

DRAFT

THE TASKS OF THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT DURING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY

Until now our reaction to the State of Emergency has tended to be on the state's terms. We ask: what do they intend to do? - to ban us, crush us, or whatever? We have, understandably, tended to be reactive.

Even in the emergency it is important to realise that we are not passive onlookers. We have already shown, in these difficult conditions, that we can make interventions: as we have done in regard to Botha's 'rubicon' speech; the so-called Convention Alliance; the distribution of our newsletters, Update and other literature.

It is important to see ourselves, as we are and were prior to the emergency: as actors. When we ask: how long with the emergency last? When will it end? -these are questions to be answered, not by the state alone. What we have done, what we do now and in the future, is part of the answer to these questions. We are subjects (makers of history) not objects in this process.

It is for this reason that this paper contextualises the emergency within the framework of our goals, instead of situating us within the state's goals. We have to guard against and overcome any tendencies towards defeatism. We try in this paper to understand the conditions under which we now have to work. How we deal with these, the extent to which we master them, will determine how this phase of the South African struggle will end. The extent to which we allow morale to fall, defeatism to creep in or alternatively, the extent to which we can adapt to the new conditions, will determine the relative strength of the people and the enemy after this phase is ended.

The next four months are crucial. The South African government has pledged to repay its debts by 31 December. That means that in order to do this it requires some sort of resolution of the present rising by that date. It needs to create an atmosphere of confidence (dependent to a large extent on political 'stability') -so that the value of the rand will rise, business confidence will be restored, investment encouraged, etc.

There has all along been continued pressure on the state to bring this phase of conflict -the emergency, to an early resolution -the fall of the rand, United States and business pressure etc. But they themselves have set a definite date by which they will have had to clear up some of their mess - the four months deadline -theirs and ours.

If some resolution of the current crisis is required in this period, the question we must ask is who will come out better equipped for the next round of struggle. The state will not be able to wipe us out now. Nor are we now in a position to take power. The question is who will be better equipped to continue the struggle from this period onwards. To what extent will the war against the people have weakened us? To what extent will the people's continuing resistance and the developing divisions in the enemy camp, have weakened them?

Obviously we want to reduce the effect of state terror as much as possible and we want to confront an enemy as weak and divided as possible. To achieve this requires on the one hand that we act responsibly and with discipline, that we do not needlessly risk ourselves or our organisations. On the other hand, we need simultaneously to be making daring interventions, to continue to play a significant role in current political events.

Before The State of Emergency - strength of the People's Camp

The rise of mass democratic struggle in the late 70s and early 80s was a new factor in South African politics, a mode of struggle that had been eradicated for 20 years. What this meant was the opening of a new front of struggle - the legal democratic struggle. While engaged in military struggle against SWAPO and the ANC, the state now also has a substantial internal mass struggle to contend with.

This mass struggle forms part of a tradition. This is a democratic mass tradition. It tries to draw in all oppressed and democratic South Africans, under the leadership of the African people and the working class. While neither of these leadership goals have always been adequately realized, the mode of struggle represents an attempt to fuse two strands of the South African movement for liberation -the national and the workers' struggle

It is not only a democratic mass tradition. It is also a national tradition. In the 1950s the Congress movement was not merely an urban movement. There were activists and branches in small dorps, on the farms and in the reserves.

These national and democratic characteristics derive from the nature of the apartheid system and the strategy and tactics used to combat it. While the South African social order is based on a capitalist economic system, this coexists with the national oppression of all classes of blacks. This means that all blacks have an interest in ending apartheid. Equally, all whites through their access to power and/ or the benefits derived from the superexploitation of black workers, have an interest in its maintenance.

This means that the struggle tends, consequently, to be national -not only in a geographical sense, but in its cross-class and cross-sectoral mode of organisation.

One of the significant features of the period immediately prior to the emergency declaration was the extent to which the people's organisations were determining the course of political events. 18 months earlier the enemy had been making most of the initiatives. But in the period immediately prior to the emergency, the government found itself in an essentially defensive posture. It was primarily occupied in trying to contain the popular surge forward.

After the 1976 rising the Nationalist Party had established more elaborate schemes for cooption of sections of the black population -in order to widen the base of the state and to divide the oppressed. This went together with a wider reorganisation of the state.

In the early years of the Botha government there was considerable momentum on the side of the regime. There was also a developing alliance with capital.

Less than eighteen months ago, the Botha regime presented a coherent strategy, forcing the oppressed to struggle in the main on terrain of the state's choosing.

Their dynamic approach had been possible because the closer link with big capital gave sufficient leverage to compensate for the Conservative Party breakaway

Much of the early Botha initiatives were under the protective umbrella of 'constructive engagement'. While this provided much needed international support, it also demanded a specific mode of conduct. The South African

regime had to move towards or appear to be closer to the model of a 'normal' capitalist state. This meant less overt repression, the appearance (and to some extent the reality) of open democratic discussion, the appearance of deracialisation of the South African state.

The conceding of space for a legal front of struggle can be explained by a combination of factors: our pressure and the fact that such legal struggle could be viewed by the state and capital, as a safety valve, as an alternative to armed activity. It was also related to the fact that the white ruling bloc was then sufficiently strong and cohesive to feel that it could contain a limited amount of democratic opposition.

The imperialists and big business were particularly keen to have evidence of democratic discussion and acceptability of the new constitution, being aware that suppression of such discussion would render its legitimacy questionable. (The imperialists and sections of capital have been more flexible in these matters and their general openness to different solutions, than has been the ruling NP.)

The combination of these factors provided space for open democratic struggle.

This was a period when state initiatives flourished, where there was an appearance of confidence as they produced Wiehahn, Riekert, de Lange reports, implemented BLAs and other schemes.

