bottles/ tins of beer which had been spiked with poison. These had been apparently been obtained by Special Forces from the 7th Medical Battalion (another report suggests they originated from the SAP) and were intended for distribution in Mozambique.
- ◇ A ex-CCB operator was approached to undertake a contract to supply poisoned beer to Zulus in the Transkei; Basson also offered him 100 000 Mandrax pills per month for one year. This approach was believed to be an attempt to get the operator under the control of the generals again. A number of reasons for the necessity of this were put forward:
 - He had been involved in elimination actions and had knowledge of Liebenberg's direct involvement;
 - he was also a key figure in the CCB group that was taking SADF to court;
 - this group had been responsible for the death of one Holtshauzen who was involved in SADF's ivory/wood/ diamond smuggling operation from Angola.
- ◇ Staal Burger, SIB member [??] and ex-CCB, was approached by a Dirk Oelofse in July 1992 for an antidote for a virus and asked that 'the doctor' make a 'whitey'. Following this Staal Burger had contact, or attempted to make contact, with Krappies Engelbrecht of the SAP (C Section), Joop Joubert and Eugene de Kock.

Criminal activities

A number of allegations relate to deep involvement in criminal activity, ranging from fraud, theft, smuggling to exchange fraud and counterfeit money. Specific allegations include:

- ◇ A scam existed in which funds relating to the issuing of SAP weapons and reward money for weapons found in foreign countries were being paid to fictitious DCC sources.
- ◇ DCC members and sources were said to be involved in motor vehicle theft syndicates, involving Europe and neighbouring states; involved in smuggling drugs, ivory, rhino horns, breadfruit trees from Swaziland and fish from Mozambique.
- ◇ Arms smuggling via the Kruger National Park and the PWV involving whites; AK47s and AKMs smuggled from Mozambique, involving the SAP, were sold R1 000 a piece in Kwazulu.
- ◇ Ex-CCB members were said to be involved in insurance fraud scams that involve submitting false car theft claims.

- ◊ Counterfeit money was allegedly used to buy arms; and there were further suggestions of cross-border trafficking in counterfeit money as well as exchange control fraud.
- ◊ Brig/Dr Basson involved in widescale corruption for personal gain.

E. Assessment of allegations re illegal or unauthorised activities

Relevant document: - Document titled 'Stafgeskrif vir die Steyn Kommissie oor beweerde riskante bedrywighede van SAW komponente.' [document plus annexures A-F]

The staff report attempts to draw together the various investigative reports/ allegations and in doing so gives some assessment about a variety of issues. **Note: This is the report given to De Klerk to read at the December briefing. Insofar as there is a Steyn report, this is it.**

- ◆ There was a great deal of interaction between the affected four components of the SADF (ie DCC, GS2, Special Forces, 7th Med Btn) thus the number of main culprits was relatively limited.
- ◆ The availability of and easy access to secret funds coupled with the Total Onslaught syndrome resulted in these activities becoming self-generating and self-perpetuating. New recruits tended to fall quickly into this pattern and those who conformed tended to be promoted - again creating a self-perpetuating syndrome. In addition an informal network tended to link like-minded individuals. What was also evident was that those in command either had personal involvement, or would have to have knowledge if they were carrying out their command effectively.
- ◆ Dubious and illegal activities had been successfully woven into authorised and official operations, making detection more difficult. A specific case in point was Special Forces use of Operation Pastoor which was implicated in stockpiling arms; the order to kill 2 Portuguese operators; training of 'resistance movements' in other countries as well as involvement in internal training; East Rand and train violence. The same interweaving of authorised and unauthorised was evident in the actions of Dr/Brig Wouter Basson, Ferdi van Wyk (GS2) and DCC. When looking at the allegations, the impression was undoubtedly created that generals and senior officers had lost pace with the mandate. Other than an urgent investigation, a 'clean up' (versuiwering) of office bearers was necessary.

◆ Assessment of persons involved:

A clean-up was not possible without taking action against:

- ◇ Gen Kat Liebenberg (caught in momentum of past)
- ◇ Lt-Gen CP van der Westhuizen (caught in momentum of past)
- ◇ Lt-Gen Meiring (following own agenda)

Others in leadership positions where intervention was necessary:

- ◇ Brig Tolletjie Botha (direct control over DCC)
- ◇ Brig Jake Swart (in charge of SF Reconnaissance)
- ◇ Genl Maj HJ Roux (in charge of Pastoor and Recce Regiments)
- ◇ Brig Ferdi van Wyk (in charge of Bevkom - formerly Stratcom)
- ◇ Col At Nell (DCC)
- ◇ Brig Wouter Basson (7th Medical Battalion)
- ◇ Col H.A.P. Potgieter (Special Forces, Pastoor project officer)
- ◇ Col Mielie Prinsloo (Special Forces or Army Intelligence?)
- ◇ Brig Oos van der Merwe
- ◇ Kmdt Anton Nieuwoudt (DCC)
- ◇ Col Bert Sachse (5 RR)
- ◇ Col Hannes Venter (4 RR)
- ◇ Cmdt Henry van der Westhuizen (DCC)

Note: The staff report includes Genl Chris Thirion in the balance sheet as one of those in leadership positions but says that action should not be taken against him.

[Further lists of names are provided of those linked to DCC and those outside of SADF structures who may be involved in violence - see Appendix]

◆ The following issues were regarded as corroborated:

- ◇ Establishment of arms caches and springboards;
- ◇ Attempt to overthrow Holomisa;
- ◇ Planting weapons in Swaziland to discredit ANC;
- ◇ Corruption of DCC members in arms deals;
- ◇ Selective leaking of info to right-wing groups
- ◇ Involvement in chemical attack on Frelimo;
- ◇ Corruption for personal gain (Wouter Basson)

◆ The following issues were regarded as probably true:

- ◇ Involvement in train violence by 5 RR;
- ◇ Genl Meiring's orders re right wing monitoring and sympathies of individuals (although this was construed as 'not sinister')
- ◇ The CBW programme and process of privatisation;
- ◇ The attempt to get Phaal to distribute poisoned beer to Zulus in the Transkei.

- ◆ The rest of the issues were graded as strong allegations.
- ◆ The basis of the investigations was based on intelligence and was not the product of sworn statements or hard evidence. Further, there was difficulty in refining intelligence sufficiently to the level where it could stand up in court. This was because of:
 - extensive destruction of evidence;
 - extreme sensitivity of the information jeopardised the safety of sources;
 - the capacity of members and groups would easily extend to murder if they felt threatened;
 - role-players protected each other.
- ◆ There was also an attempt to assess the likely impact of intervention on the role-players concerned and more generally. After weighing up the pros and cons of 'drastic intervention' vs 'an appropriately measured response', the latter was recommended.

F. What the other reports said:

As suggested at the beginning, the Steyn investigation in fact comprises a number of separate investigations. Aside from the NIS and OATI investigations into unlawful and/or unauthorised activities, a series of other initiatives formed part of and flowed from these initial investigations. The following presents a summary of these.

1. The Conradie report

Relevant documentation: Letter/Report from Conradie to Commissioner of Police 'Werksaamhede: Direktoraat Kovert Insameling en SAW (appended to Genl Steyn's Interim Report in Section F)

In terms of De Klerk's instructions on 19 November, Steyn was to be assisted by a General Conradie of the SAP in terms of his investigation into DCC. Under Conradie's control a Brig Blignaut of the SAP together with a team spent several days (23 - 26 November) examining the files of 242 co-workers/ informants and cross-checking the files against financial statements. This investigation formed the basis for Conradie's report. In it he suggested:

- ◆ **The functions of DCC were:**
 - ◇ Establish effective covert collection capacity in target lands and organisations to monitor their military capacity within the parameters, laid down by Chief of Staff Intelligence;
 - ◇ Support SAP CIS by collecting intelligence re internal unrest;
 - ◇ Ensuring effective support for covert collection operations;

◇ encouraging research & planning.