At the same time, the people's organisations used the space allowed for open democratic struggle to mobilise thousands of people. We achieved certain specific goals:

- total deligitimation of the new South African constitution and countrywide rejection of BLAs
- popularisation of democratic symbols and the early stages of the development of common understanding of the nature and goals of national democratic struggle
- national mobilisation -took the struggle to many small rural towns. Did not however reach the bantustans or farms in a systematic way
- created organisations, where there had been none before and created organisations with a national base

Not everything that contributed to state disarray over this period was under the direction of the UDF and its affiliates. FOSATU conducted its own anti-constitution and other campaigns

Equally, the continuation of the armed struggle by the ANC contributed significantly to their disarray.

The combined effect of struggle on all of these fronts has been to smash the enemy's plans. The NP has been paralysed since the rejection of the constitution. Bankrupt of alternatives they have increasingly resorted to repression. The initiative prior to the declaration of the emergency passed to the people. The state was essentially engaged in a holding action. It was on the defensive, trying to keep the lid on the people's resistance.

Dimensions of the Crisis Facing the Enemy Camp

It is sometimes said that the apartheid regime faces constant crises. We want to argue that the present crisis is the most severe it has faced, both because of its intensity and because it affects every level of the South African state.

The political crisis

At the political level the enemy faces both a crisis of control and consent. In the townships, it has lost control over the oppressed. Nationwide, communities have become ungovernable. This is no longer confined to African communities in the major urban centres. It has spread to the small towns, and in the Cape, to the coloured communities as well.

It is not just a crisis leading to the resignation of puppet leadership. In many areas the entire structure of local government has broken down: the black local authorities have resigned, rents remain unpaid a year late in the Vaal; refuse removal and day-to-day administration cannot be carried out. In the small towns in the Eastern Cape, the strength of the consumer boycott has resulted in the withdrawal of the SAP and SADF

This resistance is no longer sporadic. In many areas it has continued for almost a year. It can only be contained or suppressed through the constant deployment of more and more troops. Civil authority has broken down completely. All that remains is to attempt to maintain military control.

These factors have ruled out any possibility of consent or collaboration. Even the most conservative township resident can see that the BLA cannot provide the most basic services. In the Western Cape the largest concentration of coloured people in the country are making it clear that the Tricameral Parliament has failed to secure them a better life or fulfilled their desire for political rights.

The crisis of collaboration is not confined to the people. It has extended to the allies of the apartheid regime itself: Steve Kgame of the UCASA, for example, distanced himself from the government by calling for the release of Nelson Mandela and political rights at all levels of government; bantustan leaders have sought to distance themselves from Botha after his 'rubicon' speech.

The political crisis does not only manifest itself as a crisis of the enemy control over the majority of oppressed, but also as a crisis of confidence and cohesion within the white ruling bloc. The NP itself does not give the impression of a unified organisation. It is no longer hegemonic within the white power bloc. To the right the HNP and KP are calling for harsher repressive measures. To the centre, the PFP and the business community no longer confine themselves to criticising government policies, but present alternatives.

White South Africans in general appear rudderless. Apartheid's future seems uncertain, but most whites do not know where to look to. Many respond by emigrating, defecting from the army etc.

The economic crisis

The South African economy is facing its most serious crisis since the 1930s. This is linked to the political crisis. It comprises various dimensions:

The first feature of the South African economy bearing on the economic crisis relates to SA's position in the world capitalist system. SA is a developing country characterised by a dependence on exporting agricultural produce and minerals and importing machinery and manufactured goods. For the last twenty years, SA manufacturers have been trying to change this situation and export manufactured products to Southern Africa.,

The international recession has made it more difficult to find markets for manufactured goods in Southern Africa and elsewhere.

A second feature of the South African economy bearing on the crisis has been the attempts by the Nationalist government to break South African dependence on the import of steel, arms, chemicals and oil by establishing and supporting semi-government corporations like ARMSCOR, AE & CI and SASOL. The development of these corporations has been financed by foreign loans.

A third relevant feature of the South African economy is the vast portion of its budget that has to be spent annually on the military for its war both in Namibia and internally. This has limited the amount of money available to spend on such things as housing, education, health care and pensions and is a major source of discontent both amongst the oppressed majority and the sections of the coloured and Indian population that the government has been attempting to coopt over the last eighteen months. It has also led to increases in GST to pay the 'defence' bills

The dependence on imported machinery and foreign loans to promote the growth and stability of the South African economy has also been a major source of instability. There is a constant struggle to ensure that loans are repaid and that exports exceed imports. In a country where the white population has a very high standard of living and spends a vast portion of their earnings on imported consumer goods, this is made even more difficult.

The result is that in recent years the government has taken several steps to reduce both white spending on consumer goods and the import of machinery. It has done this by making it more expensive for firms to borrow money, for example, by raising interest rates. They have also tried to cut down on white spending power by increasing taxes and cutting back on government subsidies to agriculture as well as on health care, education and services

These measures have had a devastating effect on ordinary people. Bankruptcies have made millions unemployed (This includes many whites. The crushing of large sections of the white petit-bourgeoisie is a development whose political and economic significance needs further study). Cutbacks on agricultural subsidies have pushed small farmers off the land as well as raising the price of basic foods, cuts on health care and education have put these things beyond the reach of the majority. In the townships rents have gone up as the government has tried to force the BLAs to operate on an 'economic' basis.

These price increases have had a contradictory effect. While they were intended as a way to solve certain economic problems they have themselves created political problems that have exacerbated the economic situation.

Price rises and unemployment have been major factors in the mobilisation of the oppressed against the BLAs and the Tricameral parliament. What began in many areas as opposition to rent increases has become part of the nationwide uprising against apartheid.

The effect of this uprising is that many foreign bankers, who lend billions of rands in short-term loans, no longer feel sure that they will get their money back. It is this feeling of insecurity that resulted in the refusal by many international banks to roll over or extend R 12 billion in short term loans at the end of last month.

When the bankers refused to roll the loans over, the South African government decided to default on repayment until 31 December and placed controls on the repatriation of all foreign capital in the country until then.

For the government this was, in effect, an admission of bankruptcy. For the bankers it was further proof of the instability of the South African economy.

The question which remains in the minds of government and capital alike is what happens on 31 December? What the government hopes is that four months will be long enough to take control of the political situation and thereby restore foreign confidence sufficiently for the bankers to agree to extend the loans.

For business both local and international, it is a sign that the South African government is no longer in control of the economic situation and has been one of the factors leading local business to meet the ANC and international business to pressurise the South African government to proceed with 'negotiations' and 'reform' as quickly as possible.

The South African government is worried because there is no possibility of their being able to repay the loans in the short term. Those due are equal to about three years income from exports.

The international bankers are worried because bankruptcy of the South African economy would have very widespread effects on the world economy as a whole

For the democratic movement, the next four months are a crucial period in determining the extent to which the government will succeed in disorganising opposition sufficiently to restore apartheid rule.

International crisis

The last 25 years have seen the increasing isolation of the apartheid regime. The growth of anti-apartheid movements, especially in the last ten years in Europe and the United States, has intensified pressures well beyond that experienced prior to 1976

Dramatic manifestations of their effectiveness is the transformation of disinvestment into a real possibility. The fact that even Reagan has had to introduce some form of punitive action (albeit of a tokenist kind), in order to avert worse sanctions, indicates the extent of anti-apartheid pressures. Harry Schwartz correctly appreciated its significance: however mild the sanctions, the fact of punitive action was an important blow to the foundations of 'constructive engagement'.

What has also become evident in this period is that allies of apartheid have themselves become isolated or had to pay a price for their friendship with the apartheid regime. On an individual level there is the 'blacklist' operating in sport and culture. At the level of states, individual African states such as Nigeria have in the past, taken action against British companies. On a more general level, the United States has lost considerable diplomatic ground in the African continent as a result of constructive engagement.

The current loans crisis is a dramatic illustration of the interaction between the international and the domestic with regard to SA. Because there is pressure not to associate with the apartheid regime and also a relative lack of confidence in its capacity to survive, it has relied mainly on short-term loans. Because of this pressure on the regime and increasing lack of confidence in its ability to resolve the crisis, we have seen that foreign banks are now refusing to roll over the loans.

This international isolation has in turn been exacerbated by acts of bad faith on the part of the regime:

- the refusal to return alleged arms smugglers to the UK during the Consulate affair
- the breach of the diplomatic status of the Netherlands embassy with regard to de Jonge's arrest
- failure to fulfil the Nkomati Accord in good faith
- reneging on the loans
- attack on Cabinda oil refineries (in fact an attack on U.S. interests)

These acts do not emanate so much from dishonesty as from divergence in interests. They are, we think, symptomatic of the fact that SA as a sub-imperialist power does not have identical interests with the U.S and other big imperialists in certain respects. SA's 'need' to assault the Frontline states, for example, is incompatible with the UK's relations with Lesotho and Botswana, as members of the Commonwealth. SA's need to destabilise Angola is incompatible in some respects with US oil interests.

Ideological crisis

If apartheid is to rule without force or with less repression than has been its characteristic mode, it needs to secure ideological hegemony not only over whites but also blacks. As part of this process it has also sought to coopt sections of the black community as active collaborators in its machinery.

This process has collapsed and even some of the most hardened sell-outs are resigning from their posts or hedging their bets. We have referred to Steve Kgame's call for the release of Nelson Mandela and a guarantee of political rights at all levels of government. Even Buthelezi refused to meet Botha during his tour of the bantustans and Sebe attacked his 'rubicon' speech.

The black middle class seems to have been lost to the racists for the moment. NAFCOC has called for the release of Nelson Mandela and other demands, unacceptable to the regime, have been made.

Even TUCSA is again revealing a degree of independence. Mr Robbie Botha, reelected president, made an urgent appeal to the government to realise the seriousness of the situation and immediately make known its intentions on reform.

A very significant and unprecedented development has been the recent resignation of two coloured magistrates and the expected resignation of a prosecutor from the Athlone court. This is reported to have been as a result of community pressure. From their statements, these people hardly seem to have been highly politicised. But the level of political conflict made it impossible to resist social pressures to distance themselves from the apartheid machinery. Insofar as the courts have tended to be less affected by such pressures in the past, this trend must be alarming to the enemy

The meeting between sections of capital and the ANC is significant. It means that capital sees the state as unable to solve the crisis. This breach in the NP/capital alliance has been further exacerbated by PW's attack on the venture, implying their disloyalty in succumbing to 'communist tactics'.

The fact that Botha is forced to attack them in the press suggests that there is much less informal contact than previously. It also signifies that it is a much more independent initiative than we might have thought. In some senses, when newspapers said that PW knew about it they were protecting him - suggesting that all of this was under his sway. Now he says: no it is not - testifying to the extent of the breach

There appear, in addition, to be continual tensions within the NP. There are reports of differences between Ministers which constantly recur. This is in fact symptomatic of the conflict over what direction they are to take - towards accommodating what is their traditional base, or to move towards a more white centrist position - with PFP and capital, possibly including cooption of sections of the black community

Illustrating this inability to carry out a coherent programme is the fact that after PW's 'rubicon' speech, Pik Botha briefed EEC delegates in a considerably more 'reformist' vein, indicating that the NP had made errors in the past etc. What is significant is that this had to be done semi-covertly in a very low key way, that the rank and file of the NP is not treated to similar reflections.

Such speeches have to be given through the back door. The international community still has to be addressed separately from the NP rank and file. In a sense, this exacerbates the problems - continues to create international expectations which will be difficult to implement locally

But there is a lack of cohesion and confidence in the white community generally. A dramatic illustration of this is that the Australian Embassy had 17000 applications for emigration in the first week after PW's speech. The fact that newspapers have articles on how to get your second passport also indicates that there is not a sense, amongst whites, that they believe in what they are fighting for and are going to stay and fight for it.