◆ **Projects:**

- ◇ ARAC (African Risk Analysis Consultancy) which collected covert intelligence domestically (registered with the Kahn Commission); ARAC employed 65 Permanent Force and 4 Civilian Force members;
- ◇ PAICC CC which collected intelligence externally (also registered with the Kahn Commission); PAICC employed 47 non-Permanent Force members

◆ **Contact SAP CIS & DCC**

- ◇ Not very significant except for Natal where cooperation was deemed to be very good with 80 reports forwarded to CIS from DCC in previous six months;
- ◇ Contact with Genl-Maj Engelbrecht of Group C (SAP) for unknown purposes.

◆ **Conclusions**

Contrary to the NIS/ OATI investigations, Conradie concluded that there was:

- ◇ No evidence that DCC members stepped outside of the law;
- ◇ The methods of the handlers as well as informants were of the highest quality & it would be counterproductive to end this capacity;
- ◇ DCC was well structured and there was no evidence of hidden agendas;
- ◇ There was considerable overlap in domestic terrain with SAP CIS and a wastage of state funds could happen;
- ◇ there was no evidence that DCC was operating outside of its line function;
- ◇ All evidence of files examined reflects the fact that handlers/coworkers/informants were all working with the aim of collecting intelligence re the military threat of MK, APLA, AZANLA, Qibla & far right groupings.

2. **The Fieldhouse report**

Relevant Documentation: Letter dated 8/1/93 from Chief of Staff Personnel; Report dated 2/3/93 written by Brig Fieldhouse. Both are in Section B.

As suggested at the beginning, there were questions surrounding the re-appointment of ex-CCB members to the PAICC. A committee to look into this was set up under Brig JP Botha on 8 January 1993.

◆ **Their brief was to examine:**

- ◇ The dissolution of PAICC and arrangements re personnel;
- ◇ retrenchment packages;
- ◇ pension funds;
- ◇ whether Directive H SAW 5/1/92 UG broken [??]
- ◇ arrangements re company cars etc;
- ◇ circumstances surrounding re-appointment of former CCB members;
- ◇ possible duplication of medical and pension benefits.

- ◆ **Findings:**
- ◇ CCB members who had been re-appointed to DCC following the termination of CCB:
 - DB Smith
 - CV Lange
 - LA Maree (Chappie)
 - R van Heerden
 - JG Nieuwoudt
 - DH Fourie
 - DF du T Burger
 - A Beukman
 - WJ Basson
 - ABC Davies
 - JP du Preez.
- ◇ Circumstances surrounding reappointment: at the time the CCB was dissolved, members were given a choice whether to be taken back by SADF or to receive a retrenchment package. While a limitation was placed by the Minister of Defence on ex-policemen, no restrictions applied once members had taken the retrenchment package. At a later stage, some of those who had accepted the package approached Genl Maj AJM Joubert (then in the Chief of Staff Intelligence section) who referred the matter to Brig Tolletjies Botha (head DCC) and requested that he process the matter, funds allowing. According to this report, there was thus no hidden agenda in the process.
- ◇ All those who were re-appointed were placed in PAICC as handlers, each responsible for a number of sources. An exception to this was DF du Toit Burger who was appointed as a 'talent scout'. All of those re-appointed were considered productive except for Burger and Fourie and there were plans for them to be retrenched on 31 March.
- ◇ They were appointed to PAIIC with the same package as they had received at CCB, except they no longer received an operational allowance (R700). It was thus suggested that they were not given inflated packages.
- ◇ The investigation did find a possibility that there had been a duplication of medical/ pension benefits. It was compulsory for all PAIIC employees to be members of medical and pension schemes. Those who appointed them were unaware that their retrenchment package had also included these benefits and it does appear that seven of the members did have double membership. The investigation was not able to establish whether double claims had been made. In order to do so it would be necessary to approach Sanlam for that information.
- ◇ As regards Directive 5/1/92 UG (?), all members had been in service before 2 April 1992 therefore the directive was not applicable.
- ◇ The findings of this investigation thus cleared DCC of all charges.