The NP have themselves declared that apartheid is morally unjustifiable and many of the churches have declared it to be a heresy. This has created a considerable psychological crisis within Afrikanerdom. By themselves declaring it immoral they have created space for people to say: well what have you actually done to remove it? In addition, acts like the Uitenhage massacre have created a moral crisis similar to that in Israel after the Lebanon massacre. Along with this must be seen the desertions from the

SADF and continual allegations of atrocities. People know that all these reports cannot be fabricated. They find it hard to stomach and ask for what all of this is being done.

All the kite flying from verligtes in the Afrikaner community as well as from other sections of the white population, all sorts of crackpot schemes for political solutions, are also symptomatic of this moral disarray.

The PFP is exacerbating the disarray by 'stabbing the government in the back': While they put down the rising, the PFP then calls for Commissions of Inquiry. (This sort of thing indirectly fuels anti-conscription campaigns. The basic NP goal is to put down the rising, whatever the cost, and this is undermined by the PFP)

In addition, while the NP is paralysed the PFP is promoting alternatives to what the government is doing. This is especially significant now because, in the light of the government's paralysis, they achieve an artificial prominence. Because the government is coming out with nothing there is more attention than usual paid to the PFP and their alternatives

The people and the enemy

At this point it is necessary to investigate what effects the crisis and the level of mass mobilisation have on the two major forces in our society: the people and the enemy. The line between the people and the enemy is not a static one and different groups and individuals are drawn into different camps at different points in time

All whites have an objective interest in the maintenance of apartheid and all blacks an interest in its destruction. This fact leads us to distinguish between the ruling bloc which is made up of an alliance of white capital, petty bourgeoisie and working class elements and the oppressed black majority, all of whom suffer under apartheid.

While all whites may have an objective interest in the maintenance of apartheid, there are progressive whites who have joined the people. Similarly there are black collaborators who have joined the enemy camp.

the people's camp is made up of all democratic organisations, groups and individuals, including progressive whites- all who are sympathisers and members of organisations struggling to end apartheid and create a democratic society.

The enemy camp is made up of all those organisations and individuals who support apartheid, including collaborators. Those groupings operating in the state and other collaborationist institutions. The enemy camp is not a monolith. All members of the enemy camp have an interest in maintaining the subjugation of the majority and achieves a substantial measure of co-operation in securing this. There are nevertheless important areas of difference within this camp (and indeed within the ruling bloc) on how best to achieve this.

for example while the Nationalist Party believes that intensified repression is the best way to maintain white rule, sections of capital believe negotiations with the ANC may be the best way to preserve their business interests.

While the enemy seeks to achieve maximum cohesion and the highest degree of organisation of its camp, it constantly seeks to disorganise the people and disrupt the strategy and tactics of their organisations.

Our task in relation to the enemy camp is to frustrate their attempts at achieving unity and cohesion. We try to intensify divisions within the enemy camp and to transform temporary differences into permanent divisions. At the present time, while we realise that capital will never be part of the people's camp, our aim is to neutralise as many of the enemy's allies as possible. In so doing we dislocate their unifying project.

In regard to the dividing line between the people and the enemy, how do we relate to the PFP and Inkatha? In the past the PFP wavered between the enemy and the people's camp. While it operated in apartheid institutions, it opposed many of the enemies' actions. The PFP's recent decision to contest the people's clearly expressed will, by contesting elections in the coloured and Indian areas, and the inclusion of discredited puppets such as Dinky Pillay on its executive, its opportunist call to form a national convention alliance, are steps that place it more firmly within the enemy camp.

In the case of Inkatha, ten years ago this organisation was part of the people's camp. The attacks which Inkatha has launched on our people and our organisations made clear that it is aligning itself with the enemy.

the way we characterise any organisation or individual may not be valid for all time. Depending on their actions at a particular moment, we may or may not be compelled to reevaluate where we have located them.

What Are Our Tasks In This Situation?

a. Isolate the enemy

In the first place, as always, our job is to isolate the enemy. While this is a 'traditional' task we are now concerned with something more elaborate than undertaken in the anti-constitution campaigns. There we frustrated attempts to coopt significant sectors of the Indian and coloured communities, just as the rejection of the BLAs ensured that only puppets would staff those structures.

Now we are speaking of something broader. We have noted the rupture between capital and the NP. We want to maintain that split. But that does not mean that we draw capital into the camp of the people.

While we continue our established projects with regard to the oppressed communities- calling on puppets to resign, we are now focusing in a much more substantial way on the camp of the enemy. This has always been part of our plans in theory, but in fact the way in which the cleavage between capital and the NP has developed, presents this as a much more realistic possibility now than previously.

Our main goal must be to ensure that the alliance between capital and the NP never gets reestablished.

How do we intervene to achieve this? One of the ways that we do this is to ensure that they have no illusions about puppet solutions, eg every time

we reject PW Botha's offers -it actually energises business to come up with their own vision and that again exacerbates the split. The fact that business has met with the ANC is partly a result of popular rejection of government initiatives. In a sense, every time that we reject a government initiative, we are further exacerbating the cleavage between them and capital.

b. Strengthen the camp of the People by strengthening the basis of their organisation

In this situation we also need to strengthen the camp of the people and this means both quantitative and qualitative strengthening. We need to bring more people into our ranks but in a more disciplined way. It is also a qualitative step in the sense that we need to concentrate on particular sectors. If, for example, we have thousands of petit-bourgeoisie and very few workers, that qualitatively affects our capacity to struggle in the way we would like.

Leadership and accountability

One thing that we must be careful about in this connection is that our organisations do not become too closely associated with individuals, that we do not allow the development of personality cults. We need to understand why we regard people as leaders and to articulate these reasons. Where people do not measure up to these standards they must be brought to heel - no matter how charismatic they may be.

No person is a leader in a democratic struggle such as ours, simply because he or she makes good speeches. Those speeches are good if they are able to reflect people's aspirations.

We are not interested in good ideas or interventions or proposals for their own sake. A suggestion that arises after democratic discussion is one that we support. A decision made with people's consent is one we will recognise. No individual may make proposals on the people's behalf - unless mandated by them. No person can be a leader who acts without such a mandate, without a sense of responsibility and accountability to the people through their organisations

We need to say these things because there are some people and interests who are trying to project individuals as substitutes for political movements. We need to be very wary of this, especially now when we face the possibility or prospect of banning. If we were to consist of a few individuals what would exist after the banning?

When we say that someone is a leader we therefore mean someone who stands in a particular relationship to the people through their organisations. When we call someone a people's leader, we mean that they feel that responsibility to the people.

No human being is infallible. Business, the state and the imperialists are engaged in a concerted attempt to coopt leaders as opposed to organisations and the people. The only guarantee against cooption is people's power and accountability.

Extending the camp of the people

We need also to pay particular attention to how we extend the camp of the people. We will refer to our weaknesses in regard to women and trade unions. These sectors have been neglected. We also need to pay more attention

to the Church. Millions of South Africans are Christians -members of the Anglican, Roman Catholic and other established churches, but especially of the African independent churches. We need to be where the people are, to understand their situation better.

Neither the established nor the independent churches are monoliths. There is considerable difference between the clergy (though many of these are progressive) and the rank and file. We must find ways of developing cooperation with all levels within all sectors of the Church

In regard to struggles in the communities, we need to give special attention to the way in which adults can be drawn into the democratic movement. We do not know to what extent civics are in a position to continue now. But we need to find additional means of drawing older members of the community into our struggles. Where they have been involved- as in Port Alfred -important local victories have been achieved (e.g. withdrawal of the SADF)

We need, in addition, to talk more seriously to our youth about discipline. While we value their militancy, this has tended too frequently to be manifested in force against older members of the community. During the consumer boycotts older people have been forced to drink washing powder, cooking oil etc, sometimes with fatal consequences.

Some of these people simply do not understand the consumer boycott. They are not part of the enemy ranks. It is not our job to punish them. We should patiently explain our campaigns. We cannot use terror as a substitute for such explanations!

We will be dealing with the need to pay more attention to rural areas and it is consequently crucial that we now carefully address the land question and start incorporating appropriate demands into our struggles.

On a more specifically quantitative level we need to supplement our ranks by drawing rank-and-file members, who are misled into supporting such organisations as Inkatha, PFP and TUCSA

We need to continue to retain the support of black businesspeople and professionals. In regard to professionals, more attention needs to be paid to the democratic organisation of lawyers, doctors, teachers and academics.

How do we strengthen the camp of the people?

At the beginning of the year we formulated the theme: From Protest to Challenge, From Mobilisation to Organisation. How is it affected by the emergency?

This theme was initiated in order to take the struggle for democracy to a higher level. We called for a move from mobilisation to organisation- not because we underestimated the significance of what had been achieved. We formulated this theme because we had no illusions as to our actual strength, as to the possibilities of future development.

As part of it, we stressed the need to increase discipline in our ranks. We were aware that if we wanted to direct mass activity more effectively, if we wanted to keep the enemy on the run, then we needed to become a disciplined corps

We needed to be frank about our weaknesses. We could not be sure of our capacity to sustain mass mobilisation. Mass activity was inadequately coordinated on both national and regional levels. Mobilisation could not be an end in itself

What is the impact of the state of emergency on this thinking? The theme stressed what we saw as the crucial goals of the time? Are they now null and void? Have our goals changed because they have locked up thousands of people and sjambokked many more?

The state of emergency is a strategy for the eradication of our organisations. It is being used to try and wipe out our existence. In such a situation, the development of organisation is an even more urgent priority.

The need to build, extend and consolidate organisation is even greater under the emergency. The need to build discipline is greater than before.

How should we respond to the emergency?

Having said that, let us have no illusions: the state of emergency is a setback. There may be some intellectuals who see value in repression -because vicious acts 'unmask' the enemy. (In fact the people have never had such illusions about the enemy's vicious character, since they experience it daily) There is another brand of left lunacy which thinks that the greater the repression the more symptomatic it is of 'death agonies' and the closer we are to radical transformation.

Our view is that state repression and particularly the narrowing of the space within which we can operate is a serious problem and obstacle. We need the broadest possible space and opportunities to build ourselves.

It is a setback but not a paralysing setback. The immediate effect, we know, was to lower morale and breed a spirit of defeatism in the minds of many people. This repression has also given new space for opportunist interventions - people and groupings who hoped to step into a vacuum left by what they thought would be our smashing

There is no doubt that we should expect our ranks to be depleted. When risks are higher there are obviously fewer people willing to take these risks. But this process is itself one that steels those who remain, who become better prepared for the more difficult conditions under which we now must work

The setback also evokes other responses. One is to do nothing. From the correct conclusion that open public activities should be undertaken with caution, some activists conclude that the dangers of activity in general are so great that we should simply sit back and do nothing.

The opposite response also operates from a correct premise: that we should not give up our right to exist, that we should not abandon the front of legal democratic activity. But this tendency then concludes, wrongly, that we must carry on as before. The alternative, they argue, is to surrender and breed defeatism.

Our view is that we must not give up our space, we must continue to assert our right to exist as a legal democratic movement. At the same time, the manner in which we do this must be with sufficient responsibility to avoid needless arrests and weakening of our structures.