3. The Verbeek Committee

Relevant documentation: Letter dated 8/1/93 from Chief of Staff Intelligence in Section B.

On the 8 January 1993, a further committee under Genl Maj DR Verbeek was appointed by Lt Genl CP van der Westhuizen to oversee the termination of all DCC front organisations as well as restructuring DCC. The board were instructed to:

- ◇ Ensure all DCC front companies (ARAC, PAIIC and Afro Info) were fully terminated by the end of the financial year.
- ◇ Processes relating to the Borg [??] Receiver Revenue, Registrar of Companies, RSC, Bank must be set in motion.
- ◇ A series of arrangements to ensure proper disposal of fixed and other assets (furniture, etc) and the closing of accounts to be set in motion.
- ◇ A series of additional administrative tasks required in relation to the restructuring of DCC.

4. The Gleeson Board of Enquiry

Relevant documentation: The Gleeson Report in Section C.

The Gleeson Board was appointed at the end of December by Acting Chief of the Defence Force, Lieut-Genl DP Knobel, to investigate the allegations raised in OATI's Crusen investigation. Specifically it was meant to investigate accusations against:

- ◇ Col At Nel
- ◇ Col Mielie Prinsloo
- ◇ Cmdt SS Snyders
- ◇ JA Nieuwoudt, DMI
- ◇ T Oosthuizen, DMI
- ◇ JF Verster, DMI
- ◇ H van der Westhuizen, DMI

It reported on the 8 February 1993. Basically it was a damp squid, and decided not to run against other inter-departmental investigations (SAP, AGs, etc). It reduced its brief to investigating relatively minor aspects (eg unauthorised use of a car, use of credit card, sale of aeroplane engines) and referred them to the Military Police for further inspection. There is no indication as to the outcome of the Military Police investigation.

5. Further investigations by SAP, AGs and the Goldstone Commission:

In his December report to the State President, Genl Steyn recommended that some issues be referred to the SAP, the Attorney Generals, the Auditor General and the Goldstone Commission. In early January, the documentation that had been used to brief the State President was handed over to such a team under the direction of the AG of the Transvaal, D'Oliviera. However, D'Oliviera decided that while relevant aspects would be passed on to the Goldstone Commission, it would not form part of the inter-departmental team.

◆ Inter-departmental team:

- ◇ On 25 August 1993, Steyn reported to the Minister of Defence, Kobie Coetzee, on the progress of the investigations. Although he was no longer directly part of this aspect of the investigation, his opinion was that little progress had been made and that the SAP were doing little to investigate the allegations. [*Relevant documentation: Letter/report Section NO*]
- ◇ Although not referred to in the trial, the De Kock case was a possible outcome of this process.

◆ The Goldstone Commission:

- ◇ In Steyn's report to Coetzee he suggests that the Goldstone Commission continued investigation into those aspects that affected their mandate such as taxi and train killings. [*See Section NO*]
- ◇ In March 1993, the Goldstone Commission investigated the possible involvement of the SADF in the takeover of the Venda government by Brig Ramushwana. [*Relevant documentation: SADF documents in Section J: Goldstone Kommissie: 5 Apr 1990 (with annexures); SAW betrokkenheid by Venda Bewindsoorname: 5 Apr 1990*]
- ◇ In June 1993, Dr Pretorius wrote to the State President raising a number of concerns that he had. As a member of the Commission, he had been given access to what he refers to as the intelligence world 'of the spies of the spies' and that what he had found was a 'magdom van kriminaliteit en ongeruimdheid'. During his investigation, he became aware of the order by Col At Nel that poison in doctored wine bottles in a cabinet in DCC offices should be removed to a place called Atsegat. He also referred to allegations around chemical biological warfare and continuing assistance to Renamo.