Deepen organisation

Returning to the theme: From Mobilisation to Organisation, the fact that we cannot conduct this process in the old way, does not mean that we cannot do it at all. One of the qualities that is required of us in the period that lies ahead, is the development of a capacity to adapt more quickly and substantially to new conditions. To achieve this means we must be highly organised and disciplined. We find the theme still applicable -but in a manner adapted to the new conditions.

We need to understand what the changed conditions are. But this is not itself a static thing. The way we understand it, the extent and manner of our resistance, help determine these conditions. We have the power not only to understand but also to change the conditions within which we operate.

What makes this period qualitatively different from that before the State of Emergency, is that our survival itself is in doubt. Before we can do anything else we need to remove that doubt and survive in as large and disciplined numbers as possible.

Our mode of ensuring our survival must be responsible. Some people incorrectly see this period as the final battle. Mass militancy is seen as an immediate prelude to people's power. Alternatively, if this power is not taken, they see it as the final battle where we will be smashed.

We may be defeated now, but we must be able to fight another day. We must emerge from this period, not as invalids, but ready to continue the struggle in the most effective way possible.

The fact that the state is in crisis should not breed illusions as to our subjective strength. If we were not in a position to move from mobilisation to organisation immediately before the emergency, certainly we are not sufficiently organised to take power now.

Nevertheless the conditions that we now encounter, may help us to move closer to the achievement of these goals. Our survival makes it more urgent. Certainly we may be able to achieve higher levels of organisation and discipline amongst our advanced activists, whose ranks we must continually expand.

Survival means developing new skills

The way that we preserve our organisations now is not a static process. It is not just a question of rescuing files and evading arrest. Our members cannot wait while leaders hide. It means that whole organisations must be adapted to existence in the new period.

This is not just a question of new venues for smaller meetings, but the development of new skills. If we confront the enemy now, we need to be equipped differently and better than previously. We need more highly developed cadres. If we achieve this, we not only continue to exist but we continue the process of taking the struggle to a higher level.

The creation of advanced activists is a constant process especially now. This is a context when the need for close contact with and between these activists on a responsible basis is greater than ever before. (Yet such contact may have to be on a less centralised basis in order to reduce the possibilities of repression.)

New forms of organisation

This period requires new forms of organisation. We obviously concentrate less on high profile, public activities than in the past. This is not a rule - it may be varied depending on local conditions and the particular organisations concerned. In areas where there is no formal emergency, the possibility of such open activity may sometimes be greater. While the emergency operates de facto in the Northern Cape, OFS and Northern Transvaal, in some places such as Natal and the Western Cape, despite extensive repression, public meetings are still sometimes possible.

When we say that we must adopt less public, high profile activities this is not to concede the withdrawal of our right of legal existence. But, while we continue to assert our right, we need to organise in a manner more compatible with the present situation where the state repressive apparatuses are trying to achieve a de facto banning of the UDF and most of its affiliates - a SWAPO type situation

When we speak of moving towards a greater decentralisation of our activities, this does not mean that we undertake small-scale activities only. We may decentralise but this should be purely because, in given circumstances, it is a more effective way of mass organisation and mobilisation. Especially in these difficult times, we have a responsibility to influence and direct mass energies in a constructive direction. We need to ensure that our activists inject continuing and developing political content into popular resistance. Unless we do this there is a danger of people seeing the struggle, as it tends to be in some areas, as taking a primarily militaristic struggle.

We need to widen the geographic area within which we organise and wage our struggle. In regard to the rural areas, the new forms of organisation may well be more compatible with achieving our political goals than our previous approach. High profile public activities are obviously futile in the bantustans

It is crucial that we take steps to develop rural organisation. Unless we do this our struggle will never be truly national. It will also affect its democratic content, since the neglect of the rural areas is the neglect of African majority involvement.

But when we speak of widening the geographical area of struggle, we also need to make it a coordinated national struggle. It must be a struggle operating right round SA at the same time. Isolated resistance here and there is easier to suppress.

We need also to broaden and deepen our organisation in certain sectors of our struggle. Our organisation of women remains inadequate. Our attitude to the place of women in the national struggle tends to remain on the level of assertion of its importance. We have not taken the steps to realize our commitment. We do not seem to have taken this issue sufficiently seriously yet.

We need to understand the objective significance of women in the struggle. We need to deepen our own discipline in our relations between men and women. One thing must be guarded against: the new dangers that we now face cannot be used as a means of submerging these issues. We still have to face up to the problems of women's issues and no amount of repression can absolve us of that responsibility

We need to take more substantial steps to appreciate the role of women as a specific category within the struggle. We need a broader understanding of the disabilities that impede their participation

The extent to which we overcome this weakness, the extent to which women are in fact constructively involved, will determine the progressive content of the struggle. If we tackle this issue properly, we strengthen ourselves immeasurably.

We need also to strengthen our involvement in the unions and their struggles. In the first place this means the strengthening of UDF unions. We need to integrate their demands and needs more fully into the broader democratic struggle.

We need also to continue our support work with unions outside of our ranks, as has happened during the NUM strike. There is no reason why we should wait for our assistance to be sought. Wherever there is a strike we should offer some form of assistance. This should not only be for big strikes. Our job is to be able to respond to all the questions affecting the lives of the people -big and small

As stressed earlier, we need also to deepen our discipline -and this includes our ideological development. At this phase any lack of discipline can have consequences which are much more serious than when the conditions of struggle were easier. Lack of punctuality and other forms of irresponsibility no longer lead to inefficiency alone, but can have disastrous practical consequences for the very existence of organisations.

When we surge forward, people's morale tends to be high. We know that whenever our movement takes a knock, people tend to despair

This emergency, we know, has affected people's morale. Yet the state of emergency also presents us with opportunities. To deal with it requires ideological development. Morale is not just a question of emotions. It is also a problem of understanding. A disciplined person cannot be allowed to neglect his or her political development.

This period might provide opportunities to develop ourselves ideologically. This is something that has been neglected in recent years. It has been easy to join the democratic movement. Very often what has been most significant has been the shouting of slogans and singing of songs. No longer can we get by with slogans. To stay with us requires a commitment. We need to deepen moral commitment into a political understanding that can survive temporary defeats

What Does The Enemy Aim to Achieve By Using the State of Emergency?

The broad aim of the emergency is to reverse the gains made by the democratic movement over the last eighteen months, to resuscitate discredited leaders and to re-create the space for puppet solutions and structures. The regime realises that only by crushing the uprising can it hope to win a measure of consent and collaboration in the revival of apartheid structures. At present the power of popular anger has been so strong that even puppet leaders have been forced to distance themselves from the government.

Smashing of the people's organisations

Different sections of the enemy camp have different intentions as regards the smashing of the people's organisations. In the case of the Nationalist Party and Inkatha the intention is to completely wipe out democratic organisation. With regard to COSAS, this has taken the form of outright banning. This strategy could still be applied to UDF. In the case of other democratic

organisations, the option may be to allow the organisations to continue in name, but to ban their activities in practice. This policy has different aspects: the mass detention of activists, the harassment and murder of UDF activists in Natal by Inkatha impis. An analogy can be drawn with the way in which the South African regime has dealt with SWAPO in Namibia. While the organisation is not formally banned, it cannot operate freely and openly. The banning and disruption of meetings, confiscation of literature, all aim to prevent effective, open organisation.

In the case of the PFP and sections of capital, the attempt appears not to be to smash organisation, but to emasculate them. This strategy is aimed at a long-term cooption of both the leaders of these organisations and of their programmes. (See discussion of 'Power sharing' below)

Smashing the uprising

The second aim of the enemy is to smash the uprising in the townships. Under the guise of maintaining law and order and the protection of private property, all sections of the enemy camp support this objective of the emergency. What this means, in practice, is the constant occupation of the townships by the police and the SADF and a war of terror on the entire township population. The youth have borne the brunt of this, although it affects all residents.

The brutality of the repression, coupled with the fact that this option does not seem to be succeeding in stopping the uprising, (it is in fact spreading to areas previously untouched,) has led the PFP and to some extent capital and imperialists, to question this method.

What are the enemy's options?

When we consider the enemy options in the period ahead, we will see that they share certain aims, while there remain distinctions between them. This is especially true of the NP on the one hand, and the PFP/capital/ and imperialism on the other. In addition, these options cannot simply be implemented even where the enemy forces secure agreement amongst themselves. Their implementation is conditional on the degree of people's resistance. What happens, in fact, as a result of popular resistance, is that there is a great deal of vacillation on the part of the enemy forces. As one initiative after another is rejected, enemy aims tend to be modified.

What is fundamental and common to all of these forces is that they seek a solution over the heads of the people, one that excludes the masses. The form that this takes, is however variable, with some differences of approach between the different segments of the enemy camp

In order to achieve any such solution, certain conditions have to be established. Even the way that these conditions are set out now, we will see, have been moderated as a result of people's resistance. The first such shared aim is that the rising must be smashed. Nevertheless, as a result of the extent of resistance displayed, the degree to which non-NP forces have associated themselves with this aim has been moderated.

The second aim is to smash or emasculate the democratic organisations. While the NP moves for the former, we have seen that the PFP/capital/ the United States and imperialism generally, appear willing to deal with a wider range of popular forces, including the ANC so long as these organisations are emasculated (so long as they no longer in fact remain popular)

The fundamental ideological concepts used to mobilise people behind the type of solution favoured by the enemy camp as a whole is 'power sharing'. Although the form in which it is applied, will vary, it is a conception shared by the entire camp. The concept of 'power sharing' is counterposed, by its supporters, both to white minority rule and universal suffrage in a united South Africa.

'Power Sharing'

'Power sharing' is clearly intended as a mode of evolutionary change. It suggests sharing what exists. The existing cake should be more equitably divided. Some who were not invited to taste the fruits of power should be allowed at the table to eat, or at least to nibble. This is a revival of what SPROCAS called a 'taste of power' more than a decade ago

Power sharing is essentially political change at the top- the range of people involved in decision-making would be widened. The extent to which individuals may be brought into this process would depend on the constituency that they can command and control or are thought to be able to do.

This is related to the concept of 'consociationalism' on which the new constitution is based - a view of politics shared by all of these groupings. It is what they mean when they speak of the 'politics of negotiation', 'consensus politics' etc.

This conception of politics operates through 'leadership figures' negotiating deals. Politics is no longer determined by majorities, 'winner takes all' etc, but in the allegedly more constructive atmosphere of committee rooms.

Not anyone can be a participant in this process. For the system ^{to} operate effectively, every leader should be able to 'deliver' a constituency. Thus Hendrikse was brought in to 'deliver' the coloureds, Rajbansi the Indians and so on.

This is a form of politics in which the masses play little or no part. 'Leaders' deal on their behalf. That is precisely one of its attractions for the 'reformers' and one of the ways of safeguarding what are called group rights.

The differences between the various sections of the enemy camp with the NP is not over the fact of negotiation over the heads of the masses, but over who should be included in the negotiation process. While the NP are generally not keen to enlarge the range of negotiating parties, certainly within the central political system, other groupings argue that this system will only be viable if others are included. Its present instability, they would argue, is that it involves negotiation with too narrow a range of people. This means there are a huge mass of people whose leaders are not representing them in negotiations (and hence, as a quid pro quo, are not necessarily controlling them adequately).

Within this group of 'reformers' there are some who call for Mandela's release and his inclusion in the negotiations. This is not intended to be on terms that he or the ANC have treated as being acceptable.

The negotiations are intended to be with Nelson Mandela the man- not as a representative of an organisation to which he is responsible. Whereas he has indicated that negotiations could only be with regard to dismantling apartheid, such 'preconceptions' would hinder the negotiating process and make him an unsuitable partner as far as some are concerned. In supporting the Slabbert/Buthelezi call for a National Convention Alliance, one writer argued in the Star of 06.09.85:

'The less non-negotiables brought to the conference table the more successful negotiation is likely to be, for non-negotiables could scuttle the process before it is even begun....'