He was clearly torn by political loyalty. He suggested that he was unable to guarantee the response of the Commission and referred to De Klerk as having said to him and another advocate: "Kerels ons het genoeg probleme soos dit is - julle moet nie vir ons nog probleme gee nie." He also pointed to the great insecurity in the security community about a Nuremberg-type scenario and to the fact that many of those affected by the investigation had taken out 'insurance policies' in the form

of documentary evidence which they would release if they were made scapegoats. At the same time a strong sense of frustration at being bound to investigate only those aspects falling within the Commission's brief is evident. The Commission was also facing further difficulties in that Genl Knipe, head of the legal section of the SADF, had advised SADF members that they were not obliged to answer questions in relation to security matters and this threatened to take the wind out of the sails of the Commission completely. [*Relevant documentation: Document beginning 'Meneer die Staatspresident' and in handwriting across the top 'Memo from Dr Pretorius to SP June 1993', Section M*]

- ◊ On 19 October 1993, Goldstone wrote to the State President in which he enclosed a letter from one of the Commission members, G Steyn, who had been appointed to pull together the investigation dealing with aspects relating to Genl Steyn's findings. This letter basically raises concern around the role of NIS. According to Steyn, the Commission only had access to the OATI source documents which primarily dealt with the allegations relating to criminal activity. The allegations relating to involvement in violence were, according to Steyn, largely a product of the NIS investigation and the Goldstone Commission had failed to get access to their source documents, despite NIS's apparent spirit of cooperation. Steyn further suggests that the author of the staff report prepared for the Steyn Commission was basically a conduit for the NIS allegations. He requests a meeting with the State President, the Minister of Defence and the other parties concerned. There is no indication about whether this meeting ever materialised. [*Relevant documentation: Letter to State President from Judge Goldstone, dated 19/10/93 enclosing letter from Mr G Steyn to Judge Goldstone, dated 19/10/93, with annexures in Section NO*]

6. Financial enquiries

[*Relevant documentation: series of letters, memos and financial records to be found under section PQ. Particularly relevant is memo from VAdm Murray to Genl Liebenberg dated 22 July 1993*]

Certain covert projects of the SADF (mainly of the Army and Military Intelligence) had not been audited properly since 1987/8. An attempt was made towards end of 1992 and through the first half of 1993 to get this situation corrected. The various enquiries and reports suggest irregularities in relation to the following projects:

- **Project Campaign**

Description: preparation and execution of special tactical reconnaissance operations in RSA, TBVC, Swaziland and Lesotho:
Budget: 1992/3 - R3 000,00

- **Project Kleur**

Description: Acquisition of special operational military and general equipment, as well as services and training required for special military reconnaissance tasks
Budget 1992/3 - R33 143 000,00

- **Project Eensaam**
Description: obtain services from members that imperative for special reconnaissance operations that are not immediately available in SADF
Budget for 1992/3 - R500 000,00
- **Project Pastoor**
Description: special strategic military reconnaissance activities externally. Fronts organisations:
 - * Overflight Services and Accessories (office in RSA to manage and administer a dedicated flight capacity;
 - * Overflight Support (Edms) Bpk Office based in foreign country to do same as above
 - * Eljee Consultants (Pty) Ltd - office in RSA that financially administers all activities of fronts as well as civilian support for Pastoor activities.
 - * Palmeira Import and Export Co - based in foreign company that manages all foreign deployments.
 Budget for 1992/3 - R4 000 000,00 [This may not be total budget - rather budget that granted via Project Argitek to fund above front companies]

Further in a strongly worded letter dated 22 July 1993, VAdm Murray referred to 'screaming shortcomings' in management and control of finances in covert projects in the SA Army. He suggested 'a legion of examples' could be drawn from the experience of the CCB and Project Kampong and that all signs indicated that other projects had been managed in the same poor manner. These signs had been there for 3 years and yet it had still not been possible to get corrective action underway. His impression was that there was conscious procrastinating in setting corrective processes in motion.

Endnote

This ends the 'Steyn file'. Steyn himself took early retirement in October 1993, at the age of 51. His last progress report submitted to the Minister of Defence had suggested that in relation to the investigations of the AG, he was of the opinion that the SAP were doing little to investigate properly the allegations raised in the staff report. Few, if any, of the suspects had been questioned and there had been little progress in gathering evidence. Clearly a conflict of interests existed and he further posed the question of whether it was fair to investigate only the operators and not those who had given orders.

With regard to the organisational restructuring of the military intelligence function, some measures had been implemented but there were still outstanding issues being followed up through the KIK with little visible success.

Further, it seemed as though financial accounting of covert operations was inadequate. In some cases it had not been possible to audit projects and thus the question remained: if one cannot account for financial aspects, can the operation itself be accountable?

The Goldstone investigation was continuing into those aspects that affected their mandate - eg train/ taxi killings. Although his team had worked with the Commission, there was mistrust on both sides. Cooperation with the Commission was perceived by some in the SADF to be a threat, while the Commission was suspicious of the lengthy time it took to get access to potential witnesses or evidence.

He concluded by saying that he was no longer directly part of the investigation and reiterated his belief that a coordinated investigation effort was needed if progress was to be made and that this was in the state's interests.

Appendix: List of additional names

- ◆ People who are working or have contact with DCC:
- ◇ JF (Rich) Verster alias Jessie Grant (business)
Involved in criminal activity
- ◇ Cmdt JA Nieuwoudt alias J Nel or J Buitendag (SADF, exCIS)
Possible smuggling; possible involvement in organisation of underground structure with eye to alternative structure.
- ◇ H van der Westhuizen alias H van der Walt (Business; ex-SADF AI)
Criminal activity; activities connected to violence.
- ◇ G Janse van Rensberg (Business, ex-NI) alias Steven van Lill
Possible involvement in smuggling
- ◇ Tony Oosthuizen alias Tobie Oosthuizen, alias Michael O'Kelly alias MJ Olivier (Business, ex-NI)
Said to be MI6 agent
- ◇ Maj AM van den Berg, SADF
Corruption; extra-marital affair
- ◇ GD Price alias A Wiltshire (business, ex Rhodesian)
Unsubstantiated allegation that MI6
- ◇ RI Wishart (business, exR)
As above
- ◇ Kdr HJM Widdowson (SADF)
Spying for foreign intelligence service
- ◇ Maj HD Terblanche
Smuggling
- ◇ Cmdt Stefan Snyders(SADF)
Smuggling
- ◇ Vernon Lange alias P Page (business, ex CCB)
Smuggling
- ◇ JG Nieuwoudt alias Neuman (ex CCB, possibly business)
Extra-marital affair
- ◇ JP du Preez alias J du Plooy (ex CCB, business)
Unlicensed weapons
- ◇ LA Maree (Chappies) alias Clive Pienaar (ex CCB, Business)
Ongoing contact with ex-CCB members
- ◇ Maj FL Smit (SADF)
Unsubstantiated allegations smuggling