While vague Declarations of Intent are the order of the day, the final result of such a process, it is said cannot be prejudged. They argue that one cannot, for example, assume universal suffrage as a desirable or necessary end. Because he has demonstrated the necessary 'generosity' and 'flexibility' someone like Buthelezi has considerable appeal in some circles, as a partner in such a process. The Sunday Times explains in an editorial of 11.08.85:

'In sharp contrast to the sloganeers of violence, the KwaZulu Chief Minister has never demanded more than should be given, but, despite extreme pressure from the radicals, has skilfully practised the art of the possible, tailoring his demands to the realities of white fears.'

In the same issue, Ken Owen elaborates. He acknowledges 'a sense - no more than intuition - that Inkatha may be fraying at the edges.' Having said that, he indicates what he sees as the advantages and indeed urgency of dealing with Buthelezi:

'The political advantages of accepting Buthelezi's offer (to negotiate) - it is accompanied by the promise to shelve the question of one man, one vote in a unitary state - holds immense political advantages for President Botha....'

'It would widen Buthelezi's political base, enhance his stature against the revolutionaries that lead the struggle against apartheid elsewhere, relieve foreign pressure, enlist a powerful ally for capitalism and the free market, probably stimulate economic growth in Natal, draw on Inkatha's immense resources to protect law and order in the province, train a black elite in the art of government, forge interracial alliances, and much, much else.'

Central to the 'politics of negotiation' outside of the NP is the conception of the extension of civil rights. This much should have been implicit in our earlier discussion of power sharing. But it is worth spelling out that a national liberation struggle is revolutionary precisely because it does not seek to be 'accommodated' or to merely have rights extended to it. It is a call for the People to Govern - not to share power as if the majority were equals of a minority

The question of 'negotiation' has become a pressing one during the emergency precisely because of the patent incapacity of the existing negotiating partners to command/control more than a trifling portion of the population.

Clearly those ^{political groupings and} sections of capital who support Buthelezi's claims consider it especially urgent, for the additional reason that his being drawn into a system of negotiation, could give him the sort of power, they hope, that would arrest the process of his loss of support and ensure broader stability

The differences within the 'reformist' groupings ^{to some extent} account for their preference for one or other negotiating partner - Buthelezi as opposed to Mandela for instance

The preoccupation with the future of capital, which may be compatible with 'political shells' other than the present system, can account for the divergences between the NP and capital and also between the NP and various U.S administrations (although this is less true of the present Reagan administration which seems willing to go along with most of the NP's conceptions)

But these tendencies and choices are not determined solely by interests peculiar to particular sectors. Capital and the NP have overall orientations that are mediated by a number of factors outside and inside the country. The internal struggle against apartheid, the legal democratic struggle, the international and armed struggle are important factors whose strength or weakness at any particular moment will determine what is negotiable and with whom.

The emergency, we have argued, is an attempt to use armed force to check the legal democratic movement and thus facilitate 'negotiation' with partners of the regime's choice, or at any rate not of the people's choice and not on an agenda of their choice.

The expected smashing of the UDF and its affiliates led many newspapers to present SA's political spectrum in a fresh light, with the democratic movement figuring as 'dissidents' - representing a minority view - against the 'politics of consensus'

'Power Sharing' today

What is happening now is that the NP is afraid to widen its range of negotiating partners. Attempts to do so may further fracture the ruling alliance. But failure to do so may in turn cause a further cleavage between itself and capital. This explains the current NP paralysis. That is why business has embarked on so many political initiatives. Unlike 1976, capital is now making much more substantial and broad political initiatives.

In general, this period sees a number of fresh initiatives aimed at ending conflict. Yet all of these initiatives from the enemy camp seek a peace without majority rule. In fact this would be a recipe for further conflict.

We need to be quite clear as to our reasons for rejecting such initiatives. We seek peace and are prepared to discuss how to achieve it. We also cannot reject negotiations on principle, for all times and places. The question is under what conditions people negotiate (i.e. have our preconditions been met - i.e. release of all political prisoners, unconditional withdrawal of charges against all anti-apartheid activists, return of exiles, unbanning of banned organisations, dissolution of bantustans, abrogation of all apartheid laws, etc). We also ask: who is negotiating and on what basis? Is the leader of a minority party or a puppet to be treated as the equal of a huge popular movement as happened at Lancaster House?

Finally, not everything is negotiable. In fact we can only negotiate a narrow range of questions. We are not prepared, as the Western Cape UDF recently stated, to treat our preconditions as bargaining chips. Nor are fundamental principles such as universal suffrage in a united, democratic SA. The only question to discuss is the immediate dismantling of all apartheid structure and the creation of a democratic SA. That is our plan for peace.

Conclusions

The state and within it, the NP, is more isolated than it has ever been, much more than during the anti-constitution campaign. What we are seeing now is not only a paralysis and loss of confidence on the part of the NP, but an undermining of the link with previous allies and collaborators. Giliomee has argued that, as happened after the Anglo-boer war, the possibilities of cooption have been reduced rather than increased by the state of emergency.

The future

We have identified certain priorities for the future:

In the first place, while we continue to struggle against the programmes of the PFP and capital, we must not drive them back into the arms of the NP

We must keep the enemy sufficiently disorganised to provide us with the opportunity to rebuild, regroup and reinforce ourselves.

We noted that , before the state of emergency, we were surging forward. We must retain the initiative. It is imperative that we heighten the level of our propagandistic interventions. Through these we are capable of having considerable impact. It must be used while we build our organisations in a manner best suited to the current conditons -thus enabling us to continue the struggle and prepare for a more concerted challenge