- ◊ DH Fourie (Business, ex CCB - possibly operational manager)
Training; regular contact ex-CCB; arms deals
 - ◊ DF du Toit Burger (Staal) alias Bert alias Brummer (business, exCCB)
Extra-marital affair; smuggling; regular CCB contact.
 - ◊ WJ Basson alias WJ Bester alias M Barnard alias M Reyneke (business, ex CCB)
Regular contact ex-CCB; closely followed Webster investigation
 - ◊ Mev S de Beer (business, ex CCB)
No negative info known
 - ◊ Calla Botha (ex-CCB)
Contact with Rich Verster, member DCC but nature and scope of activities not known
 - ◊ Ferdi Barnard (ex CCB) alias Lanco Heins
Ex-DCC source but continued contact with DCC members; smuggling
 - ◊ Leon Flores (ex business)
Regular contact ex-CCB members as well as De Kock; probable smuggling; possibly part of Vlakplaas still
- ◆ People outside SADF with potential hidden agendas and/or involved in activities connected to violence:
- ◊ Anthony James Christopher White (Ant) aliases - Anthony Greenstone, Anthony Greenwood, Anthony Greenway, James White, Abe White (probable exCCB)
 - ◊ Mike Drummond (probably ex CCB)
 - ◊ Joe Verster (exBSB, exSADF)
 - ◊ Glen Gorman (probably ex-CCB)
 - ◊ Eugene de Kock (SAP)
 - ◊ Kol Jan Breytenbach (exSADF)
 - ◊ AB Stander (Riaan) (probably CCB)
 - ◊ DH Fourie (DCC)
 - ◊ Vernon Lange (DCC)
 - ◊ JP Du Preez (DCC)
 - ◊ FL Smit (DCC)
 - ◊ Riaan Stander
- ◆ Other ex-CCB members or people with possible contact to CCB members
- ◊ Glen Gorman
 - ◊ Sers MT Nickedimus
 - ◊ Bruce Anderson
 - ◊ Riaan Botes
 - ◊ Eben Barlow
 - ◊ Craig Williamson
 - ◊ Tai Minnaar
 - ◊ Kol GP Otto
 - ◊ Piet Botha
 - ◊ 'Bones' Beneke
 - ◊ Mike Pholey
 - ◊ Charl Naude
 - ◊ Basil Liebenberg

KOMMISSIE VAN ONDERSOEK NA SEKERE BEWEERDE ONGERYMDHEDE
OOR LANDSGRENSE HEEN

EERSTE VERSLAG

DIE SG PALAZZOLO - DE PONTES AANGELEENTHEID

◇ Charlie Cruise

- ◊ Henk Coetzee
- ◊ Garth Barret
- ◊ Eugene Riley
- ◊ Al Burnett
- ◊ D Coetzee
- ◊ Jan van der Merwe
- ◊ Bones Boonzaaier
- ◊ Faan Gerber
- ◊ Johnny Pasch
- ◊ Buks Buys
- ◊ Roelf van Heerden
- ◊ Ian Strange
- ◊ Vossie Vorster
- ◊ Cloete van der Merwe
- ◊ Roes Terblanche
- ◊ Wessel Jordaan
- ◊ Jakes Richter
- ◊ Piet Swanepoel
- ◊ Sakkie van Zyl
- ◊ Rocky van Blerk
- ◊ Douw Grobelaar
- ◊ Cyril Smith
- ◊ Martin Korf
- ◊ Theuns Kruger
- ◊ Leon van Rensberg
- ◊ Willie van Deventer
- ◊ Pieter Botes
- ◊ Mev Soekie Claassen
- ◊ Struis Strydom
- ◊ Dave Scales
- ◊ Niel Kriel
- ◊ Cmdt Johan Theron
- ◊ Lukas Rautenbach
- ◊ Col HAP Potgieter
- ◊ Alet Deacon
- ◊ Trevor Floyd
- ◊ Roy Vermaak
- ◊ Kolle Olivier
- ◊ Danie Phaal
- ◊ Sven Smuts-Muller
- ◊ Sedge Dunning
- ◊ Bossie Boshof (Anton)
- ◊ Dap Maritz
- ◊ JC Erasmus
- ◊ Ralph Moore
- ◊ Steve Cocroft